Index. ABM Treaty (1972),57,59 Absolute gains, ,313 model, neoliberal institutional model, 134

Transcription

1 Index ABM Treaty (1972),57,59 Absolute gains, ,313 model, neoliberal institutional model, ,138 payoff, 108 structural model, Absolute zero power, 218 Accept, 310 defined, 304 Accidents Measures Agreement (1971), 62 Actors, defined, 300 Africa, international cooperation and, Agendas, strategy of, 26 Aggarwal, Vinod, 4 Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War (1973),62 Alexander, 18 Allan, Pierre, 4 Anarchy international, , 109, neoliberal institutional model, 134 structural model, 143, 144, 146 Antarctica Treaty (1959), 57, 68 Approximate equality, 285 Arbatov, Georgi, 213 Arbitration, 25 Arena, 300, ,317,320 Argentinean public debt, Arms building, 61 Arms control, Arms race, 71n., 76, 78, 79 Arms trade, 67 Arms transfers, limiting of, 64 Aron, Raymond, 136 Assignment and matching, 25 Assurance game, , 122 Attack/accept (linkage offer), 259, , Auctions, 25 Aumann, Robert, 13, 15, 16, 18-19,20, 22,211,212 Aumann and Dreze theory, 211, 212 Aumann-Shapley value, Austrian State Treaty of 1955, 57, 68 Automata models of repeated games, 24 Avoiding Accidental Nuclear War (1971, 1973),57,61 Axelrod, Robert, 20,49, 50, 76, 359 Axelrod's repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, 20 Bacharach, Michael, 17 Backwards induction, 16 Bargaining questions, 203 Bargaining set, 23, 39 Bargaining theory, axiomatic, 21 noncooperati ve,

2 374 Bargaining time, 207 "Basic Agreement" of 1938, 362 Battle of the Sexes, 49 Bayesian equilibrium, 152, 154 Bayes's rule, 191,233,237 Belief, linkage possibility, 264 Berlekamp, Elwyn, 17 Bernheim, Douglas, 18, 24 Bilateral coalitions, Bilateral labor-management monopolies, 351, 356 Bilateral relationships, international security and, Binmore, Ken, 13, 14, 16,21,24 Biology, 25 Bipolarity, , 226 Bipolar world, 54 Bluffing, Bosnian Crisis (1908), Bracken, 1., 44 Brams, Steven, 4, 21, 25, 32, 77 Brandenburger, Adam, 24 Brito, 32 Brownie points, 35, 36, 38 Called Bluff, Calmfors, L., Camp David agreement, 63 Canadian Department of External Affairs, 204 Canadian Department of National Defence, 204 Canning, David, Caplow, Theodore, 2, Caplow's coalition theory, 2-3, Cardinal preference orderings (CPOs), 309,314 Cardinal utility schemes, 78 Case, James, 19 Caucuses, , 216, 217, 219 Centipede sequential game, 3, 4n. Centralization, Characteristic function, 22, 38-40, 41 43,44 n-person game, Characteristic function (coalitional) games, Characteristic function form, 51, 53 Characterizing function V(S),37-39 Chemical weapons agreement, 57 Chicken (game), 3,4,49, 76, 77, 78, 281 constrained preferences, , 317 contract curve above the stable Nash equilibrium, 86, 87 matrix, 12 outcome, 303, 304 Cho, 18 Classical cooperative game theory, 76, 78 Classical game thoery, 78 Classicism, 10-11, 13, Cline, Ray, 213, 214, 216 Cline's index (measures of power resources), 213, 214 Closed economies, 141 Clusters, 121 Coalitional form, 34-35, Coalition-bargaining problems, Coalition formation, theories of, 23 Coalition Formation Game, 342 Coalition games, Coalitions, 78-83, Coalition-stability analysis, 93 Coalition structures, 210 Coalition structure value (CS-value), 211, Coalition theory, 2-3 Cold War, Collective-good theory, 2, 78, 93, 98 Colman, Andrew, 13, 15 Column, 301 Committee on Disarmament (1971), 57,63 Committee systems, 218 Common Agricultural Policy, Common knowledge, theories of, Common-threat perception, 96 Community of interest, Complementary gains, Complete information, 227, 228, 229, 231 Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE), 206

3 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Confidence-building measures, 203, 206 Conflict, 301, 302, 303, 313 Conflict analysis, 21 Consensual democracy, 360 Consensus, defined, 304 Consistency of beliefs, Constrained preferences, 321 n. Constrained preference orderings (CPOs), Contract curve, 86, 248 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), 206, 213, 216, 217 Conventional forces agreement, 57 Conway, John, 17 Cooperate, 301, 302, 303 Cooperation, 301, 303 economic analysi of EC, in absolute-gains model, 109 in international relations theory, ,144,146 in labor relations, , international Cooperation procedure, Cooperative equilibrium, 114 Cooperative game, 51, 70n. Cooperative takeoff, 119 Cooperative tipping point, 118 Cooperators, minimum number of, 118 Coordination, 76 contract curve above the stable Nash equilibrium, 86, 87 Coordination game, 76, 78 Core, ll, 39, 96 defined, 23 Core group, 205 Corporatism, , 369n. Correlated equilibria, Cost allocation, 26 Cost-benefit, Council of Ministers, 328, , 338, 344 Countercoalition,41 Counterthreat concept, 34 Countervailing strategy, 225 A Course in Microeconomic Theory, Credible neologisms, 197 Crises, game-theoretic analysis, Crisis bargaining, 234 signaling difficulties with linkage, Crisis Game, 276, 277 full cooperation, 283 Nash equilibria, 277, , 293 payoffs and strategies, Critical cost, 188 Critical risk, 97 Cross-alliance rivalry, 121 Crossover point, Crisis Game, 276, 277,279 Cuban Missile Crisis, 287 Cutoff strategy, , 162 Dalkey, N., 32 Dart duel, 19 Dasgupta,21 Davis, Morton, 11, Deadlock (game), 302, 304, 354, 356, 359 constrained preference orderings, payoff, Deadlock "type" games, 322n. constrained preference orderings, Dean, Jonathan, 203 Debt rescheduling, , , Decision rules, , 153, n-step, 172 Defect, 301, 302 Defections, 253, 271, 272, , 331, Defection threats, Defense Cooperation, 57 Defensive cooperation, 122 Defensive positionality, 121, 122 Demand, defined, 304 Density, 153 Desjardins, Robert, 11 Deterrence rational, signaling and,

4 376 Development, lack of, 67 Dictatorial-sequential unanimity games (DSUGs), 156, 161, Dictatorial-sequential veto games (DSVGs), 156 Differential games, 19 Disagreement vote, 164, Discount factor, , 113, 114, 120 minimum, 114, 115, 116 Discounting, 20 Distributional-coalition theory, 93 Divine equilibria, 17 Divine sequential equilibrium, 253, 266,269 Divinity, Dixit, Avinash, 13 Dollar auction, Dominated strategies, 198 elimination of, , 197 successive elimination of, 187 Dresher, Melvin, 19 Dreze, Jacques, 211, 212 Driffill, 1., Duels, 19 Duopoly, 77 Dyads, 80 Dynamic models, 79 Dynamic nonconstant-sum games, 32 Eastern caucus, , 211, 212 Econometrica, 18 Economic rigidity, 348 Economics of industrial organization, 24 Effective benefit, 97 Effectiveness of the coalition, 90 Effort levels, 91 Ellsberg, 32 Embargo, 133, 134 Employee participation, 350 Epidemics, Epoch,300, ,317,320 Equilibrium, 154, behavior off the path, 253 beliefs off the path, 271 effect on reputation, 184 imperfect, 282 linkage model, structural model, 141, 142 subgame perfect, , Equilibrium proposal, 340, 342, 343, 344 Equilibrium theory, 180 Escalation, Crisis Game, , 287, 288 dynamics of, partial, in Crisis Game, 277 probability of, 233 Essays on the Foundations of Game Theory, 16 European Community (EC), cooperation in, 4 European Community (EC) Treaties, formal model of two-stage decision-making process, European Council, European Monetary Authority, 335, 336 European Monetary System (EMS), 330,333, ,341 European Parliament (EP), 327, 335, 338 Evolutionarily stable strategy, 25 The Evolution of Cooperation, 49 Expected internal benefit (K*ij)' 97 Expolitation, 256, 259, 260, 264, 301, 359 Extensive form, Extensive form games, with two-stage character, 156 Fair division, 26 Falklands/Malvinas conflict, False warnings, 63 Farquaharson, Robin, 26 Fashoda crisis, 261 Fenoaltea, S., , 366n. Fictitious play, 18 Final position, crisis game, 281, 282, 290 Finite, defined, 17 Finite games of perfect information in extensive form, 16-17

5 Finite two-person zero-sum games in strategic form, First-period equilibrium outcome, 133, 134 First-strike advantage, and linkage, 251 First-strike advantage for the receiver, 255, , First-strike advantage for the sender, , First-strike systems, 61, 62 Fishburn, 16 "Flexible response" doctrine, 225 Folk Theorem, 12, 114 Forward induction, Fragmented linkage, 333 "Free-for-all" power value, 215 Free-rider problem, Free-trade agreements, bilateral, 329 Free-trade outcome, 133, 134, 147n., 148n. Friedman, James, 14,23 Fudenberg, Drew, 14, 18,20 Fun and Games, 13 Functional differentiation, 143 Functional nondifferentiation, 143 Gain, concept of, Gale, David, 25 Gale's game, The Game of Business, 23 Games and Information, 13 Games and markets, 25 Games in coalitional form, Games without side-payments, 23 Game theoretical models, 79 Game theory coalitonal form, 13 international cooperation and, levels of difficulty, 9-10 limitations of, 15 sources for international relations specialists, 9-26 syndromes making books on subject unsatisfactory, Game Theory and Economic Behavior, Game Theory for the Social Sciences, 15 "Game Theory" (Aumann) in New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 15 Game Theory in the Social Sciences, 15 Game tree, 33 Gately, 45 General defection, 354, 355, 356, 359 Generating function method, 215 George, S., 335 Gilpin, Robert, 105, 136 Global security level, Gordon, D. G., 32 Grand coalition, 52 Great Britain, European Monetary System and, , 337, 339 Green, Jerry, 3, 152, 153, 161 Greenberg, 1., 342 Greenhouse effect, Greenwood, Ted, 226 Grieco, Joseph, 121, 122, 123n., 149n. Guth, Werner, 20 Guy, Richard, 17 Guyer, M. 1., 32 Hamburger, Henry, 13, 15, 16 Harmony (game), 303, 304 constrained preference orderings, Harrington, Robert, 18 Harris, Milton, 20 Harsanyi, J., 32 Harsanyi function, 42 Harsanyi-Zeuthen critical-risk principle, 96 Hart, Sergiu, 23, 211, 342 Harvey, Frank, 281 Hegemonic war, 136 Helsinki Final Act (1975), 57, 63 Hero (game), constrained preference orderings, Hildebrand, Werner, 25 Holler, Manfred, 14 Homicidal Chauffeur, 19 Hot Line Agreement (1963),57,58,61 Howard, Nigel, 21 Hypergames, 21

6 378 IATO (1949), 57 Ideal point, 247 IIIing, Gerhard, 14 Imperfect equilibrium, 282 Implementability of decision rules, model, Implicit agreements, 59 Imputation, 35, Incentive compatibility, defined, 22 Incentive theory, 154 Incomplete information, 32, 76, 226, games of, signaling and reputation modeled by games of, 20 Incremental cost, of submitting in a limited retaliation, 230 Index of instability, 32 Indifference curves, 83, 86, 87 linkage, Indifference map, 83-85, Indifference point, 270 Individual situations (IS), In extensive form, defined, Information costs, 332 INF Treaty (1987),57,60,62,69 Inside gains, 90 Institutions, 359 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), 57, 61-62, 66 Interested player, 250 International cooperation, game theory and, international security and, outside area of international security, International Journal of Game Theory, 18 International regimes, defined, 332 International relations theory, 129 International security, 47, 76 international cooperation and, qualitative characteristic function approach,53-58 Intervention cost, , 188, 2oon., 201n. Intriligator, Michael D., 2, 32 Iran-Iraq War, 64 Irresolute defender, , Irresolute player, 250, , 257, Irresolute senders, 262, , Isaacs, Rufus, 19 Issue areas, 330, 337 Issue-linkage, 333, 338, 341, 344 James, Patrick, 281 Japan, duels and games of timing, 19 Jenkins proposals, Jervis, Robert, 128, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184,189, 190,2oon. Jervis paradox, 3 Johnson, Harry, 133, 147n. Joint distribution, 153 Joint ventures, 151 decision rule example, utility of, 151 Jones, Anthony, 11 Journal of Economic Theory, 18 Journal of Theoretical Biology, 25 Kalai, E., 342 Kelly, Jerry, 26 Keohane, Robert 0., 123n., 128,329 Kernel, 23 Kilgour, Marc, 4, 25 King Solomon, dilemma of, 22 Kirwan, A., 25 Kohlberg, Egon, 18 Kreps, David, 14, 18, 19,20 Kurz, Mordechai, 23, 211, 342 Labor conflicts ( ), by country, 349, 351 Labor market, nature of, Labor relations, conflicts ( ),349 Labor unions, Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 3, 152, 153, 161 Lambelet, Jean-Christian, 4 Languages of game theory, Large-n Assurance problem,

7 Law of the Sea negotiations, Leader (game), 303, 304 constrained preference orderings, constrained preferences, 317 Legislative structure, strategy of, 26 Lemma 1,282,289,290,292 Lemma 2, 290, 291, 292 "Lemmings" effect, 190 Levin, Richard, 11 Limited nuclear options, Limited retaliation, dynamics of, Limited-retaliation equilibria, 234 Limited retaliation strategy, Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, 57, 58,60 Limiting arms transfers, 57 Limiting missile proliferation, 57 Linkage enforceability issues, 248 in crisis bargaining, logic of, model, "receptive to" condition, 255 signaling properties, 249 success possibility, 246, 248, 249 Linkage accepted, 260, , 269 Linkage attack, 260, , 269 Linkage offers, 262 Linkage reject, 260, , 269 Linked mix, , , 264, ,272 Lipson, Charles, 128 The Ingic of Images in International Relations, 182 Loss, concept of, Luce, I>uncan, 15, 16, 17, 18,23 Luterbacher, Urs, 2-3 MacI>onald, John, 23 McGinnis, M.I>., 265 Machina, Mark, 16 Managerial prerogative, 363 Mann, I., 215 Marx, Karl, 352 Matrix form, 17,34 Maximizing behavior, Maximum winning coalition, Maxmin approach, 41 May, Francis, 11 Mayaguez rescue, 180, , 184, 185,2oon. Maynard-Smith, John, 25 Mechanical design, 22 Mechanism, 154 Mehlmann, Albert, 19 Merrill, Samuel, 25 Mertens, Jean-Francois, 18,21 Metagames,21 Minimax theorem, 13 Mixed strategies, 185, 314 linkage in crisis bargaining, , 273n. Mixed-strategy equilibrium, 185 Monotone likelihood ratios, 154 Moore, John, 22 Morgan, T. C, 248 Morgenstern, 0., 11,33, 34, 35, 330, 342 Morgenstern's stable sets, 11 Morrow, James, 4 Moulin, Herve, 15, 19,24,26,85 Mutual consensus, 310, 311, 314, 315, 316,318 Mutual cooperation, 354, 355, 356, 359 Mutual defection, 301, 302 Mutual deterrence, 59, 61, 64, 69, 76, 78 Myerson, Roger, 14, 18,22 Nacht, Michael L., 226 Nalebuff, Barry, 3, 13,32 Nash bargaining axioms, 21 Nash bargaining functions, 89 Nash Bargaining Game, 340 Nash equilibria, 3, 16, 148n., 159,314 for the coalition, 94 foundations, refinements, and generalizations, illustration of full-preference orderings, 317, 319 in Crisis Game, 277, , 289, 290,293 sequential equilibrium, 186 utility functions and, 84-87

8 380 Nash equilibrium solution, II National Security Council, II NATO High Level Task Force, 205 Negotiation analysis, 219 Neoliberal institutionalism, , ,146n. model, structural model, 142, 143, 144, 145 Neorealism, 127 Neutral and nonaligned nations (NNA), 204, , 211, 212, 216 Never Cooperate (NC) strategy, ,113, 1l7-118, 119 New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 15-21,23,24 Neyman, Abrahim, 24 No consensus (NC), 309, 310, 314, 315, 316,318 defined,305 Non-convex-utility possibility curves, 86 Noncooperative equilibrium, Noncooperative game of coalition formation, 330 Noncooperative games, 70n. Noncooperative game theory, 14 Nonintervention, 191, 192, , 197, 198,20In. Nonproliferative regime, Nontransferable utility (NTV) games, 23 "No regret" criterion, 152 Normal form, 17 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), , 206, 213, 216 No sidepayment (NSP) game, 38 N-person game theory, 15 characteristic function, 35 inconclusive state of, 219 N-step decision rule, 172 N-step unanimity rule, 17l-172 Nuclear deterrence, 226 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) (1968), Nuclear terrorism, 57 Nucleolus, 23 Nye, Joseph S., Jr., 123n. Oil crisis, 45 Oligopoly theory, 24 Olson, Mancur, 93 Omniscience, paradox of, 76 O'Neill, Barry, 2, 3, 32 One-step unanimity rule, , 173 Open economies, 141 Operations research, 15 Optimal reaction curve, 92, 94, 95, 99 Ordering principle, 143 Ordeshook, Peter, 13, 14, 18,22-23,26 Ordinal preference orderings, 311 Ordinal preferences, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, 359, 363 labor relations and economic policies, 347 Origin of games, Orthogonal coalition game, 41 "Our Common House," 57 Outcome function, 154, 159 implementable, 154 Outer Space Treaty (1967),57,60 Owen, Guillermo, 23, 211 Oye, Kenneth, 128 Ozone depletion, 66 Panofsky, Wolfgang K., 226 Pareto dominance, , 272 Pareto efficient games, 330 Pareto efficient proposal, 343, 344 Pareto equivalence, 116 Pareto optimal contract curve, 86 Pareto optimal frontier, 87 Pareto optimal limit, 99 Pareto optimal set, 86 Pareto suboptimal dominant-strategy equilibrium, 265 Partition form of games, 330 Partition function form, 42-43,89,91, 161, 162 Payoffs, 35, 36, 38 cardinal utility schemes and, 78 characteristic function, 40 Coalition Formation Game, 342 Crisis Game, 276, , 283, 286, 287

9 free-trade outcome and, 147n., 148n. international cooperation and, 49, 50, 52 limited retaliation, , 235, 237 linkage in crisis bargaining, 270 multiple, neoliberal institutional model, , 134, 135, 136 Prisoner's Dilemma, 359 relative gains, secondary, structural model, , 142 tit-for-tat strategy in dyads, 110 PD-59,225 Pearce, 18 Pentagonal world of five global powers, Perfect equilibria, 17, 18 Perfect equilibrium point, 32 Perfect information, defined, Perfect sequential equilibrium (PSE), 187, ,201n. Permutation method, 215 Pivotal player, 215 Plenary sessions, , 210 Policy coordination, 331 Polish debt rescheduling, 314, Political structure, Ponnsard, Jean-Pierre, 15 Posterior implementability, 157 Posterior implementable rules, 161, 164 Posterior implementable social-choice rules, 163 Postlewaite, A., 342 Powell, Robert, 3-4, 32, 226 Power given a specific coalition structure,2i1 Power resource possibility frontier, Preemptive strike, crisis game, 276 Preference orderings, , 320 Prevail, defined, Principal-agent models, 22 Prisoner's Dilemma (PD), 3, II, 13, 15, 21,49-50, Axelrod's repeated, 20 bargaining space, bilateral labor-management monopoly, 351, 356, 359, 362 constrained preference orderings, 3I1-3B contract curve above the stable Nash equilibrium, 86 cooperation in repeated games, 24 European Community cooperation procedure, 329 linkage studies, 265 mutual cooperation, with international regimes, 331, 332 neoliberal institutionalism and, 130, 131, 132, 133, ordering and cold war illustration, payoff, relative-gains maximization model, 109 strategies, 303 structural realism and, 146n., 147n. 148n. as theory of cooperation, 219 Tucker exposition, 32 Private values model, Probabilities, 16 Profit sharing, 350 Proper equilibria, 17 Pseudoquadratic functions as utility functions, 84 Public good decision, Public-good theory, 78 Quadratic functions, as utility functions, 84 Qualified majority equilibrium proposal, 343, 344 Qualitative characteristic function, Qualitative characteristic function approach, Quotient games approach, 2I1, 212, ,219 Raiffa, Howard, 15, 16, 17, 18, 23 RAND Corporation, II Rapoport, Anatol, II, 15,21,23,32,50

10 382 Rasmusen, Eric, 13-14,20 Rational decision making, 300 Rational deterrence, Rationality, 19 Rationalizability, 18 Reaction functions, 86, 87, 88 Receiver (linkage), , 249 Reciprocated cooperation, 353 Recognition, Rapprochement (1971-), 57 Refinements, defined, 17 Regional conflicts in Asia, 57 Regional Development Fund, Regional powers, 56 Relative effort level inside the coalition, 91 Relative gains, 105, ,313 definition, international politics as problem of, maximization, 107, 108 maximization model, neoliberal institutional 'model, structural model, Relative-gains payoff, 108 Relative losses, Relative power resources of the coalition, 90 Repeated-game model, 136 Repeated games, Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game, 20,49 Reputation, , 189, 190, 192 limited retaliation and, , 242n. modeled by games of incomplete information, 20 sequential equilibrium and, 193, 194, 195, value of, 182 Reputation paradox, 180, 199 Resolute defender, 231, , 240 Resolute player, 250, , 257, , Resolute senders, 254, 257, , , , Retaliation, Crisis Game, , 286,289 Retaliation function, 282, 288 Revelation principle, 152 defined,22 Reversed equilibrium, , 201n. Richardson, 32 Riley, John, 20 Risk, of defection, 97 Risk aversion, 359, Roberts, 1., 342 Rome Treaty, 327 Roth, Alvin, 21, 23, 25, 211 Row, 292 Row, 301 Rubinstein, Ariel, 16,24 Sabourian, H., 20 Saltsjobaden compromise, 362 SALT Treaties (1972,1979),57,60 Schelbert-Syfrig, H., 365 Schelling, Thomas c., 11, 31-32, Schelling diagram, 118 Schlesinger, James R., 226 Schlesinger doctrine, 225, 231 Schouer, Andrew, 22, 24 Schwodiauer, Gerhard, 22, 24 Scoring systems, 213 Scoville, Herbert, 226 Seabed Treaty (1970),57,60 Security guarantee, 57 Segmented labor market, 351 Self-falsifying inferences, 184 Seiten, Reinhard, Sender (linkage), , 249, 254 Sequential crisis equilibria, 232, 236, Sequential equilibria, 17, 18, , , linkage model, refinements, Sequential unanimity games (SUG), agreed termination, impossibility of, equivalence between posterior implementation and SUG implementation, implementability, 159

11 optimal strategies, private values model, Sequential veto game (SVG), 155, 156 Settling regional disputes, 57 Settling regional disputes in Africa (1988),57,64 Seven Weeks War (1866),248 Shapley, Lloyd, 23, 25, , 212, 215 Shapley-Shubik power index, , 214,215,216,217 Shapley value, 2, 11,23, 52-53, ,218,342 Sharp, Jane, 206 Shubik, Martin, 2, 15, 17, 19,23, ,212 Sidepayments,44,51 Signaling, linkage, 249, 273n. modeled by games of incomplete information, 20 strategic use of, Simultaneous announcement game, 152 Single European Act (SEA), , 330,332,337,338,342,343 Single Integrated Operational Plans (SIOP),231 Sino-American "rapprochement" (1972),75 Sino-Indian War (1962), 261 Six-Nation Peace Initiative, 63 Sobel, Joel, 20 Social choice theory, 26 Social decision rules, 157 "Solvable Nuclear War Models," 32 Sonnenschein, Hugo, 24 Snidal, Duncan, 3, 78 Spheres of Influence, 59 Stability analyses, Stable equilibria, 17, 18, Stable set, 39 Stag Hunt, 3,49, 323n. constrained preference orderings, START, elimination of fixed-site ICBMs, 57, Status quo decision, 153 Steering committee (NATO), Stein, Arthur A., 128, 273n. Step function, 160, 161, 162 Stockholm Agreement (1987),57,63 Strategic form, 17-19,33-34,40 defined,17 Strategic Integrated Operational Plans (SIOP),225 Strategic interaction, terminology problems, Strategies, 154 Crisis Game, limited retaliation and sequential crisis equilibrium, Strategy and Conscience, 15 Strong-majority-rule approach, 213 Strong ordinal preferences, 32 Structural realism, , 133, 134, , 146n. structual model of absolute and relative gains problem, Subgame imperfect equilibrium, 289 Subgame perfect, Subgame-perfect equilibria, 143, , Superadditivity assumption, 51, 71 n. Supergames, Supervision, , 366n. Survival Game, 50, 51, 60 dealing with international terrorism, 63 Sutton, John, Sweden, labor relations, , 364, 365,368n. Switzerland, labor market, 4, 352, , , 367n., 368n. Symbolism of the moves, 3 Symmetrical decision functions, 88 Symmetric games, 70n. Tactical linkage, 333 Tariffs, 133, 134, 142, 147 Taylor, P., 335 Technology of warfare, 148n. Termination, agreed, impossibility of, Terrorism, international, 63 Theology, 76 Theories of coalition formation, 23

12 384 The Theory of Industrial Organization, 14 Theory of moves, 21 Thinking Strategically, 13 Thomas, L. c., 21, 25 Threat, 39,44 characteristic and partition function forms, Threat concept, 34 Threat Game, 281, 282 Threat point, 340 Threat strategies, 86 threat value, 98 Three-caucus form of bargaining, Timing, games of, 19 Tipping point, 118, 119, 120 Tipping zone, 119 Tirole, Jean, 14, 18,20,24 Tit-for-tat rule, Tit-for-tat (TFT) strategy, , 113, Tracing procedure, 18 Tradeoff functions, 89, 91 Tradeoff gains, Transaction costs, 332 "Trembling-hand perfectness," 282, 285,289, Triads, Trianguar trade, Trieste crisis (1954), 262 Trilateral coalitions, Troops reduction, 203 Tucker, A. W., 11, 32 The 2X2 Game, 32 Two-person game thoey, 15 Two-person zero-sum games, 11 Two-person zero-sum theory, 11 Two-step unanimity rule, Ultima ratio, 136 Ultimate payoff (utility), as two-step process, 108. Unanimous equilibrium proposal (UEP), 340, 342, 344 Uninterested player, 250 United Nations, 63 United Nations (treaty) (1946),57 United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), constitution, 69 U.S. Army's Armored Division Equivalent method, 213 U.S. Electoral College, 218 Unit square, games on, 19 Universal divinity, 187, Universally divine equilibria, 17 Unlimited attack, , Unlinked mix, , 268, 272 Unlinked offer, , 262, 264 Unlinked offer accepted, , , Unlinked offer rejected, , 261, 267 Unstable dynamic equilibria, 86 Upper constraint, of limit of resources, 90 User's Manual, 18, 20 Utilities, 16, 35, 36, 38, extensive form game, 153 for linkage issue, 250 state's, 139 strategies in linkages, Utility functions (i), 89-91, 168,340 Utility function (U), Utility possibility frontier, 86 Value, 39 van Damme, Eric, 15, 18,20,25 Vienna Arms Talks, Von Neumann, J., 11,33, 34, 35, 330, 342 Von Neumann stable sets, 11 Voting, strategy of, 26 Wage rigidity, 350 Waltz, Kenneth, 105, 107, 128, , 136, 139, 143, 146 War, structural model, , War initiation, 76 Warning systems, 63 Warsaw Pact, 204, 206, 213 Weber, Robert, 18,20,25 Weber, Shlomo, 4, 342

13 385 Western caucus, , 211, Wiesmeth, H., 4 Williams, John, II Wilson, Robert, 20 Winning Ways for Your Mathematical Plays, 17 Winter War ( ),246 "Workers involved" series, , 367n. "Working days lost" series, , 367n. Working groups, World powers, Worth, 35, 36, 38 Yom Kippur War (1973), 277 Young, H. P., 211 Young, Peyton, 25 Zagare, Frank, 15, normalization, normalized form, 71n. Zero sum, defined, 17 Zero-sum games, 11,49 Zeuthen's principle, 322n.