Inquiry into New Zealand's relationship with South Pacific Countries~. Individual Submission: /7 ~,

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1 PAc Inquiry into New Zealand's relationship with South Pacific Countries~. ~ Individual Submission: /7 ~, Dr. Teresia K. Teaiwa, Pacific Studies, Victoria University of Wellington 74 Rather than attempting to speak to the full range of this inquiry, this submission\~~" ~d~,,> / focuses on specific areas of interest and relevance to my academic background and ''~ "4 / interests. What my submission addresses comes under the inquiry's themes of: ~, ~/ 1. Identifying strategic threats to New Zealand's relationship with Pacific Forum members; 2. Identifying opportunities to advance New Zealand's relationships with governments and peoples in the Pacific Forum countries. Preliminary remarks I am Senior Lecturer and Programme Director for Pacific Studies at Victoria University of Wellington. I have been in this position for seven years, and have had occasion to work with NZAID and MFAT in various formal capacities. Overall, it is my assessment that there is tremendous goodwill towards New Zealand from Pacific Forum countries and civil society groups. Where New Zealand's relationships have been strained usually has had more to do with specific personalities and intellectual limitations rather than irreconcilable differences on a generalized national scale. It is important to note that while New Zealand has an unusual wealth of human and cultural capital that could be brought effectively to bear on its Pacific relationships this wealth must not be overestimated or deployed gratuitously. Furthermore, it is crucial that New Zealand avoid any conceit or smugness about its position and reputation in the Pacific region. There is a great deal of room for improvement. There are four main issues that this submission addresses: ~2 M3 oo I~l O inconsistencies between New Zealand's trade and aid policies in the Pacific i the increasing influence of China and other new Asian donors with Pacific ~ii :o im O 171 Forum members; l i M1 the dissonance between New Zealand's historic military and defence exchanges with Pacific forum members and New Zealand's aims for regional security; the responsibility of enhancing New Zealanders' knowledge and understanding of the Pacific region. New Zealand's trade and aid policies in the Pacific It is clear that New Zealand is committed to promoting processes of economic restructuring and integration in the Pacific region, and that there is little scope for Pacific Islands Countries (PICs) to pursue their own self determined alternatives with New Zealand's support. What continues to persist is a gross trade imbalance between New Zealand and PICs that is not significantly remedied by increased levels of aid. As long as PICs are encouraged to carry on privatizing utilities and state owned

2 Teresia K. Teaiwa Submission 2/5 enterprises without regard for how this inevitably translates into transferring state monopoly into private monopoly in small economies, New Zealand's aid policies will continue to have piecemeal effects because they are not accounting for greater structural problems. Persisting with this approach will see deteriorating economic and social conditions in PICs, and possibly see the further decline in New Zealand's economic influence in the region. One of the sectors in Pacific economies that New Zealand could truly enhance is agriculture. An economy built on a strong agricultural base (that benefited in no small way by the exploitation of phosphate resources on the Pacific Islands of Nauru and Banaba or Ocean Island), New Zealand also has a highly developed quarantine infrastructure. It is the latter which functions as the biggest barrier to trade with PICs. If New Zealand was serious about remedying its trade imbalance with PICs it would help them build their capacity for meeting New Zealand's and other markets' stringent quarantine compliance measures. It would seem that New Zealand has deferred to the EU's virtual dominance of Pacific agriculture through the EU's arrangements with the African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) organization. Given the finite nature of the ACP's privileged relationship with the EU, however, New Zealand should have had long term and extensive plans for stepping into the breach at least in terms of offering training and technical exchange that would enable PIC members of the ACP to make transitions that would maintain sustainable agricultural bases. According to the NZAID website, New Zealand currently has agricultural development projects in Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu, but it is curious that agriculture has not been given priority in countries like Fiji, Tonga and Samoa which have historically relied on this sector. A recent news story noted that when China hosted a meeting of the African Development Bank, Chinese officials "stressed the crucial role of public investments, especially in agriculture and infrastructure, to lay the basis for private sector growth." (The Dominion Post 25 May, 2007: B5) New Zealand's trade and aid policies over the last decade have emphasized cuts in public sector spending in the vain hope of stimulating sustainable private sector growth. Ever since the government of the day rejected the implications of the MIRAB model of small Pacific Islands economies (Cook Islands, Kiribati, Niue, Tokelau, Tuvalu) produced by Geoff Bertram and Raymond Watters in 1985 (i.e. these small economies are not likely to ever shake dependency on migration, remittances, aid or bureaucracy) New Zealand has failed to accurately assess the limits and possibilities of Pacific economies and has insisted on pushing models for growth that are patently unsustainable. The Increasing Influence of China and other New Asian Donors in the Pacific It has for some time concerned me that the New Zealand response to China's and other new Asian donors' increasing influence in the Pacific is ambivalent to say the least, and alarmist at the extreme. (see Teaiwa 2004, Teaiwa 2001) While New Zealand is quite happy to negotiate a lucrative free trade agreement with China for itself and is prepared to tiptoe around China's sensitivities regarding Taiwan and religious and ethnic minority groups such as the Tibetans and Falun Gong,. it seems too easily prepared to treat with suspicion and trepidation the growing presence of China and other new Asian players in the aid pool for the Pacific. This double standard smacks of racism and does little to dissuade PICs from courting new Asian

3 Teresia K. Teaiwa Submission 3/5 donors for their own purposes. The continued sensationalist framing of analyses of China's and other Asian donors' roles in the Pacific by New Zealand academics, media and bureaucrats is both un illuminating and counter productive to finding a more balanced and credible approach for New Zealand. China is clearly making significant investments in infrastructural development in PICs. New Asian donors like Taiwan, Malaysia, and Indonesia are strategically engaging in high leverage sectors such as infrastructure, forestry and timber, and finance. By genuinely augmenting its expertise on Asia, New Zealand will also be able to gain more insight into and be able to better manage its own performance in the new aid and trade environment in the Pacific. New Zealand's military and defence exchanges with Pacific Forum members One of the key aims of New Zealand's aid policy is peace building and conflict prevention. Regional security is also a key foreign policy issue for New Zealand and other Pacific Forum member nations. The Pacific features prominently in both the key elements and objectives of the Ministry of Defence: for example, "to assist in the maintenance of security in the South Pacific and to provide assistance to New Zealand's Pacific neighbours." It should give pause for serious introspection for New Zealand, then, when military personnel in Pacific forum countries who have received education or defence training in New Zealand do not resign their posts as a matter of principle when their commanders require them to break the law or act in contravention of the constitution of their nation. A recent MA thesis in Development Studies at the University of the South Pacific documents high ranking officers in the Fiji Military Forces making lofty statements about commitment to constitutionality, professionalism, and staying out of national politics (Senibulu 2005). Yet a year later, many of the same officers interviewed were actively participating in and supporting the December 2006 military coup. What makes the difference between rhetoric and practice, and what is New Zealand's role in promoting congruence between the two for the military personnel from the Pacific that it trains? This is a question that must be examined. It is worth noting that even though it had been determined as early as 1987 that the overrepresentation of indigenous Fijians in the Fiji Military Forces was a contributing factor to political instability in Fiji, New Zealand has continued to engage in military and defence exchanges with that country, and has made no public statements in support of diversifying the ethnic profile of the military in Fiji. It is imperative that New Zealand reevaluate its military and defence training and exchange protocols and seek to understand the military and/or political cultures of their Pacific forum partners better, New Zealanders' knowledge and understanding of the Pacific region New Zealand has a long history in the Pacific, and New Zealanders have established a multitude of positive relationships in the Pacific that have yet to be fully appreciated by either the government or the general public. As a result, New Zealand's intellectual heritage vis ā vis the Pacific remains fragmentary and dispersed among pockets of individuals. To a large extent, Foreign Affairs, Trade and Aid expertise is jealously guarded, with officials becoming heavily reliant on their (limited) personal contacts in the Pacific region, and unwilling to consult a diversity of resources. It becomes quite

4 Teresia K. Teaiwa Submission 4/5 easy for officials to be captivated by like minded members of local intelligentsia or social elites, but few inroads are made by them in terms of understanding and influencing extremists and their constituencies, who are often quite simply the disenchanted of a society. While it is true that experience is the best teacher, the MFAT approach to rotating diplomatic staff on a regular basis undermines the ability of individuals to develop meaningful expertise in countries let alone regions. When experience is not a viable route, the alternative then is to take advantage of the bounty of scholarly research that is available, and so Pacific Studies becomes a key vehicle for enhancing New Zealanders' knowledge and understanding of the Pacific region. Pacific Studies is an interdisciplinary, international and necessarily comparative field of study that equips students with both generic academic skills and specific tools for research and analysis on Pacific topics. At present, Pacific Studies is offered as an undergraduate major at the universities of Auckland, Otago and Victoria. MA and PhD degrees in Pacific Studies are also available at Auckland, Canterbury and Victoria. Pacific Studies is thus more fully developed at the tertiary level than at secondary school level, where it is offered as an NZQA subject rather than as NCEA. In the Wellington region there are only two secondary schools that offer Pacific Studies, and they are St. Bernard's in Lower Hutt and Porirua College. To date, the development of Pacific Studies in New Zealand has been ad hoc and institutionally under supported. The most significant international centres for Pacific Studies have traditionally been the Australian National University and the University of Hawai'i. Both of these institutions receive substantial direct federal funding to support research and teaching on the Pacific. New Zealand has neglected Pacific Studies for too long and has failed to grasp the full potential of what should really be one of its strategic areas for study. Rather than dismissing Pacific Studies as a "soft option" to cater for growing numbers of Pacific students in the tertiary sector, New Zealand policy makers need to appreciate how Pacific Studies can educate a broader range of New Zealanders to be culturally competent, politically savvy, and intellectually resourceful in matters Pacific. Conclusion I am thankful for the opportunity to make this submission to this inquiry, and I hope my comments are of some use to the committee in its deliberations. Dr. Teresia K. Teaiwa Senior Lecturer and Programme Director Pacific Studies Va'aomanü Pasifika Victoria University of Wellington PO Box 600 Wellington URL: http ://www. vuw.ac.nz/pacific Ph Fax teresia.teaiwa(~ l;vuw.ac.nz

5 Teresia K. Teaiwa Submission 5/5 References Bertram, I. G. and R. F. Watters, "The MIRAB Economy in South Pacific Microstates." Pacific Viewpoint 26(3), 1985: Jeffrey Sachs, "China offers lessons for the World Bank". The Dominion Post. May 25, 2007: B5. Senibulu, Luisa Matanisiga. Professionalisrn in the military: a case study of the Fiji Military Forces. MA thesis, University of the South Pacific, Suva, Fiji, Teresia Teaiwa, "Poverty and Aid: Engaging Oceania with Pacific Asia" in Engaging Oceania with Pacific Asia edited by Peter Cozens. Wellington: Centre for Strategic Studies, New Zealand, 2004: Teresia Teaiwa, "Conclusion" in Oceania and Asia: The South Pacific Looks North, Asian Studies Institute Working Paper 18 edited by Ralph Pettman. Wellington: Asian Studies Institute, Victoria University of Wellington, 2001:29 32, Websites consulted NZAID: New Zealand's New Guinea programme International Assistance and Development Agency Papua http :// png.html NZAID: New Zealand's International Assistance and Development Agency Vanuatu programme http :// vanuatu.html The New Zealand Ministry of Defence Defence Policy http :// policy.html New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Pacific http :// govt.nz/foreign Relations/Pacific/index.php