The Impact of Indigenous Movements on Natural Resource Policy in Ecuador and Bolivia Katherine Blansett March 15, 2013

Transcription

1 A RESOURCE- BASED REVOLUTION? The Impact of Indigenous Movements on Natural Resource Policy in Ecuador and Bolivia Katherine Blansett March 15, 2013

2 INTRODUCTION In the late 1990 s and early 2000 s, indigenous peasants in Bolivia and Ecuador took to the streets, organizing marches and building road blockages that paralyzed their national economies and ousted presidents. The 2003 strikes in Bolivia s La Paz and Cochabamba, dubbed the Gas Wars, opposed the construction of a natural gas pipeline to Chile, which many believed would diminish Bolivia s share in its own gas profits (Silva 2010:138). In response to these protests, military responders killed sixty protestors over the ensuing weeks, creating a political fallout so grave that President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada resigned and the Bolivian party system collapsed. Ecuador s 2005 uprising in Yasuní National Park, in which local residents invaded oilrigs in indigenous areas of the Amazon, opposed foreign oil extraction in the area. As a result, oil production in the area was halted for almost a week. These protests fit into a larger regional pattern of indigenous mobilization in the Andean region against neoliberal 1 natural resource policies that promote transnational ownership of natural resources but fail to distribute the vast wealth of extractive industries to the economically disadvantaged indigenous population (Fabricant 2012:42; Weyland, Madrid and Hunter 2010:3-4). In the cases of CONAIE (Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador; Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador) and MAS (Movimiento al Socialismo; Movement towards Socialism), in Ecuador and Bolivia respectively, these anti-establishment demands carried a markedly indigenous character as social movements reframed indigenous rights to intervene in natural resource policy to reflect cultural norms linked to decentralized ayllu democracy 2 and modern environmental protection (Fabricant 2012:44; Erazo 2013:168). 3 1 The term neoliberal refers to pro- market reforms, such as privatization and currency devaluation, characteristic of Latin American governments in the 1990 s. For more, see Silva (2010). 2 Ayllu: a traditional form of Inca community that are recognized by their self- sufficiency, community- held territory, and relations based on reciprocity (Lewellen 2003:39) 1

3 These demands were eventually channeled into a call for the implementation and institutionalization of consulta prévia (prior consultation), requiring the government to seek the consultation and approval of affected communities before beginning or deepening natural resource exploitation. Consulta prévia encourages local communities to impose additional environmental regulations and demand direct financial compensation for the local community. In the wake of the nationwide protests and the political vacuums created by the erosion of established parties, CONAIE and MAS each formed their own political parties that, directly or as part of a coalition, ran candidates on pro-indigenous and anti-neoliberal platforms. Following the departure of unpopular presidents responsible for market-friendly rather than indigenous-friendly extraction policy, current Presidents Evo Morales and Rafael Correa (of Bolivia and Ecuador, respectively) were both publicly endorsed by CONAIE and MAS and campaigned on platforms favoring the demands of indigenous groups described above. Despite similarities shared by these two cases, Evo Morales s regime has enacted significantly more indigenous-friendly natural resource policies than Rafael Correa. Morales has consistently respected indigenous rights in his natural resource policy decisions and he quickly reverses most policies that spark indigenous protest. By contrast, Correa actively excludes indigenous activists from his administration and even accelerates oil extraction in the Amazon against the opposition of local indigenous communities. An analytical puzzle emerges from these differences in policy outcomes: why was one indigenous social movement able to successfully translate the momentum from protests not only into electoral turnout, but tangible changes in natural resource policy, while the other was not? This puzzle reflects a larger theme in the evaluation of democratic participation: does increased 3 MAS and CONAIE represent the largest indigenous organizations in Bolivia and Ecuador, respectively, and are also the only movements affiliated with parties who have garnered more than 10 percent of the popular vote in national elections (LAPOP). 2

4 political participation by a marginal group in a democracy assure concrete policy change beyond elections? Indigenous Logics At Odds With Rentier State Theory The scholarship on Latin America s political economy, specifically on natural resources, centers on the recent commodity boom and its enormous influence on the New Left s 4 economic policy (Blanco and Grier 2013; Hogenboom and Fernández Jiberto 2009; Stallings and Peres 2011). While many scholars have compared the mobilization and organizational contrasts of MAS and CONAIE, there is very little work comparing the natural resource policy of Bolivia and Ecuador. In fact, Bolivia s and Ecuador s current administrations are often grouped with other commodity-based economies and participatory democracies in Latin America, particularly Venezuela (Flores-Macías 2010, pg ). The literature on resource policy as it pertains to Bolivia and Ecuador can be easily summarized by Kurt Weyland s repurposement of rentier state theory, predicting that Ecuador and Bolivia s governments will enact redistributive social programs benefiting the poor, but also favor centralization of authority and rents from natural resources (Weyland 2009). This argument suggests that Bolivia s and Ecuador s economies earn high rents that provide incentives for presidents to enact social programs supporting their constituencies in order to bring about the economic inclusion of previously marginalized sectors such as indigenous populations, while simultaneously denying this population s demand for prior consult. Therefore, rentier state theory predicts that executives will favor the centralization of natural resource rents to facilitate nationwide redistribution programs and eschew decentralizing authority over extraction policy to affected indigenous communities. 4 The phrase the New Left refers to the recent turn of many Latin American governments toward the left after the pro- market reforms of the 1990 s. For more information, see Domínguez and Shifter (2008), Weyland, Madrid, and Hunter (2010), and Silva (2010). 3

5 A related argument predicts that the mere existence of a commodity-based economy automatically provides incentives for states to concentrate authority over these commodities on the national level because resource revenue creates growth without the necessity of improved taxation policies or neoliberal strategies to attract foreign investment and encourage exports diversification (Hershberg 2010:242). Without previously enacted political constraints, such as the binomial electoral system in Chile 5 that all but guarantees conservative representation in the national legislature, states will choose to make risky spending decisions on social and infrastructure projects (Weyland 2009:151-2; Hershberg 2010). Overall, the scholarship on natural resources in Latin America considers Bolivia and Ecuador to have comparable oil policy that centralizes authority on the national level in the executive branch. This approach fails to account for successful indigenous mobilization over more than a decade demanding a decrease in the centralization of this authority. Moreover, it under-analyzes the distinct levels of success these episodes of contentious politics have experienced between the cases. Examination of international, cross-regional natural resource policy-making implies that a democratic electorate is capable of reversing policy direction through elections or revolution, thereby constraining politicians by the electorate s demands. Unless the state employs dictatorial repression, leaders must further natural resource policy that meets these demands or risk being removed from office or starting a revolution (Cabrales and Hauk 2010:61). The state s need to address these demands will sometimes triumph over incentives to erode democratic institutions to co-opt resource rents, even in resource rich states, which are usually attributed with authoritarian tendencies. Since successful indigenous movements oppose unfettered resource extraction and instead favor decentralization to ensure that affected communities have greater 5 This system elects two legislators per district and often overrepresents the minority party. For more, see Posner (1999). 4

6 control over extraction in indigenous territory and mobilize protests and electoral turnout around this interest, it stands to reason that executives in Bolivia and Ecuador may be constrained by indigenous demands that are contrary to the results predicted by rentier state theory. Participatory Democracy?: Indigenous Social Movements and the New Left State Many scholars have written extensively on the character and tactics of mobilization in Latin American movements in recent decades. These analyses discuss themes including structural explanation for the emergence of indigenous movements, the formation of ethnic parties from these movements, and accounts of the electoral strategy of these same ethnic parties, (Silva 2010; Madrid 2010; Van Cott 2005). However, this literature shares a common failing of social movement scholarship overall: a failure to focus on outcomes. Those that do often discuss broader political results such as the extent to which these ethnic forces divide and incorporate different parts of civil society or the implications of increasingly participatory rather than representative democracy for democratic governance (Mueller 2013; Motta 2009). Only recently has focus shifted to include the impact of these movements on policy change under New Left governments that were elected on pro-indigenous platforms in Bolivia and Ecuador. There are several competing explanations for the successes and failures of indigenous social movements in the region. Roberta Rice s study of indigenous party consolidation in Bolivia and Ecuador between 1996 and 2004 proves that MAS captured votes based on voters indigeneity, poverty level, and the left s previous vote share, while the only consistent predictor of votes for Pachakutik, the political party endorsed by CONAIE, was a voter s selfidentification of indigeneity (Rice 2011). This presumably reflects the broader appeal of the MAS party in Bolivia than of Pachakutik in Ecuador in comparison with other political parties. 5

7 Indigeneity determines the amount of electoral support these parties wield and the amount of influence they have in policy-making decisions of politicians that they support. Katherine Kuhn s dissertation on the employment of identity-based appeals on the part of MAS and CONAIE asserts that indigenous social movements shifted their tactics during Morales s and Correa s presidencies by directly appealing to the public to criticize the presidents failure to follow through on campaign promises (Kuhn 2013:iii). This argument attributes differences in the extent of indigenous-friendly policy to the ability of MAS to directly shame Morales with identity-based attacks, because Morales himself is indigenous, while Correa neither is indigenous nor directly participates in CONAIE (Kuhn 2013:136, 207). While this explanation addresses the link between social movement tactics and policy, it primarily concerns itself with the tactical choices of the movement confronted with officials that fail to deliver on campaign promises. It does not directly address the policy changes that came about as a result of these appeals, much less the specific connection between indigenous social movement agendas and natural resource policy. However, none of these arguments thoroughly examine the alliances formed by indigenous social movements and other actors in politics and civil society. Ruth Berins Collier and Samuel Handlin s explanation of differences in social movement effectiveness is partysociety linkages for community organizations and New Left states. Specifically, Collier and Handlin examine psychological, direct-contact, and organizational linkages between established leftist parties and organized labor or, in the case of Venezuela, between new political movements and civil society organizations (Handlin and Collier 2011). Such linkages offer the best alternative in current literature to explain not only differences in indigenous movement tactics, organization, and electoral results, but also to evaluate differences in policy outcomes. Linkages 6

8 can ensure continued influence on political establishment outside of elections. Therefore, I argue for an extension of party-society linkage analysis to indigenous social movements in Bolivia and Ecuador to better understand differences in natural resource policy. Each of these arguments underscores different levels of success in effecting policy change enjoyed by MAS and CONAIE and offers a partial explanation for the link between social movements and policy change. However, few of the studies on movement politics in Latin America place sufficient emphasis on the causal effect of these movements on policy developments after indigenous or indigenous-friendly governments are elected to office. Those that do comparatively evaluate the effect of movements on policy offer potential explanations for differences between cases but do not establish direct relationships between successful indigenous movements and the implementation of indigenous-friendly policy. Bolivia and Ecuador s current administrations are often grouped with other commoditybased economies and participatory democracies in Latin America, including Venezuela, Argentina, and Nicaragua. However, Bolivia and Ecuador are unique in their historical and contemporary experiences with indigenous social movements, which have added a distinctly ethnic tone to their progressive political discourse around natural resources. While natural resource policy and indigenous political participation are often considered independently of one another, I discover a disagreement in the outcomes predicted by each of these perspectives. Natural resource policy analysis links Bolivia and Ecuador with Venezuela, claiming that the political economy of these states is sufficiently similar that indigenous politics unique to Bolivia and Ecuador do not affect executives decision-making. 6 Meanwhile, scholars of indigenous 6 To simplify my argument, I will look most closely at executive decisions rather than legislative action, because both Ecuador and Bolivia have power concentrated in the executive branch (Domínguez and Shifter 2008) and neither MAS nor Pachakutik has a supermajority in the legislature to force new laws through (Dangl 2007:143; Becker 2011, pg 246). 7

9 social movements and ethnic politics rarely concern themselves with the impact of indigenous identity on politics beyond electoral results. This gap implies that there is a lack of examination of the relationship between these two themes. The extent of indigenous organization and participation is vital to explain the direction of natural resource policy under the New Left. The Main Argument In this paper, I look to establish a causal relation based on Bolivian and Ecuadorean indigenous social movements organizational linkages to explain whether the implementation of natural resource policy aligns with indigenous demands during and after their anti-neoliberal mobilizations in the 1990 s and 2000 s. I argue that Morales s policy addressed indigenous demands better than Rafael Correa s because MAS organized more successfully than CONAIE on the local and national level among indigenous and non-indigenous voters. MAS created a powerful electoral constituency that held Morales accountable to his campaign promises. By contrast, CONAIE did not create a movement that is strong enough to enforce its policy demands under Correa. The divergence of Morales s and Correa s responses to indigenous movement demands suggests that differences in political and mobilization strategy determine the past, current, and future influence of indigenous movements in Bolivia and Ecuador and their ability to create lasting social and political change. Upon first glance, the context and nature of indigenous mobilization in Bolivia and Ecuador seem very similar. Both occurred in the same geographical region (Latin America), during the same time period (1990s-present), and in similar demographic, political, and economic conditions (significant indigenous populations above 30 percent, neoliberal governments, and commodity based economies). Additionally, protests against these political conditions were strongly tied to groups including MAS and CONAIE, advocating specifically for 8

10 indigenous rights rather than class-based ones against practices that specifically harmed indigenous communities, particularly natural resource extraction of energy-related products (Silva 2010). The democratic regimes supported by these indigenous movements in the most recent elections both fall neatly into the radical end of New Left democracies, particularly because of the increasingly ethnic tone and participatory form of these elections. 7 These similarities aside, there are clear differences between indigenous movements in these countries. The differences between indigenous social movements in Bolivia and Ecuador explain not only the extent of their electoral influence, but also their influence on the policy choices of executives. Specifically, I argue that differences in movement-society linkages and resulting electoral consolidation of these movements, along with the continued mobilization of the movements after the election of pro-indigenous candidates, determine the degree to which these pro-indigenous executives introduced concrete changes to natural resource policy protecting indigenous autonomy over affected ancestral lands and the environment in general. I evaluate these variables with specific indicators to determine the comparative strength of indigenous movements in Bolivia and Ecuador, as well as the comparative level of incorporation of indigenous interests into natural resource policy. My explanatory variables measure the comparative strength of indigenous movements in each case. This is mostly based on (a) a qualitative evaluation of linkages formed by these movements with other political and social actors, (b) a qualitative study of indigenous party formation and a quantitative statistical analysis of the extent to which those parties captured indigenous and non-indigenous voters. In terms of organizational linkages, I compare the alliances that each movement forged with political actors outside of the movement, primarily through coalitions, since these alliances 7 Ecuador and Bolivia share sub- classification within the New Left as participatory and ethnic political environments. For more, see Levitsky and Roberts (2011) and Madrid (2012). 9

11 undermine their position as anti-establishment and revolutionary organizations. I also evaluate indigenous movements linkages to civil society, including their incorporation and antagonism to other indigenous groups or social movements made up of primarily indigenous participants. This reveals how devoted these movements were to actually effecting change for indigenous peoples, or conversely, how intent they were to monopolize indigenous support at the expense of fulfilling their objectives around natural resource policy. I continue by measuring what I call the electoral capacity of these movements; namely, the extent to which they built electoral forces strong enough to affect the results of a presidential election. To determine relative electoral power, I observe the process of party formation and measure the results of these political branches of the movements through the electoral consolidation of indigenous parties to identify whether indigeneity along with other demographic factors predict voting for an indigenous party. Finally, I evaluate the success of social movements in organizing protests after the election of pro-indigenous candidates by observing their turnout and the state s response accommodation or dismissal of indigenous demands. The dependent variable, natural resource policy, is crucial to understanding the overall success of these movements because the location of natural resource extraction occurred largely, although not exclusively, on indigenous territory, causing one of the most economically disenfranchised populations in these countries to bear a significant cultural and environmental burden (de la Cadena 2010). Natural resource politics are fundamental to explain the rise of indigenous protest and subsequent political activism, because extraction policy in the 1990 s not only perpetuated inequality and threatened their land, but also posed a threat to their personal ethnic identities. Natural resource policy reform that favored indigenous interests would imply that these movements have become established participants in national politics rather than 10

12 marginal special interest. To evaluate the success of these movements in changing natural resource policy for their interests, I observe three indicators: institutionalization and enforcement of consulta prévia, state intervention in natural resource extraction following contentious episodes, and the legislative or constitutional guarantee of environmental protection and autonomy of indigenous territory. Consulta prévia assures that indigenous peoples will have a greater voice in the process of extraction of natural resources on their own lands, while increased state intervention in resources assures that (a) foreign companies cannot supersede consulta prévia, and (b) more profits can be directed to indigenous communities affected by extraction. The protection of the environment and indigenous territorial rights reinforces the basic principles of consulta prévia and assures that, legally, the executive is obligated to decentralize a certain amount of authority. Organizational Differences Indigenous movements in Ecuador and Bolivia emerged on the national stage within ten years of one another, and both with strong initial links to civil society. According to Sidney Tarrow s description of a political opportunity structure, this is due to several structural factors. First, political decentralization and legal protection of popular participation in both countries facilitated participation on the municipal level (Tarrow 1998:32). Additionally, these organizations were able to effectively frame a credible threat, the second component of Tarrow s political opportunity structure, by criticizing market-oriented natural resource policy as the source of economic and environmental insecurity that fell disproportionately on indigenous populations (Tarrow 1998:32; Silva 2010:26; Van Cott 2010:25). However, this approach only explains why indigenous movements appeared during the 1990 s. It does not predict how these movements will develop. From the outset of the formation of national-level indigenous social 11

13 movements, clear differences emerged in Bolivian and Ecuadorean mobilization along ethnic lines. The most telling of these differences took shape in the tactical decisions that CONAIE and MAS made in their selection of organizations with which to link in the political arena and in civil society. Although CONAIE eventually emerged as the dominant political vehicle for advancing indigenous political causes in the 1990 s, it was not the sole organization responsible for mobilizing indigenous populations in Ecuador. CONAIE represented the unification of several localized indigenous movements. It faced significant competition from two other national indigenous organizations and it actively impeded the development of other indigenous organizations instead of encouraging local collaboration and forming alliances with them (Van Cott 2010: ). In the short run, the exclusion of other indigenous organizations allowed CONAIE to have sole access to negotiations with the state, and also decreased the considerable divisions that already existed within the organization (Madrid 2012:84-5). This sowed the seeds of division within the Ecuadorean indigenous movement that would eventually undermine CONAIE s attempts to unite the indigenous vote and consolidate its electoral strength. CONAIE was, however, responsible for the most successful national protest mobilizations that occurred: a 1990 levantamiento (uprising) pushing for bilingual education, a 1992 caminata (protest walk) for natural resource autonomy in the Amazon, and a 1994 Movilización Por La Vida (Mobilization for Life) against government proposals to auction communally held land in indigenous communities. All of these moments gained Ecuador the reputation as home to the strongest Indigenous movements and one of the best-organized social movements in the Americas (Becker 2011:37). This was true despite the fact that activists had made very little headway in concretely altering government policies through just mobilization (Becker 12

14 2011:37). Even in its role in civil society of organizing protest, CONAIE faced problems from the outset of translating its power through mobilization into a unified national indigenous movement. Additionally, CONAIE s focus on national protest impeded the formation of grassroots organizations that may have solidified its support on the local level (Rice 2011:175). MAS placed greater emphasis on the incorporation of other social movements within civil society and employed a bottom-up structure that the coca growers unions and lowland organizations took advantage of by lowering the barriers to entry. MAS also made use of the growing national discontent with the ineffectiveness of political parties to insert indigenous interests within an anti-establishment platform that appealed to a broad electorate, both indigenous and non-indigenous (Van Cott 2010:67-71). Most of the protests that MAS organized were centered on localized natural resource-based concerns, including the El Alto Gas Wars and the Cochabamba Water Wars. These became springboards for national discussions about neoliberal policies. These orientations reveal that MAS s general tendency was to collaborate rather than to obstruct the success of other movements. Its grassroots structure encouraged local participation and it sought to foster a strong cultural as well as political allegiance to MAS among indigenous and ethnically mixed (mestizo) populations alike (Albro 2007). Both CONAIE and MAS had roots in anti-establishment philosophies that promised to revolutionize the national political system. Their rhetoric suggests that neither organization would be prone to collaborate with political actors outside of the movements themselves even though they did share common policy goals with established leftist movements. MAS s decision to eschew cooperation with any group affiliated with the political establishment appealed to voters fed up with the corruption and ineffectiveness of Bolivian party politics. MAS did not 13

15 support any political party besides its own in its entire history, making its organization internally inclusive but externally exclusive. On the other hand, CONAIE focused most of its organizing efforts after the success of protests in the 1990 s on the formation of Pachakutik, its political wing. Pachakutik proceeded to form ill-fated alliances with non-indigenous movements and established, but struggling, leftist parties. In the 2002 presidential election, Pachakutik rallied behind Lucio Gutiérrez in the second round, a colonel heading a loosely aligned leftist coalition, hoping to unite indigenous and nonindigenous voters but ultimately splintering the indigenous vote (Becker 2011:106). Backing Gutiérrez proved catastrophic not only because it failed to consolidate indigenous electoral power, but also because Gutiérrez reneged on his entire platform once in office (Sawyer 2004:187). Gutiérrez adopted a strongly neoliberal regime and abandoned his promises to CONAIE to form an institutionally plurinational state. After such close affiliation with disloyal, non-indigenous interests, CONAIE found it difficult to maintain its legitimacy as an antiestablishment movement. CONAIE s subsequent radicalization, an effort to regain authenticity with its base, alienated its newfound non-indigenous allies after 2002 (Van Cott 2010:112). In the 2000 s, CONAIE found that its haste to sabotage competition from other indigenous movements and form alliances with non-indigenous actors eventually limited its strategic options. There are clear lessons to be learned from the contrasting organizational strategies of MAS and CONAIE even before the elections of Evo Morales and Rafael Correa. From the outset, MAS employed internally inclusive appeals and chose to unify its indigenous base before forming a political party. This allowed them to successfully mount an independent, outsider campaign and elect one of their own, Evo Morales to the presidency. Morales s experience as a 14

16 leader of the coca growers movement and fervent MAS activist contributed to his successful personalistic campaign strategy, further illustrating the importance of cultivating leadership within social movements (Webber 2011:58). CONAIE, however, directed the energy from its successful protests towards forming a political party and forging non-indigenous alliances before unifying its indigenous base, causing fragmentation of the indigenous vote at the beginning of the 2000 s (LAPOP, Bolivia 2004). In sum, MAS s strategy of internal inclusivity and external exclusivity brought it more influence than CONAIE s strategy of internal exclusivity and external inclusivity. Party Formation, the Role of Indigenous Candidates, and the Indigeneity of the Vote As mentioned above, Pachakutik was more prone to forming leftist coalitions than running successful campaigns for executives. The second round of the 2009 presidential election was no different. Pachakutik and CONAIE backed Rafael Correa in the second round of the presidential election, an outsider populist candidate whose political strategy focused on broad claims of Ecuadorean socialism, but lacked concrete policy prescriptions. Correa appealed to indigenous groups by speaking in Quechua at rallies and donning indigenous clothing, rather than by proposing action that would appeal to indigenous interests (Silva 2010:191). During the race, Correa declared that the political consolidation and entrenchment of the Ecuadorean elite was due to the mismanagement of oil revenues. He vowed to remedy this situation (Burbach, Fuentes and Fox 2013:102). Based on these promises, CONAIE endorsed Correa s candidacy because his economic platform seemed to align with their interests better than any other candidate. They also no longer possessed the electoral strength to run their ideal candidate, Lucas Maca. Pachakutik s support of a non-indigenous candidate from outside of the movement divided the indigenous vote, proving that neither Pachakutik nor the larger CONAIE social 15

17 movement could successfully unite the indigenous population in Ecuador to elect a presidential candidate behind a markedly indigenous platform (Becker 2011, pg 216). MAS s candidate Evo Morales was thoroughly rooted in the structure of MAS and the coca growers unions. Since he himself was indigenous and had led several MAS protests, Morales focused on extending indigenous demands to non-indigenous communities with leftist sympathies (Webber 2011:18). Therefore, in Morales, MAS found not only a charismatic and capable indigenous candidate, but also one able to link indigenous demands for political transformation to nationwide sentiments. In fact, since the rise of the indigenous movement in Bolivia, an increasing share of the population (higher than the rate of population growth) began to self-identify as indigenous, suggesting that individuals were accepting their indigeneity as more political outlets for indigenous representation emerged (LAPOP Bolivia 2004, LAPOP Bolivia 2012). However, the key difference between Rafael Correa and Evo Morales goes beyond simply the party or movement they represented; it extends to the very core of ethnic politics. Since Morales is indigenous, he was most likely to respond to indigenous movements use of identity-based appeals (Kuhn 2013). Correa, on the other hand, only superficially allied with indigenous cultures and would not be as accountable to the indigenous community. Empirical evidence supports the association between indigenous identification and votes for candidates promising resource policy reform, indicating the existence of a link between electoral demands by indigenous voters and reform outcomes. Roberta Rice s 2011 study on MAS s political consolidation found that indigenous parties vote shares were positively correlated with not only voter indigenous identification but also with poverty overall. My own regressions found that these same variables were correlated with indigenous peoples parties vote share, specifically in departments that are rich in natural gas (Chuquisaca, Cochabamba, Santa 16

18 Cruz, and Tarija), which I studied because particularly affected by reform of natural resource policy (Table 1). High illiteracy rates and lack of electricity, both variables indicating poverty, and indigenous self-identification are both positively and significantly correlated with voting for MAS in these departments. This correlation indicates that support for Morales and MAS extended beyond indigenous communities to the lower class regardless of ethnicity. Additionally, indigenous peoples parties vote shares grew substantially in these same departments between 1999 and 2004 the period of MAS s contentious protest and electoral campaigning. Indigenous vote shares increased from 2.4 percent to percent in Chuquisaca, 5.76 percent to percent in Cochabamba, 3 percent to percent in Santa Cruz, and 2.28 percent to 6.34 percent in Tarija (Figure 1). Clearly, MAS successfully incorporated both indigenous and poor voters nationwide as well as in resource-rich areas, demonstrating its successful tactic of combining resource policy protest with electoral alternatives to the status quo that it railed against. Pachakutik functioned as a separate entity from CONAIE and emphasized the importance of connecting indigenous rights movements to broader discontent among the electorate with establishment parties, but still enjoyed considerable support and support from CONAIE. In the 1996 elections, Pachakutik mustered an impressive 20.3 percent of the popular vote in the first round, despite the fact that it was founded a mere five months prior (Van Cott 2010:123). However, Pachakutik s political influence soon eroded after the 2002 elections, during which Pachakutik representatives in the legislature either resigned or were expelled by Gutierrez for insubordination shortly after as well (Van Cott 2010:137). This loss severely undermined Pachakutik s political legitimacy in and out of indigenous communities, which was particularly devastating as other leftist politicians and organizations were simultaneously gaining traction 17

19 among the broader electorate. The only significant variable correlated with voting for Pachakutik over the course of its development overall and in oil-rich provinces is self-identification as indigenous (Table 2, Rice 2011:179). This evidence suggests that Pachakutik was unable to consolidate electoral support outside of indigenous communities in spite of its collaboration with non-indigenous politicians. Pachakutik s vote share dropped from a high of 28 percent in oil-rich Amazonian indigenous communities, such as Sucumbíos and Napo, to as low as 20 percent, demonstrating the precipitous drop in popular support for an indigenous political party over the course of ten years (Figure 2). Pachakutik s initial political efforts did lead to increases in its vote shares across all oil-rich provinces between 1996 and 2000 from 20 percent to 31 percent in Morona Santiago, 14 percent to 28 percent in Napo, 19 percent to 26 percent in Pastaza, 10 percent to 27 percent in Sucumbíos, and 0 percent to 5 percent in Zamora Chinchipe. However, this trend did continue in subsequent elections. Pachakutik s share increased from 31 percent to 33 percent in Morona Santiago and 5 percent to 9 percent in Zamora Chinchipe, but decreased from 28 percent to 21 percent in Napo, 26 percent to 19 percent in Pastaza, and 27 percent to 24 percent in Sucumbíos. These inconsistent electoral results indicate that Pachakutik also failed to improve its vote shares in oil-rich provinces, which had been epicenters of indigenous protest and of support for CONAIE. Evidently, Pachakutik did not maintain its initial electoral success throughout the 2000 s, because it did not solidify an electoral base outside of indigenous communities. Changes in Natural Resource Policy Since the Elections of Rafael Correa and Evo Morales As is evident in the previous sections, CONAIE and MAS were in notably different positions respective to the administrations of Correa and Morales based on their organizational linkages and electoral strength. The most important indicator of the accommodation of 18

20 indigenous interests in these administrations consulta prévia appears in both executive natural resource policy and constitutional and legislative action during this time. However, from the outset, it is important to note that consulta prévia was significantly more institutionalized and enforced in Bolivia than in Ecuador. Only a year passed following his election before Correa reneged on the majority of campaign promises that he offered CONAIE. He adopted pro-market policies rather than implementing radical socialism as he had promised in his campaign (Becker 2011:203). This reversal of intentions is evident in Correa s minimal adjustments to national oil policy and centralization of authority over oil extraction in the executive branch, since both actions ran directly against indigenous demands (Erazo 2013:190). Correa did not nationalize the oil industry in Ecuador. In fact, he threatened to privatize the national oil company unless they generated more revenue with fewer expenditures. Correa actively courted foreign oil companies to enter Ecuador against indigenous interests (Burbach, Fox and Fuentes 2013:108). These policies were largely byproducts of Correa s national redistribution project. Although, Correa did redistribute oil rents through poverty reduction programs, these rents came from an increased tax on private oil companies that continued to dominate the sector (Becker 2011:179). Additionally, these programs contained no component specifically intended to empower indigenous communities. Correa discouraged the designation of funds to rural areas, where indigenous communities were most concentrated (Becker 2011:183). His program did not, however, enjoy substantial success in poverty alleviation. Some accuse Correa of abandoning indigenous interests for clientelistic purposes rather than wide-scale poverty alleviation (Burbach, Fox and Fuentes 2013:103). Therefore, Correa s political and economic policies did little to address indigenous demands in Ecuador. 19

21 In Bolivia, Morales visited El Alto upon taking office to declare the nationalization of natural gas resources, diminishing the role of the private sector in production and transferring ownership to the state-owned Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB). Morales continuously deepened the nationalization process by expropriating several foreign-owned gas companies as well as pipeline and storage companies (Flores-Macías 2012:39). Morales also nationalized hydroelectric production, the telecommunications industry, and the pension system over the course of his presidency (Flores-Macias 2012:39-41). He maintained a consistent rhetoric favoring nationalization, reaffirming his commitment to MAS s objectives of a state-led economy and his opposition to predatory transnational corporations into the Bolivian economy (Kuhn 2013:202). Morales also began a very successful poverty reduction plan that focused on the redistribution of natural resource rents to attack longstanding inequality. His programs included Renta Dignidad, a cash transfer for all elderly citizens regardless of income and Juacinto Pinto, a cash transfer for families with children enrolled in school. Both of these programs contributed to significant poverty reduction during his administration (Flores-Macías 2012:40). Indigenous logic surrounding natural resources has evidently permeated the Morales natural resource policy. The nationalization of various sectors including natural resources and the implementation of a successful poverty reduction program deprive Morales of a certain level of control of such policy that runs counter to rational choice theory that rentier state theory assumes. This shows that indigenous political mobilization played a significant role in diverting natural resource policy away from the rentier model. 20

22 Constitutional and Legislative Reforms: Expanding the State s Presence in the Environment and Contracting it in Indigenous Territory The victories for Ecuadorean indigenous groups were mixed in the drafting and ratification of the 2009 Ecuadorean constitution. Although it does endow the environment with unalienable rights that are to be protected by the states, the new constitution does not further indigenous rights past what had been established under the previous constitution in any concrete ways. It does declare that Ecuador is a plurinational state, but it does not explicitly extend rights to indigenous people beyond those of any Ecuadorean citizen (Constitution of Ecuador, Article 6). Although the 2009 Constitution guarantees the right of indigenous and other affected communities to be consulted before beginning extractive processes, it leaves the final decision to the state (Constitution of Ecuador, Articles 57.7 and 398). This outcome is not surprising, because CONAIE and other indigenous actors were excluded from the drafting process, indicating their lack of political voice within the Correa administration. They were left with the decision to either support the new constitution despite its lack of explicit promises, or to oppose it and further fragment the Ecuadorean left, thereby strengthening conservatives (Becker 2011:159). The failure of the 2009 constitution to deepen indigenous political rights to autonomy or to guarantee consulta prévia and CONAIE s decision to sill support its ratification shows the extent to which indigenous interests were discounted from Correa s policy plan. Meanwhile, the constituent assembly convened by Morales in 2007 and the subsequent constitution ratified by the Bolivian population in 2009, established legal protection for many of the indigenous communities demands. MAS served as a representative vehicle for a multitude, all of whom were heavily involved in the drafting of the constitution despite the Bolivian Congress s requirement that all members of the Constituent Assembly belong to a 21

23 registered political party (Silva 2010:144). The representation of indigenous groups in this Constituent Assembly ensured that indigenous Bolivians would have an active role in the drafting of a new constitution and, therefore, would be able to directly reform the legal system that MAS attributed with the perpetual inequality of the Bolivian indigenous. Politically, the new constitution enshrined indigenous rights to localized political autonomy, culture, and recognition by the state. Indigenous peoples may determine political processes of representation within their own communities without being subject to national or subnational regulation or standards (Constitution of Bolivia, Article 202.8). Consulta prévia is recognized as an integral component of Bolivian law, and another article explicitly states that indigenous communities have a right to deny or to directly benefit from resource extraction in their ancestral territory, without interference by third parties (Constitution of Bolivia, Articles 11.I.1 and 30.II.15). The 2009 constitution also established a multi-level national system of autonomy for all indigenous communities that institutionalized indigenous regional political autonomy outside of the executive branch (Constitution of Bolivia, Article 289). In response to indigenous demand, the constitution declared that Bolivia is a plurinational state and it explicitly guarantees that state entities are required to communicate in both Spanish and at least one indigenous language (Constitution of Bolivia, Article 5.II). This provision allows indigenous citizens without a grasp of Spanish to still communicate in their indigenous language and it encourages the use of these languages in an official capacity, which could protect them from extinction. However, the Constitution failed to fully address the issue of property rights for the indigenous, which still remains a source of conflict between Morales and MAS (Fabricant 2012:174). 22

24 Finally, in 2012, the Bolivian legislature passed a law declaring that it is the obligation of the state to protect Madre Tierra (Mother Earth) from exploitation, an abstract but nonetheless explicit statement that the government has an obligation to protect the environment (Achtenberg 2012). This legislation, combined with the new constitution, permanently enshrined legal protection of indigenous autonomy, consulta prévia and environmental regulations, the central indigenous political demands intended to increase local control over resource extraction. Results of Continued Indigenous Protest Around Natural Resource Policy CONAIE s diminishing mobilization capacity is most evident in its attempts to mobilize protest against Correa s regime. In light of Correa s increasingly centralized state oil policy and disinclination to institutionalize indigenous rights, CONAIE realized that the president was not only impeding their agenda, in spite of the electoral support that they lent him, but also actively undermining their mobilization. In November 2007, local indigenous groups took control of oil wells in Dayuma demanding better enforcement of consulta prévia, but Correa deployed the military to break up the protest and charged several participants with terrorism (Burbach, Fox, and Fuentes 2013:110). Three years later, in July 2010, CONAIE staged a protest of Correa s failure to reform land and water policies. Correa mobilized 10,000 of his own civilian supporters in a stronger counter-protest and accused CONAIE of attempting to destabilize his regime, thereby de-legitimizing CONAIE s cause yet again (Hispano.com, Marchas a favor y en contra de Correa ). Correa even went so far as charging four CONAIE leaders with terrorism, permanently undermining the internal organization of the movement itself (Burbach, Fox, and Fuentes 2013:111). Correa s extreme reaction to the threat he perceives from CONAIE proves that Correa has not protected indigenous interests in regards to natural resources, preferring to actively squash continued mobilization attempts by CONAIE. 23

25 By contrast, MAS has continued to effectively mobilize during the Morales era, ensuring that indigenous interests retain a pivotal role in natural resource politics. The clearest instance of recent anti-government protest occurred in 2010 when Morales implemented a tax on natural gas consumption in hopes of earning income to improve rural infrastructure (CNN, Bolivian president asks for forgiveness ). MAS believed that this tax would greatly increase the prices of basic necessities, thereby negatively affecting the poor and indigenous who spend the majority of their income on such necessities. Nationwide protests and road blockades, organized by MAS, convinced Morales to roll back the tax and ask the indigenous community for forgiveness (CNN, Bolivian president asks for forgiveness ). In the same year, MAS again mobilized against the construction of a highway through the largely indigenous Isiboro-Secure National Park and Indigenous Territory (Territorio indígena y parque nacional isiboro secure, TIPNIS), fearing environmental consequences from its construction as well as the pollution that increased traffic would bring (Burbach, Fox and Fuentes 2013:93). Again, Morales halted plans to build the highway, demonstrating Morales s desire to internally resolve conflict between MAS and his own administration rather than defy their demands. MAS continues to wield effective collective action power that bodes well for the continuation of indigenous political mobilization even after Morales s election, assuring that elected officials will be held accountable for their policies regardless of their movement affiliation. Conclusions I find that successful indigenous mobilization in Latin America can successfully circumvent the outcomes predicted by rentier state theory concerning natural resource policy. MAS s successful indigenous organization proved an electoral force to be reckoned with, succeeding in the election of a candidate from their own organization who reformed natural 24

26 resource policy to better reflect their interests. Even when Morales diverged from these interests, MAS again mobilized and forced him to reverse his actions. Meanwhile, CONAIE emerged from a competitive indigenous camp with fractured interests, and formed several unfortunate alliances with anti-neoliberal candidates who proved unwilling to cooperate once elected. Results for redefining natural resource policy according to indigenous rights have been dismal, to say the least, in Ecuador. The strategic mobilization tactics of indigenous movements is vital to bring about concrete change in natural resource policy from the neoliberal era. Indigenous movements in Bolivia, encompassed by the MAS organization, effectively furthered their own agenda through the election of Evo Morales, drafting the 2009 constitution, and protest against policies that went against their demands for indigenous political autonomy, consulta prévia, or natural resource nationalization. These successful mobilization strategies allowed the Bolivian indigenous community to leave behind their previous political insignificance and become a powerful electoral force. This change in status ensured that indigenous citizenship would be deepened by the Morales presidency. MAS demonstrated that its organizational capacity to mobilize protestors and elect presidents warranted the loyalty of elected officials and thereby assured that indigenous issues would continue to be a focus of administrations in Bolivia. By contrast, the fractured indigenous movement in Ecuador best represented by CONAIE did not managed to translate its early collective action capacity and political popularity into natural resource policy reform. Since CONAIE and Pachakutik were not able to elect a president out of their own mobilization efforts, they were forced to form ill-fated electoral coalitions, first with Gutiérrez and then with Correa. Neither president fulfilled their promises to revolutionize the oil sector and both continued or deepened neoliberal policies that disadvantage indigenous 25