In Politics we Trust...or not? Anti-austerity demonstrators and their political elites

Transcription

1 In Politics we Trust...or not? Anti-austerity demonstrators and their political elites Jacquelien van Stekelenburg & Bert Klandermans Sociology/VU University Amsterdam Paper written for ECPR, Glasgow, 3-6 September 2014 First draft, please do not site nor circulate ABSTRACT The economic crisis leaves its marks on the European political arena and changes the relation between 'a' people and 'its' elites. We deem trust to be crucial in this context, as trust is the moral cement that binds a just political order. We aim to understand what that means for demonstrators. We exploit a dataset 'Caught in the act of protest. Contextualizing Contestation' comprising approx. 20 anti-austerity demonstrations spread over five northern, and southern European countries. This dataset encompasses data on about 4,000 antiausterity demonstrators. These demonstrators trust in their parliaments vary widely, ranging from trustworthy capable, to corrupt incapable. We expect that defending interests or principles vis á vis politicians someone trusts, activates different motivational mechanisms compared to defending interests or principles vis á vis politicians someone does not trust. We are particularly interested in who the trusting and distrusting demonstrators are and how their variation in trust affects their motives to participate. 1

2 INTRODUCTION The financial economic crisis marked the beginning of the 21 st century. It left its marks on the European political arena and changed the relation between 'the' people and 'their' political elites. All over Europe citizens took to the streets to demonstrate against austerity measures. Rallying not only against the measures their governments are taking, but also against the governments that are taking these measures; against politicians that claim to represent them but by whom they don t feel represented. Aptly framed in the slogan of the Spanish Indignados Democracia real ya! (Real Democracy Now). Nowadays, many people converge on the belief that the way democracies function and the political outcomes they generate are frustrating, disappointing, short-sighted, unfair, and thus seriously deficient (Offe, 2011). In this context, political trust is of crucial importance; it is the moral cement that keeps a political order together. But it is not the purpose of this paper to explore the reasons for the alleged erosion of trust in politics. Instead, this paper takes us to the trusting and distrusting anti-austerity demonstrators in the streets of Europe, and addresses the questions who they are and why they protest? By contrasting trusting and distrusting demonstrators socio-demographic profiles and their reasons to protest, this paper aims to shed light on the ongoing debate whether it is trust ór distrust which makes people protest. Although the relation between political trust and protest behaviour has been a central topic of research into political participation since the 1960s, scholars still disagree on how they are theoretically linked. Two competing claims can be found in the literature (e.g. Hooghe & Marien, 2013; Hutter & Braun, 2014). Some authors argue that trust is a prerequisite for any form of political participation to occur, while others claim that distrust can be a motivating factor for participation in non-institutionalized forms of participation (Hooghe & Marien, 2013: p. 131). The first line of reasoning assumes a positive relationship. It is argued that trust in politics is positively related to protest behaviour, because citizens require a minimum level of trust in order to participate in politics, be it institutionalized or non-institutionalized politics (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995). The second line of reasoning, however, assumes a negative relationship (Dalton, 2008; Hooghe & Marien, 2013; Hutter & Braun, 2014; Inglehart, 1977, 1981). Here it is argued that disenchanted citizens turn their back to institutionalized forms of politics, and instead get involved in protest activities as these activities allow more direct, more flexible, issueoriented and elite-challenging ways of participation in politics (e.g. Inglehart, 1981; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Norris, 2003). We argue that these seemingly contrasting claims 2

3 are not contrasting, but may operate in tandem. That is, we expect to find trusting and distrusting demonstrators at the same time, in the same national context, and in the same demonstration. In fact, we maintain that both trust and distrust in political institutions may colour people s motivation to protest, however, in a diverging manner: defending interests or principles vis á vis politicians someone trusts, activates different motivations compared to defending interests or principles vis á vis politicians someone does not trust. The relations of the motivational mechanisms are inherently complex. On the one hand, scholars argue that the combined presence of high political trust and high political efficacy functions as an ideal breeding ground for political action (Almond and Verba, 1963}. Gamson (1968) however, argues that it is political efficacy combined with distrust rather than trust which serves as a motivating factor for protest behaviour. In his own words: a combination of high political efficacy and low political trust is the optimum combination for mobilization (p. 48). Citrin (1974), finally, argues that "politically cynical should be more likely to engage in noninstitutionalized politics" (p. 980), and hence, brings in yet another motivational mechanism: political cynicism. We hypothesize that trusting and distrusting demonstrators are spurred onto the streets by diverging motivational mechanisms. We suggest that while trusting demonstrators are expected to be motivated by political efficacy, distrusting demonstrators are expected to be motivated by political cynicism. To test this reasoning, we exploit a dataset Caught in the act of protest. Contextualizing Contestation comprising 20 anti-austerity demonstrations spread over five northern and southern European countries. This dataset encompasses data on nearly 4,000 anti-austerity demonstrators, and their different motivations to protest. These demonstrators' trust in their political elites varies widely, ranging from trustworthy capable, to corrupt incapable. This paper compares the socio-demographic profile of these trusting and distrusting demonstrators and examines how their variation in trust affected their motives to participate. The paper is structured as follows. First we elaborate on the relationship between political trust and protest behaviour. Thereafter, we review the literature on political trust and demonstrators socio-demographic characteristics followed by proposed motivational mechanisms. In the next methods section, we present the data, and measures and methods used. We then present our empirical findings, while the final section concludes with a summary of the results and their implications. 3

4 Political trust and protest Trust is an ambiguous concept. People may trust different institutions for different reasons (Van der Meer & Dekker, 2011). Following van der Meer and Dekker (2011) we perceive of trust as a subjective evaluation of a specific relationship: A trusts B to do X (Hardin, 2000). According to Kasperson and colleagues (1992) the relationship is evaluated along four aspects: competence, intrinsic and extrinsic commitment (i.e. caring and accountable), and predictability. In this paper, we focus on citizens trust towards their parliament, as a key institution of representative democracy (c.f. Hutter & Braun, 2014). Parliaments may be judged to be competent when the policy output is successful socially, economically and/or politically. They may be considered to be inherently committed (caring) when they represent the electorate. Parliamentary behaviour may be enforced when citizens are able to dismiss malfunctioning politicians. And, finally, parliaments may be more predictable to the extent that parliamentarians are true to their word, party coalitions fulfil their terms and the system as a whole is well-established (see van der Meer and Dekker, 2011). In the literature two competing claims can be found on the relationship between political trust and political activity. On the one hand, scholars have made the claim that a lack of political trust means that citizens will abandon institutionalized political activities in favour of protest activities. However, another interpretation highlights that citizens need a basic level of trust in order to be politically active, be it institutionalized or protest activities (Hooghe & Marien, 2013). Available empirical findings do not offer a conclusive answer to this controversy either, since studies report negative, positive or statistically non-significant effects (see Norris, 2011: p. 223f, cited by Hutter & Braun, 2014). However, two recent multi-level analyses of European countries seem to settle the empirical dispute (Hooghe & Marien, 2013; Hutter & Braun, 2014). Both relied on the European Social Survey (ESS), but Hooghe and Marien focus on diffuse trust while Hutter and Braun focused on trust in parliament. Despite the diverging bases of trust, both studies revealed that distrusting citizens are more likely to take part in protest activities than trusting citizens. However, there are three reasons why we should be careful in interpreting empirical findings. Firstly, protest is a term often used too generically, covering multiple types of non-institutional activities, some of which are now incredible routinized e.g. petitioning, consumerism and others of which remain relatively rare, like occupying a building (Saunders, 2013). These very different non-institutionalized activities are often lumped together, but their users and the underlying motivational mechanisms differ considerable. 4

5 Secondly, some surveys have used intention to protest, rather than self-reported or actual protest. As intentions and actual participation show considerable discrepancies (Klandermans & Oegema, 1987), we should be careful in interpreting empirical findings that are either assess intentions or actual participation. Thirdly, and finally, studies so far, tended to concentrate on the diverging political activities trusting and distrusting citizens embark on institutionalized versus non-institutionalized activities thereby neglecting the effects of diverging levels of trust among citizens engaging in one and the same political activity. By singling out actual trusting and distrusting participants in street demonstrations, we aim at a nuanced approach to understanding the relationship between political trust and participation in street demonstrations. In line with Hooghe and Marien (2013) and Hutter and Braun (2014), many of our street demonstrators distrust their parliament (46 percent). However, not all demonstrators distrust their parliaments. In fact, 36 percent of our approx. 4,000 demonstrators trusted their parliament somewhat, and 18 percent even trusted their parliament much to very much. Hence, despite the fact that all these citizens were taking part in street demonstrations, their trust in political elites varied widely. This calls for theory which takes into account diverging levels of political trust among participants in one and the same political activity. In this paper we aim to build and test theory which explains the effects of diverging levels of political trust of demonstrators in terms of (1) their diverging socio-demographic profiles, and (2) and the motivational consequences of diverging levels of trust. Trusting versus distrusting protesters: who are they? Inspired by Norris and colleagues 1 (2005) we conceive of distrusting and trusting demonstrators respectively as: (1) disenchanted radicals, and (2) resourceful strategists. Disenchanted radicals. Popular during the 1960s and 1970s, the disenchanted radicalism thesis holds that protest is a response to abject economic and/or political conditions, and constitutes a rejection of the key representative institutions of the political system (Jenkins 1993, Dalton and van Sickle 2005). Protests are treated as uncommon radical events which arise from people having grudges against the political system or regime (Gurr, 1970, Hutter & Braun, 2013). Widespread political protest is perceived as a threat to 1 These authors also address a third factor (contextual factors), arguing that the socio-demographic profile of demonstrators depends on the specific circumstances surrounding each demonstration. This makes the contextual account an explanation of a different kind. Rather than being an explanation for the sociodemographic profile of trusting and distrusting demonstrators, it urges us to have a keen eye on contextual characteristics that may affect characteristics of constituencies and/or mobilization of certain groups. 5

6 the legitimacy of democracy, as citizens express discontent not only with particular leaders or issues, but also with the political system itself (Norris et al. 2005). Following this reasoning, we expect that distrusting rather than trusting demonstrators can be profiled as disenchanted radicals. Disenchantment is seen as a crisis of trust in politics, politicians and political institutions (Clohesy, 2013: 108), It is the disenchanted citizen who takes it onto the streets. Rather than making a forced choice amongst unsuitable candidates or parties, disenchanted citizens choose to take part in protest or abstain from politics altogether. Either because of their alienated low social status or their deliberate rejection from being part of the existing political processes (Norris 2005; Kaase 1999). Disenchanted radicals thus turn their back to institutionalized politics. This is not only reflected in low voters turnout among disenchanted radicals, but also their low party memberships (Clohesy, 2013: 108). For disenchanted radicals, protest substitutes participation in institutionalized channels (Muller 1979). Resourceful strategists. In stark contrast to the view of demonstrators as disenchanted radicals, an increasing number of scholars argues that protest has actually normalized (e.g. Meyer & Tarrow, 1998; van Aelst & Walgrave, 2001). Adherents of this theoretical strand claim that disenchanted radicals are an artefact of the time period during which they protested. Secular trends in secondary and higher education, in leisure hours, and in mass communications in post-industrial societies have generated far more cognitively skilled, informed, and demanding citizens (Norris et al., 2005: 191). This allows them to have advanced political knowledge and social networks to manage collective actions (Inglehart, 1977, 1997; Dalton, 2000; Norris et al. 2005). Such citizens express discontent with particular issues or leaders but do not necessarily distrust them they embark on protest activity as yet another strategic resource in their political toolbox (Inglehart 1990, Norris 2002). These citizens trust their politicians to listen to them. For resourceful strategists, protest is just another way to voice their concerns. Following this reasoning, we expect that trusting rather than distrusting demonstrators can be profiled as resourceful strategists. As cognitively skilled, and informed citizens, resourceful strategists have various strategic resources at their disposal: social capital, political interest, political ideology and the like. Their membership in traditional voluntary associations is a source of social capital, which significantly affects protest potential (Kaase 1999; Benson and Rochon 2004), and protest participation (Klandermans et al, 2008). Political interest can be understood as the attention people pay to politics (Martín and van Deth 2007). As politically interested people, 6

7 resourceful strategists care more about politics, and are more willing to act upon it, especially by way of elite challenging protest types of political participation (Inglehart 1990, 1997, Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Unlike disenchanted radicals, who are expected to be extreme ideologues, resourceful strategists are likely to be moderate ideologues. For resourceful strategists, protest participation supplements political activity in institutionalized channels. Applying our distinction between distrusting demonstrators as disenchanted radicals and trusting demonstrators as resourceful strategists we are now in the position to pose our first set of hypotheses regarding the diverging socio-demographic profiles of trusting and distrusting demonstrators. Compared to trusting demonstrators, distrusting demonstrators are expected to be: less active in institutionalized political channels (H 1.1 ). lower educated (H 1.2 ). drawn disproportionately from working class, trusting demonstrators from middle class (H 1.3 ). less organizationally embedded (H 1.4 ). less interested in politics (H 1.5 ). less satisfied with democracy (H 1.6 ). clustered to the extreme ends of the ideological political spectrum, trusting demonstrators more moderate (H 1.7 ). Trusting versus distrusting protesters: why do they protest? Classical theories proposed that people participate in protest to express their grievances stemming from relative deprivation, frustration, or perceived injustice (Berkowitz, 1972; Gurr, 1970; Lind & Tyler, 1988). Scholars of social movements, however, began to question the effects of grievances on movement participation and proposed that the question to be answered is not so much whether people who engage in protest are aggrieved, but whether aggrieved people engage in protest. They suggested efficacy, resources, and opportunities to predict protest participation (Klandermans, 1984; McAdam, 1982; McCarthy & Zald, 1976). Political efficacy Efficacy refers to the individual s expectation that it is possible to alter conditions or policies through protest (Gamson, 1992). This echoes certain properties of the classic sociological construct of agency, which similarly refers to beliefs that 7

8 individual actions have the potential to shape, and thus change, the social structure. For the perception of the possibility of change to take hold people need to perceive the group to be able to unite and fight for the issue and they must perceive the political context as receptive for the claims made by their group. The first refers to group efficacy: the belief that grouprelated problems can be solved by collective efforts (Bandura, 1997), and the second refers to political efficacy: the feeling that political actions can have an impact on the political process (Campbell, Gurin, & Miller, 1954 ). Political efficacy is conceptualized as having two dimensions: internal efficacy: the extent to which someone believes to understand politics and to participate in politics, and external efficacy: citizens' faith and trust in government. Political cynicism Political cynicism has been defined as a lack of confidence in or a feeling of distrust toward politics (e.g. Cappella & Jamieson, 1997). Cynical citizens are found to believe that political system and governments themselves are corrupt and problematic, and that politicians cannot be trusted (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997). From a theoretical point of view trust and cynicism are each other s flip side. Trust can be seen as the cement and precondition of every relationship. Cynicism, on the other hand, is the absence of the belief in the reliability of authorities, or no or limited faith in their sincerity. We argue that both trust and distrust in political institutions may affect people s motivation to demonstrate. However, in a different way. Firstly, trust versus distrust. We expect that defending interests or principles vis á vis politicians someone trusts, activates qualitatively and quantitatively different motivational mechanisms compared to defending interests or principles vis á vis politicians someone does not trust. Following the most recent findings based on two multi-level analyses by Hooghe and Marien, 2013 and Hutter and Braun, 2014 we hypothesize that distrusting demonstrators are stronger motivated to challenge their political elites in demonstrations than trusting demonstrators. In statistical terms, we expect a main effect of trust on motivation to demonstrate. This brings us to our first hypothesis regarding the motivational mechanisms: 1. Distrust is expected to spur demonstrators motivation stronger than trust (H 2.1 ). The literature offers competing claims regarding the combined effect of trust in politics and feelings of efficacy, On the one hand, scholars argue that the combined presence of high political trust and high political efficacy functions spurs political action (Almond and Verba, 1963). Gamson (1968) however, argues that it is political efficacy combined with distrust rather than trust which serves as a motivating factor for protest behaviour. 8

9 Recent findings by Hooghe and Marien (2013) on the interaction effects of trust and efficacy, might shed light on these contrasting hypotheses. They show that trusting efficacious people are more inclined to embark on institutionalized activities, however, for non-institutionalized activities they do not find such interaction effects. Consequently, we will put Gamson s hypothesis explicitly designed for non-institutionalized activity to the test: 2. Strong feelings of efficacy combined with political distrust rather than trust spurs demonstrators motivation (H 2.2 ). Citrin (1974), finally, argues that "politically cynical should be more likely to engage in non-institutionalized politics" (p. 980), and brings in cynicism as a motivational mechanism. To our knowledge, the combined effects of efficacy and cynicism for trusting and distrusting demonstrators have not been examined before. Yet, our theory on distrusting demonstrators as disenchanted radicals and trusting demonstrators as resourceful strategists may be helpful here. That is, disenchanted radicals have turned their back to institutionalized politics and are therefore expected to be cynical about politics. The various resources resourceful strategists have at their disposal, will make them feel efficacious. They will strategically deploy their resources to those political activities be it institutionalized or noninstitutionalized they presume suit their goals best. Consequently, the motivational mechanisms for disenchanted radicals and resourceful strategists will diverge: 3. Cynicism is expected to spur the motivation of distrusting demonstrators (H 2.3a ). Political efficacy is expected to spur the motivation of trusting demonstrators (H 2.3b ). Political cynicism, finally, both works to reduce and reinforce protest participation depending on whether it goes together with feelings of distrust (Klandermans et al., 2008). In their study on migrant s participation in non-institutionalized activity, Klandermans and colleagues show that political trust does not make a great difference among immigrants who are not cynical about politics. The activity level of cynical immigrants, however, is strongly influenced by trust in politics, yet in opposite directions. That is, the more cynical migrants are about politics, and the more they trust politics, the lower their activity level, while the more cynical they are, and the less they trust politics, the higher their activity level. As a result, both the least politically active and the most politically active were found among the cynics. This brings us, to our final hypothesis: 9

10 4. Among cynical demonstrators we expect the least and the strongest motivated demonstrators. The least motivated are those who combine political cynicism with trust; the strongest motivated are those who combine cynicism with the feeling of distrust (H 2.4 ). METHODS The results we will discuss are from data collected in the context of a study of street demonstrations (the CCC-study i ). The data encompass anti-austerity demonstrations, demonstrations about a variety of social, political and cultural issues, and ritual parades. We will concentrate on the participants in the 20 AA-demonstrations that were covered between November 2009 and November 2012 in the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain and the U.K. (Table 1). <<Table 1>> Sampling demonstrations Obviously, at the start of the project we did not know what to expect in terms of demonstrations. It was agreed that between 2009 and 2012 each national team was to study between 8 and 12 demonstrations with at least participants. Naturally, our sample of demonstrations is not a random sample. In some countries we covered nearly all demonstrations that took place in the period our fieldwork lasted, in other it was a convenience sample of the demonstrations staged. We defined Anti Austeritydemonstrations as protests by people whose material interests are threatened by austerity measures taken by their government. Since the financial-economic crisis burst onto the national and international stage in 2009, anti-austerity-demonstrations have been common responses of citizens to austerity measures in most European countries. The CCC-dataset comprises 20 Anti-Austerity demonstrations. On the whole, we think that these 20 antiausterity demonstrations provide a fair picture of austerity demonstrations as we know them. 10

11 Collecting data and sampling participants ii The protest surveys employed printed questionnaires ( ) handed out at the demonstration to be returned to the university using prepaid envelopes. In order to control for response biases we also conducted short (2-3 minutes) interviews with a subsample of the respondents ( ) at the demonstrations comprising questions identical to those in the printed questionnaire. The refusal rate for the face-to-face interviews is low (on average 10%). By comparing the answers in the face-to-face interviews with those to the identical questions in the returned questionnaires and by comparing the face-to-face interviews of those who returned their questionnaire with the interviews of those who did not, we can make fairly accurate estimates of the response bias. In total participants returned the questionnaires distributed during 20 anti-austerity demonstration (see Table 1 for an overview). The response rates varied between 14 and 52 % between demonstrations with an average of 31%. Comparison of those who did and did not return the questionnaire revealed that those who did return the questionnaire were on average somewhat older and higher educated than those who did not. The analyses we conducted to assess whether the nonresponse could have resulted in biased findings and conclusions did not reveal any deviating outcomes. As for the sampling of participants, we designed a sampling strategy such that each participant had the same likelihood of being selected. Although circumstances inevitably necessitate variation we aimed to keep sampling procedures as identical as possible for the various demonstrations. A demonstration is covered by a team consisting of a fieldwork coordinator, 3-4 so called pointers, and interviewers. Each pointer has a team of 4-5 interviewers. The pointers select the interviewees, while interviewers conduct the interviews and hand out the questionnaires. Separating these two roles appeared to be crucial in preventing sampling biases (Walgrave, Wouters, and Ketelaars 2012). As interviewers tend to select people they belief to be willing to cooperate, they end up producing biased samples. In demonstrations that move through the streets teams start at different points of the procession and work towards each other approaching every n-th person in every n-th row. At demonstrations that stay in the same area, the space is divided into smaller areas; in each area a pointer selects interviewees taking the density of the crowd in that area into account. The result of all this is samples that we believe to be representative of the demonstrators present. 11

12 Measures All questionnaires and procedures are standardized. Identical questions and indicators (translated and back-translated) are employed in each country and for each demonstration. In this paper we aim to answer two key questions: Who are the low and high trusting demonstrators? And: What motivates low and high trusting demonstrators to protest? Trust in national parliament was assessed by the following question: How much would you say that you trust your national parliament? (1 not at all 5 very much). In order to answer the first question Who are the low and high trusting demonstrators? the independent variables are grouped into the following three components: (1) involvement in (non)-institutionalized politics, (2) human capital, and (3) various resources. Involvement in (non)-institutionalized politics In order to assess whether demonstrators protest to substitute institutionalized political activity (disenchanted radicals) or to supplement institutionalized political activity (resourceful strategists) we asked respondents about their involvement in institutionalized and non-institutionalized protest. Involvement in institutionalized politics Voting. We asked respondents whether they voted in the last general elections (yes/no). Political party membership. We asked our respondents whether they have been passively or actively involved in political parties over the last 12 month. Involvement in non-institutionalized politics We asked our respondents whether they undertook any of the following political activities during the past 12 months: contacted a politician, signed a petition, donated money, buy-, or boycott a product, strike, demonstration, direct action, and violent action. The activities load on three factors explaining 52.02% of the variance. The factors respectively represent individualized activity (contacted a politician, signed a petition, donated money, eigenwaarde 2.10, explained variance 18,44%); consumerism (buy-, or boycott a product, eigenwaarde 1,56, explained variance 17,09%); and collective action (strike, demonstration, direct action, and violent action, eigenwaarde 1.02, explained variance 16,50%). 12

13 Human capital This cluster of independent variables reflects people s ability to be involved, it refers to personal resources such as money, or (cognitive) skill sets. Educational level. In internationally comparative research it is important to employ a standardized comparative measurement of educational level, we used a novel continuous comparative education measure, ISLED: the International Standard Level of Education (Schröder & Ganzeboom 2013). Subjective class. We employed the subjective class scale from WVS It reads: People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the working class, the middle class, or the upper or lower class. Would you describe yourself as belonging to the upper class/upper middle class/ lower middle class/ working class/ lower class. Various resources This cluster of independent variables, reflects people s various resources known to facilitate political involvement: (1) social capital (organizational embedddeness), (2) political interest and satisfaction with democracy, and (3) political ideology. Organizational embeddedness. We asked our respondents in how many of the following types of organizations they have been involved during the past 12 months: church, sport/cultural, community organization, trade unions, political parties, environmental, charity/welfare, third world/global justice/peace, human rights/civil rights/anti racist/migrant/ women s organization and LGTB. A factor analysis revealed 3 factors explaining 41% of the variance: (1) community-based organization (church, sport or neighborhood organization), (2) New Social Movement Organizations (NSM, environmental, third world global justice and peace, anti-racist / migrant and human / civil rights, gender-based, women s LGTB), (3) Old Social Movements (political parties and trade unions). We created subscales by counting the number of memberships per type of organization. Interest in Politics. Political interest is understood as the attention that people pay to politics. We ask: How interested are you in politics? (1 not at all 5 very); Satisfaction with democracy. In general, how satisfied are you with the functioning of democracy in your country? (0 very dissatisfied 10 very satisfied); Left-right self placement. Left-right self placement on a scale from 0=left to 10=right: 13

14 In order to answer the second question what motivates low and high trusting demonstrators to protest we pose a set of questions related to the demonstration our respondents took part in: Political Efficacy. A scale constructed of the following two items Organized groups of citizens can have a lot of impact on public policies in this country and My participation can have an impact on public policy in this country. (1 strongly disagree 5 strongly agree). The two load on a single factor and correlate.45; we collapsed them into a single measure ranging from 1 not efficacious to 5 very efficacious. Political cynicism. A scale constructed of the following two items Most politicians make a lot of promises but do not actually do anything and I don t see the use of voting, parties do whatever they want anyway. (1 strongly disagree 5 strongly agree). The two load on a single factor and correlate.39; we collapsed them into a single measure ranging from 1 not cynical to 5 very cynical. Determination to participate. Respondents indicated their determination to participate in answering the following item: How determined were you to participate in this demonstration? ranging from 1 not very determined to 5 very determined. RESULTS In what follows we will answer the questions Who are the low and high trusting demonstrators? and: What motivates low and high trusting demonstrators to protest? However, first we present descriptive analyses on the ratio of distrusting and trusting demonstrators per country and type of demonstrations, in order to provide some background information. Trusting versus distrusting demonstrators Table 2 reveals that nearly half of our sample of demonstrators distrusts their parliament (45,9%), this confirms our hypothesis (H 2.1), and nuances the findings of Hooghe and Marien (2013) and Hutter and Braun (2014) that the more one distrusts politics the more one is inclined to take part in street demonstrations. We assigned our 3984 respondents to three groups: (1) low trust in parliament (1777 respondents, 45,9%), medium trust in parliament (1386, 35,8%) and high trust in parliament (705 respondents, 18,2%). 14

15 << Table 2>> Table 3 reveals an overview of the levels of trust of our respondents per country, it shows that percentages of distrusting demonstrators runs from 34,2% (The Netherlands) to 75,6% in Italy. In accordance with our demonstrators as disenchanted radical thesis, demonstrators distrust their parliaments more than the general population (as measured by the ESS). << Table 3>> Table 4, finally, provides an overview of the levels of trust in parliament by type of demonstration. For this overview we employed the full CCC dataset (comprising demonstrators). It reveals that participants in ritual parades (e.g. 1 May demonstrations, gay pride) are the most trusting demonstrators. Anti-austerity demonstrations and demonstrations regarding socio-cultural issues attract about the same proportion of rather distrusting demonstrators (45,9% versus 47,2% respectively). << Table 4>> Trusting versus distrusting demonstrators: who are they? In this section we formulate an answer to the first question Who are the low and high trusting demonstrators? and see whether their profiles fit the disenchanted radicals versus resourceful strategists theses. The independent variables in Table 5 are grouped into three components: (1) involvement in (non)-institutionalized politics, (2) human capital, and (3) various resources. In accordance with hypothesis H 1.1, distrusting demonstrators engage less in institutionalized politics than trusting demonstrators; they vote less (84,4% versus 95,5% ), and political party membership is lower (22,0% versus 25,6%). Note that if trust in parliament increases, the proportion of demonstrators undertaking institutionalized activities also increases, the same pattern holds for all the independent variables in this table. Shifting the focus to non-institutionalized activities, we can observe that distrusting demonstrators participate more in non-institutionalized activities as strikes, demonstrations, and direct 15

16 action than trusting demonstrators (collective action 38,1% versus 23,9%). This is what one would expect, given the distrusting demonstrators as disenchanted radicals thesis that suggests that protest activity substitutes for institutionalized political activity. However, distrusting and trusting demonstrators level of activity in individualized actions and consumerism is about the same, thus distrusting demonstrators are choosy in the type of non-institutionalized actions they undertake. Trusting demonstrators, on the other hand, are active in institutionalized channels, and also undertake non-institutionalized activities. Again this is what one would expect given the trusting demonstrators as resourceful strategists thesis. This thesis suggests resourceful strategists strategically deploy their resources to whatever activity they deem effective, hence, non-institutionalized activities supplement institutionalized activities. In terms of human capital, distrusting demonstrators have less capital at their disposal. They are lower educated than trusting demonstrators, this confirms H 1.2. And in accordance with hypothesis H 1.3, distrusting demonstrators come disproportionately from working class (42,2% versus 20,3%), while trusting demonstrators come disproportionately from middle class (50,5% versus 70,4%). and lower educated, and higher educated. Trusting demonstrators also have more resources at their disposal than distrusting demonstrators, be it social capital, political interest or political ideology. Compared to distrusting demonstrators, trusting demonstrators are more active in civic organizations (46,8% versus 28,5%), and new social movement organizations (45,0% versus 41,4%). But for trade unions the reversed can be observed, distrusting demonstrators are more active in trade unions than trusting protesters (68,4% versus 61,7%). Trusting demonstrators are more interested in politics (3,33 versus 3,11 on a 5 point scale), and are much more satisfied with how democracy works in their country (6,78 versus 3,75 on a 11 point scale 0-10). In accordance with H 3.2 we expected and found that trade unions mobilize on average more distrusting demonstrators (68,4% versus 61,7%), while new social movements mobilized on average more trusting demonstrators 45,0% versus 41,4%).. less organizationally embedded (H 1.4 ). As expected, our distrusting demonstrators self-identified more to the extreme poles, while trusting protesters were more moderate. In terms of voting, distrusting demonstrators voted much more for parties at the extreme end of the ideological political spectrum than trusting demonstrators (16,1% versus 5%). Hence, distrusting demonstrators failed more often to vote than trusting demonstrators, and if they vote, they vote more often for extreme political parties. These votes are perhaps protest votes against the political system. We come back to this in the discussion. All in all, we come to the conclusion that trusting 16

17 demonstrators have more resources at their disposal deemed to facilitate collective action participation than distrusting demonstrators. Trusting protesters can thus rightfully be described as resourceful strategists. Distrusting versus trusting demonstrators: why do they protest? Now we shift the focus to the motivational mechanisms and formulate an answer to the second question Who are the low and high trusting demonstrators? Table 6 provides an overview of the descriptive statistics of the motivational dynamics of distrusting and trusting demonstrators. It reveals that distrusting demonstrators are more cynical than trusting demonstrators (3.35 versus 2.30 on a 5 point scale), while trusting demonstrators feel more efficacious (4,04 versus 3,70). <<Table 6>> Distrusting versus trusting demonstrators Table 7 contains the results of the logistic regression analysis. In accordance with hypotheses H 2.3a, distrusting demonstrators were more likely to be cynical about politics than trusting demonstrators. Trusting demonstrators, on their turn, felt more efficacious than distrusting demonstrators, which confirms H 2.3b. In addition to being much more cynical, distrusting demonstrators were also more determined to protest than trusting demonstrators. <<Table 7>> The effects of efficacy, cynicism and trust on determination disentangled The logistic regression showed that distrusting demonstrators are more cynical about politics, while trusting demonstrators felt more efficacious. Yet, we still have to answer the key question of this paper; being whether distrusting demonstrators are more inclined to take the cynicism path, while trusting demonstrators are expected to take the efficacy path. To test our hypotheses concerning trust as moderator, we conducted a hierarchical regression with a three-way-interaction term. First, we first regressed determination on trust, efficacy 17

18 and cynicism. The second step contains the product of all three predictor variables. For the trust as moderator hypothesis it is important that this 3-way interaction was significant. This turned out to be the case: the three-way interaction term cynicism/efficacy/trust revealed the following fit: F (4; 3636) = 19,88, p <.001, β = 0.04, p =.07; indicating that the relationship between feelings of efficacy and cynicism on determination to participate varies across levels of trust in parliament. To interpret these findings we have plotted the relationship between determination to participate and efficacy and cynicism at low and high levels of trust separately (Aiken & West, 1991). First, each predictor was standardized. For the outcome variable (determination to participate), interaction effects were plotted using the parameter estimates derived from the standardized regression equations. Predicted values were computed using scores that were one standard deviation below and above the mean of cynicism (for low and high trusties, respectively, Aiken & West, 1991). Figure 1 displays the influence of cynicism and efficacy on determination to participate for low and high trusties. In terms of trust, Figure 1 clearly displays that distrust motivates participation in demonstrators. Distrusting demonstrators the two red lines are more determined to demonstrate than trusting demonstrators the two blue lines, in fact, the most trusting and efficacious demonstrators, are the less determined to participate. Among distrusting demonstrators, feeling efficacious or not, does not really matter. Hence, we reject Gamson s hypothesis (H 2.2 ) that strong feelings of efficacy combined with political distrust spurs demonstrators motivation. It s more the distrust than feelings of efficacy which spurs people s motivation to protest. Finally, cynicism. While cynicism does not significantly affect efficacious distrusting and trusting demonstrators determination the red and blue dotted line. Cynicism does affect inefficacious demonstrators determination the red and blue solid line, albeit in opposite directions. That is, the more cynical inefficacious distrusting demonstrators feel, the more determined they are to participate; yet, the more cynical inefficacious trusting demonstrators feel, the less determined they are to participate. Hence, while cynicism acts as an amplifier for inefficacious distrusting demonstrators, it acts as a suppressor for inefficacious trusting demonstrators. Hence, a healthy doses of distrust, combined with inefficaciousness and cynicism form a potent mix to take it onto the streets. People feeling powerless, use indeed the streets to voice their distrust, cynicism and frustration. 18

19 DISCUSSION The goal of this paper was to shed light on the debate regarding the relationship between political trust and protest activity. This debate boils down to the question whether trust in politics is positive or negative related to protest activity. We expected both distrusting and trusting people to take it onto the streets and argued that the question to be answered is not so much whether people who engage in protest activity trust or distrust their political elites, but more who the (dis)trusting protesters are and why they protest. In order to do so, we compared the socio-demographic profile and the motivational mechanisms of about 4,000 demonstrators in north and south European anti-austerity demonstrations. If we learn one thing from this endeavor, it is how different distrusting and trusting demonstrators are. Despite the fact that these trusting and distrusting demonstrators take part in the same protest activity, they seem to come from different social strata, and are pushed onto the streets by different motivational mechanisms. For the distrusting disenchanted radicals in our sample, non-institutionalized politics substitute for participation in the institutionalized channels they distrust. But they are choosy, in fact, it is collective actions like demonstrations, direct action and strikes in which they are more active than trusting demonstrators. For the trusting demonstrators, noninstitutionalized politics function as politics with other means, non-institutionalized politics supplements their activism in institutionalized channels. Distrusting demonstrators failed more often to vote than trusting demonstrators, and if they vote, they vote more often for extreme political parties. These votes are perhaps protest votes against the political system. This is not only interesting in terms of the distinction between party politics and movement politics i.e. what strategies have citizen at their disposal to protest in institutionalised politics, but also touches upon the question whether non-institutionalized activities substitute or supplement institutionalized activities, i.e. is protest via party politics perceived as an effective strategy or not? Disenchanted radicals form the majority of our sample. However, these disenchanted radicals have less resources commonly known to facilitate collective action at their disposal, but they seem to compensate this void with their stronger motivational mechanisms (i.e. the forceful combination of distrust in politics with political cynicism). This finding asks for a refinement of social movement theory, that these days focuses on resources and political opportunities. The reasoning goes that the resources are a necessity to overcome the 19

20 collective action problem, and open rather than closed windows of opportunities spur action. Our finding seem to indicate precisely the opposite, we find more distrusting demonstrators in the streets, relatively low on resources. Of course this might be an artefact of the demonstrations we sampled anti-austerity demonstrations but, one might recall that our comparison with demonstrators in socio-cultural issues found about the same ratio of trusting and distrusting demonstrators. Future research could focus on different types of demonstrations and/or different contextual circumstances (e.g. closed versus open opportunity structures, relatively bad vs relatively good economic circumstances). That there is a significant difference among trusting and distrusting demonstrators, not only in terms of their socio-demographics, but also in their motivational mechanisms suggests that there is value in taking a more nuanced approach in understanding the motivational mechanisms for participation in protest activity. Next to street demonstrations, future research could unlump (cf. Saunders 2013) other forms of non-institutionalized activism to see whether different types of protest activity really do have different motivational mechanisms. 20

21 ENDNOTES i A detailed description of the project and its tools can be found in the project-manual (Klandermans et al. 2011). The manual is available on request; see the project website ( ). See also Van Stekelenburg et al. (2012). ii See Walgrave and Verhulst 2011 and Walgrave et al. 2012, for extensive discussions of the various biases resulting from sampling and non-response. 21

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