Nonviolent Resistance in Hybrid Regimes: Youth Movements in Post-Communist States

Transcription

1 Nonviolent Resistance in Hybrid Regimes: Youth Movements in Post-Communist States Olena Nikolayenko Department of Political Science Fordham University Faber Hall, Rm East Fordham Road Bronx, NY Draft. July 15, 2011 Comments are welcome. Prepared for presentation at the pre-asa workshop Making Connections: Movements and Research in a Global Context, Las Vegas, August 18-19, 2011.

2 Brief Description of the Book Project Over the past decade, a myriad of youth movements emerged in the post-communist region and pressed for political change during the election period. In 2000 the Serbian social movement Otpor (Resistance) played a vital role in bringing down Slobodan Milosevic. Inspired by the example of Otpor, similar youth movements were formed in Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, and Ukraine. On the eve of the 2001 elections Belarusian youth set up the social movement Zubr (Bison) to challenge the power of the incumbent president. In 2003 Georgian civic activists formed the youth movement Kmara (Enough) to press for radical reforms. Ukrainian youth mobilized via the civic campaign Pora (It s Time) during the 2004 presidential elections. Emulating these examples, Azerbaijani youth set up several youth groups ahead of the 2005 elections. Never before have post-communist youth protested on such a grand scale. Some youth movements, however, were more successful than others in mobilizing citizens for political change. This book argues that the analysis of tactical interactions between social movements and incumbent governments provides a partial explanation for divergent movement outcomes. Tactical interaction is an ongoing process in which insurgents and opponents seek, in chesslike fashion, to offset the moves of the other. 1 On the one hand, social movements seek to attain their goals and bring about political change through the deployment of novel tactics. On the other hand, movement opponents seek to counteract these threats through countermobilization tactics. This dynamic relationship between social movements and their opponents has a profound effect on the movement s success. If the social movement deploys novel methods of resistance, such tactics might catch the authorities off guard and strengthen the movement s position vis-à-vis its adversary. Otherwise, the use of conventional protest tactics puts the social movement at a disadvantage, since the ruling elite can anticipate a certain pattern of mass mobilization and take preemptive action. This book seeks to extend social movement literature by examining state-movement interactions in hybrid regimes, falling somewhere between democracy and dictatorship. Most empirical research on tactical interactions has been done in advanced industrial democracies. Much less empirical work has focused on the interplay between social movements and their opponents in non-democracies. Yet, the rise of hybrid regimes provides a new political context for analyzing state-movement interactions. A salient attribute of these regimes is a combination of formal democratic institutions with systematic nondemocratic practices. The regime type has an effect on the timing of mass mobilization, the scope of movement claims, the repertoire of contentious collective action, and the repertoire of countermovement tactics. Compared to social movements in liberal democracies, challenger organizations in hybrid regimes tend to face higher barriers to political participation. At the same time, the repertoire of countermovement tactics in hybrid regimes is constrained by the government s ambitions to maintain a façade of democracy. 1 McAdam, Doug Tactical Innovation and the Pace of Insurgency. American Sociological Review 48(6): , p

3 Table of Contents Chapter 1. Introduction Chapter 2. Elections as an Opportunity for Political Change Chapter 3. Otpor: Bringing Down Milosevic Chapter 4. Zubr: Struggle against Lukashism Chapter 5. Kmara: Enough of Corruption and Poverty Chapter 6. Pora: It s Time to Win Chapter 7. Resistance of Azerbaijani Youth Chapter 8. Conclusion 3

4 Chapter 1. Introduction Over the past decade, a large number of youth movements emerged in the post-communist region. Youth deployed nonviolent methods to demand political change in repressive political regimes that took root since the collapse of communism. In 2000 the Serbian social movement Otpor (Resistance) formed by a group of students from the University of Belgrade played a pivotal role in ousting Slobodan Milosevic from office. Thousands of young Serbs became engaged in nonviolent resistance to the regime and voted the incumbent president out of office. Inspired by the example of Otpor, Belarusian youth set up the social movement Zubr (Bison) on the eve of the 2001 presidential elections and called for the removal of the incumbent president from power. Similarly, youth in the Republic of Georgia formed Kmara (Enough) shortly before the 2003 parliamentary elections to push for radical reforms. In 2004 the Ukrainian youth movement Pora (It s Time) mobilized thousands of citizens in anticipation of electoral fraud. Likewise, Azerbaijani youth groups Magam (It s Time), Yeni Fikir (New Thinking), and Yokh (No) burst into the political scene to press for free and fair elections in Never before have post-communist youth mobilized on such a grand scale. Remarkably, the youth movements shared a lot of similar characteristics. With the exception of Otpor and Yeni Fikir, the movements were formed during the election year in anticipation of large-scale electoral fraud. Youth demanded free and fair elections and mobilized citizens to exercise their voting rights. Furthermore, movement participants targeted the incumbent president as a major obstacle to political liberalization. To accomplish movement goals, young people applied nonviolent methods of resistance, including graffiti, stickers, and street performances. These cross-movement similarities were not accidental. The cross-border 4

5 diffusion of ideas explains, in no small degree, the use of similar movement tactics. Civic activists across the region learned about Otpor via the mass media and established direct contacts with Serbian youth. The attribution of similarity contributed to the adoption of Otpor s ideas. Young people shared similar political values and faced a similar set of constraints on political participation. Furthermore, this generation of activists had a common experience of growing up in the post-communist period (Nikolayenko 2007). Some youth movements, however, were more successful than others in mobilizing citizens for political change. In Serbia Otpor recruited thousands of young people to put up nonviolent resistance to the regime. Similarly, thousands of young Ukrainians poured into the street and stayed in the tent city to denounce electoral fraud. Albeit on a smaller scale, Kmara enlisted a sufficiently large number of young people to campaign for radical reforms. In contrast, Azerbaijani youth groups attracted no more than 100 members each. Furthermore, Zubr mobilized a relatively small number of young people to tilt the power balance in its favor. This book argues that the analysis of tactical interactions between social movements and incumbent governments provides a partial explanation for divergent movement outcomes. Tactical interaction is an ongoing process in which insurgents and opponents seek, in chesslike fashion, to offset the moves of the other (McAdam 1983: 736). On the one hand, social movements seek to attain their goals through the deployment of novel tactics. On the other hand, movement opponents seek to counteract these threats through countermobilization tactics. This dynamic relationship between the social movement and its opponents has a profound effect on the movement s success. If the social movement deploys novel methods of resistance, such tactics might catch the authorities off guard and strengthen the movement s position vis-à-vis its adversary. Otherwise, the use of conventional protest tactics puts the social movement at a 5

6 disadvantage, since the ruling elite can anticipate a certain pattern of mass mobilization and take preemptive action. Learning is a critical dimension of tactical interactions. By definition, learning is reflexive. In the course of the protest cycle both civic activists and the ruling elite can draw lessons from earlier episodes of mass mobilization. This study suggests that learning is critical to the development of effective strategies and tactics. Movement participants can devise more effective tactics if they draw lessons from their firsthand experience in previous protest campaigns and scrutinize anti-regime struggles around the globe. Similarly, the powerholders can devise more effective countermobilization tactics if they draw lessons from previous protest campaigns both inside and outside the country. In particular, autocratic incumbents can benefit from a cross-national exchange of ideas about the maintenance of the non-democratic regime. This study applies the concept of tactical interactions to the analysis of mass mobilization in five hybrid regimes, falling somewhere between democracy and dictatorship. The analysis suggests that the interplay between social movements and their opponents influenced movement outcomes. In some instances, the pace of autocratic learning exceeded the magnitude of tactical innovation exhibited by youth movements. Specifically, the adaption of Otpor s tactics put late risers in the protest cycle at a disadvantage because the model of nonviolent resistance became well-known to the incumbent authorities and enabled them to take preemptive action. Tactical interactions in hybrid regimes are distinct in several ways. The regime type affects the timing of mass mobilization. The democratic political system offers citizens multiple points of access. Presumably, social movements in democracies can stage an effective protest campaign regardless of the election cycle. In full-blown dictatorships, civic activists are systematically denied opportunities to express their grievances and demand concessions from the 6

7 government. Oftentimes, dictators opt to stifle any sign of dissent. In contrast, hybrid regimes offer limited opportunities for political participation of regime opponents. Social scientists and practitioners have recently begun to consider elections as a critical moment for regime change in hybrid regimes (Forbig and Demes 2007; Kuntz and Thompson 2009; Lindberg 2009). When the incumbent government in the hybrid regime resorts to large-scale electoral fraud, it may trigger mass mobilization of the disgruntled population and culminate in the breakdown of the political regime. In addition, the regime type has an impact on the scope of movement demands. While claim-making in democracies tends to reflect diversity of political views in society, the range of permissible political claims is quite limited in non-democracies. An overt anti-incumbent campaign is usually met with repression in hybrid regimes. Incumbents, however, might tolerate moderate criticism of public policies if civic activists refrain from placing the blame for socioeconomic problems on the chief executive. Social movements in hybrid regimes need to be well aware of these constraints to minimize the extent of repression. The regime type further affects movement choices regarding the repertoire of contentious collective action, a limited set of routines that are learned, shared, acted out through a relatively deliberate process of choice (Tilly 1995: 26). In democracies, given the protection of political rights and civil liberties, social movements can choose a wide range of tactics. In contrast, the repertoire of contentious action is quite limited in full-blown autocracies, since the intensity and frequency of repression assume large proportions. The political context in hybrid regimes, located between these two extremes, compels social movements to tread carefully in the grey zone of politics. In particular, social movements in hybrid regimes need to display a lot of 7

8 resourcefulness to combine protest tactics deployed in liberal democracies and full-blown autocracies. Finally, the regime type influences the repertoire of countermobilization tactics. In democracies, incumbent governments are under pressure to act within legal boundaries in their interactions with challenger organizations. In full-blown autocracies, incumbents have the capacity to apply indiscriminate violence against social movements and cover up their hideous acts. In hybrid regimes, however, the powerholders maintain a facade of democracy that precludes them from launching an overt large-scale attack against challenger organizations. Instead, incumbent authorities in hybrid regimes need to exercise ingenuity in manipulating laws and devising extra-legal means to strip social movements of power. The Rise of Hybrid Regimes Since the collapse of communism, there has been a proliferation of political regimes falling somewhere between democracy and dictatorship. According to Diamond (2002: 27), the number of pseudodemocracies increased from half a dozen in 1974 to more than 45 in 2001, amounting to somewhere between one-quarter and one-third of all states at the turn of the twenty-first century. Within the post-soviet region, Freedom House classified at least eight states as partly free in the 1990s, indicating that they fell short of both liberal democracies and full-blown autocracies. 2 Furthermore, empirical evidence suggests that such regimes are quite durable (Brownlee 2009). More than two-thirds of post-soviet states remained non-democratic in 1999, a 2 Freedom House is an international non-governmental organization that monitors democratic change worldwide. It ranks countries on a scale from one to seven based on the total number of raw points awarded to the political rights and civil liberties checklist questions. Then each pair of political rights and civil liberties ratings is averaged to determine an overall status of free ( ), partly free ( ), or not free ( ). Since 1994, the Baltic states Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are coded as free, while four Central Asian states Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are coded as not free. For more information, see Freedom House (2007). 8

9 decade since the fall of the Berlin Wall. The persistence of these pseudodemocracies begs the question of how to distinguish them from other forms of political order. The classification of contemporary non-democracies presents a challenge for social scientists. To some extent, this challenge arises from disagreements over the definition of democracy. According to the minimalist perspective, democracy is associated with free and fair elections (Schumpeter 1942). Others posit that the provision of civil liberties and political rights is an indispensible attribute of democracy (Dahl 1971). More recently, some scholars argue that the notion of an uneven playing field should be integrated into the conceptualization of liberal democracy (Levitsky and Way 2010a, 2010b). Depending upon the preferred definition of democracy, analysts may come up with different estimates of non-democracies in the world today. A fine-graded classification of repressive political regimes is further compounded by the fact that social scientists need to apply subjective criteria to distinguish between full-blown autocracies and the hybrids. It is debatable when the scope, intensity, and frequency of repression reach a point that calls for the classification of the regime as authoritarian, rather than hybrid. Belarus, for example, is a case of the hybrid regime that has grown increasingly authoritarian and has become known as Europe s last dictatorship. In light of these theoretical and methodological ambiguities, numerous efforts have been made to conceptualize the essence of contemporary non-democracies and put a label on them. Scholars describe such regimes as hybrid (Diamond 2002), competitive authoritarian (Levitsky and Way 2002), or semi-authoritarian (Ottaway 2003), to name a few. This study focuses on a subset of hybrid regimes defined as competitive authoritarian. According to Levistky and Way (2010: 5), competitive authoritarian regimes are civilian regimes in which formal democratic institutions exist and are widely viewed as the primary means of gaining power, but in which 9

10 incumbents abuse of the state places them at a significant advantage vis-à-vis their opponents. In competitive authoritarian regimes election processes are fundamentally flawed, civil liberties and political rights are systematically violated, and state resources are regularly abused to skew political competition in favor of incumbents. Levitsky and Way (2010b: 10-12) point out that an uneven playing field is marked by unequal access to resources, the mass media, and the rule of law. Press freedom, for example, is constitutionally guaranteed in competitive authoritarian regimes. Yet, incumbents systematically exert political pressures on the media by manipulating libel laws and endorsing the selective enforcement of tax code. The aforementioned disparities in access to resources, the mass media, and the rule of law underpin the durability of competitive authoritarian regimes. Nonetheless, elections in competitive authoritarian regimes present a slim opportunity for political change. The political regime provides room for the nominal presence of the political opposition. Electoral laws do not bar multiple candidates from vying for power. Under these conditions, the opposition political parties may use the election period as a trigger to mobilize citizens against the autocratic incumbent (Kuntz and Thompson 2009). This study treats Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Serbia, and Ukraine as competitive authoritarian regimes. 3 Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s these countries lacked viable democratic institutions. Elections were regularly held, and opposition political parties competed for power. Incumbents, however, skewed political competition in their favor through systematic abuses of democratic procedures. Numerous reports by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) indicate that electoral processes in these states were 3 Levitsky and Way (2010: 34) consider the political regime in Azerbaijan as insufficiently competitive. Azerbaijan, however, possesses most of the attributes of a competitive authoritarian regime, including multicandidate elections and the presence of opposition political parties. 10

11 fundamentally flawed. In the past few years, however, some of these regimes experienced a period of political liberalization as a result of the so-called electoral revolutions, while others remained resilient to political change. 4 Massive protests against vote rigging led to the resignation of the incumbent presidents in Serbia (2000) and Georgia (2003) and the political defeat of the incumbent s handpicked successor in Ukraine (2004). In contrast, the incumbent presidents in Azerbaijan and Belarus survived outbursts of mass mobilization and consolidated their power. A brief description of each country is provided in the following paragraphs. 5 Azerbaijan is a former Soviet republic that regained national independence in 1991, after a 71-year period under communism. It is located in the South Caucasus and borders on Armenia, Georgia, Iran, Russia, and Turkey. Azerbaijan is a resource-rich country. According to some estimates, the country s proven oil reserves amount to seven billion barrels. In addition, Azerbaijan is the twenty-fifth largest exporter of natural gas. Yet, most people live in poverty. GDP per capita, ppp was $10,900 in The country has the population of eight million people, 93 percent of which profess nominal identification with Islam. From 1992 to 2003 the country was ruled by Heidar Aliyev, former Communist Party official and KGB chief. Prior to his death, the incumbent president manipulated electoral processes to pass on the reins of power 4 The phrase electoral revolutions is widely used to describe mass protests in the aftermath of fraudulent elections in the post-communist region. Another popular term for these events is colored revolutions. The 2003 protest events in Georgia became known as the Rose Revolution because a few protesters carried roses to symbolize commitment to nonviolence. The phrase Orange Revolution was coined to describe mass mobilization in Ukraine because the color of Viktor Yushchenko s presidential campaign (orange) was ubiquitous during post-election protests. The term revolution, however, does not imply the introduction of substantive, long-term institutional changes in domestic politics. Since these protest events, only Serbia made tangible progress towards the consolidation of democracy. Georgia and Ukraine experienced a short period of political liberalization followed by the reversal of democratic practices. Azerbaijan and Belarus continue to stay on the path to authoritarianism. In describing political arrangements in these states, I use the past tense in reference to events during the election year and do not imply the end of nondemocractic practices. 5 Country information, including population statistics and GDP per capita, ppp (2010), is retrieved from The World Factbook. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency. Available at 11

12 to his 42-year old son, Ilham Aliyev. It is the only case of hereditary succession in the post- Soviet region. Georgia is another former Soviet republic located in the South Caucasus. It shares borders with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia, and Turkey. The country s location between Asia and Europe makes it an important transit point for energy supplies. Georgia is known for its exports of agricultural products and beverages. The country s GDP per capita, ppp was $4,900 in The post-soviet state has the population of 4.6 million people, 89 percent of which are Christian. Eduard Shevardnadze, former Communist Party leader and Soviet Foreign Minister, was the President of Georgia from 1995 to He was forced to resign almost one year prior to the expiration of his second presidential term in the aftermath of the Rose Revolution. Belarus is a former Soviet republic situated in Eastern Europe. The country borders on the European Union (Latvia, Lithuania and Poland) and such post-soviet states as Russia and Ukraine. The incumbent president propagates the idea of market socialism, imposing state control on prices and currency exchange. The local economy depends, to a large extent, upon the cheap supply of energy resources from Russia. The country s GDP per capita, ppp stood at $13,600 in The country s population is approximately 9.6 million people. Since 1994, Alyaksandr Lukashenka, former head of a collective farm, occupied the president s office and was officially re-elected three times. Lukashenka has recently begun to make public appearances with his out-of-wedlock son Kolya and position the 6-year old boy as his successor. Similarly, Ukraine is a post-soviet state sandwiched between the European Union and Russia. Steel production is a significant contributor to the country s GDP, making Ukraine the fifth largest exporter of steel in The local economy is crippled by the heavy dependence on Russia s supply of highly-priced energy resources and lack of structural reforms. In 2010 the 12

13 country s GDP per capita, ppp was $6,700, almost three times less than in the neighboring Poland. The country s population is approximately 45 million people. From 1994 to 2004 Leonid Kuchma, former manager of the Soviet Union s largest missile factory, held the post of the country s president. Upon the expiration of his second presidential term, Kuchma halfheartedly handpicked as his successor Viktor Yanukovych, a politician with the murky criminal record and mafia ties. The large-scale electoral fraud during the 2004 presidential elections triggered massive protests and led to the political defeat of Yanukovych. Serbia is a post-socialist state that emerged from the debris of Yugoslavia. For more than a decade since the violent breakdown of the multiethnic federation, Serbia was a part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) consisting of Serbia and Montenegro. In 2006 these two states formally declared national independence. Like Azerbaijan, Serbia had GDP per capita, ppp of $10,900 in The local economy was heavily hit by inept public policies and international isolation in the 1990s. The country s population is estimated to be seven million people. As a former Communist apparatchik, Milosevic played a domineering role in Serbian politics from the late 1980s until his forced resignation in The incumbents in these states set up an uneven playing field by inhibiting the opposition s access to resources, the mass media, and the rule of law to the extent turnover of power was hardly possible. The ruling elite sought to limit the opposition s capacities to campaign by stifling economic freedoms in the country. The authorities stalled market reforms and checked the growth of the private sector. Tax police, for example, has become notoriously known as a tool in state dealings with regime opponents. Businessmen associated with the political opposition faced the threat of unscheduled tax inspections and hefty fines, while tycoons close to the presidential administration reportedly received unsanctioned tax breaks. 13

14 According to the Index of Economic Freedoms annually compiled by Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal, the selected states scored less than 60 points on a scale from 0 to 100, where 100 represents the maximum amount of economic freedom. 6 The distribution of scores was as follows for the election year: Azerbaijan (2005) 54.4, Belarus (2001) 38, Georgia (2003) 58.6, and Ukraine (2004) The data for Serbia in 2000 are unavailable, but it is reasonable to assume that the level of economic freedom during the late Milosevic period was even lower than in the former Soviet republics. Given systematic violations of economic freedoms, the political opposition faced considerable obstacles in raising funds and disbursing resources to challenge the incumbent government. Furthermore, domestic politics was marred with systematic encroachment on press freedom (see Committee to Protect Journalists ). Incumbent governments sought to exercise control over the mass media in several ways. First, state officials hampered the issuance of licenses and the distribution of airwaves to independent media. In Serbia, for example, the government closed down the private radio station Radio B92. Second, state officials undermined the financial viability of private media. The Belarusian authorities, for example, seized equipment and froze a bank account of a private printing house that published several independent newspapers on the eve of the 2001 elections. Moreover, the ruling elite arbitrarily used libel laws and tax inspections to impose hefty fines and trigger the closure of independent media for allegedly economic reasons. Third, the powerholders induced self-censorship by orchestrating physical attacks on journalists. Media professionals known for their investigative 6 A country s overall economic freedom score is a simple average of its scores on ten individual freedoms, each measured on a scale from 0 to 100, where 100 represents the maximum freedom. The ten freedoms are business freedom, trade freedom, fiscal freedom, government spending, monetary freedom, investment freedom, financial freedom, property rights, freedom from corruption, and labor freedom. Based upon these indicators, such advanced industrial democracies as the United States and the United Kingdom scored 77 and 74 points, respectively, in For more information, visit the web site of the Washington-based think tank Heritage Foundation 14

15 reports were often harassed by thugs. Several journalists were killed for performing their professional duties. Georgiy Gongadze, editor of the online publication Ukrainska Pravda (Ukrainian Truth), was murdered in September Likewise, Elmar Huseynov, editor of the Azerbaijani magazine Monitor, was gunned down in March These systematic attacks on press freedom hampered genuine political competition. In addition, the incumbents manipulated laws to accommodate their political aspirations. Specifically, they devised various ways to circumvent the two-term constitutional limit on presidential terms and prolong their political dominance. To stay in power, Milosevic changed his position from the President of Serbia ( ) to the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ( ). In addition, the FRY Assembly amended the constitution, stipulating election of the president by direct popular vote, rather than the federal parliament. The constitutional amendments were introduced shortly before Milosevic called snap elections, with the intent to boost his bid for re-election. Upon the start of his first term, President of Belarus Lukashenka also initiated the revision of national laws. The constitutional amendments of 1996 granted the president vast powers and extended his first term until In Ukraine Kuchma also considered multiple legal maneuvers to extend his presidency. The Constitutional Court ruled that the incumbent president was eligible to run for a third term in office. In 2004, however, Kuchma announced his intent to step down and backed the candidacy of Yanukovych. In Azerbaijan the incumbent president groomed his son as his successor. Of all the incumbent presidents, only 75-year old Shevardnadze repeatedly stated that he would resign at the end of his second term. At the same time, the President of Georgia warned the political opposition that authorities will not let destabilization, confrontation, or violence burst into state institutions, including in election commissions (Peuch 2003). 15

16 The orchestration of large-scale electoral fraud was a common incumbent tactic in these regimes. Elections in the selected states failed to meet OSCE standards for democratic elections. OSCE (2000a) described the federal elections held in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on September 24, 2000 as fundamentally flawed. Similarly, OSCE (2001) identified fundamental flaws in the electoral process in Belarus. The 2003 parliamentary elections in Georgia were also marred with significant and systematic electoral fraud (OSCE 2003). Likewise, OSCE (2004) documented a number of serious shortcomings during the first and second rounds of the 2004 presidential elections in Ukraine. In Azerbaijan, the OSCE election observation mission reported a wide range of serious violations during the vote count at the polling stations and during the tabulation of results at constituency election commissions (OSCE 2006a: 2). The powerholders viewed fraudulent elections as a vehicle for extending the length of their tenure and keeping the pretence of legitimate authority. Notwithstanding gross human rights violations, the incumbents tolerated the presence of opposition political parties. For example, Musavat Party and the Popular Front Party of Azerbaijan (PFPA) participated in parliamentary elections and nominated their candidates for presidency. On the eve of the 2003 presidential elections, a total of thirty candidates, including Isa Gambar, leader of Musavat Party, and Ali Karimli, leader of PFPA, submitted applications for registration (Sodergren 2004). Similarly, the Central Election Commission of Georgia registered eleven candidates in the 2000 presidential election (OSCE 2000b: 10). In 2003 the National Movement and Burjanadze-Democrats passed seven-percent threshold to enter the Georgian parliament. Likewise, the bloc Our Ukraine headed by Viktor Yushchenko and the Tymoshenko bloc, named after the former prime minister Julia Tymoshenko, gained seats in the Ukrainian parliament as a result of the 2002 parliamentary elections (OSCE 2002: 24). In Serbia, 16

17 several political parties, including Democratic Party and Democratic Party of Serbia, competed for power in the 1990s. Finally, several opposition political parties, including the Belarusian Popular Front (BNF) and the United Civic Party of Belarus, were formally registered in Belarus. To protest the adoption of a new election code, most opposition political parties boycotted the 2000 parliamentary elections in Belarus. Despite considerable political setbacks, the opposition political parties and politicians associated with them posed a threat to political stability. If wellorganized, the political opposition could expose electoral fraud, enlist public support, and mobilize citizens against the current regime. Civic activists in several post-communist states have recently attempted to bring about regime change via elections. The assumption was that autocratic incumbents could be voted out of office by virtue of a well-organized get out the vote campaign, professional work of independent election observers, and large-scale post-election protests. Given the timing of mass protests and popular demands of regime change, such events were aptly described as electoral revolutions. This wave of electoral revolutions was marked by high levels of youth participation in protest events. 7 In large numbers, young people turned to the street to protest against voterigging. Furthermore, for months prior to elections, youth movements challenged the power of incumbent presidents and galvanized mass support for political change. Youth Movements in Post-Communist States Youth movements are here broadly defined as organized and conscious attempts on the part of young people to initiate or resist change in the social order (Braungart and Braungart 1990: 157). The modifier youth refers to the demographic composition of the movement. Illic (2001), 7 Though different segments of the population participated in post-election protests against electoral fraud, youth movements were often considered as the engine of anti-regime resistance (Chivers 2004; Cornwinr 2005). 17

18 for example, estimates that 71 percent of Otpor members were under 25 years of age. Empirical evidence further suggests that students formed the core of activists in the youth movements. This is consistent with the argument that the tipping point for participation in protest activity tends to be lower for students, compared to other social groups (Jarvikoski 1993; Karklins and Petersen 1993). Young people tend to have less access to positions of power and fewer commitments associated with the fulfillment of adult roles. At the same time, students play an important symbolic role in modern societies. As one former Otpor activist put it: Youth are small in numbers in the former Soviet republics, these are old nations. But students are perceived as the future of the nation. If they turn to the street, it signals to the rest of people that something is wrong. They don t stand only for themselves, but also for their families. 8 This study treats the level of youth mobilization during the election year as the dependent variable. In estimating the level of youth mobilization, the analysis relies upon three indicators: the size of the youth movement, the size of post-election protests, and the length of post-election protests. This study compares levels of youth mobilization in relative terms. First, this study assesses the level of youth mobilization in proportion to the population of the capital city because capital cities were central sites of political contestation in the region. Mass support for anti-regime protests in these urban areas could be interpreted as an indicator of the movement s success. Second, the analysis takes into account the number of regional branches, given the country s population. If the social movement functions only in the capital city, it considerably limits the scale of mass mobilization. In addition, the level of youth mobilization needs to be 8 Interview with Srdja Popovic, Otpor, member of the human resources and marketing department, Belgrade, January

19 evaluated in proportion to the regime s strength. In more repressive political regimes the movement of a larger size is necessary to upset the power balance. Though reported statistics capture cross-country differences, they should be considered only as crude estimates of youth mobilization. Accurate data on the movement size are missing for several reasons. First, some individuals participated in protest events without establishing a formal affiliation with the movement. Second, most former movement participants continue to live in repressive political regimes and decline to divulge full information about the size of antiregime social networks due to security concerns. Moreover, this study reports the size of postelection protests as a whole because it is nearly impossible to compile the headcount of young protesters in each country. Still, the overall size of post-election protests can give us a good proxy for the level of youth mobilization because multiple reports point to the numerical prevalence of young people among protesters in the street (Chivers 2004; Corwinr 2005). INSERT TABLE 1 HERE Table 1 presents estimates of mobilization levels in the region. Clearly, Otpor developed the most extensive network of activists. By September 2000 Otpor had more than 70,000 members in 130 branches across the country. According to the reported data, every hundredth citizen of Serbia was a movement participant. A smaller fraction of the total population joined social movements in Georgia and Ukraine. According to the most optimistic estimates, Kmara s membership reached 3,000 people at the peak of the movement s activity (Kandelaki 2006: 8). According to Kaskiv et al. (2005), Pora had more than 35,000 movement participants in the country of 45 million people. In Belarus Zubr established its presence in 152 towns, with more 19

20 than 1,500 people pledging the oath of allegiance to the movement (Babak 2002; Kobets n.d.). In contrast, Azerbaijani youth groups attracted no more than 100 people each and operated, mainly, in the capital city of Baku (Huseynov 2007). Notwithstanding data limitations, it is quite clear that post-election protests in Serbia and Ukraine were larger than those in Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Georgia. The size of the largest protest rally in Serbia was equivalent to more than half of Belgrade s population. Similarly, the largest gathering of protesters in Maidan, Kyiv s main square, approximated one-third of the city s population. Between three and ten percent of Tbilisi s population turned to the street on November 22-23, 2003 (Nodia 2005: 99). In contrast, the size of post-election protests was equivalent to less than one percent of the city s population in Baku and Minsk. In general, the data suggest that it is insufficient to bring 15,000 protesters to the city s main square to deter police violence. When hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians filled Maidan, the sheer size of the crowd imposed constraints on elite response. In contrast, the relatively small size of anti- Lukashenka protests unleashed political violence against civic activists. Finally, the length of post-election protests varies across the countries. The longest protest campaign was held in Ukraine, in part, due to the permanent occupation of the city s main square and the installment of the tent city. Thousands of Ukrainians stayed in the tent city from November to December Most people left the square on December 3, after the Supreme Court s ruling invalidated the fraudulent election results, while a few activists stayed downtown until December 26, the re-run of the second round of the presidential election. In the remaining cases, protest rallies were staged for several days after the fraudulent elections. The first post-election protest rally was held in Tbilisi on November 4, 2003, two days after the parliamentary elections. Subsequently, a round-the-clock protest rally was organized in front of 20

21 the parliamentary building from November 8 to November 14. After a short break the Georgian opposition forces resumed protest rallies and pressed for Shevardnadze s resignation. Two years after Georgia s Rose Revolution protest rallied were held in Baku. The length of protest rallies, however, was shorter in Azerbaijan. In the wake of the 2005 parliamentary elections, citizens participated in protest rallies on four separate dates. Furthermore, post-election rallies lasted for only two days in Belarus in The Belarusian opposition lost momentum when Hancharyk showed lack of interest in continuous anti-regime protests. Overall, this analysis registers cross-country variations in the extent of youth mobilization. This book contends that the study of tactical interactions between youth movements and incumbent authorities provides a partial explanation for divergent movement outcomes. Obviously, these tactical interactions were conditioned by the political environment and resource availability. The Study of Strategy and Tactics In recent years, there has been renewed interest in the study of movement strategies and tactics (Doherty 1999; Jasper 2004, 2006; McCammon 2003; McCammon et al. 2008; Minkoff 1999; Taylor and van Dyke 2004). Strategy is a long-term plan of action, while tactics denote specific means to execute a strategy. A major finding in the literature is that social movements tend to deploy a recurrent set of tactics to attain their goals. Tilly (1995: 26) develops the concept of the repertoire of contention to describe a limited set of routines that are learned, shared, acted out through a relatively deliberate process of choice. Strike, for example, is a common form of protest among workers. Yet, the toolkit of movement tactics may undergo change. Beckwith (2000: 181) introduces the concept of a hinge in collective action to define an opportunity to 21

22 adapt or replace the traditional repertoire. There may be several opportunities for the transformation of the repertoire. Based upon the analysis of women suffrage movement, McCammon (2003), for example, demonstrates how significant political defeat may trigger a change in movement tactics. Research further suggests that a period of heightened protest activity can engender the deployment of novel tactics. Tarrow (1993), for example, finds that Italian workers devised new forms of strike during the protest cycle of the 1960s and 1970s. Another strand of research focuses on countermovement tactics (for a review, see Davenport 2007). In non-democracies, the incumbent government is the movement s primary adversary. A consistent finding in this literature is that dissent provokes some form of repressive action. Repression can be defined as any actions taken by authorities to impede mobilization, harass and intimidate activists, divide organizations, and physically assault, arrest, imprison, and/or kill movement participants (Stockdill 1996: 146). The literature indicates that incumbent authorities can choose a wide range of repressive measures to retain power. Earl (2003), for example, develops a typology of repression and contrasts coercion with channeling. While coercion involves the use of force, channeling refers to a subtler form of repressive action aimed at affecting the forms of protest available, the timing of protests, and/or flows of resources to movements (Earl 2003: 48). Furthermore, the behavior of the coercive apparatus may change over time. Della Porta (1995), for example, documents the evolution of policing styles in Italy and Germany from the 1950s to the 1980s. These two lines of inquiry are somewhat disconnected. The concept of tactical interactions brings these two strands of research together by integrating into analysis tactics of both social movements and their opponents. McAdam (1983) singles out two components of tactical interactions: tactical innovation and tactical adaptation. 22

23 Tactical innovation refers to the use of novel tactics by challenger organizations. In turn, tactical adaptation describes tactics of the movement s opponents to counterbalance the use of unorthodox movement tactics. The concept of tactical interactions implies that both social movements and their opponents engage in strategic thinking. This study assumes that a small group of individuals movement leadership plays a crucial role in developing the movement s strategy and tactics. While rank-and-file members can engage in heated debates about movement s activities, it is oftentimes the movement leadership that shoulders the responsibility for charting the movement s course of action. Consistent with this view, prior research indicates that movement leadership affects movement dynamics in numerous ways (Nepstad and Bob 2006). From this vantage point, strategy is a result of interactions among the individuals authorized to strategize on behalf of the organization (Ganz 2009: 10). Following Ganz (2009), this study singles out three critical elements of the movement s strategy: timing, targeting, and tactics. First, the social movement needs to identify an opportunity for political change to act effectively upon its demands. Second, the social movement needs to focus on a specific target to make the best use of its resources. Third, movement participants need to choose tactics that are most likely to produce the desirable outcome. This study further distinguishes tactics pertaining to recruitment, tactics vis-à-vis opponents, and interactions with allies. The logic of numbers dictates that recruitment tactics are important to upset the power balance between the challenger organization and the powerholders. Moreover, tactics vis-à-vis opponents and allies are critical to the movement s effectiveness, since the social movement is usually at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the incumbent government. 23

24 The movement s opponent is another major player in tactical interactions. In nondemocracies, the incumbent government is the movement s primary adversary and target. It is reasonable to assume that incumbent governments can display resourcefulness in counteracting the deployment of unorthodox movement tactics. Yet, the concept of tactical adaptation has received little attention in social movement literature. As Ingram, Qingyuan Yue, and Rao (2007: 54) point out, protest targets have largely been depicted as actors devoid of strategic ability and, instead, either blind to protests or able to crudely repress activists using the levers of the state. In particular, incumbent authorities in non-democracies can devise a plethora of countermobilization measures to complement or substitute repressive action. Davenport (2007: 9), however, notes that social movement scholars tend to understudy such alternative mechanisms of social control as persuasion and selective incentives. This book extends social movement literature by examining state-movement interactions in hybrid regimes. Most empirical research on tactical interactions has been done in advanced industrial democracies. Dixon (2008), for example, examines the interplay between labor movements and employer organizations in the United States in the 1950s. Much less empirical work has focused on interactions between social movements and their opponents in nondemocracies (Titarenko et al 2001; Zhao 2000). Shriver and Adams (2010), for example, trace the evolution of environmental dissent and state response in communist Czechoslovakia. The rise of competitive authoritarian regimes provides another political context for analyzing the interplay between social movements and their opponents. The regime type has an effect on the repertoire of contentious collective action and the repertoire of countermovement tactics. Compared to social movements in liberal democracies, challenger organizations in hybrid regimes are likely to face higher barriers to political participation. At the same time, the 24

25 repertoire of countermovement tactics in hybrid regimes is constrained by the government s ambitions to maintain a façade of democracy. Under these circumstances, the choice of tactics has significant repercussions for social movement outcomes. Learning through Experience and Example This book further contends that learning is a critical dimension of tactical interactions. Before deciding upon the deployment of certain tactics, social movements and their opponents may draw lessons from their own experience or the experience of others. This study singles out engagement in previous protest campaigns and the cross-national diffusion of ideas as key learning mechanisms. A long-term history of mass mobilization has far-reaching consequences for statemovement interactions. Through participation in a series of protest campaigns civic activists can build their organizational skills and gain a better understanding of which anti-incumbent tactics work in a particular political context. Furthermore, episodes of mass mobilization in nondemocracies may create organizational holdovers that can be activated at a later point in time (Almeida 2003). Similarly, autocratic incumbents may respond to an outburst of mass mobilization more effectively if they reflect upon their action during previous protest campaigns. In addition, frequent confrontations with protesters may strengthen the capacities of the coercive apparatus to police and suppress protests. Though social movements and their opponents do not necessarily draw valuable lessons from previous protest campaigns, a record of mass mobilization in the country increases the chances that such learning might occur. The cross-national diffusion of ideas supplies another opportunity for learning by social movements and their opponents. Diffusion refers to the flow of social practices among actors 25