The Dera Sacha Sauda Controversy and Beyond

Transcription

1 The Dera Sacha Sauda Controversy and Beyond The emergence of a de facto consociational mode of governance under the auspices of the Shiromani Akali Dal (Badal)-Bharatiya Janata Party led government in 1997 could deter the assertion of violent communal identity politics in Punjab. Yet it remains to be seen if this mode of governance can play the same deterrent role in the case of caste-based identity politics in the state. The incumbent SAD(B)-BJP government s handling of the fallouts of the Dera Sacha Sauda controversy and its accommodation of the rapidly asserting dalit identity will be crucial in the preservation of peace in Punjab. Li o n e l Ba i x a s Following the appearance on May 13, 2007, of Gurmeet Ram Raheem Singh, the chief of the Dera Sacha Sauda sect, based in Sirsa district of Haryana, dressed as the tenth Sikh guru, Gobind Singh, and purportedly distributing amrit, in an advertisement carried out in newspapers, violent clashes arose in Bathinda district of Punjab, and to a lesser extent in Ludhiana and Moga, between the premis and followers of the Shiromani Gurudwara Prabhadank Committee (SGPC). The latter felt insulted by the advertisement and accused Gurmeet Singh of blasphemy while the former protested against the denigration of their master. Despite Gurmeet Singh s apology Joginder Singh Vedanti, jathedar of Akal Takht, issued a hukumnama (edict) directing all Sikhs to boycott the Dera Sacha Sauda and its premis. He also issued an ultimatum to the Punjab State government to arrest Gurmeet Singh within ten days. Not only had this event strongly echoed the April 13, 1978 clash between the Nirankari sect and Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale s followers in Amritsar, but the political dimension of the controversy linked to the fact that the Dera Sacha Sauda had supported the Congress during the February 2007 Punjab legislative assembly (PLA) elections made people fear that it could degenerate into a violent conflict. Nevertheless, the Shiromani Akali Dal (Badal)-Bharatiya Janata Party-led government somewhat managed to diffuse the tension mainly thanks to the overall control of the Parkash Singh Badal-led Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD-B) over the various components of the Sikh political system [Wallace et al 1981: 1-32]. However, besides the religious and political dimensions of the controversy, there is another dimension, namely the caste question, that could prove to degenerate into violence if not dealt with by the Badal government. The various deras are actually mostly composed by dalits and lower castes and are hence instrumental in the assertion of their identity on the political stage. That is mainly why they encounter stiff resistance from the upper caste jats-controlled SGPC and Punjab government. Exactly three months before, on February 13, 2007, PLA elections had taken place and surprisingly went largely unnoticed. It strikingly contrasts with the three previous PLA elections of 1992, 1997 and 2002, which received strong press and academic attention [Singh 1992: and 1998: ; Kumar and Kumar 2002a: ]. Is it a sign that democratic normalcy is now firmly established in Punjab 15 years after the end of the Khalistani insurgency? Actually, for the very first time, there was no reference at all during the electoral campaign to the tumultuous period that lasted between 1978 and 1992 and resulted in more than 25,000 casualties. More generally it must be said that though the so-called Punjab problem has been widely studied and subsequently deeply transformed the field of Punjab studies [Jodhka 1997: ], the process of normalisation that began in 1992 through the revival of electoral politics has been comparatively ignored. However, a study of the patterns of this normal isation process should provide us with valuable insights on the renewal of India s democracy since the beginning of the 1990s, at least in Punjab. Moreover, the political dynamics that we witnessed during these recent elections were more than simply a confirmation of the previous trends identified before by several scholars [Jodhka 2000: ; Kumar and Kumar 2002b: ]. It has in fact entered another significant dimension. The return of the region on the forefront of the Punjab political scene has already been assessed [Jodhka 2005: ]. However, what we seem to witness nowadays is the emergence of a de facto consociational power-sharing mode of governance under the auspices of the (SAD-B)-BJP-led Punjab government. To what extent the rise of power-sharing politics in Punjab has contributed to deter violence is the core of this article. In a breakthrough article, Arend Lijphart argued that India, especially during the Nehruvian era, would have evolved a de facto consociational power-sharing system [Lijphart 1996: ]. However, since prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru s death, the centralisation of power, particularly during Indira Gandhi s personalised rule, would have undermined these power-sharing features of the Indian political system and would have resulted in an upsurge of ethnic violence. It is to be noted that the core of the consociational argument is that it is the only mode of governance able to guarantee democratic stability in a multiethnic society. As a result, India, which has no institutionalised patterns of consoci ationalism and nonetheless somehow managed to preserve demo cratic stability, was a striking exception that undermined the power-sharing argument. According to Paul Brass, a strong opponent to consociational theory, India stands as the living proof of the fallacy of both the argument that democratic governance is impossible in a multiethnic context and the one that claims that consociationalism is the only regime able to provide it in this context [Brass 1991: ]. Ian Talbot concluded Economic and Political Weekly October 6,

2 on his side that even though a de facto consociational system existed in Punjab during the rule of the Punjab Unionist Party bet ween 1923 and 1946, power-sharing governance could not be applied in the context of contemporary India [Talbot 1996: 65-75]. A few years later, Steven Wilkinson contradicted all of them by claiming that actually India is nowadays closer to a consociational regime than it had never been the case during the Nehruvian era and, more importantly, that it is the very reason why ethnic violence has spread [Wilkinson 2000: ]. The argument, in this article, is first that the SAD (B)/BJP government in Punjab is now eventually engaged in a process of establishing a de facto consociational model of governance in Punjab which convin cingly managed to deter Hindu/Sikh communal and Sikh ethno-nationalist violence. But, second, that this power-sharing model could prove unable to deter caste violence as exemplified in the case of the Dera Sacha Sauda/SGPC controversy. I Since the revival of electoral politics in Punjab, first in 1992 but more convincingly in the subsequent years, Punjabi politics witnessed a gradual fading away of identity politics and a return to regional politics. The 1992 PLA elections were organised at a time when both militant and state violence were still widespread; hence very few expected it could provide an effective basis for normalisation in Punjab. Actually, during the electoral campaign, the very legitimacy of the elections was put into question. While according to the Punjab Congress Party the return to democracy through the tenure of provincial elections was a necessary prerequisite to the establishment of peace, the moderate Akali factions claimed on the contrary that peace must come first and then democracy can durably be reinstalled. As a result, these moderate Akali factions chose to follow the militant groups call for boycotting the elections. Moreover, the Akalis were compelled to boycott them as participation, when none of their demands expressed since the Anandpur Sahib Resolution, 1978 had been addressed during the electoral campaign, would have meant losing their face in the eyes of the people they claimed to represent. Unsurprisingly, these elections witnessed the lowest ever turnout in Punjab, 24 per cent and 21.5 per cent in assembly and Parliament elections respectively, and were stigmatised by the boycotters as an apology for a representative government. Beant Singh-led Congress 10 per cent government went on the restless repression of militancy through extrajudicial methods and finally managed somehow to eradicate it from Punjab. Then, in January 1993, panchayat elections were organised. The Congress secured an overwhelming electoral victory as in the subsequent elections, the September-October 1994 zilla parishad and panchayat samiti elections. What was eventually the most significant element in these elections was the very high turnout, around 82 per cent [Verma 1995: ]. It strongly emphasised the will of the electorate to revive electoral politics in Punjab. Furthermore, it strikingly contrasted with the commonly less significant role local bodies elections usually played in comparison to provincial and national elections. This time, on the contrary, it must be underlined that it was the local elections and not the provincial elections that significantly promoted such a change. The Congress electoral successes however soon came to an end as the peace card reached exhaustion. The radical and moderate Akali factions were able to come back to the forefront of the Punjabi political scene thanks to the disappearance of militancy. Actually, the Parkash Singh Badal-led faction managed to incarnate into moderation due to its refusal to enter the still rather radical alliance of six Akali factions promoted by Gurcharan Singh Tohra, president of the SGPC, and Manjit Singh, jathedar of the Akal Takht. In 1996, during the national elections, Badal faction openly supported the Bharatiya Janata Party and won 8 seats out of 13, the Congress stepping down from 12 to 2. They then decided to forge a pre-electoral alliance to contest the 1997 Punjab legislative assembly elections. It was a significant move from the past electoral strategies that the two had previously undertook as they shifted from a pragmatic postelectoral coalition government to a substantial pre-electoral alliance [Kumar P 2000: ]. In their common minimum electoral manifesto, they emphasised the need to promote peace and Sikh/Hindu unity as expressed in the much-heard slogans of Panth, Punjab, Punjabiat (Sikhs, Punjab, Punjabiness) or Punjabi ekta (unity of Punjab). Moreover, they advocated the need to shift from an anti-centre and confrontationist position toward a cooperative federalism. This was significant not only from the Akali Dal point of view but also from the perspective of the centre. The interference of the central government in Punjabi politics, first by destabilising the 1967, 1969 and 1977 elected coalition governments led by the SAD and second by sponsoring religious orthodox militant groups such as the Dal Khalsa and Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, head of the religious seminar Damdami Taksal, who became the militants iconic leader, by the end of the 1970s, proved to be critical for the emergence of violence in Punjab. From 1996 to 2002, during the successive tenure of the BJP-led a national governments, the centre had always kept aloof from Punjabi provincial politics. SAD-BJP Alliance Tastes Success During the 1997 electoral campaign, some panthic issues such as the transfer of Chandigarh and Punjabi-speaking areas or the setting up of a commission of inquiry into the police raj and 1984 Delhi anti-sikh riots were raised. Nevertheless, the prominent issues were not religio-political but rather politico-economic. The SAD (B) accused the incumbent Congress government of inefficiency and corruption and stressed the need for development and good governance in Punjab. As a result, he made a plethora of populist economic electoral promises such as building roads and bridges, supplying free power and water to farmers, octroi, fiscal governance, etc. The SAD/BJP combine made a landslide victory, the former getting 75 seats and the latter 18, its best ever tally. The complementarities of the electoral support base of both parties the SAD (B) gathering the rural jat Sikh votes and the BJP the urban Hindu votes were of critical importance in their success. Actually, these elections overwhelmingly represented a heavy sanction for the Congress which got only 14 seats. For the first time, an Akali-led Punjab government managed to end its five-year tenure. It was however unable to secure a second mandate. The economic non-performance of this govern ment activated the anti-incumbency factor, particularly vibrant in Punjab, and the factional strife between Badal and Tohra raised the spectre of gurudwara politics. However the SAD-BJP government must be credited, though not for good governance, for the fading away of identity politics in Punjab. In 4060 Economic and Political Weekly October 6, 2007

3 spite of the factional feud within the Sikh political system, the government never indulged in identity politics by raising panthic issues on the provincial political arena [Verma 1999: ]. It actually strongly benefited to the Punjab Congress Party. By the mid-1990s, despite the disappearance of militancy, it was strongly associated in the eyes of the people to the tumultuous period between 1978 and As its memory was hardly raised between 1997 and 2002, and nearly not at all during the 2002 PLA electoral campaign, the Punjab Congress now posited itself anew on the political stage and made its manifesto meaningful for the electorate. What then mattered most for the people, was economic performance and good gover nance. If the Congress was able to provide it, then there was no issue to vote for it. The Punjab Congress came to power in It sanctioned the second alternance at power in Punjab in just ten years, according to Samuel Huntington the two-turnover test being a convincing sign of effective democratic consolidation [Huntington 1992: ]. The core of the Congress electoral promises were relatively similar to the ones of the SAD (B)/BJP as was the content of the accusations of corruption made at each other by the respective leader of the SAD (B) and the Punjab Congress, Badal and Amarinder Singh, a former moderate Akali heir of the princely state of Patiala. Actually, if the SAD (B) tally suffered an important decline, the most significant loss concerned the BJP whose tally came down from 18 to 3. It then became evident that the content of the political agenda as well as the electoral prospect of the SAD (B) were strongly linked to the electoral performance of its ally, the BJP, as the Punjabi electorate was getting increasingly polarised [Verma 2002: ]. II In 2007, the third consecutive government of Punjab ended its five-year tenure. The February 2007 elections again witnessed another power alternation with the return of the Badal-led SAD- BJP alliance at the head of Punjab. This was anticipated by the BJP-SAD (B) s landslide electoral victory in the 2004 Lok Sabha elections. The alliance got 11 seats out of 13, the Akalis polling 34.3 per cent of votes and the BJP 10.5 per cent. The two remaining seats were won by the Congress who had seats adjustments with the left parties, the CPI and the CPI(M). Once again, we witnessed a complete reversal of the previous results in the 1999 Lok Sabha elections and the 2002 assembly elections, over- whelmingly favourable to the Congress, which themselves had introduced a complete reversal from the 1997 assembly elections and 1998 Lok Sabha elections, which had benefited the then SAD/BJP combine. It is puzzling to note that twice, once the Akali-BJP in 1999 and once the Congress in 2004, the incumbents have lost the elections so badly within two years of their strong success in the respective assembly elections of 1997 and Explaining such regular changes in the electoral performances of the Akali Dal and the Congress in Punjab since 1966, and especially since 1992, could appear as a puzzle for the political scientist. As insightfully put by Ashutosh Kumar, in Punjab, religion, caste, region, language and leadership factors combine differently in different elections to produce contrasting electoral outcomes [Kumar 2004: ]. Only two years after the Congress was sworn in Punjab, the electorate clearly expressed its discontent with it. The anti-incumbency factor must have played a role as 45 per cent of the respondents to the NES 2004 post-poll survey rated the performance of Akali- BJP government better than the one of the present Congress government. According to the CSDS team, the positive evaluation, especially on the economic front, of the BJP-led NDA government at the centre was particularly harmful for the Punjab Congress government [CSDS team 2004: 28-30]. Moreover, since the 1999 Lok Sabha elections, the Akali factions of Gurcharan Singh Tohra and Kuldip Singh Wadala merged with the Akali Dal (Badal), while the Congress suffered from internal rivalries and defections, a trend commonly coined as the rebel factor. Development Back as Agenda The electoral campaign for the 2007 PLA elections displayed again the same usual populist promises and personal attacks between Parkash Singh Badal and Amarinder Singh. Badal made price rise a poll issue in order to seduce Dalits and poor sections; he promised cheap rations, tubewell connections and numerous freebies like free electricity and water, and he labelled Singh as the most inexperienced and inefficient chief minister the state had ever seen. He added now the Maharaja will face the wrath of the people. The common man has taken to the street to oppose its anti-people policies (quoted in Hindustan Times, January 21, 2007). Harish K Puri [Puri 2007] blames the contenders for the banality of political discourse and poverty of ideas. All major parties focused on issues relating to development such as employment, electricity, roads, education and so on. But corruption was at the centre stage. During the 2002 assembly election campaign, Amarinder Singh had seemed to enjoy a relative advantage against Badal, in whose regime corruption was widely believed to have touched new heights. After five years, though Singh suffered a credibility deficit precisely on that count. The shift from religio-political issues such as the transfer of Chandigarh, Anandpur Sahib Resolution, human rights violations, to political-economic issues such as transparency, good governance, economic performance seems to have strongly enforced the anti-incumbency factor. This election was the first since the 1992 PLA elections in which the panthic issues were totally absent and unaddressed. The Akalis seemed to have renounced any attempt to communalise these polls. It is a clear indicator that what the people of Punjab foremost want is economic growth and efficient public services, that is good governance. But is it a sign of reconciliation? Does it mean that Hindus and Sikhs are now reconciled despite the traumatic events of random killings of Hindus, of Operation Blue Star, of the Delhi anti-sikh riots? As put by Shekar Gupta, So in 2007, 23 years after that conversation [with Sant Longowal in 1984 about the need for peace and the impossibility of reconciliation], if the Akalis and the BJP come together in a ruling alliance in a clean election where 76 per cent come out to vote, and where Akalis fielded seven Hindus and the BJP, four jat Sikhs, what would you call it? The victory of two cynical rival communal forces? Or the arrival of a new politics, a nationalist alliance that bridges what almost became a disastrous communal divide though not passing the test of classical, ideological secularism. Whichever side you are on, it is a moment to savour, a moment of change, evolution and reconciliation [Gupta 2007]. Economic and Political Weekly October 6,

4 The BJP has been highly instrumental in the electoral victory of the SAD-BJP alliance. In fact, the Congress continued to realise important gains in the rural areas and especially in the Malwa region, the traditional electoral bastion of the SAD, mainly due to the Dera Sacha Sauda sect support. Actually, for the first time, the Congress won in the Malwa region and the SAD (B) in the Majha and Doaba regions, traditional strongholds of the Congress. Compared to the 2002 PLA elections, the SAD (B) augmented its tally by only 8 seats. Considering the huge turnout, 76 per cent, it is possible to assess that the Punjabi party system is experiencing an increasing bipolarisation between the Congress and the Akali Dal (Badal) [Kumar 2007]. None of the other contenders, the Marxist parties, the BSP and significantly the panthic alliance between SAD (Amritsar), SAD (1920), SAD (Longowal), Dal Khalsa, Majha Akali Dal and Shiromani Khalsa Panchayats, managed to win any seat. Yet, the BJP proved to be crucial in the victory of the combine, hence becoming more and more indispensable for the Akali Dal (Badal). The BJP realised dramatic gains by securing 19 seats, new record for the party, whereas it could only get three in the 2002 PLA elections, hence nearly wiping out the Congress from urban consti tuencies. However, the electoral outcome is not a positive vote in favour of the SAD-BJP alliance but rather an indictment of the non-performance compounded by the internal bickering within the Congress. In the absence of credible alternatives, the electorate in Punjab has repeatedly been forced to go for what they possibly begin to see as a lesser evil with the passage of time. Like in the case of Congress in 2002, SAD-BJP has come back to power primarily due to the follies of their opponents rather than their own policies and programmes or lack of it [Kumar 2007: ]. Such a comment tells a lot about the responsibilities the SAD-BJP government will have to bear during its tenure. Regionalisation of Punjab Polity One of the most interesting dynamics that occured in Punjab between 1992 and 2007 is the increasing regionalisation of identity and politics. The emphasis of the Akalis discourse on punjabiat and on Punjabi ekta is a clear example of that move. Actually, according to Pritam Singh, the process of the transformation of Akali Dal from a Sikh party to a regional Punjabi party seems to be at last beginning to take place [Singh 2007: ]. For the first time in its history, the Akali Dal has put up a substantial number, seven, of Hindus as its candidates. The BJP also has selected four jat Sikhs as its candidates in some constituencies. Not only has it opened its gate to the Hindus but also to the dalit Sikhs some of whom were included in the political affairs committee and given electoral tickets. Eventually, the Akali Dal is engaged in a process of broadening of its electoral basis by inclusion of all sections of the Punjabi population irrespective of their religion or caste. This move is likely to meet the will of the people of Punjab to be represented by a strong regional party and not only to rely on national parties such as the Congress and the BJP. At the same time, the Punjab Congress Party under the leader ship of Amarinder Singh is also increasingly becoming a regional party distinct from the national Congress Party. We have already noted that its support basis now comes from the three regions of Punjab and even from the jat Sikhs of Malwa. In this context, the fact that the decision to abolish the 1981 agreement on distribution of river waters with the states of Haryana and Rajasthan was made by the Punjab Congress Party without even consulting the central leadership of the Congress is to be mentioned [Jodhka 2005: 224]. The Termination of Agreements Bill was unanimously approved by the PLA. Moreover, the Punjab Congress Party is getting increasingly involved in celebrating religious and cultural events related to Punjab s history, hence disregarding the claim of the Akali Dal to be the sole spokesperson for the Punjabis. These interrelated trends toward the unioni sation of the Akali Dal and the punjabisation of the Congress Party, to be fully understood, must be placed in the general context of the changes in Indian politics since the beginning of the 1990s, that is the strengthening of regionalist parties, their increasing influence on national politics and the subsequent devolution of political decision-making from the centre to the states. Comparisons with the Punjab Unionist Party It would be in fact tempting to draw a parallel, as was underlined a few sentences before by using the term unionisation, between the current near de facto consociational rule of the Akali (B)-BJP government and the Punjab Unionist rule between 1923 and However, there are striking differences between the two that must be stressed first in order to allow a fruitful comparison. Firstly, the Punjab Unionist Party was a single party set up in 1923 through the gathering of members of the first Punjab legislative council created in 1921 whereas we have today a pre-electoral alliance of two political parties. There are actually only few prospects that could indicate that the SAD (B) would be able to implement by itself such a powersharing mode of governance in the near future. Secondly, the Punjab Unionist Party was overtly and essentially representing the agrarian interests of the Punjabi landed aristocracy from within the three religious communities that composed preindependence Punjab. As a matter of fact, it corresponded rather to a supra-communal alliance of agrarian elites whose electoral strength relied on the manipulation of strategic local and factional alliances. Today, the colonial state as well as the Punjabi Muslim population has vanished and the SAD (B)-BJP alliance represents a more pro-poor ideology with a proper mass electoral support among both rural and urban voters. Nonetheless, what still appears common between the Punjab Unionist Party and the SAD (B)-BJP alliance is the emphasis on the region. Both formations, though in a rather different manner, have tried to evolve a supra-communal regional identity, namely, punjabiat. With regard to the Punjab Unionist Party, Ian Talbot concluded that the use of elite accommodation, grand coalition and proportionality in recruitment to the public services tend to justify its association with consociationalism, though it could also be argued that it bears similarities with the Congress system between 1947 and 1967 [Talbot 1996: 74]. Steven Wilkinson agreed with Talbot to designate the colonial era of provincial politics as consociational and disagreed with Lijphart to apply the same qualification to the Nehruvian era. Yet, he acknowledged that India s democracy has become increasingly consociational since Nehru s death. According to him, the rise of violence, especially Hindu/ Muslim riots and caste violence, in India during the 1980s and 1990s would actually be related to the consociational nature of 4062 Economic and Political Weekly October 6, 2007

5 India s democracy. He argued that consociationalism might have contributed to the rise of violence through the reification and institutionalisation of identities, though it cannot only be blamed for this as other factors must have played their part. The SAD (B)-BJP combine is doubtlessly a grand coalition, which gathered both Sikhs and Hindus, and rural and urban voters. The compulsions of coalition politics have forced both the SAD (B) and the BJP to moderate their political agenda, especially its communal dimension, hence diffusing elite accommodation which contributes to the development of informal minority vetoes and cultural autonomy. Finally, the overall regionalisation of Indian politics and the emergence of lower caste political parties have increased the competitiveness of the political system and ensured that minority votes played a more and more important role and also electoral politics became more proportional. As a result, the politicians overwhelmingly resorted to the grant of job reservations, linguistic protections, special economic programmes and reserved seats in the legislatures. However, caste politics, especially dalits assertion, is far less developed in Punjab than in the Hindi belt. Thus, if powersharing politics have contributed to the decline of religiousbased identity politics, it does not seem to be the case as far as caste-based identity politics is concerned. To illustrate that, we are now going to turn our attention toward the Dera Sacha Sauda/SGPC controversy. III Exactly three months after the PLA elections, the appearance, on May 13, 2007, of Gurmeet Ram Raheem Singh, the chief of the Dera Sacha Sauda sect, dressed as the 10th Sikh guru, Gobind Singh, and purportedly distributing amrit, in an advertisement carried out in some newspapers, fuelled what seemed at first to be sectarian-related violence but would eventually be revealed as caste-related violence. The day after violent clashes resulting in 25 people wounded, arose in Bhatinda district of Punjab, and to a lesser extent in Ludhiana and Moga, between the premis and followers of the Shiromani Gurudwara Prabhadank Committee and the Sikh Student Federation (Mehta). The latter felt insulted by the advertisement and accused Gurmeet Singh of blasphemy while the former protested against the denigration of their master. Among the Sikh protesters, Balwant Singh Nandgarh, Jathedar of Takht Damdama Sahib, Harnam Singh Dhuma, Jathedar of the Damdami Taksal, and Daljit Singh Bitoo, a former militant now affiliated to the Akali Dal (Mann) were involved. Giani Joginder Singh Vedanti, Jathedar of Akal Takht, issued a hukumnama directing all Sikhs to boycott the Dera Sacha Sauda and its premis. He also issued an ultimatum to the Punjab state government to arrest Gurmeet Singh within 10 days. However, most of the Singh sahibs (apex clerics) considered this edict to be too soft. A Return of Religious Passions? Most of the Sikh religious organisations formerly involved in the Khalistan movement were leading the protest against the Dera Sacha Sauda. Amidst Sikhs branding their swords, some former Khalistani militants were also involved and slogans in favour of the establishment of Khalistan were raised during the protests. The expression of regret by Gurmeet Singh on May 19 was rejected by the Sikh clergy which urged the Deras to give up all their assets in Punjab by May 27. An apology was addressed to Guru Gobind Singh; yet most of these groups were not appeased and still demanded the government to seal all assets of the Dera Sacha Sauda. Moreover, a march to Salabatpura village of Bathinda district to seize the Dera s campus there was pressed for and a bandh called. The bandh, which was near total, occurred on May 22 but remained peaceful. This event brought back memories of the Khalistan insurgency as it also began by a sectarian clash, that time between the Nirankaris and Bhindranwale, Jathedar of the Damdami Taksal, and its followers, 13 of whom died. The rise of Bhindranwale was actually propelled by this very event. Here also, more than the religious aspect of the contro versy, it is the political dimension of the conflict that was reminiscent of the beginning of the Khalistan movement. In 1978, while ironically Parkash Singh Badal was already Punjab chief minister, the Nirankaris were protected by the Congress while Bhindranwale was also sponsored by it allegedly to weaken the moderate Akalis. Before the February 2007 PLA elections, the seven-member Political Affairs Wing (PAW) of the Dera Sacha Sauda sect, for the first time in the history of the sect founded in 1948 by a partition refugee from Baluchistan, Shyam Mastana, issued a directive to its followers in Punjab, especially well represented in the south-western districts of the state, to cast each and every vote in favour of the Congress candidates in the 2007 PLA elections. Despite the Congress overall electoral defeat in the polls, this played a significant role in the Congress victory in several constituencies of the Malwa region, a traditional bastion of the Akali Dal. Actually, without the near wiping out of the Congress from urban Hindu constituencies by the BJP, the Akali Dal (Badal) could hardly have won the elections. Since then, the Akalis strongly resented the Deras, violence had already erupted one month before the controversy, when a Sacha Sauda memorial was ravaged on April 23. The reasons for the Dera s support of the Congress remain unclear. One thing is that Gurmeet Singh s daughter is related by wedding to Bhatinda s Congress legislator, Harminder Singh Jassi, and Amarinder Singh s advisor, Bharat Inder Singh Chahal. According to others, Gurmeet Singh would have exchanged his support for the Congress to obtain its protection against a possible indictment for the murder of Ram Chandra Chhatrapati, a Sirsa-based journalist who was investigating alleged Sacha Sauda criminality, and the CBI s probing allegations that he was involved in such illegal practices as sexual enslavement of women premis. Other conspiracy-lovers suspected the Congress to have intentionally fomented sectarian trouble with a view to destabilise the Badal government, hence embarrassing its relationship with its ally, the BJP. Response by SAD-BJP to the Dera Issue Consequently, the recent SAD (B)-BJP government experienced its first fault line as the BJP dissociated itself from the bandh called on May 22 and put firm pressure on chief minister Badal to diffuse sectarian tension or otherwise the party will not hesitate to take drastic actions, which meant leaving the coalition government. The BJP s Punjab general secretary Kamal Sharma added: The images of shops being forcibly shut and damaged by Sikh youth brought back memories of the days of militancy to our supporters. The baba has undoubtedly done Economic and Political Weekly October 6,

6 wrong but the inaction by the Badal government for four days is not justified. We want Badal to ensure that the radical elements of the Sikh community do not take centre stage [Singh V J 2007: 16]. Chief minister Badal appeared initially rather inconsistent. He intervened only after May 17 when violence had already broken out and streets were taken on by crowds of angry Sikhs wearing swords and spears. According to Pramod Kumar, Badal was deliberately slack. He should have acted on the first day itself. What was the point in allowing the sarbat khalsa in Talwandi Sabo on May 17 in the Malwa heartland where passions were already inflamed? It is to be noted that Badal called an allparty meeting only on May 18 after the sarbat khalsa, which called for the boycott of the premis. No measures were taken to prevent the Sikh crowds from marching from Talwandi Sabo to the Dera Salabatpura where violence erupted. This should have been anticipated. The police only got into when the matter had gone out of hand [Singh V J 2007: 16]. Harish Puri commented that Badal is using the crisis to consolidate his panthic hegemony but runs the risk of letting the radicals gain ground. While Puri s concerns seem legitimate, it actually proved to be the contrary as shown by the case of Paramjit Singh Sarna, president of the Delhi unit of the SGPC and convener of the hardline Khalsa Action Committee (KAC). He finally dissociated himself from the radical opposition toward the Dera Sacha Sauda and joined the Badal government which he was previously trying to destabilise. He himself played the peace broker by facilitating the reception of Gurmeet Singh s latest letter of apology. That this apology could not be accepted by the Sikh hardliners actually does matter considering Badal s control of the Sikh political system. Between 1997 and 1999, Badal managed to gain overall control over the various components of the Sikh political system: the president of the party, the leader of the legislative wing who becomes chief minister if the party forms the government, the president of the SGPC and the jathedar of the Akal Takht. Factional feuds arose between Badal and Tohra over the respective roles of the SAD and the SGPC. Badal considered that it was the occasion to assess his power over the SGPC and the Akal Takht, respectively run at that time by Gurcharan Singh Tohra and Manjit Singh. After a while, Badal finally managed to dismiss both and to replace them with close collaborators [Chatterjee 2000: ]. The price to pay for Badal was the electoral defeat of its party first in the 1999 Lok Sabha elections, then in the 2002 PLA elections. Nevertheless, his control over the Sikh political system was by then confirmed and still remains till date. The most important development concerning this episode was, as clairvoyantly put forward by A S Narang, that it was not a simple continuation of the traditional factional strife within the Sikh political system but rather the initiation of a secular turn under the auspices of the SAD (B) [Narang 1999: ]. The secular nature of this dynamic has been confirmed by the attitude of Badal during the Dera Sacha Sauda controversy. However, it has also confirmed the fact that Badal remains first and foremost a Sikh, and not a Punjabi, political leader. Despite some initial inconsistencies in the handling of the crisis and some attempted violence against Gurmeet Singh, Badal-led government now appeared to have calmed the overall law and order situation. Later Prakash Singh Badal claimed that no one will be allowed to disturb the hard-earned atmosphere of peace and communal harmony and the government will deal firmly with anyone trying to take law in its hands. Badal appealed to all Punjabis to rise above communal or ideological differences and preserve and safeguard communal harmony in the state. The Caste Dimension Yet, there is another dimension related to the Dera Sacha Sauda/SGPC controversy, the caste dimension, which has to be dealt with as it could considerably disrupt the relatively quiet political situation in Punjab both at short- and long-term perspectives. According to Praveen Swami and Aman Sethi, Gurmeet Singh s choice to back the Congress could be linked to the often forgotten caste dimension of Punjab politics, and especially the dalits assertion [Swami and Sethi 2007: 25-28]. He could have tried to maximise the attraction the Dera Sacha Sauda generated, as well as other sects such as the Ravidasis, the Radhasaomis or the Bhaniarawalas, among both Hindu and Sikh dalits which still suffer discrimination in Punjab, especially in rural areas. Though the exact per cent of dalits within the Sacha Sauda is not known with precision, it is believed to be wide, may be as much as 70 per cent. What nonetheless is known for sure is that Punjab is the Indian state which has the highest percentage composition of dalits, approximatively around 30 per cent. Despite this strong proportion in the Punjabi population, and the fact that they are the best-off across India, the dalits of Punjab have still been unable to assert themselves on the political scene in contrast to dalits in Uttar Pradesh through the BSP. In Punjab, their assertion is propelled through the aegis religion. It began first with the ad dharm movement launched by Mangoo Ram during the 1920s. The ad dharm movement projected itself as a new religion and the untouchables as a distinct religious community from Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs. Their separate status was recog nised by the 1931 colonial census and this movement enjoyed a great popularity among the Chamars of the Doab region. Thus, the Deras played an important role in the articulation of dalits identity and interests and could command growing numbers of followers who asked for their share of power and wealth. As a matter of fact, in Punjab, religious rebellion from mainstream Sikhism became the vehicle of dalit resistance against alienation and discrimination. That is the prominent reason, and not the controversial use of Sikh symbols, why the orthodox Sikh institutions are defiant toward these godmen and sometimes try to suppress their movement, for instance the case with Piara Singh Bhaniarawala. The broad significance of this phenomenon has been succinctly underlined by Meeta and Rajivlochan: it concerned a number of issues: the protest by at least one group of dalits against the domination of the present-day SGPC and upper castes over the gurudwaras and by implication the Akal Takht, the ability of the dominant groups to mobilise state support for their control over the gurudwaras and expressions of religion and the strong response from the people of Punjab to the perceived threat to religion, especially from those adopting the iconic emblems of the Sikh gurus [Rajivlochan 2007: ]. Another recent caste-related conflict also clearly illustrated this process of identity assertion among the Punjabi dalits: the case of Talhan. A conflict arose in the beginning of June 2003 between ad dharmis and jat Sikhs in the village of Talhan, situated near Jallandhar in the Doab region, over the question of representation and participation of the former in the management of a religious shrine, demand which was rejected by the managing committee, mostly composed of jats, of the shrine [Jodhka 2004: ]. Jodhka aptly 4064 Economic and Political Weekly October 6, 2007

7 emphasised that the Talhan case was more than just another case of caste oppression but rather a significant test case, an experience of assertion. It was a case of demanding equal rights and a share in the resources, material as well as symbolic, that belong commonly to the village and had so far been under the exclusive control of the locally dominant caste. Their ability to make such a claim was itself a result of a long history of struggle and consolidation, which included making claims over resources available in the Sikh religion. While violence related to the Dera Sacha Sauda/SGPC controversy still erupted on July 8 when KAC militants and premis clashed in Ferozepur [Zaidi 2007: 28-30], this very contro versy might not lead to an upsurge of violence in Punjab. Never theless, this controversy is but an epiphenomena of a larger dynamic of caste-based identity politics and dalits assertion which if not dealt with quickly and properly could certainly lead to civil strife in Punjab [Ram 2007: 19]. Conclusion To what extent has identity politics faded away in Punjab since 1992? It seems that the revival of electoral politics in Punjab since 1992 has successfully managed to deter communal identity politics by focusing the provincial political agenda on Hindu/ Sikh unity and good governance. The successive SAD (B)-BJP and Punjab Congress government have contributed to put the Punjabi regional identity on the forefront and to preserve peace. Significantly, it appears that following the recent February 2007 PLA elections the new SAD (B)-BJP government is engaged in a process of implementing a de facto proto-consociational mode of governance which should be able to deter communal violence. However, it remains to be seen if it could play the same preservative role as far as caste-based identity politics is concerned. Since past few years, a dalit identity assertion movement is gaining momentum in Punjab. It is in this context that the recent Dera Sacha Sauda/SGPC controversy must be understood as well as the Talhan case and the Bhaniarawala phenomenon. Will it lead to an upsurge of violence or not actually heavily depends on the attitude, accommodating or not, that the Jat Sikhdominated SGPC and Punjab government will adopt toward this movement. If on a short-term perspective, the controversy with Dera Sacha Sauda should not disrupt the political situation, it appears that on a longer perspective, the scenario seems far more enthusiastic. EPW lionel.baixas@csh-delhi.com [This paper is based on a communication realised on July 9, 2007, at India Habitat Centre, New Delhi, during the concluding seminar of the research project India s Democratic Renewal in Question, organised by the Centre de Sciences Humaines (CSH), New Delhi, and coordinated by Stéphanie Tawa-Lama-Rewal, part of the French foreign affairs ministerfunded research project on Democratic Transformations in Emerging Countries: South America, Africa, Asia, coordinated by Institut Français d Afrique du Sud (IFAS).] References Brass, Paul R (1991): Ethnic Conflict in Multiethnic Societies: The Consociational Solution and Its Critics, in Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison, Sage, Delhi. 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