Drugs and Conflict Prevention in Afghanistan

Transcription

1 Drugs and Conflict Prevention in Afghanistan Workshop report June 2016 Prepared by The IISS Security and Development Programme Supported by The Open Society Foundations (OSF)

2 Drugs and Conflict Prevention in Afghanistan On Thursday 26 May 2016, The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) hosted a daylong, high-level workshop on Drugs and Conflict Prevention in Afghanistan. The event was held at IISS Middle East in Manama, Kingdom of Bahrain. The objective of the initiative was to bring together officials and experts from Afghanistan and other relevant countries to reflect on the United Nations General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) on drugs 2016 deliberations and their relevance for Afghanistan; encourage the integration of drug policy into mainstream policy discussion in and about the country; and promote cross-departmental and multidisciplinary approaches. For these reasons, participants were encouraged to offer policy-relevant suggestions and use concrete examples. The entire discussion was conducted on a non-attributable basis to facilitate the frank exchange of views. The agenda was designed around five sessions, each introduced by presentations by both Afghan government officials and experts, and the intervention of a discussant. A food-for-thought paper had been prepared and distributed ahead of the high-level workshop. Its text is annexed to this report. Drugs and Conflict Prevention in Afghanistan 2

3 Key points There is now greater understanding in Afghanistan of the causal relationship among terrorism, drugs trade, and conflict. This link prevents a peace agreement. There is a need for shifting the balance from counternarcotics and law enforcement to focusing on the health and economic well-being of people, i.e. through a public health approach that includes more discussion, awareness, prevention, and treatment; and a vigorous programme of economic livelihoods to replace poppy cultivation. Afghanistan needs markets for its traditional crops. Besides the nature of reforms, it is fundamental to clearly design their sequencing and measures of success. Lessons from other countries are useful, but solutions need to be designed by Afghans taking account of cultural sensitivities. Be creative: it should be possible to donate seized poppies to those countries that process them for medical use and help the 8.5 billion people around the world who currently do not have access to painkillers. An internationally financed regional opium bank could also be an option. UNGASS 2016 perpetuated the traditional attitude of the global north trying to control the global south, i.e. prioritising approaches aimed at stopping illicit drugs from reaching the West. Such attitudes within UN circles need to be reshaped. The international community is preoccupied with other challenges in spite of Afghanistan s worsening security situation. This is also exemplified by the different treatment received by Afghan migrants compared with Syrians when trying to reach the European Union. There is a need for more impetus by regional cooperation organisations, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), in tackling narcotics trafficking. Corruption at all levels continues to pose a serious obstacle. Importantly, the justice system needs to be depoliticised and decriminalised to help dismantle criminal networks and tackle the problem of corruption. It is crucial to change incentives for development agencies, for instance by financing the mainstreaming of counternarcotics in development projects aimed at re-building local economies and incorporating change at the strategic level. In the face of ever-growing capital flight to Persian Gulf countries, repatriating funds to Afghanistan could become an important source of investment and economic growth. Interventions are usually borne out of crisis situations. It does not have to be like that: prevention, including through the implementation of innovative policy approaches, should become a priority. Drugs and Conflict Prevention in Afghanistan 3

4 Session 1: Reflections on UNGASS 2016 On April 2016, the United Nations General Assembly hosted a Special Session on drugs (UNGASS 2016) long awaited and the first of its kind in nearly two decades. Given its relevance to the theme of the workshop it was deemed worthwhile to reflect on the significance of this historical event for the drug policy debate in general and for Afghanistan specifically. In recent years discussions around drug policy had evolved significantly and a number of countries had adopted less punitive approaches geared towards harm reduction, decriminalisation, and alternative penalties. Colombia, Mexico, and Guatemala have been key players in this debate highlighting how the current drugcontrol regime was incompatible with the needs of countries at the forefront of the drug problem. As part of these efforts they called for bringing UNGASS forward from the originally agreed 2019 date. Others, however, have remained in favour of traditional, prohibition-driven approaches in the context of what is described as the war on drugs. It became clear in the course of the discussion that UNGASS 2016 had been a disappointing experience for those hoping for change at the UN level. Indeed, it was apparent that nation states were the ones in the position to promote progress towards less repressive strategies. Scanning the international scene it was noted that several countries had already decided to put the well-being of their citizens before the diplomatic challenges that they would likely face if attempting to undermine the existing international conventions on drugs. 1 Among the cited examples was Switzerland, where more than 2,000 people received heroin from state-funded clinics following a quick response by the government of then-president Ruth Dreifuss in the 1990s. This approach had been prompted by the realisation that having people injecting drugs on Swiss streets had a significant social impact and was seriously damaging for Switzerland s image. As a result, the country was capable to quickly contain an HIV epidemic. In the Netherlands, the introduction of coffee shops legally selling cannabis to adults was aimed at separating cannabis from all other drugs which would continue to be criminalised. Nowadays, the country has lower drug consumption rates than its neighbours. In Bolivia, the third-largest producer of coca/cocaine in the world, anyone with a family tradition of growing coca was allowed to have a plot of land to do so. In India, opium addicts were allowed to buy poppy straw to brew opium tea known for preventing withdrawal symptoms. These cases among many other examples including from Portugal, Uruguay, Peru, and Laos were discussed at the outset of the workshop not with the goal of suggesting that Afghanistan should adopt similar approaches but instead to Single Convention on Narcotic Substances; 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances; 1988 UN Convention on Illicit Trafficking of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.

5 illustrate that alternative measures were possible and countries could use tailormade approaches that best suited local circumstances. Moreover, as one participant stressed, too often plans such as for eradication had been designed in Kabul, London, or Washington rather than in the most affected Afghan provinces (Helmand, Kandahar, and Badakhshan), therefore failing to take into account the reality on the ground. Yet, it had to be conceded that the social taboo associated with narcotics had long prevented the formulation of locally made solutions. Afghans had hoped for a more serious conversation to take place at UNGASS Members of the delegation lamented that, as often was the case, too much time was spent discussing Afghanistan s culpability vis-à-vis drug production and trade and not enough attention was paid to the drivers of the phenomena and to understanding the fact that the country was a victim rather than a perpetrator. Afghan suffering was exemplified by the interdependence of drugs and insecurity and the use of drug proceeds to fuel the insurgency which, in turn, victimised civilians. In addition, opium production had an adverse effect on the agriculture market and resulted in the neglect of licit crops. The number of drug users was also on the rise. Some participants believed that as long as there was demand for opiates internationally, Afghanistan s neighbours continued to act as transit corridors for drug traffickers, and precursors kept on flowing into Afghanistan, the country could not be expected to face and solve this major problem alone and needed additional resources to strengthen state capacity, particularly in terms of lawenforcement capabilities and the support of farmers. The discussion highlighted disagreement over the extent and effectiveness of Western support given to Afghanistan, ranging from statements such as American counternarcotics funding has been a major failure and the UK alternative livelihood programme did not make sense to experts urging colleagues to acknowledge reality and the fact that President Ghani had warned more than a decade ago that Afghanistan was becoming a narco-state. Furthermore, some claimed that Afghanistan could not afford to wait for international demand reduction. Instead, the country had to act now. Session 2: Understanding the full impact of the drugs trade on Afghanistan As session two made clear, one cannot underestimate the impact of the narcotics trade on Afghanistan as a whole. The discussion focused on three areas: public health, peace and conflict, and corruption and governance. All agreed that the impact on public health was immense, as a large proportion of the population including children were becoming drug users due to Afghanistan s position as the world s largest producer of opioids. A lack of access to treatment for drug addicts, little Drugs and Conflict Prevention in Afghanistan 5

6 public awareness about the issue, joblessness, poverty, and insecurity further contributed to a public health crisis amounting to the dismantling of Afghan society. Drugs also played an important role in fuelling the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan. As a war resource, drugs were mainly used by insurgents who did not have recourse to legal economy. This has led to a symbiotic relationship between the Taliban and narcotics traffickers, although the group has not become a pure criminal-insurgency hybrid, as seen elsewhere. The expansion of drug production in recent years was due to three factors a lack of alternatives to the opium economy, state weakness, and escalating conflict all of which fed into each other. The drawdown of Western military forces was said to be accompanied by further retreat of the state and economic development in drug-producing areas that was unlikely to be reversed. Corruption in Afghanistan has not only been exacerbated by the conflict and the drugs trade, but also has itself caused instability. Drug businesses tended to entangle all parties: it was argued that the Taliban s way to power was paved by corruption, and that criminals had infiltrated into the government, in particular in the justice sector one cause of the alleged lack of political will to tackle corruption. The insurgents, former warlords, and people connected to the previous administration were all said to continue to benefit from the drugs trade. Most of the profits, however, went to criminal groups outside Afghanistan, and regional actors were highlighted as a part of the problem. Additionally, drugtrafficking routes are being used for human trafficking. While not an impossible task, a major decline in the opium economy did not appear achievable in the near future due to the conditions needed to ensure the effectiveness of counternarcotics policy. Domestic, regional and global market conditions have to be conducive to a reduction in opium production; there has to be sufficient state capacity; and a reduction in armed conflict. Nevertheless, the discussion sparked several policy recommendations. In themselves, these highlighted the challenge of appropriately sequencing any reforms, as well as the importance of determining what would constitute success. Participants called for a reconsideration of existing, securityfocused counternarcotics strategies to take public health issues more into account. Recommendations for public health policy included improved efforts to recognise substance abuse and to help addicts. To deal with the corruption problem, the justice system needs to be depoliticised and decriminalised to help dismantle criminal networks, and the hawala money-transfer system should be regulated although formal banks also play an important role. It is clear that a multifaceted, flexible approach is needed to combat Afghanistan s drugs problem. Drugs and Conflict Prevention in Afghanistan 6

7 Session 3: Why have counternarcotic efforts produced limited results? This session narrowly focused on why previous counternarcotics policies had not been successful and how policymaking could be improved in a difficult budgetary context. There was agreement, not least among the Afghan participants, that counternarcotics in Afghanistan had been mishandled from the outset. Reforms required resolving an as-yet inconclusive debate about reapportioning efforts to tackle the wellknown supply-side challenge of production, while addressing Afghanistan s growing addiction crisis. Sharing lessons from past mistakes would put Afghanistan and its partners in good stead to regain trust. Despite the sea of corruption, the Western counternarcotics community owed it to both itself and Afghans to see the islands of integrity in the country. Some argued for a rebalance in Afghanistan s counternarcotics policy. At the national level, efforts to impede production would not break the supplyside momentum which always overwhelmed demand. Since traffickers would always find ways to push drugs to new consumers, realistic policy ought to focus on harm and risk reduction to consumers instead. It was lamented that counternarcotics no longer stood at the top of the political agenda. This affected negatively the Ministry of Counter Narcotics budget. Its resulting depleted capacity explained why efforts had become ineffective. The Ministry, formerly a directorate, had a mission to coordinate. But even before it ran into budget restrictions, it had already been operating from a low baseline: it had little implementation capacity of its own, and an authority shared with the Interior Ministry, and the ministries of Agriculture and Health. Other agencies could afford to ignore targets it set for them. Without alternative livelihoods being better integrated with counternarcotics, law-andorder approaches were the only recourse, at the risk of creating a vicious circle. In contrast to these assessments, one influential minority view among Afghans argued President Ashraf Ghani was fully dedicated to re-elevating counternarcotics as a political priority. It was mentioned that National Security Council deliberations would soon bear fruit. The newly established rehabilitation centre in Kabul (Omid Camp) dispensed care for longer. However, Afghanistan was also warned against setting too high a priority to counternarcotics, lest this would fall outside current United States (US) funding priorities. Also, the days when foreign funding was secured by stamping counterterrorism objectives onto counternarcotics missions were over. A foreign expert gave a critical assessment of the design and implementation of recent foreign-backed, Afghan- governmentowned and -led counternarcotics policy. The legacy of the United Kingdom s (UK s) policy was pretty embarrassing. More Drugs and Conflict Prevention in Afghanistan 7

8 generally, Afghanistan s foreign partners had never considered a theory of change against which to judge their efforts, leading to fixations on the what? not the why. Neither had impact studies been carried out, nor had there been a real joint elimination strategy with the Afghans. In the case of the US, accountability to Congress had created an over-reliance on the wrong metrics, including the number of cultivated hectares destroyed. Integrity and better research had to be at the heart of reformed policy. Afghan civil society and officials explicitly articulated failures of previous, mostly foreign-led counternarcotics efforts. Notably: 1) the gains of Provincial Reconstruction Teams had hardly outlast the Western troop withdrawal; 2) food zones had become a tool to pre-empt the spread of production rather than to wean off communities; 3) legal, substitution crops had too low market value (for farmers) and access (to Western export markets); 4) untimely annual UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reports had inaccurately reflected the national picture, in turn misleading policy mid-course evaluations; 5) local development-foreradication promises had not been kept; 6) eradication messages to villages lacked coherence and clarity; 7) cash compensation for eradication had, in fact, incentivised cultivation in 2003 and 2004; and 8) farmers had no storage facilities for legal fruit and vegetable crops. Afghans agreed the voice of local rural communities deserved far greater weight in policy planning. This meant acknowledging the reality that local security provision was a prerequisite to effective counternarcotics. Also, on the consumer side, it meant, for example, coming to terms with the obstruction of village mullahs to awareness programmes. But overall, this was necessary to ensure Afghans would own their counternarcotics effort. Session 4: How is the illicit economy likely to influence future development plans? The fourth session discussed the impact of illicit economies on Afghanistan s development prospects, drawing from past and current trends. Participants highlighted evidence of the damaging impact of illicit economies on social and economic progress. The spread of opium cultivation has taken a toll on legal activities, especially on agriculture. It was mentioned that Afghanistan imported much of its food because farmers were occupied with opium production, which usually earned producers higher revenues than conventional crops. This, in turn, had an impact on infrastructure since drugtrafficking groups opposed the construction of roads or bridges, which made the movement of government troops easier. The influence that non-state armed groups exerted among poor rural communities also impeded the full exploration of Afghanistan s mineral resources. Participants highlighted the case of lapis lazuli, which were smuggled out of Drugs and Conflict Prevention in Afghanistan 8

9 Afghanistan in great quantities, whereas legal exports paled in comparison. One of the reasons behind the Afghan state s difficulty in establishing its authority over some areas and sometimes even holding territorial control was the availability of ample resources for the Taliban resulting from their involvement in drug-trafficking operations. It was said that the drug-trafficking groups often had more resources, and therefore more influence among rural communities, than the Afghan state itself. Importantly, the session also hosted ample discussion on ideas and experiences regarding alternatives for development. Moving away from opium cultivation was mentioned as not only possible but also as a relatively straightforward endeavour (or not rocket science, as one participant put it). Provinces with a minimum of stability and effective governance had been able to build some infrastructure and irrigation systems. These structures, alongside access to consumer and labour markets, allowed for a more effective replacement of opium by other crops and legal economic activities. However, it was emphasised that a ban on opium cultivation was more effective in such conditions than forced eradication (a recurrent policy tried in Afghanistan and other countries of drug production, without much evidence of success). There was overall agreement that it was possible for legal economic activities to compete with illicit ones. The example of Afghan apples was cited as a potential source of revenue for the country which was currently under-exploited due to the lack of infrastructure to store the produce for longer than three months. Crops most likely to replace opium production were those that benefited from high international prices and that thrived in water-scarce environments. Wheat, often mentioned in similar discussions, was not deemed to be a feasible substitute due to its low value, its low labour intensity, and the need for large quantities of water. Additionally, it was recommended to secure transit routes for legal trading activities in the region (some work had already been carried out to this effect) and that the strengthening of infrastructure, such as securing electricity generation in the northern regions bordering Tajikistan, was key to boosting activities such as mineral extraction. The topic of capital flight was also explored during the session. Tens of billions of dollars had been diverted to capital markets in Persian Gulf countries, some of it possibly illegally. One expert pointed out that Afghan poppy traders increasingly received larger profit shares which, however, would end up in Dubai. 2 Whereas some remittances from the Gulf reached Afghanistan, the bulk would not 2 It was noted that Taliban leader Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour, killed by an American drone strike on 22 May 2016, had been one of the most corrupt among the Taliban leadership. He had managed to buy people with his wealth but was never able to gain legitimacy. The Taliban wanted drugs to be taxed to generate revenues to fund their jihad, rather than to enrich leaders wishing to buy expensive properties in Dubai. Drugs and Conflict Prevention in Afghanistan 9

10 return to and therefore benefit the country. Such funds, if returned to Afghanistan, could become an important source of investment and economic growth. Repatriating money was also more likely to have a short-term impact, it was said something quicker than trying to attract foreign direct investment to Afghanistan s war-torn economy. Closing remarks The final session was designed to pull together some key threads and conclusions following a day of intense and lively discussion. Naturally, given the history of Afghanistan, much of the discussion had made reference to eradication. Yet, it was important to be reminded of the inability of any country to successfully eradicate illicit crops at a time of conflict. Perversely, both drugs and the efforts to eradicate them strengthened conflict and there was no record of any insurgency being weakened through counternarcotics. In Afghanistan, most counternarcotics strategies, and eradication in particular, had pushed civilians towards the Taliban and terrorist groups highlighting the dichotomy between counterterrorism and counternarcotics practices and priorities, and, once again, pointing at the multidimensional victimisation from which the country is suffering. In this respect, military priorities had driven short-term development objectives the latter normally require long-term engagement and there was no balance between counternarcotics and public health or economic replacement initiatives. These mistakes should be avoided in the future. The sentiment that Westerners representing a large drug-consumer market behaved with impunity and failed to take enough responsibility for their role in driving demand and, as a result, the international drug trade, was once again stressed and was clearly widespread among Afghan delegates. Similarly, the role of regional transit countries remained problematic. In this context, the need for deeper regional cooperation had been hailed as a key prerequisite for success. Nevertheless, porous borders, widespread corruption, and high levels of insecurity continued to pose serious obstacles to closer cooperation. To date, the track record of regional cooperation has been unsatisfactory. Narcotics trade and production have been the core of the discussion but some legal economies, chiefly the exploitation of mineral resources, are also known for undermining the state, calling for a broader approach that acknowledges the role of other commodities. Drugs and Conflict Prevention in Afghanistan 10

11 ANNEX Food-for-thought paper May 2016 This paper has been produced in preparation for a high-level workshop organised by The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in Manama, Kingdom of Bahrain, on 26 May 2016 with the aim of encouraging the integration of drug policy into mainstream policy discussion, and promoting cross-departmental and multidisciplinary approaches. The conflict environment The conflict in Afghanistan took a turn for the worse in The Taliban were emboldened by the full transfer of security responsibilities to Afghan forces in October, the United Nations (UN) assessed the Taliban s presence to be more widespread than at any time since 2001 and NATO s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was folded into the Resolute Support train, advise, and assist mission, with more limited rules of engagement. Operation Freedom s Sentinel was launched as a separate United States (US) counterterrorism mission. At the same time, military operations in Pakistan s tribal areas pushed more militants into Afghanistan, and an offshoot of the so-called Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL (Wilayah Khurasan), took territory in eastern Afghanistan. At up to 15,000, conflict fatalities saw a sharp increase on The Afghan government and the Taliban held direct talks for the first time in 2015, but the peace and reconciliation process was disrupted by Taliban disunity after the group s leader Mullah Omar was confirmed dead. Recognising Afghan forces continued need for strong support, the US and other NATO allies decided to slow their withdrawal of troops is likely to see more intense fighting, and provincial centres remain at risk of falling to the Taliban. How drugs fit in The UN Office on Drugs and Crime s (UNODC s) Afghanistan Opium Survey 2015 indicated a 19% decrease in opium poppy cultivation in 2015 and a 48% fall in opium production on the 3 IISS, The IISS Armed Conflict Survey 2016 (Oxon: Routledge, 2016). Drugs and Conflict Prevention in Afghanistan 11

12 previous year. 4 Nevertheless, in Spring 2016 the poppy harvest promised high yields and peace of mind for the thousands of seasonal labourers seeking work in Helmand, the largest producing province. At the same time this was a promising sign for the Taliban who appear to be profiting from imposing taxation on opium production and use of the harvest season as a recruitment opportunity. 5 Moreover, elements within the Taliban have become more deeply and directly involved in the drug trade putting aside some of their ideological drive (and the fact that drugs are considered forbidden, haram, in Islam) to benefit from the proceeds of the narcotic trade. 6 Besides from the challenges associated with the withdrawal of NATO forces, stabilisation efforts are likely to be undermined by the drugs trade and resulting competition among a plethora of local actors wishing to either control the trade or use counternarcotics policies to undermine their opponents. This worrying trend was predicted by an earlier IISS study in and was confirmed by a more recent report by David Mansfield and Paul Fishstein. The latter expected this trajectory would continue in the coming years with the likelihood of: widespread opium cultivation returning to Helmand and Nangarhar; provinces currently deemed poppy-free seeing a renewed reliance on poppy cultivation, e.g. in Ghor and Laghman; and even the possible expansion into previously uncultivated territories in the south. 8 Furthermore, misguided responses to drug crop cultivation from domestic and international actors working in this policy arena may have a destabilising effect of their own by upsetting political settlements at subnational levels. 9 The policy challenge In spite of this growing and serious challenge, insufficient attention is paid locally and internationally to addressing an issue that is too often relegated to the margins of policy debates. The IISS believes that this trend should be reversed and that every opportunity should be seized to promote multidisciplinary debates that take into account, among others, security, development, public health initiatives, human rights, and governance which are all needed in this context. Understanding the latter is particularly crucial, as is gaining a 4 UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2015, March Taimoor Shah and Mujib Mashal, Bountiful Afghan Opium Harvest Yields Profits for the Taliban, New York Times, 4 May Azam Ahmed, Penetrating Every Stage of Afghan Opium Chain, Taliban Become a Cartel, New York Times, 16 February Nigel Inkster and Virginia Comolli, Drugs, Insecurity and Failed States: The Problems of Prohibition (Oxon: Routledge, 2012). 8 David Mansfield and Paul Fishstein, Eyes, (Still) Wide Shut: Counternarcotics in Transition in Afghanistan (London: Christian Aid, 2015), p David Mansfield, A State Built on Sand (London: Hurst, 2016), p. 15. Drugs and Conflict Prevention in Afghanistan 12

13 nuanced appreciation of the implications that drug-control policies have in the Afghan context. Worryingly, and as indicated by the US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), [a]s of September 30, 2015, the United States has provided $8.4 billion for counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan since [ ] However, the US track record in combating narcotics production in Afghanistan is not encouraging. 10 Indeed, the country remains the number one poppy producer in the world. To the IISS, this indicates that efforts should be recalibrated and lessons from other regions that had experienced the socalled war on drugs should be taken into account. President Mohammad Ashraf Ghani appears to share this belief and the desire to engage relevant officials within his administration to promote a more effective and comprehensive approach. President Ghani noted in a recent interview: You cannot carry a war on drugs because, again, if you look at the literature on Latin America, Central America, and particularly Mexico, there are lessons and the lesson that is fundamental, [is that] those are failures. [ ] Where success has been in Thailand, because the Golden Triangle shifted. And there the key issue was job creation. 11 The President s remarks were particularly welcomed and came at the time of the adoption of the Afghan National Drug Action Plan The latter has at its core the decrease in poppy cultivation and production and trafficking of opiates, as well as demand reduction and increased provision of treatment for users. 12 Drugs use has in fact increased, especially in rural areas where rates are three times higher than in cities and rehabilitation centres are virtually non-existent. 13 This further highlights the need for a joint approach to the drugs issue that encompasses traditional stakeholders such as the ministries of Interior and Counter Narcotics and the security forces, as well as the Ministry of Public Health, among others. UNGASS 2016 President Ghani s references to the war on drugs and the experience of other countries grappling with the narcotics issue were testimony to the evolution that the debate around drug control and policy has undergone in recent years. The desire for reform, primarily driven 10 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 30 October 2015, pp Mohammad Ashraf Ghani in Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 30 October 2015, pp , 12 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Counter Narcotics, Afghan National Drug Action Plan , 14 October 2015, p. 4, 13 Ibid., pp Drugs and Conflict Prevention in Afghanistan 13

14 by Latin American leaders and promoted by notable individuals such as the members of the Global Commission on Drug Policy, 14 gained momentum in the run-up to the much-awaited United Nations General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) on drugs on April 2016 the first of its kind in nearly two decades. Specifically, several states and civil societies had argued in favour of abandoning criminalisation (including of personal consumption) and punitive approaches championed in UNGASS 1998 in favour of a more humane and harmreduction-driven strategy. The latter has, to varying degrees, been piloted in a number of countries around the world taking advantage of a certain degree of discretion allowed within existing UN conventions pertaining to, for instance, decriminalisation and alternative penalties. In spite of the hope for change, the outcome of UNGASS 2016 has been deemed disappointing by many civil society organisations for its lack of transparency, the reaffirmation of the status quo, and the overlooking of the widely documented failure of the existing drug-control regime and its many unintended consequences. 15 Nevertheless, while it appears clear that reform is unlikely to come from above, i.e. from the UN, change can most definitely be driven by initiatives at the national level (as a number of case studies already indicate). The Afghan approach It is in this context that in spite of the largely business-as-usual outcome of UNGASS 2016, there is value in discussing how Afghanistan is going to implement its National Drug Action Plan and its integration within a holistic and nuanced approach. For instance, it would appear advisable to factor in causes of cultivation, use, and trade of poppy in the design of development plans that acknowledge the varying degrees of dependency on the poppy economy across Afghanistan s many regions. 16 In addition, the adoption of the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development and the accompanying 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) can act as catalysts for a new approach to sustainable development which, importantly, should be more inclusive of local communities (and women), among other aspects. Another important element to be considered and discussed at the forthcoming IISS workshop is the extent to which proceeds of poppy cultivation and opium trade fuel corruption a cancer President Ghani has vowed to fight. Corruption hampers security as the police and the military might be tempted by easy financial rewards, and similar temptations might be experienced by government officials who may find profiteering from opium taxation, to 14 See list of commissioners here: 15 For instance: Public Statement by the Global Commission on Drug Policy on UNGASS 2016, 21 April 2016, 16 William Byrd and David Mansfield, Afghanistan s Opium Economy: An agricultural, livelihood and governance perspective, report prepared for the World Bank Afghanistan Agriculture Sector Review, Drugs and Conflict Prevention in Afghanistan 14

15 mention an example, more appealing than implementing good governance. And bad governance, corruption, and bribery, in turn, have a corrosive impact on the lives of citizens and have been acknowledged as obstacles to development. 17 *** All of the above constitute the pieces of a complex picture presenting multiple layers and interdependencies. It appears impossible to effectively address any of the previously mentioned challenges conflict, criminal activities, corruption, the need for economic development, and health issues such as addiction and HIV/AIDS resulting from the sharing of needles without tackling the others. It is in this spirit that the IISS wishes to conduct the scheduled high-level workshop to discuss current initiatives, assess the reasons for limited success to date, and look ahead with a view of promoting a multidisciplinary approach that would curtail the illicit trade in opium and limit its implications, both directly and indirectly. About The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) The IISS is an independent think-tank which, over the course of nearly 60 years, has established an international reputation in the study of conflict and global security issues, and is recognised for its international convening power. Founded in 1958, the Institute, a registered charity, has enjoyed a reputation for intellectual integrity and independence in the field of security research. Based in London, and with branch offices in Washington, Singapore, and Bahrain, it has a highly international staff. Its fact-based analysis is both academically rigorous and relevant to the solution of problems encountered by the strategic community of decision-makers and opinion leaders. The IISS has multi-year experience studying the Afghan conflict as well as illicit economies (and narcotics in particular) and how they fuel instability. IISS researchers have produced a wide range of publications ranging from books such as Afghanistan to 2015 and Beyond (2011) and Drugs, Insecurity and Failed States: The Problems of Prohibition (2012) to policy pieces such as Afghanistan s Poppy Crop (2007), Re-thinking the Drugs War in Afghanistan (2012), and Drug Markets, Security and Foreign Aid (2013). Afghanistan is also a prominent feature in the IISS Armed Conflict Database, and the annual Armed Conflict Survey and The Military Balance. 17 Transparency International, Ending corruption for a better future for all, Drugs and Conflict Prevention in Afghanistan 15