EU Sanctions against Russia

Transcription

1 EU Sanctions against Russia Dr Clara PORTELA Singapore Management University

2 Structure I. Sanctions i. Brief introduction ii. Evolution of sanctions research iii. Main findings and flaws II. EU Sanctions and Russia

3 I. Sanctions: Introduction Definition-operation-evolution of scholarship

4 Sanctions: A definition Definition: deliberate withdrawal of a benefit that would otherwise be granted by a (group of) sender(s) in response to objectionable behaviour (Portela 2010). The sanction shall cease when the objectionable act ceases. No agreed defintion, does not appear in UN Charta, normally euphemisms used.

5 Practice During the XXth century, mostly unilateral practice by the US. Multilateral use: advocated by Wilson following the creation of LoN UN: limited use during CW (2), rise after its end Regional organisations: on the rise, mostly by EU and AU, ECOWAS Shift towards TS in mid-1990s

6 Targeted SNS Comprehensive Sanctions = complete interruption of trade and finance btw sender and target - deligimitised by severe humanitarian impact= Iraq, Yugoslavia, Haiti - target = country - still used by US and others Targeted Sanctions = discriminate; should be free of humanitarian effects - canalise harms towards individuals/ elites responsible for wrongdoing - All practice by EU &UN since mid-1990s - Most common: travel ban, assets freeze, arms embargo - Also commodity embargo, flight ban, investment ban

7 How do sanctions work? Naive Theory Galtung (1967) - Sanctions > ec. disintegration > pol. disintegration - Naive theory quickly discredited: economy adapts Sanctions should work when threatened (Hovi et al ) imposition of sanctions = failure of coercive attempt - Can only work when target miscalculated: a/ did not believe the threat b/ underestimated impact and corrects calculation afterw ards

8 Evolution of sanctions research (I): I. Negative Determinants of Efficacy prior to 1985: inefficacious (Galtung, Doxey) II. More Optimistic: In search for the formula Hufbauer et al.: Economic Sanctions Reconsidered (1985) - Inaugurated strand > identifying variables Subsequent research adopted Hufbauer et al. dataset and evaluation method Based on naive theory

9 Evolution of sanctions research (I) Functions of SNS Coerce change in target s behaviour Regime change Preventing flow of arms, development of WMD weakening economic/ military potential of target supporting democratic opposition (bargaining chip) placating domestic audiences deterring similar behaviour by others (Miller 2014) Supporting allies identity-building; enhancing international profile Strand of research pointing to multiplicity of aims (Barber, Lindsay, Baldwin, Elliott) sanctions scholarship evaluates coercive impact only

10 Search for determinants of success Sanctions scholarship searching for determinants since 1980s inconclusive Fraught with methodological problems: a/ no consensus on how to define and measure success b/ establishing causality, especially in the face of concurrent policies = perennial

11 Establishing Causality Pape (1997) suggests 3 criteria: (1)the target state concedes to a significant part of the demands; (2) sanctions are threatened or applied before the target changes its behaviour; (3) no more-credible explanation exists for the target s change of behaviour.

12 Determinants Consensual: SNS work better against: - friends (Drezner 1999) - modest aims (Hufbauer et al. 2007) - Dem./ autocratic reg other than single-party (Wright/Escriba 2010) - unprotected by regional powers - wielded at-one-go rather than gradually (Hufbauer et al. 2007) - strategic commodities Debated: Multilateral vs. Unilateral: contradictory evidence:collective action problems greater legitimacy Trend = multilateral targeted vs. comprehensive: limited evidence Trend = selective (financial SNS) (Drezner 2011; Biersteker 2013) Carrots and sticks (O Sullivan/Haass 2000)

13 Flaws: Measurement before feasibility? 1/ Only evaluates target compliance with stated aims, but: - Fullfil multiple objectives; goals change; - goals may be hidden; - Compliance might not feature 2/ Other goals not considered measurable 3/ Attempts at measurement preceded discussion of feasibility of measurement (Jones and Portela 2014) Scholarship has not clarified how SNS affect targets + how they bring about the desired result i) Naive theory is not confirmed ii) Ancillary role: SNS complement/interact with other tools

14 II. EU Sanctions

15 Origins and evolution Two strands: a) Implementation of UN sanctions b) Autonomous practice since early 1980s Phase I: 1980 Maastricht: very limited practice; Phase II: Maastricht- 2010: - Narrowly targeted: arms embargoes + blacklists - Mostly HR + democracy, other objectives Phase III: change in late 2010s: Iran, Syria, CdI, Russia - Commodity embargoes + financial sanctions - entail ec. costs to EU members

16 EU sanctions practice Source: Guijarro and Portela in De Vries et al. (2014) 30 Evolution of CFSP sanctions ( ) Sanctions regimes in force

17 EU SNS Universe 1/ CFSP: Uzbekistan, Belarus, Transnistria, FRY 2/ art. 96 Cotonou suspensions (development aid + trade preferences): Togo, CAR, Comoros, Rep. Guinea, Fiji 3/ GSP trade preferences: Burma, Belarus (SL) 4/ Informal SNS: China, Cuba, Russia Combination of: CFSP and art.96: Zimbabwe, Guinea GSP and CFSP: Belarus, Burma - Decision-making processes differ (Portela 2010)

18 Committment to Targeted-ness - Principles on the use of sanctions (2004) - preceded by guidelines on implementati on (2003) - Purposes for which sanctions would be employed. - Commitment to use targeted sanctions (minimise effects on those not targeted)

19 Sanctions against Russia in the CFSP context - most severe sanctions against Russia: in the post-maastricht phase: - Two previous attempts linked to the Chechn ya wars in the 1990s: i) postponement of implementation of PCAii) re-direction of aid ii) grain embargo early 1980s a) Crimea + S. b) Russia

20 Rationales Sanctions - Maximise impact on Russia while minimising imp act on EU member states - Distribute costs among a number of MS (albeit not equally) Countersanctions - Promote domestic industries (issues history) - However: one of the few areas where EU can provide compensation (agriculture) - Desire to obstruct cohesion by affecting Southern European countries (?)

21 Continuity features - Generally, response to armed conflict on European territory elicited most severe re sponse (comparable to Kosovo sanctions) - Resort to the Commission + EEAS for the design of measures - Decision by the European Council instea d of the GAERC - Becoming more comprehensive again (Biersteker et al. 2013) [less problematic?]

22 Novelties Escalation pre-phases announced Emphasis on scalability support of conflict resolution talks however, lack of synchronisation btw. ceasefire agreements and sanctions rounds

23 Thanks!

24 Some References Biersteker, T., Eckert, S., Tourinho, M., Houdakova, Z. (2013) The Effectiveness of Targeted Sanctions, Graduate Institute:Geneva / Watson Institute: Providence Drezner, D. (1999) The Sanctions Paradox, New York: CUP Drezner, D. (2011) Sanctions sometimes smart, International Studies Review 13 Galtung, J. (1967) On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions, World Politics 19 Hovi, J., Huseby, R. and Sprinz, D. (2005) When do (Imposed) Economic Sanctions Work?, World Politics 5(7) Hufbauer, G., Schott J., Elliot, K. and Oegg, B. (2007) Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, Washington, DC Jones, L. and Portela, C. (2014) Evaluating the success of sanctions, Centre for the Study of International Security and Development, Queen Mary University Working Papers No.3 Miller, J. (2014) The secret success of non-proliferation sanctions, International Organisation 68(4) Portela, C. (2010) European Union Sanctions and Foreign Policy, London: Routledge O Sullivan, M. and Haass, R. (2000) Honey and Vinegar, Washington DC.: Brookings Vries, A. de, Portela, C. and Guijarro, B. (2014) Improving the Effectiveness of Sanctions: A checklist for the EU, CEPS: Brussels Wright, J. and Escriba, A. (2010) International sanctions and the survival of authoritarian rulers, International Studies Quarterly 54(2)