Framework: Systems and Mechanisms

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1 Notes Introduction 1. Some have drawn the conclusion that the idea of value-neutral social science is at best self-delusion, and that what matters is to choose the right normative and ideological positions for social theorizing. The position I present in chapter 4 is that much of what goes by the name of social science is in fact applied science and social technology, such as the whole field of policy-related work. Here normative and ideological positions indeed do and must play a central role. 2. So-called political theorists who reside in departments of philosophy or political science for the most part specialize in the history of political philosophy, usually unconnected with the debates and concerns of the social sciences. See the journal Political Theory, but also the contributions to the American Political Science Review that are reserved for political theorists. 3. Which is not to say that such boundaries cannot or should not be drawn. For a philosophy-based systematic conception, see Bunge A useful survey of the historical emergence of the global order of nation-states is provided by Opello and Rosow From 51 states in 1945 when the UN was founded to more than 190 states by the end of the century. 6. Timor-Leste (East Timor) became a sovereign state in Rather than speaking abstractly of society and state, I use the phrase statesocieties in this study in order to refer to the roughly 200 concrete social-political systems that are situated in a specific, territorially defined, and internationally recognized nation-state without a priori privileging state-societies over other social systems. 8. On sociology s lack of interest in nations and nationalism, see Spillman 2004; Szacki The widely used phrase the Washington consensus has come to epitomize the neoliberal position in political and ideological discourse (Williamson 2003). 10. The oft-cited author of the so-called end of history thesis is Fukuyama 1992.

2 170 Notes 11. This study is greatly indebted to the philosophy of Mario Bunge. However, it is acknowledged that so-called critical realism (e.g., Bhaskar 1975) shares some of the central assumptions and concerns of Bunge s scientific realism. Chapter 1 Framework: Systems and Mechanisms 1. On systems theories in general and specific versions, see Müller For examples of critiques of Parsons s systems theory: Elias 1994, intro; Habermas 1988; Luhmann s systems theory: Bluhdorn 2000, Osterberg 2000; Wallerstein s world systems theory: Aronowitz 1981, Kaplan In fact, Bunge s ontology is not confined to social systems. See especially his Treatise on Basic Philosophy, Vol. 4: A World of Systems (1979). 3. A number of recent works in different social science disciplines have attempted to bridge the methodological individualism-holism divide. The literatures going by the common name of new institutionalism represent recent attempts of this sort in political science (e.g., Ostrom 1991), comparative politics (e.g., Lichbach and Zuckerman 1997), sociology (e.g., Brinton and Nee 1998), economics (e.g., Rutherford 1996), management theory (e.g., Ingram and Silverman 2002), organizational theory (e.g., Powell and DiMaggio 1991) and policy studies (e.g., Scharpf 1997). The difficulty and ultimate failure to date of integrating rational choice and culturalist theories is discussed by Johnson That our subjective experience of living in/being a member of social systems is direct does not imply that our experiences, even such basic and immediate experiences as emotions, are not semiotically encoded. See for example Wierzbicka s (1999) Emotions across Languages and Cultures. Diversity and Universals. 5. On the question of whether they are central parts in other animal social systems, see Wierzbicka Models are of course also central in social systems of modern science. Indeed, a fundamental problem in the social sciences is how to model the actors models that are part of the social phenomena to be explained. 6. Of course there are also local, regional, and global land systems. 7. An excellent ethnographic and sociological study of major mechanisms of transformation in land systems in postcommunist Romania is Verdery 2003, which will be discussed at greater length later in this chapter. 8. On the role of laws in mechanismic explanation, see Bunge According to Hedström and Swedberg (1998, 6), Arthur Stinchcombe (1991) reopened the debate in the journal Philosophy of the Social Sciences. Ten authors are assembled in Social Mechanisms. An Analytical Approach to Social Theory (1998), including Raymond Boudon, Jon Elster, and Arthur Stinchcombe, as well as the volume editors Peter Hedström and Richard Swedberg. Bunge s article Social Mechanisms was published in 1997, also in Philosophy of the Social Sciences. In the same journal, two special issues (June and September 2004) were devoted to discussing Bunge s approach to systems and mechanisms. 10. In his Theory and Social Structure (1948/1968), republished as ch. III of On Theoretical Sociology (1967).

3 Notes Functionalism, like Bunge s systemic approach, may have negative connotations for some readers. For clarification, see Mahner and Bunge (2001). 12. Merton (ibid.) continues: Basic query: What is the presently available inventory of social mechanisms corresponding, say, to the large inventory of psychological mechanisms? What methodological problems are entailed in discerning the operation of social mechanisms? As Renate Mayntz (2004, 256) diagnosed in a recent symposium on systems and mechanisms, [w]ith the exception of game theory, the literature is still devoid of attempts to treat diverse kinds of actor constellations in different fields of macro-social research as systematically as has been done for the emergent effects of collective behavior....the problem is that in most empirical studies in which structural configurations and actor constellations play a crucial role, very little effort is devoted to distil mechanism models from the analysis. 13. A general search (August 23, 2005) of the Social Sciences Citation Index for the period shows that mechanistic occurs in the title or abstract of about 500 articles, while relational occurs in about 2,500 articles. Bunge s own mechanismic appears twice. A relational perspective has a long tradition as part of Marxian dialectics (cf. Heilbroner 1980, ch. 2). 14. This leads some theorists to argue that conceptual systems themselves can be social mechanisms (e.g., Wight 2004). 15. Much literature in comparative politics is actually focused on one country only. Here the comparative, generalizing element may be implicit, or the type of explanation offered is actually of type 1 as just discussed. Chapter 2 The Problem-Oriented Approach to Order: The Case of the Theory of Sovereignty 1. Contemporary debates involving sovereignty, whether relating to international relations theory, globalization, human rights, international law, citizenship or migration, or development are not engaged directly in this chapter. For useful introductions to the debate, see for example Spruyt 2002; Wouter and De Wilde 2001; Krasner Kurtulus (2004) surveys how different fields and disciplines approach sovereignty. 2. There is a third objection. Sovereignty, one might contend, means absolute sovereignty, or else it does not make any sense. Of course the same would then have to be said about freedom, tolerance, and democracy. For just as it is quite meaningful to speak of limited freedom, limited tolerance, and limited majority rule, it is quite useful to speak of limited sovereignty. However, as the examples from the history of political theory referred to below show, even the principle of unlimited sovereignty is not necessarily inconsistent with a theory (and practice) of institutional control, whereas theories of limited or mixed sovereignty were in fact seriously defective. See also note 9 below. 3. The first statement of Popper s solution to the problem of knowledge was published in German as Die beiden Grundprobleme der Erkenntnistheorie (1979), on the

4 172 Notes basis of manuscripts from the years 1930 to An English translation is in preparation. The Logic of Scientific Discovery was a strongly abridged version of this work from which large parts containing many of the ideas that Popper developed only much later were cut. For the reader unfamiliar with Popper s solution to the so-called problem of induction, the relevant sections in Miller s Popper Selections (1985) can serve as a useful introduction. 4. From the justificationist metacontext, relativists infer that since there cannot be any certain knowledge, there cannot be any absolutely true knowledge; hence, knowledge (or the truth) becomes a matter of social convention. See in this context especially Popper s critique of the sociology of knowledge (1966/2, ). 5. In his early writings, Popper implicitly tends to identify the demarcation between science and nonscience with the demarcation between good and bad...[theories]. Thus, as Bartley (1984, 205) further explains, Popper, in his most extreme statement denies that untestable or unfalsifiable theories even speak about reality. Popper himself, in Objective Knowledge (1972, 40n) writes with respect to his early work: In those days I identified wrongly the limits of science with those of arguability. I later changed my mind and argued that non-testable (i.e., irrefutable) metaphysical theories may be rationally arguable. For further on this, see especially chapters 8 and 10 in his Conjectures and Refutations (1968) as well as Sect. 15 of his Realism and the Aim of Science (1983). 6. This formulation has the advantage of not disputing the general or transhistorical character of political theories or any of their elements in principle. By emphasizing the importance of a given problem situation, it is possible to avoid both radical relativist and absolutist positions while benefiting from the theoretical insights considered fundamental by each. The fact that many political theorists have made universal claims for their doctrines need not disturb us. There is no reason why we could not read them as making more or less general and contextbound, though not universal, claims. At least in this respect we will not lose anything of significance by refusing to understand their theories as their authors understood them. 7. For a recent account of Bodin s theory of sovereignty with special emphasis on its historical context, see Engster The notion of sovereignty was first formulated under the Roman Empire from the first century A.D., in much the same way and by much the same process. Cf. Hinsley 1966, With a reversal of roles, the same of course applies to the popular rights doctrines with the paradoxical result that the people are claimed to have supremacy over the people. (On this paradox and its resolution through a theory of popular sovereignty, see comments on Locke, below). 10. Bodin did address the question of tyranny explicitly, and came to the conclusion that although some minor forms of resistance to the sovereign were admissible, removal or tyrannicide were not. On this as well as the specific historical circumstances that provide the context for Bodin s answer, see Quaritsch 1970,

5 Notes As such, it does not make the claim that political power is in fact sovereign in the empirical sense that Popper has criticized (see above). It only means that there can be no rightful or legitimate claims for political power that do not originate in and are not sanctioned by the sovereign. 12. Bodin s reformulation of the problem of order, however, that is, his conception of absolute sovereignty, did not become prevalent until the end of the seventeenth century until which time conceptions of limited or double sovereignty were still widely advocated. As Hinsley has pointed out: It was clear at the time, on the other hand, that this mixed government and similar compromise theories failed to check dissension, as they failed to avert the Civil War. And it is now clear that this was because they merely extended the dualism which it was the aim of the concept of sovereignty to overcome (merely shifted the conflict between dualism and the idea of sovereignty) by seeking to split or subdivide the rulership itself when it was in practice impossible to limit or subdivide the government power that was coming to be seen as sovereign power (Hinsley 1966, 138). 13. Writers like Anthony Ascham, John Rockett, and Henry Parker. Cf. Hinsley 1966, Locke s conception of sovereignty, as J.H. Franklin has shown, was already worked out by George Lawson, a political moderate writing in the later Interregnum. Cf. Franklin Of course Locke s comprehensive theory of sovereignty has not always been fully understood, nor has it gone unchallenged. [T]he abstract concept of the state as a moral person, and even the doctrine of sovereignty itself, were blunted and obscured when Montesquieu, like the Founding Fathers of the American Constitution after him, mistook the English principle of mixed government, based on the separation of different government powers, to be a doctrine resulting from and justifying the deliberate division of sovereignty itself among several independent owners (Hinsley 1966, 152). Rousseau, on the other hand, not only rejected any division of sovereign power but also any constitutionalist elements such as the division of powers or representation. Reversing Hobbes s thesis, in which the state dominated the community which created it while remaining separate from it, he allowed the community to swallow up the state and left the community with no organ capable of exercising power (ibid., 155). 16. See the useful discussion in Kurtulus (2004) of the distinction and some of the relationships between normative and empirical approaches to the question of sovereignty. 17. I elaborate this point further in chapter The former German Democratic Republic, or East Germany, is a rare case in point for giving up state sovereignty in favor of unification with the Federal Republic, that is, in favor of national reunification. 19. Astute observers of U.S. foreign policy in the early twenty-first century, however, see the United States ill served by this approach (see, e.g., Johnson 2004; Mann 2003).

6 174 Notes Chapter 3 Homo Nationis: The Psychosocial Infrastructure of the Nation-State Order 1. Though one of his mistakes, that is, treating the normative theory of sovereignty as an empirical theory of political power the descriptive fallacy (see final section of ch. 2) is still frequently committed in the contemporary debate. 2. See Macpherson 1964; van Krieken Society is used in the generic sense of social group. 4. This is the title of one of his major works (Elias 1991). 5. I am purposely speaking of nation-state societies as composed of individualizing members rather than individuals. This is to emphasize that individualism is not somehow opposed to society but rather has emerged in particular types of societies. More on the historical individual below. 6. Whereas the economic and political regimes of communism, and in three cases the federal state itself, collapsed, national identity and culture survived and thrived. In spite of certain ideological declarations to the contrary, communist states did not denationalize their populations, and for the most part reinforced their national specificity. 7. Being products of an ongoing social process, national culture and national habitus should not be treated as independent or dependent variables. See ch. 1 for the distinction between variable-oriented and mechanismic explanation. 8. The more general concept of social capital has been widely employed since the last decade of the twentieth century, though Bourdieu is not the only or even major source of inspiration. For a wide-ranging survey of the origins and diverse usages of the concept of social capital in sociology, see Portes 1998; in political science, Jackman and Miller Ironically, habit and habitus are well-established concepts in the natural sciences. 10. I provide a broad discussion of the concept of habitus in Pickel 2005a. 11. The same habits that for a long time support or are at least compatible with the existence of a particular social order, however, may under certain conditions also have the opposite effects of facilitating revolutionary action and regime collapse, as was the case in many of the communist regimes in For an interesting illustration of this point in the context of East Germany in 1989, see McFalls Camic, writing in the mid-1980s, does not mention Elias once. 13. The significance of habit in determining individual behavior is also highlighted in recent psychological literature (Ajzen 2001). 14. See however the work of Michele Lamont (1992; 2002), who also provides a critique of Bourdieu s conception of habitus. 15. If indeed it is recognized as such. 16. For a critical assessment of these positions from a viewpoint similar to the one presented here, see Billig (1995), esp. ch The EU as the leading case of transnational integration provides an ideal testing ground for whether and how strong postnational identities can emerge. See for example Cederman 2001; Soysal 2002.

7 Notes That is, in terms of similar values as measured, for instance, in the cross-national surveys of Inglehart (e.g., 1997). 19. The best recent treatment of this banal nature of nationalism is probably Billig Note that the claim here is not that national habitus works everywhere as the only, or necessarily major, psychosocial foundation of modern order. Such generalizations would be untenable given the diversity of nation-states. 21. There are other structural features of a state-society, such as internal linguistic or religious divisions, that do not favor the development of a national habitus. 22. For a critique of Gellner s functionalist leanings, see O Leary Contrast this rich conception of economic culture with economist L. Thurow s (2000) thin conception: Traditionally, culture is older people telling younger people what they should believe and how they should act. What is frightening about the new electronic culture is that it is a for-sale culture that jumps right across the generations directly to the young. In contrast to older forms of culture, this culture does not have any specific values that it wants to inculcate. Those who produce this culture provide whatever sells whatever the young will buy. It is a culture of economics (profits) rather than a culture of values (morals). 24. See, however, Crane 1998; Abdelal 2001; Tsygankov I rely in this section heavily on the analysis by Spillman/Faeges See also Szacki Writing in the early 1970s, leading nationalism scholar Anthony Smith concluded that the debates of Marxist thinkers Kautsky, Luxemburg, Bauer, and Lenin were the most consistently sociological of the attempts to explain nationalism until the present decade (quoted in Spillman and Faeges 2005, 412). 27. Durkheim, like Marx, was convinced of the transitory character of the nation, remarking presciently that there is tending to form...a European society that has even now some feeling of its own identity and the beginnings of an organization (quoted in Spillman/Faeges 2005, 413). 28. With the addition of Timor-Leste (East Timor) in May of 2002, there are now 193 de iure sovereign states in the world. In addition, there is a small number of de facto independent states, inhabited dependent territories, as well as areas of special sovereignty. 29. A correspondingly one-sided overemphasis of the cultural can be found in the idealist conceptualizations of nation in some of the works published in the 1990s. Greenfeld 1992, 2001; critically: Rutland 2003; Meyer et al I define state-society as the social system composed of the permanent residents of a territorial state. The significance of this concept will become clearer in ch. 6, in which the nation-state-society problematic is systematically explored. 31. While the civic versus ethnic dualism in the categorization of nationalisms is now widely recognized as problematic, Zubrzycki (2001) shows how they may serve as ideal types if approached and employed with sufficient care. 32. There are of course important variants on the basic type, the most important being the federal model pioneered by the United States.

8 176 Notes Chapter 4 Changing Orders: Theory, Strategy, Ideology 1. This formulation is more dramatic than informative. All of these twenty-two new nation-states had been in existence and fully institutionalized as federal or sub-states for many decades, a crucial precondition for successful secession (Roeder 2001). 2. On economic reforms under communism, see Berend 1999; Hewett For an excellent historical review of this debate, especially the conservative and reactionary positions, see Hirschman For an application of Hirschman to the postcommunist debate, see Greskovits The thumbnail sketches of the basic positions I provide under the headings of theory, strategy, and ideology are designed for illustrative purposes. While I have tried to capture the essence of these two positions in the debate as I see them, they are obviously highly simplified. For this reason, I do not cite individual authors unless I am dealing with specific arguments. 5. My three standards for evaluation are informed by the critical rationalist s nonjustificationist and nonfoundationalist tools for eliminating error by criticizing our conjectures or speculations. See, for example, Bartley 1984, 127. See also ch The failure to be clear on the distinction between means and ends, as Ben Slay (1993) points out, was a source of confusion in the transformation debate. 7. For my own view on this debate, see the editors introduction in Bönker/Müller/ Pickel Possible exceptions include Russia and Ukraine. As John Dryzek and Leslie Holmes (2002) find in their comparative analysis of political discourses in thirteen postcommunist states, all have cultural resources for the strengthening of substantive democratic institutions and practices. 9. Again, this can be said with more conviction about some countries than others. 10. I have elsewhere (Pickel 1997) concluded that for this and other reasons neoliberalism has become what in the context of Marxist-Leninist states was called an official ideology, that is, a set of doctrines that has lost much of its practical policy significance but that continues to rein as symbolic discourse at the political level. 11. Thus in a piece published in 1994, he offers the following gradualist s reflection on policy strategy that contrasts sharply with his full-mouthed neoliberal rhetoric: The reforming politician must take into account the fact that radical transformation of any society is a complex and dynamic process, not merely an exercise in applied economics or political science. [It] takes years to complete; it cannot be accomplished merely with some sort of overnight shock-therapy (V. Klaus, The Economist, September 10, 1994, 57). 12. This is precisely the point that Karl Popper, who is frequently invoked by gradualists, makes when he writes that the difference between Utopian and piecemeal social engineering turns out, in practice, to be a difference not so much in scale and scope as in caution and preparedness for unavoidable surprises (Popper 1976, 69). On Popper and transformation theory, see also ch A particularly striking example is provided by Murrell (1995a, 88 89), which recounts the peculiar indigenization of radical reform ideology and practice in Mongolia.

9 Notes A claim advanced by Murrell (1995a). 15. It is beyond the scope of this analysis to explore the ways in which ideology and strategy are and are not linked. This distinction underlies a number of studies that have explored such links in a variety of contexts. A classic treatment of the relationship between Marxist-Leninist ideology and policy practice is Moore (1965). For the Western context, see, for example, Hall (1989). 16. Thus, a mid-1990s twelve-country survey of people s attitude toward the pace of economic reform in their country would suggest that neoliberal ideology with its emphasis on reform speed still enjoyed significant popularity. See The Economist, July 22, 1995: Grimm (1993) and Brada (1995) present arguments to this effect. Chapter 5 Explaining and Designing Order: Social Science and Social Technology 1. Arguably, the entire third-world development experience could be considered as earlier instances of attempts at controlled, systemic change though perhaps with the important caveat that modernization did not necessarily entail wholesale adoption of Western political and economic institutions. The same could be said about Japan in the nineteenth century and Turkey in the early twentieth century, as well as the experience of all late developers. As Gerschenkron (1962) has shown with respect to nineteenth-century European economic history, latecomers developed their own set of institutions specific to their local conditions rather than simply copying those of the advanced countries. 2. As borrowed from Roscoe Pound (1922, 99), as Popper (1966/61, 210) himself acknowledges. 3. Nationalism, religious fundamentalism, environmentalism, and feminism are alternative, to some extent competing, doctrines of social change, though none of these enjoys nearly the same powerful institutional and political support as neoliberalism. 4. As Mario Bunge (1998, 440) has pointed out, there is a wedge between social science and social technology, namely ideology. This is unavoidable and not deplorable in itself, because technology is neither value-free nor morally neutral. There would be no problem with a proscience and morally right ideology. The trouble is that most ideologies do not meet these conditions. 5. Thus there is general decline in the political and symbolic attractiveness of neoliberalism as we move from west to east. It is highest in Central Eastern Europe and the Baltic states, more controversial in Southeastern Europe, highly controversial if not simply passé in Russia and the CIS, and anathema in China as well as in the geographic outlier, Cuba. 6. As Janine Wedel (1998) documents, Harvard economist Jeffrey Sachs, for example, advised not only the Polish reform government in 1990, but also appeared in the Polish media to promote the political project of radical transformation. 7. Initially Anglo-Saxon (the United States), subsequently Western European with the growing importance of EU membership; but very little from East Asia,

10 178 Notes arguably the region with the most relevant cases for late integration into the capitalist world market. 8. Many of these ideas have been further developed by the leading German critical rationalist, Hans Albert (e.g., 1999a, 1978, 1976). With the exception of a recent English-language collection (Albert 1999b), most of his work is unfortunately not available in English. 9. The same inconsistency has been noted by Moessinger (1999, 119) in Hayek s call for the state to maintain the conditions for spontaneous order: Obviously, it is legitimate to ask whether, in the very attempt to preserve spontaneous order, the spontaneity itself is not destroyed. 10. On this distinction, see Moessinger 1999, Example of normative catalytic principles: Western models are best and should be copied; or, indigenous models are best. 12. Catalytic mechanisms: the central change mechanisms in a specific case. 13. Catalytic practices: rely on Western experts wherever possible; do without Western experts wherever possible; rhetorically and symbolically talk neoliberal, even if your goals are fundamentally different. Chapter 6 Nationalizing Mechanisms in a Globalizing World 1. See ch. 1. For a brief overview of mechanism-based explanation and different views on the methodological presuppositions of the approach, see my introduction to the two special issues of Philosophy of the Social Sciences on systems and mechanisms (Pickel 2004). 2. The phrase national culture, subsequently used without quotation marks, is defined and developed below in my conception of nation as process. It should therefore not be mistaken as an essentialist concept. 3. This spillover of national cultures across the borders of states (often misleadingly referred to as transnationalization ) is easily accounted for in the conception presented here. National cultures, as further explained below, are not conceived as social entities or properties but rather as social processes (i.e., nationalizing mechanisms) in concrete social systems such as government agencies, firms, associations, or families. Such social systems are active and embedded in supranational contexts in many different ways. 4. [A mechanismic approach] shifts the search away from general models like rational choice that purport to summarize whole categories of contention and movement toward the analysis of smaller-scale causal mechanisms that recur in different combinations with different aggregate consequences in various historical settings (McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly 2001, 24). Every major social change is likely to be biological, psychological, demographic, economic, political, and cultural either simultaneously or in succession. Hence, the mechanism of every major social change is likely to be a combination of mechanisms of various kinds coupled together (Bunge 1997, 417).

11 Notes I am aware of the problematic semantics of social system, a concept that for many social scientists is associated with systems theories such as those of Parsons, Easton, or Luhmann. However, I am not convinced that concepts such as social sites (Tilly) or social fields (Bourdieu) improve upon the systemic ontology advocated here, but rather that they may invite confusions between social systems, symbolic systems, and conceptual systems (cf. Bunge 1996a). See further on this ch Other examples of imagined communities that do not have any independent social existence are the good guys and the bad guys (cf. U.S. President George W. Bush s view of the world) or the fan community of a Rock star. 7. This definition attempts to incorporate the subjective, intersubjective, and objective dimensions of nation. The statement itself is objective (it reports a widely held social representation), recognition is intersubjective, and experience is subjective. 8. In states with more than one numerically and politically strong nation, cultural hegemony may to some extent be shared (cf. the Canadian case). In all other states, the dominant nation s cultural hegemony may be more or less openly contested, both from within the dominant nation and by the subordinate nations. 9. Samuel Huntington (2004) sees this cultural hegemony at risk as a result of recent Latino immigration to the United States. Similar fears are voiced in other countries of immigration, including recently also European countries. 10. To take the case of Germany, Auslandsdeutsche are individuals of German ethnicity who are entitled to German citizenship; more than 2 million from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union emigrated to Germany in the 1980s and 1990s. They are legally and politically fully integrated as citizens, yet culturally barely integrated (therefore a subordinate nation ). Second- and third-generation Turks, on the other hand, may be fully integrated culturally but not politically if they do not have German citizenship. 11. This conception of the national therefore includes individual cognition, social discourse, and social structure (usually studied separately by psychology, discourse analysis, and sociology). It also takes to heart Elias s point that [i]t is not enough to seek structures in language, thought or knowledge as if they had an existence of their own independently of the human beings who speak, think or know. In all these cases one can connect characteristics of the structure of language, thought or knowledge with the functions they have in and for the life of human beings in groups (1991b, 68). 12. This breakdown closely follows, but is not identical with vandijk 1998, esp. 37, 39, 120, 126, 196. VanDijk s project is to develop a new concept of ideology that serves as the interface between social structure and social cognition (ibid., 8). He is however opposed to the concept of habitus (ibid., 47) and does not speak about national culture. 13. See however Goodin et al. 1997, who explore the wider claim for sovereignty for the nonhuman great apes, in light of some debates in political theory and of contemporary developments in the theory and practice of sovereignty. 14. Of course it would be naïve to assume that premodern societies necessarily had a more harmonious relationship with their natural environment. For striking counterexamples, see Diamond 2005.

12 180 Notes 15. I use culture here in its anthropological sense of symbolic or meaning systems. 16. For a brief survey of literatures on national economies, national states, economic nations, and national economic cultures, see ch. 3; Pickel 2003; 2005b. 17. While the world s two most populous states, China and India, have greatly accelerated their integration into the world economy, it is important to keep in mind that large majorities of their respective populations have seen a reduction in their life chances as a result. 18. For more on this, see Bunge This is a distinction that in its narrow form applies only to modern liberal societies that are functionally highly differentiated and in which society and economy are systems with a significant degree of autonomy from the state. In other words, economy and civil society are formally empowered to be actors in the political system. Nonliberal civil societies do not have the same degree of functional differentiation and autonomy from the state as liberal civil societies. On the distinction between Civil Society (i.e., in its Western liberal sense) and civil society in a general sense, see Gellner Speaking of functions does not make this analysis functionalist in a general sense. One can replace function with effect without altering the argument. On functions and functionalism, see Mahner and Bunge This is why the NM is also particularly relevant for the extensive literature on democratic consolidation. See Linz and Stepan Economic nationalism, however, is alive and well. See Helleiner 2002; Pickel 2003, 2005b; Helleiner/Pickel These cases of state dissolution and national reformation are probably best understood by combining the NM with change mechanisms based on the existence of federal state institutions in those multinational states. For an argument to this effect, see Roeder Major exceptions include Canada, Northern Ireland, and Spain. 25. The argument that regions are able to bypass the national level is at best partially true (Hettne and Soderbaum 2000). 26. On collective memory, see also Bruner (2002), Olick and Robins (1998); Schudson (1997). 27. This general model of nationalizing mechanisms has drawn on vandijk s model of the reproduction of ideologies (1998, ). As mentioned above, I view nationalism/nationality/national identity, in short the national, as a meta-ideology and a meta-discourse based in concrete social systems. 28. NMs also operate in the global economic system and in global culture, but these global structures are more controversial and more difficult to model. This is why they are not included in this brief sketch. 29. That is, political practices taking for granted the fundamental character of national sovereignty. 30. Brubaker (1998, 300), for instance, similarly distinguishes between state-framed and counter-state forms of nationalism. Tilly (1998, ) speaks of state-led versus state-seeking nationalisms.

13 Notes Note: Nationally specific experiences, policies, and ideologies, usually originating in dominant state-societies, can become transnationalized and may then be promoted through globalizing mechanisms such as isomorphism, conditionality, et cetera in international organizations such as the IMF, World Bank, and UN. Cf. also the snowball effect in Eastern European civil-society movements in the late 1980s. 32. In systemic ontology, individual human beings are both members of social systems and constitute biosocial systems themselves (Pickel 2005a; cf. also Bunge 1979). Chapter 7 Nation and Social Order in the Global Age 1. In the globalization debate, an influential but false opposition between global and national orders is often tacitly assumed. This relationship is often portrayed as a zero-sum game between two sets of players. Simplistic frames such as this can clearly serve a purpose in ideology and political mobilization (witness neoliberalism and the antiglobalization movement), but at the expense of the deeper understanding that social science tries to achieve. 2. What Scholte (2000, 55 58) refers to as methodological territorialism. 3. Quoting Scholte (2000, 59) once more, we should not replace territorialism with a globalist methodology that neglects territorial spaces. The end of territorialism owing to globalization has not meant the end of territoriality. To say that social geography can no longer be understood in terms of territoriality alone is not to say that territoriality has become irrelevant. We inhabit a globalizing rather than a fully globalized world. Indeed, the rise of supraterritoriality shows no signs of producing an end to territoriality (emphasis in original). 4. This would be a handy explanation for the burgeoning nationalism literature since the early 1980s, though few of its major contributors such as Hobsbawm (1990) predict the imminent decline of nation and nationalism. 5. At the individual level, for example, even a person who de facto does not own anything has property rights under a liberal constitution. Or, rich and poor alike have the freedom to sleep in the street, even if the rich do not take advantage of it. 6. On sovereignty and European integration, see Preuss 1996; Heinemann-Gruder 2000; Bellamy and Castiglione 2003; on sovereignty in the context of the UN, see Held 1995; Gow 2000; Urquhart International relations theorists talking about the nation-state have traditionally had little to say about the national. With the constructivist turn in IR, this is gradually changing. See, for example, R.B. Hall On changing conceptions of the people in the history of political theory, see ch. 1; Hinsley On the concept of international regime as elements of global order, see e.g., Krasner 1983; Rittberger 1993; March and Olsen It should be recognized that existing states differ widely in the degree to which they constitute highly structured domestic orders. As, for example, Migdal (2001) and Scott (1998) have argued, the orderliness of nation-states domestically is in

14 182 Notes part the result of conventional analytical frameworks rather than of a more simply structured social reality. 11. This is a core assumption in so-called Realist theories of international relations, which have been the subject of strong criticisms. For a recent defense of structural realism, see James This is not the place to review the debates between Realists, Idealists, and Critical Theorists dominating debates in the (sub-) discipline of international relations, which in the twentieth century has claimed scholarly responsibility for explaining world politics. That field is a good example of disciplinary self-ghettoization in which social reality is confined to what is called the international level. Moreover, the distinct tasks of social science and social technology have often been collapsed into agendas freely mixing scientific, normative, and ideological problems, ranging from the defenders of the status quo to the advocates of oppressed classes, regions, and gender groups. This is not to belittle the real contributions the field has made to our understanding of world politics, nor to dismiss normative and ideological theorizing as such, especially of the progressive kind. However, the resulting confusion between different types of problems is unlikely to advance either social science or social technology. 13. See the contributions in Helleiner/Pickel 2005 on the effects of economic nationalism on domestic and foreign policy. 14. See Hofstede 1999, and the large literature devoted to the relationships between national cultures and business. 15. By sectoral, I mean that such ideologies have a one-sided orientation and focus on economic, political, cultural, moral, gender, or ecological dimensions of global order. By culture-bound, I mean that many of these ideologies are strongly tied in their origins and significance to specific national cultures or civilizationally distinguished sets of national cultures (e.g., Western, Muslim, Confucian). 16. Of course not in the sense of global culture. It is true for conceptions based on Western philosophies and values, but also for holistic native cosmologies. 17. On the historical origins of disciplines and the role of states in their development, see Wagner et al This is not to deny that they have their own transnational internal cultures. 19. The fragmented political order and the problem of coordinated policy-making is well illustrated by the case of post-dayton Bosnia (Donais and Pickel 2003). 20. Lichbach and Seligman (2000) provide a useful account of the two basic modern approaches to the problem of social order, the Hobbesian and the Marxist; see esp. ch. 2. Similarly, Elster (1989, introduction) speaks of the two problems of social order. 21. Types of social system is a conceptual category. Real social systems cannot always be neatly categorized, but the types of social system proposed here can serve as useful approximations. For example, the U.S. film industry is both a cultural system and an economic system. 22. This is not a particularly controversial statement. In fact, lip service is often paid to the need for interdisciplinarity, a need that is all too obvious to be denied. At

15 Notes 183 the same time, social mechanisms of disciplinary reproduction and differentiation ensure that this remains largely a rhetorical appeal. 23. See also ch Neoclassical economics has no theory of the firm (cf. Bunge 1998, ch. 3). 25. For a recent critique and alternative, see White 2001; Fligstein For a useful introduction to rational choice approaches in the study of politics, see Friedman For a critique, see Green and Shapiro A devastating general critique of rational choice theory from the perspective of the philosophy of science is contained in Bunge 1999, ch The various new institutionalisms are a more fruitful case of interdisciplinary cooperation (Fligstein 1997; Hollingsworth 2000).

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