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2 AN APPROACH TO THREAT ASSESSMENT SY POLICE I> HV 8080.S64 M

3 >3- APPROACH TO THREAT ASSESSME NT -PO4.,.ICE? 7 Prepared by: 'ee Police and Security Branch Ministry of the Solicitor General

4 F( 8Œ-90 Canadian Police College Seminar June 1981 M3-71 /98/ AN APPROACH TO THREAT ASSESSMENT BY POLICE Y ECIICiTOP. GENEAL CANADA AU (...; AOU1 k; Prepared by: Rick Martynook Police and Security Branch Ministry of the Solicitor General

5 I. INTRODUCTION A. Police forces have been charged with four basic responsibilities by society: 1. the preservation of life; 2. the protection of property; 3. the preservation of the peace; and 4. the protection of the rights of all citizens. B. As threats to the peace and safety of society have been manifested in differing forms, police forces have developed various capabilities to counter such threats. The advent of increased barricade and hostage situations has seen the development of Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Teams by the Los Angeles Police Department, the Emergency Response Teams by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and those of a number of police forces in Canada. Regardless of what such units are called, they have a common purpose - to provide police forces with special response capability to counter such situations.

6 II. PURPOSE A. It is the purpose of this paper to discuss aspects which should be considered by police managers to determine the need for, and appropriate level to which, special armed response capability should be developed within their forces. B. Unfortunately, as with all subjects of an intangible nature, it is not possible to develop a formula into which numbers can be inserted, calculations made, and hard and fast answers obtained. Nor can this paper be considered all inclusive. When considering the aspects presented below, it must be remembered that each police force will encounter circumstances unique to its own situation. Rather, what follows is intended as a guide to indicate areas which might be examined and to suggest other factors worthy of study. The overriding consideration is that a police unit must be equal to the level of response to which it is committed. C. For organizational purposes, this paper is set out in the following manner. 1. Types of barricade and hostage situations: a. a definition; b. characteristics of the incident; c. a perpetrator's profile; d. targets of interest; e. exacerbating factors. 2. Civil environmental factors: a. civil tensions; b. manifestations of civil tension; c. targets of interest; d. target vulnerability; e. other factors. 3. Police environmental factors: a. the police intelligence network; b. crisis management responsibilities; c. exercise of police responsibilities; d. police response to barricade and hostage situations.

7 3 III. BARRICADE AND HOSTAGE INCIDENTS A. For purposes of examination, barricade and hostage incidents may be grouped into several distinct types. While such classifications are useful for discussion purposes, it must be remembered that in actuality any specific incident may contain elements of any number of the types identified. 1. Professional criminal barricade and hostage incidents a. definition of the incident: i) an act which normally arises as a corollary of another criminal act - e.g. hostages taken during a bank robbery to shield the escape of the perpetrators or bo be used as barter for freedom. b. characteristics of the incident: i) is generally spontaneous as a result of fear; i is an act entered into for the personal gain of the perpetrator, with no socio-political overtones; is perhaps unique among barricade and hostage incidents in that confrontation with authorities is not included as an element of the original "game plan"; iv) the perpretator(s) should be expected to have moderate resources available. c. profile of the perpretrator: i) in the long terni, he may be considered to be a rational thinker whose action is directed towards a rational end - i.e. safety and freedom; in the initial instance, he may be dangerous because of being caught in an unplanned situation; he will be frustrated, confused and fearful and because of this, may make snap decisions without taking time to realistically assess the situation. d. targets of interest:

8 banks, trust companies, and other institutions which deal with large amounts of precious metals, gems, cash, or other valuable commodities; executives and/or families of executives of such concerns may be seized for attempted extortion purposes. e. exacerbating circumstances: i) a history of excessively harsh police response to criminal acts may precipitate barricade and hostage situations by the perpetrators of criminal acts as a form of "insurance". 2. Political terrorist barricade and hostage incidents a. definition of the incident: i) an act designed primarily to create fear for political purposes. b. characteristics of the incident: i) is normally extremely well planned, organized and executed; i iv) an act entered into to gain support, publicity and/or ransom, either in money or in kind, in aid of a political cause; is normally committed by a group of a paramilitary nature; the perpetrators should be expected to be very well equipped with weapons, explosives, etc. c. profile of the perpetrator: i) he is normally a well-trained, dedicated "professional" individual; i he can be expected to be fanatical to the point of murder and suicide; rather than being mentally deranged, he should be viewed as mentally healthy, but with concepts of morality modified by intense ideological indoctrination.

9 d. targets of interest: i) generally, institutions which represent, or are related in some way to the "cause" - diplomatic, consular and/or governmental institutions or officials; - other prominent individuals who symbolize opposition to the "cause"; - quasi-official groups or individuals, such as athletes, cultural delegations, etc.; - business concerns owned by, or known to support the opposing faction. e. exacerbating circumstances: i) a history of authorities acceding to terrorist demands may attract such incidents to the area; i iv) the existence of a significant ethnic/religious minority in the community which would be sympathetic toward the objectives of the perpetrators; such a minority could harbor support cells of the terrorist group(s) which perpetrate the incident; universities or other similar institutions which encourage ideological experimentation may contain factions which would support the terrorist group(s); because of the strong feelings generated by such incidents, opposing factions may initiate counter action; v) because of the strong feelings and publicity generated by such incidents, either pro or anti-factions from other locations may be attracted to the scene. 3. Barricade and hostage incidents by irrational persons a. definition of the incident: i) an act committed by a person suffering from a temporary or permanent mental disorder. b. characteristics of the incident:

10 i) may be planned or spontaneous; i is normally committed by a single individual; is generally highly emotional and involves concerns of self preservation and/or revenge on the part of the perpetrator; iv) a significant number are family or associate oriented; v) may be very dangerous because of the unpredictable nature of the perpetrator; vi) the resources available to the perpetrator may vary widely. c. profile of the perpetrator: i) he may be suffering from one of the following conditions - alienation; - deprivation; - sociopathic personality disturbance; - depression; - an inadequate personality; - an inferiority complex; - delusions of grandeur; - a paranoid personality; - paranoid schizophrenia. he may be acting on his own behalf or on behalf of some imagined "oppressed" group in society. d. targets of interest: i) family; i close associates; individuals or institutions within society which project a strong authority figure. e. exacerbating circumstances: i) the police and others responding to the incident may be seen by the perpetrator as

11 symbols of the "oppressor" which he is fighting, and thus further aggravate the situation; sympathy for the prepetrator may be generated within the population at large by the projection of a "little guy against the system" image. 4. Barricade and hostage incidents by prison populations a. definition of the incident: i) an act within the confines of a prison or gaol perpetrated by the inmates. b. characteristics of the incident: i) generally are planned; i the objectives may be escape, a redress of grievances and/or publicity for grievances; resources available to the perpetrators are normally minimal, however on occasion they may be moderately well equipped. c. profile of the perpetrator: i) he is usually desperate; elements of at least one of the following are probably present - professional criminal; - political terrorist; - irrationality. d. targets of interest: i) staff and employees of prisons; visitors to prisons. f. exacerbating circumstances: i) the police will generally be viewed by the perpetrators with extreme suspicion and dislike;

12 i the physical layout of prisons imposes severe limitations of movement on the forces responding to the incident; outside support for the perpetrators may be generated within prison reform and prisoner aid groups. 5. Barricade and hostage incidents by extremists a. definition of the incident: i) a broad grouping used to cover any acts not included above; covers the spectrum from "symbolic" acts - e.g. such as have occasionally happened in labour disputes, to incidents which could be considered quasi-terrorist in nature. b. characteristics of the incident: i) may be planned or spontaneous; i is generally undertaken with respect to issues over which strong feelings have been generated; objectives are - to gain publicity for the cause; - to generate public support; - to gain concessions from authorities. iv) the perpetrators may have moderate resources available. c. profile of the perpetrator: i) he may be expected to be highly emotional but may cool down with the passage of time; i iv) he will lack the fanaticism of the political terrorist; he may be under the influence of alcohol or drugs; may include irrational persons.

13 d. targets of interest: i) business or financial institutions, or representatives thereof; i governmental institutions or officers; individuals or institutions which represent a cause - doctors and hospitals which perform abortions; - nuclear power plants; - industries involved in the by-production of toxic wastes. e. exacerbating circumstances: i) counter actions may be initiated by those opposed to the views held by the perpetrators; support actions may be undertaken by those who agree with the perpetrators; i iv) the issues involved may be of such a nature as to generate reactions.in universities and similar institutions; pro and anti-factions from outside the area may be attracted to the scene; v) the incident may be used by dissidents of various ilks to promote their own ends, by adopting positions in support of, or in opposition to, the perpetrators.

14 IV. CIVIL ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS GERMANE TO BARRICADE AND HOSTAGE INCIDENTS A. From the capsule examination of the various types of barricade and hostage Situations presented above, it may be seen that the motivation for such incidents may vary widely. There are many factors which may be present, specifically within a community, or within the country as a whole, which could provide a stimulus for such occurrances, or given the act, the degree of support for/opposition to, the incident which might be present either within, or outside the area. B. Some of the influencing factors are discussed below. It will be obvious that some of these factors may be germane to one or more of the types of barricade and hostage situations discussed, but not necessarily applicable to others. 1. Civil tension a. civil tension arises when the public as a whole, or a segment thereof, becomes alienated from aspects of society. Such dissatisfaction may be manifested in protests or demonstrations which may escalate to include barricade and hostage situations. b. causes of civil tension i) socio-political factors: - minority group issues - power struggles - efforts by the minority to system to gain recognition aspirations - efforts by the majority to the status quo. alter the for their maintain - an absence of organization among minority group members - may generate hopelessness the minority - absence of a upon radical minority. feelings of dispair and among individuals within moderating influence individuals within the

15 an absence of leadership among minority group members - self-proclaimed leaders - puppet leaders - radical leaders - no leaders. - public apathy to minority conditions or issues - lack of financial aid - lack of moral aid or support. - pressure group issues - pressure groups are formed to provide support for, or opposition to, contentious issues - e.g. homosexual rights groups, anti-nuclear power organizations - the comments above concerning minority groups apply equally here. - the generation gap - youth activities may be unacceptable to the older members of society - again, the comments concerning minority groups apply. - widespread and blatant civil corruption - pay- off s - favouritism in making civic appointments, and/or issuing monetary grants - misuse of public money. - unresponsiveness of elected representatives and/or governmental institutions to the needs/demands of the population. - rumours and sensationalism - inflammatory statements and stories based on distortions and/or half truths - may be generated by either side to the issue, or by the media.

16 public events exacerbated by deficiencies or outside influences - involvement of radicals and/or irrational individuals in rallies, demonstrations, etc. concerning content ious issues - poor organization - failure of the event to meet expectations. economic factors: - unemployment. - extreme poverty. - unfair hiring practices by businesses in the area. - poor housing conditions and discrimination in the sale of real estate. - extreme variations in affluence levels in various segments of the community - can generate insensitivity to and/or unawareness of the poorer segments on the part of the more well-off - can generate unrest and dissatisfaction within the poorer segments. - industries or jobs which attract transient workers - generally found in "boom" development situations - adequate social facilities may be lacking - workers may lack stabilizing influences such as families. - militant labour unions - may encourage and/or support actions by radical or irrational individuals in support of their cause.

17 loss of purchasing power - rising taxes - inflation. i police factors: - efficiency of the police intelligence network - good intelligence can be used to formulate plans of action to minimize developing situations, or to warn appropriate officials of impending situations so that remedial or counter action can be taken - faulty intelligence or lack of intelligence can lead to inappropriate responses which exacerbate the situation. - past police response actions - a history of ineffective police responses may encourage excesses on the part of dissidents or radicals - excessively harsh past police responses may encourage barricade and hostage incidents out of fear. - the exercise of prejudice against segments of society by police personnel in the course of their duties. - lack of police cooperation with legitimate groups - no encouragement towards self-policing by the group membership - no understanding of or sensitivity toward the legitimate concerns expressed by the group membership. - lack of general knowledge on the part of police - no knowledge of the history of past actions by groups - lack of knowledge of outside influences on local groups

18 il lack of knowledge as to the universality of issues of concern locally. c. manifestations of civil tension i) a greater frequency of instances of resisting arrest in certain areas or by certain segments of the population; i iv) an increase in vociferousness and abusiveness toward police in crowds which gather when arrests are made; an increase in the number of incidents of violence or threats of violence; an increase in the number of charges of alleged police brutality; v) an increased distrust or resentment of law enforcement agencies and personnel; vi) v increasing rumours and statements of dissatisfaction, public name calling and other attempts at provocation; the appearance of "hate" literature, threatening or derogatory signs, leaflets, pamphlets; vi a stepping up of gang activity, characterized by anti-social activity on the part of minority group members, acts of vandalism and wilfull damage, particularly on public property; ix) progressively overt attacks upon constituted authority through 2. Targets of interest - protest meetings and demonstrations - speeches and literature - sit-ins, lie-ins, etc. in commercial and public buildings - disruption of and interference with police activities. a. Any attempt to assess the probability of the

19 occurrence of a barricade and hostage incident must include a consideration of the aspects which might make a facility or an individual an attractive target for the perpetrators of such an incident, as well as reflection upon the vulnerability of possible targets. b. It is obvious that motivation, will to a large degree, determine attractiveness of a target to the perpetrators of barricade and hostage incidents. i) targets of interest to professional criminals: - banks, trust companies, credit unions; - jewelry firms, precious metal mines or smelters; - as a barricade and hostage incident is not normally part of the "game plan", little thought would be given by the perpetrators as to the suitability of the target for defence against assault by police authorities. targets of interest to political terrorists: - embassies and consulates of nations with a history of internal unrest; - quasi-official representatives of such countries - e.g. trade missions and delegations, cultural groups, athletic teams; - business concerns which are owned by, or known to deal extensively with the governments of such countries; - the facilities of countries which support the governments of such nations; - the facilities of countries which have taken repressive measures against the terrorist organization(s) in question, or other terrorist organizations allied with the one(s) in question; - Canadian governmental institutions, more probably federal, possibly provincial, less likely municipal; - the suitability of the target for defence against assault by authorities may be a consideration. i targets of interest to irrational persons: - Canadian government facilities, either

20 federal, provincial or municipal; - business concerns with a history of labourmanagement unrest, strikes, lay-of fs; - financial institutions; - little thought would normally be given by the perpetrator as to the ease of defence of his position. iv) v) targets of interest to prison populations: - for the purpose of the current aspects of this discussion, prison situations may be considered to be specific cases; however, circumstances such as lax procedures by guards, and faulty construction and poor maintenance of the facility would be attractive to inmates. targets of interest to extremists: 3. Target vulnerability - such a list could be infinite; any facility which symbolizes a cause might be attractive - businesses with labour problems; - governmental institutions; - manufacturers of contentious items - e.g. war goods; - contentious public services - e.g. nuclear power facilities; - the suitability of the facility to withstand siege by police authorities would probably be of only minor consideration. a. Considerations which may be utilized to assess the vulnerability of a target include the following. i) the physical make-up of the target and surrounding area: - targets located in isolated or quiet areas may be more attractive than those in a busy core area - suitability of soil in the area for tunneling - the nature of the terrain around the facility

21 trees, etc. would assist an undetected approach to the facility - flat ground with no trees, etc. would provide a clear field of fire for the perpetrators - is the target entirely enclosed within physical boundaries - the nature of any perimeter barrier - e.g. a heavy chain link fence is more difficult to breach than a hedge - construction of the facility; a brick building with no windows is less vulnerable than a glass one. i the employees at the target: - are external tradesmen or technicians required for repair or servicing - are casual or contract workers employed - labour management relations; satisfied employees are less likekr to become involved, either actively or passively, in situations than are dissatisfied or alienated workers. the security program in place at the target: - are security precautions visible from outside the target - are security precautions predictable - is a security force in place - are check points used - are patrols made - is access controlled - identity procedures for employees entering the target - restrictions on employee access to critical areas within the target - are employees security screened - are security briefings given to employees - are instrusion detection devices and instrusion alarms in place - is protective lighting in place

22 Other relevant factors - are procedures in place to deal with emergency situations? a. the nature of any emigre groups within the community: i) some emigre groups have brought disputes from their homelands with them to Canada; such groups may participate in, or actively or passively support or encourage terrorist or extremist action against the opposing faction; i other emigre groups tend to leave the disputes of their homelands behind them and could be expected to ignore or oppose any terrorist or extremist action; is the local emigre group an isolated faction within Canada, or part of nation-wide distribution? If the latter, an incident could attract emigres from outside the community to the scene. b. the nature of the issue within the community: i) if issues are of a local concern only, outside radicals are less likely to be attracted to the scene, either with the aim of precipitating an incident, or supporting one in progress, for their own ends; i issues of national concern are more likely to draw radicals to the scene in an effort to further their own purposes; highly emotional issues of widespread interest to the community are more likely to culminate in incidents than are issues of minor interest and concern; iv) are the issues within the community of such a nature that local radicals might attempt to generate an incident for their own purposes. c. the geographical location of the community: i) the proximity of the community to other centres

23 the possibility of a spill-over effect from nearby communities; transportation facilities - ease of travel to and escape from the community by outside professional criminals, political terrorists or other radical factions. d. facilities of "special interest" within the community: i) diplomatic premises; i iv) governmental facilities; large international business concerns; airports; v) harbours; vi) v prisons; universities; vi facilities vital to the maintenance of an acceptable life style.

24 V. POLICE ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS GERMANE TO BARRICADE AND HOSTAGE INCIDENTS A. The police intelligence network 1. A requisite for armed response operations is a good intelligence network. Good intelligence can contribute significantly to the successful resolution of such operations; while faulty intelligence can lead to disaster. Such a network should include not only a police force's own resources but also the exchange of material with neighbouring departments, and provincial and federal agencies. 2. The purpose of operational intelligence is to provide those in command at various levels with timely and accurate intelligence concerning the opposition's movements, intentions and methods, thereby assisting those in command to neutralize the opposition in the minimum of time and with the minimum expenditure of resources. The information and/or intelligence provided to those in command is produced by an intelligence staff through the detailed study of the organization, tactics and equipment of the opposition combined with a study of the environment in which the opposition intends to operate. 3. The particulars generated by an intelligence network should include a. probable causes, locations and objectives of disturbances, as well as particulars concerning organizations involved and leaders thereof and the composition, temper and estimated number of participants with a view to projecting the possibility of the incident escalating into a barricade and hostage situation. b. organizations -and individuals, both private and public who are active in the community who may exert influence to generate incidents. c. ethnic, religious or other communities or groups which would support terrorist or extremist acts i) selection and reconnoitring of targets; provision of arms and equipment; i provision of "safe houses". d. paramilitary training facilities and caches of arms, explosives and other equipment available to groups.

25 e. locations of legitimate sources of arms, equipment and explosives which could be'stolen by professional criminals, terrorists or extremists i) military armouries; explosives magazines at construction sites. f. particulars concerning the movements of non-local individuals who might travel to the scene to exacerbate local incidents. g. the activities of known professional criminals in the area. h. particulars and movements of known professional travelling criminals. i. the movements of large amounts of money or other valuables within the area. J. current trends in criminal activity. k. particulars concerning possible targets, from both the professional criminal and terrorist/extremist perspectives i) plans of the target; vantage points in the vicinity of the target; i obstacles to the approach to the target - e.g. fences, walls; iv) cover and concealment in the vicinity of the target - e.g. sewers, fences; V) observation and fields of fire from the targets; vi) avenues of approach to the target. 1. particulars concerning escape route from potential targets i) most barricade and hostage situations afford five opportunities for authorities to conduct an assault

26 at the site of the incident - e.g. while the hostage takers are in the building in which the incident was perpetrated; - during the time of the movement of the hostage-takers from the site to intermediary transport - e.g. movement from the building in which the hostages were taken to the helicopter, bus, etc., which is to take the group to an airport; - during travel by the intermediary transport - e.g. on the route taken by the bus from the site to the airport; - during the movement of the hostage takers from the intermediary to the final transport - e.g. the transfer of the hostage takers from the helicopter or bus at the airport to the aircraft provided for their escape; - onboard the final transport - e.g. ambush of the hostage takers by security forces located within the aircraft provided for the escape, or assault on the aircraft after the hostage takers have boarded. details similar to those outlined in "k" should be collected to facilitate an assault by authorities at any of the five stages outlined above. B. Crisis management responsibilities 1. Any crisis management framework developed within Canada necessarily imposes responsibilities for response to situations such as barricade and hostage incidents on various levels of government. As barricade and hostage incidents, regardless of their motives, are criminal offences, implementation of the response would normally be undertaken by police forces established under the authorities of the various governmental levels. An outline of the federal view of a crisis management mechanism, and of the responsibilities of each segment is shown below a. municipal/regional authorities: i) responsibility for providing police services and maintaining law and orderls delegated by provincial police acts;

27 provincial police acts authorize municipal authorities to request provincial assistance in situations which are beyond the capability of local police forces. b. provincial authorities: i) responsibility for the administration of justice within the province, including the enforcement of the Criminal Code; i iv) responsibility for ensuring that the standards of policing are adequate and that law and order is maintained within the province; responsibility for providing required assistance to municipal police forces; responsibility for maintaining a provincial police force; v) responsibility for obtaining assistance if required from outside the province in the event of emergency situations. c. federal authorities: i) responsibility for ensuring the "peace, order and good government" of Canada; i responsibility for providing a federal input to hostage and related situations in Canada which are of such national or international significance that the federal government must be involved; responsibility for providing any required assistance to provincial authorities in the event of emergency situations. C. The exercise of police responsibilities 1. The manner in which police managers exercise their statutory obligations must be tempered by the realities of available fiscal, material and manpower resources. It is apparent that it would be a waste of valuable resources to develop capabilities which are not required. At the same time, however, it is incumbent upon police managers to ensure that their forces are able to respond to all reasonable contingencies. Such

28 an assessment will involve consideration of several factors a. the probability of a barricade and hostage situation occurring: i) preceding sections of this paper have discussed this aspect. b. the level of response capability required to respond to a barricade and hostage incident: i) the nature of the incident itself would indicate the degree of sophistication required for response - the successful resolutions of the 1977 hijacking of a Lufthansa aircraft in Mogadishu, Somolia, and of the 1980 occupation of Iranian Embassy in London by, respectively, the West German GSG9 unit and the British 22 Special Air Services Regiment, demonstrate the capabilities of extremely sophisticated and dedicated response teams when dealing with determined, "professional" terrorist groups. The 1972 "Munich Massacre", on the other hand, provides evidence of the probable outcome of a situation in which a force is committed to a task beyond its capabilities. - there are any number of examples of successful actions against incidents perpetrated by professional criminals, prison inmates and irrational individuals which have been undertaken by police armed response teams. Unfortunately, there are also many examples of failure because the police teams were committed to tasks beyond their capabilities c. the resources available within the police force to deal with barricade and hostage incidents: i) the British force numbers less than one hundred while the West German anti-terrorist unit involves over one hundred and seventy-five men. For all practical purposes, these teams are dedicated to this function and do little else but train to respond to

29 incidents. Each unit spends millions of dollars annually on training facilities and equipment. The failure rate among candidates for duty with these units is in the order of seventy percent. From the above comments, it is apparent that a capability to match such units is far beyond the resources of most, if not all, police forces in Canada. Police special armed response teams, on the other hand, normally consist of between five and eight men. Such teams are equipped and trained to a sufficient level to deal with most incidents that are likely to be encountered. Such a level of response should be well within the resources of moderate to large-sized forces. d. resources available from outside the police force: i) neighbouring municipal, or provincial and/or federal authorities may be in a position to provide - equipment; - armed response teams with capabilities greater than those of the police force of jurisdiction; - personnel to perform routine patrol functions to enable the police force of jurisdiction to concentrate on containment and assault action at the scene; - personnel to perform routine patrol and scene containment duties to enable the police force of jurisdiction to concentrate on the assault functions. D. Response to a barricade and hostage situation by the police force of jurisdiction 1. In the event of a barricade and hostage situation, it is the responsibility of the police force of jurisdiction to a. exercise command and control at the scene i) there are exceptions. The Quebec Police Act, for example, authorizes the Lieutenant Governor-in-Council to order the Director General of the Quebec Police Force to assume

30 command of the police forces responding to an emergency situation. b. take the necessary action to contain the scene, and request assistance from outside sources if necessary. c. deploy an armed response team, or if necessary, request the services of such a team with a capability sufficient to meet the situation at hand from outside sources. d. in consultation with provincial and/or federal authorities as required, determine the circumstances under which an armed response team will be committed to action. e. in consultation with provincial and/or federal authorities as required, authorize the commitment of an armed response team.

31 VI. CONCLUSION A. The objectives of a threat assessment are to: 1. determine potential targets for barricade and hostage situations. 2. provide an indication of the motives for any incidents which might occur. 3. determine the level of response which can realistically be provided by the police force of jurisdiction. 4. provide a mechanism to indicate when it is probable that the level of response required by an incident is beyond the capabilities of the police force of jurisdiction. 5. determine resources which are available from sources outside the police force of jurisdiction. B. The implications of the use of force in the resolution of barricade and hostage situations: 1. assaults should be undertaken only as a last resort after all else fails, or it is clearly evident that the lives of the hostages are in imminent danger. 2. the mounting of an assault is the ultimate sanction which can be levied; such action implies a decision to sacrifice the lives of the hostage takers to preserve those of the hostages. 3. any force committed to an assault must clearly possess a capability sufficient to resolve the situation with sufficient dispatch so as to maintain the risk to the hostages at an acceptable level.

32 SOL.GEN CANADA Lia BIBLJO OOQOj IrAVIY SOLICITOR GENLi AL CANADA AUG AOtJT ;:s 1992 DFLInT."..4LIE. OLLlCfl}:Uï 2: ' CA?lADA OTT AV.Sf; MA OPic

33 4 * HV Martynook, Rick An approach to threat.s64 assessment by police

34 , 1 r II, P