The roots of radicalism and anti-roma attitudes on the far right. Anikó Bernát, Attila Juhász, Péter Krekó and Csaba Molnár

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1 The roots of radicalism and anti-roma attitudes on the far right Anikó Bernát, Attila Juhász, Péter Krekó and Csaba Molnár This paper seeks to look more closely at the prevalence of anti-gypsy sentiment, which is one of the main pillars of Hungarian far-right movements. It will show which social groups and attitudes connect with the politically increasingly relevant anti-gypsy concept a concept which, for all that it is extreme, has been widely accepted in Hungary in recent decades. But the success of the Hungarian far right over the past five years may not have its origins solely in this: it is worth examining which social groups and attitudes have helped move the far right from the margins to the mainstream and to a socially more accepted position. In this study, radical and far-right opinions are measured by people s attitudes towards the Roma and towards foreigners and immigrants; support for radical and far-right political groups is gauged in terms of the number of Jobbik voters. The analysis is based mainly on a 2011 TÁRKI representative survey of Hungary featuring 3,000 respondents. Attitudes towards the Roma in Hungary in recent decades There are several possible ways of gauging attitudes towards minorities, but this study will primarily apply a method that is based on evaluation of a set of statements. These have been used in TÁRKI surveys six times over the past two decades or so. The responses are measured using a four-degree scale. Opinion has remained relatively stable, judging by the number of respondents who agree with the six statements, even though political and public discourse on the Roma has changed significantly over this period. In the 1990s and early 2000s, a politically correct public discourse was the mainstream attitude; but this changed significantly after the so-called Olaszliszka case 1 of 2006, which is when the term gypsy crime was coined and rapidly gained currency in public discourse. Gypsy crime is not a criminological term; from 2006 on, it became more akin to a political slogan one that is not only used by people on the far right, but that is also more and more prevalent in the public media as well (Juhász, 2010). In the recent past, there has been a significant change both in the extent of media coverage of the Roma and in the content of news stories: the selection of Roma-related topics is more negative, and the way they are covered has more of an adverse slant. In sum, while there is now more coverage of the Roma in the public domain, and while this coverage tends increasingly to use ethnicity to explain negative features (Bernáth and Messing, 2012), the public s attitudes towards the Roma have remained relatively constant (and negative) throughout the period examined. Between 1994 and 2011, the share of those who harboured anti-roma sentiments was high and stable. This is illustrated by the results of the 2011 survey, in which one Hungarian adult in ten agreed that the Roma should have more social benefits, whereas eight out of ten respondents thought that the problems of the Roma would be solved if they finally started working (the emphasis on finally suggesting that finding work depended solely on the Roma). Furthermore, six people in ten agreed with the (radical) statement that crime is in the blood of the Roma, while four in ten believed it to be only right that there should still be clubs and pubs which Roma are not allowed to enter, i.e. where the Roma are still discriminated against. On the other hand, eight out of ten supported the integrated education of Roma children, and six out of ten agreed that traditional family values are stronger among the Roma (Table 1). Thus despite strong agreement on two positive items the general trend has been negative throughout the period. 1 The Olaszliszka case revolved around the murder of a non-roma motorist by a group of Roma in Olaszliszka, North-Eastern Hungary. In Hungarian public discourse the murder became a totem of gypsy crime. In October 2006, a 45-year-old local teacher was driving with his two daughters through the village of Olaszliszka, when a Roma girl ran out in front of his vehicle. The car knocked her off her feet and the driver got out to see if she was alright. The Roma girl ran off uninjured, but word spread like wildfire through the village that a Roma child had been killed. A Roma mob closed in on the teacher and beat him to death, in full view of his own children. Eight men were tried for the murder.

2 Table 1. Attitudes towards the Roma in the 1990s and 2000s in Hungary (percentage of those agreeing with the statements) Positive items More social benefits should be given to the gypsies than the non-gypsies. All gypsy children have the right to attend the same classes as non-gypsies. Respect for traditional values is stronger among gypsies than among non-gypsies Negative items The problems of the gypsies would be solved if they finally started working. The inclination to criminality is in the blood of gypsies. It is only right that there are still pubs, clubs and discos where gypsies are not let in N 988 3,857 1,521 1,022 4,040 3,040 Source: 1994: Hungarian Academy of Sciences Institute of Psychology: Authoritarianism and Prejudices Survey; 1997: 6th wave of the Hungarian Household panel; 2000: TÁRKI Omnibus 2000/12; 2002: Hungarian Academy of Sciences Institute of Psychology TÁRKI Opinion Poll May 2002, published by Enyedi, Fábián and Sik (2004); 2008: TÁRKI Omnibus 2008/5-7, 2011: TÁRKI Omnibus 2011/4-6 (own calculations). In what follows, the three negative statements are selected as the components of an index that will be used to explore the social base of anti-roma sentiments. This index shows that three Hungarians in ten (30 per cent) are anti-gypsy, since they agreed with all three negative items, whereas 13 per cent of the population accept the Roma, as they rejected all three statements. The remaining 57 per cent are undecided, having accepted (or rejected) one or two items, meaning they have not formulated a coherent opinion on the matter. The strongest relationship is not between anti-gypsy sentiment and any socio-demographic characteristic, but between anti-gypsy sentiment and political preference: a disproportionate number of those who agreed with all the negative statements about the Roma are supporters of the far-right Jobbik party (which hardly comes as a surprise). What is more surprising is that less than half of Jobbik voters (46 per cent) agreed with all three items, even though the party s main pillar is anti-gypsy. It is also noteworthy that a third of those who support the two larger parties share this anti-gypsy attitude (Hungarian Socialist Party 33 per cent; FIDESZ-KDNP 31 per cent), as do a fifth (21 per cent) of supporters of the small leftist party LMP. This anti-gypsy attitude was shared by a similar proportion (22 per cent) of those respondents who had a party preference but would not disclose it, and by 28 per cent of those who could not (or would not) choose from among the parties. Traditional socio-demographic characteristics have only a small impact on attitudes towards the Roma, suggesting that anti-gypsy sentiment is fairly evenly (and widely) spread throughout society. There are just a

3 few exceptions to this: slightly more women (15 per cent) than men (11 per cent) reject the three negative statements about the Roma, while the oldest age group (people of 70 and above), pensioners and those who live alone also all tend to be more tolerant (20 per cent, 17 per cent and 32 per cent, respectively). In terms of place of residence, the smallest share of people who agree with anti-gypsy sentiments is in the capital city (23 per cent), while the highest level of agreement is to be found in the larger cities or county seats (35 per cent). Looking at the regional disparities, the smallest proportion of people with anti-gypsy attitudes is in the South Transdanubia region (18 per cent), while the largest proportion is in the regions of Central Transdanubia and Northern Hungary (both 39 per cent) these are the three regions of the country where the Roma are overrepresented. As for the income of respondents, those who are in the poorest quintile (based on total household income per capita) agree least with anti-gypsy sentiments. When we look at the different characteristics of those who agree with all the anti-gypsy statements and those who are undecided or reject all the statements, many of the previous socio-demographic effects vanish, leaving only place of residence and party preference as significant factors. The most important finding from this regression analysis is that the chances of someone agreeing with all the anti-gypsy statements are more than twice as high among Jobbik voters as among the most tolerant LMP voters. Therefore in what follows we focus on Jobbik voters, and consider what the main social, demographic and attitudinal factors are that go to increase the chances of someone being a Jobbik supporter. The most relevant socio-demographic variables in determining far-right affiliation The socio-demographic findings on Jobbik s regular voters presented in the 2010 TÁRKI Social Report were essentially unchanged for the dataset that served as a basis for this research. What is more, no change was noted with regard to the unified databases of the TÁRKI Omnibus surveys either. Hence, the socio-demographic characteristics of Jobbik supporters can be regarded as quite stable. The majority of Jobbik s supporters (66 per cent) are male, which differs significantly from the support base of the other political parties taken together, where women (56 per cent) are in the majority. Young people are also overrepresented among those who favour Jobbik: every fourth Jobbik supporter is aged below 30, and every second supporter (52 per cent) is under 40. By and large, they have successfully completed secondary education (41 per cent of them have graduated from high school). Nor does the Jobbik camp lag behind the rest of the population with a party preference in terms of the proportion of supporters who are higher-education graduates. However, the share of Jobbik supporters who have at most eight years of schooling is 50 per cent less than in the two main parties. Furthermore, economic activity in part a correlate of age is higher among Jobbik supporters, which means that the poorest are underrepresented among them. This final feature is especially relevant in the current economic crisis, as history shows that the crisis of the 1930s was accompanied by an upsurge in authoritarian, fascist movements. Social scientists generally hold that worsening living conditions (such as we see during war or social upheaval) provide fertile ground for intergroup hostility and for an overall increase in violence. However, the extent to which economic factors themselves have an effect and on whom remains open to question. A research project involving 16 Northern and Western European countries (Brückner and Grüner, 2010) sought to answer precisely this question by examining the relationship between economic performance and support for far-right parties. This analysis concluded that the longer a period of recession lasts, the greater support there is for far-right political parties. However, despite the positive linear relationship (i.e. a greater recession is accompanied by larger support for far-right forces), only a minor effect is discernible: a 3 per cent economic setback results in a less-than-3 per cent increase in support for the far right. Thus even the greatest economic crisis imaginable would not be sufficient in itself to trigger a substantial rise in support for far-right politics. As for which groups in society are receptive to far-right ideologies, the debate is still going on between the various schools of social science; it nonetheless appears certain that those most receptive are not primarily the poorest, but are instead groups that have grown uncertain of their own status, yet still have much to lose.

4 It is the same story in Hungary. The surge in support for Jobbik in recent years is often attributed to the economic crisis and to deteriorating living standards; however, according to the findings reported above, this is not sufficient to explain either the demand for far-right ideologies (Krekó, Juhász and Molnár, 2011) or party preference (Rudas, 2010). Taking all the above into account, we apply logistic regression to identify the sociodemographic factors that may be considered to be individual factors that influence whether those with a party preference support Jobbik or some other political party. The results show that gender is one of the most important factors: of those with a party preference, women are not even half as likely (0.39) to support Jobbik as are men (and according to the data available, in fact only a third of Jobbik voters are women). Age is even more significant as a factor, which indicates the generationbound nature of Jobbik: compared to those aged under 30, the probability of someone aged 60 or over voting for Jobbik is very low. Level of education is also significant: compared to those with a party preference and with at most eight years of schooling, voters with a higher level of education are times more likely to support Jobbik, and those with a complete secondary education are the most likely to vote for the party. As for domicile, only the Northern Hungarian region differs significantly from the other regions of the country: compared to those living in the Central Hungarian region, voters in the Northern region are 1.8 times more likely to vote for Jobbik. With regard to standard of living, we examined household income per capita and established that, compared to the poorest, those in the second and fourth income quintiles are 2.5 times more likely to vote for Jobbik. Thus, Jobbik voters generally are not among the underprivileged segments of society: on the contrary, most of them have higher-than-average levels of education (though by and large they are not highly qualified), earn more than the average, are economically active and have better living circumstances than the average. Their receptiveness to far-right and populist political messages may well be due to the fact that they are anxious about losing their present status, and the fragility of their position provokes hostility toward both the elite above them and the poor below them. This is the social situation that underlies Jobbik and far-right ideologies generally. The most prominent attitudes determining right-wing radical sentiment If we include in an extended logistic regression model variables that are linked to the cornerstones of Jobbik s politics such as its stance on immigrants and on the predisposition of the Roma to criminality, its rejection of a number of ethnic groups, and its distrust of the political establishment we get some idea of what thought processes are uppermost in increasing the likelihood of someone becoming a supporter of Jobbik. If we take the attitude variables (questions) included in this research and examine the responses provided by Jobbik supporters and by the supporters of other parties, we find that a fifth of Jobbik supporters plan to go and work abroad for some weeks or months, whereas only 12 per cent of the supporters of other parties have any such intention. Thus Jobbik supporters are more willing than the supporters of mainstream parties to go to a foreign country as immigrants, yet they reject the idea of immigrants coming to Hungary to a much greater degree than other voters with a party preference. The sometimes covert, yet oftentimes open xenophobia contained in Jobbik s messages is also clearer among Jobbik s supporters than among the supporters of other parties. Jobbik supporters are significantly more likely than the supporters of other parties to find the idea of a Chinese, African, Roma or Jewish neighbour unacceptable. The only exception in line with the party s positive stance toward Muslim countries is their attitude toward a potential Arab neighbour: statistical analysis yielded no significant difference between Jobbik supporters and the supporters of other parties on that issue. The biggest difference in the level of rejection expressed by the two groups was in the case of Jews: about half of Jobbik voters (49 per cent) would find a Jewish neighbour unacceptable, compared to merely (!) 32 per cent among the supporters of other parties. But the most excluded group is clearly the Roma minority, members of which would not be acceptable as a

5 neighbour by 71 per cent of Jobbik s followers; supporters of other parties do not lag far behind in anti-roma sentiment 61 per cent of them rejected the hypothetical idea of a Roma neighbour. Clearly, then, among Jobbik supporters the level of rejection of certain minority groups is high. Yet it is worth highlighting an alternative interpretation: despite the fact that it is one of the cornerstones of the party s ideology and communications to contrast Hungarian and foreign/alien values, a significant proportion of the party s supporters said they would have no problem in having someone who was Jewish, Chinese or African as a neighbour. These were hypothetical questions about people s attitude to a looser (or more distant) social relationship. But when it came to the much more direct question about the criminal proclivities of the Roma, the answers provided by the two groups revealed a much more significant difference. Some 80 per cent of Jobbik supporters agreed (including 43 per cent who agreed strongly) that a proneness to criminality is in the blood of gypsies, as opposed to 59 per cent of voters from other parties (22 per cent of whom agreed strongly). Thus, in building up the profile of a typical Jobbik voter, anti-roma sentiment would again appear to be one of the main features according to this latest approach. The results we obtained from the previous, restricted logistic regression model (which measured the impact of socio-demographic factors only) and from the model extended by attitudes were quite similar. We found only minor differences: for example, in the previous model we found a low inclination for voters aged 60 and over to be Jobbik voters, but in the extended model that group is joined by voters aged 50 59, among whom the likelihood of becoming a Jobbik voter is only a third of that measured in the youngest age group. By contrast, once the attitudinal questions were included, not only was the individual impact of level of education and region of domicile not reinforced, but it effectively disappeared. We included a wide range of opinion questions in the analysis in order to find out what (related) topics determine the thinking of Jobbik voters (besides anti-roma sentiment). Of these and contrary to our expectations planning migration (i.e. readiness to emigrate), acceptance of refugees, acceptance of a Roma/Chinese/Arab neighbour, concerns about the law-and-order aspects of immigration, fears about the settlement of Arab groups, and the dangerous consequences of Arab countries/russia/the USA on the peace and security of our country did not have any significant impact. None of the statements examining people s stances on law and order and concerning immigrants in general had a significant impact in the combined model. Yet a series of other attitudes regarding immigrants and foreigners did have a significant impact in determining Jobbik supporters among people with a party preference. It is no wonder that one of the things that exerted a strong influence was anti-roma sentiment, and within this broader topic reactions to the extremely anti-roma question implying that criminality is in the blood of gypsies. Compared to those who strongly agreed with this statement, the likelihood of someone favouring Jobbik falls dramatically with the level of disagreement with this statement: the odds ratio in the case of those who rather disagree is only 0.43 and is a mere 0.20 among those who strongly disagree. The impact of attitudes towards Jews is also significant: among those who would not find a Jewish neighbour acceptable, the likelihood of finding a Jobbik voter is 2.6 times higher than among those who would have no problem with a Jewish neighbour. Furthermore, the likelihood of becoming a supporter of Jobbik is almost twice as high (1.9) among those who are concerned about a large number of Jewish immigrants settling in the country than it is among those who do not have any such concerns. Mistrust regarding institutions also significantly increases the likelihood of someone voting for Jobbik: this was measured using a main component that brought together four questions, so that one unit of decrease in the level of mistrust halved the likelihood of voting for Jobbik among voters with a party preference. The strength of the impact of institutional trust is demonstrated by the fact that, if omitted, the explained variance of the questions featured in the model is reduced from 33 per cent to 28 per cent. By gradually omitting variables that are clearly not significant, the model may be slimmed down, though the explained variance decreases only to a minor extent compared to the full model. The socio-demographic and

6 attitude variables may thus be divided into three groups: (A) factors which entailed impacts that were significant in all the models in which they were applied; (B) factors which had no impact in any of the models in which they were applied; and (C) factors whose impact was insignificant in all cases. The categorization of the factors is set out in Table 2, which effectively demonstrates that, of the socio-demographic characteristics, only gender and age have a clear and individual impact on the likelihood of someone becoming a supporter of Jobbik; taking views and opinions into consideration, institutional distrust and anti-roma and anti-semitic stances have an impact on identification with the right-wing radical party. Table 2. Factors influencing the likelihood of someone becoming a Jobbik voter, based on their impact in the logistic regression models A: variables with a clearly significant impact Gender Age Proneness of gypsies to criminality Acceptance of a Jewish neighbour The settlement of large numbers of Jews and Israelis B: variables with an impact that is not clearly significant Education level Type of settlement Region Income per capita Acceptance of refugees Acceptance of an Arab neighbour Adopting tougher regulations on immigration C: variables with a clearly insignificant impact Marital and family status Economic activity Plans to take a job in a foreign country Acceptance of a Roma/Chinese/ African neighbour Strict surveillance of immigrants Settlement of Arabs in large numbers The USA/Arab countries/russia poses a great danger to the peace and security of our country Trust in institutions (parliament, police, politicians, legal system) Conclusions In summary, we have found considerable acceptance of negative opinions regarding the Roma. This is not merely to do with the growing expression of far-right, radical and increasingly open anti-roma views in public discourse in recent years, since the proportion of those who support the stereotypical view of the Roma has remained essentially unchanged over the past two decades. It comes as no surprise that Jobbik supporters back such views of the Roma more than the supporters of other parties. Even though anti-roma sentiment and especially the strong belief that the Roma are prone to criminality is a genuinely important factor among Jobbik supporters, it is not the sole factor determining a voter s attraction to the far right. Gender has a significant impact on support for Jobbik (two-thirds of Jobbik supporters are male), as does age (the likelihood of being a Jobbik supporter is highest among those aged 30 or younger, whereas in older age groups the likelihood slides steadily). Among attitudes, a rejection of Jews and fear of their mass immigration into Hungary are the factors that significantly increase the likelihood of someone becoming a Jobbik voter. Interestingly, rejection of Roma as neighbours does not increase the likelihood of someone becoming a supporter of Jobbik, though acceptance of the concept of gypsy crime does. The impact of distrust of the political establishment is again significant: the less someone trusts political institutions, the more likely he or she is to be a supporter of Jobbik. All this demonstrates that the ideology combining anti-semitism, anti-roma sentiment and antiestablishment attitudes is capable of connecting with and influencing certain groups in society primarily young men with secondary education who fear for their current social status creating an ideological pattern that can strengthen social support for Jobbik. Our findings may appear self-evident and surprising at the same time. Obviously, Jobbik is a generational party in terms of the age of its leaders, its anti-system stance (which challenges the traditional definition of a

7 political party), the language and style employed by the party and the radical messages it voices. It comes as no surprise either that respondents who embrace the notion that gypsies have an innate criminal proclivity show greater eagerness for the politics of Jobbik; in the same way distrust of the political establishment may also push voters toward the Jobbik party. Given that Jobbik refuses to turn its back on entities that have a militant (or even military) image (such as Magyar Gárda) and often speaks the language of force, it is perhaps no wonder that men are heavily overrepresented among its supporters. However, given that the stereotypical view of Jobbik supporters as the ultimate losers in the fall of socialism (unemployed or low-income, uneducated people living in the villages of North-Eastern Hungary) is still very common in society, 2 some of our findings may come as surprising. In line with the findings of Tamás Rudas (2010), we found that the average Jobbik supporter is a middle-class man with qualifications; he may well not have suffered any direct negative political or economic consequences after the fall of socialism and the change of political regime; and thanks to the relatively sound financial background of his family, he may not even have suffered indirectly from the regime change. Such people certainly do not join Jobbik for reasons of presumed or anticipated financial benefit, but rather for symbolic and identity-related reasons. It is not indiscriminate, disadvantage-related contempt of minorities in general that inspires such voters; the prejudices of Jobbik voters are selective they mostly target Jews and Gypsies. However, taking a bird s eye view of the data, the following question is worthy of examination at a theoretical level: if it is not material factors, then what is it that propels such a wide range of voters toward the Jobbik party? Rudas (2010: 512) argues that the ideological bond comes from their difficulty in accepting the uncertainty entailed by the pluralism of values, a notion that is indeed discernible in the strongly anti-liberal stance expressed by Jobbik and its supporters. It is, however, possible that more profound reasons underlie this attitude. First and foremost, we might highlight a sense that their status and identity are endangered. The middle-class voters of Jobbik may feel that their social status is simultaneously endangered from below, by those who are dragging down the better-off (i.e. the parasites who live off state handouts, an ethnicized symbol of which are gypsies), and from above, by a tight-knit liberal and cosmopolitan elite group (symbolized by the Jews), which takes over all positions of leadership in the fields of the economy, finance, culture, the media and politics, and pushes those who want to become part of this elite downward. The remedy offered by Jobbik to this endangerment of identity is a vision of the nation that is strictly confined and homogeneous, both ethnically and in terms of its values. Minorities that function as a counterpoint to this negatively defined national identity (and incidentally, those minorities reject the idea that Jobbik has any monopoly on national identity ) are also a necessary element in constructing and underlining this identity itself: gypsies offer an object for comparison, allowing right-wing radicals to view themselves as better more decent, harder working and more successful (Dupcsik, 2009); the Jews, on the other hand, enable people to focus more precisely on what is Hungarian rather than what is alien, and also serve as a plausible explanation for the failures and shortcomings of the nation. Bibliography Bernát, Anikó (2010). Integration in the heads: Perception of the social integration of the Roma in Hungary. In: Kolosi, Tamás and Tóth, István György (eds), Social Report Budapest: TARKI, pp (in Hungarian). Bernáth, Gábor and Messing, Vera (2012). Shifted to the margins. Report on the Roma communities media appearance by the majority media [Szélre tolva. Kutatási zárójelentés a roma közösségek többségi médiaképéről], available (in Hungarian) at Brückner, Markus and Grüner, Hans-Peter (2010). Economic growth and the rise of political extremism: Theory and evidence, CEPR Discussion Paper No A view that might appear to have some substance on the basis of the electoral map of 2009 and 2010.

8 Duckitt, John (1989). Authoritarianism and group identification: A new view of an old construct, Political Psychology, 10(1): Dupcsik, Csaba (2009). The History of the Gypsy in Hungary: History in the mirror of research on gypsies, [A magyarországi cigányság története. Történelem a cigánykutatások tükrében, ]. Budapest: Osiris (in Hungarian). Enyedi, Zsolt, Fábián, Zoltán and Sik, Endre (2004). Is prejudice growing in Hungary? In: Kolosi, T., Tóth, I. Gy. and Vukovich, Gy. (eds), Social Report Budapest: TÁRKI. Jugert, P. and Duckitt, John (2009). A motivational model of authoritarianism: Integrating personal and situational determinants, Political Psychology, 30: Juhász, Attila (2010). Gypsy crime as the symbol of the truth [A cigánybűnözés, mint az igazság szimbóluma], anblokk, 4: (in Hungarian). Krekó, P. (2010). Conspiracy theories in the ideology of the Hungarian radical right [Összeesküvés-elméletek a magyar radikális jobboldal ideológiájában]. In: Magyarország Politikai Évkönyve 2010-ről. Budapest: DKMKA, pp (in Hungarian). Krekó, Péter, Juhász, Attila and Molnár, Csaba (2011). Radicalism and extremism: The increase in the demand for the far-right in Hungary [Radikalizmus és szélsőségesség A szélsőjobboldal iránti kereslet növekedése Magyarországon], Politikatudományi Szemle, 2 (in Hungarian). Rudas, Tamás (2010). The core group of Jobbik voters [A Jobbik törzsszavazóiról]. In: Kolosi, Tamás and Tóth, István György (eds), Social Report Budapest: TARKI, pp (in Hungarian).