The Arab Spring, the Gulf and Iran: What next for the Middle East?

Transcription

1 The Arab Spring, the Gulf and Iran: What next for the Middle East? Sir William Patey and Peter Jenkins January 2013 Sir William Patey Sir William Patey retired as British Ambassador to Afghanistan in April He led Britain's diplomatic mission in Kabul from military intervention through to the steady withdrawal of British soldiers ahead of control being handed to Afghan troops. Sir William has also served as Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Sudan. He was Head of the Middle East Department in the Foreign Office before becoming Ambassador to Sudan during the negotiations for a comprehensive peace agreement between the Government of Khartoum and the southern rebels (SPLA); and was Ambassador to Iraq during the drafting and passing in a referendum of the new Iraqi Constitution. He has also had diplomatic postings in Tripoli, Abu Dhabi and Canberra and worked on the Libya/Syria Desk and Iran/Iraq Desk in the Foreign Office, as well as serving as Deputy Head of the United Nations Department. Investors know all to well that turbulence in the Middle East has the capability to send tremors around the globe. Schroders Secular Market Forum invited Sir Willam Patey and Peter Jenkins, two of the world s foremost speakers on the region, to share their views and answer today s most poignant questions. Not since 1979 has there been a period of comparable uncertainty and change in the Middle East. Thirty-four years ago the Iranian Revolution culminated in the overthrow of the Shah, who was one of the West s certainties in the region. Two regional wars followed the Iran-Iraq war and the Lebanese war in a period of substantial instability that included the siege of the grand mosque in Mecca. Indeed, some believed Saudi Arabia was on the cusp of a revolution. Sir William Patey holds the view that the events of the past 18 months in the Middle East rival those in 1979 in terms of their significance. Sir William Patey came to speak at Schroders Secular Market Forum, where he attempted to answer these questions: Will the overthrow of the Sultanates in the Arab Spring nations Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Syria (yet to play out) lead to real stability and fundamental change? Or to a period of turmoil? Will the Arab Spring spread to the Gulf States? Patey opened his talk with a quote from Jack Goldenstone, who wrote in the Foreign Affairs journal: For revolutions to succeed, governments must appear so irredeemably unjust or inept that it is widely viewed as a threat to the countries future. Elites, especially the military, must be alienated from the state and no longer willing to defend it. A broadbased section of the population spanning ethnic and religious groups and socioeconomic classes must mobilize. International powers must either refuse to step in to defend the government, or constrain it from using maximum force. The jury is still out on whether the Arab Spring will lead to inclusive democracies that represent an improvement on the old regimes. Patey explained that these four factors have been present in all of the Arab Spring countries, whilst he also argued that the international dimension is the reason the Syrian regime hasn t fallen yet (nor has the military abandoned the regime). Assad is astutely aware that there is a threshold in terms of the extent of force he can use against the Syrian population before provoking international intervention. For example, chemical weapons are a game changer but for the moment the extent of bombing and the use of tanks is yet to surpass a level that international powers will not tolerate.

2 Will the Arab Spring spread to the Gulf States? If you apply this analysis to the Gulf States it helps to explain why the Arab Spring has not had a major impact there but it doesn t mean that it won t says Patey. A requirement for the Gulf States continued survival and future success is the fact that they foster a healthy environment for business and investment in order to satisfy the aspirations of a growing and increasingly younger population. Although political power is in the hands of a few they ensure that economic power is dispersed, unlike under the military dictatorships in the Arab Spring countries. In addition, the Gulf State monarchies benefit from greater social and cultural ties with broad sections of their populations, and this gives them legitimacy. While it might seem perverse to suggest that a monarchy is more legitimate, they did not come to power by overthrowing a corrupt government for the people as the military dictators had done. Unrest has spread to Bahrain, and the government resorted to force against its population. Patey argues that Bahrain s small size has allowed the West to apply diplomatic pressure for reform that it might hesitate to wield on the larger Gulf States. In addition, the West remains heavily invested in the region s stability and security. Economic power supports stability Clearly having US$130 billion to pump into the economy helps when you are under threat says Patey. Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries are likely to earn more from their oil exports over than in the previous 15 years. Saudi Arabia s debt will fall from 100% of GDP to under 5% of GDP in less than a decade, whilst the non-oil sector is growing at 8% per annum. The point is they still have the capacity to keep the population engaged there will not be bread riots in the Gulf States, says Patey. If Saudi Arabia were to be fall it would have a more profound effect on the rest of the countries in the region than vice versa Despite its enviable economic position, Patey cautions against complacency. Saudi Arabia has an aging monarchy and there is clearly a lack of job opportunities for the young, he says. If the Arab Spring was about those countries being unable to cope with the aspirations of growing numbers of young people, Patey argues that the Gulf States will have to cope with similar challenges. The population of the GCC countries is likely to double over the next 30 years, and already 50% are under 25 years old. Saudi Arabia s debt will fall from 100% of GDP to under 5% of GDP in less than a decade, whilst the non-oil sector is growing at 8% per annum. A major challenge for the Saudis is the succession to the throne. Since King Abdulaziz death in 1953 the succession has been passed down through some of his 44 sons, which has created a degree of stability. They are coming towards the end of this line now, and there is no clear candidate amongst his grandsons. King Abdullah is entering his 90s, so Patey expects a change within the next few years. In 2006, King Abdullah set up the Allegiance Council, a body that is composed of the sons and grandsons of Saudi Arabia's founder, King Abdulaziz, to vote by a secret ballot to choose future kings and crown princes. Patey says that the elevation of Prince Mohammed bin Naif to Minster of the Interior makes him a leading candidate for the top job in the future. Possible threats to Saudi Arabia? There will not be a military coup. The conspiracy involved to get all the various sections of the armed forces involved is almost inconceivable, says Patey. An Islamic revolution did not come to pass in when the country was under threat from Islamic terrorists, so Patey believes it is unlikely to happen today. He also notes that a popular revolution is unlikely. The biggest threat to Saudi Arabia is from an internal family dispute, says Patey. However, whilst the ruling family s situation seems more precarious now than it has been in the past, he rules out an imminent fall stating that he expects the Al-Sauds to remain in power. While the Saudis are very slow to reform, when they are under threat they can be very decisive, says Patey. Elections alone will not solve the problems in the Arab Spring countries For the countries of North Africa, the jury is still out on whether the Arab Spring will lead to inclusive democracies that represent an improvement on the old regimes says Patey. He argues that there will not be a transition to a more democratic system unless there are significant reforms leading to better governance. Elections mean nothing unless there are robust institutions in place to hold the government to account. The Arab Spring is not an outcome, it is a 2

3 process, and Patey says the key question is: can democracy be institutionalized? While there have been delays, this transitional process is ongoing. The risk lies in the damage that the continuing instability is having on their economies. I think the threat of military power in the Middle East was always much more potent than its use The rise of the Islamists Many feared that the Arab Spring would evolve into the Islamist Autumn. It is clear that the fall of autocratic regimes in North Africa has opened up the specter of sectarianism and tribalism says Patey. But although the Islamists have won significant victories, they have not swept the board. In Libya they achieved only 10% of the vote, in Tunisia they are in a coalition and even in Egypt where the Muslim Brotherhood is in power, they still have to govern. In governance, Patey argues, they still have to meet the aspirations of young people. No clear US strategy in the region There was a policy hiatus in the run up to the US presidential elections, but Patey fears that this policy drift could become the norm. He quoted Lord Salisbury, the former British prime minster who in the 19th century described British policy towards the world as drifting down a river using a boat hook to avoid trouble the implication being that with regard to the Middle East, the US is just trying to avoid conflict and engagement. Patey argues that the US views the Arab Spring as a domestic process, perhaps because recent campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have highlighted the limitations of their military power. I think the threat of military power in the Middle East was always much more potent than its use, says Patey. The impact of shale gas There are concerns in the Gulf about the development of shale gas in the US. The Saudis have always worried that their strategic relationship with the US would diminish if the US became energy independent, says Patey. But the reality is that even if it does, it has other interests in the region. Moreover, they will continue to have an interest in the price of oil as it directly affects the US economy he adds. In the long term, Patey believes that some in the US might ask why they defend the Strait of Hormuz when the majority of the oil is flowing to China. While China may feel pressure to take up some of the burden, you might argue that it already is. The USS Eisenhower is in the Gulf keeping the straits open so that oil can be shipped to China. And China is buying all the US Treasuries it can so the US can afford to keep the Eisenhower in the Gulf! joked Patey. Since his retirement from the diplomatic service Peter has drawn widespread interest as a rational dissenter from received Western wisdom on how to resolve the Iranian nuclear problem, and for his impartial insights into the implications of the diplomatic positioning of participants to the dispute. Peter spoke to Schroders Secular Market Forum to discuss his view of where the risks lie in Peter Jenkins Peter Jenkins combines 33 years of experience of international diplomacy with a firm grasp of the implications of nuclear technology and a wellnourished understanding of the calculations that are driving the approaches of Iran, Israel and the USA to the nuclear questions that divide them. He served twice in Vienna, the second time as the UK s ambassador to the UN, and in both cases his focus was largely on international nuclear policy issues. His last posting was as British Permanent Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and United Nations in Vienna. In that capacity he contributed to IAEA policy on a number of nuclear non-proliferation issues. He was also President of the 2007 IAEA Conference on Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear Materials, and a vice-chairman of the UN Ad Hoc Committee for the negotiation of a UN Convention on Corruption. He is an associate fellow of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy. What are Iran s nuclear intentions? I am sanguine says Jenkins. In 2003 when this issue burst onto the scene, Jenkins says that everyone involved believed that Iran was intent on developing nuclear weapons. Iran had been concealing information from the IAEA and was conducting research into military grade nuclear material and peripheral weapon technology. But at the end of 2007, a US intelligence report stated that it believed Iran had halted work on its nuclear weapons program at the end of While aspects of the program may have been resumed since, it knew of no reason to suspect that Iran s leaders had taken a decision to develop nuclear weapons. 3

4 Instead, the report stated that Iran s aim was to have the capacity to build weapons. Jenkins therefore argues that whilst it is likely that Iran is attempting to become a nuclear threshold state, it has not decided to become a nuclear armed state. The US report also added that Iran s leaders were rational actors. We often hear Israeli allegations that Iran is lead by mad mullahs but this is not the view of the US intelligence agency, says Jenkins. If you put yourself in Iran s leaders shoes, you can see some compelling reasons why developing nuclear weapons is very risky says Jenkins. President Obama has clearly stated that while he is willing to accept a nuclear threshold Iran, he is not willing to accept a nuclear armed Iran. Jenkins believes that Iran s leaders are acutely aware that the risk of an invasion would rise significantly if they were to cross the threshold. Moreover, it would lose its remaining friends in the non-aligned movement, and its relationships with Russia and China, as it has assured these nations that it will not develop nuclear weapons. Iran is not a true rogue state it does attach value to having some friends says Jenkins. However, he added that one must be cautious. It is possible, albeit improbable, that Iran has a secret facility to develop enriched uranium. But at the moment, Jenkins believes it is highly unlikely that Iran is seeking to develop nuclear arms. It is highly unlikely that Iran is seeking to develop nuclear arms at present Is a military attack on Iran s nuclear installations likely in 2013? Absent of evidence that it has or is trying to develop nuclear weapons, Jenkins believes the likelihood of an attack is low. He questions US appetite for another conflict in the Middle East. Politicians are aware that there is scant public support for an invasion, and the government appreciates that the economic consequences of an attack on Iran could be very serious indeed, says Jenkins. Moreover, the risk of an Iranian retaliation against Israel, or equally against Saudi Arabia, is very real. In addition, Jenkins believes that Israel is unlikely to attack Iran alone. Israel is aware that the US and NATO are not supportive of an attack, and it is also apparent that Israel does not have the capacity to launch a successful attack without some US assistance. An attack on Iran s nuclear facilities would have no legitimacy whatsoever under the UN charter, Jenkins added. Can a negotiated diplomatic settlement to the nuclear dispute be reached this year? The US would like to resolve this dispute, says Jenkins. The Iranians ought to be highly motivated as well given the negative impact the sanctions are having on their economy. Additionally, those that are opposed to a negotiated settlement, namely Netanyahu and his neo-conservative allies in Washington, are at a low ebb politically (the Republican candidate lost the US election and its attempts to derail Chuck Hagel, Obama s nomination to lead the Defense Department, have failed although Hagel is yet to be formally confirmed). That said, Jenkins notes that Iran s supreme leader the ultimate decision maker on this issue remains deeply distrustful of the US. It is also proving to be surprisingly difficult to set a date for the resumption of talks. While the general outline of the settlement is clear (in the non-proliferation treaty), unfortunately, the likelihood of a forthcoming agreement is not, says Jenkins. We often hear Israeli allegations that Iran is lead by mad mullahs but this is not the view of the US intelligence agency Will there be a nuclear arms race in the Middle East? In a word, no, says Jenkins; although he adds as long as Iran refrains from crossing the threshold as a caveat. In his view, the risk of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East has been greatly exaggerated. The other protagonists (Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey) are committed to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. Moreover, Jenkins does not believe the US, nor the Israelis, would sit back and watch an arms race unfold. In addition, the human resources that such a race would require are scarce in the region. He shared an anecdote of a conversation with the Turkish Ambassador, where he had said Turkey had lived alongside a nuclear armed Soviet Union for 60 years, so why should it feel compelled to get weapons now because of Iran? Moreover, the ambassador stressed they are protected under the NATO nuclear umbrella. 4

5 Sir William Patey interjected: From the Saudi Arabia s perspective it already has a nuclear weapon it just happens to be on a shelf in Pakistan. Patey s remark was tongue-in-cheek, but he does believe that Saudi Arabia has an agreement with the Pakistani military. Iran is not a true rogue state it does attach value to having some friends A word on North Korea North Korea seems to be intent on expanding its stock of nuclear material, says Jenkins. It currently has enough for 10 to 12 nuclear weapons, but it is building a new reactor that will enable it to develop its weapons capability. However, Jenkins argues that it is highly unlikely that North Korea will use nuclear weapons against its neighbors. Indeed, in his view it would not use nuclear weapons unless it came under an acute threat. North Korea s leaders are relatively rational actors, although I admit at times it may not seem to be the case, says Jenkins. There are approximately 300 families that count in North Korea, all of whom enjoy the good things in life. I do not believe that those families are suicidal, or that they wish to jeopardize their privileges. But it is equally unlikely that North Korea will give up its nuclear material. Since 2003 there have been a number of apparent steps forward and backward in terms of talks with the Americans, but no real progress. In Jenkins view, this is unlikely to change. One hopes that China could monitor North Korea s nuclear program, but it maintains that it does not have as much influence as one might expect, says Jenkins. Finally, Jenkins stressed there is no military option for the West: North Korea has rockets aimed at Seoul that could obliterate the city at the touch of a button. 5

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