China s Engagement in Africa and Its Economic and Political Consequences

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1 China s Engagement in Africa and Its Economic and Political Consequences James W. Porcaro INTRODUCTION Almost 600 years ago, the great Chinese fleet of massive multi-masted sailing ships under the command of Admiral Zheng He traversed the Indian Ocean between China and the coast of eastern Africa on two of his epic expeditions ( , ). His ships were laden with gifts of silk, porcelain, and other goods from the Chinese emperor, and in return he received rich and unusual presents from his hosts, including African zebras and giraffes. Nowadays supertankers regularly transport hundreds of thousands of tons of crude petroleum across the same route from Sudan, Angola, Nigeria, and other African countries to China. At the same time, other vessels carry mineral resources, timber, and agricultural products from across the African continent, just as Chinese heavy equipment for major infrastructure projects and manufactured goods are brought to Africa, along with billions of dollars of investment capital, as part of China s recently exponentially expanding economic engagement with the countries of sub-saharan Africa. China s trade with sub-saharan African (used interchangeably with Africa, as a shorthand, in this paper) has multiplied many-fold over the past decade. China now is Africa s third most important trading partner, behind the USA and France. The value of its trade with Africa in 1999 was US$6.4 billion. It rose to nearly US$40 billion in 2005, US$74 billion in 2007, and by 2010 it is expected to reach US$100 billion (Taylor, 2007). Chinese direct foreign investment (FDI) in Africa has been growing accordingly, though estimates of its value vary widely, with 50-80% involved in natural resource exploitation. China s strategic aim is to acquire energy resources, especially oil, and other raw materials and minerals, to maintain its booming economic growth at a rate of more than nine percent on average over the past three decades. The Economist (2008, January 19) reports, Since 2001, China has accounted for about half of the increase in the world s demand for metals and almost two-fifths of the increase in oil demand. In addition, China seeks open markets for capital investment of its mammoth hard currency reserves of nearly US$2 trillion (The Economist, 2008, June 28) and for its manufactured goods and services, thereby facilitating the development of Chinese multinational corporations.

2 China is second to the USA as the world s biggest consumer of petroleum products. In 1990, it consumed 2.4 million barrels of oil per day. Now it uses over 7 million barrels per day, about half of which is imported (The Economist, 2008, March 15). Already some 30 percent of its oil imports comes from Africa. More than 800 Chinese companies now operate throughout sub-saharan Africa, engaged in trade, manufacturing, natural resource exploitation, transport, agriculture and agricultural processing (He, 2008, p. 152). While most business activity involves large state-owned enterprises (SOEs), there are some 700 small and medium-sized companies run by private individuals on the continent, indicating the diversity of China s engagement in Africa. In addition, according to the Xinhua press agency (French & Polgreen, 2007, Aug. 17), in 2007 there were at least 750,000 Chinese working or living there for extended periods on construction projects, in mines, and with other enterprises, and as technical advisors, retail traders, farmers, and in other livelihoods. China is in Africa to stay. Its long-term strategy is for its corporations to secure and exploit key strategic resources on the continent, especially oil. China is effectively making Africa an integral part of its economic development for decades to come (Amosu, 2007, March 9). Yet this recent rapidly expanding engagement with Africa seems to have caught not only the countries of sub-saharan Africa, but also of the West, unprepared for responding to it in order to preserve and advance their own national interests. The first ministerial conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) was held in 2000 in Beijing and the second in 2003 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. For the third, in November 2006 in Beijing, the Chinese government went all out to welcome delegations from 48 African countries, most of which were led by heads of state, in the largest international summit ever held in the capital city. In addition, President Hu Jintao has visited Africa three times. ECONOMIC INVESTMENT China s heaviest involvement in sub-saharan Africa is in the oil-rich countries of Angola, Sudan, and Nigeria, along with other states with smaller levels of petroleum production. Angola is the largest foreign supplier of oil to China, providing about 18 percent of its world imports (Alden, 2007). Sonangol (Angola s national oil company) gave the rights for a large oil production block to China s state-owned Sinopec after the Chinese government agreed to provide a US$2 billion loan to the Angolan government (Alden, 2007),

3 which allowed it to bypass the conditionalities prescribed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). China also has provided billions of dollars for the reconstruction of Angola s infrastructure. Some 80,000 Chinese workers are in Angola employed on these projects by Chinese state-owned companies contracted to do the work (Ferreira, 2008). Sautman & Yan (2008, pp ) point out that China s oil deals in Africa are different from those of Western companies in that they often include loans for infrastructure projects, for which Western states and international financial institutions largely abandoned support from the 1970 s, making China Africa s preeminent infrastructure builder. Likewise, China has invested tens of billions of dollars in Sudan in the oil industry and related infrastructure projects that include refineries, pipelines, roads, railways, tanker terminals, power facilities and telecommunications in order to improve export efficiency. The Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) is the largest foreign investor in Sudan s oil production. About 40 percent of Sudan s oil goes to China, while six per cent of China s oil imports now come from Sudan. At the same time, just as in Angola and other states, tens of thousands of Chinese technicians and laborers have been brought to Sudan to build and manage these projects. China also is investing in many areas of Africa that Western governments and companies have avoided or abandoned, and it is willing to take significant risks. Amosu (2007, March 9) gives the example of China s investment of billions of dollars to develop a massive iron ore deposit deep in the tropical forest of Gabon which for decades had not drawn Western investors. China will purchase the entire output which will take three years to begin to be extracted, and build a hydro-electric dam to power the extractive infrastructure and a railway and deepwater port to export the ore. However, while China now buys 10 percent of all of Africa s exports, it is important to note that China s trade with sub-saharan Africa in 2006 was still a mere 3.2 percent of its total international trade, and while China imports about one-third of its oil from Africa, this represents only about nine percent of Africa total oil exports, with Europe and the USA each taking about one-third (Zaleza, 2007, September 5).China, in fact, has been a small player in Africa (Manji, 2008, March 27). Its foreign direct investments (FDI) in Africa are a fraction of those of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, and accounted for only about a three percent of China s total outward FDI in 2005 (UNCTAD, 2007, March 27). However, its FDI

4 stock in Africa is increasing very rapidly and China will likely soon be a main source of FDI for Africa, especially as [Chinese] government entities offer tax incentives, loans, credit and ready access to foreign exchange for enterprises that undertake FDI activities abroad (Sautman & Yan, 2008, p. 23). China s engagement strategy with the countries of sub-saharan Africa includes providing development aid; massive infrastructure projects such as roads, rail lines, port facilities, and dams, along with prestige projects such as sports stadiums, government buildings, and presidential palaces; debt relief; soft loans; cheap credit; public health, education and training projects; technical aid; and expanded access to China s home market. China has removed tariffs on hundreds of goods imported from the continent s least developed countries. The great question that arises from China s deepening involvement in sub-saharan Africa is whether or not it is and will be any different from the history of exploitation of Africa s resources by the West for more than a century which has resulted in little benefit for the development of the continent and a better life for its people. Indeed, there are many problems and criticisms of China s new place in Africa, and for many who have examined the issue it is problematic whether China s trade, investments, and forms of aid will produce sustainable growth and development in the countries of sub-saharan Africa. ECONOMIC CRITIQUE China s purchase of raw materials and investments have raised sub-saharan Africa s annual economic growth rate to more than six percent. Its demand for resources has raised commodity prices and terms of trade, and thus benefited many African countries. However, commodity prices are notoriously variable. Indeed, they have fallen sharply since 2008 with the global financial crisis and the fall in economic growth into recession. At the same time, a large number of countries on the continent are net importers of oil and raw materials, and must bear the burden of rising commodity prices. Tull (2006) points out that 90 percent of Africa s exports to China consist of raw materials and the extraction of these resources is depleting Africa s natural supply without developing its economies which remain dependent on this extraction. This lack of diversification is a critical risk for development and elimination of poverty.

5 Kaplinsky, McCormick & Morris (2006) note succinctly that China s growing demand for resources could offer significant opportunities to sub-saharan Africa, yet there is no clear correlation between development and commodity resources. They state that any benefits from a resource boom require effective management and governance. However, except for Botswana, the possession of large mineral resources in fact has led to a worsening of living standards for most people on the continent and poor governance. Alden (2007, p. 61) concurs in his assessment: Typically, the reliance of their economy upon a single resource or a collection of resources has not led to significant development but rather has served as a source of elite enrichment in the midst of a sea of poverty. Zafar (2007, p. 107) states: Historical experience shows that rich endowments of oil and metals may weaken a government s incentives for diversification and promote wasteful expenditure [and create] opportunities for rent-seeking behavior [that is] an important factor in a country s level of corruption. Furthermore, imports from China are expanding more rapidly than exports and sub-saharan Africa has a growing trade deficit with China. In fact, Carmody & Owusu (2007, p. 14) warn that the increased emphasis on oil and mineral extraction is resulting in a relative technological downgrading of Africa s economies. Many are concerned that African countries face the resource curse, which means that because of the commodity boom, the value of their currencies is rising and thus pushing up the price of their exports in other sectors as well to their disadvantage. Finally, there is growing concern that the flow of Chinese loans to African states will burden them again with high levels of unsustainable debt. Yet, as Sautman & Yan (2008, p. 14) urge that the China-in-Africa discourse be examined using comparative analysis, they note that Africa remains in a Western-created debt trap, owing more than US$300 billion and paying significant interest as much as 40 percent of the national budget in countries such as Nigeria, Kenya, and Zambia until China also is exporting to Africa enormous quantities of manufactured goods. While the low cost of these consumer goods - including clothing, electronic goods, and appliances - make them accessible and affordable to many Africans for the first time, it is not entirely a win-win situation as China characterizes all of its activities in sub-saharan Africa. In fact, there are winners and losers. Manufacturers throughout the continent have experienced the negative effects of Chinese imports and thousands of jobs have been

6 lost in this sector of the economy. Nigeria trade unions, for example, blame Chinese imports for the loss of 350,000 jobs (Kaplinsky et al. (2006). Likewise, South African trade unions claim that textile and clothing (T&C) imports from China have closed more than 800 companies in their country and left 60,000 workers unemployed (Alden, 2007). In Zambia, Kenya, Lesotho, Swaziland and other countries, too, in the textile and clothing sector as well as footwear and furniture, factories have suffered as local African manufacturers cannot compete with the many preferences afforded by their own governments to Chinese companies and the support those companies receive from the Chinese government, including access to capital and financial support, and also their employment of low-paid Chinese workers. However, again, Sautman & Yan (2008, pp ) balance these claims in stating that the T&C industry had long been in decline before the steep rise in China s exports from World Bank/IMF-mandated structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) were the actual gravediggers of African T&C production. In addition, throughout the continent local African retail merchants complain that they cannot compete with Chinese traders who have entered their markets and sell goods at lower prices than they can offer. In her research among market traders in Kampala, Uganda, for example, Lee (2007, p. 26) found they have begun to experience serious competition from Chinese formal and informal traders who now import the same items into the country at a much cheaper price, thus undermining local traders. They complain about the privileges given to Chinese traders by the Ugandan government, such as having no restrictions on the amount of goods they can import into the country and the repatriation of their profits. The Kampala traders also know well that there exits a great deal of rent-seeking in the relationship between the Ugandan government and Chinese business officials (p. 37). China s investments in resource extraction and infrastructure development are highly capital intensive ventures with minimal employment impact for Africans, in part also because of the use of Chinese laborers on many construction projects which are mostly managed by Chinese companies that are state-owned enterprises. A study by the Centre for Chinese Studies of Stellenbosch University (2006, November) on Chinese construction companies in Angola, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, and Zambia found that these companies rarely compete with indigenous African construction companies which usually lack the capacity for large projects. They usually employ large numbers of local workers, even up to 80 percent of their labor force, but they do little to build local capacity, as most of the Africans are hired as casual laborers. At the

7 same time, other reports (Alden, 2007) insist that Chinese construction companies have employed high rates of their own nationals rather than African workers in any capacity. In some cases, on Chinese funded projects, the ratio is as high as 70 percent Chinese to 30 percent local African contracted labor (Rocha, 2007). The Stellenbosch report goes on to note that the quality of work is very high when building codes and regulations are in place and effectively enforced. However, otherwise, which may often be the case, standards are often low. The study concludes that while the contribution of Chinese companies to the development and rebuilding of infrastructure in Africa is considerable, to maximize these benefits improved monitoring and evaluation mechanisms are required. Gill & Reilly (2007) address the issue of rising tensions as China s economic engagement in sub- Saharan Africa deepens. They note that the interests of China s state-owned enterprises increasingly may conflict with the political and strategic interests of the Chinese government. The business practices and working conditions imposed by these companies in their pursuit of profits have already generated significant local resistance which may undermine the government s broader objectives. In August 2006, the central leadership convened a major conference of top officials of the government, the military, and stateowned enterprises to discuss how the behavior of Chinese companies abroad risked damaging the country s image, the need to establish a more coherent grand strategy, and how to strengthen China s soft power. But these efforts have had little discernible effect on China s arms sales or the activities of Chinese energy companies in pariah states (Kleine-Ahlbrandt & Small, 2008, p. 52). Furthermore, Gill & Reilly (p. 49) raise questions about the success of Chinese SOEs in themselves, let alone the benefit of their activities to Africa. [These] are the same large-scale, inefficient, highly subsidized SOEs that have resisted previous reform efforts in China. It is unlikely that they have suddenly become models of efficiency simply because they are operating abroad Indeed, the World Bank recently reported that one-third of Chinese enterprises had lost money on their foreign investments and that 65 percent of their joint ventures had failed. Alden & Davies (2006) report that there are very few truly competitive Chinese multinational companies outside of the energy and heavy industry sectors. Another economic issue centers on China s development aid to Africa which, despite claims to the contrary, is as tied to conditionalities as foreign aid from other sources. Much of China s aid is in the form of concessional loans to governments for infrastructure projects which are implemented primarily by

8 Chinese corporations (Pehnelt, 2007). These projects use Chinese equipment, materials, and laborers. Other disbursements of aid also include procurement of Chinese goods and services. Of course, the sine qua non political condition is diplomatic acceptance of the one-china policy and severance of any ties with Taiwan. China s US$2 billion loan to the Angolan government, for example, permits Angolan companies to bid for just 30 percent of projects, while the remaining 70 percent is reserved for Chinese companies. Indeed, as Carmody & Owusu (2007, p. 8) note, In many ways, China s aid and investment in Africa is reminiscent of earlier colonial investments to ensure access to raw materials. The Kenyan economist James Shikwati (quoted in Lee, 2007, p. 31) further notes that development aid itself is one of the reasons for Africa s problems. Huge bureaucracies are financed (with the aid money), corruption and complacency are promoted, Africans are taught to be beggars and not to be independent. In addition, development aid weakens the local markets everywhere and dampens the spirit of entrepreneurship that we [Africans] so desperately need. Chinese companies disregard for the environment in Africa, just as the government in China itself operates, and the economic consequences of environmental degradation from resource exploitation are major criticisms of China s engagement in Africa from civil society organizations. One example is the export of timber from the forests of Gabon, Liberia, Cameroon, Mozambique, Equatorial Guinea, and Congo. China is the largest importer of forest products in the world and its imports tripled in less than a decade to 2005 (Chan-Fishel, 2007). Lemos & Ribeiro (2007) describe the operation of logging tropical hardwoods in Zambezia province in Mozambique. The deforestation process, illegal logging, and export of unprocessed logs make for unsustainable development of this sector the country s economy. Another example of environmental exploitation is China s huge dam building projects. Lemos & Ribeiro explain how the Mphanda Nkuwa dam project in Mozambique will have adverse effects on the people in that region and hinder the country s development. Likewise, the Chinese companies managing the Merowe dam project on the Nile River in Sudan show no respect for human rights as more than 50,000 small farmers will be forcibly displaced as a result of the construction (Askouri, 2007). Finally, the surge in immigration that has brought hundreds of thousands of Chinese into both urban and rural communities in many countries over the past decade and a half, to say the least, will dramatically change the face of the continent (Alden, 2007). Chinese are everywhere in Africa and in many areas there

9 is uneasiness about their presence and the expected growth and permanence of this migration. They include not only business people, former contract laborers, and retail merchants, but also possibly an increasing number of farmers. China s Ministry of Agriculture has drafted a proposal to encourage and support Chinese companies to buy farmland in Africa (Aderlini, 2008) and the head of China s Export-Import Bank has stated that the bank will give full support to Chinese farmers who migrate to Africa (Patton, 2008). POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES China s appeal to many African leaders is its pledge of non-interference in the political affairs of those countries and the absence of conditionalities in making investment deals and offering development assistance. Many of the countries in which China has been involved are ruled by corrupt autocratic leaders and elites who disregard human rights and the rule of law. China readily strikes deals with them that lack transparency, accountability, and other criteria established by institutions such as the World Bank and IMF, Western governments and NGOs, such as environmental impact studies, assessments of the country s fiscal policies, and improved governance. As Kaplinsky et al. (2006) note, China s engagement provides such regimes with the opportunity to escape from these measures and supports state leaders who suppress opposition political movements and civil society which call for democracy, transparency, the rule of law, and the end of corruption. In this sense, China s non-interference policy has been rightly deemed deeply disingenuous (Large, 2007, p. 161). Here an understanding of the nature of the African state is critical to assessing the implications for China s initiatives across the continent. Van de Walle (2001) makes clear that it is impossible to understand economic policy outcomes in post-colonial Africa and the failure of policy reforms without reference to four characteristics of neopatrimonialism: clientelism, access to state resources, centralization of power, and hybrid regimes. In most African states power is not exercised for the public good or for promoting development. State elites take any measures to stay in power. Thus, China s expansive engagement in Africa becomes problematic in that for state elites China provides new sources of rent seeking (distribution of access to state controlled resources) and corruption. China is an attractive partner for Africa s authoritarian leaders and regimes for whom the distribution of patronage remains an exigency for political survival (Tull, 2006, p. 467).

10 Autocratic regimes of resource-rich African countries have very little incentive to diversify their economies and promote development outside of the resource sector. Indeed, promotion of economic growth and development is not even on their agenda. They have no interest in developing a social order with a middle class that would make demands for the rule of law, democracy, an end of corruption, and good governance, and thus threaten their hold on power. Lee (2007, p. 27) found in Uganda those who claim that the government is deliberately undermining the development of an African middle class. The major reason for this is that a strong African middle class in Uganda that pays its taxes will be in a position to demand that the government address their needs and interests. In preventing the development of such a group of people, at elections the middle class is marginalized and therefore is often politically voiceless. Taylor (2007, March 9) summarizes the predicament in much of Africa. For many elites in Africa, wealth generation and survival does not depend on productive development on a nationwide scale. Elite survival depends on access to rents to distribute to patronage networks The advancement of policies that bring in revenue for the elites but that also benefit broad swathes of the population is not required. Consequently, China s economic and political support could offer African politicians increasing leeway in misusing public funds and manipulating institutions to preserve their own power. [In addition,] Chinese diplomacy and activities in engaging with certain African regimes not only clashes with the advancement of universal norms of human rights but actually helps to further undermine development. Kaplinsky et al. (2006, p. 31) similarly reveal the indirect impact of China s demand for commodities on the nature of governance in sub-saharan Africa by pointing out that recent research shows that rents derived from the extraction of 'point resources' (oil, gas, diamonds and minerals) have, since the 1970s, clearly encouraged authoritarian rule, high military expenditure, corruption and violence Thus, to the extent that there is a generic trend towards commodity production and mineral rents as a consequence of China s growing need for material inputs, it is likely that this will exacerbate some forms of poor governance in sub-saharan Africa. In Angola, for example, Soares de Oliveira (2007) notes that the oil sector earns the government more than 90 percent of its revenues. Yet, Sonangol has never been utilized in any way for the development of the country. Instead, the company is the pivotal tool for the interests of the elite clique of President Eduardo dos Santo and the oppressive and dictatorial regime. Angola is sub-saharan Africa s second largest oil

11 producer and one of its worse-governed states. The IMF estimates that between 1997 and 2002 US$4.2 billion disappeared from oil sector earnings, while the country ranks 162 out of 177 states worldwide in the UN s Human Development Index. Zimbabwe is a pariah state. Led by the 85-year-old dictator Robert Mugabe, the economy has collapsed to less than half the size it was a decade ago. Unemployment is at 80 percent, inflation rose to literally hundreds of millions of percent in 2008, life expectancy has been reduced to 37 years, food is in severely short supply, HIV/AIDS is rampant, and more than 3 million of its 13 million population have fled the country in order to survive. Mugabe retains power by fraudulent elections, repression, and brutality. Yet China has embraced Zimbabwe in spite of international sanctions against the Mugabe regime. China is the biggest foreign investor in Zimbabwe, which is the world s second largest exporter of platinum, while it supplies the Mugabe regime with armaments and jet fighters. Mugabe s reliance on China, however, comes at a high price. Karumbidza (2007) reports the ceding of control of strategic state firms and massive Chinese takeovers of major national assets. Chinese now own 70 percent of Zimbabwe s electricity generation capacity (Carmody & Owusu, 2007). While millions of Zimbabweans remain landless and Mugabe has distributed land confiscated from white farmers to his cronies and supporters, he has contracted with the Chinese to farm 386 square miles of land. All the while, Zimbabwe lacks the institutional capacity and strategic infrastructure to benefit from Chinese investments. Anti-Chinese sentiment is evident. Over the past year or so, however, China has allowed the relationship to cool, reducing its development aid and limiting itself to humanitarian assistance. In February 2007, President Hu Jintao excluded Zimbabwe from a tour of African nations. Yet, as Kleine-Ahlbrandt & Small (2008, p. 51) note, this is an economic calculation: any further investment there would yield little return while the economic crisis raged and Zimbabwe was defaulting on Chinese loans. To many observers China s approach to sub-saharan Africa is problematic in many ways. On the one hand, the stability of the regimes with which China does business is of paramount importance. Yet, by providing support to repressive regimes, China may undermine political stability needed for the long-term economic relations it seeks. The problem of tying their economic fortunes to the fate of a particular illegitimate regime is increasingly becoming apparent to the Chinese authorities (Alden, 2007, p. 66). China s investment deals depend often on the maintenance of the corrupt autocratic regimes with which it

12 does business with a lack of transparency and accountability. In future, should there somehow be changes in government from free democratic elections, new leaders might expose the content of those deals and threaten the acceptance of China s role in those countries. Clapham (2008) notes that the doctrine of sovereignty in fact is intended to protect the economic investments of the external patron through its almost unconditional support of the current regime in a particular state that allows it access to extractive resources. Yet such a strategy if fraught with deficiencies when the state s actual level of control over its own resources and population is progressively eroded (p. 365), thus threatening the external party s exploitation of those resources. In this sense, China likely will have to increasingly adjust its adherence to this doctrine in the face of the intractable issue of governance in the African states with which it deals. Indeed, Kleine-Ahlbrandt & Small (2008) point to a recent shift in China s diplomacy and its need to devise a more sophisticated approach to protecting its assets and its citizens abroad. It no longer sees providing uncritical and unconditional support to unpopular, and in some cases fragile, regimes as the most effective strategy (p. 39). China has found noninterference increasingly unhelpful as it learns the perils of tacitly entrusting its business interests to repressive governments (p. 47). Although China s diplomacy toward pariah states has been modified since a few years ago, as a result of a changing calculation of its economic and political interests as well as improving its strategic and economic relationships with Western countries, this new approach is inherently limited. For one thing, it reflects not a fundamental change in its values but a new perception of its national interests. Its main motivations remain energy security and economic growth It is simply devising more sophisticated means to secure them (Kleine-Ahlbrandt & Small, 2008, p. 51). An editorial in Beijing s People s Daily (reported by The Economist, 2008, February 9) during the political crisis in Kenya in 2008 reveals the Chinese government s view toward the expansion of democracy in Africa. Western-style democratic theory simply isn t suited to African conditions but rather it carries with it the root of disaster. The elections crisis in Kenya is just one example. The opposition party, led by Raila Odinga, naturally was upset by this commentary. Taylor (2007, p. 20) makes the following assessment. Currently, Beijing does not seem to realize that corruption and political instability sabotage the long-term possibilities of sustained Sino-African economic

13 links and also help maintain the situation where Africa remains at the bottom of the global hierarchy, plagued by dictators and human rights abusers. Whilst a certain type of African leader is deeply appreciative of such a friend, it is doubtful that the average African shares the same sentiments. The threats issued by militant groups in the Niger Delta against the Chinese after the signing of new oil and gas deals with the Nigerian government in 2006 are indicative of this issue. While Western criticism of the implications of China s economic and political engagement in sub- Saharan Africa smacks of hypocrisy, given more than a century of colonial and post-colonial policies and development plans that have left the continent in its miserable state, there is increasing concern and criticism from within Africa at China s activities (Taylor, 2007). The New Partnership for Africa s Development (NEPAD) is a plan that was adopted by the African Union (AU) in 2001 to promote democracy, stability, good governance, human rights, the rule of law, and economic development throughout the continent. Taylor (p. 21) notes that a key objection from many quarters against China s activities is that it threatens to re-introduce practices that NEPAD [and the AU] are ostensibly seeking to move away from even though China protests that it fully supports NEPAD. In fact, the Chinese model of state-led economic policies, also known as the Beijing consensus, which refutes the view that democracy is a necessary precondition to development, holds appeal to Africa s repressive and authoritarian regimes as an alternative to the Washington consensus of economic liberalism and democracy (Obiorah, 2007). Anti-Chinese sentiment among the people is on the rise in many parts of the African continent. China has invested heavily in Zambia, reviving operation of its copper mines and opening employment to thousands of Zambians, as its demand has led to soaring copper prices on the world market (Polgreen & French, 2007, August 20). In 2007, copper accounted for 71 percent of Zambia s export earnings. The state-owned Nonferrous Metals Corp., for example, plans to build an export processing zone in the Copperbelt that is supposed to bring as many as 60,000 jobs. However, the Chinese-owned copper mines there are notorious for low pay, poor working conditions, and hazardous safety practices. Until recently, as Chinese companies, in fact, have sought to improve their practices in line with Zambian law, trade union activities were banned from the mining sites. In 2005, 46 Zambian workers died in a blast at a mine explosives factory. In July 2006, the ill-treatment of workers in another mine led to violent protest by

14 hundreds of workers and several were shot. Such conditions should be no surprise, as The Economist (2008, February 9) reports on this matter in China itself. Lax mining standards have led to a gruesome string of coalmine accidents and a scandalous yearly toll of thousands of dead miners. At the same time, textile mills and other factories in Zambia have suffered from the massive inflow of cheap Chinese manufactured goods. Lusaka market merchants also are as upset with the Chinese as those in Kampala. Thus, in the presidential elections in September 2006 the opposition candidate, Michael Sata, argued strongly that Chinese investors in Zambia were new colonizers exploiting the country with little benefit for the people. The Chinese were widely perceived to be supporting the incumbent President Levy Mwanawasa, who won the election, and the Chinese ambassador threatened to cut ties with Zambia along with investors pulling out of the country. So much for China s policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of African countries. The worst ongoing disaster on the African continent is in the Darfur region of Sudan. The regime that rules the country would be unable to do so without the heavy Chinese economic and military support that it receives. United Nations investigators have found that most of the small arms used in Darfur are Chinese manufactured (Talyor, 2007). In fact, China is immersed in the internal politics of Sudan up to its neck (Askouri, 2007, p. 77). The Khartoum government has been protected by China s veto power in the UN Security Council from the imposition of sanctions and other measures, including charges of genocide. However, it must be said that China seems to be coming to recognize the international implications of its role in Africa. Since 2006, it has become engaged diplomatically in the effort to resolve the Darfur disaster, not least because its own investments in Sudan were threatened. In 2007 it gave support for the deployment of a multi-national hybrid UN-AU force of 20,000 troops to Darfur and its ambassador played a key role in convincing the Sudan government to accept the mission (Alden, 2007). In addition, China itself now has more than 1,800 military personnel and civilian police serving in seven of the UN s nine peacekeeping missions in Africa. CONCLUSION China s expansive engagement in sub-saharan Africa certainly is the most significant occurrence for the continent in the 21 st century. The question raised within Africa and by observers is whether or not Chinese

15 trade, investments, aid, and presence in countries throughout Africa will lead to real economic growth and development and betterment of the lives of the people. There is deep and well-founded concern that Chinese practices, in fact, will perpetuate and strengthen corrupt, repressive, autocratic rule by local elites while leaving the resources of continent exploited and depleted and its people as desperately poor and powerless as ever. Still, at the present time, it is premature to draw a definitive conclusion. Clapham (2008, p. 364) maintains that China s relations with Africa, in fact, fit into long established patterns of rentier statehood and politics with which Africa s rulers have been accustomed to maintain themselves Far from providing any new model for Africa s involvement in the global economy and political system, China s role has been precisely to reinforce the old one. This point of view is expanded by Sautman & Yan (2008) who recognize the reality of Africa s continued subordination within a world system that builds in exploitation and other systematic violations of rights (p. 29). They acknowledge that China operates in Africa in much the same manner as Western countries through disadvantageous terms of trade, the exploitation of natural resources, oppressive labour regimes, and support for authoritarian rulers, all common features of the modern world system (p. 10). Broadman (2008), on the other hand, believes that China s rapidly growing economic engagement in Africa is a major opportunity for the promotion of development in Africa through the integration of African economies across the continent and into the global marketplace (p. 102). However, Zafar (2007, p. 124) contends that, in fact, Chinese firms in Africa frequently operate in enclave and extractive industries, excluding those in garments and textiles, and tend not to have many linkages with local firms, especially in global production chains. Nevertheless, Broadman acknowledges that there are many constraints on the ability of African governments and businesses to take advantage of China s activities, among which the most important result from domestic factors, particularly poor governance. It is critical that an agenda for reform be devised and implemented, one that includes reduction of tariffs, greater regional integration, reform of domestic markets, improvement of infrastructure, and increased institutional capacity. Yet the reform of African states themselves and the establishment of effective governance to enable such an agenda remain the most fundamental and daunting challenges. The Democratic Republic of Congo possesses huge mineral wealth in copper, cobalt, tantalum, manganese, uranium, and zinc, as well as gold and diamonds. In 2007, the government concluded a multi-

16 billion dollar deal with China by which Chinese state-owned firms will have access to 3.5 million tons of copper reserves in exchange for building up the country s infrastructure and refurbishing the mines themselves. While this investment should contribute to economic growth that will raise the living standards of the Congolese people, The Economist (2008, March 15) notes that its corrupt and underfunded government is much less able or inclined to manage China s engagement for the benefit of its people. Indeed, almost all of Congo s mining contracts are negotiated without transparency and much of the mining sector is controlled by elites surrounding President Joseph Kabila (The Economist, 2007, September 22). Thus, at the least there are worries as to whether China s engagement in Congo will be taken as an opportunity for beneficial development. Certainly China is pursuing its own self-interests and it is up to Africans to ensure that their own paramount self-interests are effected in this engagement. As The Economist (2006, October 28) warns, this new interloper in their continent is no more altruistic than its predecessors It is up to Africans to ensure that they get a fair deal from it. Most African governments are not accountable to the people; therefore, civil society trade unions, human rights groups, environmental groups, and other NGOs - will have to involve itself actively in this process in order to produce such an outcome. China clearly is in a dominating position in its relationships with African countries. Individual states do not have the capacity or the strength to deal with China in the most advantageous way. At the regional and multilateral levels African reactions to Beijing have been basically lacking in any strategic approach, as well as being fundamentally uncoordinated, reflecting the underlying bilateral structure of China-Africa relations (Alden, 2007, p. 77). Thus, it seems at the very least, Africa must pursue a more collective and consolidated approach in its engagement with China. Throughout history Africa has been an integrated part of vast international networks of trade, across the Sahara desert from the ancient Sudanic empires in West Africa and across the Indian Ocean from the Swahili city-states along the eastern coast of the continent and the inland empires such as Great Zimbabwe, during the centuries of the trans-atlantic slave trade and the Arab slave trade to North Africa and the Middle East, and the international economic system of the colonial and post-colonial eras. The issue of Africa s agency in its international affairs has been much debated. Now again, with the intensive global

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