Social Capital, Islam, and the Arab Spring in the Middle East

Transcription

1 Journal of Civil Society, 2013 Vol. 9, No. 3, , Social Capital, Islam, and the Arab Spring in the Middle East DILSHOD ACHILOV Department of Political Science, East Tennessee State University, Johnson City, TN, USA ABSTRACT To what extent do participatory civil society dynamics, rooted in self-assertive social capital, help explain the Arab Spring uprisings in 2011? How do pro-democratic Arab attitudes matter in promoting elite-challenging collective actions? Does Islam support or hinder elitechallenging, self-assertive social capital? To answer these questions, this study systematically examines the variation in self-assertive (emancipative) social capital in Egypt and Jordan from a comparative perspective. By using emancipative social capital theory, this article embarks on an individual-level quantitative analysis derived from the World Values Survey database to explore the empirical nexus between pro-democratic attitudes, elite-challenging actions, and Islamic values in order to partly explain comparatively high-intensive and persistent uprisings in Egypt and relatively low-intensive and less persistent demonstrations in Jordan. The findings offer critical insights in understanding the social capital dimension of the Arab Spring uprisings in 2011 and contribute new clues about empirical interactions between Islamic resurgence and civil society dynamics in the Muslim world. KEY WORDS: Arab Spring, Islam, social capital, collective action, Egypt, Jordan, Middle East Introduction The Arab uprisings of 2011, known as the Arab Spring, have dramatically changed the social and political landscape of the Middle East and North Africa. The protests were sparked by the self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi in Tunisia, which led to the ousting of the Tunisian President, Zinel Abidine Ben Ali, on 14 January On 11 February 2011, the world watched how Egypt s long-term dictator Hosni Mubarak fell from power. Indeed, Mubarak s fall was a critical juncture in the Arab uprising that substantially empowered ordinary citizens to boldly continue pressuring other incumbent dictators in the region. In this way, the Arab Spring challenged the predominant assumption of Arab exceptionalism in the democratization literature (Stepan & Robertson, 2004) and set a new stage for studying the rapidly evolving patterns of Middle East politics. Correspondence Address: Dilshod Achilov, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, East Tennessee State University, 100 CR Drive, Johnson City, TN 37614, USA. achilov@etsu.edu # 2013 Taylor & Francis

2 Social capital, Islam and the Arab Spring in the Middle East 269 While some Arab nations celebrated seminal victories that toppled long-term autocratic regimes such as in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, others only saw a limited change (e.g. Morocco, Algeria, and Jordan). In other words, while some Arab states achieved comparatively high political gains (e.g. regime changes) from mass demonstrations, some states only attained limited gains (e.g. limited constitutional reforms) from mass protests against incumbent authoritarian leaders. One of the defining features of the Arab uprising was the elite-challenging actions of people that swept through the entire region. Even though collective actions by specific actors are at the heart of revolutionary struggles, they are often overlooked in empirical research to explain rare, but major, social, and political shifts (Parsa, 2000, p. 5). Collective action is a distinct and perhaps most influential form of political participation. In this respect, social capital is often cited to have a dominant influence on political participation (Krishna, 2002). For instance, Putnam writes that politics without social capital is politics at a distance (Putnam, 2000, p. 341). Whether or not citizens are actively involved in politics or whether they are alienated and cynical nonparticipants, depends entirely, in this view, on the available level of social capital (Krishna, 2002, p. 439). Social capital is not only important for providing social bonding (which connects individuals to pursue collective goals), but it is also regarded as an instrumental tool to direct communities towards active (or perhaps, more pro-active) participation in democracy building (Krishna, 2002; Putnam, 1995). Regardless of how the social capital has been defined or measured in the literature, scholars concur that social capital has emerged as an inseparable component of democratization (Fukuyama, 2001). In measuring people s involvement and active participation in society, virtually all previous empirical studies have focused on memberships in voluntary associations or interpersonal trust as key defining features of social capital. Challenging this tradition for the first time, Welzel, Inglehart and Deutsch (2005) have convincingly demonstrated that elite-challenging actions or emancipative social capital is a distinct type of social capital that is linked with greater civic benefits compared to a more generic concept of social capital. 1 They show that self-expression values nurture emancipative social capital, which in turn promotes elitechallenging actions (Welzel, Inglehart & Deutsch, 2005). In this study, by building on the previous work of Welzel, Inglehart and Deutsch s (2005) emancipative social capital theory, I examine the extent to which the dynamics of self-assertive publics, or emancipative social capital, may explain the degree of commitment, persistence and associated payoff (political gains) in the wake of the protests in Egypt and Jordan from a comparative perspective. The following three questions are examined: To what extent does self-assertive social capital help explain the Arab Spring uprisings in 2011? How do pro-democratic Arab attitudes matter in promoting elite-challenging collective actions? Does Islam support elite-challenging, self-assertive social capital? To tackle these questions, this study embarks on a quantitative analysis of emancipative social capital measured by elite-challenging actions derived from the World Values Survey (WVS). Conceptual Framework: Emancipative Social Capital The studies of social capital, in its various forms, have attracted a great deal of empirical scrutiny in the social sciences (Bourdieu, 1986; Coleman, 1988, 1990; Lin, 2001; Putnam, 2002; Putnam, Leonardi & Nanetti, 1993). Scholars have extensively explored the

3 270 D. Achilov variation of social capital to explain a myriad of social and political puzzles (Casanova, 2001; Fukuyama, 2001; Radnitz, Wheatley & Zurcher, 2009). As it is one of the widely studied concepts in democratization literature (Ciftci, 2010; Putnam, 2002; Putnam, Leonardi & Nanetti, 1993), social capital largely still remains a slippery concept. As Onyx and Bullen (2000) point out, it is slippery because it has been poorly defined, important because it refers to the basic raw material of civil society (p. 24). In general terms, social capital s popularity in empirical research is often linked to its insightful explanatory power in answering the most basic and universal question in social and political research: what keeps societies together and leads individuals to act for collective goals (Welzel, Inglehart & Deutsch, 2005, p. 122). There are numerous definitions of social capital in the literature that capture different dimensions of social relations (e.g. trust, networking, bonding, bridging, collective action, and more). Generally, in defining social capital, a heavy emphasis has been placed on why and how social relations matter and on structures in which individuals work together for a common purpose. 2 Although many comparative studies have operationalized social capital in terms of memberships in voluntary organizations, such as churches, educational organizations, environmental groups, professional organizations, or other civil associations (Diamond, 1994; Putnam, 1995; Putnam, Leonardi & Nanetti, 1993), some have focused on civic attitudes, such as interpersonal trust, as key indicators of social capital (Ciftci, 2010; Norris, 2002). Unpacking this concept, Onyx and Bullen (2000) distinguish five key elements of social capital derived from intensive literature review: community participation, reciprocity, shared values, trust, and social agency. Through hierarchical factor analysis, they identify three specific factors that appear to strongly define social capital: participation in a network/community, agency, and trust (Onyx & Bullen, 2000). Collective agency is also theorized as an important driving social force in social capital research (Leonard, 1997). In Putnam s terms, for instance, social capital is referred to as features of social organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit (Putnam, 1995, p. 67). Similarly, hightrust social relations tend to promote mutual learning experiences as a result of thicker and richer information flows (Cooke & Morgan, 2000, p. 31), and reinforce collective actions (van Staveren & Knorringa, 2007). It is widely held that social capital cannot be generated by individuals acting only by themselves in isolation from others (Leonard & Onyx, 2003). The development of social capital requires active engagement of citizens working collectively within a participative community (Leonard & Onyx, 2003). For instance, Leonard (1997) argues that social capital should be analysed through a model of a complex and multiplex interrelationship between agency and social connections. On the same grounds, drawing from collective efficacy theory, Williams and Guerra (2011) independently note the importance of collective efficacy and posit that: Collective efficacy rests on the assumption that social networks are a necessary starting point, but it adds the action-oriented component of mutual trust and support as a required precursor for collective mobilization for the common good. To this extent, collective efficacy has an agentic quality missing from conventional thinking about social capital. (p. 128)

4 Social capital, Islam and the Arab Spring in the Middle East 271 Social capital is also defined as the aggregate of resources that are connected to the ownership of a membership within a group or a network that provides its members with collectively owned capital (Bourdieu, 1986). Said differently, social capital is the result of individuals intentionally building their networks and social relations for mutual benefit (Portes, 2000). I draw from Welzel, Inglehart and Deutsch s (2005) formulation of emancipative social capital, which highlight that these networks and social relations, when activated, may empower people to pursue elite-challenging collective actions. The focus of this study is on emancipative social capital an important dimension of agentic social capital, which should not be understood in exclusive terms. In other words, a network or community may have a certain amount of social capital that it uses for a variety of purposes one of which can be emancipative political actions. To define emancipative (or self-assertive) social capital, I rely on Welzel, Inglehart and Deutsch s (2005) definition of citizens elitechallenging actions as a key determinant of self-assertive (emancipative) social capital that produces collective actions through which individuals pursue their goals in society. Until now, an empirical operationalization of social capital was predominantly based on institutional memberships. To challenge this conception, Welzel, Inglehart and Deutsch (2005) argue that: The emphasis placed on membership in voluntary associations shows a fixation on institutionalized forms of community involvement. Participation in non-institutionalized forms of community involvement, such as boycotts, strikes, demonstrations and petitions, plays a minor role. To be sure, non-institutionalized actions are distinct from institutionalized ones by their challenging nature, as they confront decision-makers with demands from below. But their elite-challenging thrust does not disqualify non-institutionalized actions as a form of community involvement. They are a form of community involvement. Yet, studies to date have been reluctant in examining elite-challenging actions as a manifestation of social capital. (p. 122) One important contribution that Welzel, Inglehart and Deutsch (2005) make to social capital literature, going beyond a fixed institutional conceptualization, is the introduction of a previously neglected empirical operationalization of self-assertive, emancipative social capital, measured by individual elite-challenging actions. Following in the footsteps of Welzel, Inglehart and Deutsch (2005), I conceptualize social capital within the framework of emancipative social capital theory. 3 Analysing Protests in Egypt and Jordan Analysing the Guardian s daily news publications of the Arab Spring events in Egypt and Jordan (Table 1), we can observe that Egyptians staged 22 major mass elite-challenging demonstrations in Tahrir Square from 7 December 2010 to 11 February The level of commitment and persistence of Egyptian protests were remarkably high, which managed to endure the hurdles of Mubarak s security forces and pro-regime provocateurs in Tahrir Square. According to the Guardian, there were 15 confirmed cases of civilian deaths from the time the uprisings erupted in Cairo until the day Mubarak fell from power (Table 1). The bloodiest day was 17 December, when nine civilians died after

5 272 D. Achilov Table 1. Frequency of major elite-challenging protests in Egypt and Jordan in 2011 Egypt Jordan Date range Protests Civilian deaths Protests Civilian deaths 1 December February 2011 a February May June December Total Note: a Mubarak s fall. Source: Only major demonstrations as defined and coded by the Guardian newspaper (The Arab Spring 2011 timeline) (URL: clashing with Egyptian security forces. To appease the demonstrators, Mubarak appointed his intelligence chief as a first-ever Vice President on 25 January and formed a new government. The protesters were unmoved. On 1 February, Mubarak announced that he would step down and pave a way for a new leader in September. This also did not satisfy the crowds of thousands who kept chanting the slogan Go away now!. 4 February witnessed the biggest demonstration yet, called the Day of Departure, with hundreds of thousands gathered in Tahrir Square demanding freedom and calling on Hosni Mubarak to step down immediately. 5 Mubarak s concessions did not help stop the uprisings; rather, the level of commitment and persistence of protesters only intensified. It was not until the 22nd demonstration on 11 February that the Egyptians finally celebrated the departure of the dictator who ruled Egypt for more than 30 years. Following the Tunisian and Egyptian massive uprisings, Jordanian oppositional forces seized the moment to take their grievances to the streets of Amman. The ruling monarch of Jordan, King Abdullah II, quickly realized the gravity of a growing tsunami of Arab uprisings in the region, which could soon claim his throne as well. Comparatively, however, Jordanian demonstrations were fewer, calmer, and more stable. There was only one major mass elite-challenging demonstration from 1 December 2010 to 11 February From the time of Mubarak s fall through the end of 31 May, Jordanians staged three mass demonstrations. The major Jordanian uprising against the regime of King Abdullah II took place on Friday, 25 February, two weeks after Mubarak s departure. 6 This was the bloodiest day of the Jordanian uprising. Thereafter, there were five demonstrations; one elite-challenging mass protest occurring each month in March, April, June, October, and November. In sum, only seven major Jordanian demonstrations were held in 2011 (Table 1). Remarkably perhaps, the Jordanian King has managed to stay in power and has avoided a possible regime collapse that happened in other Arab states by granting limited concessions in order to appease the public. He quickly discharged government ministers, extended popular financial subsidies, offered new economic incentives, and promised major political reforms. Like other Arab leaders, he employed his security forces to monitor all demonstrations and track protesters. These tactics largely proved effective in suppressing and containing the protests at manageable levels. When King Abdullah II promised new democratic reforms in June, the protesters generally appeared pleased and seemingly agreed to wait for the monarch to deliver his promises. Unlike Egyptian protesters, Jordanians did not insist on

6 Social capital, Islam and the Arab Spring in the Middle East 273 demanding immediate results; rather, the majority seemed content with this anticipation for greater democratic reforms to be delivered in the near future. The level of commitment, persistence, and demand for immediate change was substantially lower in Jordan and distinctly incomparable to that of the Egyptian uprisings. Emancipative Social Capital, Islam, and Political Change Social revolutions are commonly defined as rapid, fundamental, basic transformations of society s state and class structures driven by class-based uprisings from below (Skocpol, 1979). This is a rather narrow and strict definition. Even though it is premature to predict the long-term consequences of the 2011 Egyptian uprisings, the majority of analysts and scholars define Egypt s case as a social revolution, which led to major societal transformations from below. Jordan, however, would not qualify to fit this definition. Leading explanations by several influential works on social revolutions have used structural analyses that focus on variables such as economy, class structures, international conditions, and nature of the state (Goldstone, 1991; Moore, 1966; Skocpol, 1979). While structural models have made major advances in explaining the causes of revolutions that set the stage for mass mobilizations, they fail to explain the complexity of social revolutions in developing countries and particularly come up short in determining the revolutionary process or outcome (Parsa, 2000, p. 7). In the case of both Egypt and Jordan, the uprisings did not originate entirely from structural class-based antagonism; rather, multiple classes were united to shake the long-enduring autocratic status quo. Yet, it is important to highlight that mainly lower and middle classes were united against the ruling elite in Tahrir Square in Egypt. Similar socio-economic classes, though largely dominated by a lower class, made up the majority of protesters in Jordan. Although class-based explanations should not be dismissed entirely, the models that predominantly use class-based conflicts are insufficient to fully explain the complex extent of the Arab uprising (Parsa, 2000). The critics of structural models, on the other hand, have argued that structural explanations fail to account for the role of ideology, which is central to understanding various social mobilizations (Sewell, 1985; Zald, 2000). The theorists who viewed ideology at the forefront of social revolutions claimed that ideas play powerful roles in mass mobilizations. For instance, Skocpol (1982) writes that Shi a teachings of martyrdom inspired religiously devout Iranians to oppose the Shah Pahlavi of Iran at all costs. At first, the ideological theory may resonate with the Arab Spring uprisings given that a single Tunisian merchant (who set himself on fire) helped inspire the entire Arab world to mobilize against autocratic regimes. Nevertheless, the Egyptian protesters did not represent a single or unified ideology; rather, the masses comprise ideologically distinct groups, such as moderate Islamists, hardliner conservatives, secular liberals, minorities, and other groups with divergent ideological views. While Egyptian protesters appeared to be united under the auspice of freedom in principle, their perceptions varied in terms of specific ideas about the future path of the Republic. These ideological differences still continue today in post-mubarak Egypt. Unlike in Egypt, the protesters in Jordan did not demand immediate results from the state authorities. Though the ideas of freedom and democracy appeared to have played a central role in inspiring Egyptian protesters in Tahrir Square, by contrast, these powerful ideas were insufficient to mobilize Jordanians to the same intensity and persistence against the regime.

7 274 D. Achilov Emancipative Social Capital and Political Payoffs Democracy without citizen participation, faith in democratic institutions, and active civil society is more of an empty concept without substance that largely characterizes authoritarian regimes (Dahl, 1971). On the premise that only societies can be rich in social capital but individuals cannot, some theorists emphasized that social capital is a collective resource, with no room for individual involvement (Norris, 2002, p. 139). In contrast, some scholars stressed the connections (as central features of social capital) that individuals use to pursue their personal goals in society (Bourdieu, 1986; Burt, 1992). As most theories link social capital s central function to produce collective action in order to contest state policies and thereby to keep state structures accountable to the public, there is no conceptual justification to exclude elite-challenging action from the study of social capital (Welzel, Inglehart & Deutsch, 2005, p. 124). In this respect, Welzel, Inglehart and Deutsch (2005) convincingly argue and empirically demonstrate that the frequency of elite-challenging actions effectively measure social capital s productivity in terms of its capacity to produce collective actions that are associated with higher payoffs. Accordingly, if the level of elite-challenging actions is high, then it is theoretically plausible to expect to see a high level of public commitment and persistence to produce and maintain collective actions, which can subsequently yield higher political gains (payoff). With this in mind, I introduce first two hypotheses: H1: A higher level of emancipative social capital is associated with higher levels of commitment and persistence to democratic mass demonstrations and, thereby, is associated with a higher payoff. H2: Citizens with higher levels of pro-democratic attitudes are more likely to participate in elite-challenging actions against an authoritarian regime. Islam and Democratic Civil Society Social capital is also often cited as an important by-product of religion, tradition, shared historical experience, and other social factors that lie outside the control of any government (Fukuyama, 2001, p. 17). In the last two decades, the studies analysing Islam, civil society, democratization, and the interactions thereof have received a great deal of scholarly attention. Particularly, studying the patterns of coexistence between Islam and democracy has been at the centre of comparative political research of the Muslim world. In this respect, employing individual-level survey data on Muslim attitudes has become a leading empirical tool for understanding the highly complex composition of Muslim politics, which offer strong evidence that judgments pertaining to political circumstances and performance do make a difference (Jamal & Tessler, 2008, p. 108). The findings from survey data analyses have consistently illustrated that popular support for democracy is remarkably high in the Muslim world. For instance, the studies on Muslim attitudes in the Arab world (Jamal & Tessler, 2008), Africa (Bratton, 2003), Central Asia (Rose, 2002), and non-arab Muslim states (Hofmann, 2004) have yielded decidedly similar results that Islam and democracy are not inherently incompatible but that Islam neither fosters antidemocratic attitudes nor diminishes support for democracy (Norris & Inglehart, 2004).

8 Social capital, Islam and the Arab Spring in the Middle East 275 Some scholars, by contrast, have argued that Islam is exceptional in a sense that Muslim societies are uniquely resistant to liberal democracy by defending a Neo-Orientalist argument that questions Islam s compatibility with liberal democratic norms (Fish, 2002; Huntington, 1996). Despite the claims of Islam s inherent incompatibility with democracy and a possible clash of civilizations between the West and the Muslim world, the evidence from empirical analyses has revealed that democracy has an overwhelming positive image in the Islamic world (Inglehart, 2007; Norris & Inglehart, 2003). For instance, according to Inglehart (2007): In response to the item Democracy may have many problems but it is better than any other form of government, 61 per cent of the publics of the five Arab countries agreed strongly a figure higher than 52 per cent registered in 16 Western European countries or the 38 per cent strong agreement in the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand... Clearly, the publics of Arab countries (and Islamic societies in general) do not reject democracy: overwhelmingly majorities want it. (p. 42) This finding resonates with Esposito and Mogahed s (2008) large-n study, which claims to have surveyed a representative sample of over a billion Muslims; this study asserts that Muslims see no contradiction between democratic values and religious principles (Esposito & Mogahed, 2008, p. 63). Yet, how does a civil society argument apply to the context of the Islamic world? In this respect, Cavatorta (2006) cites three reasons for Islamist associations to be a potential force, not an obstacle, for democratization: (1) Islamic civil society movements are capable of political learning; (2) they generate secular civil society activism as a response to their activities, increasing the number of actors in the political and social system; and finally (3), they can cooperate with other civil society groups on a variety of issues, provided that they are all subject to the same autocratic rule (Cavatorta, 2006). Given this propensity for Islamic actors to support democratic civil society and in the light of the recent overwhelming political victories of moderate Islamic political parties in Tunisia (An-Nahda), Morocco (Justice and Development), and Egypt (Muslim Brotherhood), it is theoretically plausible to expect that Islam may be positively disposed to encourage citizens to participate in elite-challenging actions which promote emancipative social capital. To this end, I introduce my third hypothesis: H3: A higher level of religiosity (Islam) is positively associated with higher levels of elite-challenging actions that promote emancipative social capital. Social, Political, and Economic Contexts Egypt is the biggest Arab nation in the Middle East with over 80 million citizens while Jordan s population is only about 6 million. Yet, there are many similarities both countries share. Table 2 compares key social, economic, and political indicators that capture preuprising contexts for each state. The indicators of economic well-being were highly similar in Egypt and Jordan. For instance, the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and Human Development Index (HDI) were hardly distinct, implying that the standards of living were almost alike.

9 276 D. Achilov Table 2. Key social, political, and economic indicators for Egypt and Jordan Egypt Jordan Civil society dynamics a Percent Involved in elite-challenging actions (emancipative social capital) 25% 8% Public disapproval of authoritarian rule 88% 70% Uprising payoff (2011) Regime change Yes No Political reforms High Medium Freedom and economic development Freedom house score (2010) (2 14 scale) b 11 (Not Free) 11 (Not Free) GDP per capita (2010) c HDI c Corruption Index (2010) (0 10 scale) d Financial satisfaction (1 10 scale) a Social indicators Religiosity level Islamic values (0 100) a Percent Highly Religious ( ) 45% 68% Educational attainment (scale 1 8) a Internet users as percent of population in 2010 (average for MENA 27% 39% region was 21%) e Facebook users as percent of population in 2010 e 13% 30% Mobile cellular subscription (per 100 people) 2010 c International relations US aid (2009) in millions f Diplomatic relations with Israel Yes Yes Notes: a WVS database ( ). b Freedom House 2010 Freedom in the World database ( c World Bank Open Data indicators ( d Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index database, 2010 ( overview). e Internet World Stats ( f US Dept. of State s Congressional Research Service on the Middle East (2010, 2011) ( research). Individual assessments of satisfaction with household finances were virtually the same: an average score of 5.1 and 5.7 out of 10 (1-dissatisfied to 10-satisfied) in Egypt and Jordan, respectively. 7 The level of political rights and civil liberties, as evaluated by Freedom House, was nearly indistinguishable; both countries were classified as not free in While Mubarak managed to maintain his regime for over 30 years by suppressing civil and political liberties, Jordan has been a limited constitutional monarchy since According to the Jordanian constitution of 1951, the executive power was vested in the king with the power to appoint prime ministers and other key executive (e.g. governors) and judicial posts. Attachments to Islamic values (religiosity levels) show that Jordanians are comparatively more religiously devout (more likely to attend mosques) than Egyptians. Remarkably, close to half of the population in Egypt (46%) and the majority of Jordanians (68%) indicated that they attend mosques at least once a week. On the other hand, general secular educational attainment in Jordan was slightly higher than that of Egypt.

10 Social capital, Islam and the Arab Spring in the Middle East 277 It has been argued that technology (e.g. cell phones, Internet, and social networking sites) played a pivotal role in organizing and accelerating demonstrations across the region at early stages of the Arab uprising (Lotan et al., 2011). On the other hand, some have argued that the Internet factor should not be exaggerated nor isolated from other media outlets when analysing political change (Aouragh & Alexander, 2011). Notably, access to the Internet, mobile cellular phones (e.g. SMS text messaging), and social networking was remarkably different in each country. For instance, the percentage of Internet users was 27% in Egypt and 39% in Jordan. Facebook user penetration was only 13% in Egypt and about 30% in Jordan in This means that the proportion of Jordanian Facebook users was at least twice as big as their Egyptian counterparts. Furthermore, there were more cell phone subscribers than the entire population of Jordan (109 accounts per 100 people). Comparatively, only 87 out of 100 Egyptians had access to mobile phones. Indeed, technology was a main vehicle for communication, organization, and coordination for protesters. Nevertheless, this disparity of technological infrastructure raises an important question: why did the Internet (e.g. social networking) and texting only play a limited role in galvanizing Jordanian demonstrations, despite Jordan s greater technological advantage, whereas Facebook, Tweeter, and SMS-messaging played a central role in accelerating and, perhaps, sustaining the Egyptian uprising? This question challenges the argument that the Internet was a leading cause for the 2011 Arab uprisings. Notably, the variation in the level of emancipative social capital was high. While 1 out of every 4 Egyptians participated in 1 of 3 elite-challenging actions (25%), only 1 out of 12 Jordanians engaged in such protests (8%). Attitudes of disapproval towards having one strong, authoritarian ruler were 88% in Egypt and approximately 70% in Jordan, suggesting that a level of pro-democratic public opinion was comparatively higher in Egypt (Figure 1). Figure 1. Percentage of elite-challenging actions in Egypt and Jordan. Source: WVS data for Egypt (2001, 2008) and Jordan (2000, 2007).

11 278 D. Achilov Data and Methods This study utilizes individual-level survey data from the WVS for Egypt and Jordan. Jordan s sample size is n ¼ 2423 (n ¼ 1223 for 2001; n ¼ 1200 for 2007). Egypt s total sample is 6050 (n ¼ 3000 for 2000; n ¼ 3050 for 2008). The total sample size for both countries is n ¼ For descriptive statistics, see the appendix. Dependent Variable The dependent variable is emancipative social capital, which is measured by an index of three elite-challenging actions. I follow Welzel, Inglehart and Deutsch s (2005) conceptualization of emancipative social capital on the basis of three questions from the WVS regarding elite-challenging actions: whether the respondent had (1) ever signed a petition, (2) joined in boycotts, or (3) attended peaceful demonstrations. For each question, survey respondents could answer either have done, might do, or will never do. All have done answers were coded as 2, might do answers were coded as 1, and the remaining will never do responses were coded 0 resulting in a three 0 2 scale transformed variable (for each elite-challenging survey question). Next, an additive index scale of 0 6 was generated. For instance, a score of 6 indicates that a survey respondent had participated in all three types of elite-challenging actions, whereas 0 refers to willingness to never participate in any of these three actions. To verify internal consistency and reliability of this new index, a Cronbach s alpha coefficient of was obtained. 8 Next, a maximum likelihood factor analysis, with varimax rotation and with Kaiser normalization was estimated. While signing petitions and joining in boycotts loaded at and 0.835, respectively, attending lawful demonstrations loaded at (all loaded above 0.4 threshold). Independent Variables Disapproval of authoritarian rule measures individual perceptions towards having a single authoritarian ruler who disregards democratic elections. This variable is measured by a scale of 1 4 derived from WVS s following survey question: Would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country with a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections? Variable coding: 1 very good, 2 fairly good, 3 bad, and 4 very bad. Religiosity (Islam) is a 0 3 scale of survey respondents religious values derived from individual responses on how often they attended mosques. The respondents who attended a mosque once a week or more were assigned a score of 3 (High religiosity). Those who attended mosques once a month or only on specific holy days were assigned a score of 2 (Moderate religiosity). Those who attended Mosques less often were assigned a score of 1 (Low religiosity). If a respondent did not claim, in a separate survey question, that he/she was a convinced atheist, the minimum score of 1 was retained, since coding individuals who do not attend Mosques as not religious ( 0 score) would have been inaccurate. People who do not attend mosques at all cannot be assumed as not religious. Therefore, only those respondents who stated that they (1) did not attend mosques at all and stated (2) that they were atheist received a score of zero (No religiosity).

12 Control Variables Social capital, Islam and the Arab Spring in the Middle East 279. Female is a dummy variable that controls for gender (0 male; 1 female).. Age is a numerical value of each respondent s age.. Education is an 8-point scale of the survey respondent s education level. (Ranging from 1 Inadequately completed elementary education to 8 Completed college education.). Income is a 5-point scale of the survey respondent s income level (1 lowest; 5 highest). 9 Mode of Analysis I began with a descriptive analysis by systematically comparing and contrasting associational patterns displayed by variables under investigation. In doing so, I examined the variation in self-assertive, emancipative social capital in Egypt and Jordan with respect to associated political gains. Next, I employed an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis to explore the empirical relationship between attitudes towards authoritarianism, Islam (religiosity levels of individuals), and emancipative social capital. Results From 2001 to 2008, approximately 25% of Egyptians participated in elite-challenging actions. This rate was 8% for Jordan from 2000 to Figure 1 illustrates this comparison. While the probability for participation in elite-challenging actions was about 0.25 in Egypt, it was 0.08 in Jordan. That is, Egyptians were almost four times more likely to engage in an elite-challenging action compared with Jordanians, suggesting that the level of emancipative social capitals was almost four times higher in Egypt (revolution) than it was in Jordan (no revolution). 10 This finding lends support for H1 that a higher level of emancipative social capital is associated with higher levels of commitment and persistence to democratic mass demonstrations and, thereby, is associated with a higher payoff. Figure 2 illustrates the association patterns of individual attitudes towards having a strong leader (a proxy for pro-democratic attitudes) and the levels of elite-challenging actions in Egypt and Jordan. The disapproval attitudes towards having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections appear to be highly associated with higher rates of elite-challenging actions in Egypt. This association is supported by a positive, statistically significant Pearson correlation between the two variables (r ¼ 0.066; p, 0.000). This pattern offers initial evidence supporting the second hypothesis (H2) that citizens with higher levels of pro-democratic attitudes are more likely to participate in elite-challenging actions against an authoritarian regime. In Jordan, on the other hand, associational trends between disapproval of autocracy and emancipative social capital reveal inconsistent patterns. No clear associational trend can be observed. The Pearson correlation between the two variables yields a negative, statistically insignificant coefficient (r ¼ ; p, 0.786). Figure 3 shows a graphical illustration of the association between Islamic values and elite-challenging emancipative social capital distilled by four categories of individual attitudes towards having a strong leader.

13 280 D. Achilov Figure 2. Associational trends between levels of elite-challenging actions (emancipative social capital) and disapproval rates toward having a strong authoritarian leader in Egypt (2008) and Jordan (2007). Notes: Line of best fit: Cubic. Egypt: Pearson r ¼ 0.066, p, 0.000; Jordan: Pearson r ¼ 0.005, p, Emancipative social capital rescaled into a dichotomous measure: at least one fulfilled collective action ¼ 1, else ¼ 0. The associational plot between Islam and emancipative social capital per each level of individual support for authoritarianism suggests that more religious Egyptians (Figure 3(a)), who view authoritarianism negatively, manifest a higher level of emancipative social capital. In Jordan, no systematic trend can be distinguished (Figure 3(b)). In a bivariate association between support for authoritarianism and emancipative social capital (Figure 3(c)), as well as relationship between Islam and emancipative social capital (Figure 3(d)), Egypt clearly stands out with its positive trend in contrast to Jordan. While correlational and trend analyses provide important insights, a further analysis of the net-effects of the independent variables is necessary. In this respect, to better understand the effects of citizens attitudes towards authoritarianism, religiosity (Islam), and control variables on emancipative social capital, I estimate the following OLS model (Table 3) where Y = a + b 1 x 1 + b 2 x 2... b k x k + 1, Emancipative Social Capital = a+b 1 (Disapproval of authoritarian rule) + b 2 (Religiosity) +b 2 (Age) + b 2 (Education) + b 2 (Female) +b 2 (Income) + 1. All else being equal, the effects of pro-democratic attitudes (discontent towards having a strong leader) on participating in elite-challenging actions are positive and statistically

14 Social capital, Islam and the Arab Spring in the Middle East 281 Figure 3. Associational patterns between emancipative social capital, support for strong leader, and religiosity levels (Islam). Notes: Line of best fit: Cubic. Emancipative social capital rescaled into a dichotomy: at least one fulfilled collective action ¼ 1, else ¼ 0. Source: WVS. Table 3. OLS regression estimates of emancipative social capital Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 All Egypt Jordan Disapproval of authoritarian rule (0.019) (0.025) (0.026) Religiosity (0.019) (0.024) (0.011) Age (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) Education (0.008) (0.009) (0.012) Income (0.019) (0.022) (0.031) Female (0.036) (0.044) (0.053) Constant (0.106) (0.133) (0.149) Adjusted R N Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis. p, p, p, 0.01.

15 282 D. Achilov significant (Model 1), which suggests that citizens who disapprove of authoritarian styles of leadership are more likely to engage in collective actions against incumbent regimes. This evidence lends support for H2 that citizens with higher levels of pro-democratic attitudes are more likely to participate in elite-challenging actions against an authoritarian regime. The combined model (1) also suggests that religiosity levels are positively related to emancipative social capital. That is, holding other variables constant, citizens with higher levels of attachments to the Islamic way of life are more likely to participate in elite-challenging actions. The age, gender, and income factors are also statistically significant; older citizens, people with lower income, and females appear less likely to partake in self-assertive collective actions. Model 2 reports the findings for Egypt. Accordingly, the disapproval attitudes towards having a single authoritarian ruler in Egypt are positively and statistically related to emancipative social capital, suggesting that Egyptian citizens with more negative views towards having a strong, autocratic leader were more likely to participate in elite-challenging actions. This finding is consistent with H2. Next, attachment to the Islamic way of life, or the level of religiosity, is also statistically significant to understanding emancipative social capital. This means that, holding everything equal, individuals who frequently attended mosques were more likely to engage in elite-challenging demonstrations in Egypt. The effects of control variables, such as age, gender, income, and educational attainment, also appear to be statistically relevant to emancipative social capital. As evidence suggests, older citizens, people with higher educational credentials and females appear less likely to engage in self-assertive collective actions. Income levels, on the other hand, are positively related to participation in collective protests. This finding suggests that citizens with higher incomes are more likely to get involved in demonstrations, implying that economic conditions may not be the single source of grievances that prompt individuals to challenge the authoritarian status quo. In Jordan, the effects of the two key independent variables are starkly different from Egypt (Model 3). While there is no evidence for the effects of disapproval attitudes towards having a single authoritarian ruler, the religiosity level is negatively related to understanding emancipative social capital. Model 3 estimates that individuals religious values are negatively related to participation in elite-challenging protests in Jordan. This finding is a direct contradiction to the Egyptian case. Considering the control variables, male citizens and those with higher educational degrees appear to be more likely to engage in elite-challenging actions. Holding everything constant, while Islamic values seem to promote emancipative social capital in Egypt, they appear to negatively affect the participation in elite-challenging actions in Jordan. Even though the combined model (for both countries) yields positive and statistically significant coefficient for Islamic values, given the stark difference in the two cases, it is unclear whether or not Islam can promote emancipative social capital. Conclusion This study has attempted to (1) analyse the dynamics of emancipative social capital and associated political gains as a result of mass elite-challenging actions, (2) explain the effects of pro-democratic attitudes on propensity to partake in collective actions, and

16 Social capital, Islam and the Arab Spring in the Middle East 283 (3) examine the extent of Islam s role in shaping emancipative social capital in the context of Egypt and Jordan. In the light of early Arab Spring uprisings in Egypt and Jordan, the level of commitment and persistence of Egyptian demonstrations was substantially higher than the uprisings in Jordan. In terms of emancipative social capital, measured by the dynamics of elite-challenging actions, Egyptians were almost four times more likely to participate in democratic demonstrations than Jordanians. Consequently, the political gains of Egyptian protests were substantial (complete regime change), while the payoffs of Jordanian demonstrations were limited to political reforms proposed by King Abdullah II. In line with H1, the evidence suggests that a higher level of emancipative social capital is associated with higher levels of commitment and persistence to democratic demonstrations and is, thereby, associated with higher payoffs, as the Egyptian case attests. In contrast, a lower level of elite-challenging social capital is associated with lower levels of commitment and persistence to democratic mass demonstrations and is, thereby, associated with lower gains, as the Jordanian case suggests. In the light of these findings, emancipative social capital theory helps explain the dynamics of collective actions and associated payoffs. The role of Islam reveals inconsistent results. There is insufficient evidence to support the proposition that a higher level of religiosity (Islam) is positively associated with higher levels of elite-challenging actions that promote emancipative social capital. In other words, the findings are inconclusive with regard to Islam s capacity to stimulate the development of emancipative social capital in Islamic societies. Whereas the degrees of religiosity seem to encourage citizens to challenge elites in Egypt, less religious citizens appear to be more likely to engage in elite-challenging actions in Jordan. For Egypt, one can speculate that the Muslim Brotherhood is a highly organized and fairly powerful social and political movement, which is not the case in Jordan and which could be driving the effects of Islam in the Egyptian context. Traditionally, Islamic leadership has been far more outspoken against the Mubarak regime in Egypt as opposed to Jordan. In this respect, religious individuals may be more prone to pursue elite-challenging actions when their religious leaders (e.g. imams) actively take a firm stance to challenge state policies. By contrast, the Islamic leaders who do not take a decisive stand may leave their highly religious followers unsure and, thus, less committed to their actions. Additionally, it is also important to highlight that the level of state repression of Islamic actors has been significantly higher in Egypt than Jordan. Nonetheless, in order to further distinguish the effects of Islamic values, more future research is necessary. The degree of high commitment and persistence of Egyptian protests with associated high political gains in the end (e.g. the Mubarak regime s fall) and the relatively low commitment and persistence in Jordanian demonstrations with associated low political gains (e.g. limited reforms) lend support for emancipative social capital s explanatory strength, highlighting the importance of participatory civil society dynamics in understanding the evolving patterns of democratization in the Middle East in general, and the Arab awakening in particular. Although the findings offer compelling evidence of a relationship between emancipative social capital and political gains as a result of mass elite-challenging actions, more research to further scrutinize the effects of elite-challenging actions is necessary. In sum, this study extends the debate on the empirical nexus between social capital and democratization, while contributing answers to explain the social capital dimension of the

17 284 D. Achilov Arab uprisings in All at once, by providing a fresh analysis of Islam and its increasing role on shaping the rapidly changing social and political landscape of the Muslimmajority states, this study offers new clues on the empirical interactions between Islamic resurgence and civil society dynamics in the Muslim world. Notes 1. Welzel, Inglehart and Deutsch (2005) demonstrate that emancipative social capital, measured by elitechallenging actions, has comparably higher civic payoffs than traditional social capital measured by voluntary associations, at both societal and individual levels. 2. The structure in social capital can be in the form of groups, organizations or networks: see Coleman (1990) for a detailed discussion. 3. By drawing from Welzel, Inglehart and Deutsch s (2005) conceptualization of emancipative social capital measured by three elite-challenging actions asked by the WVS project. 4. On 11 February 2011, a long-term dictator Hosni Mubarak fell from power. 5. The Guardian, Cairo s biggest protest yet demands Mubarak s immediate departure, accessed February 10, 2012 (URL: 6. The Guardian, Thousands join day of rage across the Middle East, February 25, 2011, accessed on February 10, 2012 (URL: 7. Derived from the WVS ( ) question: How satisfied are you with the financial situation of your household? If 1 means you are completely dissatisfied on this scale and 10 means you are completely satisfied, where would you put your satisfaction with your household s financial situation? 8. A Cronbach s alpha coefficient (0.747) is statistically acceptable for the internal reliability and consistency of emancipative social capital s additive index. No inter-item correlation fell below.30 a minimum necessary threshhold (de Vaus, 2002, p. 184). 9. For missing values in the income variable, data imputation from the values derived from a variable indicating economic social class was used. 10. The odds ratio, however, does not prove that elite-challenging actions increase the chances for revolutions; rather, they manifest a strong association (at this stage) between the variables under analyses. References Aouragh, M. & Alexander, A. (2011) The Egyptian experience: Sense and nonsense of the Internet revolution, International Journal of Communications, 5, pp Bourdieu, P. (1986) The forms of capital, in: J.G. Richardson (Ed.) Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education, pp (New York, NY: Greenwood Press). Bratton, M. (2003) Briefing: Islam, democracy and public opinion in Africa, African Affairs, 102(408), pp Burt, R. (1992) Structural Holes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Casanova, J. (2001) Civil society and religion: Retrospective reflections on Catholicism and prospective reflections on Islam, Social Research, 68(4), pp Cavatorta, F. (2006) Civil society, Islamism and democratization: The Case of Morocco, Journal of Modern African Studies, 44(2), pp Ciftci, S. (2010) Modernization, Islam, or social capital: What explains attitudes toward democracy in the Muslim World? Comparative Political Studies, 43(11), pp Coleman, J. (1988) Social capital in the creation of human capital, American Journal of Sociology, 94, pp. s95 s210. Coleman, J. (1990) Foundations of Social Theory (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press). Cooke, P. & Morgan, K. (2000) The Associational Economy. Firms, Regions, and Innovation (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Dahl, R. A. (1971) Polyarchy; Participation and Opposition (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press). de Vaus, D. (2002) Surveys in Social Research (London: Routledge). Diamond, L. (1994) Toward democratic consolidation, Journal of Democracy, 5(3), pp