Hofstra University Model United Nations Conference. United Nations General Assembly First Committee. Disarmament and International Security (DISEC)

Transcription

1 Hofstra University Model United Nations Conference United Nations General Assembly First Committee Disarmament and International Security (DISEC)

2 1 Introduction to the Disarmament and International Security Committee The First Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations, also known as the Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC), deals with disarmament, global challenges and threats to peace that affect the international community and seeks out solutions to the challenges in the international security regime. 1 According to Chapter 4, Article 11 of the Charter of the United Nations, the primary purpose and aim of the General Assembly is to: Consider the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both. 2 With this as the General Assembly s charge, DISEC thus considers all matters of disarmament and international security under the purview of the committee. To achieve its ultimate goals of reducing the level of armaments around the globe and promoting cooperative approaches to international security, the committee works closely with the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament. At the 2014 Hofstra Model United Nations Conference, DISEC will address two important issues: the responsibility to protect and space disarmament. Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is the idea that the international community has a responsibility to protect people from the gravest violations of human rights, including genocides, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and other crimes against humanity. Currently, the U.N. system and international law provide that the international community should use appropriate, peaceful measures to protect populations. Should those methods fail, the

3 World Summit maintained that the Security Council had the responsibility to intervene with force if necessary. 3 As questions arise about the scope of R2P, this topic has become more and more relevant to the First Committee. It is imperative that DISEC address this issue so as to promote global security and lasting peace. Space disarmament, the second issue of the committee, is also a significant problem facing the international community today. Though gaining knowledge about space is vital, the international community has made clear that weapons do not have a place in space. For example, the Outer Space Treaty came into force in 1967, and banned weapons of mass destruction in space as well as established rules on how to responsibility use and explore outer space. As technology has progressed, however, it has become clear that agreements like the Outer Space Treaty need to be updated to, for example, prevent other types of weapons being introduced into space. Although there have been many working papers and efforts to construct new treaties, none have been successful. This committee must find a way to protect the wishes of the international community by ensuring the continued demilitarized nature of space.

4 3 Topic A: Responsibility to Protect Introduction Perpetrated by the Nazi regime in Germany before and during the Second World War, the Holocaust was an unprecedented attempt to kill an entire people and resulted the death of six million Jews and hundreds of thousands of Roma, homosexuals, disabled persons and others. While not on the same scale, similar atrocities have been committed in the latter half of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first. Just in the post-cold War period, the world has witnessed atrocities in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Darfur, to name just a few. The conflict in Syria is only the latest such humanitarian tragedy, with more than one hundred thousand dead thus far and millions fleeing violence perpetrated by the Syrian regime and rebel groups. Each of these conflicts has a different dynamic, but all share a basic feature: innocents being targeted and killed. The international community has long responded to such tragedies by saying never again. After the Holocaust, the world collectively made genocide illegal with the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, hoping that such measures may prevent it from happening again. 4 But in 1994, the UN did essentially nothing as nearly a million Rwandans were slaughtered. Since this outrage and the others that have followed the international community has attempted to put teeth behind the words never again with the development of the idea of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). R2P is a relatively new international security and human rights norm to address the international community s failure to prevent and stop genocides, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. 5 This idea challenges traditional notions of

5 4 sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention in that the entire international community and not just a particular state has a responsibility to protect against human rights abuses. According to the December 2001 report produced by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), the core principles of R2P include: State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state itself. Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect. 6 The ICISS report claims the authority for the international community to intervene to stop ethnic cleansing, war crimes, genocide, and other human rights abuses resides in the obligations not just the rights of sovereignty itself, the UN Charter and the Security Council s primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security, the significant body of international covenants on human rights protections, and the evolving practices of states, regional organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the UN itself. 7 The report envisions three responsibilities of the international community when dealing with atrocities. First, the international community has a responsibility to engage in prevention by addressing the root and immediate causes of crises putting populations at risk. Second, the international community must react to situations of compelling human need with appropriate measures, which may include coercive measures like sanctions and international prosecution, and in extreme cases military intervention.

6 5 Finally, the international community also has a responsibility to assist with recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation, addressing the causes of the harm the intervention was designed to halt or avert. 8 In the event military intervention is required, the ICISS Report presented multiple principles on which military actions to support R2P should operate. The first the Just Cause Threshold is an attempt to delineate when military intervention is necessary, specifying that such intervention is exceptional and extraordinary and that there must be serious harm occurring to human beings, or likely to occur, that results in massive loss of life that is the product of state action or the inability of the state to prevent that loss of life. This would include large scale ethnic cleansing actual or apprehended, whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape. 9 Precautionary Principles include that multilateral interventions supported by regional organizations must have the goal of stopping human suffering, that military action is a last resort, that the use of military force is the minimum amount required to halt the atrocity, and that there must be reasonable chance of success. This final point also includes that, the consequences of action not likely to be worse than the consequences of inaction. 10 The report further specifies that any military action related to R2P must be approved through the proper international channel. That is, the Right Authority Principle states that the UN Security Council should approve R2P interventions and that in most cases only military interventions approved by the Security Council are legitimate. But if the Security Council is unwilling or unable to act to protect in conscience-shocking situations crying out for action, concerned states may not rule out other means to meet the gravity and urgency of that situation. That is, regional organizations and individual

7 6 states may consider action outside the authority of the United Nations, but this in itself could be a threat to the credibility of the UN system. 11 Finally, the ICISS lays out important Operational Principles. These include general statements of: Clear objectives; clear and unambiguous mandate at all times; and resources to match. Common military approach among involved partners; unity of command; clear and unequivocal communications and chain of command. Acceptance of limitations, incrementalism and gradualism in the application of force, the objective being protection of a population, not defeat of a state. Rules of engagement which fit the operational concept; are precise; reflect the principle of proportionality; and involve total adherence to international humanitarian law. Acceptance that force protection cannot become the principal objective. Maximum possible coordination with humanitarian organizations. 12 Taken together, these four principles of R2P provided the international community with blueprint for dealing with genocide, war crimes, massive human rights abuses, and similar atrocities. In 2005, the UN General Assembly signed onto part of the ICISS s idea of R2P and stated that if peaceful means that is, diplomatic and related efforts fail to stop abuses: We are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. 13 Despite this acknowledgment of some of the R2P principles, the General Assembly s resolution failed to endorse all of the principles of the ICISS Report. But the Secretary

8 7 General s 2009 Report on Implementing the Responsibility to Protect followed, and helped to create three pillars of R2P. 14 Restating some of the principles of the ICISS Report, the pillars include the notion of sovereignty conferring not just rights but also the responsibility of states to protect their citizens, the international community s responsibility to protect vulnerable people, and that the international community must be prepared to take collective action to protect populations through diplomacy, humanitarian, and, if necessary, military force. 15 Debate on R2P, however, continues. After the Secretary General s 2009 Report, for example, the General Assembly resumed debate on how to best implement R2P. In 2010 and 2011, the Secretary General stressed the need to implement early warning systems for the prevention of genocide and other human rights abuses and ways to strengthen UN cooperation with regional bodies (e.g., NATO, the African Union). As late as 2012, the General Assembly continued to debate R2P and it remains and important issue on the UN s agenda. 16 With the 2001 ICISS Report, the UN General Assembly accepting the concept (though not all components) of R2P in 2005, the Secretary General s 2009 Report on Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, and continuous debate in the General Assembly, the international community has clearly taken some steps to further define and refine the norm of R2P. But many questions and issues remain. For example, what is the best way for the international community to detect genocide and other events so as to effectively prevent mass atrocities? When does a human rights abuse cross the threshold and become a large scale event that requires international community action? What are the conditions under which the international community should, in the name of stopping

9 8 or preventing humanitarian tragedies, violate the sovereignty of a state in a forceful way with the use military force? Or, to put it another way, what is the balance between sovereign rights and responsibilities of states and the obligations of the international community when it comes to protecting vulnerable populations? Further, what specific military options can be taken to stop such actions? Finally, can R2P ever justify the international community taking action that results in regime change in the offending state? Many of these questions were present as the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) struggled to deal with the situation in Libya in Arguably the first UNsponsored intervention justified by R2P principles, the UNSC acted in the face of violence, and the threat of increased violence against citizens, by the Muammar el- Qaddafi regime. As the Arab Spring swept across North Africa, Qaddafi unleashed his military forces against protestors and rebels denouncing his rule. As the regime s violence worsened, Qaddafi promised to destroy the center of the rebellion in Benghazi, claiming, We will come house by house, room by room. To those in the rebellion that continued to resist, Qaddafi claimed We will find you in your closets. We will have no mercy and no pity. 17 Given this unequivocal threat, after much debate the UNSC authorized all necessary measures to protect civilians in March 2011 with Resolution In practice, this meant establishing no-fly zones for the Libyan regimes air force so that they could not be used to indiscriminately bomb civilians as well as air strikes on Libyan airdefense systems. 19 But it should be noted that the UNSC passed the resolution with only ten positive votes just one over the required nine. While Russia and China did not

10 9 exercise their veto power in the UNSC and thus allowed the resolution to pass, both P5 states abstained from voting. Germany, Brazil, and India also abstained and thus did not endorse the resolution. With less than unanimous backing from the UNSC, NATO began bombing Libyan regime assets. France, Britain, and the United States supplied most of the air power with significant numbers of fighter aircraft and sea-based missiles. Done in the name of protecting civilians, this had the result of providing the rebels with significant military advantages. Eventually rebel forces drove Qaddafi from Tripoli, the capital city. By summer, many states and other international actors had recognized the rebel forcesback National Transition Council (NTC) of Libya as the legitimate government in the state. By August 2011, the African Union joined sixty other states that recognized the NTC as the new legitimate Libyan government. 20 In October 2011, rebel forces captured and killed Qaddafi as he fled in an attempt to find a safe-haven. But rebels only caught Qaddafi because of assistance from French fighter jets that were part of the NATO mission authorized by the UNSC. These aircraft bombed a suspicious convoy of vehicles; one of the twelve vehicles targeted contained the Libyan ruler. 21 Just three days after the death of Qaddafi, the NTC declared Libya to be officially liberated. Even while the events in Libya were unfolding, Russia voiced serious concern about NATO s actions. Claiming that the UNSC resolution called only for humanitarian protection, then Russian President Medvedev claimed: The UN Security Council s resolution must be fulfilled in accordance with the wording and meaning, not with the free interpretation of some states. Because we voted for a no-fly zone to stop the escalation of the conflict so that we can

11 10 separate the two sides, but what we are having now is a military operation. It may not be on the ground yet but it is certainly going up above. 22 China and other Security Council members echoed similar complaints, noting that instead of only protecting civilians as R2P calls for NATO was fighting a war against the Libyan dictator. In short, at least two P5 states voiced complaints that, even though they recognized the humanitarian tragedy occurring in Libya, R2P was used as pretext for Western military intervention to depose a dictator. This was clearly seen as a threat to traditional notions of sovereignty and non-intervention held very dearly by Russia and China. While the NATO-led, UNSC-backed military action successfully fulfilled the most basic R2P principle that is, preventing a further escalation of violence by the Libyan regime against innocent citizens the episode highlights that there remains debate over the balance between traditional sovereignty/non-intervention principles, the limits of military action in the name of R2P, and many other issues. Moreover, part of R2P stressed by the 2001 ICISS Report the international community helping to rebuild states that are targets of military action because of R2P has clearly been neglected as Libya is struggling to deal with left over militias competing for power, continued sporadic violence, and a very weak central government that can do little to protect it citizens. That is, the international community has done little to protect Libyan citizens in the wake of the military action.

12 11 Bloc Positions Western Europe: NATO and EU member states have generally supported humanitarian military interventions in Bosnia, Libya, and other conflict zones where there have been massive human rights abuses in the post-cold War era. The United Kingdom and France are generally supportive of such missions, and indeed pushed for the 2011 intervention in Libya. But recently, both France and the UK have backed away from military intervention to stop the humanitarian abuses in Syria. Germany has balked at some missions, declining to vote on the UN-supported intervention in Libya. But overall, Western Europe as a bloc that is a staunch supporter of human rights is generally supportive of the notion of R2P. Eastern Europe: Russia, by far the most powerful state in this bloc, has serious reservations about the concept of R2P. Agreeing to not block the Security Council authorization of the use of force in Libya based upon the idea that the international community had a duty to stop abuses and prevent further ones in accordance with R2P principles, Russia has argued the NATO-led mission far exceeded its authority by fomenting regime change in Libya. As such, it has strongly opposed further interventions based on R2P such as in Syria and has redoubled its efforts to support a traditional notion of sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention. Africa: Home to some of the most dire humanitarian situations of the twentieth century, including the Rwandan genocide, the conflict in Darfur, the war in the Democratic

13 12 Republic of the Congo, African nations have supported some ideas related to R2P. Indeed, the African Union (AU) signed on to the idea of R2P in However, the AU expressly did not support the UNSC resolution to intervene in Libya in 2011 based on R2P principles. 23 This may be reflective of long-standing concerns among some African states that ideas like R2P could be used as a mere justification for outside intervention in the continent. But with some critical support for R2P on the continent, the general African state view of the idea is clearly evolving. 24 Further defining the conditions under which military action is justifiable under R2P principles is critical for many African states. Arab States and the Middle East: Though traditionally against outside military intervention, the upheaval in the region because of the Arab Spring led the Arab League to break with tradition and quickly support a UN authorization for a no-fly zone to protect Libyan citizens in However, Syria a state that is currently experiencing its own internal conflict and is the subject of much debate regarding international intervention to protect innocents from the regime s actions along the lines of R2P objected to the Arab League s decision. 25 And while the Arab League supported UNSC Resolution 1973, it later condemned the scope of the NATO-led actions in Libya. 26 Post- Libya, Arab League member states seem divided on the concept of R2P, with the recognition that the international community has a duty to protect innocents when human rights abuses occur but skepticism of some of the motivation to intervene militarily in such situations.

14 13 North America: While the United States supports the notion of R2P in principle, its actions to enforce the norm have been mixed. It has a long history of using military force for humanitarian purposes and it clearly supported UNSC Resolution 1973 to protect Libyan civilians in But it failed to support strong measures to stop the genocide in Darfur, for example. It has also failed to apply the principles of R2P to the conflict in Syria, arguably because doing so would require the US to call for more international intervention in the conflict and it has deemed its political interests do not warrant such an action. 27 Canada, which sponsored the ICISS Report in 2001 that spurred the development of the R2P norm, generally supports military intervention for humanitarian reasons. Latin America: Given a history of other states intervening in Latin America, there is some hesitancy to fully support R2P. But recent gains in democracy and human rights protections on the continent has led to a growing recognition of the importance of protecting human rights at home and globally. Brazil, a state with aspirations to be a permanent member of the UNSC, has offered an alternative to counter what it considers the ill-defined criteria for the use of force under the banner of R2P, the pattern of the ineffective use of force in the name of protecting innocents, and a hidden agenda by Western states to use R2P for regime change. Calling it the Responsibility While Protecting, or RWP, the concept focuses on bringing more UNSC oversight to military operations after an authorization of the use of force is passed. According to Brazil, RWP could limit over-extensions of military operations under taken to prevent or stop humanitarian interventions as well as provide accountability to such military actions. 28

15 14 Asia: While China did not use its veto to block the 2011 UN action in Libya, as a staunch supporter of the traditional notion of sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention it has generally balked at supporting humanitarian military interventions. Importantly, it was not a softening of its stance on R2P that led China to allow Resolution 1973 authorizing the Libya no-fly zone to pass, but rather a set of an unusual set of political and factual circumstance dictated that blocking the action with its veto may be too politically costly. 29 India has been cool to the idea of R2P, abstaining from the 2011 UNSC vote to authorize the no-fly zone in Libya. However, it did provide a statement that something drastic had to be done given the dire situation for innocents in Libya. 30 Questions / Issues a Resolution Could Address With R2P stressing prevention, how can the international community determine when the threat of genocide, war crimes, or other widespread human rights abuses rises? Can UN implement a type of early-warning system? At what point should the international community begin to intervene, at first with the least coercive measures possible, when there are signs of massive human rights abuses, war crimes, genocide, or other acts? How should the UN deal with the balancing concerns for traditional sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention both concepts enshrined in the UN Charter and a norm that explicitly calls for outside intervention in some cases and will necessarily violate sovereignty in a traditional sense if applied? Who should contribute military forces to deploy to crisis spots in R2P situations? Should the UN establish a permanent force so that it can quickly respond? Should R2P be codified clearly into international law rather than continue to operate as a norm? With at least one-hundred thousand people killed and millions forced to flee their homes, does the crisis in Syria rise to the level of violence to call for the application of R2P principles? Should any resolution regarding R2P include reference to this latest humanitarian crisis?

16 15 Topic B: Space Disarmament Introduction The international community is facing ongoing complications with the issue of space disarmament. Presently outer space can be utilized for several positive things: peaceful exploration, broadening the world s knowledge of this new frontier, as well as advancing technology. On the other hand, outer space has the potential to be utilized as a stage for an arms race. As individual nations become more advanced, many want to develop space programs for research, but may also be tempted to develop space programs for military purposes. The latter is a clear threat to the international community. Moreover, the recent introduction of new technologies and potentially new types of space-capable weapons has further threatened the international community s desire to ensure the peaceful nature of space. The debate about the steps required to prevent the militarization of space thus is an ongoing battle at the United Nations. History and Scope of the Problem Shortly after the launch of the first artificial satellite and during the beginnings of the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union, the UN took its first step toward ensuring the peaceful use of space. The United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPOUS) was created in 1959 by General Assembly Resolution 1472 to be a focal point of international cooperation on space issues. COPOUS is to review the scope of international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space, to devise programs in this field to be undertaken under United Nations

17 16 auspices, to encourage continued research and the dissemination of information on outer space matters, and to study the legal problems arising from the exploration of space. 31 Since its creation, COPUOS has aided in the construction of several important treaties regarding the use of space. 32 The first and to date most important one is the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, more commonly known as the Outer Space Treaty. The Outer Space Treaty was created in 1967 and served to provide a framework for international space law. The main points and aims of the treaty can be expressed in several of its articles: Article I: The exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries Article II: Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means. Article IV: State Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military maneuvers on celestial bodies shall be forbidden. Article VIII: A State Party to the Treaty on whose registry an object launched into outer space is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over such object, and over any personnel thereof, while in outer space or on a celestial body. 33 In short, it is forbidden for any signatory to place nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction into space, or to utilize outer space for military purposes. The treaty expresses that the moon and any other celestial body is to be used for peaceful purposes and that no

18 17 nation can claim sovereignty over the moon or any other body in space. However, if a nation launches an object into space, that state has full control over that object. Another treaty involving UN member state actions in outer space is the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, also known as the Moon Treaty. Signed in 1979, this treaty turns authority of all celestial bodies over to the international community. This means that no one state can claim sovereignty over any celestial body, and that any space activity must obey international law. 34 Simply put, both the Moon Treaty and the Outer Space condemn the sending and utilization of weapons or any other type of force in outer space. In addition to these two critical treaties, there are at least three other UNsponsored treaties that deal with issues involving astronauts and the return of objects from space, liability for damage caused by space objects, and registration of objects launched into space. 35 But none of these additional treaties, like the Outer Space and Moon Treaties, have been able to address all of the concerns of the international community when it comes to the peaceful use of space. One issue is just the sheer number of signatories to the most important treaties. The Outer Space Treaty has had only 100 nations sign on, and the Moon Treaty has the dismally low number of 17 nations agreeing to abide by the treaty. While these treaties have admirable goals, they limited by the way in which the militarization of space is discussed and, as a result, cannot adequately address new technologies that could threaten the weaponization of space. That is, these treaties are in danger of failing ensure the admirable goal of preventing the militarization of space. Currently, only nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons are prevented from being

19 18 deployed, tested, or used in outer space. No other type of weapon is discussed or clearly banned in these legal documents. Moreover, there is no treaty that bans the bans the launching of nuclear weapons on intercontinental ballistic missiles that travel through space. The treaties also do not explicitly prohibit member states using force against another country s property in outer space. In an effort to address some of these shortcomings, in 2006 the United Nations proposed the Space Preservation Treaty, which would ban all space weapons and space warfare proliferation. The treaty would also call for the termination of all research, testing, and production of space weapons. Only peaceful space exploration and utilization would be allowed, enforced by an outer space peacekeeping committee to help impose the permanent weapons ban. 36 The main goals this is to prevent an arms race in outer space. Ultimately, the Space Preservation Treaty fell flat because many states objected to multiple provisions within the document. The United States and Israel, for example, notably abstained from the vote on the basis that the treaty didn t define space weapon well enough, leaving much room for interpretation. 37 The need for such a treat to ban all space weapons has been made evident with two recent events. In January of 2007, China caused alarm regarding control of space when, without alerting the international community, it shot down one of its weather satellites with a missile from the ground. The following year, the United States Navy launched a missile to destroy a non-operational spy satellite. 38 These activities clearly introduce weapons into space and essentially militarize space; just not in the manner existing treaties had envisioned.

20 19 Such occurrences bring to the fore issues that the international community should address when it comes to the peaceful use of outer space. The destruction of satellites causes an incredible amount of debris to be dispersed into space. Debris takes hundreds of years to settle, and has the potential to destroy satellites and endanger astronauts. 39 As it relates to diplomacy and promoting international harmony, these types of activities promote distrust between states. Specifically, the issue of states not informing other nations of their actions in space ahead of time needs to be solved. Nation s activities in space should be monitored and made known to the international community in order to prevent an arms race in space and create global cooperation in disarming outer space. 40 Other Relevant UN and Bilateral Treaties Regarding Space Beyond the establishment of COPUOS in 1959 and 1967 Outer Space and the 1979 Moon Treaties, there have been multiple other efforts to control activities in space. These have been both UN-sponsored and bilateral in nature. All have important elements that deal with the peaceful use of space. On August 5, 1963 the Partial Test Ban treaty was opened for signatures in order to ban nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, outer space and under water. Eventually ratified by 113 nations, the treaty banned the testing of nuclear weapons everywhere but underground and was an important step in slowing down the nuclear arms race. Ensuring safe testing of new devices and preventing release of nuclear debris were the main goals of this treaty. While this treaty had the most direct impact on the nuclear weapons powers at the time, the no arms control measure prior to this has garnered as much support in the international community. 41

21 20 On a bilateral basis, the United States and former USSR signed the first treaty to develop from the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) on May 26, The SALT I limitations on offensive nuclear missiles were significant, and relate to space as the strategic arms they deal with are intercontinental ballistic missiles that travel through space. At the same time as the SALT I negotiations, the U.S. and Soviet Union also agreed to the Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, which explicitly banned space-based ABM systems. 43 Taken together, the two treaties aimed to improve the relationship between the U.S. and Soviet Union by way of decreasing offensive and defensive capabilities in a way that could build trust between the competing states. In 1979, a second round of SALT talks resulted in a second treaty, SALT II. This set further limits of strategic offensive arms between the former USSR and the United States. 44 While some movement on space-related issues had clearly taken place, by 1984 the UN General Assembly decided that any documents created that were to revolve around outer space and the prevention of an arms race needed to be fully detailed and comprehensive. Furthermore, the General Assembly pushed the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its efforts to prevent arms races, especially in space. As a result of this effort, in 1985 the Conference on Disarmament created an ad hoc committee called the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS). PAROS reaffirmed the principles of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty but, recognizing the weaknesses of existing legal instruments, called for measures additional measures to guarantee the absents of all kinds of weapons in space. The Conference on Disarmament began work on a PAROS Treaty, but little progress was made. Mostly due to Western opposition, the committee was dissolved in

22 21 In 1996, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was established and adopted by the UN. This treaty bans all nuclear explosions from all environments, thus bolstering the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty and the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, both of which had already outlawed nuclear weapons in space. As of January 2013, the treaty has still not taken effect as several nuclear capable states specified in the treaty have not yet ratified the document. The treaty will only commence after all remaining nuclear capable states such as India, Pakistan, and North Korea have signed the treaty. 46 Block Positions: China: China has been one of the major players in the initiative to prevent a nuclear arms race in outer space. China has led several working papers that revolve around the disarming of space. Specifically, it presented a draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects, which would prevent the introduction of any weapons into space, to the Conference on Disarmament in February Given the work on this draft treaty that dates back to 2002 and China s other efforts regarding the prevention of weapons in space, the unannounced launch of the anti-satellite in January 2007 came as a shock to the entire international community. But even after this dramatic show of force in space, China has continued to push the creation of a comprehensive plan and solution for space disarmament. Russia: Russia has become one of the world s biggest supporters permanent disarming of outer space. In October of 2004, Russia became the first country to pledge that it would

23 22 not be the first to use weapons of any kind in space, and has consistently supported a suspension on testing anti-satellite systems. 48 Moreover, Russia China s co-sponsor in presenting the draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects to the Conference on Disarmament in February One important aim of Russia with regard to pushing for this a new treaty was that it could make clear that current international law does not ban non-mass destruction weapons from being deployed in space. 49 United States: The United States continues to vote unfavorably on resolutions related to preventing the weaponization of space and related issues. For example, the U.S. continually refuses to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Moreover, the U.S. objects to efforts such as China and Russia draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects, stating that it prefers to focus on short-term and voluntary measures to strengthen the long-term sustainability, stability, safety, and security of the space environment. 50 The U.S. also votes against the otherwise overwhelmingly supported PAROS treaty initiative. European Union: The European Union has consistently been a united body on this issue. The EU has supported initiatives that would draw up guidelines for conduct and behavior in space. Indeed, the EU has put forth a draft Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities that addresses issues such as space debris and aims to promote a set of best practices in space. 51

24 23 Asia: Asian member states have never opposed any treaty designed for the protection of space. Until 2007 these states seemed more interested in the discussion of general disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation than space-specific disarmament. When China launched an anti-satellite in 2007, however, other Asian states became immediately concerned with the disarmament of space. Africa: While African member states typically cast their votes affirmatively for resolutions dealing with the issue of space disarmament, they are rare at the forefront of debate. However, many African nations are interested in the particular aspects of the treaties, in as much as they have concerns that any such treaty could limit their future potential for a national space program. Middle East: The Middle East as a whole wants to encourage the security of space. Arab nations of the Middle East have taken this topic as an opportunity to oppose Israel in front of the international community since Israel abstains from most space related documents. Because of this, the Middle East is uneasy and worried that Israel may pose as a threat in utilizing nuclear weapons. Questions / Issues a Resolution Could Address Are existing treaties on space disarmament effective? Could they be altered in ways to make them stronger? Should new treaties be written? How can the U.N. better enforce existing treaties regarding space disarmament? How should the UN address the issue of anti-satellite weapons, such as the ones tested by the China in 2007 and the U.S. in 2008?

25 24 How can the UN promote a sound balance between the potential risks and rewards of utilizing space? Is the international community safe from a nuclear arms race? If so, how do we maintain that safety? If not, what steps does the international community need to take?

26 25 1 General Assembly of the United Nations: Disarmament and International Security, 2 "Charter, United Nations, Chapter IV: The General Assembly," 3 United Nations General Assembly Resolution Adopting the 2005 World Summit Outcome, 24 October 2005, Document.pdf#page=30. 4 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948). Available at: 07EE9200C58C5EC12563F6005FB3E5. 5 International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, 6 International Commission Intervention and State Sovereignty: The Responsibility to Protect. Published at the Council on Foreign Relations, December 2001, 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid. 13 United Nations General Assembly Resolution Adopting the 2005 World Summit Outcome, 24 October 2005, Document.pdf#page= The Responsibility to Protect. United Nations Office of the Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide,

27 26 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid. 17 Dan Bilefsky and Mark Landler, As UN Backs Military Action in Libya, U.S. Role is Unclear. New York Times 17 March 2011, 18 Security Council Approves No-Fly Zone Over Libya, Authorizing All Necessary Measures to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions. United Nations Department of Public Information 17 March 2011, 19 Dan Bilefsky and Mark Landler, As UN Backs Military Action in Libya, U.S. Role is Unclear. New York Times 17 March 2011, 20 Libya Profile: Timeline. BBC News 29 January 2014, 21 Muammar Gaddafi: How He Died. BBC News 31 October 2011, 22 Russia Accuses NATO of Going Beyond Resolution on Libya. RT 17 April 2011, 23 The Crisis in Libya. International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, 24 John Siebert, Africa and the Roots of Responsibility to Protect. The Ploughshare Monitor Vol. 30, Issue 4 (Winter 2009), 25 Arab League Asks UN for Libya No-Fly Zone. Huffington Post 12 March 2011, 26 Edward Cody, Arab League condemns broad Western bombing campaign in Libya. Washington Post 20 March 2011,

28 27 27 Michael Abramowitz, Does the United States have a responsibility to protect the Syrian people? Washington Post 6 September 2013, 28 Thomas Wright, Brazil hosts workshop on responsibility while protecting. Foreign Policy 29 August 2012, ecting. 29 Andrew Garwood-Gowers, China and the Responsibility to Protect : The Implications of the Libyan Intervention. Asian Journal of International Law Vol. 2, Issue 2 (July 2012) pp Simon Adams, Emergent Powers: India, Brazil, South Africa and the Responsibility to Protect. The World Post 20 September 2012, 31 United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Space, 32 United Nations Office for Outer Space: United Nations Treaties and Principles on Space Law, 33 Outer Space Treaty of 1967, 34 United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 35 United Nations Office for Outer Space: United Nations Treaties and Principles on Space Law, 36 Sharma, Rangam and Sukhvinder Singh Dari, Conflicting Sovereignty Issue in Outer Space: An Analysis of the Current Existing Conventions Vis a Vis Impediments and Challenges," IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, Vol. 1, No. I (July-August 2012) pp , 37 Ibid. 38 Randerson, James, and Mark Tran. "China Accuses US of Double Standards over Satellite Strike." The Guardian, February 21, 2008,

29 28 39 Zenko, Micah, The Danger of Space Debris, Council on Foreign Relations, September 24, 2011, 40 Kaufman, Marc and Dafna Linzer, China Criticized for Anti-Satellite Missile Test, Washington Post, January 19, 2007, 41 "Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water." U.S. Department of State, 42 "Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I)," Arms Control Association, 43 "The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty at a Glance," Arms Control Association, 44 The Strategic Arms Limitations Talks II (SALT II), Arms Control Association, 45 "Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space." Federation of American Scientists, NFZ-PAROS.html. 46 "The Status of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Signatories and Ratifiers," Arms Control Association, 47 Russia And China Propose A Treaty Banning Space Weapons, While The Pentagon Plans An ASAT Test." Stimson, February , 48 "Disarmament: Statements and Speeches." Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations Office in Geneva, June 13, 2006, 49 Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects, Council on Foreign Relations, 50 "Outer Space (Disarmament Aspects) Segment of Thematic Debate in the First Committee of the Sixty-seventh Session of the United Nations General Assembly." U.S. Department of State, October 23, Web,

30 51 EU Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities Council on Foreign Relations, September 2010, 29