Peace Process, Spoilers and Indo-Pak Conflict

Transcription

1 Introduction Peace Process, Spoilers and Indo-Pak Conflict Rizwan Zeb Pakistan has been engaged in a peace process with India since April 2003 which has been termed irreversible by the leadership of the two countries. Despite a number of pitfalls, it has survived many threats of stalemates. Cynics believe that post-9/11 Islamabad is under tremendous internal and external pressure as the power configuration at the national, regional and international levels favors India so it is perhaps the best time for a final settlement of the Kashmir issue on India's terms. Optimists on the other hand are of the view that this initiative has a greater chance of success than the earlier ones because it is not confined at the governmental level but also includes the component of people to people contact. Although New Delhi may not acknowledge that the core of the Indo-Pakistan conflict is the issue of Kashmir, recent reports about the developments which the back channel was able to make for the resolution of the problem clearly illustrates it. Another important issue between India and Pakistan is that of terrorism and it seems that it has finally been able to sink the boat of the peace process, at least for the time being. However, the biggest hurdle for any possible success of the peace process from the beginning is the trust deficit between the two. Nothing illustrates this point better than blaming of Islamabad by New Delhi and the Indian media within hours of the Mumbai terrorist attacks. It seems that the India and Pakistan peace process is suffering from the classical spoiler problem. Pranab Mukerjee once described Pakistan as a nursery of global terrorism. 1 Since the GWoT started, Pakistan has played a very significant role in it. It is credited for the capturing of a number of AlQaeda and Taliban leaders and Rizwan Zeb is a Senior Research Analyst at the Institute for Regional Studies, Islamabad, Pakistan. He is also an Associate Professor at the Iqra University, Islamabad and visiting faculty at the Quaid-e- Azam University. He was the Benjamin Meaker Professor in Politics at the University of Bristol and also Charles Wallace Visiting Senior Research Fellow in 2006 at the department of Politics, Governance Research Center, University of Bristol. In 2004, he was a Visiting Scholar at the India- South Asia Project, Foreign Policy Program, Brookings Institution, Washington DC, USA. In , he was a RCSS Mahbub-ul-Haq Fellow. He also authored Indo-Pak Conflicts; Ripe to Resolve? (Manahor, 2005). He is a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London UK. Currently, he is working on a book on Pakistan

2 foiling numerous deadly plots 2. However, at the same time, Pakistan is alleged to be part of the problem as the West continues to blame that some elements in Pakistan support the Taliban in Afghanistan. Despite playing a major role in the on-going war against terror, allegedly Pakistan remains a safe-heaven for the Jehadis and Al-Qaeda. The Mumbai terror attacks of November 26, 2008 resulted in at least 172 deaths. The Indian government and media chose to call it India s 9/11. This attack was unique in a number of ways. Unlike the 1993 and 2006 terror attacks in Mumbai, the attackers opted for a new target strategy that relied on surprise and creating confusion which would not have been possible without detailed preparation and internal support. While the attack was tragic and resulted in the loss of innocent lives, it also revealed strong deficiencies in India s internal security setup. It was clear that there was a great intelligence failure, lack of coordination between various forces that are corrupt and poorly trained and equipped and delays in the response of NSG commandos. If one goes by the logic of three Ws: What, When and Why, one can deduce that the attacks were carried out to derail the already faltering peace process between India and Pakistan and to create an atmosphere of revenge hysteria in India that would result in a war between the two countries. Though the latter never happened, the relationship of muted hostility between the two countries exists. This paper aims to 1) understand the concept of a peace process and spoilers and 2) link it with the peace process between India and Pakistan 3) analyze the Mumbai terror attack and its impact on the peace process. The Peace Process and the Spoiler Problem 3 What exactly is a peace process? According to a number of experts, a peace process is a time consuming exercise based on the mutual desire of finding a peaceful solution to a conflict. Reciprocity is most important element of any peace process. It should largely be indigenous in nature, with possible external assistance if desired by the parties concerned. A peace process cannot be launched, unless some basic requirements are met. Although these requirements might differ from case to case yet can be used without major modifications. Some of the essential requirements of a peace process are: 4 2

3 Willingness of the parties concerned to initiate the process of negotiations. Clear intentions of the leaders involved in a peace process. Application of patience and persistence. Consideration of the time factor. Political will to sustain the process of negotiations. Reduction of mutual mistrust, suspicion, and paranoia. Creating a conducive environment for negotiations. Identification of critical issues. Moving from less contentious to critical issues. Developing points of understanding. Striving for a win-win situation. Taking public opinion into confidence during the process of negotiations. Utilizing the services of a mediator, if necessary. Learning lessons from relevant cases, if necessary. Highlighting the positive aspects of negotiations and learning from past failures in negotiations. Engaging the media in building an environment of mutual confidence and trust. Cessation of propaganda warfare against the adversary. Controlling border tension. Maintaining better lines of communication between the policy-makers of the parties concerned. Factors Affecting the Peace Process There are a number of factors which play a very important role in the success of any peace process. The three most important factors are: 1) Strong yearning for peace both at the governmental and public level 2) A peace process cannot be initiated unless the time is ripe for it. 3) External involvement and encouragement in case of a stalemate 4) Patience because the peace process by nature is time consuming; if patience is missing, then incidents like an accident, terror attack can derail the whole process. 5) The process is simply a mechanism for achieving the content; if the focus is allowed to shift away from the content it could distort priorities and have a negative impact on the peace process as a whole. 5 A successful peace process should address the concerns of both or all parties regardless of their strength. If one side monopolizes the agenda, the concerns of the weaker party are ignored and this adversely affects the peace process. 3

4 Ironically, to ensure that the peace process moves on the weaker party has to maintain the ability to impose a stalemate. Experts point out that a party which has the ability to mar the interests of its adversary by stalling negotiations acquires greater control over the outcome. 6 Peace Making between Enemies 7 To make or maintain peace, parties have to cooperate mutually. However, there are certain factors that may stop two adversaries from establishing peace between themselves. For instance, if the peace making effort lacks public support then these efforts can be taken as a sign of weakness. Another challenge is that in the absence of the institutionalization of peace, the leadership of the involved parties will remain doubtful of the each other s intentions and commitment to the process. Another important issue is what both sides are getting out of the process and how the gains are used. If a certain party is getting more than the other, the chances of the other party to back off will increase because it will start thinking that it will be left no where if the other side, after getting what ever it wants, defects and that use the gain against it in any future confrontation. In short, making peace between adversaries is very tricky and can only be done if both sides seriously want to do it. Others can support them but if a party is in this for tactical reasons then this process is doomed to failure. The Peace Process and the Spoiler Problem A person or a group against the peace process having the capability to derail the process is called a spoiler. A leading expert on the subject, Stedman defines a spoiler as "...leaders and parties who believe the emerging peace threaten their power, world view, and interests and who use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it." 8 According to Stedman, four issues are important to understand the phenomenon of spoilers in a peace process: position, number, type, and locus. Position implies whether the spoiler is with in or part of the peace process. Number refers to the actual number of spoilers in a peace process. Type concerns the exact type of the spoiler and its goals. There are three types of spoilers that are a) limited spoiler that has very limited objectives b) total spoiler that would like to totally disrupt the peace process and would settle for nothing but what it wants and c) the greedy spoiler that changes its position according to the situation and circumstances. Finally, locus refers to the power base and following of the spoiler groups. 4

5 Spoilers are a twin of the peace process. Every peace process has a spoiler problem. For a peace process to succeed it is essential that the parties should be able to identify the spoilers and then address the issue collectively. Identifying and categorizing various spoilers require detailed understanding of a number of related issues such as type of a spoiler, its membership, resources and power base and life line. Once this information is available, then the problem can be effectively addressed. Peace Process before the Mumbai Terror Attacks The Peace Process between India and Pakistan began with what is now known as the Srinagar peace speech by the then Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee. This dialogue speech was motivated by a number of reasons 9 some of which are India s failure to achieve any of its objectives after a human and financially costly year-long stand-off, the Indian business community's strong desire to have access to the Pakistani market, Indian energy deficiency that stunted growth and the threat of adverse effects on foreign investment when tens of thousands of foreigners including 60,000 Americans left India along with US advice requesting its citizens to not visit India. This initiative also came in a changed international context of the ongoing war on terror in which the International community and particularly the Americans could not afford a new war in the region. Active crisis management diplomacy was undertaken by the US. In Senator Richard Lugar words war was averted (between India and Pakistan), barely, thanks to intense, discreet diplomacy by the United States. 10 Therefore it can be concluded that ground reality did not prompt the policy shift. That is exactly why the Indian foreign minister stated: 11 On May 16, 2003, Atal Behari was in Gangtok. There he said that he would have no talks with Pakistan until cross-border terrorism ends. Forty-eighty hours later, Vajpayee was in Srinagar and said I want to extend the hand of friendship. Peace Process: From SAARC Summit to Kabul Blast The Indian Prime Minster and the Pakistani President met during the SAARC summit and issued a joint statement stating that the resumption of dialogue will lead to peaceful settlement of all bilateral issues, including Kashmir, to the satisfaction of both sides. 12 Former Pakistani President Musharraf declared the event a victory of moderates of both

6 A change of guard in New Delhi and the subsequent statements especially from the National Security Advisor, Late Mr. J. N. Dixit, made a number of observers wonder whether the process would be affected adversely. However, the general mood in Islamabad remained optimistic about the prospects of the process. A secret meeting between Tariq Aziz and J N Dixit in Amritsar 14 brought the process back on track and a review meeting held in September 2004 between the foreign secretaries identified overall positivity and progress on certain issues. 15 Also, the President of Pakistan and the Indian Prime Minster met in New York at a successful meeting. Between December 26-27, 2004, the foreign secretaries met yet again for a two day evaluation of the peace process at Islamabad. After the first day of talks the Indian camp announced that the senior citizens and children would be given visa at Atari. Some negativity surfaced when Mr. Shyam Saran rejected the idea of involving Kashmiris in the talks, claiming Indians represent Kashmir and reminding Pakistan to fulfill its commitment of stopping cross border terrorism. 16 Mr. Riaz Khokhar responded by stating to the media that Pakistan had implemented the assurances given in the January 6 joint statement but human rights violations were increasing in Indian Held Kashmir. 17 The process proceeded slowly in The Indian Prime Minister in a visit to the US threatened to suspend peace efforts if Pakistan did not curb militants and raised concerns that militants could seize Pakistan s nukes. The Pakistani Foreign Office retaliated by arguing that the statements were unfortunate and misleading. Perhaps it was the lack of result for both side which led to the conclusion of the meeting in New York without any breakthroughs. The Indian Prime Minster, Manmohan Singh who brought up the issue of cross border terrorism in his address to UN. In response, President Musharraf reminded the Indians that UN resolutions on Kashmir still remained unimplemented during his address to the General Assembly. 18 Later, both sides agreed to continue the hard work and carry forward the peace process. President Musharraf expressed hope that the two sides would be able to take the peace process to its logical conclusion 19 and the Pakistani foreign minister stated that the purpose of the peace process with India was to provide solace with the people of Indian Administered Kashmir. 20 In the Indian Foreign Minster s visit to Islamabad in October 2005, the aim of which was to put the peace process back on track, there was a belief that both sides were now mentally prepared to move forward on the Siachen issue

7 The most important item on Singh's agenda was the institutionalizing of the dialogue process through the revival of the Joint Commission. 22 At the end of this visit, India and Pakistan signed two agreements on the prenotification of ballistic missile tests and the establishment of a communication link between the Coast Guard and the Pakistan Maritime Security Agency. 23 Though they failed to agree on Siachen and Sir Creek, they still discussed ways to resolve it 24 as both sides agreed to undertake a joint survey of Sir Creek and consider options for the delimitation of the maritime boundary. 25 India and Pakistan also revived the Joint Economic Commission for the first time in 16 years and its first meeting was held in Islamabad. 26 Both sides also agreed that the third round of talks would start from January. However major differences in views arose once again with the Indian foreign secretary while addressing a press conference accused Pakistan of not ending cross border terrorism 27 and dismantling the terror structure completely 28 and warned that could end if India were to be attacked by the terror elements. 29 The Pakistani Foreign Secretary responded by asserting that no cross border terrorism was taking place 30 and the Pakistani President and Prime Minister made it clear that there could be no progress with out some development on the Kashmir issue and urged that tangible progress during the third round of the composite dialogue should take place. 31 Mr. Shaukat Aziz during his meeting with Indian Foreign Minister, Natwar Singh further asserted that Pakistan would not encourage Indian traders till India moved towards the resolution of the Kashmir issue. 32 The most significant achievements of the peace process till that time were the initiation of the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus Service and the APHC leadership s visit to Pakistan. However, the peace process still did not resolve the major issues of Kashmir, Siachen and Sir Creek. The pace of the peace process was further slowed down by internal developments in both Pakistan and India. In Pakistan it was the judicial crisis, national elections and the transition to civilian rule. However, one notable exception was the video conference of the President of Pakistan, in which he stated that he was willing to consider a no first use policy of nuclear weapons and urged India not to feel threatened by Pakistan and stated that Pakistan was not threatened by it in any way. 33 However, the bomb blast at the Indian embassy in Kabul on July 7 that killed 54 people including 2 senior Indian officials dominated the peace process 7

8 during this phase of the peace. Afghan President Hamid Karazi quickly blamed Pakistan for the attack citing Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) s hand in it. In the wake of the Kabul blast, the fifth round of the composite dialogue got under way with talks between the Foreign Secretaries on 21 July. However no schedule for meetings on the various subjects that it covered was announced. The Indian Foreign Secretary, Shivshankar Menon observed stated that recent developments had put the process under stress and had attributed to a vitiated atmosphere. 34 However, the Pakistani foreign secretary Salman Bashir assured his Indian counterpart that it was ready to address India s misgivings if it shared evidence and intelligence in its possession. He also added that Islamabad was not bound to prove its credentials to anybody and that it was not fair to point fingers without substantial evidence. 35 The Kabul blast also topped the agenda of the first meeting between the Prime Ministers. Due to active American diplomatic pressure and persuasion, both sides met on the sidelines of the SAARC summit in Colombo on 2 August In short, the peace process between India and Pakistan was marred with difficulties mainly because of the difference in the approach of the parties. While Pakistan followed the conflict resolution approach, India followed the conflict management approach. The Kabul blast brought the issue of terrorism to the fore and unfortunately for Pakistan, India s accusations against Pakistan were received sympathetically internationally. In short, according to Christopher Snedden s The trust deficit is therefore the most serious ongoing problem that confronts India-Pakistan relations. Until the instigation of the current composite dialogue, both nations have had differing views on how to approach and overcome their significant differences and difficulties. Mumbai Attacks and Indian Reaction 36 On 26 November, 2008, the biggest blow to the peace process between India and Pakistan came in the shape of a series of terror attacks in Mumbai that targeted two luxury hotels and other landmarks across the city and led to the deaths of 172 people while Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi was on a visit to India to discuss important issues related to the 8

9 ongoing dialogue process including Kashmir, the Chenab River water dispute and trade ties. Although the attack lasted for several days, New Delhi committed a cardinal sin against the peace process when its media and officials started blaming Islamabad for planning the attack within the first few hours of the terror attacks even the incident highlighted utter intelligence failure as neither the police, intelligence services, RAW or ATS or CBI had the slightest inkling of what was afoot. Even the Navy Chief, Admiral Sureesh Mehta, admitted that it was a systemic failure. Ironically, no action was taken to pre-empt the attack despite the fact that the US passed on credible intelligence to India on 18 November that a terrorist assault was likely from the sea, and two five-star hotels were to be targeted. 37 Immediately after the Mumbai incident, India put dialogue with Pakistan on the hold and handed over a list of 20 people to Pakistan allegedly involved in terror incidents in India. India did not blame the civilian government in Pakistan for being involved in the incidents but accused Lashkar-e-Tayba, (LeT) for perpetrating the attacks and urged Pakistan to crack down on terrorist outfits operating in and outside of Pakistan even before the operation was over. In a televised address, on 27 November, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh blamed militant groups based in India s neighbors, a thinly veiled reference to Pakistan, for the act and warned that there would be a cost if suitable measures are not taken by Pakistan. 38 India further postponed secretary-level talks on trade and Sir Creek, called off a planned cricket tour of Pakistan and the meeting of India-Pakistan Joint Commission on Environment. Other meetings between the defense secretaries on Siachen, the water secretaries, the commerce secretaries and the culture secretaries were put on hold indefinitely and further tightened visa procedures for Pakistani nationals by increasing processing time for visa applications from 15 to 30 days. On December 1, India handed over two demarches to Pakistan. The first one was issued to Pakistan s High Commissioner in New Delhi, Shahid Malik, by the Indian External Affairs Ministry, while the second one was delivered at the Foreign Office by Indian High Commissioner Satyabrata Pal in Islamabad. In the first demarche, India accused elements from Pakistan of carrying out the terrorist attack in Mumbai and stated that it expected Islamabad to take stern action against the groups that could have been involved in the attack. 39 The second demarche was more specific and sought the extradition 9

10 of three wanted persons Maulana Masood Azhar, Tiger Memon and Dawood Ibrahim and also urged action against the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD). 40 India upped the diplomatic ante by arguing that the attacks had to be treated as part of the global war on terrorism which required global response. India put in a formal request to the UN Security Council (UNSC) seeking a ban on the JuD. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in a speech in the Parliament on 12 December called Pakistan the epicentre of terrorism and asked the international community to deal with the problem. On 16 December, Pranab Mukherjee said Pakistan should fulfill its commitment on not allowing its territory being used for terrorist activities against India. He said India wanted the assurances, given twice in the past at the highest level, to be fulfilled with the terrorist infrastructure dismantled. 41 On 17 December, he asked Pakistan to implement in the letter and spirit of the UN Security Council resolution, imposing sanctions on the JuD, and declaring its four top leaders terrorists. 42 Simultaneously, New Delhi heightened its war preparedness asserting that it was keeping all options open. Ironically, India did not even bother to officially respond to the two specific proposals made by Pakistan to set up a joint commission co-chaired by the National Security Advisers of the two countries to assist in investigation of the Mumbai attacks and to send a highlevel political delegation to New Delhi to defuse the tension. 43 A day before the arrival of US Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher in Islamabad, the Indian government upped the ante against Pakistan. On 4 January, Manmohan Singh addressing a press conference in Shillong demanded that terrorists responsible for the Mumbai terror attacks should be handed over to India for trial but made it clear that war was no solution. On 5 January India handed over to Pakistan what it termed evidence of the Mumbai terror attacks. India s high officials also continued to issue an array of statements ahead of Richard Holbrooke s visit to South Asia so as to keep the heat on Pakistan by accusing it as an epicentre of global terrorism. India also deftly succeeded in keeping the Kashmir issue out of the purview of the US special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. The 11,280-page charge sheet in the Mumbai terror attack case was filed against the perpetrators of the attack on 25 February that indicated that a conspiracy was hatched in Pakistan and masterminded by the Lashkar-e- Tayba and also included comprehensive evidence, including a confession by one of the perpetrators, to set out an unassailable case. Significantly, the 10

11 charge sheet did not make any reference to the ISI or suggest that a section of the Pakistan establishment was involved in any way in the attack. Pakistan s Response President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Syed Yousuf Raza Gilani condemned the Mumbai terrorist attacks in strongest possible terms. 44 In their separate condolence messages addressed to their Indian counterparts, they expressed shock and grief over the loss of lives in the attacks. Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi, while in New Delhi expressed grief and described the attacks as a horrendous tragedy. He, however, cautioned India not to jump to the conclusion and avoid knee-jerk articulations. He cited the Samjhota Express case when too, Pakistan was accused while investigation revealed that a serving officer of the Indian Army Lt Colonel P.S. Prohet, was involved in the carnage. 45 Pakistan offered full cooperation to India in tracking down the culprits in Mumbai. Addressing the media in Chandigarh, India, Qureshi offered a direct hotline between the intelligence chiefs of the two countries so they could share information and cooperate with each other in a more effective manner and stressed the need for strengthening the joint anti-terror mechanism to combat the menace. Islamabad also offered that a joint commission investigate the incident. Briefing envoys in Islamabad on 3 December, Qureshi again offered to set up a joint investigating mechanism which could be headed by the National Security Advisers of both countries. In an interview to Karan Thapar for The Devils Advocate programme Zardari said if evidence points to any group in my country, I shall take the strictest action. 46 On 1 December, he again offered unconditional cooperation to New Delhi in investigating the Mumbai attacks after the Indian government formally accused elements in Pakistan of being involved in the incident. The Defense Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) that met on 9 December reiterated Pakistan s resolve not to allow its soil to be used for any kind of terrorist activity anywhere in the region or the world. It also renewed the offer of full cooperation to India, including intelligence sharing and assistance in investigation as well as setting up of a joint investigation commission. Pakistan maintained that the Mumbai attackers were non-state actors that had no links with Pakistan s external intelligence agency, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Pakistan urged India to provide solid evidence before leveling any allegations against it. On 9 December, the Indian High Commission in Islamabad was 11

12 told the government had launched investigations into claims that Pakistan was involved in the Mumbai terror attacks. Foreign Secretary Salman Bashir underscored that to push the probe forward, we require detailed information and evidence. He reiterated a suggestion for joint investigations and proposed that a high-level delegation from Pakistan visit New Delhi as soon as possible. The Director of Interpol also stated that like Pakistan, he too had received no evidence from the Indians about the involvement of Pakistani elements in the Mumbai attack. On 9 December, Pakistan security forces launched a raid on Lashkar-e-Tayba banned in the country and arrested its senior leader Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi besides 12 other activists. On 10 December, a United Nations Al-Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee under UN Security Council Resolution 1267 banned JuD, Al-Rashid Trust and Al-Akhtar Trust. On 12 December, in the wake of UNSC resolution Pakistan launched a countrywide crackdown on the JuD. Police shut down its offices throughout the country and arrested scores of operatives. Hafiz Saeed was put under house arrest. Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani said Pakistan would abide by the UN resolution, fulfilling its international obligations. Pakistan, however, asserted its right to protect its territorial integrity and respond to any Indian threat. On 3 December, a joint resolution of the All Parties Conference (APC), talked of the defense of Pakistan s honor and dignity, sovereignty and territorial integrity, and expressed support for the armed forces in defending the country s security. The resolution condemned unsubstantiated allegations against Pakistan and said it wanted good relations with India on the basis of settlement of all outstanding disputes. Responding to Indian threats, on 22 December, Pakistani political and military leadership made it clear that they were alive to the threat and had the right to defense. Shah Mehmood Qureshi told reporters that Pakistani government and armed forces were fully alive to the situation and had the capability and the right to defend the country and counter aggression, if war was imposed. However, he stressed the futility of war and called for defusing tensions instead of escalating the situation. On 23 December, Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani apprised the President of the operational preparedness of the armed forces. He also warned that Pakistan armed forces would give a matching response within a few minutes if India resorted to any surgical strike inside Pakistan. On 24 December, Pakistan s National Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution condemning the Mumbai attacks and urged India to stop hostile propaganda against Pakistan that seeks to cover their intelligence failures 12

13 and to end activities [that] do not serve the cause of peace in the region. In the Senate, debate on national security saw members across party lines expressing support for the government and the country s armed forces against any kind of aggression by India. Foreign Minister Makhdoom Shah Mehmood Qureshi expressed the hope that India would not commit the mistake of carrying out surgical strikes but asserted that if war was imposed, Pakistan would respond and argued that cooperation and communication was essential to get to the bottom of the problem and reiterated Pakistan s offer to cooperate with India to bring the perpetrators to justice. On 7 January, President Zardari and Prime Minister Gilani gave assurances to carry out a credible investigation on the basis of the information provided by India on Mumbai attacks. Pakistan set up a three-member FIA investigation team to scrutinize the Indian dossier. The investigation agency was tasked with conducting an investigation on the basis of the Indian dossier on the attacks and given 10 days to report back with its findings. On 13 February, Pakistan in its first detailed response to the dossier provided by India acknowledged that the Mumbai attacks were partly planned in Pakistan and that it had arrested six suspects, including the main operator. Pakistan said criminal cases had been registered against nine suspects on charges of abetting, conspiracy and facilitation of a terrorist act. Pakistan however rejected Indian demand for the extradition of the suspects linked to the Mumbai attacks on the basis of the lack of a extradition treaty between the two countries. Shah Mahmood Qureshi asserted that Pakistan was keen on rebuilding its internal institutions. On 5 January, he again turned down India s demand for extradition of the suspects clarifying that it had a extradition treaty with the US but not India. Pakistan also took the international community into confidence and briefed 80 ambassadors based in Islamabad on 20 January on Pakistani investigation efforts. American and British Crisis Diplomacy The Mumbai terror events created renewed fear in the American and western policy circles of a new crisis erupting in South Asia. The US, UK, China and 13

14 other world players remained in constant touch with Islamabad and New Delhi to avert any possible confrontation between the nuclear neighbors. The Bush administration sent senior US officials Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia Affairs Richard Boucher, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen to the region urging India to exercise restraint and Pakistan to cooperate with India in the investigations. The US officials maintained that there was no evidence that Pakistan s government had a hand in the operation but highlighted LeT responsibility. In her visit to New Delhi on 3 December, Condoleezza Rice offered India full cooperation and promised to persuade Pakistan to take very direct and tough action and urged Indian response to be limited to arresting culprits and ensure that no further attack took place and further that its response should be judged by its effectiveness which avoids unintended consequences. In her visit to Islamabad, on 4 December, Condoleezza Rice urged the Pakistani leadership to act urgently and effectively as there was irrefutable evidence of involvement of elements in the country in order to avert a strong international response and to take a hard line on terrorism. On 12 December, US Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte while supporting Pakistan s war on terror policies conveyed assurance that India would not indulge in any military adventurism as long as Pakistan maintained verifiable commitment in action against the suspected groups. On Dec 26, Islamabad cancelled leave for operational armed forces personnel and redeployed troops along the Indian border. US intelligence officials, meanwhile, dismissed the possibility of yet another India-Pakistan war. Britain too came forward to defuse the crisis. Prime Minister Gordon Brown visited Pakistan on 14 December and urged Islamabad to take action against terrorists and promised that the British government would work with Pakistan to ensure it does not serve as a terrorist safe haven. President Zardari assured him that the Pakistan government would take action against those found involved in the Mumbai attacks. Reflections and Conclusions Unlike the popular belief, this paper has demonstrated that the Pakistan- India peace process started in April 2003 due to a number of internal and 14

15 external compulsions for India and its view that post-9/11 Pakistan was under tremendous pressure internally and externally so it was the best time for the final settlement of all issues on its terms. The biggest problem and a spoiling factor for the peace process from the very beginning was the trust deficit between the two sides. Nothing illustrates this point more than India s response to the Mumbai terrorist attacks. It seems that the India and Pakistan peace process is suffering from the classical spoiler problem. The terrorists aimed at derailing the already faltering peace process and was their basic objective. They also wanted the situation to deteriorate to the extent of war or at least troop mobilization due to which Islamabad would be compelled to concentrate on its eastern border. While the terrorists successfully achieved their basic aim, both India and Pakistan abstained from taking extreme measures. Cynics would consider this as an outcome of the back channel American diplomacy. As a peace process is a time consuming exercise based on a mutual desire of finding a peaceful solution to the conflict and patience, it cannot be achieved if either party starts blaming the other or refuses to trust it. Another point is that a party might lose interest in the peace process when it achieves positive results or might distance itself from the process if it fails to show results to its domestic constituency. This apparently is the case with India as it can not achieve much from Pakistan and the Indian public is unhappy because of terrorism. To address the aforementioned dilemmas, results are important but these cannot be achieved without consistency and patience. In short, the peace process depends on a number of factors the most important of which is patience. Sometimes, the stronger party in a peace process starts thinking that it can bargain from position of strength and achieve its objectives which leads to the failure of the process. This is a major issue in the peace process studies as India is not willing to give any concessions to Pakistan. Ironically, in such a situation, the weaker party is left with no other option but to maintain the ability to impose a stalemate. Spoilers are a twin of a peace process but for a peace process to succeed it is essential that the parties identify the spoilers and address the issue collectively. The terrorists in the India-Pakistan case are a spoiler that India and Pakistan need to address collectively if they want to establish peace in South Asia. 15

16 While terrorists are a total spoiler in the Pakistan-India peace process because their existence is threatened by a successful peace process India is also a greedy spoiler despite being a party to the process because it is changing its positions and stances and is unwilling to give concessions to Pakistan. This was clearly indicated in the recent meeting between the prime ministers of the two countries in Sharmel Shiekh where India reverted to New Delhi s position of no talks till terrorism ends after agreeing to resume the process and addressing the terrorism problem jointly with Pakistan. Till the time this mind set prevails, peace between India and Pakistan will remain elusive. Note: The views expressed in this article are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) or its affiliates. 16

17 Notes and References 1 Then Defense and now foreign minister of India gave these remarks during a talk at Harvard University on India s Strategic Perspective. For details see, India accuses Pakistan of being nursery of global terrorism, Daily Times, available at < 2 Islamabad s contribution in the WoT is well documented and the allies have praised its role in it. According to a report published at the time of the American President s visit to South Asia: Pakistan has to date arrested more than 700 members of Al-Qaeda and killed a further 850 of them. Pakistan s security forces, meanwhile, have suffered a loss of personnel, with injuries to another 760 in this war. Some of the high-profile terrorists arrested include Abu Zubayda (March 2002), Ramzi bin Alshibh (September 2002), Khalid Sheikh Mohammad (March 2003), Mustafa Ahmed Al-Hawsawi (March 2003), Mohammad Omar Abdel-Rahman (March 2003) and Abu Faraj al-libbi (May 2005). Pakistan has also helped in freezing bank accounts of Al-Qaeda and its affiliated welfare organisations, such as the Al-Rasheed Trust and the Rabeta Trust. For a detailed and comprehensive account of Pakistani contribution to the WoT see; Ghani Jafar and Rizwan Zeb, Pakistan: Countering Global Terrorism, IRS, Islamabad, 2006; also see General Musharraf is still riding high, (editorial), Daily Times available at < Al Qaeda caught and killed: Tally highest in Pakistan: Cheney, Daily Times, Thursday, October 19, 2006, available at < 3 This section heavily draws from the Section1: The Conceptual Framework of Moonis Ahmar (ed.), The Arab-Israeli Peace Process, Lessons for India and Pakistan, (Karachi: OUP). 4 Ibid., p Dr. Talat Wizarat, Peace Processes: A Comparative Study, in Moonis Ahmar, ibid., p 42 6 Ibid., p For the most comprehensive discussion on the subject see: Virginia P. Fortna, Peace Time Cease-Fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace, (New Jersey: PUP, 2004). 8 For details see Stedman, Stephen J. (1997): Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes, International Security, Vol. 22 (2): 5-53, also see Dealing with Spoilers in Peace Processes, International Workshop September 2006, Bonn, Germany. Proceedings available at < Sep2006.pdf?openelement> and Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes," in Stern, Paul C. and Daniel Druckman, eds. International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War. Washington, DC: National Academies Press, Rizwan Zeb, The Ball is In India s Court Now, 10 Rizwan Zeb, US Interests in South Asia in Post 9/11 Era: Effects on Pakistan, Margalla Papers 2004, (National Defense College, Islamabad), pp Interview of India s External Affairs Minister to Outlook (June 7, 2004) V. Sudarshan, 1 June 2004<

18 12 Rizwan Zeb, From War to Peace: Will it Last? < ull&mod=null 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 15 ibid, p Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18 Anwar Iqbal and Masood Haider, Indian premier to visit Pakistan next month: Kashmir solution to satisfaction of both sides urged, Dawn, September 16, K J M Varma, Coercive diplomacy can no longer work': Musharraf, September 29, Agreement on a certain process for Kashmir, says Kasuri, Dawn, September 30, Rana Qaisar Kasuri and Natwar meet today: Progress on Siachen pullout likely. Qudssia Akhlaque, Guarded optimism ahead of talks: Pakistan, India to discuss Siachen, Sir Creek, 22 Sushant Sareen, Natwar's Pakistan visit: Peace may get a boost, The Rediff Special September 30, Pakistan, India ink two accords, Qudssia Akhlaque, Pakistan, India sign two deals: Missile testing, coastal information Pact on missile tests, MoU on hotline Mariana Baabar Pakistan, India sign missile, hotline deals B. Muralidhar Reddy, India, Pakistan sign accord on pre-notification of missile tests, 24 No agreement on Siachen, Sir Creek, 25 Ajay Kaul India, Pak 'understanding' on Siachen by January October 04, Rana Qaisar, Indo-Pak economic commission revived after 16 years, 27 Naveed Ahmad Infiltration has not ended, says Saran 28 Every step except territorial changes possible: Shyam Saran,

19 29 Violence can derail peace process: India October 03, 2005, 30 Kashmir issue not on backburner: Pak 31 Shahzad Raza: Kashmir key to ties: PM, Musharraf says Kashmir should be resolved with sincerity, 32 Ibid. 33 For details see Regional Brief prepared by the Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad. 34 IRS Regional Briefs. 35 Ibid. 36 This section is based on the date collected from IRS regional briefs, Pakistani, Indian newspapers. Few reports on the attack which were prepared in the west have also been consulted. 37 For details regarding the attacks, see: Group from outside behind Mumbai blasts: PM, The Indian Express, New Delhi, 28 November 2008, Attack on India Pakistan is wholly to blame, The Tribune, Chandigarh, 29 November 2008, India suspends cross-loc trade, Daily Times, Lahore, 3 December 2008, Praveen Swami, Three Lashkar fidayeen captured, The Hindu, New Delhi, 28 November 2008, The Times of India, New Delhi, 10 December 2008, Baqir Sajjad Syed, Pakistan s response to India s demarche likely in a couple of days, Dawn, Islamabad, 8 December Ramesh Ramachandran, Pak envoy gets a stiff warning, The Asian Age, New Delhi, 2 December 2008, More needs to be done: Singh, The News, Islamabad/Rawalpindi, 12 December 2008, Ehsan Fazili, Pranab Mukherjee tells Pakistan: Fulfil assurances on terror, The Tribune, Chandigarh, 17 December 2008, Ashok Tuteja, Pranab to Pak: Implement UNSC resolution, The Tribune, Chandigarh, 18 December 2008, India to consider all options, warns Pranab, The News, 20 December We are obliged to consider full range of options: Pranab, The Tribune, Chandigarh, 20 December 2008, India to consider all options, warns Pranab, The News, 20 December 2008, Enough proof for Islamabad to act: Pranab, The Tribune, Chandigarh, 22 December 2008, Shujaat Bukhari, India capable of giving fitting reply: Sonia, The Hindu, New Delhi, 22 December 2008, Qudssia Akhlaque Aggressive Indian postures undermine fledgling peace process, The News, 22 December 2008, Terrorists came from Karachi via sea to Mumbai, The Indian Express, 28 November Ibid. 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid. 43 However, sanity revealed and New Delhi chose not to repeat the earlier pattern and did not snap communications with Pakistan by withdrawing its High Commissioner from Islamabad, reducing the consular staff, and stopping road, rail and air traffic between the two countries. Another positive step was that both India and Pakistan swapped the list of nuclear installations on 1 January 2009 in accordance with the Article-II of the Agreement on Prohibition of Attacks against Nuclear Installations and Facilities between Pakistan and India (1988). 19

20 44 Zardari, Gilani condemn, The News, 28 November 28, Let's stop blaming each other, suggests Pak FM, The Kashmir Times, Jammu, 28 November Zardari: If evidence points to any group in my country, I shall take the strictest action, The Hindu, 30 November