BELARUS: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION MARCH Report by Kjetil Hestad

Transcription

1 BELARUS: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION MARCH 2006 Report by Kjetil Hestad NORDEM Report 10/2006

2 Copyright: the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights/NORDEM and Kjetil Hestad. NORDEM, the Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights, is a programme of the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights (NCHR), and has as its main objective to actively promote international human rights. NORDEM is jointly administered by NCHR and the Norwegian Refugee Council. NORDEM works mainly in relation to multilateral institutions. The operative mandate of the programme is realised primarily through the recruitment and deployment of qualified Norwegian personnel to international assignments that promote democratisation and respect for human rights. The programme is responsible for the training of personnel before deployment and reporting on completed assignments, and plays a role in research related to areas of active involvement. The vast majority of assignments are channelled through the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. NORDEM Report is a series of reports documenting NORDEM activities and is published jointly by NORDEM and the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights. Series editor: Siri Skåre Series consultants: Hege Mørk, Lisa Kirkengen, Turid Wulff Knutsen, Christian Boe Astrup The opinions expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the publisher. ISSN: ISBN 10: ISBN 13: NORDEM Report is available online at:

3 Preface In compliance with its OSCE commitments and in accordance with Article 13 of the Electoral Code of the Republic of Belarus, the Government of Belarus invited the OSCE to observe the presidential election on 19 March Mr Gehrt H. Ahrens headed the OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission (EOM). 40 long-term observers (LTOs) were deployed in the field five weeks before election day. Some 400 short-term observers (STOs) observed the voting and counting process on election day throughout the country. NORDEM recruited one LTO and three STOs to the mission. The LTO, Kjetil Hestad, was deployed to Baranovichy. The three STOs, Tron Gundersen, Marianne Øen and Lisa Kirkengen were assigned to Gomel, Molodechno and Volozhin respectively. The information in this report is mainly based on the observations of the Norwegian observers who observed the election under the auspices of the OSCE/ODIHR. Their findings correspond to those of the EOM as a whole as represented in the OSCE/ODIHR s Preliminary Statement of Findings and Conclusions, which is annexed to this report. The Norwegian Centre for Human Rights / NORDEM University of Oslo June 2006

4 Contents Preface Contents Map of Country Introduction...1 Political background...1 The Legislative Framework...2 The Electoral Administration...2 Voter and Civic Education...3 Voter Registration...3 Candidate registration...4 The Election campaign...4 The Media...6 Observation on the Polling Day...7 Election day report by STO Tron Gundersen...7 Election day report by STO Marianne Øen...8 Election day report by STO Lisa Kirkengen...9 The review of Complaints Process Conclusions and recommendations Comments on the election observation mission Appendices... 13

5 Map of Country

6 BELARUS: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION Introduction The 19 March presidential election was the third such election to be held since Belarus gained independence in The EOM was invited to observe the presidential election s compliance with the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen agreement and national legislation. Four candidates, including the incumbent president, were registered by the Central Election Commission (CEC). According to the Belarus State Press, the incumbent president Aliaksandr Lukashenka was widely expected to win the election, but these early statements need to be seen in conjunction with the very strict government control over the media. Mr. Lukashenka won the election with a wide margin. The election was assessed not to be in accordance with the OSCE principles and other international standards for democratic elections. The election campaign was very low key throughout Belarus due to the fact that the opposition candidates were prevented from distributing campaign material and that their election meetings were obstructed by supporters of Lukashenka. There were two TV programs of 30 minutes for all the candidates to present their political programs. The incumbent president did not use his time and also had no election program. The state media was during the entire campaign extremely biased in favour of the incumbent president. Also the TV shows entitled Za Belarus were clearly part of a campaign in support of the incumbent president. The Government denied that this TV show had such a hidden agenda. The CEC and other election bodies showed a fair degree of technical professionalism, but it was clear that they were biased in favour of Mr. Lukashenka. The election administration obstructed the lawful right of the candidates to assembly by providing very small venues for the opposition s rallies and assigning less attractive areas for campaign materials to opposition campaigners. In the pre-election period it became clear that the voter turnout would be very high, as the voting started several days before election day. In some areas most of the voting had already taken place before the official election day. This report highlights the findings of the LTO stationed in Baranovichy, the general findings of the core team and the other LTOs in Belarus and the findings of the STOs on election day. Political background After seven decades as a constituent republic of the USSR, Belarus attained its independence in It has retained closer political and economic ties to Russia than any of the other former Soviet republics. Belarus and Russia signed a treaty on a twostate union on 8 December 1999 aiming at greater political and economic integration. Although Belarus agreed to a framework to carry out the accord, serious implementation has yet to take place. Since his election in July 1995 as the country's first president, Mr.

7 BELARUS: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION Lukashenka has steadily consolidated his power through authoritarian means. Government restrictions on freedom of speech and the press, peaceful assembly and religion continue. At a formal ceremony on 17 February, the CEC registered four presidential candidates: Mr. Siargey Gaydukevich (Liberal Democratic Party), Mr. Aliaksandr Kazulin (Social Democratic Party Hramada), incumbent President Mr. Aliaksandr Lukashenka (nonparty) and Mr. Aliaksandr Milinkevich (non-party). Mr. Kazulin and Mr. Milinkevich profiled themselves as being in opposition to president Lukashenka. The Legislative Framework The presidential election is regulated mainly by the Constitution of Belarus, the Election Code, the law on the CEC and the CEC s regulations and resolutions. The election code has serious shortcomings, which have been addressed on several occasions by the OSCE/ODIHR. So far the Belarus government has not been willing to consider these and the election code consequently has fundamental flaws. It is significant to note that in 2005 the Criminal Code was amended and that it now imposes penalties of up to two years in prison for participation in an unregistered organization or political party. This amendment seriously hampers people s ability to meet freely. The criminal code also criminalizes discrediting Belarus to an international organization or foreign government and insulting or slandering the president. For presidential elections to be valid, a turn out of 50 percent of the registered voters is required. To be elected, the winning candidate must receive more than half of all the votes cast. If no candidate secures an election victory, a second round is held within two weeks. The requirement of a 50 percent turnout is applied also to the second round of the elections. In general the CEC interpreted the provisions of the election code and other legislation restrictively. The absence of an effective complaint and appeals mechanism exacerbated the effects of this approach. The judiciary played a minimal role in providing legal redress throughout the process. The Electoral Administration The election of the president of Belarus is administered by three levels of election commissions: The CEC has 12 voting members, the 165 Territorial Election Commissions (TEC) have 13 voting members and the 6586 Precinct Election Commissions (PEC) have 13 voting members. The election bodies the Norwegian LTO met with seemed technically very well organized and several members had participated as election committee members in previous elections.

8 BELARUS: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION The CEC is a permanent body with a five year mandate. The President and the Upper House of Parliament each select 6 members. The Head of the CEC and the secretary are employed full time by the CEC as professional election administrators. The TEC members were appointed at joint sessions of local legislatures and local executives that were held on or before 28 December The TEC members could be nominated by a variety of organizations including: public associations, labour collectives, political parties and individual applicants supported by citizens. Although the Code provides that the process of selecting PEC members should be competitive, in some cases their appointment suggested otherwise and the process lacked transparency and uniformity. The PECs seemed to be established by people who were firmly loyal to the incumbent president. The PECs often seemed to have two members that were doing the talking. The rest of the PEC members were only used to answer phone calls. It was also reported to the observers that people that had wanted to sit on the PEC had not been accepted. No reasons were given for this refusal. In general, the election administration was efficient in its administration of the election process, including preparations for the election day. The election administration bodies seemed to work very well, and all legal deadlines were met. However, they were not always helpful to the observers. This could be merely because they were afraid to speak to international observers lest they say something wrong. However, in most cases election bodies worked well with the EOM. Voter and Civic Education The Belarus electorate is familiar with the election procedures, as the present election was the third presidential election in Belarus to be held under same legal framework. No form of voter education took place. One of the most important roles of the election bodies is to ensure that the turnout is high enough for the election to be verified. It was reported to the observers that people were told to go and vote by their supervisors and that if they did not vote this would have consequences for their employment contracts. Voter Registration On 9 March the CEC secretary announced that approximately voters were registered in total. No centralized and publicly available data exist on the number of voters registered in each electoral administration unit. Each of the PEC received a voter list from the local administration. In all the cases the author is aware of, the list was divided into several new lists, which each PEC member checked manually against the people listed on the addresses contained in the voter list provided by the local administration. The updated list was subsequently available for the voters to check.

9 BELARUS: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION The electoral code does not provide for the closure of voter registration prior to election day, nor does it require PECs to provide the public or higher level commissions with data on the number of citizens registered as voters in the election precinct. A voter whose name does not appear on the voter list can be added to the list until the close of polls on election day upon presentation of valid documents. Thus the final number of registered voters is only known when the CEC announces the official election results. Candidate registration Four presidential candidates were registered by the CEC. All candidate nominations were supported by signature initiative groups. The groups consisted of minimum 100 persons. All the signature groups had to register with the CEC. For a candidate to be eligible to run for president of Belarus, the candidate s signature group was required to collect at least signatures of voters. Collection of signatures was initiated for seven persons, but only four candidates managed to obtain the required number. On 17 February, the CEC registered four presidential candidates, which offered voters a genuine choice: Mr. Aliaksandr Lukashenka made it clear that he would stand for election in 2006 in the 2004 referendum, where he obtained a majority for changing the two term rule for the presidency. The 2004 referendum was assessed by the EOM to have been seriously flawed. Mr. Aliaksandr Kazulin received political support inter alia from the Belarusian Social- Democratic Party (Hramada), the Movement Will of the People, the internet community Third Way and Electronic Borisov. Mr. Aliaksandr Milinkevich received political support inter alia from the United Civic Party, The Belarusian Popular Front Party, the Belarusian Labour Party, The Belarusian Party of Communists, the Women s Party Nadzieja, the Party of Freedom and Progress (unregistered), the Belarusian Green Party, the Belarusian Social-Democratic Party Narodnaya Hromada (unregistered), the association Malady Front and the Right Alliance Organization. Mr. Siargey Gaydukevich from the Liberal Democratic Party was widely perceived as a representative for the incumbent president. The Election campaign Very little campaign activity was observed. The low level of campaign activity is mostly due to the fact that the government in all regions actively sought to limit such activities. Neither Mr. Milinkevich nor Mr. Kazulin were widely known in Belarus. Still all their rallies were attended by fairly large numbers of people but also by groups of people that shouted and sought to prevent candidates and campaigners from making speeches. There

10 BELARUS: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION was always a rather large police presence outside the venues of the opposition campaigns, which had an intimidating effect on the people who wished to attend these events. In the public not many people knew about all the candidates, which was clearly because their campaign was so grossly obstructed. The media also played a significant role in limiting the reach of the opposition campaign. The official campaign period began on 17 February after the registration of the four candidates. Campaigning before this date is prohibited by law, and some of those who did not comply with the prohibition were charged under the administrative procedures and fined. Candidates are not allowed to utilize their own private funds or direct donations to finance their campaign. The state only grants the candidates minimal funds to carry out their campaign and it is also illegal to use the newspapers to print election related information. Despite the attempts by Mr. Milinkevich and Mr. Kazulin to gain visibility during the campaign, the media s failure to allow opposition candidates an opportunity to present their views and qualifications outside the limited allocation of free media broadcasts de facto restricted voters familiarization with their platforms. Throughout the entire campaign the media favoured the incumbent president and reported on how successful his two previous periods as president had been. At the same time, the Za Belarus campaign promoting the country s achievements was highly visible. As it was not officially related to a candidate s campaign, it was not covered by campaign provisions contained in the Election Code. However, the name of the campaign is identical to the referendum campaign of 2004 in favour of abolishing the two-term presidential limit, which allowed President Lukashenka to seek a third term. Za Belarus featured concerts and events across Belarus, which were televised by Belarusian nationwide channel ONT. Observers noted a large number of billboards connected to this campaign. On several occasions, speakers at Za Belarus campaign events, including state officials, made direct appeals to citizens to vote for Mr Lukashenka. A formal complaint was filed by the Milinkevich campaign regarding the Za Belarus campaign, which was unsuccessful. In a joint statement on 17 March, the two candidates Mr. Milinkevich and Mr. Kazulin declared officially their lack of confidence in the CEC, referring to gross violations of the Constitution and a number of election-related laws, and demanded the appointment of a new CEC and the postponement of elections until July. The Role of State Authorities during the Campaign The state used considerable power to obstruct all candidates except the incumbent president and Mr. Gajdukevich, mainly through administrative sanctions. Members of the opposition campaign were also intimidated, detained, fined and arrested. The day before the election took place 8 out of 30 authorised representatives of Mr. Milinkevich were arrested. In addition at least 100 campaign activists were arrested. Approximately the same number of representatives and activists from Mr. Kazulin s campaign were also arrested. Amongst those detained during the campaign were prominent party leaders. Mr. Viachorka, leader of the Belarusian Popular Front (BPF) and another proxy, Mr.

11 BELARUS: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION Shantsev, were imprisoned for 15 days. Mr. Lebedko, leader of the United Civic Party, was detained on two different occasions. On 16 March, the Chairman of the Belarus KGB announced that Mr. Lebedko was to be charged under anti-terrorist criminal law provisions for allegedly plotting a violent coup. In Baranovichy the LTOs noticed that the opposition candidates were in general provided with venues that were too small and very few places for display of campaign materials. In some cases these locations were rather hidden or unsuitable, such as the third floor in a school or in a kindergarten. The campaign environment was also negatively influenced by other factors. Mr. Kazulin was violently apprehended on 2 March while trying to attend the government-organized third All-Belarus People s Assembly. Mr Lukashenka s campaign team stated that citizens should consider the welfare of themselves and their children before attending unsanctioned campaign rallies. A few self-identified Lukashenka supporters systematically disturbed opposition campaign events. State security forces entered campaign offices and seized campaign material ostensibly to verify if the campaign material had been produced in accordance with Belarusian legislation, particularly in line with campaign finance regulations. The pre-election climate was further degraded as the result of a press conference held by the Chair of the KGB, the Chief Prosecutor and the Interior Minister on 16 March, at which they announced that under the guise of elections, the opposition was preparing a violent overthrow of the government on the election day. Their declaration that all individuals who joined election day protests would be treated as terrorists created public fear, whereas the KGB Chair s comment that candidate Milinkevich would not be arrested before the end of the campaign sent a clear message of intimidation. The Media State structures have a virtual monopoly over the Belarusian broadcast media that have countrywide coverage. At present, the media does not serve as a forum for exchange of opinions, public debate or information about alternative political views. Over the recent years much of the independent or non-state media on both the national and the regional level has disappeared because the conditions for their work were impossible. This has naturally contributed to decrease the plurality of the media. During the campaign period, the police on several occasions confiscated copies of non-state newspapers Narodnaya Volya and Tovarisch from individual vendors. On 3 and 14 March, the entire print runs of Narodnaya Volya ( and copies, respectively) were seized by police during transportation and on 17 March nearly the entire print run, copies of Tovarisch, were seized. On 8 February, the CEC adopted a regulation granting each candidate the right to publish five typewritten pages of campaign materials in seven state newspapers and to air two pre-recorded campaign presentations on television and two presentations on radio. The CEC fixed the date of the broadcasts by drawing lots. Printing of election material by the independent media was not regulated by the law. However, the chairperson of the CEC once warned the independent media against

12 BELARUS: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION printing election material while the secretary of the CEC said that this would be permissible. The confusing messages made it very difficult for the independent media to determine what they could print. The free space in state newspapers was not provided to all candidates on an equal basis. While the platform of Mr. Lukashenka was published on the front pages, those of the other candidates were printed less visibly and were allocated less space. Mr. Milinkevich was unable to print his platform as it was not submitted by the administrative deadline. Outside the free airtime, media monitoring results show that state controlled media, in its coverage of the four candidates during the official campaign period, offered Mr. Lukashenka overwhelming and supportive coverage in their programmes with political content. The broadcast media granted the opposition candidates negligible coverage, and did not present their campaigns as issues of political significance. The opposition s election campaign events and incidents received very limited coverage in the national media. Where the opposition or other candidates were mentioned, it was usually in a negative context. In addition, the state media aired statements made by state officials that claimed that opposition politicians were instruments of foreign interests plotting a revolution in Belarus. On 17 March, only two days prior to election day, President Lukashenka addressed the country in a televised broadcast, raising the spectre of a violent seizure of power. In a subsequent broadcast, he guaranteed that there would be no coup d etat, and threatened those implicated, including opposition supporters and civil society activists, by stating we shall tear their heads off at once, like those of ducklings. In Baranovichy it was also evident that the press that sought to be independent had great difficulties in surviving under the pressure from the government. Some newspapers were denied the right to be sold in shops, and some were also denied the right to be printed. All the editors the Norwegian LTO spoke with said that they thought that they would have to close down their newspapers in the near future because it was impossible to continue with the work under the present conditions. All editors from the independent press said that the situation for the independent press had become more difficult since the previous election and they all feared that their situation would continue to deteriorate after the present election. Observation on the Polling Day The following sections present the observations of the Norwegian STOs, Tron Gundersen, Marianne Øen and Lisa Kirkengen, who observed the election in Gomel, Molodechno and Volozhin respectively. Election day report by STO Tron Gundersen The STO team was deployed to the Gomel district situated in south-east Belarus. The area was heavily exposed during and after the Chernobyl disaster. The team s area of responsibility was mainly rural.

13 BELARUS: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION Observation of the early voting Upon arrival at one polling station the team was strictly asked to register by the policeman guarding the premises. The team was denied important information in two polling stations. Otherwise no irregularities were observed. The chairwoman of one polling station claimed that the policeman present guarded the box during the night and that it was kept in a safe. The ballot box was not sealed until the closing of voting on election day. Many of the commissions were headed by women. In all but one polling station the team was received with politeness and hospitality. Observation of the opening The team was present at the opening of a polling station where procedures were followed and all required information provided. The team was allowed to move around and observe. The early voting box was taken out from the safe and had been sealed. Domestic observers were present. Observation of the polling The team visited 12 polling stations in the course of the day. Only in two cases requested information was not provided. All polling stations had police or security officers present most commonly in the voting room, but sometimes outside. The team was not allowed to scrutinize the voter list, but could look at it from a short distance. It was not possible to see if the signatures were similar. It looked as if they were, however, there was not much space for the date and signature so this was difficult to assess. Many of the domestic observers were representatives of labour or trade unions. Many of them did make notes and seemed just to sit there passively. At three to four polling stations there were representatives of opposition parties present. At two polling stations observers claimed that they could not observe properly. The team also observed one instance of mobile box voting, which seemed to be carried out in accordance with the regulations. Observation of the closing and counting The team visited a polling station in central Buda for the counting. The chairman seemed professional and experienced. All domestic observers were obliged to sit at their allocated tables, but the team could easily walk around in the voting room. The chair did not announce the results before in the end. The team could scrutinize the ballots and see which pile of votes was for which candidate. The announced votes for each candidate seemed to be proportionate to each pile. Mr. Lukashenka received approximately 1350 votes and Mr. Milinkevich approximately 50. Observation of the tabulation After the counting the team followed the packages with ballots to the territorial election commission and observed the procedures there for a while until the polling station observed had been signed in for the results. Upon request the team was showed a print out of the figures that had been entered into the computer system. The figures complied with the figures that had been provided by the polling station commission. Election day report by STO Marianne Øen The team was assigned to Molodechno rayon in the Minsk 01 oblast. The largest town in the area is Molodechno. The team met with Alexander Alexandrovich Kaputsky from BPF, who campaigned for Mr. Milinkevich, and Leonid Timokhin, a local activist for Mr. Kazulin. Both expressed fear and said they had been harassed. During the team s

14 BELARUS: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION stay in the area Mr. Kaputsky was called to the state lawyer. The team accompanied him and waited in the corridor. Mr. Kaputsky returned after a few minutes and said that the state lawyer had merely requested his address since he was not at home when the state lawyer looked for him. However, Mr. Kaputsky said he feared he would have been detained had the STOs not been present. Mr. Kaputsky also informed the team that BPF had applied to the territorial election commission for accreditation of 19 observers, of which none was accepted. He claimed that many people feared harassment should they apply for accreditation and that they therefore abstained. Observation of the early voting The chairs of PECs at urban polling stations were in general unwilling to provide the exact number of voters that had participated in early voting at the time of the team s arrival. Based on the figures provided the team estimated that among 25 and 50 percent of the voters voted early. The slots on the ballot boxes were not sealed at the closing of each early voting day. The box was supposed to be locked into a room where the lock on the door was sealed and guarded by the police. The team s request to observe the closing of early voting at one of the polling stations was refused. Instead the chair showed the room where the ballot box was kept and explained the procedure. No local observers were encountered at polling stations during early voting. The lack of sealing of ballot boxes made it impossible to assess whether fraud such as ballot box stuffing had taken place. At some polling stations the boxes were so full that a ruler was used to force the ballot papers into the boxes. Observation of the opening and voting The team attended the voting at 12 polling stations. The technical aspects of the election procedures were in compliance with the regulations as far as the team could observe. At most polling stations the team was allowed to move freely around and check the voter lists etc. However, commission members at urban polling stations were generally reluctant to provide figures for voters. Observation of the closing and counting The team observed the counting of the ballots in polling station 4. The team was allowed to observe the count from a close distance. However, the chair did not record any numbers in the results protocol until all counting was finalized. The commission had to repeat the counting of ballot papers a number of times. The results of the counting were not announced to the commission members and domestic observers present. The total numbers of voters was The number of signatures in the voter list was not provided. The number of invalid votes was 33. Mr. Gajdukevich received 21 votes, Mr. Kazulin 63, Mr. Lukashenka 900 and Mr. Milinkevich voters had voted against all candidates. The team s request to be allowed to observe the tabulation in the territorial election commission was refused. Election day report by STO Lisa Kirkengen The STO team was assigned to Volozhin rayon (county) in the Minsk 01 oblast (province). The area is near Minsk and mainly rural. Volozhin, the largest town, has approximately inhabitants. There is a large Catholic minority in the area of the other town in the area, Ivenets.

15 BELARUS: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION No campaign materials were observed in the area, but Za Belarus posters were widely observed, also outside of many polling stations. The STO team met with a representative of BPF who supported the Milinkevich campaign in Ivenets. He claimed to be under police surveillance and to have been interrogated by the police after a meeting with the OSCE LTO team. The STO team tried to meet with a representative of the Polish minority, but in the end she declined. There were 41 polling stations and one territorial election commission in the rayon. The team visited the territorial commission and 20 of the polling stations during voting on 17, 18 and 19 March. Only four heads of polling station commissions visited were male and most commissions were also predominantly female. However, in some locations, the team noted that men who were either observers representing local authorities or members of the commission gave instructions to the female heads of commission. In a few polling stations there were police officers present in the room where voting took place. While the police officers ostensibly were present to provide security, they may have had an intimidating effect on some voters. In one polling station a police officer requested to see the team s passports, including that of the interpreter. Different practices with regard to sealing of ballot boxes were observed, but all ballot boxes seemed to safely sealed. Many commissions were reluctant to provide detailed information to the team. Most did not allow the team to inspect the signed voter lists. The team could therefore not see whether there were identical signatures on the list or whether early votes were marked with dates. There were domestic observers in virtually all stations visited, but the team did not encounter any observers from political parties. Those encountered mainly represented various unions or cooperatives. None of them appeared very active in their observation and only two conveyed concerns to the team. 1 Observation of the early voting The team visited 11 polling stations during the early voting and observed the opening and final closing in two of them. Only a few commissions were willing to say how many had voted early. The figures provided varied between 10 and 60 percent. In some stations the early voting boxes were so full that staff had to use a ruler to make ballots enter the box. The Milinkevich supporter in Ivenets believed that the authorities had put pressure on voters to vote early. He considered this part of the election process to be easily manipulated, as it took place over several days and was largely unobserved. Most commissions in the stations visited claimed that ballot boxes were closed with a glued piece of paper and guarded by police during breaks and at night, but the team could not verify this. Observation of the opening The team observed the opening of the polling station in the hospital in Volozhin. All opening procedures were followed and the polling station opened on time. However, one of the observers, who represented the officers union, participated in the sealing of the boxes. Two voters were allowed to vote without showing IDs. The commission claimed that some patients did not have their IDs because they had been brought to the hospital in an emergency and that in such cases their medical history form functioned as an ID. However, no such documents were presented as far as the team could see. The curtains to the booth did not close easily, which compromised the secrecy of the vote, but the commission staff sought to close them when the voters failed to do so. 1 See the comments in the section on closing and counting.

16 BELARUS: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION Observation of the polling Procedures were mainly followed during the voting. A few persons were allowed to vote without presenting IDs. A few cases of family voting were observed, but generally commissions sought to prevent this in accordance with the regulations. Information on mobile voting was not always provided to the team, but especially in rural areas it seemed that many had requested this service. In one of the stations a voter seemed to receive two ballots and to exchange signals with a commission member about when it would be safe to cast the ballots. Observation of the closing and counting The team observed the closing and counting of votes in the orphanage in Volozhin. Observers were initially not allowed to leave their allocated seats, but the team was in the end allowed to stand somewhat closer to the counting table contrary to the domestic observers. However, it was still not possible for observers to see the marks on the ballots and the commission members also obstructed the view by standing with their backs to the observers. The team therefore had no opportunity to check whether the count was carried out correctly. The two domestic observers only complaint to the team was that they had not been allowed to see the ballots. Procedures mainly seemed to be followed, but without any attempt at transparency. The count was carried out very hurriedly and only with a few checks by the chairwoman. The results of each count were not announced publicly. The team was too far away from the protocol so see if the results were continuously noted in the protocol. It took relatively long time to complete the protocol, which the chairwoman explained by the need to make three copies. This seemed an insufficient explanation for the delay. The team was allowed to copy the figures from the protocol. According to the protocol, the voter turnout was 96 percent. Mr. Lukashenka received 81 percent of the votes, Mr Milinkevich 9 percent, Mr. Kazulin 3 percent and Mr. Gajdukevich 2 percent. The chairwoman said that a copy of the results protocol would be posted in the polling station the following day. The team followed the chairwoman and the secretary of the commission to the territorial election commission. Observation of the tabulation The reception at the territorial election commission was orderly and systematic. The team and other observers were allowed to remain in the room where the entire procedure was carried out. However, the team was not allowed to watch tabulation or any other procedures closely enough to determine whether they were carried out correctly. The commission staff provided the team with the overall voting figures for the rayon, but did not want to provide a copy of the protocol. According to the commission, the voter turnout was 98 percent and Mr. Lukashenka received 95 percent of the votes. The review of Complaints Process There is no practical mechanism in Belarus to file a legal complaint related to elections. The election code does not contain any uniform appeal process for review of all decisions and actions of the CEC.

17 BELARUS: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION While individuals may to a limited extent file complaints with electoral bodies, not all types of complaints may be filed or appealed to a court of law. The Election Code does not explicitly provide for the possibility to challenge inaction by election commissions. As of 17 March, the CEC received 231 election-related written appeals. After 18 January, the CEC did not hold a formal session to discuss and rule on election-related addresses, complaints and appeals. However, CEC officials responded to most of the complaints they had received. One case was reported of a judge who was told what decision he was to make in an election related complaint. The judge did not elaborate who had put pressure on him. Conclusions and recommendations The CEC announced the official results on 20 March Mr. Lukashenka received 82,6 percent of the votes, Mr. Milinkevich 6 percent, Mr. Gajdukevich 3,5 percent and Mr. Kazulin 2,3 percent. The official turnout was 92, 6 percent of all eligible voters. According to ODIHR EOM, the presidential election on 19 March 2006 fell short of international standards for democratic elections that Belarus has committed itself to comply with. The Norwegian observers findings are in accordance with this conclusion. State authority was blatantly used to obstruct and deny people their democratic right to participate in political parties and rallies. The opposition was denied free access to the media. The opposition parties right to take legal action was obstructed and their complaints not taken into consideration. The early voting process was not transparent. In the view of the author, ODIHR s observation of further elections in Belarus should to a greater extent be conditional upon Belarus taking into account ODIHR s previous recommendations. In the 2006 election none of ODIHR s previous recommendations had been implemented by the Belarus government. Comments on the election observation mission The ODIHR EOM was set up in Minsk in early February. The EOM was professional and worked effectively under the leadership of Ambassador Geert Hinrich Ahrens. The author would especially like to commend the work of LTO coordinator Kerstin Dokter. Her tireless efforts and dedicated work eased the LTOs work in a generally difficult working environment.

18 BELARUS: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION Appendices (not published in web edition) OSCE/ODIHR: Presidential election Republic of Belarus 19 March 2006: Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions