United Nations Security Council (UNSC)

Size: px
Start display at page:

Download "United Nations Security Council (UNSC)"

Transcription

1

2 United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Committee Introduction The United Nations Security Council (UNSC), has a primary responsibility under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security. It is for the Security Council to determine when and where a UN Peacekeeping operation should be deployed. The Security Council takes the lead in determining the existence of a threat to the peace or act of aggression. It calls upon the parties to a dispute to settle it by peaceful means and recommends methods of adjustment or terms of settlement. In some cases, the Security Council can resort to imposing sanctions or even authorize the use of force to maintain or restore international peace and security. The Security Council also recommends to the General Assembly the appointment of the Secretary-General and the admission of new Members to the United Nations. And, together with the General Assembly, it elects the judges of the International Court of Justice. HUMUN 17 UNSC recognizes the growing need to develop mechanisms to check the recent surge in production of nuclear arsenals and development along with the irresponsible use of radioactive ammunitions by countries all over the world, especially after the recent North Korea and US foreign relations row. As per our theme, we ll also be looking in detail what needs to be done regarding extremist outfits like Boko Haram in Africa. Topic A - North Korean Nuclear Proliferation

3 What needs to be done for countries developing nuclear weaponry? Introduction and History: A nuclear weapon is an explosive device that derives its destructive force from nuclear reactions, either fission (fission bomb) or from a combination of fission and fusion reactions (thermonuclear bomb). Both bomb types release large quantities of energy from relatively small amounts of matter. Nuclear weapons have been used twice in war, both times by the United States against Japan near the end of World War II. On August 6, 1945, the U.S. Army Air Forces detonated a uranium gun-type fission bomb nicknamed "Little Boy" over the Japanese city of Hiroshima; three days later, on August 9, the U.S. Army Air Forces detonated a plutonium implosion-type fission bomb nicknamed "Fat Man" over the Japanese city of Nagasaki. These bombings resulted in the deaths of approximately 200,000 civilians and military personnel from injuries sustained from the explosions. Since the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nuclear weapons have been detonated over two thousand times for testing and demonstration. Only a few nations possess such weapons or are suspected of seeking them. The only countries known to have detonated nuclear weapons and acknowledge possessing them are (chronologically by date of first test) the United States, the Soviet Union (succeeded as a nuclear power by Russia), the United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, and North Korea. Israel is believed to possess nuclear weapons, though, in a policy of deliberate ambiguity, it does not acknowledge having them. Germany, Italy, Turkey, Belgium and the Netherlands are nuclear weapons sharing states. South Africa is the only country to have independently developed and then renounced and dismantled its nuclear weapons. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons aims to reduce the spread of nuclear weapons, but its effectiveness has been questioned, and political tensions remained high in the 1970s and 1980s. Modernisation of weapons continues to this day. List Of States Involved: There are eight sovereign states that have successfully detonated nuclear weapons. Five are considered to be "nuclear-weapon states" (NWS) under the terms of the Treaty

4 on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). In order of acquisition of nuclear weapons these are: the United States, the Russian Federation (the successor state to the Soviet Union), the United Kingdom, France, and China. Since the NPT entered into force in 1970, three states that were not parties to the Treaty have conducted nuclear tests, namely India, Pakistan, and North Korea. North Korea had been a party to the NPT but withdrew in Israel is also widely known to have nuclear weapons, though it maintains a policy of deliberate ambiguity regarding this (has not acknowledged it), and is not known definitively to have conducted a nuclear test. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's SIPRI Yearbook of 2014, Israel has approximately 80 nuclear warheads. According to Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Nuclear Notebook, the total number of nuclear weapons worldwide is estimated at 9,920 in South Africa developed nuclear weapons but then disassembled its arsenal before joining the NPT. Nations that are known or thought to have nuclear weapons are sometimes referred to informally as the nuclear club. Following is the map showing nuclear armed states of the world,

5 The United States developed the first nuclear weapons during World War II in cooperation with the United Kingdom and Canada as part of the Manhattan Project, out of the fear that Nazi Germany would develop them first. It tested the first nuclear weapon on July 16, 1945 ("Trinity") at 5:30 am, and remains the only country to have used nuclear weapons in war, devastating the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It was the first nation to develop the hydrogen bomb, testing an experimental prototype in 1952 ("Ivy Mike") and a deployable weapon in 1954 ("Castle Bravo"). Throughout the Cold War it continued to modernize and enlarge its nuclear arsenal, but from 1992 on has been involved primarily in a program of Stockpile stewardship.

6 The Soviet Union tested its first nuclear weapon ("RDS-1") in 1949, in a crash project developed partially with espionage obtained during and after World War II. The Soviet Union was the second nation to have developed and tested a nuclear weapon. The direct motivation for Soviet weapons development was to achieve a balance of power during the Cold War. It tested its first megaton-range hydrogen bomb ("RDS-37") in The Soviet Union also tested the most powerful explosive ever detonated by humans, ("Tsar Bomba"), with a theoretical yield of 100 megatons, intentionally reduced to 50 when detonated. The United Kingdom tested its first nuclear weapon ("Hurricane") in The UK had provided considerable impetus and initial research for the early conception of the atomic bomb, aided by the presence of refugee scientists working in British laboratories who had fled the continent. It collaborated closely with the United States and Canada during the Manhattan Project, but had to develop its own method for manufacturing and detonating a bomb as U.S. secrecy grew after The United Kingdom was the third country in the world, after the United States and Soviet Union, to develop and test a nuclear weapon. Its programme was motivated to have an independent deterrent against the Soviet Union, while also maintaining its status as a great power. It tested its first hydrogen bomb in 1957 (Operation Grapple), making it the third country to do so after the United States and Soviet Union. France tested its first nuclear weapon in 1960 ("Gerboise Bleue"), based mostly on its own research. It was motivated by the Suez Crisis diplomatic tension vis-à-vis both the Soviet Union and the Free World allies United States and United Kingdom. It was also relevant to retain great power status, alongside the United Kingdom, during the postcolonial Cold War (see: Force de frappe). France tested its first hydrogen bomb in 1968 ("Opération Canopus"). After the Cold War, France has disarmed 175 warheads with the reduction and modernization of its arsenal that has now evolved to a dual system based on submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and medium-range air-tosurface missiles (Rafale fighter-bombers).

7 China tested its first nuclear weapon device ("596") in 1964 at the Lop Nur test site. The weapon was developed as a deterrent against both the United States and the Soviet Union. Two years later, China had a fission bomb capable of being put onto a nuclear missile. It tested its first hydrogen bomb ("Test No. 6") in 1967, a mere 32 months after testing its first nuclear weapon (the shortest fission-to-fusion development known in history). India tested what it called a "peaceful nuclear explosive" in 1974 (which became known as "Smiling Buddha"). The test was the first test developed after the creation of the NPT, and created new questions about how civilian nuclear technology could be diverted secretly to weapons purposes (dual-use technology). India's secret development caused great concern and anger particularly from nations, such as Canada, that had supplied its nuclear reactors for peaceful and power generating needs. Indian officials rejected the NPT in the 1960s on the grounds that it created a world of nuclear "haves" and "have-nots", arguing that it unnecessarily restricted "peaceful activity" (including "peaceful nuclear explosives"), and that India would not accede to international control of their nuclear facilities unless all other countries engaged in unilateral disarmament of their own nuclear weapons. The Indian position has also asserted that the NPT is in many ways a neo-colonial regime designed to deny security to post-colonial powers. Even after its 1974 test, India maintained that its nuclear capability was primarily "peaceful", but between 1988 and 1990 it apparently weaponized two dozen nuclear weapons for delivery by air. In 1998 India tested weaponized nuclear warheads ("Operation Shakti"), including a thermonuclear device. Pakistan also is not a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Pakistan covertly developed nuclear weapons over decades, beginning in the late 1970s. Pakistan first delved into nuclear power after the establishment of its first nuclear power plant near Karachi with equipment and materials supplied mainly by western nations in the early 1970s. Pakistani President Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto promised in 1971 that if India could build nuclear weapons then Pakistan would too, according to him: "We will develop Nuclear stockpiles, even if we have to eat grass." It is believed that Pakistan has possessed nuclear weapons since the mid-1980s. The United States continued to certify that Pakistan did not possess such weapons until 1990, when sanctions were imposed

8 under the Pressler Amendment, requiring a cutoff of U.S. economic and military assistance to Pakistan. In 1998, Pakistan conducted its first six nuclear tests at the Ras Koh Hills in response to the five tests conducted by India a few weeks before. In 2004, the Pakistani metallurgist Abdul Qadeer Khan, a key figure in Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, confessed to heading an international black market ring involved in selling nuclear weapons technology. In particular, Khan had been selling gas centrifuge technology to North Korea, Iran, and Libya. Khan denied complicity by the Pakistani government or Army, but this has been called into question by journalists and IAEA officials, and was later contradicted by statements from Khan himself. Israel is widely known to have been the sixth country in the world to develop nuclear weapons, but has not acknowledged its nuclear forces. It had "rudimentary, but deliverable," nuclear weapons available as early as The Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) concluded after reviewing the evidence given by Vanunu that as of 1987, "the Israelis are roughly where the U.S. was in the fission weapon field in about 1955 to 1960." and would require supercomputers or parallel computing clusters to refine their hydrogen bomb designs for improved yields without testing, though noting in 1987 they were already then developing the computer code base required. West Germany army magazine, Wehrtechnik ("military technology"), claimed that western intelligence documented that Israel had conducted an underground test in the Negev in There is also speculation that Israel may have tested a nuclear weapon along with South Africa in 1979, but this has not been confirmed, and interpretation of the Vela Incident is controversial. The stated purpose of the Negev Nuclear Research Center near Dimona is to advance basic nuclear science and applied research on nuclear energy. The primary focus is on North Korea developing Nuclear weaponry. North Korea was a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, but announced a withdrawal on January 10, 2003, after the United States accused it of having a secret uranium enrichment

9 program and cut off energy assistance under the 1994 Agreed Framework. In February 2005, North Korea claimed to possess functional nuclear weapons, though their lack of a test at the time led many experts to doubt the claim. However, in October 2006, North Korea stated that due to growing intimidation by the United States, it would conduct a nuclear test to confirm its nuclear status. North Korea reported a successful nuclear test on October 9, 2006 (see 2006 North Korean nuclear test). Most U.S. intelligence officials believe that North Korea did, in fact, test a nuclear device due to radioactive isotopes detected by U.S. aircraft; however, most agree that the test was probably only partially successful. The yield may have been less than a kiloton, which is much smaller than the first successful tests of other powers; boosted fission weapons may have an unboosted yield in this range, which is sufficient to start deuterium-tritium fusion in the boost gas at the center; the fast neutrons from fusion then ensure a full fission yield. North Korea conducted a second, higher yield test on 25 May 2009 (see 2009 North Korean nuclear test) and a third test with still higher yield on 12 February 2013 (see 2013 North Korean nuclear test). North Korea claimed to have conducted its first H- bomb test on 5 January 2016, though measurements of seismic disturbances indicate that the detonation was not consistent with a hydrogen bomb.

10 Treaties, Agreements and Intervention: By the 1960s steps were taken to limit both the proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries and the environmental effects of nuclear testing. The Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (1963) restricted all nuclear testing to underground nuclear testing, to prevent contamination from nuclear fallout, whereas the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1968) attempted to place restrictions on the types of activities signatories could participate in, with the goal of allowing the transference of non-military nuclear technology to member countries without fear of proliferation. Nuclear disarmament refers to both the act of reducing or eliminating nuclear weapons and to the end state of a nuclear-free world, in which nuclear weapons are eliminated. Beginning with the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty and continuing through the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, there have been many treaties to limit or reduce nuclear weapons testing and stockpiles. The 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has as one of its explicit conditions that all signatories must "pursue negotiations in good faith" towards the long-term goal of "complete disarmament". The nuclear weapon states have largely treated that aspect of the agreement as "decorative" and without force. In the years after the end of the Cold War, there have been numerous campaigns to urge the abolition of nuclear weapons, such as that organized by the Global Zero movement, and the goal of a "world without nuclear weapons" was advocated by United States President Barack Obama in an April 2009 speech in Prague.

11 Global Zero: Global Zero is a term in the literature of arms control that refers to the worldwide elimination of a weapons system, especially nuclear weapons or a particular class of nuclear weapons. In negotiations over the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, both sides discussed and eventually agreed to the "global zero option" in delivery vehicles with intermediate range. This option differed from other proposals that would only restrict the use of intermediate-range delivery vehicles in the European theater. The term "global zero" has also been used in connection with de-alerting nuclear weapons and the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons. The generic term "global zero" or "zero" is often associated with nuclear disarmament or the worldwide elimination of nuclear weapons in arms control discourse. Various arms control campaigns have referred to themselves as Ground Zero or simply as Global Zero. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT):

12 The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, commonly known as the Non- Proliferation Treaty or NPT, is an international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. Opened for signature in 1968, the treaty entered into force in As required by the text, after twenty-five years, NPT Parties met in May 1995 and agreed to extend the treaty indefinitely. More countries have adhered to the NPT than any other arms limitation and disarmament agreement, a testament to the treaty's significance. As of August 2016, 191 states have adhered to the treaty, though North Korea, which acceded in 1985 but never came into compliance, announced its withdrawal from the NPT in 2003, following detonation of nuclear devices in violation of core obligations. Four UN member states have never accepted the NPT, three of which are thought to possess nuclear weapons: India, Israel, and Pakistan. In addition, South Sudan, founded in 2011, has not joined. The treaty defines nuclear-weapon states as those that have built and tested a nuclear explosive device before 1 January 1967; these are the United States, Russia, the

13 United Kingdom, France, and China. Four other states are known or believed to possess nuclear weapons: India, Pakistan, and North Korea have openly tested and declared that they possess nuclear weapons, while Israel is deliberately ambiguous regarding its nuclear weapons status. The NPT is often seen to be based on a central bargain: The NPT non-nuclear-weapon states agree never to acquire nuclear weapons and the NPT nuclear-weapon states in exchange agree to share the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology and to pursue nuclear disarmament aimed at the ultimate elimination of their nuclear arsenals. The treaty is reviewed every five years in meetings called Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Even though the treaty was originally conceived with a limited duration of 25 years, the signing parties decided, by consensus, to unconditionally extend the treaty indefinitely during the Review Conference in New York City on 11 May 1995, culminating successful U.S. government efforts led by Ambassador Thomas Graham Jr. At the time the NPT was proposed, there were predictions of nuclear weapon states within 20 years. Instead, over forty years later, five states are not parties to the NPT, and they include the only four additional states believed to possess nuclear weapons. Several additional measures have been adopted to strengthen the NPT and the broader nuclear nonproliferation regime and make it difficult for states to acquire the capability to produce nuclear weapons, including the export controls of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the enhanced verification measures of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol.

14 Critics argue that the NPT cannot stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons or the motivation to acquire them. They express disappointment with the limited progress on nuclear disarmament, where the five authorized nuclear weapons states still have 22,000 warheads in their combined stockpile and have shown a reluctance to disarm further. Several high-ranking officials within the United Nations have said that they can do little to stop states using nuclear reactors to produce nuclear weapons. the treaty is nevertheless sometimes interpreted as a three-pillar system, with an implicit balance among them: I. non-proliferation, Under Article I of the NPT, nuclear-weapon states pledge not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices to any recipient or in any way assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear-weapon state in the manufacture or acquisition of a nuclear weapon. Under Article II of the NPT, non-nuclear-weapon states pledge not to acquire or exercise control over nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and not to seek or receive assistance in the manufacture of such devices. Under Article III of the Treaty, non-nuclear-weapon states pledge to accept IAEA safeguards to verify that their nuclear activities serve only peaceful purposes. Five states are recognized by NPT as nuclear weapon states (NWS): China (signed 1992), France (1992), the Soviet Union (1968; obligations and rights now assumed by the Russian Federation), the United Kingdom (1968), and the United States (1968). These five nations are also the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.

15 II.disarmament, and Under Article VI of the NPT, all Parties undertake to pursue good-faith negotiations on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race, to nuclear disarmament, and to general and complete disarmament. Article VI of the NPT represents the only binding commitment in a multilateral treaty to the goal of disarmament by the nuclear-weapon states. The NPT's preamble contains language affirming the desire of treaty signatories to ease international tension and strengthen international trust so as to create someday the conditions for a halt to the production of nuclear weapons, and treaty on general and complete disarmament that liquidates, in particular, nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles from national arsenals. No current nuclear weapons state, the argument goes, would seriously consider eliminating its last nuclear weapons without high confidence that other countries would not acquire them. Some observers have even suggested that the very progress of disarmament by the superpowers which has led to the elimination of thousands of weapons and delivery systems could eventually make the possession of nuclear weapons more attractive by increasing the perceived strategic value of a small arsenal. III.the right to peacefully use nuclear technology. NPT Article IV acknowledges the right of all Parties to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and to benefit from international cooperation in this area, in conformity with their nonproliferation obligations. Article IV also encourages such cooperation. The third pillar allows for and agrees upon the transfer of nuclear technology and materials to NPT signatory countries for the development of civilian nuclear energy programs in those countries, as long as they can demonstrate that their nuclear programs are not being used for the development of nuclear weapons. Since very few of the states with nuclear energy programs are willing to abandon the use of nuclear energy, the third pillar of the NPT under Article IV provides other states with the possibility to do the same, but under conditions intended to make it difficult to develop nuclear weapons. The treaty recognizes the inalienable right of sovereign states to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, but restricts this right for NPT parties to be

16 exercised "in conformity with Articles I and II" (the basic nonproliferation obligations that constitute the "first pillar" of the treaty). As the commercially popular light water reactor nuclear power station uses enriched uranium fuel, it follows that states must be able either to enrich uranium or purchase it on an international market. Mohamed ElBaradei, then Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, has called the spread of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities the "Achilles' heel" of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. As of states have an enrichment capability. North Korea ratified the treaty on 12 December 1985, but gave notice of withdrawal from the treaty on 10 January 2003 following U.S. allegations that it had started an illegal enriched uranium weapons program, and the U.S. subsequently stopping fuel oil shipments under the Agreed Framework which had resolved plutonium weapons issues in The withdrawal became effective 10 April 2003 making North Korea the first state ever to withdraw from the treaty. North Korea had once before announced withdrawal, on 12 March 1993, but suspended that notice before it came into effect. On 10 February 2005, North Korea publicly declared that it possessed nuclear weapons and pulled out of the six-party talks hosted by China to find a diplomatic solution to the issue. "We had already taken the resolute action of pulling out of the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty and have manufactured nuclear arms for self-defence to cope with the Bush administration's evermore undisguised policy to isolate and stifle the DPRK [Democratic People's Republic of Korea]," a North Korean Foreign Ministry statement said regarding the issue. Six-party talks resumed in July On 19 September 2005, North Korea announced that it would agree to a preliminary accord. Under the accord, North Korea would scrap all of its existing nuclear weapons and nuclear production facilities, rejoin the NPT, and readmit IAEA inspectors. The difficult issue of the supply of light water reactors to replace North Korea's indigenous nuclear power plant program, as per the 1994 Agreed Framework, was left to be resolved in future discussions. On the next day North Korea reiterated its known view that until it is supplied with a light water reactor it will not dismantle its nuclear arsenal or rejoin the NPT.

17 On 2 October 2006, the North Korean foreign minister announced that his country was planning to conduct a nuclear test "in the future", although it did not state when. On Monday, 9 October 2006 at 01:35:28 (UTC) the United States Geological Survey detected a magnitude 4.3 seismic event 70 km (43 mi) north of Kimchaek, North Korea indicating a nuclear test. The North Korean government announced shortly afterward that they had completed a successful underground test of a nuclear fission device.

18 Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (PTBT): The Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) is the abbreviated name of the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, which prohibited all test detonations of nuclear weapons except for those conducted underground. It is also abbreviated as the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) and Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (NTBT), though the latter may also refer to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which succeeded the PTBT for ratifying parties. Negotiations initially focused on a comprehensive ban, but this was abandoned due to technical questions surrounding the detection of underground tests and Soviet concerns over the intrusiveness of proposed verification methods. The impetus for the test ban was provided by rising public anxiety over the magnitude of nuclear tests, particularly tests of new thermonuclear weapons (hydrogen bombs), and the resulting nuclear fallout. A test ban was also seen as a means of slowing nuclear proliferation and the nuclear arms race. Though the PTBT did not halt proliferation or the arms race, its enactment did coincide with a substantial decline in the concentration of radioactive particles in the atmosphere.

19 The PTBT was signed by the governments of the Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and United States in Moscow on 5 August 1963 before being opened for signature by other countries. The treaty formally went into effect on 10 October Since then, 123 other states have become party to the treaty. Ten states have signed but not ratified the treaty. Early compliance with the PTBT was believed to be good, though there have been a number of accidental releases of nuclear debris into the atmosphere by parties to the treaty. Additionally, "venting" of underground tests by the US and Soviet Union also continued to release radioactive debris into the atmosphere. Fully contained underground tests were not wholly "clean" either. Underground testing reduced the risk caused by radionuclides with short half-lives, such as iodine-131, and is generally safer than other forms of testing. However, underground testing may also cause long-lived radionuclides, including caesium-135, iodine-129, and plutonium, to seep into the ground. A notable atmospheric release of radioactive gas followed the Soviet Chagan test of 15 January 1965 in present-day Kazakhstan. Roughly 20% of the radioactive debris produced by the 140-kiloton detonation was released into the atmosphere, with some fallout occurring over Japan. The US complained to Moscow, but no subsequent action was taken. On 25 April 1966, the Pin Stripe underground test in Nevada (part of Operation Flintlock) experienced a venting malfunction and produced a radioactive plume headed towards the Midwestern US; the AEC determined that the test did not threaten human health.

20 Another accidental release occurred following the Baneberry shot at the Nevada Test Site on 18 December 1970 (part of Operation Emery). The 10-kiloton underground detonation produced a fissure in the ground, which subsequently allowed radioactive gas to escape into the atmosphere. Radioactive material released by the fissure reached an altitude of 10,000 feet (3,000 m) and exposed 86 workers to radiation, though none at excessive levels. [188] The incident has since been described as one of the "world's worst nuclear disasters." Declassified US documents indicate that the US may have violated the PTBT's ban on atmospheric testing in 1972 by, at the instruction of Henry Kissinger, monitoring and collecting data on French atmospheric tests over the Pacific Ocean, which may have amounted to cooperation with the French program. Declassified documents also indicate that the US and UK circumvented the prescribed verification system in by establishing a series of additional control posts in Australia, Fiji, Mauritius, Pakistan, and South Africa. The 1979 Vela Incident in the southern Atlantic Ocean may have been an atmospheric nuclear test in contravention of the PTBT by Israel and South Africa, both of which were parties to the treaty. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT): The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is a multilateral treaty that bans all nuclear explosions, for both civilian and military purposes, in all environments. It was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10 September 1996, but has not entered into force, as eight specific states have not ratified the treaty. Given the political situation prevailing in the subsequent decades, little progress was made in nuclear disarmament until the end of the Cold War in Parties to the PTBT held an amendment conference that year to discuss a proposal to convert the Treaty into an instrument banning all nuclear-weapon tests. With strong support from the UN General Assembly, negotiations for a comprehensive test-ban treaty began in The obligations of the treaty include,

21 1. Each State Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control. 2. Each State Party undertakes, furthermore, to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion. Subsequent testing includes three countries having tested their nuclear weapons since the CTBT opened for signature in India and Pakistan both carried out two sets of tests in North Korea carried out five announced tests in 2006, 2009, 2013, and two in All five North Korean tests were picked up by the International Monitoring System set up by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization Preparatory Commission. A North Korean test is believed to have taken place in January 2016, evidenced by an "artificial earthquake" measured as a magnitude 5.1 by the U.S. Geological Survey.

22 Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG): Formed in 1975, NSG is a group of nuclear supplier countries that is focused on preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons through the implementation of a set of guidelines that dictate nuclear exports. It consists of a total of 48 states that have voluntarily agreed to coordinate their export of nuclear equipment and technology to non-nuclear states. This is to ensure that nuclear exports are used for peaceful purposes which include generation of energy rather than being utilized as weapons of mass destruction. In this regards, NSGs members are also expected to ensure there is no transfer of nuclear equipment with states that do not follow international measures and inspections and may be a cause for concern. The NSG guidelines that govern the exports are divided into two parts. The first part consists of materials and technology designed for the sole purpose of nuclear

23 development such as fissile materials, nuclear reactors and equipments, reprocessing and enrichment equipment. The second part consists of dual-good items or non-nuclear items that have legitimate civilian purposes but may also be used for nuclear weapons development. To ensure the transfer takes place under the required non-proliferation conditions and safeguards, the NSG came up with another set of guidelines that they published as International Atomic Energy Agency that ensures the nuclear related resources are not re-directed to the development of nuclear weapons. As such, the nuclear facilities of the state receiving these items must have been verified by IAEA. Lastly, for a state to become a NSG member it must be able to supply nuclear items covered by both the parts of the NSG Guidelines, must adhere to these guidelines and act in accordance with them. Support internaltional wefforts towards non-proliferation of nuclear weapon and must comply with NPT, the Treaties of Pelindaba, Rarotonga, Tlatelolco, Bangkok, or an equivalent international nuclear nonproliferation agreement.

24 NORTH KOREA Acquisition and Development of Nuclear Weapons Two different events triggered North Korea s desire for nuclear weapons. One was the statement made by U.S President Harry Truman, back in the 1950s, that the United States was considering the deployment of an atomic bomb upon North Korea to end the Korean War. It can be safely said that had there been a great opportunity, the U.S would have showed no hesitation in using weapons of mass destruction just as they had done so in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Even after a ceasrefire was formulated, the United States continued dropping tons of bombs and according to U.S Air Force Gen. Curtis Lemay, the country had killed 20 per cent of the Korean population. The second was the U.S invasion of Grenada on October Grenada and North Korea had excellent relations and actively cooperated in matters of development and particularly, military with the latter promising free military assistance. When Grenada failed to defend itself from the U.S invasion, despite being supplied with numerous by North Korea and Soviet Union, North Korea became concerned. Kim II-Sung became apprehensive that as easily as the U.S had targeted Grenada, with the same ease it could decide to come after North Korea. Hence, he felt the need to develop a deterrence which came in the form of nuclear weapons.

25 After the Korean War ended, North Korea requested its communist allies to help it develop its own nuclear weapon program. China immediately refused to share its nuclear weapon technology while the Soviet Union decided to help North Korea. It helped that the country was already trained in nuclear energy, as being a founding member of the Soviet-led Joint Institute for Nuclear Research, it had for several years sent its scientists to Soviet Union to acquire that skillset. In 1964, with the aid of Soviet Union, North Korea managed to successfully set up a nuclear reactor at Yongbyon, in the North P'yŏng'an Province, and it was initially utilized for the production of radioisotopes for medicinal and industrial purposes. Then, 70s onwards, Kim II-Sung decided to initiate the development of weapons using uranium and plutonium and this was confirmed by a defector from North Korea, who stated that Kin II-Sung had issued directives to develop nuclear warheads for missiles in For that purpose, the country also ordered all its abroad scientists to return home. The state lacked the design to construct facilities with the aim of producing nuclear weapons but, Atlanta reports, managed to procure them from a Belgian scientists at a conference in Vienne. These plans were able to help North Korea set up a plutonium separation plant. This was confirmed by an American scientist, Dr.Siegfried Hecker, who was invited in 2003 by the then North Korean leader, Kim Jong-II. 90s onwards, the country had also managed to obtain help from Pakistan. Dr. A.Q Khan, the pioneer of Pakistan s atomic program, help as instrumental as he managed to deliver uranium centrifuges, enrichment machines and technical data to North Korea. He admitted to operating a global nuclear proliferation program and had several other clients such as Iran and Libya. Later onwards, Mr.Khan said that he was operating on behalf of the North Korea which had supposedly agreed to provide ballistic missile technologies to Pakistan. Mr.Khan, to justify his position and provide evidence for the involvement of the Pakistani government, released a letter that he claimed to have received from Jong Pyong-ho, the Secretary of the Workers Party of Korea, as per which 3 million dollars had been transferred to the Pakistani military in return for the resources required to develop nuclear weapons. With the rate at which North Korea was progressing with its nuclear weapon program, the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency had become apprehensive.

26 The situation further deteriorated when the, in 1994, North Korea threatened to convert irradiated fuel rods from its nuclear facility at Yongbyon into nuclear weapons. The Bush administration became worried and instructed its military to prepare for an invasion of the country. It also requested the former U.S President, Jimmy Carter, to accept a previous invitation to North Korea. Jimmy Carter agreed and during his tenure managed to reach an agreement with Kim. This led to the formation of Agreed Framework. As per it, Pyongang would halt the construction and operation of nuclear reactors meant to produce nuclear weapons and in return, the United States would provide it with two proliferationresistant nuclear power reactors as well as with fuel oil. Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) was also formed to implement the agreement. To make sure that the country stuck true with its side of the bargain, IAEA inspectors were instructed to monitor the Yongbyon plant so that it could not be used to produce weaponsgrade radioactive material. However, the Agreed Framework broke down in The United States claimed that North Korea had admitted to possessing a uraniumenrichment program that would be used to construct nuclear weapons and in accordance with this, KEDO announced that it would suspend the construction of the two-light water nuclear reactors as well as the oil shipments. In turn, North Korea refuted U.S claims that it had made any such suggestions. It expelled IAEA instructors and announced it would restart the nuclear reactor at Yongbyon. Moreover, on 10 th January 2013, it announced that it would withdraw from the NPT. The Six Party talks began in August 2003 and consisted of China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, United States and South Korea. They were focused on reaching a conclusion that would halt the development of North Korea s nuclear program. For the talks to bear

27 fruit, it took a lot of time. On 10 th Febuaray 2005, North Korea announced that it now possessed nuclear weapons and attempted to back out of the Six Party talks but it later decided to suspend that decision of its. While the countries were busy negotiating, North Korea carried out its first nuclear test in 2006 which was verified by the United States on 11 th October. However, the bomb was also reported to have been significantly smaller as compared to the one dropped in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. On February 2007, the sixth round of this conference bore results. North Korea agreed to disable its Yongbyon nuclear facility and to call back the IAEA inspectors who would verify North Korea s actions on closing down of the site. However, the talks broke down on 5 th April 2009, when North Korea, claiming it as a part of its civilian space program, test fired a rocket. In response, the U.N issued a resolution against the country and expanded sanctions that were there upon them. As a result, North Korea withdrew from the Six Party talks and stated that it would no longer be bound by the agreements reached in the conference. On May 2009, North Korea conducts a second successful nuclear test underground. Scientists estimated that yield of the bomb ranges from 2 to 8 kilotons but as per Russia, the yield was 15 to 20 kilotons. On February 2013, The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization reported an activity that had explosion-like characteristics and that took place at the North Korean nuclear test site. The South Korean defense ministry estimated that the yield of he nuclear bomb was 6 to 7 kilotons. Two more nuclear tests are conducted in One on 6 th January which North Korea claimed was a hydrogen and CTBTO did detect seismic activity and the other on 9 th September which had a magnitude of 5.0.

28

29 Hydrogen Bomb Development North Korea A thermonuclear weapon is a second-generation nuclear weapon design using a secondary nuclear fusion stage consisting of implosion tamper, fusion fuel, and sparkplug which is bombarded by the energy released by the detonation of a primary fission bomb within, compressing the fuel material (tritium, deuterium or lithium deuteride) and causing a fusion reaction. The device is colloquially referred to as a hydrogen bomb or, an H-bomb, because it employs the fusion of isotopes of hydrogen. Nuclear tests conducted by North Korea in 2006, 2009 and 2013 were relatively low yield and do not appear to be a thermonuclear weapon. Then in 2013, the South Korean Defense Ministry speculated that North Korea had initiated plans to develop a hydrogen bomb and would soon test that. 3 years later, on January 2016, North Korea claimed to have successfully conducted a hydrogen bomb test. At the time, a magnitude 5.1 seismic event was detected, a similar magnitude to the 2013 North Korea s nuclear tests that involved a 6 to 9 kt atomic bomb. However, these seismic recordings have

30 scientists, worldwide, doubting North Korea's claim that a hydrogen bomb was tested and suggest it was a non-fusion nuclear test. Then on 3 September 2017, the country's state media reported that another successful hydrogen bomb test was conducted. The blast resulted in an earthquake with a magnitude 6.3, which was 10 times more powerful than previous nuclear tests conducted by North Korea, as per USGS and U.S Intelligence assessment states that the yield was about 140 kilotons.

31 ACTIONS AGAINST NORTH KOREA In response to North Korea s nuclear and ballistic missiles test, the United Nations has passed several resolutions. There are a total of 7 seven such resolutions each of which condemn these tests, demand an end to them and impose sanctions on North Korea.

32 The first of these is Resolution 1718 that was passed in 2006 after North Korea conducted its first underground successful nuclear test. It demands that North Korea abolish its nuclear program and refrain from further nuclear and ballistic missile tests, rejoin the Nuclear Proliferation treaty and the Six-Party talks. The resolution also imposes sanctions on North Korea. It states that member states of U.N are prohibhited from delivering military equipment or even their spare parts to North Korea as well as any other resources that may directly or indirectly contribute to the nuclear weapon program and luxury are also disallowed. It also freezes the assets, imposes a travel ban on people related to the program and directs member states to expel DPRK diplomats and government representatives. It also implies that member states may examine any DPRK shipment that is passing through their territory and thereby seize and dispose of prohibited materials. Resolution 1874 was adopted, on 12 th June 2009, by the U.N after North Korea conducted its second nuclear test in This resolution reiterates much of what has already been called for in the previous resolutions. In addition, it calls on members to not participate in any financial activity that could contribute to the nuclear weapon program and in this regard, recalls the financial transparency that it demanded in Resolution 1718 when business is being conducted with North Korea. Furthermore, unlike in Resolution 1718, this resolution gives member states the right to inspect, seize and dispose of prohibited cargo that may be there in the DPRK shipment. Lastly, a state is allowed to export to North Korea if they are for humanitarian or development purposes. Resolution 2094 was adopted on 7 th March 2013 in response to North Korea s third nuclear successful test. This time the resolution, other than reiterating the previous demands and sanctions, condemns the uranium enrichment program of North Korea and states that North Korea might be abusing immunities granted to its diplomat by the Vienne Convention on Diplomatic and Consular Relations. It further grants member states the rights to freeze or block any financial or monetary transactions that may help the nuclear program. In that regards, it imposes a travel ban and freezes the assets of the Chief and Deputy of a mining company and on another official of a company marked by the Sanctions committee. It also blocks North Korean government from bulk cash transfers and restricts them to the international banking system. Inspection of DPRK ships are also

33 made mandatory and states are directed to increase the monitoring of North Korean officials. In response to Hydrogen Bomb test: Resolution 2270 was adopted on 2 nd March 2016 in response to the North Korea s fourth successful nuclear test. The resolution expands on the ban on military equipment and goes on to cover the export of light military arms. It condemns DPRK of ignoring the welfare of their people and instead focusing on enhancing their military capabilities. Other than reiterating mandatory inspection of DPRK vessels, DRPK or any of its official are not allowed to charter vessels from other states and neither do U.N member states have permission to give them. It further states that member states are also not allowed to use any DPRK vessels or hoist their flag. It also enforces sectoral sanctions and that member states or their nationals are neither allowed to import or export coal, iron ore, gold, titanium ore, vanadium or, rare metals or any type of aviation fuel from North Korea. Furthermore, the resolution expands on financial measures. Freezes assets of DPRK s government and of its Worker Party and prohibits their banks from initiating new branches and member states should close any existing branches that may there in their territory and if they have been violating sanctions or have been participating in prohibited programs. Lastly, it places a ban on hosting DPRK trainers, advisors or military officials. Teachers from North Korea are also not supposed to be invited when specific fields that may contribute to North Korea s nuclear program are concerned. Resolution 2321 was adopted on 30 th November 2016 in response to the North Korea s fifth successful nuclear test. First off, it declared that the sanctions on DPRK were not supposed to have a negative humanitarian affects and so, the Council decided that North Korea can export coal as long as the total export does not exceed $400,870,018 or 7,500,000 metric tons per year. The resolution expands on its maritime decisions by banning the provision of crew services to North Korea with other things including the provision of insurance owned by the North Korean regime and on its cargo inspection measures, baggage entering or leaving from DPRK is also supposed to be inspected. Other than inspection of cargo transported by ships, cargo being transferred by rail or raid is also supposed to be checked. The resolutions prohibits the sale or transfer of

34 helicopters to North Korea and expands the category of luxury goods. Furthermore, member states are to reduce the DPRK officials present in their country, just allow one bank account per DPRK s diplomatic mission and imposes restrictions on travel of DPRK s government or military officials on the account that they are related to prohibited programs. The Council also decided that shall not have any scientific or technical cooperation with members of North Korean regime except for medical purposes and clarifies restrictions on specialized teachings to also include advanced chemical or electrical engineering among many other fields. On 11 th September 2017, in response to North Korea s hydrogen bomb tests, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution that condemns the test and places further new sanctions on Democratic People s Republic of North Korea. First off, the resolutions fully ban the supply, sale and transfer of all condensates and natural gas liquid to DPRK. Furthermore, U.N member states are also prohibited from initiating deals that may serve as a source of all refined petroleum products for the DPRK. In this regard, the Council has also imposed limits as per which between 1 st October 2017 and 31 st December 2017, North Korea cannot be supplied with more than 500,000 barrels of refined petroleum and 1 st January 2018 onwards, the refined petroleum that they import must not exceed 2 million barrels. Moreover, the Council also expands upon financial sanctions and bans joint ventures with DPRK organizations and individuals and also restricts the Member States from providing work authorization to DPRK nationals, ahead of this resolution. It also directs the 1718 Committee to mark vessels transporting banned items to the DPRK and to also designate WMD-related and conventional arms items. Last but not the least, Member States are given the authority, with the consent of the flag state on the high seas, to inspect vessels suspected of transporting prohibited items to the DPRK. TREATES/AGREEMENTS AGAINST DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS Missile Technology Control Regime The Missile Technology Control Regime was formed in April 1987 by the industrialized G-7 countries which are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom and

35 the United States. Initially, MTCR was solely concerned with the limiting the spread of nuclear weapons through ballistic missiles and other unmanned systems but later onwards, their focus expanded to cover all types of weapons of mass destruction including chemical and biological. The MTCR is an informal political understanding and agreement between the members in order to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons through missiles and thereby, does not impose any legally blinding obligations on its members. The regime has a total of 35 members and they are supposed to restrict their sale of missiles and other unmanned systems that are capable of delivering a 500- kilogram payload at least 300 kilometers or that can carry weapons of mass destruction. The Equipment and Technology Annex of MTCR consists of two categories. The first category includes complete rockets and unmanned air delivery systems, may they be in the form of ballistic missile systems, space launch vehicles or target drones, and as well as production facilities. The transfer of these items is completely prohibited except on extremely rare occasions. The second category consists of propulsion, propellant components, dual-use missile related components, materials that may be used for the construction of missiles and other missile systems that have a range of at least 300km. The transfer of these items is less restricted but is subject to licensing requirements for which non-proliferation factors are taken into consideration. Furthermore, these MTCR guidelines apply whether members are exporting to other members or non-members. However, since it does not impose legally blinding obligations, there are no measures that monitor the transfer of these items. However, as per the U.S law, Washington may impose sanctions on entities that have not adhered to the MTCR Annex and identify as potential threats to U.S security. Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation An international conference was held on 25 th to 26 th November 2002 in The Hague. The result: formation of the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, also known as The International Code of Conduct. A political initiative that is aimed at preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons through ballistic missiles. It is the only multilateral body that is solely concerned with ballistic missiles. However, the HCOC does

36 not call for the destruction of these missiles rather sets a precedent to be followed by the states when ballistic missiles are concerned. States that subscribe to the HCOC voluntarily are under an obligation to provide PLNs, Pre-launch notifications, on ballistic missile and space-launch vehicle launches and test flights. They are also required to submit an annual declaration (AD of their country s policy on ballistic missiles and space-launch vehicles as well as annual information on number and generic class of both of them launched in the previous year. Notably, the HCOC does not require a subscription fees. Wassenaar Arrangement The Wassenaar Arrangement was established on June It aims to ensure stability at the regional and international level by promoting transparency and greater responsibility among the member states in transfer of conventional weapons and dualuse goods to prevent destabilizing accumulations. It is there to ensure that the transfer of these items do not enhance the military or nuclear capabilities of a state. To ensure transparency and assist in understanding the risks that are there in transfer of items, states voluntarily exchange information on their export activities and items there on the arrangement s two control list. However, for transfers outside the arrangement or to non- Wassenaar states, states must report their arms transfer of dual-use goods and conventional weapons which fall under categories: battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, large-caliber artillery, military aircraft/unmanned vehicles, military and attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems, small arms and light weapons. Notably, Wassenaar cannot stop the transfer of items rather that is the choice and responsibility of the state and being a voluntary association, the committee therefore has no formal mechanism to ensure the members are compliant. But, to build confidence, the states agreed on non-binding practices on December For a country to become a part of the arrangement it must meet the following criteria; produce or export arms, implement national policies that do not allow the transfer of arms to a country that is a cause for concern, strictly follow international non-proliferation rules and implement effective export controls.

37 However, Wassenaar Arrangement is full of problems as well. There are differences of opinions among the member states and thereby, there is no consensus on various matters and so, a single country can block a proposal. Firstly, the member states disagree on the scale at which the arrangement should operate. Should it remain to continue to be just a body that exchanges information? Furthermore, the member states cannot decide which country is a cause for concern and hence, it can t affectively go against the transfer of an item to a certain country. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 was adopted unanimously on 28 April 2004 regarding the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The resolution establishes the obligations under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter for all Member States to develop and enforce appropriate legal and regulatory measures against the proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, in particular, to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction to non-state actors. It is notable in that it recognizes non-state proliferation as a threat to the peace under the terms of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, and creates an obligation for states to modify their internal legislation. Furthermore, the resolution requires every state to criminalize various forms of nonstate actor involvement in weapons of mass destruction and its related activities in its domestic legislation and, once in place, to enforce such legislation. By virtue of its universal scope and mandatory nature, resolution 1540 marks a departure from previous nonproliferation arrangements and adds a novel layer to the nonproliferation regime. Before the resolution was adopted, the non-proliferation regime was based on many partly overlapping arrangements, none of which established universal mandatory obligations. The Impact on North Korean People North Korean dictator, Kim Jong-Un, in fear of United States and the other Western countries has heavily invested his country s resources with the aim of developing nuclear weapons. As such, to ensure that there is constant and fruitful progress in the

38 nuclear program, not only the regime has imposed several restrictions people of this country and clamped down upon many of the things. These include a ban on freedom of movement, information, and speech. Without first obtaining permission from the regime, and that also only granted if you are based in Pyongyang, the North Korean people are not allowed to leave the country. Even in the former case, a person must have a specific purpose in mind and favorably one that benefits the dictatorship and its nuclear program. Similarly, the people aren t allowed to have an opinion, at least not one that differs from that of the regime s, and neither do they have access to global information because DPRK maintains an information blockade to ensure that the common folks are not exposed to foreign propaganda and ideology. Furthermore, North Korean is extremely possessed with advancing its nuclear weapons development and hence in that regards, is constantly only importing refined petroleum and/or oil and has been completely dismissive of the present Chronic food shortages and the dismal public health. The agricultural policies are in a complete mess and adverse climatic conditions, since the 1990s, have resulted in millions of malnourished people particularly children and babies. Moreover, the health system also collapsed in the 1990s and treatment is only available in selected hospitals and affordable by elite North Koreans. On the other hand, sanctions imposed by the United Nations and United States have also have had a destructive effect. The sanctions supposedly have barely have had any effect on the regime and their nuclear development program rather hurts people. For instance, the U.N Resolution S/RES/2094 (2013) paragraph 23 bans any item necessary for the normal, healthy, effective living and functioning of society as luxury goods. Similarly, because of the ban on complex equipment, consisting of electrical, chemical and biological components, cannot construct medical equipment like the

39 hyperbaric chamber which can be used to cure gangrenous arm or leg, not that they ever intend to. These sanctions have also inhibited international organizations from carrying out humanitarian activities such as provisional of nutritional supplements, treatment of infectious diseases, provision of support to rural villages, delivery of basic medicines and etc.

40 QARMA: 1. What are the causes behind militarization? Does the militarization have a deeper reason for the super powers of the world? Does it seem like that there is even a bigger capitalistic motto behind all this militarization? 2. How is the global structure, political and economic being affected by all these measures? 3. How does this affect the third world countries? 4. How do these actions affect those countries that are either not involved directly, have trade relations with those involved or are alias with them or are not even involved even indirectly? 5. How would the fear of the use of nuclear weapon affect the growth of generating power from nuclear radioactive matter? 6. How have the past actions failed to resolve the issue at hand? 7. What diplomatic regulations must be in place to contain the issue at hand? 8. What measures need to be taken to resolve the issue and induce peace in the region? 9. How will these measures be executed for long term sustainability?

41 Reference /#sthash.PiI00I2M.6voV3DIq.dpbs Korea /01-Nuclear-Global-Zero.pdf Topic B The Rise of Boko Haram in Africa

42 Introduction The UNSC has decided to place the issue of Boko Haram in Nigeria on the table. The Boko Haram, a terrorist organization, has a history of violence. In order to establish Shariah law in Nigera, the group has launched massive attacks on the people of Nigeria, Chad and Cameroon which resulted in the deaths of thousands of people. Not to mention, the organization has been shamelessly using children to conduct its attacks. In light of their horrific actions and their recent split, it is now necessary that nations come together to discuss the possible actions that can be taken against Boko Haram and implement them. Boko Haram used called itself al-wilāyat al-islāmiyya Gharb Afrīqiyyah (Islamic State West Africa) and Jamā'at Ahl as-sunnah lid-da'wah wa'l-jihād (Group of the people of the Sunnah for preaching and Jihad). It is an Islamic terrorist organization carrying out activities, primarily based in Nigeria, in Chad, Niger, Northern Cameroon. Since their current insurgency started in 2009 they have approximately killed and murdered around 20,000 people including children and have displaced 2.3 million people from their homes. In this account it was ranked as the world s deadliest terrorist organization by the Global Terrorism Index in Ideology: The ideology behind their name is Western education is forbidden. Taking Arabic grammar into the picture the word Boko Haram translates and interprets to as Western influence through education and by all means as fake and a sin and a sacrilege. And the spreading must be stopped using the Sunnah of the Prophet and the weapon of Jihad, Islamic warfare. Boko Haram was founded as a Sunni Islamic fundamentalist sect, influenced by the Wahhabi movement, advocating a strict form of Sharia law. It developed into a Salafistjihadi group in The movement is diffuse, and fighters associated with it do not

43 necessarily follow Salafi doctrine. The group has denounced the members of the Sufi, the Shiite, and the Izala sects as infidels. Boko Haram seeks the establishment of an Islamic state in Nigeria. It opposes the Westernization of Nigerian society and the concentration of the wealth of the country among members of a small political elite, mainly in the Christian south of the country. Nigeria is Africa's biggest economy, but 60% of its population of 173 million (2013) live on less than $1 a day. The sharia law imposed by local authorities, beginning with Zamfara in January 2000 and covering 12 northern states by late 2002, may have promoted links between Boko Haram and political leaders, but was considered by the group to have been corrupted. History Origin: Before colonization and subsequent annexation into the British Empire in 1900 as Colonial Nigeria, the Bornu Empire ruled the territory where Boko Haram is currently active. It was a sovereign sultanate run according to the principles of the Constitution of Medina, with a majority Kanuri Muslim population. In 1903, both the Borno Emirate and Sokoto Caliphate came under the control of the British. Christian missionaries at this time spread the Christian message in the region and had many converts. British occupation ended with Nigerian independence in Except for a brief period of civilian rule between 1979 and 1983, Nigeria was governed by a series of military dictatorships from 1966 until the advent of democracy in Ethnic militancy is thought to have been one of the causes of the civil war; religious violence reached a new height in 1980 in Kano, the largest city in the north of the country, where the Muslim fundamentalist sect Yan Tatsine ("followers of Maitatsine") instigated riots that resulted in four or five thousand deaths. In the ensuing military crackdown, Maitatsine was killed, fuelling a backlash of increased violence that spread across other northern cities over the next twenty years. Social inequality and poverty contributed both to the Maitatsine and Boko Haram uprisings. In the decades since the end of British occupation, politicians and academics from the mainly Islamic North have expressed their fundamental opposition to Western education. Political ethno-religious interest groups, whose membership includes

44 influential political, military and religious leaders, have thrived in Nigeria, though they were largely suppressed under military rule. Their paramilitary wings, formed since the country's return to civilian rule, have been implicated in much of the sectarian violence in the years following. The Arewa People's Congress, the militia wing of the Arewa Consultative Forum, the main political group representing the interests of northern Nigeria, is a well-funded group with military and intelligence expertise, and is considered capable of engaging in military action, including covert bombing. Mohammed Yusuf founded the sect that became known as Boko Haram in 2002 in Maiduguri, the capital of the north-eastern state of Borno. He established a religious complex and school that attracted poor Muslim families from across Nigeria and neighbouring countries. The center had the political goal of creating an Islamic state, and became a recruiting ground for jihadis. By denouncing the police and state corruption, Yusuf attracted followers from unemployed youth. It has been speculated that the reason Yusuf founded Boko Haram appears to be that he saw an opportunity to exploit public outrage at government corruption by linking it to Western influence in governance. He is reported to have used the existing infrastructure in Borno of the Izala Society (Jama'at Izalatil Bidiawa Iqamatus Sunnah), a popular conservative Islamic sect, to recruit members, before breaking away to form his own faction. The Izala were originally welcomed into government, along with people sympathetic to Yusuf. Boko Haram conducted its operations more or less peacefully during the first seven years of its existence, withdrawing from society into remote north-eastern areas. The government repeatedly ignored warnings about the increasingly militant character of the organization. The Council of Ulama advised the government and the Nigerian Television Authority not to broadcast Yusuf's preaching, but their warnings were ignored. Yusuf's arrest elevated him to hero status. Borno's Deputy Governor Alhaji Dibal has reportedly claimed that al-qaeda had ties with Boko Haram, but broke them when they decided that Yusuf was an unreliable person. Stephen Davis, a former Anglican clergyman who has negotiated with Boko Haram many times blames local Nigerian politicians who support local bandits like Boko Haram in order for them to make life difficult for their political opponents. In particular Davis has blamed the former governor of Borno State Ali Modu Sheriff who initially supported Boko Haram but no longer needed them after

45 the 2007 elections and stopped funding them but they were then out of control. Sheriff denies the accusations.

46 Development into an organized outfit Financing: Occasionally Boko Haram has been reported for its cocaine trafficking in media reports. James Cockayne, formerly Co-Director of the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation and Senior Fellow at the International Peace Institute, wrote in 2012, After Boko Harams founding it was accused of receiving funds and donations from Islamic sympathizers and other fake charity organizations. Either those countries funded Boko Haram that wanted to discredit their opponents or there were local Nigerian donors who wanted to support the Islamization of the region and wanted to get rid of Western influence and their western culture promoting government. In February 2012, recently arrested officials revealed that while the organization initially relied on GIVEN THEIR APPRECIATION OF THE CONTESTED NATURE OF MUCH AFRICAN GOVERNANCE, IT COMES AS SOMETHING OF A SURPRISE THAT CARRIER AND KLANTSCHNIG [REVIEW OF AFRICA AND THE WAR ON DRUGS, 2012] FIERCELY DOWNPLAY THE IMPACT THAT COCAINE TRAFFICKING IS HAVING ON WEST AFRICAN GOVERNANCE. ON THE BASIS OF JUST THREE CASE STUDIES (GUINEA-BISSAU, LESOTHO AND NIGERIA) THE AUTHORS CONCLUDE THAT 'STATE COMPLICITY' IN THE AFRICAN DRUG TRADE IS 'RARE', AND THE DOMINANT PARADIGM IS 'REPRESSION'. AS A RESULT, THEY RADICALLY UNDERSTATE THE CLOSE INVOLVEMENT OF POLITICAL AND MILITARY ACTORS IN DRUG TRAFFICKING PARTICULARLY IN WEST AFRICAN COCAINE TRAFFICKING AND OVERLOOK THE GROWING POWER OF DRUG MONEY IN AFRICAN ELECTORAL POLITICS, LOCAL AND TRADITIONAL GOVERNANCE, AND SECURITY.

47 donations from members, its links with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb opened it up to funding from groups in Saudi Arabia and the UK. Boko Haram cloaks its sources of finance through the use of a highly decentralized distribution network. The group employs an Islamic model of money transfer called hawala, which is based on an honour system and a global network of agents that makes the financing difficult to track. In the past, Nigerian officials have been criticized for being unable to trace much of the funding that Boko Haram has received. Boko Haram gets funding from bank robberies and kidnapping ransoms. As an example, in early 2013, gunmen from Boko Haram kidnapped a family of seven French tourists on vacation in Cameroon. Two months later, the kidnappers released the hostages along with 16 others in exchange for a ransom of $3.15 million. Any funding they may have received in the past from al-qaeda affiliates is insignificant compared to the estimated $1 million ransom for each wealthy Nigerian or foreigner kidnapped. Cash is moved around by couriers, making it impossible to track, and communication is conducted face-to-face. Their mode of operation, which is thought to include paying local youths to track army movements, is such that little funding is required to carry out attacks. Equipment captured from fleeing soldiers keeps the group constantly wellsupplied. The group also extorts local governments. A spokesman of Boko Haram claimed that Kano state governor Ibrahim Shekarau and Bauchi state governor Isa Yuguda had paid them monthly. Ties with Al-Qaeda and Other Militant Wings:

48 As mentioned earlier there existed the Islamic sympathizers who used to donate to Boko Haram to carry out their militant terrorist activities. Other than the local ties and sympathies Al-Qaeda is claimed to have ties with the Nigerian terrorist organization. Three weeks after July 2009 riots Al-Qaeda expressed sympathy for Boko Haram. Moreover, speaking by phone to reporters in November 2012, group spokesman Abu Qaqa said: "We are together with al-qaeda, they are promoting the cause of Islam, just as we are doing. Therefore, they help us in our struggle and we help them, too." The 2012 Reuters special report details how fighters have trained with al-qaeda affiliates in small groups over at least 6 years. According to the UN Security Council listing of Boko Haram under the al-qaeda sanctions regime in May 2014, the group "has maintained a relationship with AQIM for training and material support purposes", and "gained valuable knowledge on the construction of improvised explosive devices from AQIM". The UN found that a "number of Boko Haram members fought alongside al Qaeda affiliated groups in Mali in 2012 and 2013 before returning to Nigeria with terrorist expertise". AQIM is one of al-qaeda's regional branches, whose leader, Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud, has sworn an oath of allegiance to al-qaeda's senior leadership. In July 2014, Shekau released a 16-minute video where he voiced support for ISIL's head Abu Bakr al-baghdadi, al-qaeda's head Ayman al-zawahiri and Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Omar. In March 2015, Shekau formally pledged allegiance to ISIL, which was accepted by the group's spokesman several days later. Swearing Allegiance to ISIS Recently, there has also been a split in the terrorist organization. After pledging their alliance to ISIS, IS appointed Abu Musab al-barnawi, the son of Muhammad Yusuf, as the Wali or governor of the Boko Haram. Unlike Abubakar Shekau who has repeatedly targeted people of all faith, Abu Musab, as per the newly released manifesto, has decided to stop targeting Muslims, has shown himself to be hesitant in using children as suicide bombers and has instead, said that they shall blow[ing] up every church that we are able to reach. The appointment of Abu Musab and his differing ideology compared to that of Abubakar Shekau, Boko Haram leader since the death of Muhammad Yusuf, has bought about internal disagreements between the two leaders and has split the group into two. While the former leads the Islamic State in West Africa Province, the name was

49 changed by ISIS, and the latter leads the other half and has backed away from ISIS and once again, operates under the name Jama atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda awati Wal Jihad what it was called before pledging alliance to ISIS. Campaign of Violence By Boko Haram In 2009, police began an investigation into the group code-named 'Operation Flush'. On July 26, security forces arrested nine Boko Haram members and confiscated weapons and bomb-making equipment. Either this or a clash with police during a funeral procession led to revenge attacks on police and widespread rioting. A joint military task force operation was launched in response, and by 30 July more than 700 people had been killed, mostly Boko Haram members, and police stations, prisons, government offices, schools and churches had been destroyed. Yusuf was arrested, and died in custody "while trying to escape". He was succeeded by Abubakar Shekau, formerly his second-in-command. In September 2010, having regrouped under their new leader, Boko Haram broke 105 of its members out of prison in Bauchi along with over 600 other prisoners and went on to launch attacks in several areas of northern Nigeria. Under Shekau's leadership, the group continuously improved its operational capabilities. After launching a string of IED attacks against soft targets, and its first vehicle-borne IED attack in June 2011, killing 6 at the Abuja police headquarters, in August Boko Haram bombed the UN headquarters in Abuja, the first time they had struck a Western target. A spokesman claiming responsibility for the attack, in which 11 UN staff members died as well as 12 others, with more than 100 injured, warned of future planned attacks on US and Nigerian government interests. Speaking soon after the US embassy's announcement of the arrival in the country of the FBI, he went on to announce Boko Haram's terms for negotiation: the release of all imprisoned members. The increased sophistication of the group led observers to speculate that Boko Haram was affiliated with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which was active in Niger. Boko Haram has maintained a steady rate of attacks since 2011, striking a wide range of targets, multiple times per week. They have attacked politicians, religious leaders, security forces and civilian targets. The tactic of suicide bombing, used in the two

50 attacks in the capital on the police and UN headquarters, was new to Nigeria. In Africa as a whole, it had only been used by al-shabaab in Somalia and, to a lesser extent, AQIM. The common theme throughout the north-east was the targeting of police, who were regularly massacred at work or in drive-by shootings at their homes, either in revenge for the killing of Yusuf, or as representatives of the state apparatus, or for no particular reason. Five officers were arrested for Yusuf's murder, which had no noticeable effect on the level of unrest. Opportunities for criminal enterprise flourished. Hundreds of police were dead and more than 60 police stations had been attacked by mid The government's response to this self-reinforcing trend towards insecurity was to invest heavily in security equipment, spending $5.5 billion, 20 percent of their overall budget, on bomb detection units, communications and transport; and $470 million on a Chinese CCTV system for Abuja, which has failed in its purpose of detecting or deterring acts of terror. The election defeat of military Muhammadu Buhari increased religious political tensions. Sectarian riots emerged as a result of the breaking of an agreement after the election defeat. The subsequent campaign of violence by Boko Haram culminated in a string of bombings across the country on Christmas Day. In the outskirts of Abuja, 37 died in a church that had its roof blown off. One resident commented, "Cars were in flames and bodies littered everywhere", a phrase commonly repeated in international press reports about the bombings. Similar Christmas events had been reported in previous years. Jonathan declared a state of emergency on New Year's Eve in local government areas of Jos, Borno, Yobe and Niger, and closed the international border in the north-east Presidential Inauguration: Within hours of Goodluck Jonathan's presidential inauguration in May 2011, Boko Haram carried out a series of bombings in Bauchi, Zaria and Abuja. The most successful of these was the attack on the army barracks in Bauchi. A spokesman for the group told BBC Hausa that the attack had been carried out, as a test of loyalty, by serving members of the military hoping to join the group. This charge was later refuted by an army spokesman, who claimed, "This is not a banana republic." However, on 8

51 January 2012, the president would announce that Boko Haram had in reality infiltrated both the army and the police, as well as the executive, parliamentary and legislative branches of government. Boko Haram's spokesman also claimed responsibility for the killing outside his home in Maiduguri of the politician Abba Anas Ibn Umar Garbai, the younger brother of the Shehu of Borno, who was the second most prominent Muslim in the country after the Sultan of Sokoto. He added, "We are doing what we are doing to fight injustice, if they stop their satanic ways of doing things and the injustices, we would stop what we are doing. This was one of several political and religious assassinations Boko Haram carried out that year, with the presumed intention of correcting injustices in the group's home state of Borno. State of Emergency: Boko Haram carried out 115 attacks in 2011, killing 550. The state of emergency would usher in an intensification of violence. The opening three weeks of 2012 accounted for more than half of the death total of the preceding year. Two days after the state of emergency was declared, Boko Haram released an ultimatum to southern Nigerians living in the north, giving them three days to leave. Three days later they began a series of mostly small-scale attacks on Christians and members of the Igbo ethnic group, causing hundreds to flee. In Kano, on 20 January, they carried out by far their most deadly action yet, an assault on police buildings, killing 190. One of the victims was a TV reporter. The attacks included a combined use of car bombs, suicide bombers and IEDs, supported by uniformed gunmen. According to the 2012 US Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices. "... serious human rights problems included extrajudicial killings by security forces, including summary executions; security force torture, rape, and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment of prisoners, detainees, and criminal suspects; harsh and lifethreatening prison and detention center conditions; arbitrary arrest and detention; prolonged pretrial detention; denial of fair public trial; executive influence on the

52 judiciary; infringements on citizens' privacy rights; restrictions on freedom of speech, press, assembly, religion, and movement..." "On October 9, witnesses in Maiduguri claimed members of the JTF "Restore Order", [a vigilante group] based in Maiduguri, went on a killing spree after a suspected Boko Haram bomb killed an officer. Media reported the JTF killed 20 to 45 civilians and razed 50 to 100 houses in the neighborhood. The JTF commander in Maiduguri denied the allegations. On November 2, witnesses claimed the JTF shot and killed up to 40 people during raids in Maiduguri. The army claimed it dismissed some officers from the military as a result of alleged abuses committed in Maiduguri, but there were no known formal prosecutions in Maiduguri by year's end." "Credible reports also indicated... uniformed military personnel and paramilitary mobile police carried out summary executions, assaults, torture, and other abuses throughout Bauchi, Borno, Kano, Kaduna, Plateau, and Yobe states... The national police, army, and other security forces committed extrajudicial killings and used lethal and excessive force to apprehend criminals and suspects, as well as to disperse protesters. Authorities generally did not hold police accountable for the use of excessive or deadly force or for the deaths of persons in custody. Security forces generally operated with impunity in the illegal apprehension, detention, and sometimes extrajudicial execution of criminal suspects. The reports of state or federal panels of inquiry investigating suspicious deaths remained unpublished." "There were no new developments in the case of five police officers accused of executing Muhammad Yusuf in 2009 at a state police headquarters. In July 2011 authorities arraigned five police officers in the federal high court in Abuja for the murder of Yusuf. The court granted bail to four of the officers, while one remained in custody." "Police use of excessive force, including use of live ammunition, to disperse demonstrators resulted in numerous killings during the year. For example, although the January fuel subsidy demonstrations generally remained peaceful, security forces reportedly fired on protesters in various states across the country during those demonstrations, resulting in 10 to 15 deaths and an unknown number of wounded."

53 "Despite some improvements resulting from the closure of police checkpoints in many parts of the country, states with an increased security presence due to the activities of Boko Haram experienced a rise in violence and lethal force at police and military roadblocks." "Continuing abductions of civilians by criminal groups occurred in the Niger Delta and Southeast... Police and other security forces were often implicated in the kidnapping schemes." "Although the constitution and law prohibit such practices and provide for punishment of such abuses, torture is not criminalized, and security service personnel, including police, military, and State Security Service (SSS) officers, regularly tortured, beat, and abused demonstrators, criminal suspects, detainees, and convicted prisoners. Police mistreated civilians to extort money. The law prohibits the introduction into trials of evidence and confessions obtained through torture; however, police often used torture to extract confessions." In 2013, Boko Haram increased operations in Northern Cameroon, and were involved in skirmishes along the borders of Chad and Niger. They were linked to a number of kidnappings, often reportedly in association with the splinter group Ansaru, drawing towards them a higher level of international attention. Boko Haram has often managed to evade the Nigerian army by retreating into the hills around the border with Cameroon, whose army is apparently unwilling to confront them. Nigeria, Chad and Niger had formed a Multinational Joint Task Force in In February 2012, Cameroon signed an agreement with Nigeria to establish a Joint Trans-Border Security Committee, which was inaugurated in November 2013, when Cameroon announced plans to conduct "coordinated but separate" border patrols in It convened again in July 2014 to further improve cooperation between the two countries. The state of emergency was extended in May 2013 to cover the whole of the three north-eastern states of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe, raising tensions in the region. In the 12 months following the announcement, 250,000 fled the three states, followed by a further 180,000 between May and August A further 210,000 fled from bordering states, bringing the total displaced by the conflict to 650,000. Many thousands left the country. An August 2014

54 Amnesty International video showed Army and allied militia executing people, including by slitting their throats, and dumping their corpses in mass graves. According to Human Rights Watch, more than 130 villages and towns were attacked or controlled by the group. Chibok Kidnapping: In April 2014 Boko Haram kidnapped 276 schoolgirls from Chibok. Shekau announced his intention of selling them into slavery. More than 50 escaped. Parents of the missing girls and those who had escaped were kept waiting until July to meet with the president, which caused them concern. In October, the government announced the girls' imminent release, but the information proved unreliable. The announcement to the media of a peace agreement and the imminent release of all the missing girls was followed days later by a video message in which Shekau stated that no such meeting had taken place and that the girls had been "married off". The announcement to the media, unaccompanied by any evidence of the reality of the agreement, was thought by analysts to have been a political ploy by the president to raise his popularity before his confirmation of his candidacy in the 2015 general election. Earlier in the year, the girls' plight had featured on "#BringBackOurGirls" political campaign posters in the streets of the capital, which the president denied knowledge of and soon took down after news of criticism surfaced. These posters, which were interpreted, to the dismay of campaigners for the girls' recapture, as being designed to benefit from the fame of the kidnapping, had also been part of Jonathan's "pre-presidential campaign". In September, "#BringBackGoodluck2015" campaign posters again drew criticism. Northern Cameroon: In 2014, Boko Haram continued to increase its presence in northern Cameroon. On May 16, ten Chinese workers were abducted in a raid on a construction company camp in Waza, near the Nigerian border. Vehicles and explosives were also taken in the raid, and one Cameroon soldier was killed. Cameroon's antiterrorist Rapid Intervention Battalion attempted to intervene but were vastly outnumbered. In July, the deputy prime minister's home village was attacked by around 200 militants; his wife was kidnapped, along with the Sultan of Kolofata and his family. At least 15 people, including soldiers

55 and police, were killed in the raid. The deputy prime minister's wife was subsequently released in October, along with 26 others including the ten Chinese construction workers who had been captured in May; authorities made no comment about any ransom, which the Cameroon government had previously claimed it never pays. In a separate attack, nine bus passengers and a soldier were shot dead and the son of a local chief was kidnapped. Hundreds of local youths are suspected to have been recruited. In August, the remote Nigerian border town of Gwoza was overrun and held by the group. In response to the increased militant activity, the Cameroonian president sacked two senior military officers and sent his army chief with 1000 reinforcements to the northern border region. Between May and July 2014, 8,000 Nigerian refugees arrived in the country, up to 25 percent suffering from acute malnutrition. Cameroon, which ranked 150 out of 186 on the 2012 UNDP HDI, hosted, as of August 2014, 107,000 refugees fleeing unrest in the CAR, a number that was expected to increase to 180,000 by the end of the year. A further 11,000 Nigerian refugees crossed the border into Cameroon and Chad during August. Expansion of occupied Territory: The attack on Gwoza signalled a change in strategy for Boko Haram, as the group continued to capture territory in north-eastern and eastern areas of Borno, as well as in Adamawa and Yobe. Attacks across the border were repelled by the Cameroon military. The territorial gains were officially denied by the Nigerian military. In a video obtained by the news agency AFP on 24 August 2014, Shekau announced that Gwoza was now part of an Islamic caliphate. The town of Bama, 70 kilometers from the state capital Maiduguri, was reported to have been captured at the beginning of September, resulting in thousands of residents fleeing to Maiduguri, even as residents there were themselves attempting to flee. The military continued to deny Boko Haram's territorial gains, which were, however, confirmed by local vigilantes who had managed to escape. The militants were reportedly killing men and teenage boys in the town of over 250,000 inhabitants. Soldiers refused orders to advance on the occupied town; hundreds fled across the

56 border into Cameroon, but were promptly repatriated. Fifty-four deserters were later sentenced to death by firing squad. On 29 October, Mubi, a town of 200,000 in Adamawa, fell to the militants, further undermining confidence in the peace talks. Thousands fled south to Adamawa's capital city, Yola. Amid media speculation that the ceasefire announcement had been part of President Jonathan's re-election campaign, a video statement released by Boko Haram through the normal communication channels via AFP on 31 October stated that no negotiations had in fact taken place. Mubi was said to have been recaptured by the army on 13 November. On the same day, Boko Haram seized Chibok; two days later, the army recaptured the largely deserted town. As of 16 November it was estimated that more than twenty towns and villages had been taken control of by the militants. On 28 November, 120 died in an attack at the central mosque in Kano during Friday prayers. There were 27 Boko Haram attacks during the month of November, killing at least 786. On 3 December, it was reported that several towns in North Adamawa had been recovered by the Nigerian military with the help of local vigilantes. Bala Nggilari, the governor of Adamawa state, said that the military were aiming to recruit 4,000 vigilantes. On 13 December, Boko Haram attacked the village of Gumsuri in Borno, killing over 30, and kidnapping over 100 women and children. Attacks in Cameroon: In the second half of December, the focus of activity switched to the Far North Region of Cameroon, beginning on the morning of 17 December when an army convoy was attacked with an IED and ambushed by hundreds of militants near the border town of Amchide, 60 kilometers north of the state capital Maroua. One soldier was confirmed dead, and an estimated 116 militants were killed in the attack, which was followed by another attack overnight with unknown casualties. On 22 December the Rapid Intervention Battalion followed up with an attack on a Boko Haram training camp near Guirdivig, arresting 45 militants and seizing 84 children aged 7 15 who were

57 undergoing training, according to a statement from Cameroon's Ministry of Defense. The militants fled in pick-up trucks carrying an unknown number of their dead; no information on army casualties was released. On December five villages were simultaneously attacked, and for the first time the Cameroon military launched air attacks when Boko Haram briefly occupied an army camp. Casualty figures were not released. Baga Massacre: On 3 rd of January the militant wing attacked Baga taking control over it and the multinational joint task force. Army fled as the militants advanced. Many residents fled to Chad. There is a dispute on the death toll, the Western media claim it to be near 2000 whilst the local defense ministry argues it be near 150. On 25 January the militants advanced to Monguno, capturing the town and a nearby military base. Their advance on Maiduguri and Konduga, 40 km to the southeast, was repelled. After retaking Monguno, the army expelled the militants from Baga on 21 February. The Baga massacre was one of the Nigerian army's biggest defeats in terms of loss of equipment and civilian casualties. Several officers were court-martialed. In October 2015 General Enitan Ransome-Kuti was dismissed from the army and sentenced to six months imprisonment. It was determined that he had failed in his duty to launch a counter-attack after retreating from the town. West African Offense:

58 Starting in late January 2015, a coalition of military forces from Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, and Niger began a campaign against Boko Haram. On 4 February, the Chad Army killed over 200 Boko Haram militants. Soon afterwards, Boko Haram launched an attack on the Cameroonian town of Fotokol, killing 81 civilians, 13 Chadian soldiers and 6 Cameroonian soldiers. On 7 March 2015, Boko Haram's leader Abubakar Shekau pledged allegiance to ISIL via an audio message posted on the organisation's Twitter account. Nigerian army spokesperson Sami Usman Kukasheka said the pledge was a sign of weakness and that Shekau was like a "drowning man". On 12 March 2015, ISIL's spokesman Abu Mohammad al-adnani released an audiotape in which he welcomed the pledge of allegiance, and described it as an expansion of the group's caliphate to West Africa. On 24 March 2015, residents of Damasak, Nigeria said that Boko Haram had taken more than 400 women and children from the town as they fled from coalition forces. On March 27, the Nigerian army captured Gwoza, which was believed to be the location of Boko Haram headquarters. On election day, 28 March 2015, Boko Haram extremists killed 41 people, including a legislator, to discourage hundreds from voting. In March 2015, Boko Haram lost control of the Northern Nigerian towns of Bama and Gwoza to the Nigerian army. The Nigerian authorities said that they had taken back 11 of the 14 districts previously controlled by Boko Haram. In April, four Boko Haram camps in the Sambisa Forest were overrun by the Nigerian military who freed nearly 300 females. Boko Haram forces were believed to have retreated to the Mandara Mountains, along the Nigeria-Cameroon border. Attrition Catholic diocese of Maiduguri Boko Haram are strict advocates of Sharia in Islam and vehemently oppose the Western society as indicated by the meaning that their name holds, Western Education is Haram. The group, founded as a Sunni Islamic fundamentalist sect, has declared followers of other sects in Islam as infidels and has a deep hatred for Christianity. One of their Wali declared that the group would now aim to bomb churches and kill Christians, though there have been reports that Abo Musab al-barnawi was removed from the position of governor but that has yet to be confirmed.

59 According to a report released by the Catholic Diocese of Maiduguri on May 2015, Boko Haram has already destroyed fifty two churches inside Maiduguri city and a total of 350 churches, as also confirmed by Aid to the Church In Need. The report further estimates the death count of Catholic Faithful to be around 5000 and the displaced count to be around 100,000. Furthermore, about 26 of the 46 priests, 200 Catechists and 35 Nuns have also been displaced. Convents in the region of Potiskum, Shuwa, Bazza and Mubi have been deserted while local government and communities, such as in Pulka and Vimtim, have been bought down by the extremist group. A Table that summarizes the damage caused by Boko Haram, presented in the official report, has been pasted below. July Mosque Massacres On 1 st July 2015, during the Holy month of Ramadan, the village of Kukawa in Borno state was assaultled by more than 50 militants belonging to Islamist extremist organization, Boko Haram. The gunmen stormed into a mosque and gunned down 50 people, children

60 and adults alike, who had gathered to perform there to perform their religious obligations. The terrorists then divided into two groups. The first group started putting corpses on fire and the second proceeded to the houses where they killed women and children. The village was then set on fire. It is reported that a total of 100 people were murdered. The reason behind the attack was that Boko Haram believed that moderate Islam was being practiced and taught in that village. Then, on 2 nd June 2015, the gunmen stormed another village near Mungono and slaughtered another 48 people. 17 others were injured in this horrific attack. Suicide Bombings in Chad On 15 th June 2015, Boko Haram sent suicide bombers into the capital of Chad, N Djamena. The attackers are said to be two people on motorcycles who blew themselves outside two police stations and at a time, when police cadets were attending a session there. The attack by the militant group was in response to Chad s participation against the organization in Nigeria. It killed 23 people and injured 100 others. However, this was not the end of it and another explosion followed the suicide bombing. The bomb was planted beforehand in the academy and took the lives of 35 others. On 11 th July 2015, Boko Haram, once again, carried out suicide bombings in a village in Chad, Baga Sola, and where many people from Nigeria were taking refuge. Initially, two female suicide bombers blew themselves at the entrance to the market when stopped for security checks. Upon being halted, they immediately blew themselves up and took the lives of 16 people. Then the second group of suicide bombers which reportedly included a man and two children exploded at a nearby refugee camp and killed 22 people. As per the UNICEF, a total of 53 people died. Dalori attack

61 On 30 th January 2015, insurgents from Boko Haram struck the village of Dalori, located about seven miles from the northern city of Maiduguri. More than hundred militants invaded the village in an armored tank, a truck and dozens of motorbikes. Initially, they proceeded to indiscriminately fire at people before setting huts on fire that still had residents. No one was spared and children were burnt alive. By then 50 people had already been murdered and there were more deaths when female suicide bombers blew themselves up among the escaping villagers who were trying to get to the near Gomari Kerkeri village. The terrorists also tried to penerate the Dalori IDP camp but their efforts were made futile by the Nigerian troops. In response, they treated and blew an IED. Overall, total of 86 people were reportedly killed. Another 62 people were transferred to Abba Musa of the State Specialist Hospital in Maiduguri to be treated for severe burn injuries. The militants managed to last for four hours as even the Nigerian military, until the arrival of more reinforcements, was unable to handle the terrorists as they were better prepared and equipped than them. Child suicide bombing According to a report released by UNICEF, more and more children are being used as suicide bombers by the Boko Haram. After abducting more than 200 girls from Chibok in 2014, the group has become well-known for kidnapping children and then using them to carry out its nefarious activities. Boko Haram forces the children into marrying its fighters or often, through the use of drugs and other means, enlists them into its rank of suicide bombers. A 16-year-old girl was drugged and forced to take part in an attempted suicide bombing. She survived but was rejected by her family out of fear stigma. Boko Haram has been using children since 2014 in its attacks on Nigeria, Chad, Niger and Cameroon and since then, has used 117 children to carry out suicide bombings and three quarter of them are girls. Now, children account for a fifth of all suicide bombers in Cameroon, Nigeria and Chad. As a result, children are viewed with deep distrust and suspicion in the Nigerian society.

62 Nigerian authoritarian response Nigeria s response to Boko Haram has been a military one. The government has been consistently using force to respond to the terrorist organization s activities and to suppress them. However, Nigeria as a lone force, has hardly been successful in its efforts to counter the threat. This is primarily because of the corruption among the officials in the country. The terrorist organization has already managed to infiltrate the country s government and military. It has sympathizers and is able to take advantage of officials who can be easily bribed and persuaded for their cause. This was confirmed on 8 th January 2012 by Nigerian President, Goodluck Jonathan, who announced that the group had links in the army, the police, the executive and the legislative arms of the Nigerian government. From a military perspective, the Nigerian army lacks in the training and equipment that it possesses. Even the Boko Haram are much more well-equipped than the Nigerian army, as also evident from their assault on the village of Kukawa where they managed to last 4 hours and could not be forced out by the arrival of initial Nigerian forces as they were illequipped. Other than that, the Nigerian government formed a Joint Task Force, which comprises of Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon and Benin, and declared state of emergency in three states. The Joint Task force, with the object of carrying out military operations againt Boko Haram, have a poor record of human rights. As such, more than often they are willing to act against their own citizens, for example, in April 2013, when one Nigerian soldier was killed in an ambush, the military burnt 2000 homes of the civilians. The

Conflict on the Korean Peninsula: North Korea and the Nuclear Threat Student Readings. North Korean soldiers look south across the DMZ.

Conflict on the Korean Peninsula: North Korea and the Nuclear Threat Student Readings. North Korean soldiers look south across the DMZ. 8 By Edward N. Johnson, U.S. Army. North Korean soldiers look south across the DMZ. South Korea s President Kim Dae Jung for his policies. In 2000 he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. But critics argued

More information

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Background and Current Developments

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Background and Current Developments Congressional ~:;;;;;;;;;;:;;;iii5ii;?>~ ~~ Research Service ~ ~ Informing the legislative debate since 1914------------- Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Background and Current Developments Jonathan

More information

STATEMENT. H.E. Ms. Laila Freivalds Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden

STATEMENT. H.E. Ms. Laila Freivalds Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden STATEMENT by H.E. Ms. Laila Freivalds Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons United Nations New York 3 May

More information

Critical Reflections on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Critical Reflections on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Critical Reflections on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons by Quentin Michel* The announcement by American President G.W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Singh on 18 July 2005 of an

More information

Summary of Policy Recommendations

Summary of Policy Recommendations Summary of Policy Recommendations 192 Summary of Policy Recommendations Chapter Three: Strengthening Enforcement New International Law E Develop model national laws to criminalize, deter, and detect nuclear

More information

North Korea and the NPT

North Korea and the NPT 28 NUCLEAR ENERGY, NONPROLIFERATION, AND DISARMAMENT North Korea and the NPT SUMMARY The Democratic People s Republic of Korea (DPRK) became a state party to the NPT in 1985, but announced in 2003 that

More information

Adopted by the Security Council at its 6191st meeting, on 24 September 2009

Adopted by the Security Council at its 6191st meeting, on 24 September 2009 United Nations S/RES/1887 (2009) Security Council Distr.: General 24 September 2009 (E) *0952374* Resolution 1887 (2009) Adopted by the Security Council at its 6191st meeting, on 24 September 2009 The

More information

NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/WP.29

NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/WP.29 Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/WP.29 23 April 2014 Original: English Third session New

More information

June 4 - blue. Iran Resolution

June 4 - blue. Iran Resolution June 4 - blue Iran Resolution PP 1: Recalling the Statement of its President, S/PRST/2006/15, and its resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), and 1887 (2009) and reaffirming

More information

France, Germany, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution

France, Germany, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution United Nations S/2010/283 Security Council Provisional 4 June 2010 Original: English France, Germany, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution

More information

Implementing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Non-proliferation and regional security

Implementing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Non-proliferation and regional security 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 29 April 2015 Original: English New York, 27 April-22 May 2015 Implementing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation

More information

EXISTING AND EMERGING LEGAL APPROACHES TO NUCLEAR COUNTER-PROLIFERATION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY*

EXISTING AND EMERGING LEGAL APPROACHES TO NUCLEAR COUNTER-PROLIFERATION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY* \\server05\productn\n\nyi\39-4\nyi403.txt unknown Seq: 1 26-SEP-07 13:38 EXISTING AND EMERGING LEGAL APPROACHES TO NUCLEAR COUNTER-PROLIFERATION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY* NOBUYASU ABE** There are three

More information

and note with satisfaction that stocks of nuclear weapons are now at far lower levels than at anytime in the past half-century. Our individual contrib

and note with satisfaction that stocks of nuclear weapons are now at far lower levels than at anytime in the past half-century. Our individual contrib STATEMENT BY THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, FRANCE,THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE 2010 NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

More information

Adopted by the Security Council at its 6141st meeting, on 12 June 2009

Adopted by the Security Council at its 6141st meeting, on 12 June 2009 United Nations S/RES/1874 (2009) Security Council Distr.: General 12 June 2009 Resolution 1874 (2009) Adopted by the Security Council at its 6141st meeting, on 12 June 2009 The Security Council, Recalling

More information

Iran Resolution Elements

Iran Resolution Elements Iran Resolution Elements PP 1: Recalling the Statement of its President, S/PRST/2006/15, its resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), and 1887 (2009) and reaffirming

More information

Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 7 December [on the report of the First Committee (A/70/460)]

Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 7 December [on the report of the First Committee (A/70/460)] United Nations A/RES/70/40 General Assembly Distr.: General 11 December 2015 Seventieth session Agenda item 97 (aa) Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 7 December 2015 [on the report of the First

More information

GR132 Non-proliferation: current lessons from Iran and North Korea

GR132 Non-proliferation: current lessons from Iran and North Korea GR132 Non-proliferation: current lessons from Iran and North Korea The landmark disarmament deal with Libya, announced on 19 th December 2003, opened a brief window of optimism for those pursuing international

More information

Ontario Model United Nations II. Disarmament and Security Council

Ontario Model United Nations II. Disarmament and Security Council Ontario Model United Nations II Disarmament and Security Council Committee Summary The First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly deals with disarmament, global challenges and threats to peace

More information

Montessori Model United Nations. Distr.: Middle School Thirteenth Session Sept First Committee Disarmament and International Security

Montessori Model United Nations. Distr.: Middle School Thirteenth Session Sept First Committee Disarmament and International Security Montessori Model United Nations A/C.1/13/BG-102 General Assembly Distr.: Middle School Thirteenth Session Sept 2018 Original: English First Committee Disarmament and International Security This committee

More information

THE TREATY ON THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR SWEDEN S IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND ITEMS

THE TREATY ON THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR SWEDEN S IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND ITEMS This article is part of the shadow report I skuggan av makten produced by Swedish Physicians Against Nuclear Weapons and WILPF Sweden. THE TREATY ON THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR

More information

"The Nuclear Threat: Basics and New Trends" John Burroughs Executive Director Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy, New York (

The Nuclear Threat: Basics and New Trends John Burroughs Executive Director Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy, New York ( Towards a World Without Violence International Congress, June 23-27, 2004, Barcelona International Peace Bureau and Fundacio per la Pau, organizers Part of Barcelona Forum 2004 Panel on Weapons of Mass

More information

China, Pakistan, and Nuclear Non-Proliferation http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/china-pakistan-and-nuclear-non-proliferation/ Recent evidence regarding China s involvement in Pakistan s nuclear program should

More information

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Arab Emirates,

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Arab Emirates, AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES CONCERNING PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY The Government of the United States

More information

United Nations General Assembly 1st

United Nations General Assembly 1st ASMUN CONFERENCE 2018 "New problems create new opportunities: 7.6 billion people together towards a better future" United Nations General Assembly 1st "Paving the way to a world without a nuclear threat"!

More information

Implications of South Asian Nuclear Developments for U.S. Nonproliferation Policy Nuclear dynamics in South Asia

Implications of South Asian Nuclear Developments for U.S. Nonproliferation Policy Nuclear dynamics in South Asia Implications of South Asian Nuclear Developments for U.S. Nonproliferation Policy Sharon Squassoni Senior Fellow and Director, Proliferation Prevention Program Center for Strategic & International Studies

More information

Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations

Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations 866 United Nations Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10017 Phone: (212) 223-4300. www.un.int/japan/ (Please check against delivery) STATEMENT BY TOSHIO SANO AMBASSADOR

More information

Lesson Title: Working for Nuclear Disarmament- Understanding the Present Status

Lesson Title: Working for Nuclear Disarmament- Understanding the Present Status Lesson Title: Working for Nuclear Disarmament- Understanding the Present Status Grade Level: 11 12 Unit of Study: Contemporary American Society Standards - History Social Science U.S. History 11.9.3 Students

More information

Resolution adopted by the General Assembly. [on the report of the First Committee (A/58/462)]

Resolution adopted by the General Assembly. [on the report of the First Committee (A/58/462)] United Nations A/RES/58/51 General Assembly Distr.: General 17 December 2003 Fifty-eighth session Agenda item 73 (d) Resolution adopted by the General Assembly [on the report of the First Committee (A/58/462)]

More information

IAEA GENERAL CONFERENCE. 28 September 2005 NEW ZEALAND STATEMENT. I would like first to congratulate you on assuming the Presidency of this year's

IAEA GENERAL CONFERENCE. 28 September 2005 NEW ZEALAND STATEMENT. I would like first to congratulate you on assuming the Presidency of this year's IAEA GENERAL CONFERENCE 28 September 2005 NEW ZEALAND STATEMENT I would like first to congratulate you on assuming the Presidency of this year's General Conference. You have the full support of the New

More information

Institute for Science and International Security

Institute for Science and International Security Institute for Science and International Security ACHIEVING SUCCESS AT THE 2010 NUCLEAR NON- PROLIFERATION TREATY REVIEW CONFERENCE Prepared testimony by David Albright, President, Institute for Science

More information

2000 REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FINAL DOCUMENT

2000 REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FINAL DOCUMENT 2000 REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FINAL DOCUMENT New York, 19 May 2000 4. The Conference notes that the non-nuclearweapon States Parties to

More information

APPENDIX XIV: SUMMARY OF THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR- TEST-BAN TREATY (CTBT)

APPENDIX XIV: SUMMARY OF THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR- TEST-BAN TREATY (CTBT) APPENDIX XIV: SUMMARY OF THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR- TEST-BAN TREATY (CTBT) Opened for Signature: 24 September 1996. Duration: Unlimited. PREAMBLE TO THE TREATY The States Parties to this Treaty (hereinafter

More information

Group of Eight Declaration on Nonproliferation and Disarmament for 2012

Group of Eight Declaration on Nonproliferation and Disarmament for 2012 Group of Eight Declaration on Nonproliferation and Disarmament for 2012 This Declaration is issued in conjunction with the Camp David Summit. 1. Preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

More information

Research Guide. Security Council. North Korea : the Human Rights and Security Nexus. Vice Chair: LEE See Hyoung. Vice Chair: JEE Jung Keun

Research Guide. Security Council. North Korea : the Human Rights and Security Nexus. Vice Chair: LEE See Hyoung. Vice Chair: JEE Jung Keun Security Council North Korea : the Human Rights and Security Nexus Chair: KIM Ju Yeok Vice Chair: LEE See Hyoung Vice Chair: JEE Jung Keun 1 Table of Contents 1. Committee Introduction 2. Background Topics

More information

ATOMIC ENERGY. Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS SERIES 12950

ATOMIC ENERGY. Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS SERIES 12950 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS SERIES 12950 ATOMIC ENERGY Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy Agreement Between the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and UKRAINE Signed at Kiev May 6, 1998 with Annex and Agreed

More information

MONGOLIA PERMANENT MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

MONGOLIA PERMANENT MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS MONGOLIA PERMANENT MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS 6 East 77 h Street, New York, N.Y. 10021 Tel: (212) 861-9460, (212) 472-6517 Fax: (212) 861-9464 e-mail: mongolia(&un.int /check against delivery/ STATEMENT

More information

Lessons Learned from Nonproliferation Successes and Failures

Lessons Learned from Nonproliferation Successes and Failures Lessons Learned from Nonproliferation Successes and Failures J. I. Katz Department of Physics McDonnell Center for the Space Sciences Washington University St. Louis, Mo. 63130 USA katz@wuphys.wustl.edu

More information

CENTRAL ASIAN NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE

CENTRAL ASIAN NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE CENTRAL ASIAN NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE Signed at Semipalatinsk: September 8, 2006 Entered into force: The treaty has been ratified by all 5 signatories. The last ratification occurred on 11 December 2008

More information

2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 3 May 2010

2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 3 May 2010 AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS E-maii austraiia@un.int 150 East 42nd Street, New York NY 10017-5612 Ph 212-351 6600 Fax 212-351 6610 www.australiaun.org 2010 Review Conference of the Parties

More information

Documents & Reports. The Impact of the U.S.-India Deal on the Nonproliferation Regime

Documents & Reports. The Impact of the U.S.-India Deal on the Nonproliferation Regime The Impact of the U.S.-India Deal on the Nonproliferation Regime Documents & Reports Arms Control Association Press Briefing Washington, D.C. February 15, 2006 Prepared Remarks of Leonard Weiss Unless

More information

Lawrence Bender Producer. Lucy Walker Director. A letter from the filmmakers

Lawrence Bender Producer. Lucy Walker Director. A letter from the filmmakers Discussion Guide A letter from the filmmakers Three years ago, we began the journey of making this film. We wanted to make a movie about one of the greatest threats to humanity, the proliferation of nuclear

More information

Nuclear Energy and Proliferation in the Middle East Robert Einhorn

Nuclear Energy and Proliferation in the Middle East Robert Einhorn Nuclear Energy and Proliferation in the Middle East Robert Einhorn May 2018 The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, the National Defense University, and the Institute for National Security

More information

Origins of the Cold War. A Chilly Power Point Presentation Brought to You by Mr. Raffel

Origins of the Cold War. A Chilly Power Point Presentation Brought to You by Mr. Raffel Origins of the Cold War A Chilly Power Point Presentation Brought to You by Mr. Raffel What was the Cold War? The Cold War was the bitter state of indirect conflict that existed between the U.S. and the

More information

MODEL DRAFT RESOLUTION

MODEL DRAFT RESOLUTION MODEL DRAFT RESOLUTION MiMUN-UCJC Madrid 1 ANNEX VI SEKMUN MEETING 17 April 2012 S/12/01 Security Council Resolution First Period of Sessions Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Main submitters:

More information

THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRATEGIC POSTURE OF THE UNITED STATES

THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRATEGIC POSTURE OF THE UNITED STATES THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRATEGIC POSTURE OF THE UNITED STATES December 15, 2008 SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 1060 OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2009 (P.L. 110-417)

More information

Desiring to cooperate in the development, use and control of peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and

Desiring to cooperate in the development, use and control of peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA FOR COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY The Government of the United

More information

Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) - EU Statement

Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) - EU Statement 23/04/2018-00:00 STATEMENTS ON BEHALF OF THE EU Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) - EU Statement Preparatory

More information

Ambassador Dr. Sameh Aboul-Enein. Ronald Reagan Building - Washington DC

Ambassador Dr. Sameh Aboul-Enein. Ronald Reagan Building - Washington DC The Middle East Free Zone: A Challenging Reality Ambassador Dr. Sameh Aboul-Enein Strategic Weapons in the 21st Century: Deterrence and Stability in Today s Environment Co-hosted by Los Alamos and Lawrence

More information

Re: Appeal and Questions regarding the Japan-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement

Re: Appeal and Questions regarding the Japan-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement To: Mr. Fumio Kishida, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Japan Re: Appeal and Questions regarding the Japan-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement From: Friends of the Earth Japan Citizens' Nuclear Information

More information

Agreement between the Government of India and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards to Civilian Nuclear Facilities

Agreement between the Government of India and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards to Civilian Nuclear Facilities Atoms for Peace Information Circular INFCIRC/754 Date: 29 May 2009 General Distribution Original: English Agreement between the Government of India and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application

More information

(Nagasaki University, January 20, 2014)

(Nagasaki University, January 20, 2014) Nuclear Disarmament and Non-proliferation Policy Speech by H.E. Mr. Fumio Kishida, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, at "Dialogue with Foreign Minister Kishida (Nagasaki University, January 20, 2014)

More information

Address by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov at Plenary Meeting of Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, March 7, 2009

Address by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov at Plenary Meeting of Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, March 7, 2009 Page 1 of 6 MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION INFORMATION AND PRESS DEPARTMENT 32/34 Smolenskaya-Sennaya pl., 119200, Moscow G-200; tel.: (499) 244 4119, fax: (499) 244 4112 e-mail:

More information

Iran s Nuclear Program: Tehran s Compliance with International Obligations

Iran s Nuclear Program: Tehran s Compliance with International Obligations Iran s Nuclear Program: Tehran s Compliance with International Obligations Paul K. Kerr Analyst in Nonproliferation August 12, 2009 Congressional Research Service CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members

More information

KAZAKHSTAN. Mr. Chairman, We congratulate you on your election as Chair of the First Committee and assure you of our full support and cooperation.

KAZAKHSTAN. Mr. Chairman, We congratulate you on your election as Chair of the First Committee and assure you of our full support and cooperation. KAZAKHSTAN STATEMENT by H.E. Mr. Barlybay Sadykov, Am bassador-at-large, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, at the General Debate of the First Committee 70th session of the United

More information

U.S. Assistance to North Korea

U.S. Assistance to North Korea Order Code RS21834 Updated July 7, 2008 U.S. Assistance to North Korea Mark E. Manyin and Mary Beth Nikitin Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Summary This report summarizes U.S. assistance to

More information

29 th ISODARCO Winter Course Nuclear Governance in a Changing World

29 th ISODARCO Winter Course Nuclear Governance in a Changing World 29 th ISODARCO Winter Course Nuclear Governance in a Changing World 7-17 January 2016 Session 5;Pannel on: Assessing the Vienna Agreement on Iran s Nuclear Program By Ambassador Soltanieh Why Islamic Republic

More information

DECISIONS AND RESOLUTION ADOPTED AT THE 1995 NPT REVIEW AND EXTENSION CONFERENCE

DECISIONS AND RESOLUTION ADOPTED AT THE 1995 NPT REVIEW AND EXTENSION CONFERENCE DECISIONS AND RESOLUTION ADOPTED AT THE 1995 NPT REVIEW AND EXTENSION CONFERENCE Decision 1 STRENGTHENING THE REVIEW PROCESS FOR THE TREATY 1. The Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation

More information

Union of Concerned of Concerned Scientists Press Conference on the North Korean Missile Crisis. April 20, 2017

Union of Concerned of Concerned Scientists Press Conference on the North Korean Missile Crisis. April 20, 2017 Union of Concerned of Concerned Scientists Press Conference on the North Korean Missile Crisis April 20, 2017 DAVID WRIGHT: Thanks for joining the call. With me today are two people who are uniquely qualified

More information

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Arab Republic

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Arab Republic AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT CONCERNING PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY The Government of the United

More information

Nuclear doctrine. Civil Society Presentations 2010 NPT Review Conference NAC

Nuclear doctrine. Civil Society Presentations 2010 NPT Review Conference NAC Statement on behalf of the Group of non-governmental experts from countries belonging to the New Agenda Coalition delivered by Ms. Amelia Broodryk (South Africa), Institute for Security Studies Drafted

More information

Iran s Nuclear Program: Tehran s Compliance with International Obligations

Iran s Nuclear Program: Tehran s Compliance with International Obligations Iran s Nuclear Program: Tehran s Compliance with International Obligations Paul K. Kerr Analyst in Nonproliferation October 1, 2009 Congressional Research Service CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members

More information

IAEA 51 General Conference General Statement by Norway

IAEA 51 General Conference General Statement by Norway IAEA 51 General Conference General Statement by Norway Please allow me to congratulate you on your well-deserved election. Let me also congratulate the Agency and its Member States on the occasion of its

More information

Agreement signed at Washington June 30, 1980; Entered into force December 30, With agreed minute.

Agreement signed at Washington June 30, 1980; Entered into force December 30, With agreed minute. Agreement signed at Washington June 30, 1980; Entered into force December 30, 1981. With agreed minute. AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT

More information

TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Parties to the Treaty,

TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Parties to the Treaty, 22 April 1970 INF International Atomic Energy Agency INFORMATION CIRCULAR GENERAL Distr. ENGLISH TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS Notification of the entry into force 1. By letters addressed

More information

Security Council. The situation in the Korean peninsula. Kaan Özdemir & Kardelen Hiçdönmez

Security Council. The situation in the Korean peninsula. Kaan Özdemir & Kardelen Hiçdönmez Security Council The situation in the Korean peninsula Kaan Özdemir & Kardelen Hiçdönmez Alman Lisesi Model United Nations 2018 Introduction The nuclear programme of North Korea and rising political tension

More information

Nuclear Energy and Disarmament: The Challenges of Regulation, Development, and Prohibition

Nuclear Energy and Disarmament: The Challenges of Regulation, Development, and Prohibition Nuclear Energy and Disarmament: The Challenges of Regulation, Development, and Prohibition By Sergio Duarte High Representative for Disarmament Affairs United Nations Panel on The International Regulation

More information

The Korean Peninsula at a Glance

The Korean Peninsula at a Glance 6 Kim or his son. The outside world has known little of North Korea since the 1950s, due to the government s strict limit on the entry of foreigners. But refugees and defectors have told stories of abuse,

More information

F or many years, those concerned

F or many years, those concerned PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS STRENGTHENING GLOBAL NORMS BY GEORGE BUNN 4 Global concerns over illicit trafficking in nuclear materials have intensified in the 1990s. Some countermeasures have

More information

Chapter 18 The Israeli National Perspective on Nuclear Non-proliferation

Chapter 18 The Israeli National Perspective on Nuclear Non-proliferation Chapter 18 The Israeli National Perspective on Nuclear Non-proliferation Merav Zafary-Odiz Israel is subject to multiple regional threats. In Israel s view, since its threats are regional in nature, non-proliferation

More information

2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons * 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Final Document Volume I Part I Review of the operation of the Treaty, as provided for in its article VIII

More information

United Nations General Assembly 60 th Session First Committee. New York, 3 October 3 November 2005

United Nations General Assembly 60 th Session First Committee. New York, 3 October 3 November 2005 United Nations General Assembly 60 th Session First Committee New York, 3 October 3 November 2005 Statement by Ambassador John Freeman United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, on behalf of

More information

MULTILATERAL NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT VERIFICATION AND NORTH KOREA Kuala Lumpur, 26 November 2013

MULTILATERAL NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT VERIFICATION AND NORTH KOREA Kuala Lumpur, 26 November 2013 MULTILATERAL NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT VERIFICATION AND NORTH KOREA Kuala Lumpur, 26 November 2013 David Cliff, VERTIC Researcher Firstly, thank you to Meena and INENS for the invitation to come and speak here

More information

Scott D. Sagan Stanford University Herzliya Conference, Herzliya, Israel,

Scott D. Sagan Stanford University Herzliya Conference, Herzliya, Israel, Scott D. Sagan Stanford University Herzliya Conference, Herzliya, Israel, 2009 02 04 Thank you for this invitation to speak with you today about the nuclear crisis with Iran, perhaps the most important

More information

High-level action needed to promote CTBT s entry into force. Interview with Carl Bildt, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden

High-level action needed to promote CTBT s entry into force. Interview with Carl Bildt, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden In the spotlight High-level action needed to promote CTBT s entry into force Interview with Carl Bildt, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden Q: Sweden has always been one of the strongest proponents

More information

Interviews. Interview With Ambasssador Gregory L. Schulte, U.S. Permanent Representative to the In. Agency

Interviews. Interview With Ambasssador Gregory L. Schulte, U.S. Permanent Representative to the In. Agency Interview With Ambasssador Gregory L. Schulte, U.S. Permanent Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency Interviews Interviewed by Miles A. Pomper As U.S permanent representative to the International

More information

Luncheon Address. The Role of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in the Global Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Regime.

Luncheon Address. The Role of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in the Global Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Regime. Luncheon Address The Role of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in the Global Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Regime By Sergio Duarte High Representative for Disarmament Affairs United Nations Conference

More information

Dr. Sameh Aboul-Enein Budapest, June, 2012

Dr. Sameh Aboul-Enein Budapest, June, 2012 Annual NATO Conference on WMD Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non-Proliferation 2012 Conference on the Establishment of Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and all Other Weapons of Mass Destruction: the Way Forward

More information

2 May Mr. Chairman,

2 May Mr. Chairman, Statement by Mr. Kazuyuki Hamada, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan at the First Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference for the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear

More information

NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.30

NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.30 Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.30 18 April 2018 Original: English Second session Geneva,

More information

Treaty on the Northeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (tentative translation) (The Democratic Party of Japan Nuclear Disarmament Group) Preamble

Treaty on the Northeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (tentative translation) (The Democratic Party of Japan Nuclear Disarmament Group) Preamble Treaty on the Northeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (tentative translation) (The Democratic Party of Japan Nuclear Disarmament Group) Preamble The States Parties to this Treaty, 1. Recalling that Northeast

More information

EU S POLICY OF DISARMAMENT AS PART OF ITS NORMATIVE POWER Roxana HINCU *

EU S POLICY OF DISARMAMENT AS PART OF ITS NORMATIVE POWER Roxana HINCU * CES Working Papers Volume VII, Issue 2A EU S POLICY OF DISARMAMENT AS PART OF ITS NORMATIVE POWER Roxana HINCU * Abstract: This article argues that EU s policy of Disarmament, Non-Proliferation, and Arms

More information

Keynote by the Executive Secretary Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization.

Keynote by the Executive Secretary Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. Keynote by the Executive Secretary Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization Dr Lassina Zerbo Pugwash Conference Nuclear tests: past and future Astana, 25 August

More information

It is today widely recognized that an international arms control treaty can be successfully

It is today widely recognized that an international arms control treaty can be successfully Maintaining the moratorium a de facto CTBT Arundhati GHOSE It is today widely recognized that an international arms control treaty can be successfully concluded only if and when the strong and powerful

More information

Non-Proliferation and the Challenge of Compliance

Non-Proliferation and the Challenge of Compliance Non-Proliferation and the Challenge of Compliance Address by Nobuyasu Abe Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs United Nations, New York Second Moscow International Non-Proliferation Conference

More information

A GOOD FRAMEWORK FOR A GOOD FUTURE by Jonathan Granoff, President of the Global Security Institute

A GOOD FRAMEWORK FOR A GOOD FUTURE by Jonathan Granoff, President of the Global Security Institute A GOOD FRAMEWORK FOR A GOOD FUTURE by Jonathan Granoff, President of the Global Security Institute I buy gasoline for my car from a Russian concession in my neighborhood in the suburbs of Philadelphia;

More information

F A C T S H E E T. The European Union and Iran

F A C T S H E E T. The European Union and Iran Brussels, 14 October 2013 131014/01 F A C T S H E E T The European Union and Iran While the European Union s objective remains to develop with Iran a constructive partnership, from which both sides could

More information

Remarks on the Role of the United Nations in Advancing Global Disarmament Objectives

Remarks on the Role of the United Nations in Advancing Global Disarmament Objectives Remarks on the Role of the United Nations in Advancing Global Disarmament Objectives By Angela Kane High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Briefing to officers of the Saudi Command and Staff College

More information

PS 0500: Nuclear Weapons. William Spaniel

PS 0500: Nuclear Weapons. William Spaniel PS 0500: Nuclear Weapons William Spaniel https://williamspaniel.com/classes/worldpolitics/ Outline The Nuclear Club Mutually Assured Destruction Obsolescence Of Major War Nuclear Pessimism Why Not Proliferate?

More information

The Non- Aligned Movement (NAM) Database

The Non- Aligned Movement (NAM) Database The Non- Aligned Movement (NAM) Database 64 th United Nation First Committee Submitted by the NAM Thematic Summaries Statement by Indonesia on Behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) at the General Debate

More information

NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.33

NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.33 Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.33 19 April 2018 Original: English Second session Geneva,

More information

Montessori Model United Nations MMUN 2012

Montessori Model United Nations MMUN 2012 Montessori Model United Nations Dear Delegates, First Committee of the General Assembly Disarmament and International Security () It is my great honor to welcome you to the 2012 Montessori Model United

More information

Interview with Annalisa Giannella, Personal Representative on

Interview with Annalisa Giannella, Personal Representative on Interview with Annalisa Giannella, Personal Representative on Nonproliferation of WMD to EU High Representative Javier Solana Interviews Interviewed by Oliver Meier On Feb. 16, Arms Control Today international

More information

PS 0500: Nuclear Weapons. William Spaniel https://williamspaniel.com/classes/ps /

PS 0500: Nuclear Weapons. William Spaniel https://williamspaniel.com/classes/ps / PS 0500: Nuclear Weapons William Spaniel https://williamspaniel.com/classes/ps-0500-2017/ Outline The Nuclear Club Mutually Assured Destruction Obsolescence Of Major War Nuclear Pessimism Why Not Proliferate?

More information

ADVOCACY GUIDE Second preparatory committee of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty 22 april - 3 may

ADVOCACY GUIDE Second preparatory committee of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty 22 april - 3 may ADVOCACY GUIDE Second preparatory committee of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty 22 april - 3 may 2013 1 2 What is the npt The nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) opened for signature on 1 July 1968

More information

AS DELIVERED. EU Statement by

AS DELIVERED. EU Statement by AS DELIVERED EU Statement by H.E. Ms. Federica Mogherini High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Vice-President of the European Commission General Debate 2015

More information

United States Statement to the NPT Review Conference, 3 May 2010 US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton

United States Statement to the NPT Review Conference, 3 May 2010 US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton United States Statement to the NPT Review Conference, 3 May 2010 US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton SECRETARY CLINTON: I want to thank the Secretary General, Director General Amano, Ambassador Cabactulan,

More information

Report of the 10th International Student/Young Pugwash (ISYP) Conference. Astana, Kazakhstan, August 2017

Report of the 10th International Student/Young Pugwash (ISYP) Conference. Astana, Kazakhstan, August 2017 Report of the 10th International Student/Young Pugwash (ISYP) Conference Astana, Kazakhstan, 23-24 August 2017 This report summarizes the proceedings and discussions of the 10th International Student/Young

More information

Eighth United Nations-Republic of Korea Joint Conference on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Issues

Eighth United Nations-Republic of Korea Joint Conference on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Issues Keynote Address Eighth United Nations-Republic of Korea Joint Conference on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Issues By Sergio Duarte High Representative for Disarmament Affairs United Nations Joint Conference

More information

Israel s Strategic Flexibility

Israel s Strategic Flexibility Israel s Strategic Flexibility Amos Yadlin and Avner Golov Israel s primary strategic goal is to prevent Iran from attaining the ability to develop nuclear weapons, which would allow Tehran to break out

More information

Council conclusions Iran

Council conclusions Iran Council conclusions Iran - 2004-2008 2004 23/02/04 "1. The Council discussed the Iranian parliamentary elections on 20 February. 2. The Council recalled that over the last ten years Iran had made progress

More information