A fine line : The Delicate Relationship between Political and Bureaucratic Heads in Public Sector Management in Ghana

Transcription

1 A fine line : The Delicate Relationship between Political and Bureaucratic Heads in Public Sector Management in Ghana Kwaku Ofosu Adarkwa, M.Sc. M.A PhD Candidate Accra Institute of Technology Accra, Ghana koadarkwa@ait.edu.gh ofosuadarkwa@yahoo.co.uk & Frank L. K. Ohemeng, PhD Assistant Professor School of Political Studies University of Ottawa 120 University Private Ottawa, On. K1N 6N5 fohemeng@uottawa.ca A paper prepared for the XVII annual meeting of the International Research Society for Public Management (IRSPM), Birmingham, UK Ontario, 30 March- 2 April, 2015 Panel B101 Mapping the Purple Zone: Performance-based Public Management and the Interface between Politicians and Public Servants Working Draft Not to be quoted without the authors permission

2 Introduction: The preoccupation of all developing countries with governance, including problems with public sector institutions and services delivery (Hyden, et al. 2003; Rashid, 2014; Werlin, 2003), is such as to have become the very theme of that development (Collier, 2007; Grindle, 2004). One characteristic of good governance is a partnership of political and administrative leaderships that is innovative and promotes participation and trust, enhancing their consensus building response to the needs of citizens (Dasandi, 2014; Demir, 2009; Hyden, et al. 2003; Kathyola, 2010; Vigoda-Gadot and Mizrahi, 2014). Concerned not only with decisions, then, governance is also about outcomes of the engagement and empowerment of all societal actors. Relationships are built not only between those entrusted with political and bureaucratic authority, but also between the political and bureaucratic authorities and the citizenry. The relationship between political power and administrative authority is nevertheless extremely important if the ideals of good governance are to be achieved (Demir, 2009ab; Kathyola, 2010; McCandless and Guy, 2013; van der Wal, 2013; Vigoda-Gadot and Mizrahi, 2014). Notwithstanding, the public administration literature continues to debate, sometimes contentiously, the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats in the policy making process. That debate has concentrated on the inability to draw a line, even a fine one, between the two roles and, conversely, to indicate where they converge in the policymaking and implementation processes. The problem also has much to do with the liberal democratic ethos that entrusts elected officials with policy making, while the bureaucracy is seen as subservient to those officials, whose decisions they are expected to implement (Montjoy and Watson, 1995). The identification of this discord between 1

3 politics and administration has been attributed to Woodrow Wilson, and it was later expanded on in Max Weber s discussion of the relationship between the King and court officials in his ideal bureaucratic model (Campbell and Peters, 1988; Carroll, 1990; Minogue, 1998). Most of the literature, unfortunately, focuses on this relationship at the decision-making level, rather than on the overall management of the public sector -- the exception is the work by Nicholson-Crotty, 2009 and Peters and Pierre, eds. 2001) -- and we therefore deem it necessary to move the discussion into the politics-management realm, especially in the developing world. The necessity to understand the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats in public management derives from the fact that in many cases it is: (1) central to the success or failure to implement institutional (administrative) reforms, particularly where the interests of politicians and bureaucrats have clashed; (2) fundamental for strengthening institutions and achieving successful development outcomes; (3) necessary for public sector efficiency and for improving the functioning of the modern democratic state (Vigoda-Gadot and Mizrah, 2014: 66); (4) the key feature of the successful developmental state, which Ghana yearns to be; and (5) it builds citizens trust in government (in both politicians and bureaucrats, with a clear distinction between them), and their perceptions about the performance of the entire governmental machinery (Vigoda-Gadot and Mizrah, 2014: 66). The extant literature dealing with this important subject has, despite its long history, focused mostly on the developed world, to the neglect of developing countries (Aberbach et al. 1981; Dasandi, 2014). The minority of papers that have tried to analyse the issue in developing countries have remained at the level of general discussion, with just a few exceptions (Cameron, 2010; Charlton, 1991; Jacobsen, 1999; see Dasandi, 2

4 2014); and where this is not the case, they have focused only on the local government sector (Azunu, 2013). It is therefore our intention to fill this gap by examining the politico-administrative relationship in the Ghanaian context. The Ghanaian situation merits our attention because numerous disagreements between political (ministers) and bureaucratic (chief directors) heads have recently been, and continue now to be, reported in the media. While not new, their escalation is a cause for worry, because they impair the overall development of the country (Barnes, 2014). Concisely, the relationship between politicians and bureaucratic heads in the development and implementation of public policy in Ghana has been frosty. Repercussions include stalled reform initiatives, high administrative turnover -- wreaking bureaucratic instability -- and the over politicization of the bureaucracy. What accounts for this poor relationship, and how does it affect the overall management of the country? We attempt to answer these questions by emphasizing the relationships and partnerships between political and bureaucratic heads in public sector management, which should be designed to fairly and visibly accommodate differences among the citizenry, the private sector, and the government. The problem itself is a matter of the unconscious acceptance of the dichotomy between politicians and administrators, where the former believe that they have fiduciary powers and, therefore, the prerogative to set policies, and that the latter should obediently implement them. We argue further that this relationship has led to the over politicization of the bureaucracy, sometimes constraining bureaucrats in policy development, management, and implementation: not a healthy situation in the quest for national development (Ayee 1999; Katrisku, 2013). We adopt a theoretical perspective on the dichotomy to examine it and how it continues to affect 3

5 national development (Skelley, 2008; Van Riper, 1984; Wilson, 1887). The New Public Management in Ghana and other developing countries, with its managerial rationality, has ultimately redefined the role and responsibility of bureaucrats (Owusu and Ohemeng, 2012). Politicians are expected to define policies, assign goals and responsibilities, and evaluate results, while bureaucrats are required to manage and implement these plans (Carboni, 2010; Demir, 2009b; Demir, and Nyhan, 2008). We begin our discussion by reviewing the extant literature on the politics and administration dichotomy, a necessary starting point for understanding the two power actors. We will then discuss the methodology used in the collection of information for the paper. Following that will be a brief discussion of the development of the civil service in Ghana. Here our interest is in how this development might have affected or shaped the relationship between politicians and senior bureaucrats from the independence period to the current regime. Drawing on the data collected, we analyse the current politicoadministrative state of affairs, and then conclude the paper with a general discussion on what needs to be done to engender an effective relationship between the two groups. The Politics-Administration Dichotomy: A Review of the Literature An issue that has received, and continue to receive, significant attention in the field of public administration is one that dates back more than 200 years: the politicsadministration dichotomy, or the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats in the policy making and administration process (Goodsell, 2015; McCandless and Guy, 2013; Georgiou, 2014; Peters and Pierre, 2001; Vargas, 2014). Discussions have generated much controversy and confusion in terms of the originality of the idea, whether it really 4

6 exists, and whether it is just a theory or has practical significance (Demir, 2009; Overeem, 2005; 2006; Overeem and Rutgers, 2003; Skelley, 2008; Svara, 2006; 2001; 1999). We will attempt here to briefly review the literature on the subject. In terms of the originality of the concept, while significant scholarship has attributed it to the work of Woodrow Wilson (Cook, 1997; Kirwin, 1987; Rutgers, 2003; Peters and Pierre, 2001), there is another view that the idea was not his, but that he borrowed it from people under whom he had studied (Van Riper, 1984). Be that as it may, the force the concept projects to the understanding of the politics-administration relationship, is of no doubt (McCandless and Guy, 2013). Since Wilson unequivocally had more to say about it than anyone before him [if we accept the view of Van Riper, and we have no basis for rejecting that], we think it necessary to take him as our point of departure in this paper. Furthermore, as noted by Peters and Pierre (2001:3), his ideas, and analogous ones, formed the basis for a good deal of the Anglo-Saxon concepts about the proper role of the civil service in government. This Anglo-Saxon tradition is the operative one in Ghana (Adamolekun, 2002; Adu, 1969; Muwanga-Barlow, 1978). Additionally, as noted by Burke (1997: 287), a close look at the development of Wilson s thinking on this score can enrich the context for understanding the current public discontent about how government is run, and the efforts at reform such discontent has spawned. It can provide a foundation for raising critical questions about the impact of reform initiatives like the now seemingly omnipresent 'reinventing government.' We agree with Overeem and Rutgers (2003) that any attempt to categorise the avalanche of its interpretation would be hopeless (163). In its strictest sense it envisages public employees as impersonal and apolitical, in the sense of having no political 5

7 interests or political affiliations (Fry, 1989; Wilson, 1887). Wilson (1887) considered this to be what administrative officials are expected to do, as compared to politicians or elected officials: [T]he field of administration is a field of business. It is removed from the hurry and strife of politics; it at most points stands apart even from the debatable ground of constitution study ( ). He considered that administration lies outside the proper sphere of politics. Administrative questions are not political questions. Although politics sets the tasks for administration, it should not be suffered to manipulate its offices (210). The administrative bureaucracy, then, can exist only where it is removed from the political life of the people: its chiefs as well as its rank and file. The administrative office, including its motives, objectives, policy, and standards, must be bureaucratic, and set apart from politics (Uwizeyimana, 2013). Politicians act as sovereign representatives of political values and interests, while bureaucrats are subordinate policy executors, whose major concern is efficiency (Carboni, 2010: 92). The central argument of the dichotomy model is that governments come and go, but the public service remains. Therefore, the public service needs to be characterized by professionalism (Mafunisa, 2003: 88). Consequently, administrators [are] perceived in a subordinate role vis-a-vis the legislature [politician] and [are] expected to yield to legislative [political] suggestions for audits, to the audits themselves, and the implementation of recommendations coming out of the concluded audits without serious argument (Lee, 2006: 1025). The Debate Over the Relevance of the Dichotomy From the literature two schools of thought -- for and against -- emerge, although 6

8 Demirs (2009b) identified three when he added what he called the interaction school. Nevertheless, in this paper we will focus on the for-and-against schools for the sake of convenience. One side prizes the idea s theoretical and practical implications in the study of public administration and the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats, while the other dismisses it a fantasy. In this section we briefly (not exhaustively) review both perspectives. The first school is ardently supported by scholars like Overeem, and argues that the public service needs to be neutral, professional, and shielded from the world of politics (Mafunisa, 2003:88). Stene (1975) believes that opponents of the idea are misguided in dismissing it or pronouncing its demise. Their interpretation of the very concepts of politics and administration leaves them unable to do otherwise. He advises them to seek to develop clarified distinctions among such terms as goals, policies, politics, and administration (89) before one could pronounce such a death. Rutgers (2001) has similarly cautioned against the idea's opponents attempts to discard it on the premise that many issues of study, although they are accepted by scholars, are yet not so neatly categorisable, and that attempting to do so is like trying to destroy a straw man. Just as the male/ female or fauna/flora dichotomy, he explained, is not discarded when confronted with phenomena that do not fit the initial classification, we should not give up too soon on the politics/administration dichotomy if it still seems to be enlightening for an overwhelming number of cases In short, it seems that many attempts to abolish the politics/administration dichotomy are like burning a straw man, in particular if a new dichotomy is introduced to replace it (16-17). Mafunisa 7

9 (2003) also says that the usefulness of the dichotomy model is in its intention: i.e., to protect day-to-day public administrative activities from interference by elected officebearers and members of political parties. It helps to protect public administration from political patronage, where party political connections become the over-riding criteria in public personnel functions such as recruitment, transfer, training and promotion (88). Critics have been warned not to throw out the bathwater with the baby. This is idea, whether its holds normative or practical promise is of essence to governance. Consequently, Rutgers (2003) notes that because as a dichotomy does not amount to some realistic opposition, an empirical phenomena can have the pure characteristics of both politics and administration. We should not prematurely give up on the politics/administration dichotomy, as it still throws light on an overwhelming number of aspects of public administration (20). The second school of thought consists of critics who do indeed dismiss the idea as fantasy because one cannot separate politics from administration or, even, neatly categorize the two. This is not a new criticism (Riggs, 1971; 1987), and can be traced to the early writings of public administration, particularly Waldo s work, which continues to attract attention in our time (Overeem, 2005; 2008; Riggs, 1987). This school simply sees the dichotomy as a normative idea without much practical relevance (Svara, 1985); in other words, a myth (Riggs, 1987). As noted by Montjoy and Watson (1995: 231), the dichotomy of policy and administration traditionally interpreted prescribes roles that are neither practical nor desirable in council-manager government. Svara (2006) is also of the view that the dichotomy is not useful for describing how politicians and administrators typically relate to each other, nor does prescribing how they should 8

10 interact to have a constructive relationship to serve the public interest (122). He thinks that one could argue that the continuous process of policy making and policy implementation is more important to the ongoing relationship between the two types of officials than is the episodic electoral process and, therefore, is more important to describing the relationship, but that matter is taken up later (123). Similarly, Uwizeyimana (2013: 171) has also questioned the practicality of the dichotomy. To him, there is [a]mple evidence to show that the politics-administration dichotomy envisaged by Wilson and his supporters is neither practical nor possible in a real organisation (both government and private). Politics cannot be separated from the policy implementation process due to the fact that: policies are made and implemented by people who are by nature political beings, and the fact that policies are made and implemented through political institutions. In this case, the way forward is to strike a balance between the two equally important and inseparable aspects of any organisation and of government in particular. Others believe that the complexity of policy making and policy implementation means that the dichotomy does not exist in the present age. Such scholars actually believe in a trichotomy (Carroll, 1990). According to her, when one carefully examines the dichotomy idea, one is bound to find that [i]t concerns itself with the distinction between the legitimation and program administration functions of government. But this distinction overlooks the fact that there are three functions, which must be carried out within any organization, including public organizations. Legitimation or politics is the institutional role; coordination, control or administration is the managerial role; but there is also doing whatever it is the organization does, the technical role (361). Yet others believe that the removal of partisanship and patronage from administration does not necessarily equate to an institutional separation of all policy making from administrators (Montjoy and Watson, 1995). According to Svara (1995), it is therefore necessary to recast the policy-administration dichotomy in a form that is normatively and empirically tenable (221). He goes on to say that policy making can be 9

11 viewed as the mixture of efforts by elected officials and administrators with the latter some times dominant. Administrators have extensive opportunity to set policy-initiating proposals, exercising discretion, manipulating expertise, writing budgets, and determining the delivery of services -- and through implementation they shape policy formulated by elected official (222). In all, the relevance of the debate, and the importance of understanding it in the modern context, is in the fact that [t]o reject the dichotomy is to ignore its usefulness in practical matters, namely distinguishing between governance functions. And from an ontological view, it is useful in terms of inquiring whether the political and administrative worlds are really separated. For example, politics and administration do battle through performance-measurement initiatives today. Outcomes reports are used like legal briefs to make a political case for or against a program despite the fact that performance measurement was initiated to remove the political from the administrative. The interface between administration and politics also comes to the foreground in citizenparticipation initiatives (McCandless and Guy, 2013: 371). Methodology In this paper we have adopted a combination of a number of qualitative research methods in the data gathering process (Alasuutari, 2010; Guest, et al. 2013). First is the case study approach, the essence of which was to capture the particularity and complexity of the issue in Ghana, and to understand the important circumstances surrounding it (Guest, et al. 2013; Stake, 1995; Swanborn, 2010; Yin, 2013). The intention was not to build a theory out of the case, but to arrive at a clearer and deeper understanding of the problem with a detailed account of this particular issue (Editors, 2012; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; Swanborn, 2010). In other words, it is an attempt to intensively study a phenomenon that many feel bodes ill for the country. We hope, however, that with this case we will be contributing to the still meagre literature on this subject from a 10

12 developing country perspective (Siggelkow, 2007). We utilized two methods in the data collection process. It must be acknowledged that the study focused on the elite in society. Thus, similar to van de Wal (2013), we studied both government and governing elites, including legislative, executive, and administrative public officeholders occupying senior positions (750; see also Aberbach and Rockman, 2002). These actors are also considered policy elites because they have official positions in government with the responsibility of making or participating in making and implementing authoritative decisions for society (Grindle and Thomas, 1991). The difference in our approach, however, is that the Ghanaian political system (constitution) tasks the president with selecting more than half of his cabinet members and ministers from the legislature, although the system is not a parliamentary one where both the executive and the legislature are fused together -- unlike the strict separation of powers of the American system studied by van de Wal and Aberbach and Rockman (Ayee, 1999; ECA, 2010). In order to better understand, we interviewed both present and past legislative, executive, and administrative public officeholders. For the legislativeexecutive elite, we were interested in those that hold or held positions as ministers and who have or had direction relationships with bureaucratic heads. We used both the structured questionnaire administration and narrative interview approaches. Although initially we were interested in face-to-face interviews based on the narrative approach, we had to administer the questionnaire, especially in the case of individuals in government (politicians and bureaucrats), because during our initial contact for interview request a number of them said they preferred it, as well as because of time constraints. Questionnaire administration has been defined simply as a method of data 11

13 collection with a set of questions [emphasis ours], which is completed by the respondent in written format (Marshall, 2004: 131). Questionnaire use in research has a number of advantages, but also poses challenges, the most prominent of which is the validity issue. We were cautious with the information obtained from the questionnaire so as to ensure the validity of responses. The questions were open-ended, enabling the respondents to answer freely (Aberbach and Rockman, 2002). For other participants we used in-depth semi-structured interviews concentrating on the narrative approach (Feldman et al. 2004). We employed this method because we wanted to understand their stories and their perception of this relationship; as some scholars have noted, stories are powerful instruments for understanding a number of phenomena (Feldman et al. 2004; Franzosi, 1998; Lewis, 2011; Miller, 2012; Sanford, 2010). According to Feldman, et al. (2004), stories contain narrators understandings of specific 'recipes' for change (148). As already stated, those interviewed included present and former elected officials who were serving or had served as ministers, former highranking senior bureaucrats, and academics. The elected and bureaucratic officials had their own stories to tell, and those stories helped us capture the nuances of the situation in Ghana. At the same time we were interested in the academics for their knowledge of Ghanaian public administration. Others, moreover, have served as consultants to past governments, and were involved in carving out a better politico-administrative relationship under the advocated reform initiatives, while others continue to do so now. Altogether questionnaires were sent to 26 selected participants, while four face-to-face interviews, were conducted as part of the preliminary studies. 12

14 The Emergence of the Politico-Bureaucratic Relationship in Ghana In this section our aim is to briefly distil trajectories of the evolution of the politico-bureaucratic relationship in Ghana. The present study will not be understood otherwise, as this context has continuously shaped the relationship between the two protagonists (Pollitt, 2013). As succinctly put by Nti (1976: 3), one cannot explain change or continuity except in terms of history. Furthermore, the review will show the changing dynamics of this relationship caused by the political subtleties that Ghana has experienced since independence. These diminuendos will also help to explain the intent of the various administrative reforms that have occurred over the years, and their effects on this relationship in policymaking and public management. The civil service system that Ghana, like some other African countries, inherited from the colonial rulers in the late 1950s was inspired by the Weberian bureaucratic model (Adamolekun, 2002; Muwanga-Barlow, 1978). Before independence expatriate administrators dominated the top tiers of its hierarchy, with indigenous Ghanaians occupying the lower ranks. Independence brought the quest to replace all expatriates and uproot the last vestiges of colonialism through what has become known as the Africanisation of the civil service and the pursuit of speedy socio-economic development. The relationship between politicians and bureaucrats in independent Ghana was, and has continued to be, defined by this context (Amonoo, 1981; Gyimah-Boadi and Rothchild, 1990). From 1957 until the end of the first republic in 1966 and, even, since then, this relationship was seen as one of master and servant (Amonoo, 1981; Appiah, 2006; Ayee, 2013). The politician had a stranglehold on both policymaking and public management, 13

15 however, and this has continued to today. For instance, it is well documented that bureaucrats continue to be shut out of the policy making process (Kpessa, 2010; Libby, 1976; Ohemeng, 2005; Omaboe, 1966). As Kpessa and Atuguba (2013) put it, increasingly, elected officials and policy makers across political parties in Ghana resort to high level executive or presidential commissions constituted outside the official channels of the policy bureaucracy to initiate policy deliberations prior to legislative debates and executive assent and implementation (99). The quest for rapid national development and the reorientation of the bureaucracy toward political freedom created an antagonistic relationship between elected officials and the service (Amonoo, 1981; Omaboe, 1966). Politicians became policy developers (makers) as well as implementers, and were ahead of civil servants in all spheres of both (Omaboe, 1966). Distrust characterized the relationship between the CPP government and bureaucrats during this period, and especially explains the speed with which politicians wanted to get things done, not to mention the ideological underpinning of such projects (Amonoo, 1981; Gyimah-Boadi and Rothchild, 1990). Extreme politicization of the bureaucracy ensued, with the senior bureaucrats replaced as heads of institutions by party loyalists (Appiah, 2006). Writing on the period, Gyimah-Boadi and Rothchild (1990) note that Nkrumah vowed that he would see to it that there were no civil masters as under colonial rule but servants carrying out the policy decided by the cabinet (233). They hold that senior officers were regarded with suspicion (233), leading to questioning of their loyalty. The government thus did all it could during this period to assert political control over the bureaucracy (Amonoo, 1981, Ayee, 2001). 14

16 One of the most glaring attempts at politicisation and control of the bureaucracy, straining the already bad relationship between it and the regime, was the creation of a number of parallel bureaucratic institutions, including some state-owned enterprises, to undertake national development and assume significant powers under the presidency (Adu, 1969; Amonoo, 1981; Kraus, 1971; Muwanga-Barlow, 1978; Omaboe, 1966). The growth of public institutions that operated parallel to the regular public service changed the attitude of the state administrative structures from concern with law and order to an interest in development and providing public services, and further centralized the decision making process (Crook, 1983; Haruna, 2003). An administrative labyrinth was the reality for the state by 1965 (Berg, 1971; Rimmer, 1991). It is therefore not surprising that Amamoo (1981) has described this period as the politics of institutional dualism. By 1966 and the overthrow of the Nkrumah regime, the relationship between the bureaucrats and politicians was one of uneasy tension, with the former more or less relegated to the background in terms of voice possession in the setting of an agenda for national development (Amonoo, 1981). Gyimah-Boadi and Rothchild (1990) succinctly captured this situation when they wrote: Although the government, in its haste to get on with the development process, saw little alternative to the expanded public corporate role, it was not keen to entrust this additional responsibility to the old-line civil service [I]t regarded the civil service as routine-minded, conservatives and lacking in the necessary commitment. Hence it sought to restrict the civil service role to its traditional pursuits and to allow public corporations a large measure of autonomy in managing their day-to-day tasks (236) The period from the end of the Nkrumah regime to the emergence of the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) ( ) saw significant fluctuation in the relationship between the bureaucracy and elected officials. Government changed often, mainly through military coups, except from late 1969 to the early part of 1972 and 15

17 from September 1979 to December 1981, when there were civilian administrations. The topsy-turvy political environment of the period also saw a number of reforms of the civil bureaucracy that undermined its smooth functioning and alienated it from the policy making process because political leaders suspected their opposite numbers in the service (Asante, 2005). Corruption in the service became rampant, severely damaging its public image; this became a pretext for making the already difficult relationship even worse, especially under the various military rules. As summed up by Asante (2005), the ruling juntas, usually comprising service commanders and a few senior officers, assumed the role of ultimate policy-making organs. Ranking officers, who are usually appointed to other high public offices in government agencies remain answerable to the executive-cumlegislative arm of government (their commanders). One can still say that the bureaucracy gained some prestige during this period in terms of its relationship with government. Of the relationship between politicians (military and civilian) and the bureaucracy prior to the PNDC days, Gyimah-Boadi and Rothchild (1990) noted that the various military and civilian regimes ruled in close collaboration with their civil service advisers, and not, surprisingly these senior cadres gained additional influence from this association, being viewed as experts (243). In what follows we will briefly look at this relationship up to the time of the return to constitutional rule in The first military coup that overthrew the Nkrumah government occurred in The junta established the National Liberation Council (NLC), one of whose initial policies was an attempt to depoliticize the civil service. It tried to establish a cordial 16

18 relationship with senior civil servants by replacing politically appointed regional and district commissioners with administrators who were career civil servants (Gyimah-Boadi and Rothchild, 1990). In terms of economic policy making, we see the involvement of the bureaucracy alongside the business community in the regime s National Economic Council, which had control over economic policies. The NEC included five senior civil servants and two financial professionals. According to Kosack (2012), the NLC and the NEC ruled in a fashion similar to the British: bureaucrats were at the centre and governed the local level through alliances with tribal chiefs and through central appointed administrators. It was the same during the short-lived Busia regime ( ). There was then some form of continuity with that of the NLC with, again, technocrats dominating the government s economic team, for example. Like its predecessor regime, however, these technocrats had come from outside the civil service, as they had worked for the World Bank or the IMF (Libby, 1976). What is obvious, however, is that the policy making process became the bona fide arena for politicians and technocrats from International Governmental Organizations, resulting in the external co-optation of the policy making process in Ghana (Libby, 1976). There is still in that process no evidence of antagonism between the government of Busia and the civil service. All was not necessarily rosy in the relationship between the government and the service; the latter was over politicized during this period (Darkwa, et al. 2006). One of the key issues was the firing of over 500 of them, commonly referred to in Ghanaian political history as Apollo 568. Many believe that it was a deliberate attempt to politicize the service, as those who were sacked were seen as enemies of the 17

19 government (Amamoo, 2000; Owusu, 1972). Furthermore, the government s measures to increase efficiency and productivity in the economy through cost adjustment, as well as the cost imposed on the service, further mutually alienated and increased tension between the two institutions (Owusu (1972). The PNDC era witnessed perhaps the most contentious relationship ever between the bureaucracy and the government. Prior to that party's coming to power, the civil service had suffered from the economic malaise that afflicted Ghana in the 1970s. Its pay had been eroded by massive inflation, and a number of civil servants had left the country for greener pastures (Ayee, 2001; Chazan, 1983; Herbst, 1993; Werlin, 2003). Ability to undertake basic functions was extremely weak, making it a moribund paper pushing institution (Nti, 1980: 2). Thus, by 1981, the evidence pointed to a civil service which was beset with a myriad of capacity problems (Appiah (2006: 12). When the PNDC formed a government, it partly blamed the bureaucracy for the socio-economic and political woes of the country, and described the institution as an agent of imperialism and neo-colonialism, which should be overthrown rather than being simply reformed (Ayee, 1993: 28). This perception defined the relationship between the government and the service. When the government embarked on its economic recovery program of 1983 the civil service and, for that matter, senior civil servants were shut out of the policy discussion and, even, the implementation of the program's core aspects (Hutchful, 1997). One of the first actions of the government towards the bureaucracy then was designed to invigorate it and make it good at implementing its policies, as well as redefining the relationship between the two state apparatuses. Prior to the introduction of 18

20 the first reform effort, many civil servants were summarily dismissed, while others were accused of corruption and incompetence, arraigned before the newly established public tribunals, and given long jail sentences. In all, the civil service as a whole was accused of inefficiency, and corruption, and of being over-centralized and a neo-colonial apparatus with undemocratic leadership (Appiah, 2006: 14). The first attempt at reform was the Kaku Kyiamah Committee of May 1982 to advise the government on restructuring the bureaucracy (Ayee, 1993). In its report the Committee called for the civil service to restrict itself to: (a) formulating policies; (b) providing the administrative support units for political heads; (c) co-ordinating and monitoring programs and activities within the ministerial sector; and (d) conducting interministerial relationships. It further called for the politicisation of the position of the principal secretary, because it believed that some of the principal secretaries had the habit of resisting or blocking the flow of professional advice direct to the political head (Woode, 1984: 46). Woode (1994), however, believes that in making this recommendation the Committee did not show any rigorous intellectual appreciation of the subject in all its ramifications. It failed to provide concrete evidence that principal secretaries resist and block the flow of advice to the political head (46). It also recommended the democratization of the advisory mechanism, which would have allowed all heads of directorates in a ministry equal and easy access to the political head. The acceptance of the recommendations led to some structural changes, including the redesignation of the position of principal secretary to that of Chief Director, who must be appointed based on both merit and partisanship. The position of Chief Director was opened to applicants from outside the public service (Ayee 1991; Barnes, 2014). 19

21 Another issue that affected the relationship between the government and the civil service was the establishment of revolutionary organs: the People's Defence Committees (PDCs) and Workers' Defence Committees (WDCs) in various cities, towns, villages, and workplaces, including the civil service. The WDCs were established with the goal of helping formulate government policy. They enforced price controls and curfews, supported rent controls, and investigated mismanagement in both government and business. On the other hand, the PDCs were formed under the directorate of a coordinating committee made up of representatives from all the progressive political organizations. This institution was part of the plan by the government to incorporate new groups into the planning and implementation of state programs, and thereby decentralize the government structures. The PDCs had the goal of organizing development programs in factories, banks, institutions, and universities, while acting as watchdogs for the government (Opoku-Dapaah, 1992). Ghana returned to constitutional rule in January 1993 when the fourth republic was inaugurated. The period has witnessed two alternating governments: the National Democratic Congress (NDC) (1 and 2) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP). The NDC 1 began in 1993 and ended in 2000, when the party was defeated in the general election by the NPP. In turn the NPP governed for eight years, and was defeated by the NDC in It must be said that many people, including civil servants, considered, and perhaps still consider, the NDC's rule the perpetuation of the PNDC government; and this affected their relationship with the government. A decisive element in the relationship between the government and the civil service is the constitutional provision that bars civil servants from openly engaging in 20

22 political activities. It is also enshrined in Civil Service Law 1992, as well as the Civil Service Code of Conduct, Under the latter bureaucrats are expected to exhibit neutrality in political affairs. Another significant issue that has characterized this period is the number of civil service (including public sector) reforms that have been undertaken, and continue to be undertaken, by government, and which continue to define the relationship and the politicization of the service. The new Civil Service Act permanently changed the dynamics of the service and the relationship between politicians and the bureaucracy. As already noted, it empowered the president to appoint the head of the service, as well as chief directors of the various ministries, in consultation with the Public Services Commission. These appointments are by the terms and conditions specified in the letter of appointment. Furthermore, under article 195 of the constitution, the president is empowered to appoint the directors for the ministries and departments. The strangest thing about this power is that under the civil service structure, directorship is attained through career progression in the service. The overall effect of the reforms of the 1990s and the constitutional requirement for appointment is the over politicisation of the top personnel of the civil service; which, according to Ayee (2009), has created a situation where [s]ome civil servants either campaign on the platforms of political parties, or stand for parties in their primaries or parliamentary elections, or take up top posts without resigning their positions. The negative effect of this trend on the supposed neutrality of the civil service and its work cannot be overestimated. It has created possible avenues for conflict of interests especially when the Civil Service Code of Conduct enjoins civil servants to exhibit a sense of fairness, selflessness, and justice and take decisions solely in the interest of the public. 21

23 The Effect of the Politico-Administrative Relationship on the Civil Service What have been the actual effects of the difficult politician-bureaucrat relationship on policy making and public management in Ghana? Here we draw on our research to discuss them. It should be made clear that the culture of the relationship under discussion, especially in terms of the dichotomy, is that of the British system, rather than the American. We examine four main areas: over-politicization; frequent administrative turnover; bureaucratic mistrust; and organizational disloyalty. Over-politicisation of the Bureaucracy We have already noted that since independence the bureaucracy has continued to be not only politicized, but over-politicized, and this continues to sabotage its conduct of its business and its overall performance. There have consequently been calls to reduce, even eliminate, this over-politicization. Some politicians have indicated that they cannot work with bureaucrats, and have asked the Office of the Head of the Civil Service (OHCS) to transfer them, giving some flimsy excuse. As one interviewee pointed out, [I]t has also happened at the local level, where Metropolitan, Municipal, and District Chief Executives on assumption of office have requested the transfer of Coordinating Directors (senior bureaucrats). The request for transfers is not based on performance, but on differences in terms of age, qualification, perceived political differences, etc. In some cases bureaucrats have either resigned or retired to avoid what one called such humiliation. It must be acknowledged, however, that this issue of transfer has been exacerbated by the political affiliation openly exhibited by some bureaucrats, who are expected to remain generally neutral and non-partisan. How can one strike a balance 22

24 between political victimization of bureaucrats and those bureaucrats excessive political bias? High Administrative Turnover Rate The chilly relationship has led to frequent administrative turnover in the civil service. There are two types. First is the forced, or early, retirement of bureaucrats who cannot cope with the stress, and the second involves moving them to a different ministry. The first usually pertains to the Head of the Civil Service (HoCS) and the CDs, and even, sometimes, the director level. For instance, during the NPP's eight-year rule the HoCS changed multiple times, with no one spending more than two years, and others designated as acting, with no clear timetable for their confirmation or removal. Something similar happened when the NDC II came to power in Such frequent changes turn the organization into a headless chicken running in all directions. It also happens at the chief director level. Ministers usually feel uncomfortable working with such chief directors, and regard them with suspicion. One way chief directors prevent this, an interviewee said, is by simply bending to the whims and caprices of the politicians. In short, they give up trying to stop the minister involving himself or herself in the administrative affairs of the ministry. The problem, as noted by Barnes (2014), is that when this happens it becomes difficult to assign blame when an administrative problem occurs. What is the effect of such high turnover? As noted by some respondents, frequent changes do affect the policy direction and implementation of the Ministries, Departments and Agencies. Stability is necessary for effective and robust policy direction and implementation. They also spread fear and anxiety among bureaucrats, ultimately 23

25 destroying their confidence, and even their mental equilibrium, both of which are, needless to say, indispensable for policy design and implementation. An interviewee was of the view that frequent postings of chief directors to new posts have the definite effect of slowing down the implementation of a ministry s policies and programs. The new chief director requires time to get acquainted with the terrain and read up the files. Another explained that officers hounded out of their positions cannot be relied upon to prepare comprehensive handing-over notes. It is in an atmosphere of peace that officers tackle their assignments with competence. A hurriedly prepared handing-over of notes cannot be of much use to an incoming officer. Another was much more concerned about team building, and particularly what he described as a winning team. To that purpose, he noted, it takes time to build a winning team, and frequent changes at the top have the effect of disrupting teams. The new leader should know the skills and competences of existing teams before deciding on the appropriate action to take, and this involves time and efforts. Clearly, frequent turnovers damage the overall performance of the civil service, just as frequent turnovers of ministers (often termed reshuffles) impair the performance of the civil service, unless the reasons for such frequent changes are gross indiscretion and/or corruption on the part of the heads. Serious Issue of Mistrust of the Chief Director We have already noted that one of the effects of the conflicted relationship between politicians and bureaucrats is the high turnover rate, whether it takes the form of the transfer or retirement of the bureaucrat. An important implication of the turnover -- in particular, transfers based on a politician s request -- is that by the time the chief director 24

26 arrives at the new ministry, the reasons for posting are already known, and this can initiate another cycle of mistrust with the replacement. Ministers therefore refuse to listen to such chief directors, and shut them out in a number of ways while micromanaging the drafting of policy papers and legislative proposals, and from the overall management of the ministry (Barnes 2014). Furthermore, the relationship between the chief director and his or her subordinates becomes one of mutual disrespect. As one interviewee conceded, frequent turnover creates an atmosphere of uncertainty, especially for the chief director, thus leading to timidity, fear, and an inferiority complex, which could affect the overall grip on the ministry, and sometimes leads to the questioning of their leadership competence by their staff. Organizational (Bureaucratic) Disloyalty An issue that seems to be creeping into the politics-bureaucracy interface is perceived organizational or bureaucratic disloyalty, which is the opposite of organizational loyalty in terms of the faithfulness and devotion of the bureaucrat in relation to his or her clients -- i.e., the politician, fellow bureaucrats, and the citizenry as a whole. Without such loyalty it is impossible for the organization to achieve its goals. It is thus believed that employees who are loyal and enthusiastic will work dedicatedly and to the best of their ability. Hubbard and Paquet (2007) have identified two types of disloyalty that apply to the bureaucracy: passive, which may mean responding to the narrowest interpretation of what is expected and required, and, as a result, reducing the burden of office to something much less than it should be; and active, which is about deliberately undermining the work 25

27 of superiors and/or betraying the trust of partners and citizens. They can be found simultaneously in the bureaucracy, but the more profound variety is the active form. Hood (2001) thinks that active disloyalty includes the leaking of confidential material or policy proposals to journalists or opposition parties by disgruntled bureaucrats, and other forms of policy sabotage. In Ghana we find both disorders at work in the bureaucratic environment. The attitudes of ministers have driven a number of bureaucrats into their shells, and to adopt a Let's-see-what-he/she-can-do attitude in the workplace, lamented a senior official in one ministry. In another breathe; Information has been leaked to the opposition in some cases. For instance, in a private conversation with one of the authors, a bureaucrat revealed how they (he and some colleagues) leaked government information to the opposition (the NPP) in the run-up to the 2000 general elections. Similar leaks occurred when the NDC was in opposition, a good example being that of a draft report of the Auditor-General that ended up in the hands of a leading member of the minority in parliament. Conclusion The importance of the roles of bureaucrats and politicians in the development of a country cannot be underestimated. In recent times the emergence of the New Public Management assumed the essence of politicians taking control of policy making as a result of what its proponents ascribed as the overwhelming power of the bureaucracy. Thus, the need for political control over policymaking became the mantra of the day. The striving of politicians to monopolise policymaking is not new. That quest has, however, 26