The African Union and the promotion of democracy and good political governance under the African Peer-Review Mechanism: 10 years on

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1 Africa Review ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: The African Union and the promotion of democracy and good political governance under the African Peer-Review Mechanism: 10 years on André Mbata Mangu To cite this article: André Mbata Mangu (2014) The African Union and the promotion of democracy and good political governance under the African Peer-Review Mechanism: 10 years on, Africa Review, 6:1, 59-72, DOI: / To link to this article: The Author(s). Published by Taylor & Francis. Published online: 03 Mar Submit your article to this journal Article views: 5310 View related articles View Crossmark data Citing articles: 1 View citing articles Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at Download by: [ ] Date: 26 December 2017, At: 04:35

2 Africa Review, 2014 Vol. 6, No. 1, 59 72, The African Union and the promotion of democracy and good political governance under the African Peer-Review Mechanism: 10 years on André Mbata Mangu* Department of Public, Constitutional & International Law, College of Law, University of South Africa, PO Box 392 UNISA 0003, South Africa (Received 26 November 2013; accepted 12 January 2014) In May 2013, the African Union (AU) commemorated both the 50th anniversary of the Organisation of African Unity and the 10th anniversary of the African Peer-Review Mechanism (APRM). Democracy and good political governance features prominently in the AU Constitutive Act and constitute the first thematic area under the APRM. The AU adopted several other instruments aimed at promoting democracy and good political governance among its member states. These include the New Partnership for Africa s Development (APRM) base document, its Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance which governs the APRM, the African Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, and the African Charter for Democracy, Elections and Governance. As Africa celebrates a decade of both the AU and the APRM, this article revisits democracy and good political governance from an African legal and political perspective. It also assesses AU Member States compliance with the APRM and their achievements on the road to democracy and good political governance. It finally looks at the challenges and prospects for democracy and good political governance on a continent that has suffered several decades of authoritarianism and mal governance. Keywords: Africa; African Union; African Peer-Review Mechanism; African renaissance; democracy; good political governance Introduction The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) played a crucial role in ending colonialism in Africa before its replacement with the African Union (AU). Unlike the OAU, the AU takes democracy and good political governance seriously (AU Constitutive Act 2000, Arts 3 & 4). In July 2001, African leaders gathered in Lusaka, Zambia, and endorsed the Strategic Policy Framework and a New Vision for the Revival and Development of Africa or the New African Initiative, which later transformed into the New Partnership for Africa s Development (NEPAD) (Mangu 2007, ). The Lusaka summit established the NEPAD Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSGIC), which met for the first time in Abuja, Nigeria, in October The AU held its inaugural meeting in Durban, South Africa, in July 2002, and adopted a Declaration on the Implementation of NEPAD that approved the NEPAD Progress Report and Initial Action Plan. It also adopted the NEPAD Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance (DDPECG), which underpins the work of the African * manguamb@unisa.ac.za 2014 The Author(s), published by Taylor and Francis This is an Open Access article. Non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly attributed, cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way, is permitted. The moral rights of the named author(s) have been asserted.

3 60 A.M. Mangu Peer-Review Mechanism (APRM) (Mangu 2007, 355), and encouraged its member states to accede to the APRM. On 9 March 2003, the HSGIC established the APRM as a voluntary self-monitoring mechanism for better governance in view of the implementation of NEPAD. The second summit of the NEPAD HSGIC also adopted the APRM Base Document and Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on 9 March The APRM was officially launched during the 9th summit of the HSGIC held in Kigali, Rwanda, from 13 to 14 February 2004 (Mangu 2005, , 2007, 356). The AU adopted several other instruments in order to promote democracy and good political governance. These instruments include the African Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (ACPCC) and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG). The year 2013 marked the 50th anniversary of the OAU/AU and the 10th anniversary of the establishment of the APRM. The commemoration of this joint anniversary provides African leaders, intellectuals, and anyone interested in democracy and good political governance in Africa with a golden opportunity to take stock and reflect on the road that the AU has gone to promote them under the APRM as well as on the challenges and prospects. This is exactly what this article purports to do. It first revisits the concepts of democracy and good political governance from an African perspective. It then focuses on African states compliance with the principles of the APRM and what they have achieved in terms of democracy and good political governance. It also reflects on the challenges and prospects for democracy and good political governance in Africa where people have suffered decades of authoritarianism and mal political governance since most countries acceded to independence in the 1960s. Democracy and democracy in Africa Democracy is undoubtedly the most discussed and contested notion of political theory (Hoffman 1988, 31). It is still highly contested in analytical and ideological discourse (Wiseman 1996, 7 8). Nwabueze (1973) pointed out that No word is more susceptible of a variety of tendentious interpretations than democracy (1). There is a widespread agreement that democracy is a good thing. The term democratic almost inevitably connotes praise, while undemocratic implies censure (Wiseman 1990, 4). Many governments tend to describe themselves as democratic. In some cases, the term has even been incorporated into the official name of the state although in most cases where this happened the states concerned appeared significantly undemocratic (Wiseman 1990, 4). Even authoritarian leaders have claimed to be democrats and proclaimed their faith in democracy (Mangu 2002, ). Democracy has existed throughout centuries and ages surrounded by all these paradoxes (Ronen 1986a, 1, 35; Mangu 2002, ). Defining it remains a challenge (Ronen 1986a, 1). Depending on the scope of democracy, two major conceptions of democracy have been identified, namely the minimalist and maximalist conceptions (Mangu 2002, 176, 2007, 358; Wiseman 1996, 7 14). Minimalist conceptions of democracy were informed by the two ideologies that dominated the contemporary world, namely liberalism or capitalism and socialism or communism. Democracy is defined as a specific political machinery of institutions, processes, and roles (Ronen 1986b, 200). The notion of institutional democracy is of the sort found in Robert Dahl s concept of polyarchy. According to Dahl, polyarchy in a political order is characterised by seven institutions, all of which must be present. These are elected officials, free and fair elections, inclusive suffrage, and right to run for office, freedom of expression, alternative information, and associational autonomy (Dahl 1971, 1989, ; Sorensen 1996, 42; Wiseman 1996, 8). Polyarchy is distinguished by two broad characteristics. Citizenship is extended to a relatively high proportion of

4 Africa Review 61 adults, and citizens are entitled to oppose and vote out the highest officials in government (Dahl 1989, ; Wiseman 1996, 8). According to Sorensen (1996, 42), Dahl s notion of polyarchy has three elements: competition for government power; political participation in the selection of leaders and policies; and civil and political rights (Sorensen 1996, 42). Sandbrook (1996) defined democracy as: a political system characterized by regular and free elections in which politicians organized into political parties compete to form the government, by the right of virtually all adult citizens to vote, and by guarantees of a range of familiar political and civil rights. ( ) In minimalist views, democracy is synonymous with competitive, multiparty democracy, and elections. It is representative democracy, also labelled as Western or liberal democracy. Marxist and socialist scholars were among the first to level criticism at the minimalist conceptions of democracy. Amin has argued that Western or liberal democracy is only a mask for bourgeois democracy. In his view, it has no social dimension. It is confined to the political domain and ignores the masses of the people. It privileges individual and political rights over collective and socio-economic rights and the rights of the minority (bourgeois) over those of the people. It would be regrettable to stop at Western democratic forms without taking into consideration the social transformations demanded by the anti-capitalist revolt of the periphery (Amin 1996, 61, 64 70). Glaser (1996) also lamented over Western democracy, which is irretrievably associated with individualism, formalism and reformism (270). As for Shivji (1991, , 1992, 2) he preferred a substantive or specifically a popular democracy to this liberal democracy that Ake regarded as an impoverished democracy (Ake 1996, 32) and Maurice Duverger considered a démocratie sans le peuple (democracy without people), a particracy and a plutocracy or a government of political parties and the haves, respectively (Duverger 1976). Whilst minimalist scholars define democracy as a process and a set of institutions and focus on political democracy emphasising individual and political rights, their maximalist counterparts rather focus on the substance and values of democracy, the most important being social equality. They stress collective and socio-economic rights. In their view, democracy is essentially socioeconomic, participative, popular, or social democracy. To liberal and bourgeois or elite-driven democracy, they oppose social, economic, and popular democracy or people-driven democracy (Amin 1996, 70 71; Glaser 1996, ). Maximalist definitions of democracy are in many ways more attractive than the minimalist ones. However, they too are not immune to criticism. Wiseman identified at least three sets of problems associated with these conceptions. First, values like economic equality, high participation levels, and gender equality should be seen as possible results of democracy rather than as part of its definition. Second, these conceptions are inherently imprecise on the extent to which these characteristics have to be realised. There is no agreement on how equality should be measured. Third, and probably most importantly, while maximalist definitions of democracy may be useful in outlining future goals, they are less useful when analysing the political systems of the real world, which inevitably fall far short of the ideal (Wiseman 1996, 9). Glaser also ended up criticising the maximalist conceptions for their emphasis on social equality, substantive democracy, and collective rights to the detriment of legal equality, formal democracy, political pluralism, individual rights, and civil liberties, which are yet indispensable to any political order claiming to be democratic and should not therefore be judged or jettisoned on the basis of instrumental criteria (Glaser 1996, ). Arguably, democracy as a system of government includes institutions, principles, individual, civil, and political rights championed by minimalist scholars and also values, collective, and

5 62 A.M. Mangu socio-economic rights defended by maximalists. Unfortunately, in minimalists views, democracy is very often and abusively reduced to two components, namely elections and multiparty system. Elections and democracy have become virtually synonymous in Western political thought and analysis (Bratton and Posner 1999, 378; Harbeson 1999, 39; Joseph 1999, 9 11). Yet, Bratton and Posner (1999) rightly held that formal procedures for elections did not create democracy and experience has shown in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, for instance, that elections can coexist with systematic abuses of human rights and disenfranchisement of large segments of the population (Bratton and Posner 1999, ). These elections, which have generally been rigged by the ruling party and its government, resulted into a cosmetic democracy (Ake 1996, 130, 137) or a choiceless democracy with people voting without choosing (Mkandawire 1999, 135). Barack Obama dismissed this type of democracy; he considered it an electocracy (Obama 2008, 375). On the other hand, democracy cannot be equated with a multiparty system. When it exists, multipartyism is not a guarantee for democracy. In many countries, multipartyism has contributed to the survival of authoritarian regimes instead of promoting democracy. In Africa, Asia, and Latin America, experience has also shown that authoritarianism may well and very often tie the knot with elections and integral multipartyism (Conac 1993, 492). If elections and multipartyism are not synonymous with or a guarantee for democracy, it is difficult, if not impossible, to consider that modern democracy can go without them (Bauer 1999, ; Bratton and Posner 1999, 379; Conac 1993, 492; Glaser 1996, ; Nzongola-Ntalaja 1997, 15). Based on the history of the continent, the aspirations of its people, and its prominence in both the political and the social science discourses in Africa, democracy is not an exclusive property of Western societies (Nzongola-Ntalaja 1997, 10, 13 14). Neither is it foreign nor a novelty in Africa (Wiseman 1990, 6). It also belongs to Africans and is feasible in Africa (Ronen 1986b, 202; Ake 1996, ). Governance and good political governance in Africa During the first two decades of Africa s independence, the bulk of the conventional Western political and even scientific discourse favoured dictatorships of development in African states. The developmental state had to be an authoritarian state. Many political scientists and legal scholars endorsed the idea of a developmental or modernising oligarchy (Gregor 1974, 3, 4; Sandbrook 1996, 140; Sklar 1996, 2; Sorensen 1996, 31 60). Towards the end of the 1970s, the ability of African authoritarian governments to deliver on their developmental objectives became evident. African people, Western governments, and international financial institutions had to take note of the failure of the dictatorships of development (Sklar 1996, 1 30). Then came the discourse on governance, which was considered a conditionality to benefit loans and other financial advantages from the Bretton Woods institutions (World Bank 1987). At the start, governance in the developmental discourse adopted by Western governments and international financial institutions funded by them referred to the management of a state s affairs or the practical exercise of power and authority to conduct public affairs (Hyden 1999, 184; Mangu 2002, 184). It is only in a paper read at the World Bank-sponsored conference on development economics in 1992 that Boeninger suggested that governance was the same as good government (Boeninger 1992, 24 38; Hyden 1999, 184; Mangu 2002, 48). Still, such governance did not necessarily mean democratic governance. By establishing an institute on democratic governance within the Council for the Development of Social and Economic Research in Africa (CODESRIA), African social sciences researchers made it clear that Africans were mainly interested in good and democratic governance and a

6 Africa Review 63 truly developmental state had a better chance under democracy than under authoritarianism (Mangu 2002, 196). The AU also formally endorsed this view. The AU and the promotion of democracy and good political governance According to its Constitutive Act, the objectives of the AU are inter alia to promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance (Article 3 (g)). On the other hand, one of the major principles of the AU is respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance (Article 4 (m)). There is clearly a close relationship between democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and good governance. Virtually all AU instruments aim at promoting democracy and good governance. These include all AU human rights instruments, the ACPCC, the ACDEG, the NEPAD, and APRM documents. The APRM and the promotion of democracy and good political governance The APRM places a high premium on democracy and good political governance, which is its first thematic area, the three others being economic governance and management, corporate governance, and socio-economic development. Mandate, purpose, and leadership of the APRM The mandate of APRM is to ensure that the policies and practices of participating states conform to the agreed political, economic, and corporate governance values, codes, and standards. Its primary purpose is to encourage and build responsible leadership through a self-assessment process and constructive peer-dialogue, to foster the adoption of policies, standards, and practices that lead to political stability, high economic growth, sustainable development and accelerated sub-regional and continental economic integration through sharing of experiences, and the reinforcement of successful and best practices, including deficiencies and assessing the capacity-building needs of participating countries. The APRM is under the leadership of the Committee of Participating Heads of State and Government (APR Forum). The overall responsibility of the APRM falls on the Panel of Eminent Persons (APR Panel) who should be recognised and competent experts in one of the four APRM thematic areas. They should demonstrate a commitment to the ideal of pan-africanism and are appointed by the APR Forum. They lead the Country Review Teams (APR Teams) and one of them is appointed by the APR Forum as the chairperson of the Panel for a maximum period of five years. The APR Panel ensures the integrity of the review. It is assisted by a secretariat (APR Secretariat), which should be competent and technically capable to undertake the analytical work that underpins the peer review. APR teams report to the APR Panel, which also report to the APR Forum (Heyns and Killander 2006, ). Review and stages of the APRM The APRM entails periodic reviews of the policies and practices of participating states to ascertain progress made towards achieving mutually agreed goals and compliance with agreed political, economic, and corporate governance values, codes, and standards as outlined in the DDPECG. Every review must be technically competent, credible, and free of political manipulation. There are four types of reviews under the APRM. The first country review, which is the base review, is carried out within 18 months of a country becoming a member of the APRM. The second is a periodic review, which takes place every two to four years.

7 64 A.M. Mangu The third type of reviews is a review that can be solicited by a member country for its own reasons. The fourth type consists of reviews that can be instituted by the APR Forum in a spirit of helpfulness to the government of a participating country where there are signs of impending political or economic crisis. APRM as a process also consists of five stages. Stage one is the preparatory phase both at the level of the APRM Secretariat and at the national level. It involves a study of the political, economic, and corporate governance and development environment in the country to be reviewed. It is based on up-to-date background documentation prepared by the APRM Secretariat and material provided by national, sub-regional, regional, and international institutions. A questionnaire is forwarded by the APR Secretariat to the country to be reviewed. This country establishes a Focal Point (a member of the Cabinet) and constitutes an independent national governing council (NGC) or a national commission consisting of all the stakeholders, to conduct the self-assessment exercise on the basis of the questionnaire and with the assistance, if necessary, of the APR Secretariat and/or relevant partner institutions. A country support mission is sent to assist in the preparation of the country self-assessment report (CSAR) and a preliminary programme of action (POA). Both the CSAR and POA are submitted to the APR Secretariat. During the same time, the APRM Secretariat develops a country background document and the Country Issues Paper (CIP) on the four thematic areas and cross-cutting themes to guide the country review process. The CIP identifies areas that require further information, as well as major shortcomings and deficiencies and areas for capacity-building for further investigation by the Country Review Mission (CRM). At this stage, the memorandum of agreement (MOU) for technical assessment and the country review visit is signed between the government of the participating country and the APR Team led by a member of the APR Panel. This brings the first stage to an end. Stage two is the review team visit or CRM to the participating country to carry out the widest possible range of consultations with the government, officials, political parties, parliamentarians, and representatives of civil society organisations, including the media, academia, trade unions, business, and professional bodies. Stage three is the drafting of the country review report (CRR) on the basis of the briefing material prepared by the APR Secretariat and the information gathered in stage two. The draft CRR is first discussed with the government to allow it to react to the findings and to put forward its own views on how the identified shortcomings can be addressed. The response or reaction of the government is appended to the CRR. The government should indicate whether it is willing to take the necessary actions and measures to put right any identified shortcomings, what resources are needed, and how long the process of rectification can take. At this stage, the country finalises its POA, taking into account the conclusions of the draft report. Stage four begins with the submission of the final CRR, plus the final POA to the APR Forum through the APR Secretariat and the Panel. It ends with the consideration and adoption of the final report, including their decisions in this regard. If there is no political will from the reviewed country to rectify the identified shortcomings, the APR Forum will do everything practicable to engage reluctant governments in constructive dialogue, offering, in the process, technical and other appropriate assistance. If dialogue proves useless, they may wish to put the government on notice of their intention to proceed with appropriate measures by a given date. Such measures are to be utilised only as a last resort. The anticipated duration of each stage of peer review, from the beginning of stage one to the end of stage four, is six months. Stage five is the final stage of the APRM. It is the formal; and public tabling of the report in key regional and sub-regional structures such as the Pan-African Parliament, the African Commission, the Peace and Security Council, and the Economic, Social and Cultural Council of the AU. This should happen within six months after the report was considered by the APR Forum (Heyns and Killander 2006, ).

8 Africa Review 65 Accession and funding of the APRM Accession to the APRM is subject to the signing of the MOU and the depositing of the signed document at the NEPAD Secretariat. Participation in the APRM process, which is notified to the Chairperson of the NEPAD HSGIC, entails an understanding to be subject to periodic peer review, as well as to facilitate such review, and be guided by agreed parameters for good political, economic, and corporate governance. The governments of the AU member states who are participating in the APRM are themselves responsible for the funding of the review of their countries (Heyns and Killander 2006, 298, 301). Achievements of AU member states participating in the APRM in the area of democracy and good political governance As early as January 2013, 32 AU member states had accessed to the APRM after signing its MOU. These countries include Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, and Zambia. Accordingly, out of the 54 AU member states, 22 had shown little interest in the mechanism. This is somehow regrettable from African leaders who committed to democracy and good political governance by adopting the AU Constitutive Act. Among the 32 AU member states that signed the MOU, 18 (almost a third of all AU member states) went through the first, original or base review, which was to be carried out within 18 months of becoming members of the APRM. No single AU member state participating in the APRM had solicited a special review. Nor had the APR Forum instituted a review in a spirit of helpfulness to the government of a participating country where there are signs of impending political or economic crisis despite many signs of impending political crisis existing in countries such as Egypt (before and after the Arab Spring ), Kenya (before the 1998 elections), Mali, Niger, or Sudan, to name but a few. Any assessment of the achievements of the APRM in the area of democracy and good political governance should be based on an investigation into participating states compliance with the codes and standards set in the DDPECG and with the NEPAD objectives. Compliance with APRM standards and codes Many AU member states participating in the APRM never signed a number of key regional standards and codes such as the ACDEG and the ACPCC. In some other cases, they signed but did not ratify or they took long to do it. Even after they signed and ratified, they still failed to implement them fully. Non-respect for the constitution and the rule of law, mal governance, and corruption which are rampant across the continent testify to this. As for the protection of human rights, which is critical to democracy and good political governance, for instance, it is worth stressing that although all AU member states signed and ratified the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (ACHPR) most of them have failed to report on the progress made in its implementation to its enforcement mechanism, namely the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights. Most countries that ratified the ACHPR and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC) failed to report to the African Commission and to the Committee on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. Moreover, an important instrument such as the Protocol to the ACHPR establishing an African Court on Human and Peoples Rights requires States Parties to make the declaration provided by Article

9 66 A.M. Mangu 34(6) to give their citizens and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) locus standi or access to the Court. Many African States Parties have failed to make this declaration and remain reluctant to do so, denying their citizens and NGOs the right to access the African Court. Those who expected more declarations under the APRM were disappointed in as much as they were with AU member states compliance with the NEPAD objectives. Compliance with the NEPAD objectives The APRM is also based on participating states compliance with the NEPAD nine objectives in the area of democracy and good political governance (Heyns and Killander 2006, 292, ). According to several APRM CRRs, most countries have failed to comply (APRM 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009a, 2009b, 2010a, 2010b, 2012, 2013; MAEP2008, 2009a, 2009b). Prevention and reduction of intra- and interstate conflicts Countries participating in the APRM have been involved in the reduction of intra- and interstate conflicts in Africa, especially in the Great Lakes Region, Central, and Western Africa. This involvement resulted in the prevention and the reduction of these conflicts despite their persistence in countries such as Burundi, Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Egypt, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Some AU member states participating in the APRM are also accused of fuelling internal conflicts in neighbouring countries (Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda in the DRC, Sudan in South Sudan and Chad, and Chad in CAR). Constitutional democracy, including periodic political competition and opportunity for choice, the rule of law, citizens rights, and the supremacy of the constitution Constitutions and human rights are regularly violated. Most countries are unable to fund their own elections and elections are generally rigged by the ruling parties, which are reluctant to relinquish power and concede defeat to the opposition. Elections, which were expected to contribute to the promotion and consolidation of democracy and peace, have unfortunately failed to do so and become a major problem of governance in Africa. Some leaders do not hesitate to manipulate the constitutions of their countries in order to get rid of any limitation on their terms of office. As a result, the law of the rulers still prevails over the rule of law and few countries would qualify as fully fledged constitutional democracies despite the fact of having adopted a supreme constitution, accessed to the ACDEG, and regularly going to the polls. As Africa got ready to commemorate the golden jubilee of the OAU/AU and the 10th anniversary of the APRM, there were cases of unconstitutional change of government in Egypt, Libya, Mali, and CAR and attempts of coups d Etat followed by repression and human rights abuses in countries such as Mauritania and Chad. In May 2013, there was unconstitutional change of government in Egypt and two other countries participating in the APRM, namely Zimbabwe and Madagascar, were preparing for elections amid allegations of corruption, human rights abuses, and violations of the Constitution amid the rule of law. Promotion and protection of economic, social, cultural, civil, and political rights The overwhelming majority of Africans do not enjoy their human rights. Some progress has been made with regard to cultural, civil, and political rights. The situation of economic and social rights is even worse. Accordingly, Africa has still a long way to go in promoting economic, social,

10 Africa Review 67 cultural, civil, and political rights. The establishment of the APRM has not brought human rights abuses to an end. Upholding the separation of powers, including the protection of an independent judiciary and an effective legislature In many countries, the powers are concentrated in the hands of the executive and the ruling party and there is no effective separation of powers despite its entrenchment in the constitution. The judiciary is also corrupt and its independence still remains a dead letter across the continent. On the other hand, Parliaments generally rubber-stamp the decisions made by the ruling party, especially by its leader. In no country has Parliament passed a motion of no confidence in the president or the cabinet and there is no effective legislature in most AU member states, including those participating in the APRM. Ensuring accountable, efficient, and public office-holders and civil servants, and promoting the development and participation of civil society and the media Despite progress made in some countries, Africa continues to suffer from bad governance and mal administration. Many public office-holders and civil servants are corrupt, inefficient, and unaccountable. Several African governments have failed to promote the development and participation of civil society and independent media. Fighting corruption in the public sphere Corruption was identified in all APRM CRRs as one of the cross-cutting issues of governance in Africa. It remains rampant and endemic not only in the public service but also in the private sector as no sector is immune to corruption. The AU and the APRM have done little to reduce the scourge of corruption despite the adoption of the ACPCC as few states have failed to comply with this convention. Promotion and protection of the rights of women The number of women in political institutions has tremendously increased in Africa, especially in countries such as Rwanda, South Africa, Angola, and Uganda. There are two female heads of state and government in African countries participating in the APRM, namely President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf of Liberia and President Banda of Joyce Malawi. Many AU member states adopted the principle of parity between men and women in the exercise of political responsibilities. However, its enforcement remains a challenge. Women remain the principal victims of all forms of discrimination and violence despite the fact that many AU member states signed and ratified several UN and OAU/AU instruments aimed at protecting their rights. Protection and promotion of the rights of children AU member states signed and ratified several instruments to protect the rights of children. These instruments include the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict, the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, the ACHPR, the African Youth Charter, and the ACRWC. However,

11 68 A.M. Mangu despite the adoption of these human rights instruments, the violations of the rights of children continue unabated across the continent. Promotion and protection of the rights of vulnerable groups, including displaced persons and refugees Apart from women and children, vulnerable groups also include people with disabilities, displaced persons, migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers. The members of vulnerable groups are entitled to rights enshrined in instruments such as the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, the Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons, the ACHPR, and the OAU Refugee Convention. Unfortunately, their rights are also violated in many African countries. On balance, the contribution of the AU and the APRM to democracy and good political governance has been a mixed one. AU member states adopted several instruments aimed at promoting democracy and good political governance. They also made some progress with regard to the NEPAD nine objectives. However, full compliance remains a huge challenge as all the core standards and codes have not been adhered to and the NEPAD nine objectives have not been achieved. Challenges and prospects for democracy and good political governance under the APRM The APRM is confronted with many problems or challenges with regard to the promotion of democracy and good political governance in participating member states. Political will and commitment to the APRM As stressed earlier, the APRM is a voluntary mechanism. Decisions to sign the APRM MOU, subject an AU member state to peer review or solicit a review, establish a Focal Point, constitute an independent NGC, invite a CRM, sign an MOU with the APR Team for technical assessment and the country review visit, prepare and implement a POA, and to regularly and timely report to the APR Panel and Forum are made by the government under the leadership of the Head of State and Government of the concerned AU member state. A political will and commitment to the APRM is therefore required. Moreover, the APRM is based on a participating state s compliance with international and regional standards and codes as well as with the NEPAD nine objectives. Accordingly, as for the AU itself, the success of the APRM is mainly dependent on the political will and commitment of African Heads of State and Government, particularly those who participate in the HSGIC. The fact that a number of AU member states have not adhered to the APRM, that they have not signed and ratified some key standards and codes or have failed to comply with the NEPAD objectives several years after they acceded to the APRM suggests that that a strong political will or commitment to democracy is still lacking. Inclusiveness, popularisation, and public ownership of the APRM One of the major shortcomings of the APRM lies in the fact that it is government- or state-centred and driven from its inception to its conclusion. The success of the APRM also depends on its inclusiveness, its popularisation, and its public ownership. The APRM should rather become a people s affair and all the stakeholders, including the government, parliamentarians, civil servants, and civil society organisations should be entitled and encouraged to participate in the different stages of the process.

12 Africa Review 69 Unfortunately, the overwhelming majority of the people of the participating countries are not well-informed about the APRM and they even ignore that their countries acceded to the mechanism. Few participating countries have conducted public campaigns to popularise the APRM. No country has even translated the APRM instruments in national languages that the people speak and understand (Mangu 2007, 382). The APRM should be directed at the people who are the first to be concerned with democracy, good political, economic, and corporate governance and not the government, the community of donors, foreign investors, or international financial institutions. Nor should it be the preserve of a few in the government. The different branches of government, civil society, and the people should be involved in the NGC, the discussion of the CRR and the NPOA as well as in the regular reporting to the APR Panel and Forum on the progress made in the implementation of the NPOA. The people should be brought in and ultimately take the ownership of the APRM (Mangu 2007, 382). Impartiality of the APR forum and the toothless-character of the APRM Over the past 10 years of the APRM, African leaders have been eloquently silent and supportive of colleagues behaving badly in terms of democracy, good governance, and human rights or those clinging to power through vote-rigging (Mangu 2007, 384). The club mentality that characterised the OAU survives under the AU. The communiqués issued after the different summits of the APRM HSGIC always contain long paragraphs congratulating the leaders of the reviewed countries for a job well done without any regard to the state of democracy and political governance in these countries. African leaders would keep on congratulating one another for the good quality of their governance until some of their colleagues have been overthrown or until they are under duress to distance themselves from them by the leaders of the most powerful nations. One of the most serious problems with the APRM also lies in the fact that it has no teeth. There are no effective sanctions for lack of democracy and good political governance (Mangu 2007, 384). And yet, democracy and good political governance cannot prosper without any possibility of sanctions for those leaders who have become famous for the violations of the rule of law and human rights in their countries. Independence of the members of the APR teams and panel Cabinets, which already dominate the self-assessment process, are tempted to manipulate the work and to undermine the independence of the members of the APR teams to ensure that their views are endorsed by the APRM Secretariat and APR teams in their final reports. APR teams sometimes find themselves under pressure to make concessions in their reports despite the fact that the CSARs might have concluded on bad political governance through concentration of powers, non-respect for the constitution, violations of human rights, absence of the rule of law, corruption, and electoral frauds or manipulations (Mangu 2007, 383). It would be wrong for African leaders to publicly recognise the competence and independence of the members of the APR teams and still expect them to behave like their advocates or spin doctors. Unfortunately, some members of the APR teams were recused or declared persona no grata and the members of the APR Panel, especially the chairperson, are likely to find themselves jobless if they are seen to be too independent and critical about the quality of democracy and good political governance in some influential AU member states participating in the APRM. On the other hand, nobody will ever be appointed on the APR Panel if he or she does not enjoy confidence of his or her head of state and other colleagues in the HSGIC. So far, the members of the APR teams have struggled to maintain their independence vis-à-vis the countries under

13 70 A.M. Mangu review. However, independence is regularly under siege and may be lost. It is therefore critically important to keep on struggling to preserve it. Cabinet s stranglehold of the APRM Governments tend to control the APRM from the first to the final stage and to use the NGC to showcase what they consider and want the rest of the world to consider their democratic and good governance credentials in order to get the much needed external financial resources (Mangu 2007, 382). This is not surprising. The exercise is both technical but also political. However, cabinet s stranglehold on the APRM is also a challenge to its success. Funding of the APRM The APRM is costly. Its funding is a critical issue that should be addressed seriously as more and more states accede to the mechanism and several countries have to be reviewed on an annual basis. The APRM intended to preserve the independence of African States and avoid foreign assessment and diktats in the area of governance. To remain an African-driven and owned mechanism, African governments should be able to fund the APRM from their own national budgets. Democracy and good political governance, which are to be promoted by the AU under the APRM, should be primarily home-grown and funded. Africans should understand that they cannot demand democracy and good political governance, which is in their own interest, and yet rely on others to pay for it (Mangu 2007, 384). Experience has shown that as for independence, no genuine democracy will ever consolidate if it is externally funded since those who feed you and finance your economies generally also end up becoming the masters of your destiny. Although external contributions should be solicited and welcomed given the historical responsibility of both the West and the East for African miseries and woes, African countries should be and remain the main funders of the APRM and their contributions should be substantial for them to be taken seriously. The annual contribution of $USD 100,000 is too little and even ridiculous. This contribution should be increased threefold, fourfold, or even fivefold while new and alternative sources of funding should be found at the national and regional levels. When resources are so abundant to finance authoritarianism, human rights abuse, and voterigging in many African countries, the underfunding of the APRM can only be justified by lack of political will or commitment. The prospects for democracy and good political governance have improved since the AU superseded the OAU and the APRM was established. They will definitely improve further if African people take its ownership and African leaders resolve to take up the challenges to the APRM and strengthen their commitment to this mechanism, which is critical for an African renaissance. Conclusion According to Pliny the Elder, there is always something new coming out of Africa Ex Africa semper aliquid novi. The APRM is one of those rare and good things or news which has come out of Africa since the continent entered the twenty-first century which some of its leaders vowed to make an African century when they established the AU and launched the APRM. African renaissance is not possible without respect for democracy and good political governance that feature prominently in the AU and NEPAD instruments and constitute the first APRM

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