Semi-presidentialism in Francophone Africa: Is it working?

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1 Semi-presidentialism in Francophone Africa: Is it working? Sophia Moestrup, Ph.D., National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) Paper presented at the International Political Science Association s 20 th World Congress Fukuoka, Japan, July 9-13, 2006 Introduction This paper will address the issue of how well young semi-presidential democracies are working in Francophone Africa, where semi-presidentialism has been the privileged constitutional choice. 1 The 1958 constitution of the French Vth Republic with its 1962 amendment introducing direct elections of the president, has served as a natural blueprint for many of the current constitutions in the region. In theoretical debates, the jury is still out as to the likely effect of semipresidentialism on young democracies: is it a help or a hindrance for democratic survival? 2 Duverger (1997) and Sartori (1997) argue that semi-presidentialism has inherent qualities that serve a young democracy well, as the existence of a dual executive in theory addresses some of the rigidities found in presidential systems. It is argued that semi-presidential systems are better equipped to weather situations of divided government, where the president is not backed by a parliamentary majority, as executive power then shifts to the prime minister. On the other hand, critics of semi-presidentialism like Linz (1997) and Stepan and Suleiman (1995) argue that it is a regime type that is even more gridlock prone than presidential systems, given the possibility of cohabitation between a president and a prime minister from opposite political camps. 1 In the present paper I follow Robert Elgie who defines semi-presidentialism as the situation where a popularly elected fixed-term president exists alongside a prime minister and cabinet who are responsible to parliament (Elgie 1999c, 13). For a brief overview of the debates surrounding the definition of semi-presidentialism, see Moestrup (2005). 2 I will discuss democratic survival in lieu of democratic consolidation. As pointed out by O Donnell (1996), existing definitions of democratic consolidation in the democratization literature tend to be either teleological, tautological or both. A consolidated democracy is generally simply one that has not been overturned yet.

2 Francophone Africa provides an excellent setting for taking a closer look at how semi-presidentialism is actually working in a number of young democracies. Though very diverse in ethnic composition, geography, resource endowments, literacy rates etc., Francophone African countries share a common colonial history that left significant political imprints. I am here referring to the territories of the former administrative federations of French West and Equatorial Africa. 3 Political elites were socialized to the French political system and some became elected as representatives to the legislature of the IVth French Republic and even served as cabinet members. After independence in 1960, Francophone Africa maintained close political, economic, cultural and security ties to France, as evidenced through the holding of periodic conferences of Francophone leaders; France s continued backing of the currency of the zone (the Franc CFA); 4 regular meetings of the cultural organization La Francophonie; and France s repeated military interventions in local conflicts, most recently in support of President Déby in Chad. 5 The workings of semi-presidentialism in a number of young democracies in the region will be analyzed through a process of structured focused comparison (George 1979): structured because the same questions will be asked of each case, and focused because limited to those questions perceived as relevant for the purposes of the present inquiry. The aim is to uncover the political processes at work, to help determine whether semipresidentialism has indeed played a facilitating or a hindering role for the survival of young democracies in the region. 3 Afrique Occidentale Française (AOF) and Afrique Equatoriale Française (AEF). AOF included: Mauritania, Senegal, Guinea, Côte d Ivoire, Mali, Burkina Faso (former Upper Volta), Benin (former Dahomey), and Niger; with Togo having status as UN trust territory. AEF included: Chad, Central African Republic (former Ubangui- Shari), Gabon, and Congo Brazzaville (former French Congo); with Cameroon having status as UN trust territory. The former French colony of Madagascar was incorporated along with the AEF and AOF territories into the French Union in 1946, and has since maintained close ties with France and its former colonial territories; Madagascar will therefore be included in the present discussion of Francophone Africa. 4 Franc de la Communauté Financière Africaine. 5 For more on the commonalities linking Francophone Africa together and making valid comparative analysis possible, see Le Vine (2005, 2-5). 2

3 Semi-presidentialism in Francophone Africa has had a mixed record. Of the six young democracies discussed in the following, three have survived while three have broken down at one point or another. While the young Malian democracy is thriving, the difficulties encountered in countries like Niger and Madagascar in managing intra-executive conflict illustrate that semi-presidentialism does not by itself enhance political flexibility. In Niger, political gridlock provided the opportunity for a military coup, in In Madagascar, conflict between president and prime minister culminated in 1998 with a constitutional amendment giving the president the authority to appoint and dismiss the prime minister. One of the major finding of this paper is that semi-presidentialism tends to hinder the chances of survival of young democracies having undergone a conflict-ridden transition to democracy. Political flexibility is a precondition for semi-presidentialism to work rather than an institutionally derived outcome. This is a somewhat paradoxical finding, given that semipresidentialism may often appear particularly attractive to key political actors in a country undergoing a difficult democratic transition, as it allows for power-sharing at the top of the executive. In the following, I start by giving a brief overview of the process of democratic transition in Francophone Africa in the 1990s, followed by an outline of salient provisions in the semi-presidential constitutions that were adopted by young electoral democracies in the region during this period. This is followed by a section presenting and discussing the actual performance of semi-presidentialism in our sample of countries, comparing and contrasting the experience of countries where democracy survived with that of countries where it did not. Major findings are summarized in the conclusion. The process of democratic transition Of the 15 Francophone African countries listed above, only seven went through a process of political transition during the late 1980s and early 1990s so extensive as to culminate with at 3

4 least one set of free and fair elections. 6 These are: Benin, Central African Republic, Congo Brazzaville, Mali, Madagascar, Niger, and Senegal. These countries all at one point achieved the status of electoral democracy following Freedom House s definition, 7 even if democracy did not subsequently survive in all seven. Of these seven, Benin opted for a presidential system and will therefore not be included in the present analysis. Congo Brazzaville changed its regime form from semipresidential to presidential in 2002, and its short-lived experiment as a young semipresidential democracy will be included in the discussion below. In the remaining eight countries, though there have been attempts at political reform pushed from below (e.g. Gabon and Togo) or constitutional reforms initiated by incumbent leaders (e.g. Cameroon and Burkina Faso), political developments have so far fallen short of resulting in a democratic transition. Of the six semi-presidential young democracies established in Francophone Africa in the early 1990s, three have survived so far (Madagascar, Mali and Senegal), while three have broken down (Central African Republic, Congo Brazzaville and Niger). Democracy has since been restored in Niger (1999) and the Central African Republic (2005), bringing the current number of electoral semi-presidential democracies in Francophone Africa to five. 6 The spread of democracy in Africa during this period was a result of several confluent processes: the fall of communism in Eastern Europe which helped discredit Marxist-Leninist regimes in the region; abysmal economic performance during a prolonged period of time leading to increasing popular pressure for change; and rising donor pressure for political liberalization and economic reform in a post-cold war context. 7 Freedom House classifies as electoral democracies countries satisfying the following criteria: 1) A competitive, multiparty political system; 2) Universal adult suffrage for all citizens (with exceptions for restrictions that states may legitimately place on citizens as sanctions for criminal offenses); 3) Regularly contested elections conducted in conditions of ballot secrecy, reasonable ballot security, and in the absence of massive voter fraud that yields results that are unrepresentative of the public will; 4) Significant public access of major political parties to the electorate through the media and through generally open political campaigning. The electoral democracy designation reflects a judgment about the last major national election or elections. The presence of certain irregularities during the electoral process does not automatically disqualify a country from being designated an electoral democracy (Freedom House 2005). 4

5 Table 1. Democratization in the 1990s in Francophone Africa Country Electoral democracy Break-down of democracy Freedom House score Current regime (P=presidential, SP=semi-pres.) Benin 1991 no 2 F P Burkina Faso no 4 PF SP Cameroon no 6 NF SP Central African Republic 1993 yes 4.5 PF SP Chad no 5.5 NF SP Congo Brazzaville 1992 yes# 5 PF P Côte d'ivoire no 6 NF P Gabon no 5 PF SP Guinea no 5.5 NF P Madagascar 1992 no 3 PF SP Mali 1992 no 2 F SP Mauritania no 5 PF SP Niger 1993 yes 3 PF SP Senegal 2000 no 2.5 F SP Togo no 5.5 NF SP # Congo s 1992 democratic regime was semi-presidential Source: Freedom House (2006) Of these six semi-presidential young democracies, three (Congo Brazzaville, Mali and Niger) became democratic following the holding of a National Conference modeled on the Beninese example. 9 In the case of Madagascar, a widely representative National Forum served as a constituent assembly, drawing up a new constitution which was subsequently adopted by referendum. In the Central African Republic and Senegal, democratic change came through elections, without the prior holding of some sort of national consultation resulting in the adoption of a new constitution. 8 Average of political and civic liberties scores. Freedom House ranks countries scoring as free (F), 3-5 as partly free (PF), and as not free (NF). A country can still be classified as an electoral democracy, though it is ranked as partly free (e.g. Madagascar). 9 For a general discussion of the holding of National Conferences as a distinctive African process of political transition, see Bratton and Van de Walle (1997). Benin held the first of these Conferences, in 1990, and the Beninese model was subsequently followed in 10 other countries. Some have argued that France played a capital role in the Beninese transition, talking of Paristrojka (Raynal 1991, 24). Without doubt, the opinion of France was solicited and played a certain role in the choice and design of a National Conference modeled on the experience of the Convention d états généraux of the French revolution (Robinson 1994). However, the Conferences resulted in very different outcomes, reflecting differences in local political context. 5

6 Both in Congo Brazzaville and Niger, the National Conference was a truly revolutionary process, where the participants declared the Conference to be sovereign and replaced the incumbent president (Sassou Nguesso in Congo and Ali Saibou in Niger) with a new transitional government (Clark 1997; Moestrup 1999). The transitional government subsequently oversaw the drafting and adoption by referendum of a new constitution and the holding of presidential and legislative elections. In Mali, on the contrary, the Conference had limited autonomy. It was stage-managed by the transitional government established following a coup against former dictator Moussa Traore in March 1991, and presided over by the coupleader, lieutenant-colonel Amadou Toumani Touré. The transitional government, with both civilian and military members, had overseen the drafting of a new constitutional text, which was then submitted to the National Conference for adoption (Clark 1995). In Madagascar, the National Forum was set up following a prior compromise between incumbent President Ratsiraka and opposition forces, resulting in the establishment of a transitional government (Africa Report 1992). In other words, while the transition and adoption of a new democratic constitution was forced through from below in Congo Brazzaville and Niger, it was the result of a prior compromise in Mali and Madagascar. In the Central African Republic, President Kolingba tried to control political reform by refusing the holding of a sovereign National Conference, while allowing for constitutional changes introducing a semi-presidential regime and multipartism. A last ditch attempt on Kolingba s side to subvert the 1993 presidential elections was opposed by France, and Ange- Felix Patassé was elected president in a second round of elections, under the watchful eye of the French government with 1,400 troops stationed in the country (O Toole 1997, ). In contrast, the elections that brought democracy to Senegal in 2000 were free and fair not under external pressure, but as a product of a gradual process of political liberalization over the 1980s and 1990s (Le Vine 2005, 259). 6

7 To conclude this brief overview of the transition process through which democracy was introduced in these six semi-presidential Francophone countries, it is interesting to note that in the three countries where democracy was the result of compromise or gradual liberalization, democracy has so far survived (Madagascar, Mali, and Senegal). In the remaining three countries, where democracy either came about through pressure from below or from the outside resulting in the ousting of incumbents, democracy was at some point overturned (the Central African Republic, Congo Brazzaville, and Niger). Constitutional provisions and electoral law The constitutions that came to govern the six young semi-presidential democracies discussed here, 10 share the fundamental common element of a dual executive, with a directly elected president and a prime minister accountable to parliament (though Congo Brazzaville in 2002 switched to a presidential system). In all the constitutions there are provisions for parliament s ability to dismiss the government through a vote of no confidence; similarly, the constitutional texts provide for the president s power to dissolve parliament. Interestingly, the length of the presidential mandate is now the same for all of the countries (five years) with a maximum of two terms, except in Madagascar where three terms are allowed (the Central African Republic 1994 constitution provided for three six year terms which changed to two five year terms in 2004). 11 There are, however, important differences between these constitutions in terms of the relative distribution of powers between the president, the prime minister, and the legislature. And it is interesting to note some of the changes that have been made over time following constitutional revisions in individual countries (Central African Republic, Madagascar, Niger, and Senegal). The specific relations to be discussed in the following include: the president s 10 The constitutions to be discussed in the following are: the Central African Republic (1994 and 2004), Congo Brazzaville (1992), Madagascar (1992, amended in 1995 and 1998), Mali (1992), Niger (1992 and 1999), and Senegal (1963 with 1998 amendments, and 2001). Appendix 1 provides references to where the full text of these constitutions can be found. 11 The new presidential constitution in Congo Brazzaville provides, however, for two seven-year terms. 7

8 role in appointing and dismissing the prime minister; the president s agenda setting and vetopowers; and the procedures surrounding votes of no-confidence and the dissolution of parliament. Annex 2 provides a summary of these relationships. Shugart and Carey (1992) first argued for the need to subdivide semi-presidential regimes into two categories, premier-presidential and president-parliamentary regimes, given the distinct differences in authority patterns between the two. Shugart (2005) has further elaborated on this distinction and classifies a number of countries into premier-presidential and president-parliamentary systems, depending on whether the president has discretion to dismiss the prime minister: the president can unilaterally decide to dismiss the prime minister in president-parliamentary systems, but not in premier-presidential systems. 12 The risk for democratic break-down should be larger in president-parliamentary systems, given the more presidential nature of the system (Elgie 2005). In our Francophone African sample, based on a reading of the constitutional texts, we find that the president cannot dismiss the prime minister at his own initiative in Mali, Niger and according to the 1992 constitutions in Congo and Madagascar; but he can in Senegal, the Central African Republic and the revised 1998 Malagasy constitution. While all the constitutions have the president formally appointing the prime minister, there are some important qualifications to these powers in some of the constitutions. The Malian, Nigerien 1992, and Senegalese constitutions simply state that the president appoints the prime minister. Both the 1994 and 2004 Central African constitutions add that the prime minister must subsequently submit his government s program to parliamentary approval, at which point parliament may topple the newly appointed government through a vote of no 12 An issue here is that it may require an interpretation of the constitutional text to determine whether indeed the president does have discretion to dismiss the prime minister there is thus room for ambiguity, as Shugart (2005) admits. For example, while Shugart (2005) classifies Senegal as premier-presidential, I find that both the 1998 revised constitution and the 2001 constitution should be classified as president-presidential, as it is clearly stated that The President appoints and dismisses the prime minister (art. 43 and 48, respectively), without special provisions for the conditions under which the prime minister may be dismissed. 8

9 confidence. Congo s 1992 constitution specifies that the president appoints a prime minister who has been previously approved by a parliamentary majority, while the Malagasy 1992 constitution went as far as saying that the prime minister is elected by a parliamentary majority. In Niger and Madagascar, where disagreements ensued between president and parliament over the appointment of the prime minister, subsequent changes to the constitutional text went in opposite directions: strengthening the role of the president in Madagascar (where the constitution now after the 1998 amendment simply states that the president appoints the prime minister), while weakening that of the president in Niger (who now appoints the prime minister from a list of three names submitted by parliament). 13 With regards to agenda setting powers, the president presides over the Council of Ministers according to all the constitutions discussed here. In addition, the Central African Constitution of 1994, the Senegalese constitution in both its 1998 and 2001 versions, as well as the Malagasy 1998 amended constitution, specify that the president determines national policy which the prime minister then implements. In the 2004 Central African Constitution, the provision was softened to giving the president the prerogative of deciding the outline of national policy. In the 1999 Nigerien constitution, based on the experience of conflict between president and prime minister over agenda-setting for Council of Minister meetings where national policy is formulated, it is now stipulated that the president and prime minister must agree on the agenda. Concerning legislative initiative, the Malagasy, Central African and Senegalese constitutions give the right to initiate laws to both president and government, as well as the legislature (though the provision for presidential legislative initiative is eliminated from the 2001 Senegalese constitution); in the Malian, Nigerien and Congolese constitutions, legislative initiative is given only to the government (prime minister and cabinet) and the 13 Interestingly, the 1995 amendment to the Malagasy constitution had introduced a similar provision. 9

10 legislature. Veto-powers also vary across constitutions. The Central African and the 1992 Nigerien constitution require a two thirds majority vote to overturn a veto, and the Senegalese constitution a three fifths legislative majority. While the Congolese and Malagasy constitutions give the president no veto powers, the Malian and 1999 Nigerien constitutions require a simple majority of parliament to overturn a presidential veto. Finally, with regards to the countervailing powers of the president to dissolve parliament and of parliament to topple the government through a vote of no confidence, there are also interesting variations. While the general pattern is for the president to be able to dissolve parliament every 12 months, the 1992 Malagasy constitution restricted this right to once every 18 months, and only after two previous instances of no-confidence vote in the government (and then only at the request of the government). The Senegalese 1998 amended constitution similarly required a previous vote of no-confidence to be passed in the government. The 1999 Nigerien constitution now limits the president s right to dissolve parliament to once every 24 months, while the Senegalese 2001 constitution specifies that parliament cannot be dissolved during the first two years of its term. For votes of no confidence, the general pattern is that they must be supported by at least one tenth of deputies to be brought forward, and then require a simple majority of members of parliament to pass (Congo, Niger, and Senegal). In the Central African Republic, the proposal for a censure vote must have the initial support of one third of deputies. The required majority for a vote of no confidence to pass is increased to two thirds in Mali and in the 1998 amended Malagasy constitutions (where the motion of no confidence must moreover have the support of one half of the deputies to be tabled for a vote). To sum up the variations in authority patterns and countervailing powers discussed above, the constitutions that favor of the president the most are the Central African ones, the Malagasy with 1998 amendments, and the Senegalese with 1998 amendments. All three can 10

11 be classified as president-parliamentary, following Shugart and Carey s definition, and have other provisions besides the ability of the president to dismiss the prime minister unilaterally that reinforce the powers of the president vis-à-vis parliament and the government (though the president has no veto-powers in Madagascar). It is also interesting to note that while the Nigerien and Senegalese, and to a lesser extent the Central African constitution, over time have been changed to decrease the president s powers, in Madagascar, on the contrary, there has been a consistent and considerable increase in presidential powers through the 1995 and 1998 revisions. This discussion leaves no immediate clues as to the impact of authority structures on the likelihood of survival of a young semi-presidential democracy. The risk of democratic break-down does not seem to be greater in the more presidential constitutions: democracy has survived thus far in Madagascar and Senegal, while it broke down in Congo Brazzaville, the country with the semi-presidential constitution which arguably provided for the weakest presidential powers. Finally, a discussion of authority patterns and countervailing powers would be incomplete without mentioning the electoral system. As Duverger (1980, ) shows, semi-presidential regimes in the developed world function very differently depending on whether the president politically belongs to the legislative majority. If the president is concomitantly the head of the parliamentary majority, the regime in practice becomes presidential, with the president ruling through the prime minister. If not, the role of the president may be limited to that of a controller. While a majoritarian electoral system tends to reduce the number of parties in parliament, the opposite is true of systems of proportional representation. The latter tend to promote the representation of smaller parties and contribute to party system fragmentation (Duverger 1976), making it more unlikely for the president to 11

12 be backed by a majority-party in parliament and thereby increasing the chances of cohabitation. As can be seen from the table below, proportional representation has only been adopted in Niger and Madagascar, and in both countries it did indeed lead to fractured parliamentary majorities, contributing to government instability. Proportional representation was abandoned in 1998 in Madagascar in favor of a mixed system, combining majoritarian and proportional elements; in Niger, revisions in the electoral law in 1999, contributed to making the system less proportional. Table 2: Electoral systems in our six countries Country Electoral system Central African Rep. majoritarian Congo Brazzaville majoritarian Madagascar proportional; mixed Mali majoritarian Niger proportional Senegal mixed Source: African Elections Database The effects of semi-presidentialism So how has semi-presidentialism actually worked in our sample of six countries in Francophone Africa? Has it contributed to democratic survival in Madagascar, Mali and Senegal? Did it, on the contrary, contribute to democratic break-down in the Central African Republic, Congo Brazzaville and Niger? Did the existence of a dual executive facilitate the management of divided majorities, when the parliamentary majority did not coincide with the majority having brought the president to power? Did power change easily from president to prime minister in the event of cohabitation? Or did cohabitation, on the contrary, contribute to democratic break-down? How well did presidents and prime ministers from the same political majorities collaborate? These are crucial questions that will be addressed in the following, where the discussion is divided into three parts, looking first at the successful 12

13 cases where democracy has so far survived, and then at the unsuccessful cases where the young democracy broke down, though it may subsequently have been restored. Finally, the findings are compared and discussed, in an attempt at answering the questions outlined above. Table 3: Human Development Indicators in our six countries Country 2006 electoral democracy Breakdown of dem. Population 2003 (million) GDP/capita 2003 (PPP USD) Literacy rate 2003 (% above age 15) Life expect (years) Central Afr.Rep. yes yes 3.9 1, Congo Brazza. no yes Madagascar yes no Mali yes no Niger yes yes Senegal yes no , Source: UNDP (2005) As preliminary background information, table 3 above provides a picture of differences in human development (measured in terms of GDP/capita, literacy levels and life expectancy) between our six cases. As can be seen, democracy has so far survived in the richest as well as the poorest country in the sample (Senegal and Madagascar). Democracy has also survived in Mali, with a literacy rate of only 19%, but broke down in Congo Brazzaville, with a literacy rate of 83%. There is no clear trend in the relationship between life expectancy and democratic survival. And finally, small size does not seem to be a boon for democracy, as democracy broke down both in the Central African Republic and Congo Brazzaville, the two countries with the smallest populations. Successful cases It is interesting to note that in the three successful cases to be discussed here (Madagascar, Mali, and Senegal), there have not been instances of cohabitation as yet, between a prime minister and a president from opposite political camps. However, as shown by the following brief overviews of political developments in these countries since their recent transition to democracy, the relationship between the two executives has nonetheless not always been 13

14 smooth. In particular, the president may resent a prime minister from a coalition partner (Madagascar), or even from his own party if the prime minister is seen as a political rival (Mali and Senegal). Madagascar: President Didier Ratsiraka, who had come to power in a coup in 1975, negotiated an agreement with the opposition called the Panorama Convention signed on October 31, This agreement maintained Ratsiraka as head of state, though he had to relinquish most of his powers to a transition government; Ratsiraka was also allowed to run in the 1993 presidential elections which, however, he lost to opposition leader Albert Zafy. That same year, the opposition coalition Hery Velona which had supported the candidacy of Zafy won a majority in parliament (Marcus 2004, 2). This opposition was, however, a fractious movement whose internal contradictions rapidly surfaced once it came to power. Government instability and tensions between prime minister and president ensued, culminating in 1995 with Zafy s calling for a referendum on a constitutional revision that would allow the president greater influence in the appointment and dismissal of the prime minister. The referendum passed. However, the following year, resentment over the president s move to replace Prime Minister Ravony, combined with accusations of corruption, eventually lead to the impeachment of Zafy by parliament, upheld by the Constitutional Court (ibid. 3). The presidential elections saw the come-back of Ratsiraka as president, this time democratically elected. The institutional framework had still not stabilized following the 1995 amendment to the constitution. In 1998 Ratsiraka initiated a new amendment which again was adopted through referendum. This amendment served to reinforce the president s authority over the prime minister and cabinet even further; gave him the right to dissolve parliament on his own initiative; and included provisions for presidential appointment of one third of the members of a newly created Senate (Marcus and Ratsimbaharison 2005, 504). The electoral law was 14

15 also amended to introduce a mixed system in replacement of the previous system of proportional representation. Ratsiraka proceeded to consolidate his power by gaining majority support in parliament in the 1998 parliamentary elections. Following a highly controversial presidential election in 2001, Ratsiraka unexpectedly lost power to Marc Ravalomanana, a self-made businessman (Cornwell 2003). Backed by an absolute majority in parliament for his party TIM since the 2002 legislative elections, Ravalomanana has benefited from the strong presidential powers enshrined in the revised constitution to rapidly consolidate his authority. He has kept the same prime minister, Jacques Sylla, since In his critics view, Ravalomanana has used his powers to fuse economic and political interests and power, appointing business partners to leading political positions (Marcus and Ratsimbaharison 2005, 508). Not surprisingly, tensions are again arising as the December 2006 presidential elections approach, given the increasingly zerosum nature of Malagasy politics (UN IRIN 2006). Mali: Following the end of the transition period and the adoption of a new constitution in January 1992, Alpha Oumar Konaré, the leader of the ADEMA party that had played an important role in the opposition to the regime of Moussa Traoré, was elected president. ADEMA went on to win a comfortable majority in parliament. Though ADEMA could have formed a one-party majoritarian government, Konaré privileged the inclusion of other, smaller parties in cabinet formation (Askia 1995, 121). Economic troubles and violent demonstrations contributed to government instability during the first year and a half of the new democratic regime, with three cabinets in rapid succession (Sborgi 1998, 450). The ability of Konaré to use his prime ministers as scapegoats for the economic and political troubles the country was encountering may have 15

16 helped defuse tensions. 14 Eventually, the smaller coalition partners of ADEMA left the cabinet in 1994, leaving the party alone at the helm of the government, and alone to assume the responsibility of solving the intractable economic problems (Askia 1995, 123). Ibrahim Keita was appointed prime minister in 1994, introducing a period of government stability; Keita remained in place till February 2000 when he was dismissed due to his alleged implication in a corruption scandal. Under Keita s tenure, the prime minister s office had at times been seen as a near rival in power of the presidency, as Keita cumulated the double offices as leader of ADEMA and as the head of government (Smith 2001, 76). While a majoritarian electoral system may increase the chances of a one-party majority, it cannot, of course, guarantee that internal conflict within the dominant party and/or within the dual executive in a semi-presidential regime do not eventually undermine the unity of the party. Despite the comfortable majority ADEMA enjoyed in parliament from 1992 to 2001, the party has suffered from internal divisions. The party practically imploded in 2001 due to mutual accusations of corruption and deep disagreements over the selection of the party s candidate for the presidential elections, as Keita left the party and went on to create his own, taking a number of ADEMA deputies with him (Boilley 2002, ). Former general Amadou Toumani Touré, one of the chief facilitators of the democratic transition, won the presidential elections and took over power in June 2002 at the end of Konaré s second term. Touré does not have any formal party affiliation, and no single party or coalition managed to win an absolute majority of seats in the July 2002 parliamentary elections. The current political situation has been characterized as one of imperfect cohabitation ( cohabitation imparfaite ): a president faced with a parliament without stable majority (Lissouck n.d., 9). In April 2004, Touré replaced one technocrat for the other as prime minister. 14 Blondel (1992; 166, ) argues that one of the advantages of semi-presidentialism in particular (and dual leadership systems in general) is that it allows the head of state to keep some distance apart from ordinary politics. 16

17 Senegal: Senegal had a long and protracted transition to democracy, culminating with the election of Abdoulaye Wade as president in March 2000, replacing Abdou Diouf in power since 1981 (Le Vine 2005, ). Wade proceeded to nominate Moustapha Niasse of the AFP party as prime minister, honoring inter-party agreements between members of the coalition which had brought him to power. During the election campaign, Wade had promised a new constitution, reducing presidential powers. Following his election, debates over constitutional design ultimately resulted in the adoption of a new semi-presidential constitution with only somewhat reduced presidential powers, compared to the 1962 constitution that had been amended in 1998 (Thomas and Sissokho 2005, 101). Disagreements between Wade and Prime Minister Niasse over economic policies led to Niasse stepping down in April The AFP became the major opposition party following legislative elections later that month, where the remainder of the coalition backing Wade won three quarters of the seats (Galvan 2001, 56). The large victory of Wade s forces was in part due to a revision of the electoral system which while maintaining a mixed system, increased the number of seats allocated through plurality (Creevey et al. 2005, 488). Wade proceeded to nominate Senegal s first female prime minister, Madior Boye, who was sacked in November 2002 as a result of a series of financial scandals and a deadly ferry accident. She was replaced by Idrissa Seck, vice-president of the PDS, Wade s party. Seck went ahead and took on a more active governing role than had otherwise been the practice in Senegal. Reports of rivalry between the prime minister and the president began to emerge, and Seck came to be perceived as a possible presidential candidate and competitor to Wade. Not surprisingly, Wade dismissed Seck in April 2004 and appointed a more malleable technocrat, Macky Sall, to be Senegal s fourth prime minister in as many years (afrol News 2004). 17

18 In July 2005 former Prime Minister Seck was arrested and imprisoned under accusations of corruption and of threatening state security. He spent seven months in detention till the security charges were dropped and he was released in February His imprisonment led to fractions in the PDS, with a number of members breaking off to form a party to support Seck (IRIN 2006). Seck has since gone on to declare his intention to run for the presidency in In December 2005, the National Assembly voted to delay parliamentary elections scheduled for 2006 till 2007, to coincide with presidential elections. This will buy the PDS time to rally its troops. In the meantime, the arrests of other leading opposition figures for shorter or longer periods of time have tarnished Wade s democratic credentials. Unsuccessful cases The unsuccessful cases to be discussed here are the Central African Republic, the Republic of Congo, 15 and Niger. In all three cases, the military or armed militias (Congo Brazzaville) have played a crucial role, arms trumping electoral outcomes and constitutional rules. In none of the three cases did semi-presidentialism help instill a culture of negotiation and dialogue. On the contrary, conflict between president and prime minister contributed to a coup in Niger, while attempts at avoiding cohabitation led to armed confrontation in Congo Brazzaville. In the Central African Republic, democracy survived as long as foreign peacekeeping forces remained present. Central African Republic: Presidential elections held in August-September 1993 under the watchful eye of France led to the replacement of General Kolingba in power since 1981 by Ange-Félix Patassé, former prime minister and cabinet member under Bokassa and subsequent opposition leader. A new constitution was adopted the following year that was criticized by the opposition to Patassé for being too presidential, giving the president 15 Also called Congo Brazzaville, to distinguish it from its mighty neighbor the Democratic Republic of Congo (former Zaire). 18

19 significant authority over the prime minister, and allowing for three six-year presidential terms (O Toole 1997, ). Patassé s party, the MLPC, won only a relative majority of seats in the legislature and had to form a coalition government. Threatened by a vote of no-confidence, Prime Minister Jean-Luc Mandaba resigned in April Patassé was accused by the opposition of privileging his own ethnic group, the Sara, ethnocentrism having characterized most of the Central African Republic s history both under colonial times and since independence. Patassé appointed Gabriel Koyambounou of the Yakoma ethnic group (and member of the MLPC) as new prime minister (ibid.). The new prime minister only survived little more than a year in office, before being replaced in short succession by two prime ministers from outside the MLPC, as Patassé formed governments of national unity in response to three military mutinies in 1996 and These mutinies were driven both by material (salary arrears) and political grievances (unequal treatment of military officers based on ethnic affiliation) and were put down by French troops. An African peacekeeping force was deployed to Bangui in early 1997 and subsequently replaced by a UN peace-keeping mission (the MINURCA) in 1998, which remained in place till 2000, following Patassé s reelection as president in 1999 (State Dept. 2006). In May 2001, former President Kolingba and forces loyal to him within the army made a putsch attempt which was put down with the help of Libyan forces. The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, François Bozize, was suspected of being in connivance with the rebels and fired. This led to skirmishes between forces loyal to the government and supporters of Bozize within the army. Bozize fled the country but returned to launch a coup attempt in October 2002, and eventually he succeeded in ousting Patassé in March 2003 (ibid.). 19

20 General Bozize proclaimed himself president and mandated a National Transitional Council with the elaboration of a new constitution (Freedom House 2004) which was adopted in This new constitution reduced the length and number of presidential terms to two five-year terms; it also reduced somewhat the president s prerogatives for determining national policy, in favor of increased powers for the prime minister. In 2005, Bozize was elected president in free and fair elections, and the Central African Republic resumed its status as electoral democracy (Freedom House 2006). Bozize proceeded to appoint a technocrat from the African Development Bank, Elie Doté, as new prime minister. Clearly, in the Central African Republic the political scene since the first transition to democracy in 1993 has been dominated by the military as principal arbiter of politics (Le Vine 2005, 290). A politicized military has been the locus of interethnic grievances and conflicts, and the appointment of a prime minister of the Yakoma ethnic group in 1996 was plainly insufficient to address these. Republic of Congo: The national conference which took place in Brazzaville in February- March 1991 stripped President Sassou-Nguesso, in power since 1979, of most of his powers, and criticized him severely, some conference members going as far as calling for his arrest. The subsequent transition government organized legislative and presidential elections in June-July 1992, which Pascal Lissouba (a former prime minister) and his electoral alliance won (Clark 1997, 68-71). The coalition supporting Lissouba s choice of prime minister quickly fell apart as Sassou Nguesso s party, the PCT (which had been part of this coalition), was dissatisfied with only receiving three cabinet posts. The new parliamentary majority voted no-confidence in the prime minister and his cabinet in September Lissouba retorted by dissolving the legislature, which led to a severe political crisis as this move was declared illegitimate by the 20

21 opposition. 16 Eventually the military acted as mediator, prompting Lissouba to form a government of national unity under a neutral prime minister (ibid. 72). Parliamentary elections in May 1993 confirmed the previously observed ethnoregional distribution of votes, between the north (Sassou), the south-west (Lissouba) and the south-east (Bernard Kolélas, the leader of the MCDDI party and runner up against Lissouba in the presidential elections). Lissouba s party and coalition partners won a majority of seats, against widespread accusations of fraud by the opposition, leading to armed clashes between militia groups supporting Lissouba, and Kolélas, respectively. 17 Relative peace only returned in January 1994, as a result of a compromise in parliament (Eaton 2006, 50-52). Reconciliatory measures continued throughout the year and in January 1995, Lissouba formed a new government including members from Kolélas party. Sassou Nguesso, however, remained alienated from the reconciliation process (Clark 1997, 75). As the presidential elections of 1997 approached, Sassou s popularity appeared on the rise. Following confrontations between Sassou and Lissouba supporters, Lissouba ordered the arrest of several key members of Sassou s entourage, thus initiating an armed confrontation which Sassou eventually won, with support of Angolan troops and the tacit backing of France (Clark 2005, ). 18 Lissouba fled into exile. After renewed fighting in , Sassou has since consolidated his power through the adoption of a new, presidential constitution in 2002 and flawed presidential elections that same year, which led to his election for a seven-year mandate (renewable once). 16 Article 80 of the 1992 constitution states that: When the equilibrium of the public institutions is interrupted notably in the case of sharp and persistent crisis between the executive power and the Parliament, or if the National Assembly overturns the Government two times in the time of one year, the President of the Republic can, after consultation of the Prime Minister and the President of the National Assembly, pronounce the dissolution of the National Assembly. 17 During the 1993 electoral conflict, Sassou s militia group, the Cobras largely remained on the sidelines, though Sassou reportedly supplied Kolélas with arms (Magnusson and Clark 2005; 563, 568). 18 Lissouba had backed UNITA and concluded an agreement with an American oil company, much to the displeasure of Luanda (IRIN 1997) and Paris (Clark 2005, 136). Sassou s militia included officers retired from the Congolese military in 1995 in a military restructuring aimed at ensuring greater ethnic balance within the armed forces which had tended to be dominated by northerners (Bazenguissa-Ganga 1999, 42). 21

22 The unwillingness of key political actors in Congo to compromise and abide by electoral outcomes while preferring military solutions, undermined democracy in Congo Brazzaville. In lieu of facilitating power-sharing, semi-presidentialism contributed to conflict, as Lissouba refused to appoint a prime minister from the opposition once he lost the parliamentary majority in Niger: Opposition participants dominated the preparation and the conduct of the National Conference, seeing it as a strategy of regime change (Robinson 1994, 603). The military was abundantly criticized for its role in politics. At the end of the transition period, Mahamane Ousmane, leader of the CDS, won the presidency, and the six-party coalition supporting him won a slim majority in parliament. Economic difficulties and social discontent quickly put a severe stress on the governing coalition. In accordance with pre-election agreements, Ousmane had appointed Mahamadou Issoufou, leader of the PNDS, as prime minister. Disagreements between Ousmane and Issoufou over policy issues and the distribution of prerogatives between the two executives, culminated with the prime minister stepping down in September 1994, withdrawing his party from the coalition. The PNDS entered a new majority coalition with the MNSD (the party that had governed the former one-party regime), and proceeded to toppling the new government through a vote of no confidence (Issa Abdourhamane 1996, 15-17). Ousmane dissolved parliament and called fresh legislative elections in January 1995 that his coalition however lost, forcing him to appoint the Secretary General of the MNSD, Hama Amadou, as the new prime minister (Africa Report 1995, 6-7). A painful period of cohabitation ensued. Conflict centered around: control over the political agenda; appointments in the local and central administration; and presidential vetoes (Issa Abdourhamane 1996, 24-30). The central issue of contention was whether cohabitation meant a shift in power from president to prime minister (as the majority 22

23 supporting the prime minister claimed); or whether it meant a co-management of power between prime minister and president (as the president and his supporters claimed) (Tankoano 1996, 93-96). The stand-off between president and prime-minister seriously discredited the democratic government and opened an opportunity for a military come-back. The military took power in a coup on January 27, 1996, justifying its action with the supposed threat of a civil war, though in the donor-community, few if any (including French diplomats) believed that a civil war had been in the making. 19 The leader of the junta General Ibrahim Mainassara Baré (former army chief of staff) proceeded to get himself elected in fraudulent presidential elections in July 1996, after the adoption of a new presidential constitution. However, Baré s government was rapidly weakened by internal dissent in the army, fueled by competition over access to public resources (Issa Abdourhamane 1999, 92). In April 1999, Baré was assassinated by elements of the presidential guard, the leader of which, Major Dauda Mallam Wanké, went ahead to organize a new democratic transition. This included the adoption of a revised semi-presidential constitution that better clarifies the roles and responsibilities of prime minister and president, notably in a situation of cohabitation. Democracy returned to Niger with free and fair elections in October-November Tandja Mamadou, the leader of the MNSD and a retired army Colonel, won the presidential elections. The MNSD and the CDS (the two former arch-enemies during the fateful 1995 cohabitation) joined in a coalition and won an absolute majority of seats in the parliamentary elections. Following pre-election agreements, former President Ousmane became chairman of the National Assembly, while Hama Amadou became prime minister again (Di Lorenzo and Sborgi 2001, ). Since 1999, Niger has been characterized by a remarkable political stability. Three attempted votes of no-confidence initiated by the PNDS and its allies in 19 Personal communications in Niamey with donor and diplomatic representatives, January and February