A Defence of Sceptical Authoritarianism

Transcription

1 POLITICS: 2002 VOL 22(3), A Defence of Sceptical Authoritarianism Thom Brooks Department of Philosophy University of Sheffield Vittorio Bufacchi argued in this journal that democracy was under threat from two extreme philosophical positions: totalitarianism and nihilism. Sandwiched between these polarities is liberal democracy. Bufacchi believes that one of liberal democracy s distinctive properties is an endorsement of scepticism, which he then attempts to illuminate. In contrast, this article will argue that an authoritarian government bound by a constitution permitting civil liberties might also adopt political scepticism. This removes the aforementioned distinctiveness of liberal democracy in this regard and, in addition, leads us toward a rethinking of the possibility of a more plausible consideration of democracy. Introduction In his article Sceptical Democracy, Vittorio Bufacchi (2001) attempts to protect democracy from two threatening and extreme philosophical positions: totalitarianism and nihilism. He argues that liberal democracy s distinctive characteristic is an endorsement of scepticism. Totalitarianism endangers liberal democracy by its refusal to permit scepticism, while nihilism achieves the same result through extreme moral relativism. Following the example of Hannah Arendt, I am sure that liberalism is not totalitarian, but I am not so sure that the two are polar opposites. 1 Nevertheless, despite my agreement with Bufacchi that sound government cannot endorse nihilism, I do think that we might support a system of sceptical government in between liberal democracy and totalitarianism. Such a place is, for Bufacchi, anti-democratic. As I both reject totalitarianism and liberal democracy I shall call my position sceptical authoritarianism. My goal will be to demonstrate that an authoritarian-styled government with specialists and experts in power can satisfy not only what most attracts Bufacchi to democracy but other democratic theorists as well such as Robert Dahl and Thomas Christiano if (1) there is a constitution ensuring broad civil liberties along the lines of a US Bill of Rights, (2) all members of society are bound by the constitution, (3) unelected specialists can be outvoted in the parliament by popularly elected counterparts, and (4) all adult citizens directly vote for these elected officials. Bufacchi on totalitarianism Bufacchi believes that there are two forces at work against democracy. One of them is totalitarianism and it supposedly rejects democracy for the reason that democ- Published by Blackwell Publishers, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA

2 A DEFENCE OF SCEPTICAL AUTHORITARIANISM 153 racy is unable to ground society on infallible foundations (2001, p. 23). Linking it with religious fundamentalism, he says that: (1) Totalitarianism does not allow for a plurality of thinking. (2) Totalitarianism justifies the reordering of society and unlimited human sacrifice in its Utopian future. (3) Totalitarian rulers are not constrained by the rule of law (ibid.). All three instances are not only correctly viewed as bad, but as a threat to the liberal democratic way of life. 2 On the other hand, it is important to note that opposite circumstances are quite desirable permitted plurality of thinking, absence of unlimited human sacrifice, and rulers bound by the rule of law. Hannah Arendt has stated what I believe is the primary characteristic of totalitarian regimes: absolute terror (2000, p. 119). This terror is best expressed through the complete irrationality of the society s political organisation: men are taught they are superfluous through a way of life in which punishment is meted out without connection with crime, in which exploitation is practiced without profit, and where work is performed without product...a place where senselessness is daily produced anew. 3 There is a relationship between irrationality and fear in totalitarian governments where the irrationality of the system highlights and exacerbates enforced terror. Instead, what governments ought to be moving toward is a system of rational organisation where punishments fit crimes, where honest labour is rewarded, and where predictability and accountability are governmental virtues, all things considered. 4 Aside from Arendt, there are two other important contributions to categorising and thinking about totalitarianism. Among Carl Friedrich s well-known aspects of totalitarianism he included: (1) an ideology focused on a perfect state of mankind, (2) a single mass party led by one man, superior to or intertwined with the state bureaucracy, (3) a near-complete monopoly of all means of effective mass communication, and (4) a terroristic police. 5 These characteristics certainly do seem to fit totalitarian governments quite well, based upon historical evidence. However, strictly speaking, there is nothing that necessarily equates a single mass party led by one individual (say, a benevolent king), a near monopoly over mass communication, and an ideology somehow wrapped up in an ideal of how people ought to be with totalitarianism. In fact, it has been the consequences of a few modern governments that demand our condemnation of their style of governance and our label of totalitarian. If the state owned most, if not all, of the newspapers, radio and television stations, the main objection from liberals would be a concern that dissent was being suppressed. If this were not the case, the government might be hailed as a model of tolerance, rather than a model of tyranny perhaps even allowing greater broadcasting privileges to minority viewpoints than would be permitted in liberal democracies. In Leonard Schapiro s careful study of totalitarianism, he argues that the power of the leader of the mass party does not flow from the party itself, but instead his

3 154 THOM BROOKS becoming leader is no more than a preliminary to establishing, or attempting to establish, supreme personal power over the state as well as over the party (1972, p. 25). He further argues that leaders of totalitarian regimes must both (1) eliminate potential rival institutions to his power and (2) derive their authority from some source other than the constitution. 6 In fact, according to Schapiro, [t]he only safeguard against the would-be benevolent despot lies in legal order (ibid., p. 30). It is in this acceptance of rival socio-political institutions and the rule of law enshrined in a constitution binding all members of a society which separates totalitarian governments from other forms of governing, including, but not limited to, liberal democracy. If such a constitution were in place allowing dissent, reasonably fitting punishments with crimes based upon harm, scepticism might flourish in a government that was not a liberal democracy. Another source of terror in totalitarian regimes for many is the regime s eagerness to dictate all matters of morality to the individual, stripping the person of both political rights and a private sphere of personal morality. 7 While an irreconcilable matter of fact for totalitarian regimes, authoritarian governments might easily sidestep this likely objection by adding into their constitution something like the US Bill of Rights, which permits a free press, free speech, dissent and freedom of worship, and prohibits cruel and unusual punishments. A constitution that protects civil liberties to which all in the society are to submit would avoid this danger, while by no means necessitating democratic government. This fact begins to expose what I believe is a major weakness in Bufacchi s argument for sceptical democracy. Finally, for Bufacchi, the particular menace arising from totalitarianism is its arrogance of certainty and total resolution, the arrogance of believing that one s views are correct beyond doubt (2001, p. 24). While it is certainly true that on some matters many people are more correct in their judgements than others, it is likewise true that if ensuring the further rationality of society all things considered is to be a civic virtue, then prohibiting dissent in favour of true believers who follow their gut, rather than their mind, is a civic vice. It is in just this light that Bufacchi s own call to arms is most telling: his message is not particularly directed toward the rational sceptic to whom he offers praise, but rather instead to [a]ll true believers in democracy (2001, p. 25). This apparent contradiction might be avoided by arguing that liberal democratic governments best facilitate dialogue, for Bufacchi this is expressed in political scepticism. Ironically, while post-democratic governments ought to be characterised by rational deliberation, the transition to democracy might be characterised by true belief. Scepticism and liberalism: only in a democracy? Bufacchi hopes to identify scepticism as a distinctive characteristic of liberal democracy, which will further distinguish it from the anti-democratic forces of unreasonable certainty, such as totalitarianism (2001, p. 25). To this end, he identifies three praiseworthy attributes of scepticism:

4 A DEFENCE OF SCEPTICAL AUTHORITARIANISM 155 (1) Scepticism must not necessarily imply a denial of truth. (2) Scepticism does not mean that the truth does not exist, nor that we do not, or cannot, know anything. (3) Scepticism merely challenges us to provide justifications. 8 In this manner he finds scepticism to be interposed between certainty and nihilism. This I do not dispute. My difficulty lies in his association of scepticism with democracy, as well as linking certainty and nihilism with anti-democracy. I do not accept any of these linkages. For one thing, no matter the level of permitted scepticism, it is not inconceivable to imagine a tyranny of the majority in democracies which do not sanction protections of civil liberties and minorities in their rule of law. On this count, Bufacchi does well to avoid this dilemma by arguing in favour of liberal democracies whereby such protections would be in place. Yet, this violates his equation of scepticism with liberal democracy set exactly between the antidemocratic totalitarianism on one hand and nihilism on the other. It appears problematic to say that illiberal democracies are less democratic than liberal democracies, as illiberal democracy must be closer to either extreme as liberal democracy is defined as a point equidistant from the extremes which is what we must conclude from Bufacchi s argument. In fact, what really distinguishes liberal from illiberal democracies is simply whether or not such a government is liberal or illiberal. The point between totalitarianism and nihilism is more a characteristic of liberalism (and scepticism) than of democracy. To be juxtaposed equidistant from either extreme, it is irrelevant to some degree what the political institutions are and how exactly they are to function. What is relevant is that such a government ought not to institutionalise extreme moral relativism nor absolute certainty of truth or leadership. It is political scepticism that is between certainty and nihilism and not (sceptical) liberal democracy. In his criticism of totalitarianism, Bufacchi not too surprisingly invokes Sir Karl Popper: decisions arrived at democratically, and even the powers conveyed upon a government by a democratic vote, may be wrong. It is hard, if not impossible, to construct a constitution that safe-guards against mistakes. This is one of the strongest reasons for founding the idea of democracy upon the practical principle of avoiding tyranny, rather than upon a divine, or a morally legitimate, right of the people to rule. 9 Popper is arguing that since it is next to impossible to write a constitution which will avoid mistaken decisions, democracy is foremost desirable because it will avoid tyranny: this principle outweighing any right of the people to rule. As seen above, the democratic form of government is not itself inherently opposed to tyranny: should a state be without constitutionally protected civil liberties and/or the rule of law applying to all members of the state or if the majority wishes to sanction the persecution of a minority through the ballot box, they may do just that. What prevents tyranny is not so much democracy, but the protection of civil liberties which ought to include some substantial form of individual political expression. Perhaps unknowingly, Popper s brief argument does not so much argue for democ-

5 156 THOM BROOKS racy as such than it does for the rule of law and political expression. Both of these may be easily accommodated by a sceptical authoritarian government. Scepticism and authoritarianism Suppose that there was a government consisting primarily of specialists in medicine, law, economics, social welfare, etc. These specialists are each highly regarded in their fields and are selected from their fields for fixed terms. While making up a large number of delegates in the government s parliamentary body, they are outnumbered by the popularly elected representatives which make up two-thirds of the parliament. Elected politicians would then be able to be a check upon the powers of the unelected specialists. Providing that there is a constitution establishing the rule of law and ensuring civil liberties to which all are subject, I believe that such a government would resist most criticisms of non-democracies and yet satisfy what is most characteristic of democracies: permit a plurality of thinking, all members of the state would be bound by the rule of law, punishments would fit the crime, unelected delegates would be prevented from doing whatever they want by popular representatives directly accountable to the people, and rival political institutions might flourish. Unlimited human sacrifice, political authority derived outside of the constitution and the absolute power of any individual or small group would never be able to come into existence. While non-elected officials might control a considerable share of power (and perhaps control the judiciary and ministry of justice), this form of government would be safe from all the objections against totalitarianism listed by Bufacchi, Friedrich, Schapiro and Popper, while satisfying what Bufacchi believes to be democracy s primary characteristic: scepticism (see Bell, 1997, p. 8; cf. Warren, 1996, p. 247). Many future commentators may well fault me for advocating a system of government where at least one-third are unelected (and a far greater share if we include the judiciary) on the grounds that a major facet of one s civil liberties is the right to vote (which I have not taken away) and that the whole of the government must be directly accountable to the citizens it represents. First of all, I have not denied anyone the right to vote (in fact, I am for its expansion) nor who to vote for (as I have not given any criteria which potential representatives need to fulfil nor do I have much of a desire to provide one). Secondly, much of what we call liberal democracy is made up of unelected officials: bureaucrats, government prosecutors and the whole of the judiciary, in addition to the various other members of the government, such as the police and fire service, state university employees, health care professionals, street sweepers, refuse collectors and so on. With these various agencies the problem is rarely one of we should elect each police officer and rather a question of ensuring that each agency is held accountable to popularly elected officials (who are then accountable to the members of the state). In light of these circumstances, I do not believe that the possible objection to my proposal that the whole of the government ought to be popularly elected and directly accountable to those it represents holds any weight. 10 Of course, those in favour of democracy have usually championed the expansion of education to minimalise popular decision-making based upon mistakes. I am in agreement with these democratic theorists. The consequences of this position are

6 A DEFENCE OF SCEPTICAL AUTHORITARIANISM 157 then effectively to make experts out of the people; to minimalise so-called faulty persons incapable of good judgement. Where I differ from many democratic theorists is in my unwillingness to accept the status quo as the best of all possible worlds. If a pure democracy with well-educated citizens is the ideal government, a pure democracy with citizens having generally poor (or worse) knowledge of important issues facing society is not second-best by default (see Zaller 1992). Such a government would be more likely to make poor decisions than the more authoritarian government I highlighted above, where, for example, expert specialists in the health care field will help draft health care legislation alongside democratically elected officials. I therefore hold as a rule that the less competent are more likely than the more competent to do harm. 11 Democratic scepticism opposes what Bufacchi calls the illegitimate imposition of one s views on another (2001, p. 28). Of course, persons in places of authority democratic or not often make poor judgements. What is illegitimate about being right? In every democratic election the losers in the voting process are imposed upon in some manner. For example, a pro-life minority which equates abortion with infanticide is being imposed upon by the majority in a certain way. What I believe makes such political decisions legitimate is the manner in which they came into being: respecting dissenting opinions and allowing their free public expression. Merely taking tallies of public opinion from time to time on different issues need not necessitate the respect of opposing views nor require the assurance that these voices can be given a public forum for deliberation. Furthermore, I believe that there is little need for government institutions to be neutral among human interests, nor are they. 12 The best example is crime: if government were neutral to all points of views, there would be few, if any, legal punishments as there would be correspondingly little, if any, crime. Yet our liberties to our lives and livelihood are dependent upon the enforcement of laws commanding the respect of these liberties, exercised through making activities such as assaulting one s person or damaging one s property a punishable crime by the state. What is vital is the respect of civil liberties, which my proposed authoritarian government fully endorses. Bufacchi comes some way to agreement on this point when he says that the inopportune objection... often made by post-modernists is to object to democratic impositions of liberal views upon those who are unpersuaded by the cogency of these views (2001, p. 26). Bufacchi argues that the enforcement of decisions arrived at democratically on all citizens whether or not they voted or what they voted for is legitimate, provided that there are adequate procedures in place that allow for adequate deliberation and revision (2001, p. 27). Of course, what is even more vital to the legitimacy of these decisions is the respect for civil liberties. But it is not just Bufacchi s characterisation of scepticism as a primary fact of democracy that I believe is in error. For Robert Dahl, the primary principle that democracy must uphold is that all members of a polity ought to be considered as politically equal, where all votes are counted with equal weight (1998, p. 37). Amongst other competing principles this may be Dahl s most preferred, but political equality through counting votes with equal weight need not be specific only to democracy. My hypothetical government would count votes equally, too.

7 158 THOM BROOKS However, in counting each vote equally there is no necessity stated that all members of the government must be elected to hold office. Nowhere would this criticism be more true for Dahl than with the judiciary, to which he opposes popular elections for judgeships. Why not sceptical authoritarianism? In his rejection of a Platonic theory of guardianship, Robert Dahl states that: almost all of us do rely on experts to make crucial decisions that bear strongly and directly on our well-being, happiness, health, future, even our survival, not just physicians, surgeons, and pilots but in our increasingly complex society a myriad of others. So if we let experts make decisions on important matters like these, why shouldn t we turn government over to experts? Attractive as it may seem at times, the argument for Guardianship rather than democracy fails to take sufficient account of some crucial defects... To delegate certain subordinate decisions to experts is not equivalent to ceding final control over major decisions... The fundamental issue... is not whether as individuals we must sometimes put our trust in experts. The issue is who or what group should have the final say in decisions made by the government of a state (1998, pp ) (emphasis in original). There is certainly an affinity between what I am espousing and Plato s theory of guardianship, highlighted in his Republic. What is crucial for me in Dahl s rejection of this theory is the fact that he only raises an objection about the so-called experts having final control over major decisions. If these experts were checked by a popularly elected body which would outnumber them in a parliament 2:1, this objection would be overcome, as the final say would be left to the representatives. Keeping the government from corruption is the second main argument against guardianship (Dahl, 1998, p. 73). Popular accountability and transparency is supposed to serve as a safety net to government corruption although it, too, often fails to do just this. My more qualified version of guardianship would then avoid this objection. Dahl also demands that democracies have effective participation (where citizens may have equal and effective opportunities to share their positions with other citizens), enlightened understanding (where citizens have effective opportunities to be educated on relevant alternative policies and consequences), the policies of the government must always be open to change by the members, and all adults who are permanent residents ought to have full rights as citizens (1998, pp ). These characteristics are founded on the principle of equality amongst citizens. It is important to note that Dahl says: Perhaps it bears repeating that as with other associations no state has ever possessed a government that fully measured up to the criteria of a democratic process. None is likely to[!] (1998, p. 42). Keeping in mind Dahl s admission that it is less than likely that any democratic government will fully live up to the expectations we might have of how democ-

8 A DEFENCE OF SCEPTICAL AUTHORITARIANISM 159 racy ought to work, I believe that it is certainly possible to maintain an authoritarian government which put a premium on educating its citizens, engendered transparency enforced by popularly elected officials, and the extension of suffrage to all adult citizens (and perhaps also to teens). Of course, where I would differ from Dahl s democracy is that I would not advocate a government entirely composed of elected officials, most if not all of whom will be constantly repositioning themselves for future elections. The one weakness might be authoritarianism s incompatibility with equal and effective opportunities to express various political views. 13 What I have proposed would protect the freedom of association, speech, press, religion, etc., of citizens and ensure that dissenting voices were heard in the public forum. However, each citizen would not have an equal voice compared to others. This fact would not trouble me that much, as (1) some people make better judgements than others, (2) some people do not have anything more than a vague and uninformed opinion about certain issues, and, more importantly, (3) we regularly weigh voices differently in society. (For example, some governments do not allow criminals to vote. Other governments have unelected bodies such as Britain s House of Lords and Ireland s Senate where individuals in each may not be democratically appointed, may vote in the legislature, and votes as a private citizen during public elections. Such persons do not have equal voting privileges as the common citizen.) What is most vital to democracy is the rule of law, not arbitrary enforcement of the law. Bufacchi acknowledges that the rule of law in democratic societies is an imperfect procedure at best. 14 This is not a cause for alarm. Instead, it raises the importance of leaving the outcomes of democratic decision-making open to correction at any time. Bound only by the rule of law, my hypothesised government may adjust, eliminate or create laws in concert with the approval of a democratic and directly elected check on its powers to shape law. There would then be no ability of the government arbitrarily to make law and cause havoc for citizens as so many tyrannical governments have done, as the non-elected specialists cannot do whatever they would please. For Bufacchi, democracy is to be cherished for being institutionalised uncertainty (2001, p. 27). Indeed, the greater the uncertainty of outcomes of the political process, the better (ibid., p. 28). I disagree. Rather than uncertainty, a certain level of predictability is necessary if for nothing other than to ensure that currency markets remain healthy. As for a healthy government, the goal is to make sound judgements that improve the lives of citizens while respecting the individual civil liberties of each member (and perhaps environmental awareness as well). A wide range of potential options is harmless, but the great potential for chaos is just the opposite. Conclusion Robert Dahl says: Simply put, the issue is not whether a government can design all its laws so that none ever injures the interests of any citizen. No government, not even a demo-

9 160 THOM BROOKS cratic government, could uphold such a claim. The issue is whether in the long run a democratic process is likely to do less harm to the fundamental rights and interests of its citizens than any nondemocratic alternative. If only because democratic governments prevent abusive autocracies from ruling, they meet this requirement better than nondemocratic governments (1998, p. 48) (emphasis added). A lesson learned from history, the major argument against non-democracies is twofold: (1) non-democratic governments have a greater tendency toward corruption than democracies and (2) democracies have over time done a far superior job of respecting civil liberties. Neither claim in favour of democracy necessarily depends upon people voting. What is most important is avoiding corruption and respecting the individual rights of citizens to dissent, assemble, worship, own property, etc. Historically, this is certainly true. However, from a philosophical point of view it does not follow that only democracy brings about these admittedly good consequences. Given particular checks upon state encroachment of individual rights and abuse of power, many other systems of governance might satisfy Dahl s demand as well. If one were to list desirable consequences which we believe democracy produces, it might look like this: (1) avoiding tyranny, (2) essential rights, (3) general freedom, (4) self-determination, (5) moral autonomy, (6) human development, (7) protecting essential personal interests and (8) political equality (Dahl, 1998, p. 45). My hypothetical authoritarian government in some manner an inverted British parliament satisfies each of these consequences through its strict adherence to the rule of law, protection of civil liberties, full transparency and its democratically elected check on specialists appointed by their profession. My purpose here was twofold. First, I hope to have convincingly demonstrated that sceptical deliberation is not specific to democracy, but rival forms of governance. Secondly, the common infatuation with democracy needs to be critically re-examined and defended on the grounds that most, if not all, of what we tend to find attractive about popular government can be satisfied by a qualified version of Plato s theory of guardianship, where experts serve a major role in shaping governmental policy. I would contend that what people love most about democracy is the satisfaction of certain consequences listed above. My claim is that we do not need democracy to gratify this satisfaction. Notes I am most grateful to Ger Casey, Fabian Fregenhagen, and two anonymous referees for very helpful comments on earlier drafts. 1 Arendt, 2000, pp : Professor Voegelin seems to think that totalitarianism is only the other side of liberalism, positivism, and pragmatism. But whether one agrees with liberalism or not (and I may say here that I am rather certain that I am neither a liberal nor a positivist nor a pragmatist), the point is that liberals are clearly not totalitarians. This, of course, does not exclude the fact that liberal or positivistic elements also lend themselves to totalitarian thinking; but such affinities would only mean that one has to draw even sharper distinctions because of the fact that liberals are not totalitarians (emphasis in original). 2 See Halberstam, 1998, p Arendt, 2000, pp See Canovan, 1974, pp , 24 25, 35 37, and Schapiro, 1972, pp. 49, 102.

10 A DEFENCE OF SCEPTICAL AUTHORITARIANISM See Mackie, See Friedrich, 1954 and Schapiro, 1972, pp Schapiro, 1972, p. 27; see pp , For example, see Lenin s speech to the young Communists in 1920: We recognise nothing private. Our morality is entirely subordinated to the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat. See Lenin, 1966 [1920], pp ; Lubonja, 2001; and Schapiro, 1972, pp Bufacchi, 2001, p. 25 and Grayling, 1991, p. 24 quoted by Bufacchi. 9 Bufacchi, 2001, p. 26 and Popper, 1988, pp quoted by Bufacchi. See Dahl, 1998, p A self-described radical democrat, Warren adds: in today s societies the domain of democracy is narrow, empowerment is limited, and opportunities to make a difference in the course of everyday life are rare (1996, p. 266). One dissenter is Christiano (1996 and 2001), who opposes any barrier to voting and popular representation beyond the capability of elaborating, reflecting on and revising ideas about justice (2001, p. 207). However, he also says: The most reliable guides to truth are the best advisors. Furthermore, we must sometimes choose partners in joint ventures and it is important that we choose competent partners because we have to live with the results. So competence plays a very important role cial organization. And this holds for moral competence as well (ibid., p. 214). In his masterful examination of US public socio-political opinion, Zaller (1992) would argue that far fewer citizens would meet this criteria. While acknowledging this work, Christiano unfortunately does not challenge Zaller s findings. 11 Cf. Christiano, 2001, p See Soltan, 1993, p To a certain degree my position resembles a minimalist democracy which John McCormack calls oligarchic and democratic : elites rule but... the people choose which elites do the governing (2001, p. 311). 14 Bufacchi, 2001, p. 27. See Arendt, 2000, p. 120 and esp. p. 128: The first essential step on the road to total domination is to kill the juridical person in man. References Arendt, H. (2000), The Portable Hannah Arendt, ed. Peter Baehr, Harmondsworth: Penguin. Bell, D.A. (1997), A Communitarian Critique of Authoritarianism, Political Theory 25(1), pp Bufacchi, V. (2001), Sceptical Democracy, Politics 21(1), pp Canovan, M. (1974), The Political Thought of Hannah Arendt, London: J.M. Dent & Sons. Christiano, T. (1996), The Rule of Many: Fundamental Issues in Democratic Theory. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press. Christiano, T. (2001), Knowledge and Power in the Justification of Democracy, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79(2), pp Dahl, R.A. (1998), On Democracy, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. Friedrich, C.J. (1954), The Unique Character of Totalitarian Society in C.J. Friedrich (ed.), Totalitarianism, New York: Grossett & Dunlop, pp Grayling, A.C. (1991), Testing Notions of Knowledge, Times Literary Supplement, 6 September. Halberstam, M. (1998), Totalitarianism as a Problem for the Modern Conception of Politics, Political Theory 26(4), pp Lenin, V. (1966 [1920]), Collected Works, Vol. 31, trans. J. Katzer, London: Lawrence & Wishart. Lubonja, F. (2001), Privacy in a Totalitarian Regime, Social Research 68(1), pp Mackie, G. (1998), All Men Are Liars: Is Democracy Meaningless? in J. Elster (ed.), Deliberative Democracy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp McCormick, J.O. (2001), Machiavellian Democracy: Controlling Elites with Ferocious Populism, American Political Science Review 95(2), pp Plato (1992), Republic, trans. G.M.A. Grube and C.D.C. Reeve, Indianapolis: Hackett. Popper, K. (1988), The Open Society and its Enemies Revisited, The Economist, April, pp Schapiro, L. (1972), Totalitarianism, London: Pall Mall.

11 162 THOM BROOKS Soltan, K.E. (1993), What is the New Constitutionalism? in S.L. Elkin and K.E. Soltan (eds.), A New Constitutionalism: Designing Political Institutions for a Good Society, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp Warren, M.E. (1996), What Should We Expect From More Democracy? Radically Democratic Responses to Politics, Political Theory 24(2), pp Zaller, J.R. (1992), The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.