GEORGIA: EXTRAORDINARY PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION JANUARY Report by Inger Marie Bakken

Transcription

1 GEORGIA: EXTRAORDINARY PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION JANUARY 2008 Report by Inger Marie Bakken NORDEM Report 4/2008

2 Copyright: the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights/NORDEM and Inger Marie Bakken. NORDEM, the Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights, is a programme of the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights (NCHR), and has as its main objective to actively promote international human rights. NORDEM is jointly administered by NCHR and the Norwegian Refugee Council. NORDEM works mainly in relation to multilateral institutions. The operative mandate of the programme is realised primarily through the recruitment and deployment of qualified Norwegian personnel to international assignments that promote democratisation and respect for human rights. The programme is responsible for the training of personnel before deployment and reporting on completed assignments, and plays a role in research related to areas of active involvement. The vast majority of assignments are channelled through the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. NORDEM Report is a series of reports documenting NORDEM activities and is published jointly by NORDEM and the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights. Series editor: Siri Skåre Series consultants: Kenneth de Figueiredo, Karin Lisa Kirkengen, Christian Boe Astrup The opinions expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the publishers. ISSN: ISBN: NORDEM Report is available online at:

3 Preface The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe/Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) conducted a Needs Assessment Mission (NAM) on 20 and 21 November 2007 in order to assess the conditions and preparations for the election and to advice on the level of ODIHR involvement in the election. The NAM recommended that a standard election observation mission be deployed. Following an invitation from the ministry of foreign affairs of Georgia, received on 26 November 2007, OSCE/ODIHR deployed an Election Observation Mission (EOM) to observe the extraordinary presidential election on 5 January The EOM was headed by Ambassador Dieter Boden of Germany and consisted of a core team of 13 international staff based in Tbilisi, and 28 long term observers (LTOs) deployed throughout the country, altogether representing 25 OSCE participating states. Norway deployed 2 LTOs; Inger Marie Bakken with Mtskheta-Mtianeti and Kaspi as area of responsibility (AoR), which is north of Tbilisi towards the Russian border, and Leif Erik Broch with Kvemo Kartli II and Sagaredjo as AoR, which is south east of Tbilisi towards the border of Azerbaijan and Armenia. 300 Short term observers (STOs) were requested to be deployed throughout the country to monitor the opening of the polling stations, the voting, the counting of ballots and tabulation of results. Norway deployed 4 STOs; Synne Brekke (Svaneti and Imereti), Jørgen Holten Jørgensen (Samegrelo), Bror Gevelt (Samtskhe-Javakheti) and Anne- Grethe Eeg Storli (Kvemo Kartli II and Sagaredjo). Altogether 495 international observers were deployed on election day, 5 January polling stations were observed during the opening, 1771 polling stations during the voting and 180 polling stations during the counting. 1 This report presents the findings of the Norwegian observers. These observations correspond with those of the EOM presented in two interim reports, the preliminary statement issued on 6 January 2008 and a post election interim report covering the period 6 18 January The final report of the EOM had not been published at the time the report was written. The Norwegian Centre for Human Rights/NORDEM University of Oslo March Extraordinary presidential election Georgia 5 January Preliminary statistical report 8 January 2008.

4 Contents Preface Contents Map of Country Introduction...1 Political Background...2 The Legislative Framework...4 The Electoral Administration...5 Voter and Civic Education...7 Voter Registration...7 Candidate Registration...9 The Election Campaign The Media Observation on Election Day Areas of responsibility Observation of the opening Observation of the polling Observation of the closing and counting Observation of the tabulation The review of Complaints Process Conclusions and Recommendations Appendix EOM Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions

5 Map of Country

6 GEORGIA: EXTRAORDINARY PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS Introduction The 2008 election was the first genuinely competitive presidential election in Georgia with seven candidates. The legal framework is generally adequate for the conduct of democratic elections. Georgia has a diverse media environment, including private and public broadcasters and numerous press outlets that are generally available across the country. A wide range of views was available to voters, especially through talk shows, televised debates and free airtime, which gave the electorate a valuable opportunity to learn about candidates and parties views and campaign programs. In the Norwegian LTOs AoRs, the election campaign was completely dominated by the United National Movement, while the Bloc of Nine coalition and the New Rights Party were moderately active. The other candidates had only minor if any campaign activities. The opposition expressed a deep mistrust in the election administration and the authorities and presented many accusations of intimidation, misuse of state resources e.g. to the LTOs but when they were asked for details they were generally not able to present anything of substance. It was therefore not possible to follow-up on most of these allegations. The opposition claimed that the voter list was highly inflated and very inaccurate with a high number of voters no longer living in the district and deceased people. The authorities on the other hand claimed that the voter list was the most accurate in the country s history. The possibility to register on the additional voter list on election day was a safeguard for people living in the precincts who could not be found on the regular voter list on election day. At the same time, the ballots in separate red envelopes created some problems and lengthy counting processes both locally and at the central level. The concept of an additional voter list was introduced shortly before the election and polling station staff was unfamiliar with the procedures of the red envelopes were passed over to the central commission for counting. The central commission counted in chaotic circumstances, counting groups did not apply uniform procedures when deciding on the ballot validity and they generally speaking practiced a more liberal interpretation of ballot validity than the marking of the ballot invited to. The election day was calm in the AoR of both LTOs and STOs. The polling stations opened on time even though many were busy preparing shortly before the opening. Polling went on in a peaceful manner although some polling stations were reported to be rather small considering the number of voters. Some minor irregularities were reported. Counting was time consuming, election officials in some instances had difficulties conducting the tabulation and the protocols were sometimes filled in with pencils rather than pens, as prescribed. To ensure accuracy the protocols should be faxed directly to the central commission, but in many cases the polling stations were not able to send faxes because they did not have a land line.

7 GEORGIA: EXTRAORDINARY PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS The report is written by LTO Inger Marie Bakken with input from LTO Leif Erik Broch and with election day reports from the four Norwegian STOs. The findings of the Norwegian observers correspond to the general findings of the EOM. Political Background Georgia regained its independence in April During the early 1990s the country was faced with two major separatist movements, in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which led to open war and the displacement of more than persons. These conflicts are still unsolved. The country s first president Zviad Gamsakhurdia was forced to leave the country in April 1992, after a period of civil tension. Former Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze returned to the political arena and succeeded gradually to restore order. In 1995 he was elected president and in 2000 he was re-elected. His rule was marked by extensive corruption, but also progressive reforms. During the last part of the 1990s Georgia lost control over the autonomous republic of Adjara, on the Black sea, and the Pankisi canyon, close to Chechnya. One of president Shevardnadze s political allies was Mikheil Saakashvili. He resigned as minister of justice in 2001, left the Citizens Union of Georgia and formed the National Movement. The parliamentary election in November 2003 fell short of a number of OSCE commitments and other international standards for democratic elections 2 and Mr. Shevardnadze resigned later that month after massive public protest, called the Rose Revolution. The presidential power was transferred to the speaker of parliament and a presidential election was held in January Mikheil Saakashvili, one of the leaders of the Rose Revolution, was elected president with 96 % of the votes. A main concern for the new government was to restore the country s territorial integrity. President Saakashvili managed to normalize the situation in Adjara, but not in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. On the contrary, tension increased and in South Ossetia even armed battles took place. In June 2007 an interim administration was set up in South Ossetia under the control of the Georgian government to put pressure on the separatists. Other important issues for president Saakashvili have been to increase the efficiency of the state, to fight corruption and to improve tax collection. Furthermore it has been a priority to improve law-enforcement agencies and to re-establish public confidence in them. At the end of September 2007 the former minister of defence Irakli Okruashvili was arrested, two days after he initiated a new party, the Movement for a United Georgia. He was accused among other things of money laundering and abuse of office. 2 OSCE/ODIHR final report on the parliamentary elections in Georgia 2 November 2003, Warsaw. 28 January 2004, page 1.

8 GEORGIA: EXTRAORDINARY PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS Okruashvili on his side publicly accused Mr. Saakashvili of a range of previous misdeeds, including having asked him to kill Arkadi Patarkatsishvili (owner of the very popular Imedi television), lying about the death of the speaker of parliament/later minister of state Zurab Zhvania, blocking plans to regain control of South Ossetia, and of being engaged in building a private business empire instead of fighting corruption. Nine political parties representing a large part of the opposition called for the release of Okruashvili, for constitutional changes and for early parliamentary elections. In early October Mr. Okruashvili pleaded guilty, and withdrew his accusations against Mr. Saakashvili. Following this statement, Mr. Okruashvili was released on bail. Mr. Okruashvili later said he had confessed under pressure. For several days from 2 November onwards, opposition parties held peaceful demonstrations in front of the parliament, drawing tens of thousands of people to the biggest protests since the Rose Revolution. They called for the rescheduling of parliamentary elections from autumn to spring 2008, revision of election-related legislation and for the resignation of Mr. Saakashvili. On 7 November 2007, the demonstrators were dispersed by the Georgian police and the president declared a state of emergency for 15 days, referring to an attempt to overthrow the government by violence. Imedi television and two other channels were shut down. The state of emergency was lifted after nine days. This crisis led to a political dialogue between the authorities and opposition parties. The legal framework for the conduct of elections became one of the central issues of the negotiations, which resulted in some concessions by the majority party. In response to the demands of the opposition for the next parliamentary elections to be rescheduled, the president initiated the conduct of a referendum to consult the public on the preferred timeframe for elections. The 7 November events changed the political situation, seriously staining president Saakashvili s image (also by provoking harsh criticism from western countries) and encouraging cooperation among the majority of the opposition parties. Seven candidates were running for president: 1. Levan Gachechiladze, a presently independent member of parliament, was nominated by the opposition coalition called the Block of Nine, registered as the Political Movement Freedom. 3 He was one of the founders of the New Rights Party, but left in 2003 due to the party s reluctance to support the Rose Revolution. Mr. Gachechiladze is a non-party figure. Even if he was the businessman of the year in 1999 and a leading figure in the November demonstrations, he was relatively unknown to the public before he was nominated. The Block of Nine is a heterogeneous group; their only common aim is opposition to Mr. Saakashvili. 2. Arkadi ( Badri ) Patarkatsishvili was an independent candidate. He was one of the owners of Imedi TV station together with Robert Murdoch s News Corporation. He was 3 The block consists of the following parties; the Republican Party, the Conservative Party, Georgia s Way, the Freedom Party,the People s Party, the Movement for a United Georgia, We Together, National Forum and Georgian Troops. The Republican Party and the Conservative Party have sufficient support to be entitled to governmental funding.

9 GEORGIA: EXTRAORDINARY PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS accused during the November demonstrations of plotting to overthrow the elected authorities. He fled the country, and was abroad during the election period. The head of his campaign office publicly announced that a coup would take place the day after the election should Mr. Saakashvili be reelected David Gamkrelidze represented the Political Union New Rights. He has been a member of parliament since He is supported by Industry will save Georgia (also called the Industrialists). Neither party participated in the Rose Revolution or the November demonstrations. Mr. Gamkrelidze was active in Georgia s independence movement. 4. Shalva Natelashvili represented the Labor Party of Georgia, which he founded in He has been in opposition to both Mr. Shevardnadze and Mr. Saakashvili and was one of the leaders of the demonstrations in November. He was accused of espionage and conspiracy to overthrow the government. 5. Mikheil Saakashvili represented the Political Union United National Movement. He was one of the leaders of the Rose Revolution, and was elected president in January His popularity has dropped considerably due to long-term social poverty, the sale of state assets and recently the oppression of the demonstrators of 7 November. He made a couple of changes in his government after the November riots, and presented social welfare programs. 6. Giorgi Maisashvili was an independent candidate. He returned to Georgia at the end of the Rose Revolution, and founded the Party of the Future in August Irina Sarishvili-Chanturia was an independent candidate in this election. She has been accused of being anti-western and pro-russian. Several of the candidates have cooperated at earlier stages; either through their respective parties cooperation or having formerly been members of the same party. The Legislative Framework The EOM found that The Election Code (UEC) is generally adequate for the conduct of democratic elections, if implemented in good faith. Recent amendments to the UEC address a number of long-standing recommendations of the OSCE/ODIHR and the Council of Europe. 5 The legal framework for elections in Georgia includes: The constitution of Georgia 4 He died 12 February 2008 in London. 5 Council of Europe, OSCE parliamentary assembly, OSCE/ODIHR and the European parliament International Election Observation Mission: Georgia Extraordinary Presidential Election, January Statement of preliminary findings and conclusions, 6 January 2008, page 2.

10 GEORGIA: EXTRAORDINARY PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS Universally recognized human rights principles and standards of international law as guaranteed in the articles 6 and 7 in the constitution The UEC adopted on 2 August 2001 and amended numerous times since, most recently on 12 December 2007 Other legislative acts such as the general administrative code, administrative procedural code, administrative offences code, criminal code Legal acts of the election administrations (decrees and ordinances) In response to the demands of the opposition, the parliamentary majority initiated a number of significant amendments to the UEC, the most important of which concerns the composition and function of the election administration introducing party representatives in the Central Election Commission (CEC) and in the Precinct Election Commissions (PECs). Some parties were satisfied with the changes, but others thought they were introduced too close to the day of the election. The president is elected for a five year term. The presidential candidate who receives more than 50 per cent of the votes on election day, is elected. If none of the candidates receives 50 per cent of the votes, a second round of elections between the two candidates who obtained the largest number of votes is held two weeks later. The candidate who receives the largest number of votes in the second round, is elected. Changes in the UEC were made as late as 12 December This made it difficult to ensure that each person participating in the election administration was briefed about the current rules and regulations. For instance the concept of additional voter list was introduced in December. Until election day it was unclear whether it was permitted to campaign on election day. It turned out that it was prohibited to use free air time on public and private TV for advertisements on the day of the election, but that it was legal to campaign in other ways. The Electoral Administration The EOM found that during the pre-electoral period, the CEC operated in a transparent manner, holding frequent meetings open to observers and the media. Election commissions on all levels were cooperative. 6 While the new CEC composition formula resulted in a welcome greater political inclusiveness, the commission s members were often not observing the neutrality required of election administration, and many decisions were voted in a partisan manner. 7 Elections in Georgia are administered by an election administration on three levels; Central Election Commission (CEC), 76 District Election Commissions (DECs) and 3,500 Precinct Election Commissions (PECs). 6 Ibid, page 2 7 Ibid, page 3

11 GEORGIA: EXTRAORDINARY PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS The CEC is composed of 13 members; six non-partisan members nominated by the President and appointed by Parliament under the leadership of an appointed chair for a period of five years and one member nominated by each of the political parties that received at least 4 % of the votes at the previous parliamentary election. Seven parties were above this limit in the 2004 parliamentary elections. The six non-partisan members were elected through an open competition. Any eligible citizen of Georgia of at least 25 years of age, who has higher education and a positive public image, speaks Georgian fluently, has at least three years of work experience and a certificate for election administration officials may participate in the competition to be a CEC-member. The members of the CEC elect among themselves the deputy chair and the secretary. DECs are composed of five members and are appointed by the CEC by majority voting after an open competition. To participate in the open competition one has to be a citizen of Georgia of at least 21 years of age, with higher education, fluent in Georgian and with a certificate for election administration officials. The members of a DEC select from among themselves the chair, deputy chair and the secretary. Each PEC is composed of 13 members; six non-partisan members appointed by the majority of the relevant DEC and one member nominated by each of the political parties that received at least 4 % of the votes at the previous parliamentary election. Seven parties were above the given limit in the 2004 parliamentary elections. The members of a PEC elect from among themselves the chair, deputy chair and the secretary. The term of office lasts from the first meeting to the completion of all the procedures in the given precinct. An electoral precinct is formed for a minimum of 20 and a maximum of 1500 voters. Since there are no street addresses in the villages and the voters were listed alphabetically on the voter lists, rural precincts were not adjusted for this election even if the number of voters exceeded All candidates can be represented by two proxies at every election commission. The proxies have the right to attend election commission sessions and express their views on the topics on the agenda. All activities of election commissions are open to the public. The CEC establishes election districts, registers candidates, maintains and publishes the general voter list, establishes the election materials, determines the rules of certification of election administrations officials, checks the legitimacy of decisions and acts of DECs and PECs, ensures computer processing and publishing of the election results, determines the final results and considers election related complaints. The DECs assist in compiling the voter lists, ensure training of members of PECs, assist in organizing meetings of candidates and voters, check the legitimacy of decisions and acts of PECs, summarize the results of the election, consider election related appeals and complaints and take relevant decisions which are forwarded to CEC. The PECs check the accuracy of the voter list and propose necessary changes to the relevant DEC, establish the supplementary voter list for mobile voting, issue voter invitation cards to all voters, display information at the precinct, prepare the polling station for election day, ensure the exercise of the voters rights on election day, determine the election results in the precinct, approve the summary protocol and apply to relevant DEC to annul the results by decision of the majority of the PEC members.

12 GEORGIA: EXTRAORDINARY PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS The opposition expressed to the LTO teams a deep mistrust in the election administration, mainly because of the allegedly inflated voter list. The opposition did not have a single member of the leading troika (chair, deputy chair and secretary) of 249 PECs in DECs in Sagaredjo, Rustavi, Gardabani or Marneuli. The opposition in all these districts claimed that in many cases they were excluded from the election process of the PEC troikas as their members were either not informed or misinformed of the time and place for the initial meeting where the election for leading positions took place. There were no formal complaints submitted on this matter in any of the four districts. The Block of Nine in Dusheti complained to the LTO team about difficulties in being elected to the leading positions of the PECs. The decisions made at the first meeting in eight PECs in Dusheti were voided by the CEC due to procedural failures, which in a couple of cases was difficult to understand for the LTO team checking the exact text of each protocol. In seven of these eight PECs the Bloc of Nine had obtained leading positions at the first meeting. Voter and Civic Education According to the International Election Observation Mission Statement of preliminary findings and conclusions a voter education campaign through the national media was carried out. 8 The LTO team observed that the CEC launched a voter information campaign about how the use of video cameras inside the polling stations in some larger towns could prevent and sanction malpractices. According to the OSCE/ODIHR Interim Report no 2 (14-24 December 2007) Georgian public broadcaster (GPB) and some private national and regional broadcasters published talk shows and debates among some of the candidates to make the viewers familiar with the different candidates points of view in some political questions. 9 A large number of domestic observers were accredited for the whole electoral process. Voter Registration The EOM found that 8 Ibid, page 2. 9 Page 5 in the report

13 GEORGIA: EXTRAORDINARY PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS The CEC undertook significant efforts to improve the accuracy of the voter list and voters were provided with a wide range of possibilities to check their records. Despite these efforts, inaccuracies on the voter list remain. 10 The CEC has overall responsibility for the maintenance of a centralized and computerized voter register. Twice a year the CEC receives updated data from the institutions responsible for the registration of citizens. On 19 October 2007, the CEC launched a country-wide door-to-door voter list verification project in order to address previous concerns related to the accuracy and completeness of the voter list. Some 3,000 special groups including representatives of some of the parties carried out this work. According to the CEC, two thirds of the total number of registered voters were verified as a result of the verification. Five per cent of the voters were added to the list, 10 per cent of the records corrected and 1,5 per cent of the records removed because they concerned deceased persons. As of 25 November 2007, the voter lists were posted on the CEC website, and subsequently at DEC and PEC premises for public review. Up to 23 days before an election, a voter may request amendment to the list regarding her or his data, or that of her/his family. The CEC informed the EOM that within the legal deadline, it did not receive any complaints regarding inaccuracies in the voter list. On 17 December, the Labor Party submitted a complaint regarding such inaccuracies. Although it was filed after the legal deadline for voter list verification, the CEC announced that the cases listed in the complaint would be checked, and that if any mistakes were found, changes would be made following court decisions. 11 The LTOs do not know the outcome of this investigation. Each PEC received the final voter list, which should be posted at the PEC s premises, no later than 2 January. 12 It was also possible to register to vote on election day for persons who were registered in the precincts territory, but were not on the regular voter list. This voter list was named the additional voter list. A copy of the IDs of such voters should be attached to the list. This voter list was introduced in December. The ballot cast by a person on the additional voter list should be put in a separate envelope, and either counted at the PEC or at the CEC depending on the decision of each PEC. In light of concerns about the quality of the voter list, the introduction of an additional voter list was regarded as a useful measure for ensuring enfranchisement of all individuals eligible to vote, but missing on the list of voters. As in previous elections, internally displaced persons (IDPs) were included in the regular list of voters. 10 Council of Europe, OSCE parliamentary assembly, OSCE/ODIHR and the European parliament. International Election Observation Mission. Georgia Extraordinary Presidential Election, January Statement of preliminary findings and conclusions, 6 January 2008, page 2 11 OSCE/ODIHR EOM Georgia Extraordinary Presidential Election Interim Report No.2, December 2007, page 3 12 In addition two other voter lists were prepared before election dag. A) Special voter list: For voters who had not been able to register within the allowed time frame and persons who on election day were not able to vote at the precincts where they live. B) Supplementary voter list: for people who needed a mobile ballot box on election day.

14 GEORGIA: EXTRAORDINARY PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS In Sagaredjo, Rustavi, Gardabani and Marneuli, both NGOs and the opposition claimed that the voter list was highly inflated and very inaccurate, with a high number of voters no longer living in the district or deceased persons. The ruling party, the United National Movement, and the DECs all claimed that the voter list was the best they ever had. They admitted that there was a high number of voters on the register who were living abroad, but these voters were entitled to be in the voter list as they could come home to vote. Surprisingly the final voter list in all four districts had increased compared with the voter list designated for public inspection. Some of the increase was due to registration of army and border police (Gardabani), but the LTOs were not able to obtain an explanation for the whole increase. District Number District Name # of PECs voter list Repeat Parliamentary Elections 2004 voter list September 2006 voter list December 2007 Final voter list Sagaredjo Rustavi Gardabani Marneuli Candidate Registration The EOM found that This was the first genuinely competitive presidential election in Georgia. Candidate registration was overall inclusive and transparent. 13 To be eligible to run for president, one has to be a natural-born citizen of Georgia, have the right to vote and be at least 35 years of age. One has to have lived in Georgia for at least 15 years, including the last two years before the election. Political parties and initiative groups of at least five voters registered with the CEC are entitled to nominate candidates. Candidates must collect 50,000 signatures in order to register with the CEC, no later than 25 days before the election. The candidate representing the party winning the highest number of votes in the most recent parliamentary election has the right to choose the number on the ballot paper, either the same number as the party had on the ballot paper last election or number one. Based on the same rule, the candidates representing the parties which came second and 13 Council of Europe, OSCE parliamentary assembly, OSCE/ODIHR and the European parliament. International Election Observation Mission. Georgia Extraordinary Presidential Election, January Statement of preliminary findings and conclusions, 6 January 2008, page 4

15 GEORGIA: EXTRAORDINARY PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS third in the last parliamentary election have the right to either choose the number they had last time on the ballot paper or the second or third spot on the ballot. The Election Campaign The EOM found that The campaign was overshadowed by widespread allegations of intimidation and pressure, among others on public-sector employees. These included a number of confirmed cases of pressure on opposition supporters by the police and local officials to desist from campaigning, threats of arbitrary arrest or job dismissal and cases of landlords who were pressurized not to let premises for use as opposition campaign offices. Isolated instances of violence against opposition activists, including kidnapping, were reported and verified. 14 In general the election campaign in the LTOs AoRs was completely dominated by the United National Movement, while the Bloc of Nine coalition and the New Rights Party were moderately active. The other candidates had only minor if any activities. The election campaign was generally calm and quiet. The opposition expressed a deep mistrust of the election administration and the authorities and presented many accusations of intimidation, misuse of state resources etc. to the LTO-team 13, but when they were asked for details they were generally not able to present anything of substance. It was therefore difficult to follow-up on these allegations. There were some incidents; such as arrests of opposition party activists, but it seemed that these incidents were not election related. Also in the AoR of the team of the other Norwegian LTO, the National Movement dominated the campaign. The team observed a rally where the Block of Nine gathered 300 men and women in Mtskheta. Not much was said about the Bloc of Nine s own program. The presidential candidate and other speakers mostly attacked the United National Movement, with emphasis on what happened during the demonstrations on 7 November The LTO team observed large differences even in the United National Movement s local campaigns; from a very professional local office in Kaspi to a quite simple office in Kazbegi. This was most probably due to differences in the resources allocated to the respective party offices. The Media The EOM found that 14 Ibid page 5

16 GEORGIA: EXTRAORDINARY PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS A wide range of views was available to voters, especially through talk shows, televised debates and free airtime, which gave the electorate a valuable opportunity to learn about candidates and parties views and campaign programs. Public TV offered free airtime to all candidates, including those it was not obliged to offer it to. 15 The media conduct is regulated by the Constitution, the Law on Broadcasting, the Law on Freedom of Speech and Expression, the General Administrative Code, Chapter of the Freedom of Information and the Electoral code, articles 73 and 731. According to the UEC private and public media, electronic as well as printed, are obliged to allocate free airtime and print space to election candidates. Candidates of political parties above a certain size in parliament have this right automatically, other candidates have to prove their public support by opinion polls. Georgia has a diverse media environment, including private and public broadcasters and numerous press outlets which are generally available across the country. Four TV channels are nationwide; Georgian public TV, Rustavi 2, Imedi TV and Adjara TV. Five daily and weekly newspapers are nationwide. The media environment in Georgia is still relatively weak and vulnerable to political pressure. Media owners tend to use their outlets to promote their own political and economic interests, and there is little willingness to accept editorial independence of journalists. TV is the most popular source of information about politics in Georgia. Imedi TV is owned by one of the presidential candidates, Mr. Patarkatsishvili, and since August 2007 partly by Robert Murdoch s News cooperation. Rustavi 2 played a crucial role during the Rose Revolution, and is now accused by the opposition of backing Mr. Saakashvili s administration. Georgian public TV was transformed from a state TV into a public TV in Imedi TV was raided by the police on 7 November 2007 and the Tbilisi city court suspended Imedi s license for three months for having broadcast a statement by Mr. Patarkatsishvili that supposedly called for the violent overthrow of the government. The same statement was also broadcast on other TV channels without the same consequences. After a massive interest in the Imedi case from national and international organizations, including the OSCE representative on freedom of the media, restrictions were lifted on 6 December. Imedi was broadcasting from 12 December to 26 December, when the journalists left the TV channel because of the unclear relationship between the owner and the journalists. The journalists did not feel completely independent of the co-owner of the station, who was running for presidency. During the state of emergency, restrictions were imposed on the broadcasting of information programs and newscasts by electronic media across the country, with the exception of the Georgian public broadcaster (TV and radio). Print media in Georgia generally offer a wide range of views and political positions and are not afraid of criticizing the government. But they are less widely distributed and have less influence than the TV stations. 15 International Election Observation Mission Statement of preliminary findings and conclusions, 6 January 2008, page 6

17 GEORGIA: EXTRAORDINARY PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS Observation on Election Day The International Election Observation Mission (IEOM) stated that Election day was generally peaceful. Overall, voting was assessed positively by a large majority of IEOM observers. However, organizational and procedural shortcomings were observed, especially with regard to inconsistent application of inking procedures, intended as a safeguard against multiple voting. This is especially significant given the reintroduction of election-day voter registration and the scale by which it was used. The vote count was evaluated less positively, with many significant procedural shortcomings observed, which may have been complicated by lastminute revisions of election-day procedures. 16 When counting ballots cast by voters added to additional voter lists on election day, the CEC did not apply uniform procedures, especially when deciding on ballot validity 17 Areas of responsibility Martvili Synne Brekke was assigned to Martvili, which is located in the Samegrelo-Zemo Svaneti region. This is North West of Kutaisi, where the team had its base. Martvili has 38 polling stations. By 3 January, the DEC reported to the long term observers that there were a total of voters registered on the voter lists. Team 0708 covered the area to the south of Martvili, while another team covered the area to the north of Martvili as well as the tabulation process in the DEC. Zugdidi Jørgen Holten Jørgensen s AoR was located in Zugdidi rayon in the Samegrelo-Zemo Svaneti Region in Western Georgia. The team s AoR included 20-plus polling stations, all of which were located in villages. The team s AoR bordered the Gali district in Abkhazia, and IDPs in some villages numbered more than half of the population. Aspindza The area of responsibility of Bror Gevelt in the Samtskhe-Javakheti region consisted of small villages in the area in and around the town of Aspindza. This mountainous region, economically depressed, is inhabited mostly by ethnic Georgians. It is also the home of a considerable Armenian minority, mostly settled in ethnically homogeneous villages. The region is located in the mid-south of the country and borders with Turkey in the south. The electorate of the region seemed more than average pro-saakashvili. Sagaredjo Anne-Grethe Eeg Storli s area of responsibility was Sagaredjo in Rustavi. The district is mainly a rural area and has a population of approximately inhabitants of which 16 Ibid, page 2 17 OSCE/ODIHR Post-election interim report no 1, 6-18 January, page 1

18 GEORGIA: EXTRAORDINARY PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS live in the city of Sagaredjo. The district has a large minority, mainly of Azeris that speak Azerbaijani. According to the LTO the DEC had estimated that 27 per cent of the registered voters are Azeris. Observation of the opening In Mtskheta-Mtianeti and Kaspi as well as in Kvemo Kartli II and Sagaredjo, the AoRs of the two LTOs, only minor irregularities were reported during the opening. The four STOs did also not report about serious problems during the opening. Zugdidi The team observed the opening of a polling station in a village close to Zugdidi. The team arrived at 7:20. Preparations were in progress, and there were more than 15 persons inside the premises. The PEC was present in full (with 13 members), including the seven representatives appointed by the presidential candidates. There were in addition two domestic non-partisan observers. Responsibilities were assigned by drawing lots, and all necessary election equipment was in place. The polling station opened at 08:00 precisely, and the first voter appeared shortly thereafter. The control sheets were signed by the first voter and the PEC members, after which one sheet was inserted in the ballot box which was subsequently sealed. Within the first half an hour more than ten voters had voted. No irregularities were noted by the team. Aspinda Opening procedures were observed in a PS in Rustavi. The PEC showed a genuine interest in implementing the prescribed rules for the process, and no major incompliance was revealed. However, late arrival of voter lists and instructions from the Central CEC, combined with an apparent lack of training, contributed to a very slow start. Although the PEC managed to open the PS on time, work was hectic and the commission failed to display the public protocol. The PEC was somewhat saved by a low and slow voter show up. Sagaredjo The team observed the opening in a polling station in Sagaredjo. The team observed that the stationary and mobile boxes were sealed before the polling station opened and not after the first voter had arrived cf. art. 52 nr. 6 of the Election Code. The team did not observe that control sheets were signed by all PEC members and the first voter or that they were put into the stationary and mobile boxes, as required. Observation of the polling There were only minor irregularities reported to the LTO team in Kvemo Kartli II and Sagaredjo during polling. There were several (unverified) accusations from the opposition, e.g. of bussing of voters to polling stations, especially in Sagaredjo and Rustavi. The LTO team 13 received many reports of irregularities from PECs in the Sagaredjo area, but the STO team sent there to do a follow-up was not able to observe any irregularities or even voters at the time they were present in the area.

19 GEORGIA: EXTRAORDINARY PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS Several PECs in Marneuli had a very high turnout (between per cent compared to the overall turnout of 56,19 per cent). In Marneuli and Sagaredjo there were PECs where a high number of voters had been able to cast their vote in a surprisingly short time for some PECs the time per vote was down to seconds. The LTOs were not able to establish the reasons for the high turnout. The lack of election material in minority languages caused problems in several PECs, especially in Sagaredjo where the election material was only in Georgian in spite of a large minority of Azeris (27 per cent of the voter list). According to the law Gardabani and Marneuli are declared as ethnic minority regions, but still not all PECs had election material in minority languages. In these districts some PECs did not have the election material in Georgian, but only in minority languages. In Mtskheta-Mtianeti and Kaspi procedures were reported to the LTO team to have been generally followed. The most common mistake was a failure to check fingers for invisible ink. One STO team reported to have heard about National Movement members interfering in the voting process at a PS in Dusheti region. They rushed to the PS but found nothing. Martvili A total of seven PSs were visited. One reason for the low number of PSs visited was the time consumed by the transportation of the forms, as there were no faxes available in the area. The team did not observe any major violations of the election code, and no deliberate attempts at fraud. At the PSs visited the process went smoothly, and the procedures described in the UEC were mostly followed. Voters IDs were checked, the voters were inked, ballots were stamped, and the voters signed the voter list, and marked their ballots in secrecy. The team could observe the process freely at all PSs visited, and was not prevented in any way. Some irregularities and problems were observed during the day. There were crowds of people standing outside many of the PSs, waiting to vote. This created a tense atmosphere in some places, but not to the extent that it disturbed the voting process, at least not while the team was present. The PECs succeeded in keeping the queue outside the PS, due to a well organized division of labor in the PSs. When the voters entered the PSs, they were seldom checked for traces of invisible ink. In fact none of the PSs visited did this routinely, although usually one PEC member was assigned with the duty of checking voters for ink. The purpose of inking voters may have been unclear to both the voters and the PEC members. The team overheard voters questioning the inking process, and one voter almost refused to vote because she did not want to be inked. Another problem observed in all the PSs visited was the large number of non-voters inside the PS, generating some degree of noise and disorder. Some PSs were located inside small premises, and had up to 26 non-voters inside at all times 13 PEC members plus a high number of domestic observers. The role of these observers was not entirely clear, many of them were seemingly uninterested in and ignorant of the process. The presence of a number of different voter lists was also problematic. Some of the domestic observers pointed to the problem of verification of the voter list, and claimed that dead people had not been removed from the general voter list prior to election day.

20 GEORGIA: EXTRAORDINARY PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS At all the PSs visited voters had been registered to the additional voter list on election day, and in the cases the team observed such registration the procedures were followed. The number of voters on the additional voter list was not very high, and the team did not get the impression that there was any multiple voting related to the additional voter list, as the registration of the voters was properly checked. The most severe irregularity was observed in one PS where lists of the candidates were put up inside the two polling booths. On one of the lists candidates 5 and 6 were marked, while on the other list candidates 1 and 5 were marked. The PEC chair did not visibly react to this, she only suggested that it was voters who had marked the lists. Despite the high number of domestic observers inside the PS, none of them had noticed that the lists were marked before the team came. One of the domestic observers responded by pulling down both the lists while the team was present. Zugdidi Time allowed for observation of the polling at 12 polling stations. Leader- and membership in the PECs seemed to have been distributed fairly evenly among men and women, and there were domestic observers present at every station. Most PECs were represented by all candidate parties, and commission members tended to be present during the entire day. Voters appeared rather regularly to the polling stations throughout the day, and in most places voters would wait in line for a few minutes only. Small crowds were observed outside two polling stations, but no tension or unrest was observed. Inside the polling stations, the atmosphere was calm and friendly. PECs seemed to abide by electoral rules, with only minor irregularities observed. At one place, visited at 09:00, the ballot box was unsealed. When asked why that was so, the chair answered that they had simply forgotten to seal it, which they then did immediately. At another place, the ballot box was not sealed with the regulated blue scotch, but with a home-made seal. They claimed they had not received the blue one, and their own seal seemed adequate. At a third place, the registrar wore a scarf resembling the colors of Saakashvili s campaign and with a clearly visible number 5. On a Christmas tree in another station, the star was replaced by a number 5, which, again, not only could symbolize the election date (5 January), but the 5th candidate on the ballot paper, Mr. Saakashvili. At the fifth place, a domestic observer complained about a representative of the authorities who had entered the polling station and asked for some voters passports, of which he asked to have photocopies. When told by the PEC chair that he was not allowed to behave in that manner at a polling station, he maculated the photocopies and claimed this story had nothing to do with the elections. The PEC chair confirmed this observation. At the sixth place, two police officers were observed, claiming they had come to vote. As they were not on the voter lists, they were asked to leave which they did. PEC members seemed to be generally well prepared for the elections, and there were seemingly few problems as to polling procedures. Most, though not all, voters were checked by the entrance with UV light. They were requested to show IDs, and ink was added according to the rules to most voters. As was the case inside the polling stations, no tensions, intimidations or campaigning were observed outside the premises.

21 GEORGIA: EXTRAORDINARY PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS Aspinda Despite numerous minor mistakes made by the PECs, no attempts of election fraud were observed. Of the more grave mistakes were entries into the protocols with the use of pencils instead of pens. On one occasion, a lack of ballot box seal was observed, but this was corrected when alluded to. Shortcomings in general related to the size of the PEC, the number of national observers and proxies, the types and number of voter lists, the amendments to the UEC and the late arrival of rules, regulations and instructions to the PECs on how to comply with those amendments. The number of PEC members (13), combined with the numerous election observers and proxies, could fill the sometimes very small PSs with as many as 25 authorized persons. This complicated the chair s work with regard to management, administration and ability to implement corrective actions if needed. It also complicated the work of the STOs in general as over-crowdedness hindered an effective observation. It proved difficult to distinguish between authorized persons, unauthorized persons, PEC members and voters inside the PSs. It was this team s clear impression that the national observers, who were mostly very young, were locally recruited and had very little understanding of the process. They showed little ability and interest in discovering shortcomings in the implementation of the electoral procedures, even those alluded to by the STOs. Hence, the national observer group s presence could constitute a false varnish rather than a genuine safeguard to the election. The confusion with regard to the different voter lists became very apparent as more PSs were visited. In particular, the PECs revealed their incompetence with regard to distinguishing between the special, the supplementary, and the additional list and also in how to enter the respective numbers into the protocols. Sagaredjo Some polling stations had problems with the voting procedures and some of the PEC members showed deliberate intent to compromise the integrity of the voting. When the team entered the polling stations they seemed to intensify the voting procedures, but the voters were not always checked for ink or being inked after voting. The names of the voters who were rejected because of inked fingers, were not entered in the record book as prescribed. During the observation the number of voters declined, but according to the PEC they had not closed the polling station for voting. The team s presence may have influenced the voting in these polling stations. Most of the voters were Azeris and many did not speak Georgian. All the important election information and the ballot papers were only written in Georgian in these polling stations. This caused a lot of questions and a need for guidance from the PEC members on how to vote and may have compromised the voters right to secret voting. There were no domestic observers in these polling stations, only candidate proxies. The behavior of some of the candidate proxies were interfering with voting in two PECs. One tried to evict voters with inked fingers by force and one was sitting at the registration table during voting hours.