First Deliberative Polling in Korea: Issue of Korean Unification Seoul, South Korea

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1 First Deliberative Polling in Korea: Issue of Korean Unification Seoul, South Korea Executive Summary: Center for Deliberative Democracy of Stanford University Jan 25, 2012 The Event On Saturday August 11, 2011, a stratified random sample of 193 residents of Seoul and its surrounding metropolitan area gathered together in a large assembly hall of a regional training facility in the outskirts of Seoul. They were gathered to discuss various aspects of the Korean unification issue the conditions, timing, and consequences of reunifying the two Koreas and were prepared to tackle the issue for the rest of the weekend. The weekend was part of the first Deliberative Polling experiment conducted in Korea and the entire process was broadcasted as a one-hour program on KBS, the public broadcasting network in South Korea (click here to see video clips from the KBS broadcast on Dec. 4, 2011). It was part of a two-part documentary on the unification issue. Chief producer Yong-chul Kong explains the purpose of the program as follows: The issue of unification with North Korea is not just a problem for each of us individually. It is a problem we [South Koreans] face together, as a nation. To a large extent, the future of the Korean peninsula depends on how we deal with this issue. But as a nation, we are far from reaching a national consensus regarding this issue, and different social collectives - the right, the left, the older generation, and the younger generation - they are all talking past one another Given the sharp divide between generations and between political parties on the issue of unification, a Deliberative Poll faced distinctive challenges. It was employed to measure what the public would think if it were to deliberate together under transparently good conditions. To this end, a scientific random sample of the residents of Seoul (and the surrounding province) was invited to participate in a two-day deliberative event. Those who accepted were sent briefing documents that contained background on the issue and the pros and cons of different policy proposals. During the two-day event, the participants alternated between their randomly assigned small groups and the larger plenary session to discuss the issue and pose questions to competing experts. The participants were polled before and after the deliberative process to judge whether deliberating caused them to change their opinions. These results were compared to an independent control sample (N=1956) that did not participate in the deliberation.

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3 The Results The results in the following paragraphs will focus mostly on the post-deliberation numbers. Most of the post-deliberation percentages presented in this report have shown a statistically significant difference between T1 and T2. In some cases, however, we present post-deliberation results that are statistically indistinguishable from predeliberation results due to its practical importance. These questions will be recorded in the footnotes. 1. Unification: Timing and Economic Consequences Overall, South Koreans showed overwhelming support for unification. Before deliberation, 71.6% of South Koreans thought unification were necessary 1. This already high number increased to an astounding 91.2% post-deliberation. Regarding the timing of unification, people were more inclined to say, we should wait until conditions mature (53.5%) as opposed to unifying as soon as possible (33.7%). People thought that unification would be hugely beneficial to North Korea (94.2%), but they also came to believe that unification would be beneficial to South Korea as well (from 48.2% before the weekend to 72.6% afterwards). Although people saw that unification might worsen some social problems such as the ideological divide (59.5%) and the rich-poor gap (67.8%) 2, there was a greater belief that South Korea would develop into a powerful nation if unified (85.6%). One notable trend was that when asked about the possible economic setbacks as a consequence of unification, more people indicated a desire to reunify when opportunity presented itself, even if this meant some setbacks in the economy (59.6%). A lesser proportion of people said that they opposed unification if it hurt the economy (23.8%). In addition, 78.2% of people also thought that it is important for South Korea to secure the costs of unification, although people were split on the idea of establishing a unification tax (32.6% oppose ; 38.9% support ; and 26.4% in the middle ). 2. North Korean Nuclear Issue and Humanitarian Aid to the North South Koreans believed that if the North possesses nuclear weapons, it would be a severe problem for South Korea s security (76.7%), and worried it might incite Japan s nuclear armament (81.9%). They also preferred complete dismantlement of 1 This number was calculated by the collapsing the responses of 6-10 on a 0 to 10 scale, where 10 is completely necessary, 0 is completely unnecessary, and 5 is exactly in the middle. All percentages presented in this summary are such collapsed percentages unless stated otherwise. 2 The response distributions of the ideological and rich-poor gap questions were similar (i.e., statistically indistinguishable) before and after deliberation.

4 North Korean nuclear programs as a resolution (65.8% support) as compared to freezing the program at current state (27.5% support). 3 In addition, after deliberation, people were less inclined to hold a conditional attitude about humanitarian aid. Support for continuing humanitarian aid regardless of the North Korean nuclear issue rose dramatically from 43.4% to 78.3%. People were also less likely than before to answer that we should suspend sending rice to North Korea if any of the rice is being redirected for military purposes (64.1% to 54.5%), but this number was still high. A related trend was found for the percentage of South Koreans believing that South Korea should possess nuclear weapons. This number declined from 53% to 34.3% after the deliberations. People also believed that rice (67.9%), fertilizers (73.0%), and medical supplies (74.6%) were helpful aid products for North Korean civilians. 3. Economic Cooperation and Policies As for specific economic cooperation projects between the North and South, postdeliberation results showed an increased support for expanding the Gae-sung industrial complex (from 45.6% to 77.7%) and the Gum-gang-san tourism project (from 50.3% to 62.7%). This seemed to be triggered by an increased confidence about the positive effect of these programs. 66.9% of South Koreans said they thought the Gum-gang-san project was effective in bringing about unification, and 86% thought so about the Gae-sung industrial complex. The Gae-sung project additionally bolstered people s beliefs about its positive effects on the South Korean economy (from 50.2% to 67.9%). Process Evaluation The participants were asked to evaluate the elements of the process on a scale from 0 to 10, ranging from 0 generally a waste to time to 10 extremely valuable. 94.8% rated participating in the small group discussions at 7 or above, 79.0% rated meeting and talking to other participants outside the formal discussions at 7 or above. 84.2% rated the large group sessions with the candidates at 7 or above, and 92.2% rated the event as a whole at 7 or above. Partners and Project Team KBS and Seoul National University jointly organized a special committee (lead by Prof. S.-K. Park, SNU) to carry out the project. They cooperated with the Center for Deliberative Democracy of Stanford University on all aspects of the project. The survey was carried out by the KBS Broadcasting Culture Research Center, and it was in the field twice (pre-, post-deliberation) during the period of August 8 25, The briefing 3 The response distributions of the North Korean nuclear issue questions were similar (i.e., statistically indistinguishable) before and after deliberation.

5 documents were prepared by the Institute for Peace and Unification Studies of Seoul National University (lead by Prof. M.-K. Park, SNU) and every effort was made to ensure balance of the presented viewpoints. The scientific team in charge of the project was led by Professor Kyu S. Hahn of the Institute of Communication Research of Seoul National University in collaboration with the survey research team of the KBS Broadcasting Culture Research Center. Results of were analyzed by the Center for Deliberative Democracy of Stanford University. Deliberative Polling is a registered trade mark of James S. Fishkin. Professor Robert C. Luskin has collaborated with Fishkin on nearly all the Deliberative Polling projects since their inception in For more information on Deliberative Polling please visit The process has been employed in the US, Britain, Australia, Hungary, Denmark, the European Union, Japan, Brazil, and China, among other countries.

6 Korea DP Results (Revised) Oct 1, 2011 * The blue cells indicate significant changes from T1 to T2. Q1. How necessary or unnecessary do you think reunification is? Unnecessary (0-4) 12.5% 3.7% Exactly in the middle (5) 14.5% 4.1% Necessary (6-10) 71.6% 91.2% DK/NA 1.6% 1.0% T1 T2 Diff. (T2 T1) Sig. (p) Q2. Some people think that we should not reunify until certain conditions have matured. (0) Others think that we should reunify as soon as possible. (10) Wait until conditions mature (0-4) 39.8% 53.5% Exactly in the middle (5) 20.7% 13.0% Reunify as soon as possible (6-10) 38.4% 33.7% DK/NA 1.0% 0.0% Q3. Some people think that we should not reunify if it would hurt our economy. (0) Others think that we should reunify when opportunity presents itself even if it would hurt our economy. (10) Oppose if it hurts economy (0-4) 28.0% 23.8% Exactly in the middle (5) 20.2% 16.1% Support even if it hurts economy (6-10) 49.6% 59.6% DK/NA 2.1% 0.5% Q4. Do you think the Gae-sung industrial complex project should be downsized? Or do you think that it should be expanded? Downsize (0-4) 29.5% 7.7% Exactly in the middle (5) 21.2% 14.0% Expand (6-10) 45.6% 77.7% DK/NA 3.6% 0.5% Q5. Do you think the Gum-gang-san tourism project should be downsized? Or do you think that it should be expanded? Downsize (0-4) 28.4% 15.5% Exactly in the middle (5) 17.6% 20.7% Expand (6-10) 50.3% 62.7% DK/NA 3.6% 1.0% Q6a. All aid to North Korea should be discontinued until the North Korean nuclear issue is settled. Oppose (0-4) 35.2% 50.2% Exactly in the middle (5) 19.7% 18.7% Support (6-10) 37.9% 28.0% DK/NA 7.3% 3.1%

7 Q6b. Humanitarian aid should continue regardless of the North Korean nuclear issue. Oppose (0-4) 33.7% 10.4% Exactly in the middle (5) 19.7% 10.9% Support (6-10) 43.4% 78.3% DK/NA 3.1% 0.5% Q6c. If any part of the aid rice is being redirected for military purposes, we should suspend sending rice to North Korea. Oppose (0-4) 19.1% 26.4% Exactly in the middle (5) 11.4% 16.1% Support (6-10) 64.1% 54.5% DK/NA 5.2% 3.1% Q6d. South Korea should also possess nuclear weapons. Oppose (0-4) 21.2% 39.3% Exactly in the middle (5) 15.0% 20.7% Support (6-10) 53.0% 34.3% DK/NA 10.9% 5.7% Q6e. President Lee should set up a North South Korean summit meeting right away. Oppose (0-4) 21.2% 8.9% Exactly in the middle (5) 21.8% 21.8% Support (6-10) 52.9% 68.0% DK/NA 4.1% 1.6% Q6f. We should establish a reunification tax Oppose (0-4) 45.2% 32.6% Exactly in the middle (5) 23.3% 26.4% Support (6-10) 25.4% 38.9% DK/NA 6.2% 2.1% Q7. How much money are you willing to pay for reunification costs? (per year) 87,566 원 150,529 원 62, Q8. How frequently should our government raise questions about the human rights issue in North Korea Rarely (0-4) 7.4% 5.1% Exactly in the middle (5) 17.1% 8.8% Often (6-10) 72.7% 83.5% DK/NA 3.1% 2.6% Q9. Some people think our government should take a conciliatory approach toward North Korea. (0) Others think that we should take a hard-line approach toward North Korea. (10) Conciliatory approach (0-4) 17.1% 27.5% Exactly in the middle (5) 22.3% 24.4% Hard-line approach (6-10) 57.0% 45.1% DK/NA 3.6% 3.1%

8 Q10a. How much would you support or oppose the following resolution for North Korean nuclear issue?: a. Complete dismantlement Oppose (0-4) 14.0% 10.9% Exactly in the middle (5) 17.6% 14.5% Support (6-10) 60.5% 65.8% DK/NA 7.8% 8.8% Q10b. Freezing their program at current stage Oppose (0-4) 41.0% 35.7% Exactly in the middle (5) 22.8% 21.2% Support (6-10) 28.5% 27.5% DK/NA 7.8% 15.5% Q11. If we do reunify, what kind of flag do you think we should use? The Taeguk (current S.K. national flag) 46.6% 37.8% The Ingong (current N.K. national flag) 0.0% 0.0% The Hanbando (current one Korea flag used 19.7% 25.4% in co-sponsored events) Make a new flag 28.5% 31.6% DK/NA 5.2% 5.2%.000 Q12a. How important or unimportant is the following condition for reunification? a. South Korea securing the costs for reunification Not important (0-4) 20.7% 7.2% Exactly in the middle (5) 19.2% 13.0% Important (6-10) 58.0% 78.2% DK/NA 2.1% 1.6% Q12b. International support from neighboring countries Not important (0-4) 27.4% 31.7% Exactly in the middle (5) 16.1% 21.2% Important (6-10) 53.9% 45.1% DK/NA 2.6% 2.1% Q12c. North Korea s attitude change Not important (0-4) 2.6% 2.0% Exactly in the middle (5) 5.2% 2.6% Important (6-10) 89.1% 94.9% DK/NA 3.1% 0.5% Q12d. Overcoming the difference between North and South Koreans Not important (0-4) 2.0% 0.0% Exactly in the middle (5) 3.6% 3.6% Important (6-10) 91.8% 95.3% DK/NA 2.6% 1.0% Q13a. How beneficial or harmful do you think reunification would be for: a. South Korea Harmful (0-4) 33.7% 18.2%

9 Exactly in the middle (5) 14.0% 9.3% Beneficial (6-10) 48.2% 72.6% DK/NA 4.1% 0.0% Q13b. North Korea Harmful (0-4) 3.6% 1.0% Exactly in the middle (5) 5.7% 4.1% Beneficial (6-10) 87.6% 94.2% DK/NA 3.1% 0.5% Q13c. Yourself Harmful (0-4) 24.3% 12.9% Exactly in the middle (5) 31.6% 37.8% Beneficial (6-10) 39.9% 46.1% DK/NA 4.1% 3.1% Q14a. Do you think the following social problems will improve or worsen after reunification? a. The gap between the rich and poor Worsen (0-4) 65.9% 67.8% Exactly in the middle (5) 14.0% 12.4% Improve (6-10) 16.1% 17.1% DK/NA 4.1% 2.6% Q14b. Real estate prices Worsen (0-4) 45.2% 42.6% Exactly in the middle (5) 14.0% 20.7% Improve (6-10) 34.7% 32.7% DK/NA 6.2% 4.1% Q14c. Unemployment Worsen (0-4) 39.5% 40.3% Exactly in the middle (5) 11.4% 13.5% Improve (6-10) 46.6% 42.9% DK/NA 2.6% 3.1% Q14d. Ideological conflict Worsen (0-4) 54.4% 59.5% Exactly in the middle (5) 12.4% 8.8% Improve (6-10) 27.5% 27.9% DK/NA 5.7% 3.6% Q15a. What do you think about the following statements regarding the prospects of reunified Korea? a. Defense spending will be reduced Disagree (0-4) 22.2% 18.6% Exactly in the middle (5) 23.8% 13.0% Agree (6-10) 51.3% 66.2% DK/NA 2.6% 2.1%

10 Q15b. There will be lots of cheap labor Disagree (0-4) 11.0% 6.1% Exactly in the middle (5) 15.0% 11.4% Agree (6-10) 70.4% 81.3% DK/NA 3.6% 1.0% Q15c. We will be able to use the natural resources located in the North Disagree (0-4) 5.6% 2.0% Exactly in the middle (5) 6.2% 3.1% Agree (6-10) 86.5% 93.3% DK/NA 1.6% 1.6% Q16a. How likely or unlikely do you think are the following statements for post-reunified Korea? a. Reunify into a democratic system. Unlikely (0-4) 68.9% 68.0% Exactly in the middle (5) 9.3% 15.5% Likely (6-10) 17.5% 13.4% DK/NA 4.1% 3.1% Q16b. Elect national leaders through free election. Unlikely (0-4) 31.2% 24.9% Exactly in the middle (5) 19.2% 18.1% Likely (6-10) 46.6% 51.8% DK/NA 3.1% 5.2% Q16c. Develop into a powerful nation Unlikely (0-4) 15.5% 3.6% Exactly in the middle (5) 14.5% 9.3% Likely (6-10) 68.0% 85.6% DK/NA 2.1% 1.6% Q17a. How effective is the Gum-gang-san project for? a. Brining about reunification Not effective (0-4) 31.1% 19.7% Exactly in the middle (5) 18.1% 13.0% Effective (6-10) 47.8% 66.9% DK/NA 3.1% 0.5% Q17b. The South Korean economy Not effective (0-4) 49.8% 46.6% Exactly in the middle (5) 18.1% 22.8% Effective (6-10) 29.5% 28.5% DK/NA 2.6% 2.1% Q17c. The North Korean economy Not effective (0-4) 4.1% 4.1% Exactly in the middle (5) 6.7% 2.6% Effective (6-10) 86.0% 92.2% DK/NA 3.1% 1.0%

11 Q17a. How effective is the Gae-sung project for? a. Brining about reunification Not effective (0-4) 23.3% 4.6% Exactly in the middle (5) 17.6% 8.8% Effective (6-10) 56.5% 86.0% DK/NA 2.6% 0.5% Q17b. The South Korean economy Not effective (0-4) 28.5% 14.5% Exactly in the middle (5) 18.7% 16.1% Effective (6-10) 50.2% 67.9% DK/NA 2.6% 1.6% Q17c. The North Korean economy Not effective (0-4) 2.6% 1.0% Exactly in the middle (5) 4.7% 2.1% Effective (6-10) 91.1% 94.8% DK/NA 1.6% 2.1% Q19. How helpful do you think the North-South economic cooperation is in maintaining the Kim-Jong-Il regime? Not helpful (0-4) 15.0% 19.6% Exactly in the middle (5) 21.8% 19.7% Helpful (6-10) 55.5% 50.9% DK/NA 7.8% 9.8% Q20. How pressured do you think the North Korean government would feel if the North- South economic cooperation is suspended? Not pressured (0-4) 17.6% 18.1% Exactly in the middle (5) 10.4% 9.8% Pressured (6-10) 68.3% 70.1% DK/NA 3.6% 2.1% Q21a. How helpful are the following aid products for North Korean civilians? a. Rice Not helpful (0-4) 26.9% 19.2% Exactly in the middle (5) 11.9% 10.9% Helpful (6-10) 57.6% 67.9% DK/NA 3.6% 2.1% Q21b. Fertilizers Not helpful (0-4) 18.1% 12.5% Exactly in the middle (5) 13.0% 11.9% Helpful (6-10) 66.4% 73.0% DK/NA 2.6% 2.6% Q21c. Medical supplies Not helpful (0-4) 18.6% 11.4% Exactly in the middle (5) 11.4% 11.4%

12 Helpful (6-10) 67.0% 74.6% DK/NA 3.1% 2.6% Q22. Do you think that North Korea is using the aid rice they receive for military purposes? It is not used for military purposes (0-4) 3.6% 5.1% Exactly in the middle (5) 10.9% 14.5% It is being used for military purposes (6-10) 78.2% 76.6% DK/NA 8.3% 3.6% Q23. How likely or unlikely is it that sudden situation, such as mass protests or civil rebellion will unfold in North Korea in the next 2-3 years? Unlikely (0-4) 19.7% 25.4% Exactly in the middle (5) 18.1% 20.7% Likely (6-10) 55.4% 47.7% DK/NA 6.7% 6.2% Q24. How effective or ineffective is it to distribute propaganda leaflets in North Korea to open up their government regime? Ineffective (0-4) 32.6% 38.9% Exactly in the middle (5) 15.5% 18.7% Effective (6-10) 46.1% 39.9% DK/NA 5.7% 2.6% Q25. How effective or ineffective is it to distribute propaganda leaflets in North Korea to influence the awareness of North Korean civilians? Ineffective (0-4) 25.4% 33.3% Exactly in the middle (5) 15.0% 15.5% Effective (6-10) 55.0% 49.2% DK/NA 4.7% 2.1% Q26a. How much of a problem would it be for the following if North Korea did possess nuclear weapons: a. South Korean security Not a problem (0-4) 5.7% 7.2% Exactly in the middle (5) 11.4% 12.4% Severe problem (6-10) 79.3% 76.7% DK/NA 3.6% 3.6% Q26b. Japan s nuclear armament Not a problem (0-4) 4.1% 7.7% Exactly in the middle (5) 12.4% 7.3% Severe problem (6-10) 79.8% 81.9% DK/NA 3.6% 3.1% Q26c. U.S. attack on North Korea Not a problem (0-4) 9.9% 11.9% Exactly in the middle (5) 15.5% 14.0% Severe problem (6-10) 70.5% 70.5% DK/NA 4.1% 3.6%

13 Q27a. How effective or ineffective would each of the following options be for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue? a. Direct conversation between the U.S. and North Korea Ineffective (0-4) 27.0% 16.7% Exactly in the middle (5) 19.2% 15.5% Effective (6-10) 48.1% 65.3% DK/NA 5.7% 2.6% Q27b. Direct conversation between South and North Korea Ineffective (0-4) 9.3% 4.1% Exactly in the middle (5) 14.5% 5.7% Effective (6-10) 73.0% 88.7% DK/NA 3.1% 1.6% Q27c. 6-party talks Ineffective (0-4) 18.1% 10.4% Exactly in the middle (5) 17.1% 19.2% Effective (6-10) 60.1% 68.0% DK/NA 4.7% 2.6% Q27d. Military pressures Ineffective (0-4) 41.5% 45.7% Exactly in the middle (5) 17.6% 22.3% Effective (6-10) 36.8% 30.1% DK/NA 4.1% 2.1% Q27e. Economic sanctions Ineffective (0-4) 19.2% 24.3% Exactly in the middle (5) 14.0% 16.6% Effective (6-10) 62.1% 56.5% DK/NA 4.7% 2.6% Q28a. How big a role do you think the following countries play regarding the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue? a. China No role (0-4) 4.1% 2.6% Exactly in the middle (5) 3.1% 5.2% Big role (6-10) 91.1% 91.8% DK/NA 1.6% 0.5% Q28b. U.S No role (0-4) 5.7% 4.6% Exactly in the middle (5) 9.8% 7.3% Big role (6-10) 82.5% 87.5% DK/NA 2.1% 0.5% Q28c. Russia

14 No role (0-4) 9.8% 7.7% Exactly in the middle (5) 16.1% 18.1% Big role (6-10) 72.0% 71.5% DK/NA 2.1% 2.6% Q28d. Japan No role (0-4) 29.0% 30.1% Exactly in the middle (5) 23.8% 23.8% Big role (6-10) 45.0% 43.6% DK/NA 2.1% 2.6% Q28e. South Korea No role (0-4) 16.6% 10.8% Exactly in the middle (5) 14.5% 13.5% Big role (6-10) 66.9% 74.6% DK/NA 2.1% 1.0% Q28f. North Korea No role (0-4) 6.2% 4.6% Exactly in the middle (5) 6.2% 4.7% Big role (6-10) 84.5% 86.5% DK/NA 3.1% 4.1% Q29a. How positively or negatively do you feel about the following countries? a. China Negative (0-4) 46.2% 49.7% Exactly in the middle (5) 28.0% 31.1% Positive (6-10) 23.8% 19.1% DK/NA 2.1% 0.0% Q29b. U.S Negative (0-4) 19.8% 15.1% Exactly in the middle (5) 23.3% 18.1% Positive (6-10) 54.9% 65.9% DK/NA 2.1% 1.0% Q29c. Russia Negative (0-4) 33.7% 25.4% Exactly in the middle (5) 36.3% 48.2% Positive (6-10) 27.4% 25.4% DK/NA 2.6% 1.0% Q29d. Japan Negative (0-4) 60.6% 50.8% Exactly in the middle (5) 19.2% 22.3% Positive (6-10) 18.7% 25.9% DK/NA 1.6% 1.0% Q29e. North Korea

15 Negative (0-4) 58.0% 53.9% Exactly in the middle (5) 20.7% 21.2% Positive (6-10) 18.7% 22.2% DK/NA 2.6% 2.6% Q30a. How much does each of the following countries wants a South-Korea-driven reunification? a. China Does not want it (0-4) 80.8% 88.7% Exactly in the middle (5) 9.3% 6.2% Wants it (6-10) 8.8% 3.0% DK/NA 1.0% 2.1% Q30b. U.S Does not want it (0-4) 33.7% 27.6% Exactly in the middle (5) 11.4% 20.7% Wants it (6-10) 53.4% 49.2% DK/NA 1.6% 2.6% Q30c. Russia Does not want it (0-4) 51.9% 66.3% Exactly in the middle (5) 27.5% 24.4% Wants it (6-10) 17.1% 7.2% DK/NA 3.6% 2.1% Q30d. Japan Does not want it (0-4) 59.2% 60.7% Exactly in the middle (5) 19.2% 20.2% Wants it (6-10) 18.6% 18.2% DK/NA 3.1% 1.0% Q31. How much do you support or oppose the current government s North Korean policies? Oppose (0-4) 38.9% 47.6% Exactly in the middle (5) 20.7% 20.7% Support (6-10) 33.7% 28.0% DK/NA 6.7% 3.6% Q32a. The following words describe different feelings and emotions that you may have towards the issue of Korean reunification. Read each item and mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that word. Indicate to what extent you have felt this way during the past few weeks. Use the following scale to record your answers. a. Excited Not at all (0-4) 34.7% 16.1% Exactly in the middle (5) 22.3% 16.6% A great deal (6-10) 40.4% 66.5% DK/NA 2.6% 1.0% Q32b. Afraid

16 Not at all (0-4) 27.9% 37.8% Exactly in the middle (5) 24.4% 23.3% A great deal (6-10) 45.1% 37.8% DK/NA 2.6% 1.0% Q32c. Irritated Not at all (0-4) 42.9% 63.7% Exactly in the middle (5) 20.2% 20.2% A great deal (6-10) 34.6% 15.2% DK/NA 2.1% 1.0% Q32d. Sad Not at all (0-4) 47.1% 56.0% Exactly in the middle (5) 21.2% 21.8% A great deal (6-10) 28.5% 20.3% DK/NA 3.1% 2.1% Q32e. Angry Not at all (0-4) 37.8% 63.2% Exactly in the middle (5) 23.8% 16.6% A great deal (6-10) 34.3% 18.2% DK/NA 4.1% 2.1% Q32f. Nervous Not at all (0-4) 20.1% 28.0% Exactly in the middle (5) 20.2% 19.7% A great deal (6-10) 58.0% 51.3% DK/NA 1.6% 1.0% Q32g. Enthusiastic Not at all (0-4) 36.2% 25.4% Exactly in the middle (5) 27.5% 22.3% A great deal (6-10) 33.7% 50.3% DK/NA 2.6% 2.1% Q32h. Downhearted Not at all (0-4) 51.3% 64.7% Exactly in the middle (5) 25.4% 20.7% A great deal (6-10) 19.6% 12.4% DK/NA 3.6% 2.1% Q32i. Disgusted Not at all (0-4) 51.4% 72.1% Exactly in the middle (5) 19.7% 15.0% A great deal (6-10) 26.0% 11.4% DK/NA 3.1% 1.6% Q32j. Happy

17 Not at all (0-4) 33.7% 17.6% Exactly in the middle (5) 24.9% 20.7% A great deal (6-10) 38.4% 61.1% DK/NA 3.1% 0.5% Q32k. Scared Not at all (0-4) 35.8% 53.3% Exactly in the middle (5) 23.3% 19.7% A great deal (6-10) 36.7% 26.4% DK/NA 4.1% 0.5% Q32l. Blue Not at all (0-4) 55.4% 67.2% Exactly in the middle (5) 22.8% 20.2% A great deal (6-10) 18.7% 10.8% DK/NA 3.1% 1.6%