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1 Council of the European Union Brussels, 16 December /14 PE 418 INST 636 JUR 966 NOTE from: To: Subject: General Secretariat of the Council Delegations Partial summary record of the meeting of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (AFCO) of the European Parliament, held in Brussels on 4 December 2014 Another academically-oriented AFCO meeting where the two main topics of discussion were Mr CORBETT's working document suggesting improvements to the future hearings of Commissioners-designate and Mr DUFF's paper on a reform of the European electoral law. There was a high degree of consensus on Mr CORBETT's suggestions with regard to the hearings. On the rather more thorny issue of the reform of the European electoral law, which was dominated by a series of presentations by experts, opinions were more divided. The bold ideas set out in Mr DUFF's paper, redolent of those in his previous unsuccessful AFCO reports, were largely seen as hypothetical and politically unrealistic /14 SC/lo 1

2 Item 7 - Procedure and practices regarding the 2014 Commissioner Hearings 1 - Presentation by Richard CORBETT of a working document and exchange of views Mr CORBETT (S&D, UK) presented his working document which takes stock of the recent Commissioner hearings and proposes 7 areas where there is scope for improvement: 1. Timing - the timing of the 2014 hearings was compressed as a result of the tardy nomination of candidates by some Member States. The paper suggests setting a deadline by which all Member States have to put forward a candidate. 2. Hearing of the First Vice-President - given Timmermans' wide-ranging horizontal responsibility, his hearing was carried out by the Conference of Presidents, despite this being contrary to the EP's rules of procedure (which provide for the committees to carry out the hearings). The paper raises the question as to whether this should be made a standard part of the EP procedure for the hearing of Commissioners with a special status or for one or more Vice-Presidents. 3. Style of questions - the paper advocates fewer questions (only 25 instead of 45) with the possibility for members to pose an immediate follow-up question. Mr CORBETT argued that the purpose of hearings was not to give as many MEPs as possible the opportunity to take the floor, but was intended to be an inquisitorial, investigative questioning of Commissionersdesignate. This could be done more effectively with follow-up questions, particularly when initial answers are unsatisfactory. 4. Procedures for evaluation - the paper aims to establish clearer procedures for the evaluation, by group coordinators, of a Commissioner-designate. At the 2014 hearings, a lack of consensus among coordinators resulted in flexible mechanisms being introduced (e.g. additional written questions, a second hearing) despite these not being strictly in accordance with the EP's rules of procedure. The paper thus seeks to introduce guidelines on the evaluation process (i.e. where there is no clear majority, the first step is to send further written questions, if these are unsatisfactory, to invite candidates back for a hearing, and if still unsatisfactory, putting this to a committee vote). 1 CORBETT working document on the 2014 Commissioner Hearings 17010/14 SC/lo 2

3 5. Publication of the results of the evaluations - the rules currently provide that the results of an evaluation are to be published 24 hours after the hearing. However, reaching agreement on an evaluation may take longer than 24 hours. Hence, the report suggests changing this to "24h after the evaluation". 6. Horizontal issues - sometimes Commissioner-designates are asked questions relating to horizontal issues (e.g. gender balance within the Commission, the structure of the Commission or policy priorities), which would be better addressed to the Commission President. The paper suggests that the Conference of Presidents be given the possibility to discuss those issues with the President of the Commission, either in a meeting or in a plenary debate. 7. Declarations of interest - referring in particular to a Commissioner-designate having passed on contested shares to a member of his family, Mr Corbett suggested that the rules on the declaration of financial interests be clarified and potentially toughened. However, Corbett warned that the EP itself would have to respect the rules it imposes on the Commission. In addition to the above points, Mr Corbett recently heard the suggestion that Member States submit the names of 2 candidates (one male and one female) to the President of the Commission, and leave the final choice to the latter (suggestion supported by Ms BRESSO (S&D, IT)). The subsequent discussion showed a high degree of consensus on the issues. Ms BRESSO (S&D, IT) expressed satisfaction with the report and Mr PREDA (EPP, RO), on behalf of the EPP, largely supported the suggestions, with the exception of that limiting the number of questions at hearings: he claimed there was political significance in giving MEPs the opportunity to ask questions. However, Mr SCHÖPFLIN (EPP, HU) disagreed, describing some hearings as "political theatres" devoid of real incisive questioning. Mr SCHÖPFLIN added that privacy concerns would arise if the EP pushed for a more in-depth declaration of interests. On the hearing of the First Vice-President, he suggested that a strong stance be taken against the Conference of Presidents' which had acted in violation of the EP's rules of procedure (supported by Mr CASTALDO (EFDD, IT)). The horse-trading that took place behind-the-scenes among the largest groups was criticised by Mr DURAND (Greens, FR) and Mr CASTALDO (EFDD, IT) /14 SC/lo 3

4 Mr ANNEMANS (NI, BE) advocated greater involvement of non-attached members in the evaluation process, suggesting they be allowed to participate in discussions with coordinators. Next steps: The Chair, Ms HÜBNER (EPP, PL), suggested that the coordinators would soon confirm that the working document could become an own-initiative report, without having to wait for the upcoming complete overhaul of the EP's rules of procedure. Mr CORBETT intended to attend the Conference of Committee Chairs to hear their views and informally seek those of the Commission. Should AFCO then approve an own-initiative report based on his document, he would draft a report taking stock of the debate and continue discussions both within the EP and with other institutions. Item 3 - The reform of the European electoral law - Exchange of views and presentation by experts The Chair gave a brief analysis of the previous attempts to reform the European electoral law, explaining that the lack of political appetite had resulted in EU elections still being largely governed by differing national laws. Paul NEMITZ, DG JUST Director for Fundamental Rights and Citizenship, opened the discussion and made the following main points: the low turnout is not specific to the EU - it is a phenomenon that also occurs in secondary national elections. Contrary to some academic predictions (notably Professor WEILER), increasing the powers of the EP did not result in an increased turnout - quite the contrary. the key to increasing turnout is improving public communication and mobilising people, launching awareness-raising campaigns on EU issues, bringing the EU political process closer to citizens. the Spitzenkandidaten were an important step in making the EU more democratic. The Commission is currently preparing a report assessing the impact of the experience and looking into how to better exploit the mechanism /14 SC/lo 4

5 Andrew DUFF, former MEP and former AFCO rapporteur on these matters, presented the findings of his paper entitled "Democratic legitimacy in the European Union: taking a new look at the composition and electoral procedure of the European Parliament 2 ". He advocated a bold series of reforms including a uniform electoral procedure, an objective method of seat apportionment and a revised voting system in the Council: On the uniform electoral procedure (provided for under Article 223 TFEU) he reiterated his suggestion of transnational lists (headed by party political champions) from which a certain number of MEPs would be elected to create a pan-european constituency. On the EP's right to propose a system of seat apportionment between MS (pursuant to Article 14(2) TEU), he encouraged MEPs to consider the "Cambridge compromise" ("Cam-Com"): an arithmetical formula for the redistribution of seats within the EP. He argued that this would counter the "seat trading" that occurred haphazardly on the margins of IGCs and would resolve the concern raised by Germany's Bundesverfassungsgericht that citizens are not represented equally at EU level. Review of weighting of votes in the Council: Mr DUFF acknowledged that the Cam-Com method would penalise middle-sized MS - which are currently over-represented - and suggested that, by way of compensation, their clout in the Council be increased. He presented another formula ("JagCom") to that effect, which was apparently briefly considered - and then dismissed - during the Convention on the Future of Europe. Mr DUFF conceded that his recommendations would require Treaty change and close examination at an upcoming IGC. 2 DUFF paper on the EP electoral procedure 17010/14 SC/lo 5

6 Professor PUKELSHEIM (Institute for Mathematics, University of Augsburg) made a strong plea for "double proportionality" to be introduced into the EU election procedure as a method for allocating MEP seats. The method, which assumes the existence of Union-wide political parties, is divided into 2 rather complex steps: super-apportionment (whereby all disposable seats are apportioned in proportion to the vote totals of the union wide parties) and sub-apportionment. The main benefit of this method is that it secures electoral equality among EU citizens, regardless of their provenance. The professor also made further suggestions regarding: the design of ballot sheets: which should include the name and emblem of a European political party, or include information about the group's European outlook, in order to give them a European perspective. thresholds: to lower the 5% threshold depending on how party support spreads across the EU, namely by introducing a "threshold cascade" (for example, imposing a threshold of 5% of votes if the party is supported only in one MS, 4% if supported in 2 MS, 3% if supported in 4 MS, 2% if supported in 8 MS, and so on). Brendan O'LEARY (Political Science professor at the University of Pennsylvania), offered a more provocative view, suggesting that there was no case for a common electoral law, and inviting members to consider reverting to pre-1979 indirect elections. He claimed that rather than seeking a uniform electoral law, the EP should promote best practices across the EU. He also advocated a long-term clear apportionment rule for MEP seats and transnational lists. On the other hand, he argued against imposing a single system of proportional representation throughout the EU, claiming that there was no consensus among the political science community as to which was the best. He also cautioned against giving jurisdiction over EU electoral law to the European Court of Human Rights, claiming that courts can unwind sensibly made political bargains. He underlined that if the EU was ever to become an effective federation, logic would dictate a move to proportionality within the EP accompanied by equality of States within the Council - otherwise two versions of proportionality are applied in the two "houses" of the EU federation /14 SC/lo 6

7 Roberto D'ALIMONTE, Professor at the LUISS University in Rome, like other speakers, queried the reasons for a uniform electoral law, claiming that it would not increase turnout "by an iota". The real reason for the low turnout at European elections was that such elections were not seen to matter, given that they are not decisive (i.e. they do not change the government). Making the stakes more visible and rendering the elections more decisive would be key to improving turnout. He supported the theory of double proportionality (presented by Prof Pukelsheim), but argued that transnational lists (suggested by O'LEARY) were idealistic because parties had no real incentives to create such lists. Having said that, he felt that DUFF's suggestion of a "threshold cascade" and of the creation of a quota of seats to be assigned at union level in a single constituency could both be reasonable - albeit unrealistic - incentives in that regard. Overall, however, the speaker felt that the institutions had made a good effort to harmonise the electoral system, and that it would be very difficult to go beyond the equilibrium that has been reached. Yves BERTONCINI (Director of Notre Europe - Jacques Delors Institute in Paris) reiterated the fact that a reform of the electoral law should not aim to increase turnout. On the issue of the allocation of seats, he felt that the Cam-Com model presented by DUFF would be fair, despite reservations as to whether it could truly improve the situation. He supported moving from degressive proportionality to progressive proportionality in the allocation of seats (i.e. the more votes the more seats), either by modifying the 2002 Council Decision or by transferring best practices. He also suggested that the size of constituencies and the way they are put together could be further examined and potentially reformed. He proposed thresholds in as many MS as possible, claiming that this would give clarity to citizens /14 SC/lo 7

8 In the following debate, MEPs voiced a number of concerns, including: the unrealistic scope of the suggested reforms (RANGEL (EPP, PT), CORBETT (S&D, UK, SCHÖPFLIN (EPP, HU)), advocating smaller, more gradual changes (WIELAND (EPP, DE), LEIN (S&D, DE), UJAZDOWSKI (ECR, PL)); the legislative reforms being an artificial solution to the problems of legitimacy (UJAZDOWSKI (ECR, PL), KATROUGKALOS (GUE/NGL, EL); the need to for a corresponding readjustment of the weighting of votes within the Council if changes are made to the representation of MS in the EP (RANGEL (EPP, PT), BRESSO (S&D, IT), SILVA PEREIRA (S&D, PT); Members also offered varying explanations as to the low turnout in European elections, the most common being the fact that the elections are not decisive in changing those governing the EU (CORBETT (S&D, UK), LEIN (S&D, DE), KATROUGKALOS (GUE/NGL, EL)). CORBETT suggested that developing the Spitzenkandidat experiment could improve the situation. Other explanations included citizens' weak identification with European politics (SCHÖPFLIN (EPP, HU), and a loss of output legitimacy resulting from austerity (KATROUGKALOS (GUE/NGL, EL)). In his closing remarks, Andrew DUFF replied to queries as to the objectives of a uniform electoral law, stating that this was not an academic exercise but a step in the creation of a federal European Parliament. There was no single perfect system but it was important to approach to these matters in a more methodical and less arbitrary way. The single most important thing was to have transnational lists for pan-european seats at the 2019 elections. He encouraged his former colleagues to be more bold at the start of their mandate, claiming that "if the EP fails to seize this chance, it will be condemned by public opinion for generations to come" /14 SC/lo 8

9 Item 8 - Presentation by experts of the conclusions of the Study "Political parties and Political foundations at the European Level: challenges and opportunities" 3 Luciano BARDI (Co-Director of the Observatory on Political Parties and Representation at the European University Institute), Eugenio PIZZIMTI (Assistant Professor at the University of Pisa and member of the Observatory on Political Parties and Representation at the European University Institute), and Enrico CALOSSI presented the findings of the new study commissioned by AFCO, which is a follow-up to a 2010 study on how to create transnational party representation. Discussions on the study's findings included: The fact that the economic crisis did not bring about the feared political cleavage among and within political groups, where there is still considerable convergence and cohesion. The recently-adopted 2014 Regulation on European political parties and their funding does not address some of the shortcomings of its predecessor, Regulation 2003/2004. In fact, it appears to take a step back. Its main shortcomings are that it effectively subordinates European political parties to national parties and does not address the issue of how to link European political parties to EU citizens. Until these shortcomings are addressed, it is premature to speak of a European party system or European representative democracy. On European Foundations, their main activities have included organising events to contribute to the debate on European public issues and releasing publications. However, they could be encouraged to play a greater role in the European citizens initiative (ECI), for example, and they could enhance their role by organising more events alongside national foundations. In the subsequent debate, Mr CORBETT (S&D, UK) stated that the encouraging findings of cohesiveness among the political groups tallied with those of Simon HIX, from the London School of Economics, who had concluded that the political groups had become more cohesive over time. CORBETT expressed reservations, however, as to whether national foundations would use the ECI. Mr SCHOLZ (GUE/NGL, DE) explained how the power struggle between national political parties and European political parties hindered the latter from becoming stronger. He also supported the views that European parties needed to have a proper institutional structure. 3 Expert study on Political parties and Political foundations 17010/14 SC/lo 9

10 Item 5 - Chair s announcements concerning coordinators recommendations The Chair confirmed the report proposed by the Greens on "Transparency, Accountability and Integrity in the EU institutions", and nominated Mr DURAND (Greens, FR) as rapporteur. She also allocated several opinions to the political groups: The Annual Report on Subsidiarity and proportionality: ECR The Annual report on monitoring the application of EU law: EFDD The report on the situation of fundamental rights in the EU: S&D The recommendations to the Commission on negotiations for TTIP: EPP. The Chair announced the dates of future hearings, which included "Lessons to be drawn from the implementation of the ECI" (26 February 2015), the "Institutional aspects of new rules on economic governance and the role of the eurogroup" (17 March 2015) and the "Institutional future of the EU within and beyond the Treaties" (16 April 2015). AFCO would also hold two mini-hearings in 2015, one on the EU's accession to the ECHR and the other on the EU's accession to the European Social Rights Charter. Item 10 - Next meetings. 20 January 2015, and (Brussels) 26 February 2015, and (Brussels) 17010/14 SC/lo 10