Learning the Wrong Lessons About Nicaraguan Democracy: A Response to Anderson and Dodd. Samuel R. Greene

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1 Learning the Wrong Lessons About Nicaraguan Democracy: A Response to Anderson and Dodd Samuel R. Greene Samuel R. Greene is a PhD candidate in the Department of Politics at the Catholic University of America. His recent publications include The Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in El Salvador, March 2009 with Stacy Keogh in the journal Electoral Studies and What Democracy for Afghanistan? (2009), a National Defense University study cowritten with Charles Barry. Leslie Anderson and Lawrence Dodd reach a curious conclusion in their analysis of Nicaragua s 2008 municipal elections in the pages of this journal. Despite widespread fraud in the 2008 election, they argue that the landslide Sandinista (FSLN) victory is evidence of the ability of local FSLN leaders to meet constituent needs in Nicaragua s relatively decentralized government. The election should thus be understood as a sign of the growing autonomy of FSLN municipal leaders. For Anderson and Dodd, this independence serves as an indicator that despite the well-documented problems with Nicaragua s democracy and institutions at the national level, Nicaragua s democracy may yet be advancing. 1 Their interpretation is precisely at odds with most Nicaraguan assessments of the 2008 elections; outside of FSLN stalwarts, Nicaraguans from all sides of the political spectrum broadly condemned the election as a terrible setback to Nicaragua s democracy. Miriam Argüello, a member of the National Convergence, a sometime FSLN ally, described the elections as a complete mess a step backwards of fifty years [in its] disrespect to the popular will in elections, 2 while Ethics and Transparency, a nonpartisan NGO that oversaw Nicaraguan 1

2 election monitoring in Daniel Ortega s 2006 victory, called 2008 the least transparent and most conflictive electoral process in the country s recent history. 3 Minimizing the extent of the electoral fraud and suggesting that the flawed Sandinista victory is evidence of independence within the FSLN that shows Nicaraguan democracy is working well at the local level is a profound misinterpretation of the 2008 elections and the state of Nicaraguan politics. Recent events in Nicaragua suggest that municipal leaders are captive to destructive national forces that threaten to undermine Nicaraguan democracy; 109 FSLN mayors and vice-mayors supported Daniel Ortega s extraconstitutional attempt to run for re-election in 2011 despite the Nicaraguan constitution s clear prohibition of consecutive re-election. Nicaragua s 2008 election is best understood as a setback to democratic consolidation rather than a cause for optimism. The Flawed Process of the 2008 Municipal Elections Anderson and Dodd downplay the deep flaws in the 2008 election, describing the fraudulent election as merely somewhat tainted. 4 They minimize the importance of the maneuverings of the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE), which is responsible for accrediting political parties and implementing electoral rules prior to the election. As part of a power-sharing agreement between Ortega and Constitutionalist Liberal Party (PLC) leader Arnoldo Alemán, the CSE was populated with allies of the two established parties. The CSE has a long history of attempting to dubiously disqualify candidates and parties or manipulate party rules, but several of its most egregious decisions profoundly affected the 2008 elections. In February 2008, it removed anti-alemán conservative Eduardo Montealegre from his position as leader of the 2

3 National Liberal Alliance (ALN) and replaced him with an Alemán loyalist. 5 This led Montealegre to seek a closer association with Alemán in the PLC, causing members of the ALN to defect to the FSLN. It also prevented two dissident parties, the Sandinista Renewal Movement (MRS) and the Conservative Party (PC), from competing in the 2008 elections on spurious grounds, after previously approving their participation. Thus the CSE undermined opposition to the FSLN by weakening the right and disqualifying FSLN dissidents on the left. 6 Daniel Ortega s refusal to allow internal election monitors with reputations for neutrality, such as the Nicaraguan NGO Ethics and Transparency, or impartial outside monitors such as representatives of the Organization of American States to observe the election should also cast serious doubt on the integrity of the electoral process. Both the left and right charged that the elections were rife with irregularities, from problems in the distribution of voting documents and polling stations closing early to the fraudulent annulment of votes and deliberate manipulation of reports from polling places by electoral officials. Sources with knowledge of the ballot-counting procedures of the CSE suggested that the results were altered after the CSE received them. In some cases, it is alleged that polling places reported a 100 percent margin in favor of the FSLN candidate in some instances not even recording the vote of a candidate for himself. The CSE s reporting procedures have also been called into serious doubt, given that the CSE s published results did not accord with the tallies agreed upon by election monitors from the political parties contesting the election. 7 While opposition candidates often claim fraud because of disappointment with their own performance, it is worth noting that Montealegre did not accuse Ortega of a fraudulent victory in the 2006 presidential election, despite Ortega s narrow margin of victory. 8 Indeed, the results of the 2006 election were accepted by all three losing presidential candidates and their parties, 3

4 despite their profound disappointment with the results. The 2008 results, however, were widely condemned. Anderson and Dodd suggest that most voters respected the electoral results. 9 If this were the case, why did many prominent Nicaraguans from different political persuasions call the 2008 results into question? The Nicaraguan Episcopal Conference of Catholic Bishops reported that the populace possessed a generalized distrust of the electoral results, an assessment that was confirmed by news sources with conservative and leftist tendencies. 10 Use of a dubious election as an indicator of democratic progress should be met with skepticism. Providing Services as a Measure of Democracy Anderson and Dodd s evidence that local FSLN leaders are committed to democracy is also problematic. They suggest that the local government s ability to provide services is evidence of democratization at the local level. Opinion polls suggest that citizens have greater confidence in the municipal government to deliver services and be responsive to citizen needs. Thus FSLN municipal leaders won votes because of their superior commitment to a democratic provision of constituent services, leading to democratization at the local level. The delivery of services, however, should not necessarily be equated with democratic fervor. Municipal leaders have other good reasons to perform well. Good delivery of services in a democratic framework can serve as a precursor to an authoritarian transition. Failure to deliver anticipated services will likely lead to unrest and threatens the prestige of a mayor. It seems that Anderson and Dodd conflate capacity with democracy. It is unsurprising that many municipal governments are considered to be better at delivering services than the Nicaraguan national government. But relatively effective municipal governments are not necessarily democratic. 4

5 Nicaraguan history also points to another reason for municipal leaders to provide services: graft. Arnoldo Alemán exemplifies this trend. When Alemán was elected mayor of Managua in 1990, his personal wealth was estimated at US$20,000. As mayor, Alemán established a reputation as a leader who got things accomplished by slashing through bureaucratic obstacles. He also earned a significant amount of money through corruption; by the time Alemán became the PLC nominee for the 1996 presidential election, he had amassed significant personal wealth from his malfeasance. 11 Local politicians have a long history of delivering services for reasons other than their commitment to democracy, particularly when the national government does not provide reliable services. Tammany Hall clearly responded to constituent needs, but certainly did not further democracy in New York. Anderson and Dodd do not convincingly demonstrate that the case is any different in Nicaragua. The Long Arm of FSLN Institutional Control Notwithstanding the flaws in the 2008 election, Anderson and Dodd also argue that the electoral fraud is not that significant because the FSLN mayors elected via dubious results will act independently of Daniel Ortega and the national FSLN leadership. Neither the past FSLN treatment of party dissidents nor the FSLN mayors behavior following the 2008 election lends credence to this argument. The FSLN party directorate, under the close control of Daniel Ortega, has long exercised tight control over candidate selection and purged members who did not follow Ortega s leadership. While some autonomy is tolerated, it is unlikely that the FSLN would allow 5

6 candidates with a record of disagreeing with the party over important national issues to run for key offices, including the post of mayor in major towns. In the past, controversial FSLN politicians have been expelled from the party for failure to follow party leadership. The example of Herty Lewites s independence as mayor of Managua given by Anderson and Dodd does not help their argument that FSLN mayors have autonomy to challenge national leadership. Lewites was forced out of the FSLN because of his individualism as mayor and because he challenged Ortega for the top spot on the FSLN ticket in the 2006 presidential election. His successful campaign for mayor of Managua in 2000 on the FSLN ticket came only after members of the business wing of the FSLN brokered a rapprochement between Ortega and Lewites following Lewites s 1996 campaign as a member of the Sol coalition which tilted the mayoral race to the PLC. 12 Lewites s campaign for president in 2006 as part of the MRS included a denunciation of the FSLN s authoritarian control of candidates. The FSLN has traditionally delivered block voting on key issues that interest the national party leadership, expelling party members unwilling to toe the line. The line of exrevolutionaries removed from the party for challenging Ortega is long, and many supporters of the FSLN revolution in the 1980s want nothing to do with Ortega s current leadership of the party. 13 Nothing about the 2008 municipal election indicates that the FSLN attitude toward dissent has changed. Indeed, in the most important recent test of the independence of FSLN mayors Daniel Ortega s move to change the Nicaraguan constitution to allow for presidential re-election to consecutive terms nearly every mayor toed the FSLN line. Ortega s maneuverings threaten to undermine the small amount of progress that Nicaragua s fragile democracy has made since

7 Nicaragua s Flawed Institutions and the Question of Re-Election The previous twenty years of electoral politics in Nicaragua suggests that its political institutions are deeply flawed. The performance of key institutions, from the CSE to the Supreme Court, demonstrates that Nicaraguan institutions and laws are prone to widespread manipulation. 14 However, Daniel Ortega s initiative to allow the president and mayors to seek re-election to consecutive terms, which had been forbidden by a 1995 amendment to the Nicaraguan constitution, threatens to deal grave damage to the country s constitution. While Ortega had considered amending the constitution, passing a constitutional amendment had uncertain prospects because of his lack of a plurality in the national assembly. Instead, judges beholden to the FSLN ruled that the 1995 amendment to the constitution violated the article that established the criteria for officeholders. Because the original article regulating eligibility for executive offices did not mention re-election, but only established minimum age and character requirements, the 1995 amendment was held to be unconstitutional. 15 This ruling was condemned by Nicaraguans on both the left and the right as an untenable interpretation of the Nicaraguan constitution that threatened to undermine whatever remained of the principles of the rule of law. Voices from many political persuasions insisted that declaring an amendment designed to alter a section of the constitution to be unconstitutional for failing to comply with the section it amended must be understood as legal chicanery. Ortega and other prominent members of the FSLN supported the amendment when its target was to prevent conservative Antonio Lacayo from amassing power. In 1995, the FSLN argued that re-election would encourage authoritarianism. This is still the case in Ortega s reform threatens 7

8 both to undermine the Nicaraguan constitution and to facilitate a transition to an authoritarian delegative democracy. Did leading FSLN mayors speak up to oppose Ortega s plan? If the FSLN mayors elected in 2008 truly had independence from the national leadership, then it should be expected that many of them would oppose Ortega s attempt to secure re-election, given its potential to undermine the foundation of Nicaragua s democracy. Furthermore, FSLN moderates would have political reasons to oppose re-election, as Ortega s disqualification from re-election as president would provide an opportunity to change party leadership Ortega has been the FSLN presidential candidate in every election since Instead, the Nicaraguan press reported that Ortega s petition to the court arguing that his human rights were violated by a prohibition on re-election was cosigned by 109 FSLN mayors and vice-mayors, who demanded the right to be re-elected to their posts, as well. 17 This belies contentions that the 2008 elections might make a positive contribution to Nicaragua s democracy because FSLN mayors have significant independence. FSLN mayors might have autonomy on local issues; but on national issues, they have remained faithful to Ortega s authoritarian politics. If local autonomy means lockstep support on crucial issues for an authoritarian national leadership, it is worth quite little. The Consequences of Learning the Wrong Lessons Anderson and Dodd are incorrect to argue that the Nicaraguan case supports a theory that democratization in local politics can be decoupled from de-democratization in national politics. They present a picture of democratic politics focused on the provision of services at the local level, in contrast to the authoritarian politics of Ortega and the FSLN leadership at the national 8

9 level. But the national is not so easily separated from the local in Nicaragua. Even if FSLN mayors had democratic intentions for local governance, the dubious electoral results by which many of them were elected and their support for the undemocratic goals of their national leadership have undermined the future of Nicaragua s democracy. Given the power of national institutions to shape the rules of local elections in Nicaragua, as well as the role of national parties in candidate selection (particularly within the FSLN) and the close relationship between prominent local political leaders and national issues, Nicaragua seems to be a poor case for this argument even if local leaders were committed democrats. Unless local politics is sealed off from national politics by geography or removed from the influence of national money, the competing directions of local democratization and national dedemocratization seem primed for an ending that would result in democratic failure all around. Given the national government s control over police power and the national treasury in Nicaragua, local autonomy is limited. The national control of electoral rules and the judicial system also allows national leadership to circumvent democratic forces at the local level. Mayors without a national power base do not have sufficient political resources to resist manipulation of electoral rules and institutions. National control over candidate selection also limits the ability of local leaders to democratize when their national parties are pushing their country in an undemocratic direction. Could FSLN mayors oppose Ortega on an issue key to his political survival and stay inside the FSLN? Even a charismatic figure with a national following like Herty Lewites could not stand against Ortega within the FSLN. The support of FSLN mayors for re-election suggests that unless local parties have autonomous resources and freedom from national parties and electoral 9

10 rules, democratization at the local level is unlikely to overcome de-democratization at the national level. In Nicaragua, there is no silver lining in the results of the fraudulent 2008 municipal elections. The de-democratization of national politics has also touched local leaders. It may be that members of the FSLN at the municipal level would behave differently without Ortega s leadership. Given that Ortega is only 65, however, it is unlikely that he will not be the FSLN candidate for president in Even if the right is able to unite behind a single candidate in 2011, the 2011 election is unlikely to be free and fair. There is also little reason to expect that the FSLN mayors will object to a stolen election, since they stand to benefit from electoral fraud on behalf of their party in their own campaigns for re-election in Advice that the international community should be cautious about condemning the 2008 elections and withholding aid is misplaced. The FSLN municipal leaders that Anderson and Dodd worry about undermining were brought to power in a dubious election and have supported an attempt to weaken key democratic institutions. The grave damage to the probity of Nicaragua s elections and to respect for its constitution is the true story of the 2008 municipal elections. If Nicaragua s tentative advances toward democracy are undone, the 2008 elections will be remembered as an ominous sign of the coming collapse. 1 Leslie Anderson and Laurence Dodd, Nicaragua: Progress Amid Regress? Journal of Democracy 20 (July 2009): Quoted in Aliados FSLN demandan recuento, Confidencial, 7 December See 4 Anderson and Dodd, Nicaragua: Progress Amid Regress? CSE desconoce a Montealegre como presidente del ALN, La Prensa, 20 February2008; Los pecados del CSE, La Prensa, 16 November

11 6 Pacto cancela personalidad jurídica al MRS y PC, La Prensa, 11 June 2008; Los pecados del CSE, La Prensa, 16 November For a good summary in English, see Nicaragua Is the Municipal Elections Big Loser, Envio, November 2008; available at 8 Ortega won with 38 percent of the vote. A 3 percent reduction for Ortega or a 6 percent increase in support for Montealegre would have forced a runoff that Montealegre almost certainly would have won. The Wall Street Journal made a similar point on its editorial page: Election Fraud in Nicaragua, Wall Street Journal, 24 November Anderson and Dodd, Nicaragua: Progress Amid Regress? Deslegitiman elecciones, El Nuevo Diario, 12 November Some of the text is reprinted in English in Nicaragua Is the Municipal Elections Big Loser. 11 Some reports calculated his wealth at over $200 million. See Eduardo Marenco Tercero, Nicaragua: entre el patrimonialismo de los Somoza y la corrupción de Alemán (Managua: Impresiones y Troqueles, 2004). 12 FSLN oficializará guillotina a Lewites, Confidencial, 27 Feburary William Grigsby, Breaking Free of Fear to Defend Ideas and Rights, Envio, March 2005, provides a good analysis in English. 13 For a good treatment of these divisions in English, see Rory Carroll, Second Coming of the Sandinistas Turns Sour, The Observer, 11 January For an account in English, see David Close and Kalowatie Deonandan, eds., Undoing Democracy (Lanham, Md.: Lexington, 2004). 15 Siete días para la historia, El Nuevo Diario, 26 October FSLN no objetó la no reelección, El Nuevo Diario, 15 November Lacayo was the son-in-law of Violeta Chamorro, who defeated Ortega in the 1990 election. The 1995 amendment also prohibited the immediate reelection of immediate family members of the previous president. 17 Siete días para la historia, El Nuevo Diario, 26 October