SCUSA 64 Leading in Lean Times: Assuring Accountability and Assessing American Priorities in an Age of Austerity

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1 1 SCUSA 64 Leading in Lean Times: Assuring Accountability and Assessing American Priorities in an Age of Austerity Can t Stop the Bomb? Arms Control and Proliferation Nuclear weapons have been at the forefront of security policy since their advent and first use during World War II. As the Soviet Union and China crossed the nuclear threshold, attention turned to cooperative methods of limiting their spread. This resulted in a set of international agreements anchored by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). These legal agreements have faced challenges since their inception, but none so severe as Pakistan s test of a nuclear weapon in This test ushered in a new series of concerns for nuclear weapons in international security. 1 The Pakistan nuclear test took many by surprise, despite the fact that the country had been looking to achieve technological parity with its regional adversary India, which first tested a weapon in The source of surprise did not lay with Pakistan s intent, since the country had never signed on to the NPT, but in their ability to develop a weapon with minimal support from the existing nuclear powers. 2 Pakistan s capacity to cross the nuclear threshold by using informal networks and dual-use material made it clear that cooperative measures like the NPT represented only one approach to the problem and one that might not be sufficient to stem the spread of nuclear weapons in the future. The detonation of Pakistan s nuclear weapon coincided with an increase in militant Islamic terrorism marked by the African embassy bombings in 1998, the USS Cole bombing in 2000, and then the September 11 attacks against the United States in Concerns about the spread of nuclear technology fused with those of increased large-scale terrorist activity, rekindling discussions of the threat from nuclear terrorism. 4 While the international nonproliferation regime successfully limited the number of states that pursued nuclear weapons through cooperative threat reduction and regional treaties, it was not designed to handle emerging threats with greater interest in competition than cooperation. 5 Amid evolving security challenges in the late 1990s, there was increased emphasis on counterproliferation as an additional measure. 6 Counterproliferation attempts to combat the 1 See Richard K. Betts, The New Threat of Mass Destruction, Foreign Affairs 77 (January 1998), pp Pakistan received assistance from China in form of uranium and technical designs. See Bates Gill, The growing Challenge of Proliferation in Asia, in Fragility and Crisis: Strategic Asia , Ellings and Friedberg eds. (Seattle, WA: National Bureau of Asian Research) pp and Leonard Weiss, Pakistan: It's déjà vu all over again, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Vol. 60, No. 3 (May/June 2004), pp Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (New York, NY: Random House, 2002). 4 Graham Allison was one of the leading voices, but there was precedent well before. See Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, (New York, NY: Holt, 2004), but discussion in the early 1980s can be found in Thomas Schelling, Thinking about nuclear terrorism, International Security Vol. 6, No. 4 (Spring, 1982), pp George Perkovich, Nuclear Proliferation, Foreign Policy No. 112 (Autumn, 1998), pp Barry R. Schneider, Nuclear Proliferation and Counter-Proliferation: Policy Issues and Debates, Mershon International Studies Review Vol. 38, No. 2 (Oct., 1994), pp and Harald Müller and Mitchell Reiss,

2 2 spread of unconventional weapons, with nuclear capabilities at the top of the list. The turn toward counterproliferation and combating the spread of nuclear weapons represented a sea change from the cooperative approach of curtailing proliferation that dominated much of the late twentieth century. But the vision has not truly been realized. The strategic shift to a combative approach is complicated by the inertia of prior policies and an ambiguous threat that has materialized only in subtle ways. Two of the United States most pressing national security issues, the nuclear programs in Iran and North Korea, lie at the intersection of nonproliferation and counterproliferation. Both countries have challenged the principles that undergird the cooperative approach of the NPT by signing the convention and then either withdrawing or violating the agreement. Since both countries appear relatively undeterred in their quest for nuclear weapon capabilities, the policy and operational communities often resort to competitive measures such as denying resources, stifling technological advancement, and imposing costs. Despite the suite of cooperative and competitive approaches applied to these problems, there have been few hard-won victories with respect to either program over the past decade. Both issues remain centerpieces in foreign policy. Economics and trade layer an additional series of issues for consideration. There is a large and growing nuclear power industry throughout the world, and it is an important part of debates about alternative energy sources. 7 The risks associated with nuclear power, which include those pertaining to facility safety, the availability of nuclear material, and the spread of nuclear engineering know-how, are a critical component of the nuclear-power debate. The nuclear power industry is also the source of many dual-use materials, which are components that can be used for both licit and illicit nuclear programs. There is also a growing industry around nuclear and radiological materials in science and medicine that create concerns for smaller scale threats. The rest of this paper will explore some specific aspects of nuclear weapons and nonproliferation in greater detail. The next section will summarize the current state of play in the global nuclear arena, while also raising some important issues and constraints facing the global community. This will be followed by an assessment of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, particularly the underlying logic of the treaties as well its successes and failures. Finally, this paper will address counterproliferation and specifically the way it differs from nonproliferation while still being beholden to its legacy. The World of Nuclear Weapons The NPT is the centerpiece of international efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. The notion behind this cooperative agreement is simple: country A may be better off with nuclear weapons provided their neighbor country B does not have them, but once country B acquires nuclear weapons then country A would have been better off had neither pursued that course. The three pillars of the NPT, which entered into force in 1970, call for non-proliferation, disarmament, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. 8 There are five recognized nuclear powers Counterproliferation: Putting new wine in old bottles, The Washington Quarterly Vol. 18, No. 2 (1995), pp John Deutch, Arnold Kanter, Ernest Monizc, and Daniel Poneman, Making the world safe for nuclear energy, Survival Vol. 46. No. 4 (2004), pp Statute of the IAEA, 1956, Bwww.iaea.org/About/statute_text.html.

3 3 in the treaty corresponding to the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. These five countries identified in the NPT are not the only ones, however, possessing nuclear weapons. India successfully tested a nuclear weapon in 1974, and Pakistan followed in India then tested a more complicated fusion weapon in It is also widely acknowledged that Israel has an undeclared nuclear capability. None of those countries had ever signed the NPT, meaning that their proliferation activities were not violations of treaty obligations. Beyond these eight countries, there are two countries with active nuclear programs at different stages of development who were both signatories of the NPT at one point. Their activities have put them in violation of their obligations and they have subsequently been classified as rogue regimes. The North Korean pursuit of nuclear weapons began in 1956 and resulted in their first nuclear test in 2006 with a follow-on test in They withdrew from the NPT in 2003, and some have suggested the manner of their withdrawal violated international law. The result of these tests is disputed, but they appear to have achieved a modest nuclear reaction. One of the ways that North Korea managed to subvert international inspections was by running parallel programs for both plutonium and highly-enriched uranium. While much of the international attention was focused on the Yongbyon plutonium reactor, North Korea invested in its uranium program. At present, North Korea is considered a nuclear-capable country with approximately two to ten nuclear weapons. The second state currently viewed as a rogue regime is Iran. Unlike North Korea, Iran has not withdrawn from the NPT and claims that its current nuclear activities are consistent with the treaty pillar of developing nuclear energy. Iran, a leading oil producing state, argues that it wishes to reserve its petroleum stock for export and meet its domestic energy needs through nuclear power. Despite this claim, Iran has blocked inspections of many nuclear facilities, and the international nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has found Iran in violation of their treaty obligations. Iran has invested in uranium enrichment, and it seems as though they have run experiments aimed at enriching materials to levels well beyond those necessary for an energy program. There are two final categories of states that play an important role in nuclear proliferation. Many states have the nuclear material and scientific capabilities to develop nuclear weapons in a matter of months, putting them in the category of latent nuclear weapons states. Germany and Japan, for example, could probably become nuclear weapons states in less than a year. Other countries that could probably cross the weapon threshold quickly include Canada, South Korea, and Taiwan. It is unclear whether Iran aspires to be a full-fledged nuclear weapon state or whether it seeks a latent nuclear weapons capability. The final category is composed of states that have voluntarily given up nuclear ambitions after investing in weapons programs. Some of the notable examples include South Africa, Libya, Brazil, and Argentina. 9 Former Soviet states like Ukraine and Belarus opted to relinquish nuclear weapons left from the Soviet occupation after a lengthy negotiating process in the early 1990s. Debates about nuclear programs have often focused on different types of nuclear technologies. The simplest form of a nuclear weapon is an atomic bomb, where atoms collide at high speeds and break into pieces. Atom bombs use one of two designs commonly referred to as 9 Scott Helfstein, Friends Don t Let Friends Proliferate, Political Science Quarterly Vol. 125 No. 2 (2010), pp

4 4 the implosion or gun design. The gun method shoots atoms at one another from opposite sides of a tube, whereas the implosion forces the atoms to collide through inward detonation. Atom bombs yield one kiloton to five hundred kilotons of conventional explosives, and their fissile material is either enriched uranium (often 235) or plutonium (often 239). Hydrogen or thermonuclear bombs are more complicated to construct and offer much greater yields. These weapons leverage a fission trigger to generate fusion, which is the bonding of atoms. While the fission trigger will be similar to the atomic bomb, the fusion reaction uses tritium, deuterium, or lithium deuteride, in a design commonly referred to as a two-stage process. The explosive yields are reported in megatons with a 1961 Soviet test exceeding fifty megatons. The established nuclear weapons states recognized by the NPT all have thermonuclear capabilities; the rogue states, on the other hand, are pursuing the less sophisticated atomic weapons. Technological details like these, while seemingly arcane, are often at the center of debates about nuclear agreements, sanctions, verification, and disarmament. Fissile material is created through a process called the nuclear fuel cycle. Given that there are different nuclear fuels, the specifics of the cycle may be different despite similar basic processes. The cycle begins with mining the material and it is then enriched to a higher isotope and fabricated into material for use. Controversies over the North Korean program, for years, revolved around their distinction between the plutonium and highly enriched uranium program. The Iranian program, by contrast, has drawn criticism by enriching material to levels beyond those needed for energy production to isotopes that are precursors for weapon-level enrichment. There are five recognized nuclear weapons states, but more than five have nuclear weapons. Is this a problem? Is it really a security threat if rogue regimes acquire nuclear weapons, and if so, why? Are more states likely to have nuclear weapons ten or twenty years into the future? Is this a concern for the U.S. and the international system? How might they react to future nuclear weapons cascades? Nuclear Nonproliferation The policy of nonproliferation has been the cornerstone of United States nuclear policy since the 1950s. Nonproliferation is generally defined as preventing the spread of something, but in the context of nuclear weapons it has come to reflect a far more specific set of concepts. The use of nuclear weapons at the end of World War II was quickly followed by the first Soviet nuclear test in Subsequent years proved ever more dangerous as nuclear tests grew larger until the development of the hydrogen bomb in the early 1960s. The power of these weapons frightened world leaders. 10 In 1958, the Irish External Minister introduced the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The theory behind nuclear arms control and the NPT comes from liberal schools of international relations theory, which have developed the idea of cooperation under anarchy. 11 The treaty only works when countries feel they are better off not having nuclear weapons, as long as other countries (except for the five nuclear weapons states) do not have them as well John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2005). 11 Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions, World Politics 38 (1985), Robert Axelrod, Evolution of Cooperation (New York, NY: Basic Books 1984). There is also an important argument about the risks associated with accidental nuclear use, for example see Scott Sagan, The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, International Security 18 (1994),

5 5 The theory is similar to that of repeated prisoner s dilemma. 13 Both players are always incentivized to deviate from the cooperative outcome (in this case, proliferate) with any one play, but mutual cooperation becomes a stable state over an infinite number of plays. The treaty and associated regime is built on mutual or multilateral cooperative interests. International treaties must take account of four components: coordination, distribution, information, and enforcement. 14 Coordination and distribution issues are often addressed in treaty negotiation, where parties decide what they agree upon (coordination) and the distribution of benefits across signatories. Once the treaty goes into effect, success is often based on enforcement mechanisms or punishments should a signatory violate their obligations. Information about activities is a critical component in identifying violations. The State Department, the Defense Department, and the Department of Energy all include senior level offices that address nonproliferation and nuclear treaties. These efforts usually focus on three areas: states, science, and verification. The nonproliferation regime is designed first and foremost around states. The articles of the treaty establish acceptable and unacceptable standards for states. It is the governments that choose to be signatories of the agreements, recognizing that such an action binds them to international law on nonproliferation. This is a reasonable course of action given that the difficulties of developing nuclear weapons make states the most likely actors to pursue such programs. Over time, however, threats may originate elsewhere. The second area that receives great attention in nonproliferation is science and technical capabilities. Nuclear weapon development is a scientific endeavor, meaning that knowledge and skill sets are critical to weapons development. There is significant investment in nuclear technologies, which include methods and tools for weapons development as well as sensing research to help identify other states nuclear capability. The sensing component leads into the third component underlying the United States efforts in nonproliferation. Verification helps to solve information problems and allow for treaty enforcement should certain parties engage in prohibited activities. International bodies want to ensure that parties are complying with the treaty provisions, but this requires knowledge of illicit activities. There must be ways, albeit imperfect ones, of verifying the activities of signatories; these may be technological means such as sensors, human intelligence sources, or international trading activities involving dual-use materials or suspicious financial transactions. The nuclear nonproliferation treaties have had their share of both supporters and detractors. Those that condemn the NPT are quick to point out the rogue activities of North Korea and Iran, while also pointing to the geopolitical complexities resulting from the proliferation activities of those states that never signed the treaty: India, Israel, and Pakistan. It is also clear that the international community has struggled with the appropriate response to states that remain outside the treaty or violate their obligations. There is concern today that a new nuclear weapons cascade could occur at any time given geopolitical pressures in the Middle East and Asia. The most extreme argument against the NPT actually rejects the underlying concepts 13 James Morrow, Game Theory for Political Scientists (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994). 14 James D. Morrow, Modeling the forms of international cooperation: distribution versus information, International Organization Vol. 48 No. 3 (June 1994), pp

6 6 and expounds the virtues of a world filled with nuclear weapon states so afraid of one another that war becomes almost unthinkable. 15 While the NPT and related attempts at nonproliferation have drawn substantial criticism, supporters often point to an impressive historical record. 16 All but three countries have signed the NPT. While some states continued nuclear weapons programs after initially signing the treaty, evidence suggests that all but the two rogue regimes have terminated their programs. Of almost two hundred states, there are, then, only five the two rogues and the three nonsignatories that present a serious challenge to the NPT. Over the past forty years, the vast majority of the world s states have decided that nonproliferation is in their national interest. Past success does not necessarily mean that there are not serious challenges to the international nonproliferation treaty regime moving forward. For example, the treaty allows five states to have nuclear weapons, but the rising power India is not among them. India can continue to remain outside the NPT, as it has done thus far, but this may present a challenge as the country plays an increasingly important role in international politics. There are also serious challenges associated with enforcement and the capacity to punish those that violate their obligations. 17 The disarmament and nuclear energy provisions in the NPT also present a challenge. While the United States and Russia have undertaken steps in disarmament through strategic arms treaties, there is waning interest on either side to move below current levels. There are ongoing debates about modernizing the nuclear weapons arsenal in the United States before reducing warhead numbers further. 18 Countries that are weary of the nonproliferation treaties often point to the large arsenals in the United States and Russia as evidence that the accepted nuclear powers have not met their obligation of disarmament. While there is a movement interested in achieving a global zero, that is a world with no nuclear weapons, there is no clear path to achieve that end. 19 The provision for the peaceful use of nuclear energy is also a challenge. It often serves as the justification that countries like Iran and North Korea use to develop nuclear weapons programs. They acquire commercial technologies involved in nuclear energy and leverage dualuse resources. Has the NPT and nonproliferation initiatives been effective at stemming the spread of nuclear weapons? If so, why has it succeeded? If not, why has it failed? Is there a way to strengthen the successful parts while addressing weaknesses? Should this continue to be an international priority, or is technological advancement making this thinking obsolete? Is nonproliferation the only tool, or even the best tool, to address the spread of nuclear weapons in the future? 15 Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better. Adelphi Paper No (London, UK: IISS, 1981); and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and William H. Riker, An Assessment of the Merits of Selective Nuclear Proliferation, Journal of Conflict Resolution 26 (1982), George Perkovich, Nuclear Proliferation, Foreign Policy No. 112 (Autumn, 1998), pp For an empirical test of state proclivity to pursue nuclear weapons, see Sonali Singh and Christopher R. Way, The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation: A Quantitative Test, Journal of Conflict Resolution 48 (December 2004), See George Perkovich, Bush's Nuclear Revolution A Regime Change in Nonproliferation, Foreign Affairs 82 (March April 2003), 2; Symposium, Is Preemption Necessary? The Washington Quarterly 26 (Spring 2003), ; and Jofi Joseph, The Exercise of National Sovereignty: The Bush Administration's Approach to Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation, The Nonproliferation Review 12 (July 2005), See Dana Priest, Aging U.S. nuclear arsenal slated for costly and long-delayed modernization, Washington Post September 15, 2012 and Reif Kingston, Nuclear weapons: The modernization myth, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists December 8, Ivo Daalder and Jan Lodal, The Logic of Zero: Toward a World Without Nuclear Weapons, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 6 (November/December 2008), pp

7 7 Counterproliferation The existence of dual-use technologies highlights one of the weaknesses associated with nonproliferation. 20 Since nonproliferation relies on a cooperative framework where the underlying assumption is that the parties will opt to forgo weapons, there is no clear mechanism to address states or sub-state entities that eschew threat reduction and choose instead to pursue these weapons. States may choose to opt out or withdraw from the NPT, while sub-state actors like terrorists are not a party to such agreements. Nonproliferation is not well-suited to these entities or problem sets. Counterproliferation is the active process of combating others efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. The concept of counterproliferation gained traction in the late 1980s and early 1990s with the disintegration of the Soviet Union. 21 The Soviets had maintained nuclear arsenals in many of the satellite states such as Ukraine and Belarus and these countries had an expansive nuclear architecture. Although the newly independent states would ultimately accede to the NPT, there were concerns about unsecured nuclear material moving out of the region. While the total quantity of orphaned nuclear sources remains unclear, the mere possibility that terrorists or rogue regimes would acquire those materials motivated a more active stance towards preventing their spread. The IAEA has identified 1,080 cases of illicit trafficking and other unauthorized use of nuclear and radiological materials from 1993 through To date, the only known instances of nuclear material used in terrorist bombs occurred in connection with Chechen separatists, though these devices were never detonated. 22 While counterproliferation is envisioned as a distinct approach to halting the spread of nuclear weapons, it has relied on tools quite similar to those in nonproliferation. For example, one of the major counterproliferation initiatives is an international agreement called the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which is a group of countries that agree to take more active steps such as prohibiting the sale of dual-use materials and investing in nuclear detection capabilities. 23 These measures have proved important, but the PSI is itself an international treaty much the like the NPT. The approach involves cooperation with other states as a solution to rogues and sub-state behavior. The emphasis on states and state solutions is not the only legacy of nonproliferation. Counterproliferation efforts are generally focused on scientific solutions. For example, much of the nuclear detection technologies currently used were developed in support of counterproliferation initiatives. The evolving science of nuclear forensics is another example. The United States and some partner countries have invested heavily to build a database of nuclear signatures, so should a nuclear explosion occur or smuggled nuclear material be seized, 20 John F. Sopko, The Changing Proliferation Threat, Foreign Policy, No. 105 (Winter, ), pp Schneider 1994; Müller and Reiss There have been no instances of nuclear terrorism to date, and there a no specific reports of attempted radiological attacks since The first two radiological incidents, in 1995 and 1998, involved Chechen Separatists and caesium-137 sources targeting a park in Moscow and a railroad east of Grozny, respectively. The 2000 incident involved a bomb at Russian nuclear facility, but the Russians reported that there was no ongoing nuclear activity at the facility. The Pakistan Taliban has also targeted that country s nuclear facilities in offensive attacks. 23 Andrew C. Winer, The proliferation security initiative: The new face of interdiction, The Washington Quarterly Vol. 28, No. 2 (2005), pp and Thomas D. Lehrman, Rethinking interdiction: The future of the proliferation security initiative, The Nonproliferation Review Vol. 11, No. 2 (2004), pp

8 8 their origins could be traced. At present, many are skeptical about such efforts, but there is an effort to improve capabilities over time. Many of the primary counterproliferation activities, in short, bear the signature of their nonproliferation origins by focusing on states and science. Nuclear smuggling below that state level has been rare, but it represents a challenge. The largest case of nuclear smuggling involved the AQ Kahn network, which supplied weapons designs, centrifuges and other materials to rogue states like Libya and North Korea. 24 AQ Kahn was the head of Pakistan s nuclear program. After Pakistan acquired nuclear weapons, Kahn repurposed the network for smuggling nuclear technologies. It took a number of years to identify the activity and dismantle the network. While Kahn has been under house arrest in Pakistan, and is widely viewed as a national hero despite the smuggling activities, no other member of the network faced significant penalties including posttrial incarceration. The case highlights many of the problems facing global efforts in counterproliferation. What is the appropriate emphasis on nonproliferation versus counterproliferation going forward? Are current counterproliferation initiatives sufficient to address the threats, and if not, what new ones might be considered? What are the risks and costs associated with noncooperative (i.e. counterproliferation) initiatives? What are the risks of ignoring counterproliferation measures? Concluding Policy Issues Can the NPT, a static treaty, remain relevant in a dynamic world? The NPT only acknowledges five nuclear weapons states, but this no longer represents the universe of states that possess nuclear weapons. Is it possible to maintain the NPT as reality diverges from the agreed construct? If so, what measures should be taken to strengthen the treaty in light of these weaknesses, and if not, what course should the United States follow in its stead? What, if anything, must the international community to do improve upon the current framework? How would one go about bringing the relevant international players to the negotiating table? What goals should the United States pursue in the nuclear weapons arena? Should the United States continue to invest in nonproliferation or would national interest be better met by alternative methods of dealing with nuclear weapons? Is pursuit of global zero, or a world without nuclear weapons, in the best interest of the United States? Is the current emphasis on state versus non-state threat appropriate, and if not, how might it be changed? Much discussion of nuclear weapons emphasizes the national and international interest in stemming the spread, but what role should nuclear weapons play in U.S. defense policy? Should they be an active part of the defense posture, or is that role more likely to trigger proliferation elsewhere? Should the United States more actively offer security guarantees to allies through threats of nuclear retaliation (what is often called the nuclear umbrella), or should the United States avoid using nuclear weapons to make security guarantees? If other countries pursue a new generation of tactical nuclear weapons, which is very possible, should the United States follow suit? What would the implications be for the NPT? 24 Chaim Braun and Christopher F. Chyba, Proliferation Rings: New Challenges to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime, International Security Vol. 29, No. 2 (Fall 2004), pp

9 9 Recommended Readings Barry R. Schneider, Nuclear Proliferation and Counter-Proliferation: Policy Issues and Debates. Mershon International Studies Review 38 (1994), Scott Helfstein, Friends Don t Let Friends Proliferate, Political Science Quarterly Vol. 125 No. 2 (2010), pp Nina Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo : the United States and the non-use of nuclear weapons since 1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002) Sonali Singh and Christopher R. Way, The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation: A Quantitative Test, Journal of Conflict Resolution 48 (December 2004),

10 10 Additional Readings Alexander H. Montgomery and Scott D. Sagan, The Perils of Predicting Proliferation, Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 53 No. 2 (April 2009), Andrew C. Winer, The proliferation security initiative: The new face of interdiction, The Washington Quarterly Vol. 28, No. 2 (2005), pp Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and William H. Riker, An Assessment of the Merits of Selective Nuclear Proliferation, Journal of Conflict Resolution 26 (1982), Chaim Braun and Christopher F. Chyba, Proliferation Rings: New Challenges to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime, International Security Vol. 29, No. 2 (Fall 2004), pp Dong-Joon Jo and Erik Gartzke, Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation, Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 51 No. 1 (February 2007), Graham T. Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe (New York: Times Books, 2004). Ivo Daalder and Jan Lodal, The Logic of Zero: Toward a World Without Nuclear Weapons, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 6 (November/December 2008), pp Jacques E. C. Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). Marc Trachtenberg, The Influence of Nuclear Weapons in the Cuban Missile Crisis, International Security, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Summer, 1985), pp Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995) Ray Takeyh, The Rogue Who Came In from the Cold, Foreign Affairs 80 (May/June 2001) Peter D. Feaver and Emerson M.S. Niou, Managing Nuclear Proliferation: Condemn, Strike, or Assist? International Studies Quarterly 40 (June 1996), pp Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions, World Politics 38 (October 1985), pp Scott Sagan, The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, International Security 18 (1994),

11 11 Scott D. Sagan, Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb. International Security Vol. 21 No.3 (Winter 1996), Steven E. Miller, The Case Against a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent, Foreign Affairs 72 (Summer 1993), pp Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New York: Praeger, 1977) Whitney Raas and Austin Long, Osirak Redux? Assessing Israeli Capabilities to Destroy Iranian Nuclear Facilities, International Security 31 (Spring 2007), Ted Galen Carpenter, Closing the Nuclear Umbrella, Foreign Affairs 73 (March/April 1994).