"FOR A EUROPE OF REGIONS AND CITIES: THE VIEW OF YOUNG PEOPLE" 1 April 2014 Committee of the Regions

Transcription

1 "FOR A EUROPE OF REGIONS AND CITIES: THE VIEW OF YOUNG PEOPLE" 1 April 2014 Committee of the Regions Workshop (3): How should the CoR fit into the EU's institutional architecture in future? By Ian GOROG, Veka MODEBADZE, Eric Carlos PARDOS VEGLIA, Anna SZCZODROWSKA, Domenico VALENZA Trainees at the Committee of the Regions 1 Introduction We can observe today a certain inconsistency between the structure of the Committee of the Regions as a representative body and the mainly advisory functions attributed to it. While its representative dimension can be seen as a means of giving a direct voice to the cities and regions in Brussels, the limitation of its powers to advisory functions seems to situate the CoR more as a source of expertise on the local and regional dimensions. The democratization strategy since the early 1990s has been the EU s institutional response to the growing dissatisfaction of citizens and public calls for more transparency and inclusion. Taking into account current demands and challenges faced by the EU as well as its unique legislative system, we dare to suggest transforming the Committee of the Regions into an institution with legislative powers. The CoR could draw its inspiration from Euroscepticism to garner greater autonomy, legitimacy and a stronger position on the European institutional scene. 1 The document was finalised on March 18,

2 Recommendations 1) Building a European Senate of Local and Regional Authorities Following the debate and the scenarios proposed by the CoR bureau on January in its Report on the First 20 years of the Committee of the Regions, we propose: to transform the Committee of the Regions (CoR) into a third legislative chamber representing European Local and Regional Authorities. Following models of unequal bicameralism throughout Europe, the "European Senate of Local and Regional Authorities" (hereafter, the "Senate") would have partial and limited competences and prerogatives as a part of a tricameral system also comprising the EP and the Council; to give the Senate legislative competence in the field of EU cohesion policy. In a tricameral legislative model, the European Parliament (EP), the Council and the Senate would have equal legislative powers on cohesion policy. In other policy areas, the European Parliament and the Council could ask the Senate for its opinion and/or vote. A special committee would be set up to discuss the new legislative procedure. The Senate would only have exclusive powers in the field of territorial representation, and would be consulted on all issues affecting a region (or even other territorial entities such as provinces or towns). Such a scenario implies constitutional amendments, namely a revision of Articles 305, 306 and 307 of the TFEU. 2) The Senate to appoint the European Commissioner for Regional and Urban Policy The European Union's regional policy, also referred to as cohesion policy, is one of its most important policies, accounting for one third of the EU's total budget. Its purpose is to reduce significant economic, social and territorial disparities between Europe's regions, and to support competitiveness, economic growth and job creation at regional level. As the regional level is the end beneficiary of this policy, we would advocate a more 'participatory approach'. The aim is to bring EU regional policy close to the local level and allocate the available funds as efficiently as possible. As the Senate would be the institution with the greatest awareness of local interests, it should have a say in appointing the regional policy commissioner. Additionally, making the Commission accountable to the Senate would strengthen the latter's institutional position. Therefore, we propose that: the Senate should vote on the appointment of the regional policy commissioner at a joint committee session with the EP; the regional policy commissioner should be accountable to the Senate, i.e. the Senate would have the power to table a motion of censure on the regional policy commissioner. 2

3 3) A more coherent selection process for members of the Senate The selection procedure for Senate members would be crucial in ensuring adequate local representation. At present, the various procedures for selecting CoR members and alternates throughout the EU reflect the wide range of political and territorial systems in Europe. There are two main models: federal countries or countries with strong regional systems, where the national delegations to the CoR are largely made up of regional representatives (local authorities are only marginally represented); countries with weaker regional systems (representatives are mostly or even exclusively from the local level). Given the range of selection procedures adopted for each national delegation, a stronger coherence in the selection process is needed and emphasis should be placed on the role played by the associations of local and regional authorities. We therefore propose 2 scenarios: short-term scenario: status quo, but the European Court of Justice rather than the Council should adopt the list of members drawn up on the basis of proposals by each Member State; long-term scenario: a bottom-up election process to harmonize selection, inspired by the the indirect grands-électeurs system in France. We recommend an intermediary election process: each region or local authority could draw up a list of electors, comprising directly elected representatives from local and regional authorities (regional governors, members of regional parliaments, mayors, etc.), each of which would select Senate members through a weighted vote. In order to respect the legal order and regional governance system of each Member State, the election procedure would be left to the Member States according to Article 288 TFEU giving each country the choice of form and methods. This would allow each country to select its elected territorial representatives in line with its regional governance system 2. 4) Closer cooperation with the European Parliament 2 For instance, this system would not force countries whose main territorial entities are cities to elect regional representatives. 3

4 We would argue against integrating the Senate into another political institution such as the EP. However, parliamentarism could reinforce the European Union process as a whole. We therefore propose very close cooperation with the EP in preparation for the amendments arising from the new legislative competences of the Senate during the first stage of European legislative decision-making: the Senate would vote on an opinion and mandate its rapporteurs to negotiate with the EP; EP and Senate rapporteurs could work together in close coordination. They could draw up a compromise text, to be submitted for debate and final approval in both institutions; in the event of a negative final vote by the Senate, its rapporteurs would participate in the new trialogue meetings. This process would be mandatory for regional affairs and optional in other cases where requested by the EP. The purpose of this recommendation would be to facilitate the legislative procedure by trying to prevent deadlock and ultimately striking a new balance with stronger synergy. 5) Strengthening the CoR's access to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). Since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the Committee of the Regions has been a semiprivileged applicant, insofar as its right to seek review is limited. The CoR can only take action for the purpose of protecting its own prerogatives. 3 Besides, the Committee now has the possibility to challenge legislative acts on grounds of infringement of the principle of subsidiarity. 4 It only has this right with respect to legislative acts where the TFEU provides for consultation, irrespective of whether such a challenge is intended to protect its prerogatives. This new power of the CoR seems to have great potential and could strengthen the CoR's role at the ex post and ex ante stages of decision-making. However, this power, which was granted to the CoR by the Lisbon Treaty, has not yet been exercised. Just as the EP was able to secure greater access to the CJEU, the CoR's rights in this respect should also be enhanced. The EP was able to enjoy semi-privileged applicant status thanks to a Court of Justice stand on this matter. Initially the EP had no statutory rights deriving from the Treaties; however, the Court in its case law recognized the EP's rights as semi-privileged applicant. 5 The Parliament used this facility to great effect to protect its rights to be consulted in decision-making. Since the Court ruled that EP measures having legal effect are subject to review under Article 263 TFEU, the Nice Treaty granted the EP full privileged applicant status. The above remarks make it clear that the CJEU is more concerned with the need for institutional balance rather than a restrictive list of institutions that can bring court actions as set out in the Treaties. CJEU case law should therefore take precedence over a restrictive interpretation of the 3 Art TFEU 4 Art.8.2 of the Protocol No 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality 5 Roquette Freres v Council and Maizena v Council, where the Court ruled that the Parliament has the right to intervene voluntarily in cases before the Court of Justice. 4

5 respective treaty article. However, bearing in mind that the Senate will be an institution at EU level, we propose the following rules for CJEU access: actio localis as a variant of actio popularis, as a substitute for direct democracy at local level. As opposed to its conventional definition, we suggest that an actio localis could be taken in defence of local and regional interests. An actio localis could be triggered by a certain percentage of local or regional authorities of EU Member States. The revised treaty would include a provision empowering a certain percentage of local and regional authorities to launch an actio localis with a limited scope. They could raise a collective action regarding breach of the Senate s prerogatives as well as breach of the proportionality and subsidiarity principles. Bringing actio localis to the CJEU could also be used as a remedy for defective application of the law; proportionality principle. The Senate would be granted privileged applicant status whenever the EU has intervened excessively in its areas of competence. Conclusion European integration has long been an élite-driven process, from which the public has been largely excluded. Accordingly, our proposal aims to bring EU citizens closer to European legislative processes by transforming the CoR into a 'Senate', involving the new institution in the legislative procedure, increasing its influence on cohesion policy through participation in the procedure for appointing the regional policy commissioner, developing legal ties with the European Parliament and fighting for statutory representation of regional interests vis-à-vis the CJEU. Now is the time to act. In times of economic crisis, growing European scepticism and regional identity, one should not underestimate the power of public feelings. Strengthening the regions in Europe would bridge the gap between the European Union and its citizens. This can only be done by granting more powers to the CoR and thus transforming it into a major EU institution. Final Recommendations 1. to build a European Senate of Local and Regional Authorities : transform the Committee of the Regions (CoR) into a third legislative chamber representing 5

6 European local and regional authorities; give the Senate legislative competence in the field of EU cohesion policy. 2. To empower the Senate to appoint the European Commissioner for Regional and Urban Policy: the Senate should vote on the appointment of the regional policy commissioner at a joint committee session with the EP; the regional policy commissioner should be accountable to the Senate. 3. To ensure a more coherent selection process for Senate members: short-term scenario: status quo, with the European Court of Justice responsible for appointing members; long-term scenario: harmonization of selection procedures, with an indirect legislative election inspired by the system of grands-électeurs. 4. To build closer cooperation with the European Parliament: negotiation with the EP (opinion, rapporteurs operating together, compromise text); in the event of a negative vote by the Senate, participation by rapporteurs in trialogue meetings. 5. To strengthen CoR access to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU): actio localis granted to the regional and local level, triggered by a certain percentage of Member State local or regional authorities; privileged applicant status for the Senate whenever the EU has intervened excessively in its areas of competence. 6