Franco-German relations and European integration: peeling off the labels 1

Transcription

1 British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Vol. 4, No. 3, October 2002, pp Franco-German relations and European integration: peeling off the labels 1 ADRIAN TREACHER Books reviewed Cole, Alistair (2001) Franco-German Relations. Harlow: Pearson Education, x pp., ISBN Friend, Julius (2001) Unequal Partners: French-German Relations The Washington Papers 180. Westport: Praeger and The Center for Strategic and International Studies, xv pp., ISBN Hendriks, Gisela and Morgan, Annette (2001) The Franco-German Axis in European Integration. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, ix pp., ISBN Webber, Douglas (ed.) (1999) The Franco-German Relationship in the European Union. London: Routledge, xvi pp., ISBN Axis, couple, engine, motor and partnership immediately spring to mind when one thinks of the contemporary Franco-German dynamic in the context of the perpetually integrating European Union. Indeed, one of the four volumes under review here even uses the first of these labels in the title. Unfortunately this array of terms can make this bilateral relationship somewhat baffling to comprehend. Alistair Cole offers us a useful Political Studies Association Published by Blackwell Publishers, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA 510

2 corrective to this overwhelming mind-set that EU integration is all about France and Germany and nothing else by asking three principal questions: to what extent this dynamic does actually exercise leadership in the European Union; to what extent the two have undergone policy convergence since 1990; and is the balance between the two shifting? These themes will be developed later in this review article, but first one needs better to understand the relationship itself and the claims that it is unlike any other. Is this relationship really so special? The proliferation of labels does perhaps indicate that there must be something worth studying here. It seems to this observer at least that this relationship is at its most special within the context of the EU. Outside of this regional organisation, the two neighbours interact in a similar fashion to other nation states. These countries are, after all, not the only ones to have repeatedly contested each other s territorial integrity. However, it is hard to envisage European integration in its present form without acknowledging France and Germany s interdependent destiny, as forged by the traumatic upheavals over the last century and a half. With this in mind, the respective government machineries have been, and continue to be, two of the most important players in the integration process. Only six years ago, one highly respected French political commentator recounted to me that France and Germany had to keep talking to each other or else they would be fighting. This sounds rather sensationalist but it does underline the sense of mutual dependence that exists between the two countries. The volumes under review here make it abundantly clear that this axis was not forged out of some mutual benevolence. Rather, in different ways and for different reasons, integration served the strategic interests of the governing elites in both countries. From a French perspective, EU membership has brought with it continued attempts to manipulate this regional organisation to enable Paris to construct a global and high-ranking foreign policy that national resources alone could no longer attain. This objective included the containment of its neighbour across the Rhine and the mitigation of any factors that could lead to German domination on the European continent. For Germany, European integration promised the prospect of international rehabilitation after the atrocities of the Nazi era. But more than this, Douglas Webber proposes that in this relationship, each partner is more keen not to fall out with the other than with any Political Studies Association

3 other EU member state. It is in the EU context that this relationship is at its most profound. In short, this is not your typical bilateral relationship; there is consensus across these studies that this relationship is special. As Webber notes, the frequency of bilateral meetings alone would qualify it for such a label. We are hard-pressed to find anything comparable in terms of its institutionalisation and in terms of the implications of any breakdown in relations. Cole, for example, characterises the nature of this relationship as existing between a formal institution and an informal bilateral regime that is brought to life by human agents (political leaders). Volter Schneider and Thierry Vedel meanwhile (in Webber), although acknowledging the centrality of governmental agents, utilise a policy network model to describe the alliance, in which simultaneously autonomous supranational, different intergovernmental and sub-national actors participate in the policy process (p. 90). The former approach, the focus on the respective leaderships, is the one that first springs to mind when one considers this relationship. It was to this level that observers traditionally pointed when they bestowed the labels mentioned in the introduction above. But it seems to me at least that it is at the sub-elite level, as explicitly covered by Cole, that the real institutionalisation of the relationship has taken place. So what role can one actually attribute to elite personalities? In the crucial early years of the European Union, France s President de Gaulle was indisputably the key referent in the relationship. His German counterparts were frequently embarrassed by his actions as he, deliberately or not, placed them in the awkward position of seemingly having to choose between Paris and Washington DC as their focus of loyalty. Cole tells us that certainly Chancellors Erhard and Kiesinger had less empathy for the General than had Adenauer, and that none of de Gaulle s successors at the Elysée could pretend to maintain Germany in such an equal relationship. But even when the personal chemistry is less congruent, there appears to be something in this Franco-German dynamic that still manages to foster some form of positive consensus on the key issues. In this way, Brandt and Pompidou, despite quite differing perspectives towards this bilateral alliance, were able, at The Hague in 1969, to agree EU-related resolutions on monetary union and foreign policy. Schmidt and Giscard, meanwhile, were more amicable and forged the classic trade-off direct elections for the European Parliament (to reflect German supranational tendencies) in return for the institutionalisation of the European Council (to satisfy French intergovernmentalist leanings). 512 Political Studies Association 2002.

4 Julius Friend, meanwhile, provides a most useful insight into the Kohl Mitterrand dynamic by charting their actions and motivations with regard to the controversial period in Franco-German relations surrounding German reunification. He discusses the Maastricht process, both in terms of the two intergovernmental conference (IGCs) and the subsequent treaty s arduous and painful ratification across the Union. He backs up the analysis of the other volumes under review here by stressing the contrasting visions of Europe embraced by each party. The German representatives were very much in the federalist bloc, looking, for example, to strengthen the relative power of the European Parliament. The French position, meanwhile, could be described as most certainly anti-federalist. The former would ultimately be disappointed at the lack of progress on the political agenda, while the French were delighted that EMU was now central. Nevertheless, despite the fairly fundamental fissure in their ultimate visions, there was something specific to this relationship that enabled both countries to stand together in pushing short- and medium-term EU integration forward. In short, the resilience of this Franco-German alliance cannot be reduced to the importance of political agency. The relationship has become institutionalised at many levels and now has its own momentum. Implications for the European project As established above, three of these accessible volumes explicitly set out to examine this relationship by getting beyond the often unhelpful, overgeneralising, labels to ascertain its real significance to the EU. The fourth (Friend) is less explicitly about Franco-German relations in the context of the EU but nevertheless provides highly useful insights. Its focus is much more on the relationship itself in the aftermath of German reunification, but here, too, the question is posed as to what extent this partnership acts as the driving force for Europe. More particularly, Friend asks whether the two countries, or the political elites thereof, still need each other. He highlights the contrasting ultimate visions for the European project and wonders whether they are reconcilable. After all, the German vision still rests very much on the country s own domestic, federal, model whereas the French vision remains strongly in the Gaullist, intergovernmentalist, mould. Hitherto, this divergence has neither seriously harmed the relationship nor significantly impeded the European integration project. However, as the issue of an EU competence catalogue and constitution moves up the agenda, the Franco-German partnership could be placed Political Studies Association

5 under increasing strain. Moreover, such events are a reminder that European integration is not solely about the relations between Berlin and Paris. Britain s pivotal role in the militarisation of the Union would be one example of other member states taking the lead; Finland s Northern Dimension would be another and Greece s obstructionist stance on the Macedonia question would be a third. In short, these new developments, coupled with the challenge of enlargement, now lead one to question whether the Franco-German integrationist motor is in need of a service. Nevertheless, Cole speaks for all three EU-focused volumes when he states that European integration can languish in the absence of fundamental Franco-German agreement, as was the case from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s. To this end, one can point to the often determining role played by Franco-German disharmony with regard to, for example, the collapse of the European Defence Community, Britain s accession to the EU, the empty chair crisis, the dissolution of the snake monetary system and the GATT Uruguay Round. Whilst this relationship may fall short of a joint hegemonic status (Cole), these two partners can lay claim to a very particular place in the EU integration process. Indeed, the other member states often look to this axis to show the way. For Gisela Hendriks and Annette Morgan, the central role played by the Franco-German partnership will be tolerated by their EU partners so long as it is deemed to be making a positive contribution to European integration. The book by Webber et al. provides a survey of different policy areas in order to gain an understanding of Franco-German relations in the EU context. The conclusion reached is that there are, in fact, multiple relationships within this regional organisation: one cannot necessarily generalise across cases. What is crucial here is just how central a particular issue is to each set of national interests, the strength and longevity of EU competencies in the issue area, and the level of multilateral interaction at work. On agriculture for example, Webber notes that France and Germany have not been natural allies, and that divergences between them are legion. Martin Rhodes, meanwhile (in Webber), describes an awkward alliance over the years in the area of social policy. Patrick Weil (also in Webber) makes a number of similar observations on the topic of immigration policy. As already implied, what is remarkable about this relationship is that it has not been uncommon for each country s representatives to approach an issue from initially starkly different standpoints but then almost inevitably to succeed in forging a common position and embracing policy convergence and emulation. Hendriks and Morgan illustrate this perfectly with their three post-german reunification EU-policy case studies: EMU (Eco- 514 Political Studies Association 2002.

6 nomic and Monetary Union), CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy) and eastern enlargement. They argue that rather than being a declining influence, as others may argue, this axis has both engineered and controlled these three policy processes, albeit to varying degrees. EMU as a project, they observe, was initially pushed from Paris, but now it bears the hallmark of Germany (p. 87). The convergence came, primarily, with both leaderships, for different reasons, wishing to minimise the part played by the Commission. From the French perspective, a stronger presence from Brussels would have threatened its intergovernmentalist vision for EU integration. The view from Germany, meanwhile, rested on the desire both to stay in control of the process, which would result in the abolition of the highly successful and symbolic Deutschmark, while at the same time ensuring the autonomy of the future European Central Bank. It was made clear that EMU was too sensitive an issue for German policy-makers for them to allow it to be exposed to the usual vagaries of EU decision-making. In the case of the European Union s CFSP, a difference of opinion exists within the literature reviewed here. While Amaya Bloch-Lainé (in Webber) notes that both countries have worked hand in hand to give Europe a stronger voice, Hendriks and Morgan observe much less of a determining role for the Franco-German axis. They point to Germany s traditional preference for close relations with Washington, while France has repeatedly promoted the notion of an autonomous Europe. At Maastricht, German negotiators lobbied for the second pillar to be less intergovernmental while the French were trying, as usual, to reconcile the irreconcilable (p. 110), namely an effective European foreign policy without compromising national sovereignty. It was the intimacy of the Kohl Mitterrand dynamic that enabled both leaderships to overcome national considerations. Since then, Chirac s election in France has put paid to this intimacy, leaving an important window of opportunity for the Blair government to play a constructive role with the French in this area, especially in the negotiations over the European Union s Rapid Reaction Force. With eastern enlargement, likewise, Hendriks and Morgan present starkly different starting-points for France and Germany and then illustrate how this conflict became replaced over time by the Franco-German position. This view is supported by Patrick McCarthy (in Webber), who charts the two countries inexorable, and often painful, convergence on this issue. He writes: like other problems, it had to be tackled and a common Franco- German position found. If no common position existed, then the con- Political Studies Association

7 flicting views could not be allowed to undermine cooperation as a whole. If a strongly held common position could be advanced via the EU, its chances of being translated into Community policy were good. A weak agreement meant the leadership on the issue would pass to other EU actors and the chances of effective action reduced. (p. 42) As elsewhere in this relationship, there was a blend of competition and accord; their shared histories force them to hammer out an agreement, with failure not being an option. McCarthy notes that this issue was particularly tortuous for the two to concur on, partly because it was a relatively new item in their long-standing partnership. Moreover, the limits of Franco-German power were evident, not least because of the draining effect of EMU on all parties involved. Much time and effort had to be put in to ensuring that EMU conformed to the designated timetable and then that enough countries were able to be part of the single currency at its launch, a task achieved by being increasingly flexible in the interpretation of the convergence criteria for EMU. One could also highlight the debilitating effect of the Yugoslav crisis in the sense that it tended to absorb a huge amount of EU resources and decision-making time, to the obvious detriment of other policy priorities. It is clear, however, that the balance in this bilateral relationship has been and is shifting towards Germany. Already, well before the momentous events of , it had assumed a position of growing economic predominance. Reunification and the end to bipolarity in Europe enabled it to go on a belated complementary political journey. Over the past decade, the rest of the EU membership, as well as the wider world, have been adjusting to an increasingly self-confident Germany that is becoming progressively less encumbered by what Hendriks and Morgan refer to as historical inhibitions. Especially under Chancellor Schröder, there is a leadership that has been increasingly prepared for Germany to behave as a normal foreign policy actor, now, on occasion, explicitly pushing its own self-interested agenda openly rather than couching it in some EU context. Friend acknowledges the shifting and unequal nature of the contemporary partnership, and then goes on to illuminate a not uniquely French misperception that lies at the heart of the relationship. The policy-makers in Paris generally fail to understand that a more powerful Germany will not necessarily increasingly throw its weight around. Instead, the two sets of elites actually have contrasting perceptions of power. This misperception, Friend argues, explains, for example, French efforts at the December 516 Political Studies Association 2002.

8 2000 Nice European Council to reassert French influence. But, he notes, reasserting power does not automatically increase it. While French leaderships, as alluded to above, have quite openly sought to manipulate the European project in order to maintain a semblance of national greatness that can live up to past glories, their German counterparts have to look forward. For them, the EU is not about accumulating and maintaining power in the traditional sense. It has been and remains about enabling Germans to like their country again and to build something positive for Europe. Just because French leaderships desire to aggrandise national power and influence, and to project French prestige across the globe, it does not imply that the decision-makers in Berlin have the same vision. Hence, although the political elites of both countries have sought to overcome the respective national insecurities caused by momentous past traumas, they have adopted starkly different tactics to achieve this. This is as apparent with regard to European integration as it is in any other aspect of foreign policy. Conclusion To conclude, the Franco-German relationship remains an important field of study and each of the books here represents a useful commentary on this subject. When it comes to understanding this relationship all these volumes make clear that the interested student must distinguish between big or history-making decisions in the EU, where French and German negotiators still play an influential role, and smaller more routine decisions, where non-state and supranational actors are more prevalent. Moreover, as the collection edited by Webber makes clear, it is also difficult to generalise about this relationship across different policy areas. Its form and nature is contingent, varying according to the topic under negotiation. What left me unfulfilled, however, was the comparatively little attention given over to the possible negative implications of this tight and special bilateral relationship, particularly in light of the growing imbalance in relations between the two countries. Only Webber really develops the notion that, to a large extent, this alliance is something that neither country can now get out of, even if its leaders wanted to. However, even then the treatment is far too brief. It is, of course, a truism to say that close and harmonious Franco-German relations are vital to EU and European integration and it is in the interest of us all that they are bound together. However, the French and German leaderships are paying a price in terms Political Studies Association

9 of manoeuvrability and freedom of action. At times, for the sake of the axis, they are not able to consider the full array of policy options that are open to their counterparts in the other EU member states. This, for me at least, certainly merits further investigation. As alluded to above, should, for example, Britain join the single currency and the EMU project, it could potentially become a viable partner for either or both countries even, perhaps, with a comparable level of bilateral institutionalisation. Elsewhere, the impending enlargement of the Union will evidently offer new potential strategic partnerships. Just how well placed will either the French or German leaderships be to exploit these possible new opportunities? There is a broader theoretical issue here. Relations between entities in the social and political sciences are rarely fixed and immutable. While the Franco-German alliance may currently appear to be a relatively permanent feature of the geo-political scene, a glance back in time reminds us that this has not always the case. Notes 1. I am extremely grateful to Jim Buller for his comments on an earlier draft of this piece. Dr Adrian Treacher University of Sussex Sussex European Institute Falmer Brighton, BN1 9SH A.H.Treacher@sussex.ac.uk 518 Political Studies Association 2002.