The Political Dimension of Enlargement of the EU

Transcription

1 1 Khleslplatz 12 A Wien T F The Political Dimension of Enlargement of the EU Vortrag von Heinrich Schneider im Rahmen des Dialogforums Österreich und Polen: Für eine gemeinsame Zukunft in Europa! vom 15./16. Februar 2002 herausgegeben von Brigitte Marcher Englische Übersetzung von Mag. Ursula Cordt Heinrich SCHNEIDER Professor für Politikwissenschaft i.r. der Universität Wien; Gastprofessor an der Donau- Universität Krems, Vizepräsident der Österr. Gesellschaft für Europaforschung, seit 1989 stv. Delegationsleiter eines Teilnehmerstaates bei der KSZE/OSZE, seit 2001 Ehrenvorsitzender des Wissenschaftlichen Direktoriums des Instituts für Europäische Politik in Berlin (vormals Bonn; von dortselbst Vorsitzender). 400 Veröffentlichungen, darunter Europäische Grundverständnisse im Wandel (mit M. Jopp und A. Maurer), Rückmeldungen und nähere Informationen: Dr. Brigitte Marcher, Renner-Institut, Bereich Europa (EU) Tel.: 01/ DW 24; marcher@renner-institut.at

2 2 HEINRICH SCHNEIDER THE POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION Introduction to the panel discussion at the Vienna Diplomatic Academy on February 15, What items are on our agenda? The programme appears to be clearly and logically structured. At this forum, four areas are to be discussed: Economics, Politics, Science and Research as well as Culture. And the next item on our agenda is Politics. But how exactly are we supposed to deal with this area? We may approach this subject from an Austrian or from a Polish perspective; this would be in line with the general topic of this forum and would also appear logical in view of the composition of this panel. Nevertheless, allow me in my introduction to add another perspective which reflects neither the Polish nor the Austrian position.

3 3 I should like to address the political dimension of enlargement primarily from the vantage point of the European Union itself. This does not mean perverting the topic. As Austria is a Member State of the European Union and Poland will accede to it, both of our countries have a vital interest in the future success of the European Union. 2. But what does this political discussion comprise? In three out of four discussions about the political problems associated with enlargement, it is normally stressed that enlargement necessitates various reforms and that the institutional problems in particular must be addressed first. This used to be the official stance adopted by the EU itself. The need for reform was demonstrated by the most recent reform conferences which aimed at making the Union itself fit for enlargement, to use the buzz word. What were the main objectives? The core issues to be discussed at these conferences were the famous leftovers of Amsterdam.

4 4 This made it sound as if the political system of the EU could be prepared for enlargement by simply agreeing on the number of Commission Members; on the reallocation of votes in the Council; on the composition of the European Parliament, and on a wider application of the majority voting rule in the Council. Anyone familiar with the actual problems knows that things are not quite like that. Therefore, it was not exactly encouraging to see that the most recent intergovernmental conferences and endspurts at summits, including Nice, got stalled in this narrowed-down agenda. These conferences were either unwilling or unable to deal seriously and comprehensively with the exhortations and proposals of the Three Wise Men (Jean Luc Dehaene, Lord David Simon of Highbury and Richard von Weizsäcker). Let us recall for a moment the report produced by the Three Wise Men, as this constitutes a fundamental document. On September 1, 1999, Romano Prodi had requested these three distinguished personalities to write a report on the impact

5 5 of enlargement on EU institutions. These Three Wise Men submitted their report as early as October 18. The brief period required for the drawing up of the report indicated that indepth analyses were hardly necessary as the most pressing needs for change seemed to be obvious in the eyes of the authors. They warned against a half-hearted reform and against a narrowing down of the vision of the aforementioned topics it would be wrong, they argued, to treat these issues in isolation; rather they would have to be analysed in the context of comprehensive institutional reform. (Moreover, such reforms would have been indispensable anyway, even if the enlargement had not been put on the agenda...) The Three Wise men made a large number of proposals for substantive reform from granting the EU the status of a legal entity, to amendments to the flexibility rules and the subdivision of primary legislation into a basic treaty and a body of other provisions, for which a simplified amendment procedure (not subject to ratification by the Member States and with a stronger involvement of the European Parliament) would have to be envisaged.

6 6 De facto this meant grouping together and defining all provisions relating to the EU s objectives, principles, political guidelines, fundamental rights and institutions in a higherranking constitutional document albeit without any explicit reference being made to the term constitution. Most of the proposals made by the Three Wise Men were not enforceable at the Nice summit. However, there were a number of reasons for this. In the opinion of some agents a genuinely fundamental reform harboured the risk of delaying enlargement. At the very least, they believed, it had to be feared that the citizens in the future member states might gain the impression that the old Member States intended to postpone the date of their countries accession. And finally it would also be perceived as unfair if the old Member States negotiated far-reaching and fundamental reforms amongst themselves, thus imposing a fait accompli on the new Members. In the meantime, however, the situation has changed. 3.

7 7 In a few weeks from now the Convention on the Future of Europe some refer to it as a Constitutional Convention - will start its work under the chairmanship of Valéry Giscard d Estaing, and the candidate countries will participate in its deliberations. The task of the Convention will not be an easy one. In all probability the focus will be on the improvement, or perhaps on the restructuring, of the institutional system, starting with the topics listed in declaration no. 23 of the Final Acts of the Nice Summit. However, I have serious doubts about the feasibility of dealing with the political problems of the European Union properly if all other dimensions of European politics are faded out. Right from the beginning, the principles on which the architecture of integration has been based and which at the same time are the secret of its success, have been conscious efforts to induce and utilize the dialectics of driving forces and interest groups in economics, a specific legal system, political constellations and opportunities presenting themselves in particular situations,

8 8 institutional arrangements, and, time and again, creative ideas thanks to which virtue could be made of necessity whenever the need arose. Anyone who disregards any of these dimensions in an analysis and ignores the dialectic interactions is not taking reality seriously and is walking around wearing blinkers. In other words: In the reform of the EU, political dimensions in the narrower sense of the term, but especially blueprints (to quote one of Joschka Fischer s favourite words) can be discussed meaningfully only if they are considered in this overall context. In drawing attention to this fact I am in no way departing from the topic proper of this panel discussion. When, on May 12, 2000, Joschka Fischer in his Berlin speech opened the debate about the future which has meanwhile led to the Convention, he expressly stated that the forthcoming enlargement constituted the real reason why a reflection on the political structure of the European Union could no longer be delayed. 4.

9 9 This means, in reality, that the topic to be discussed by us is so far-reaching and so complex that in view of the scarcity of time available we can single out only a few of the multitude of aspects and issues, and address these merely in a superficial, sketchy manner. I do not even wish to consider what has become of the leftovers from Amsterdam. Problems that strike at the heart of the matter are more important. Rather than paying well-meant lip-service to anyone I would prefer to outline these problems in extremely sharp contours. In the early days of the debate on enlargement, and even before he was elected President of the European Parliament, Klaus Hänsch stated: The more states join the European Union and the smaller they are, the more supranationality and central power will be required in order to preserve a minimum of cohesion and capacity to act. As a result, the opportunities for preserving national and regional autonomous entities and assuring a comprehensive,

10 10 democratic participation of citizens in politics at all levels will tend to decline. Owing to the dichotomy between these principles, the balance of the Union, once it has reached a certain size, can no longer be guaranteed. The question as to whether the situation can be described in such an apodictic manner may well have to remain unanswered; but Hänsch is by no means the only proponent of this view. Amongst the many voices that have made themselves heard let me quote just one: David Calleo, the high-profile expert from Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D.C.: If the enlargement does take place, it will prove very difficult to lead a Union consisting of 25 equal partners, all of whom will be negotiating toughly on the common policies... The decision-making structures will, of necessity, become more imperial otherwise they will collapse. An enlarged European Union will need a strong core with agreed guidelines which it can impose on the other countries. The question as to how the European Union can build such a

11 11 core, which will allow policies to be pursued in the interest of the community, and how it can convey these goals in an acceptable form... represents a major political challenge. I can hardly resist the temptation to quote the following passage from Calleo s speech: Such relationships of tutelage can, of course, be sold more easily if they are presented in a technocratic rather than a political guise. The European Monetary Union, for example, seems to meet with rather more acceptance as a vehicle for such disciplinary measures because all reasonable individuals will agree to a technocratic monetary policy. Such disciplinary measures, it seems, can obviously be achieved more easily by means of the market forces because it can then be argued that nothing can be done against them... But if the Union wishes to enlarge itself and at the same time retain its cohesion, there is no alternative to centralist disciplinary measures.

12 12 The enlargement to include approximately ten further states will not only transform the structure of its individual bodies, but also its entire system. The Copenhagen Proclamation of June 1993, stipulating that the thrust of European integration must be preserved with EU enlargement, sounded well intentioned. But how this can be achieved represents the very challenge about which Hänsch and Calleo have developed their own, not terribly attractivesounding ideas. Behind all this lies the basic theory: If enlargement leads to a situation in which a wider variety of views and interests are contributed to the political process, this will give rise to the release of centrifugal forces against which new centripetal forces must be mobilized and institutionalized if the disintegration of the whole is to be avoided. The growing differences between the economic conditions in the Member States expected in the wake of enlargement (and the ensuing problem of disciplinary measures in economic and fiscal policy) will not, however, be the only factor that will reinform the heterogeneity of the enlarged Union.

13 13 The new members will bring a wider variety of political and cultural traditions and thought patterns into the Union. They will have to adjust themselves gradually to the Union's integration culture. (The fact that this will be a painstaking process which will trigger frustrations has already been demonstrated in connection with the measures imposed on the candidate countries by Brussels under the pre-accession strategy.) 5. Tensions are pre-programmed. This, of course, also holds true for the distribution and financing conflicts which, especially in the last few weeks, have cast their shadows on the future, namely on the accession negotiations. But this is an issue which has rather more to do with the topic of the previous panel discussion. What needs to be taken seriously in this context is found at another level: integration policy principles and rules and practices which have been taken for granted to date will be contested in future. This has repercussions for the functioning of the EU institutions.

14 14 It will become more difficult to shape a complex, but at the same time goal-oriented homogenous policy. The concept that has been upheld in the EU s history to date, namely that integration resulted from the successive and consistent implementation of projects and programmes on the basis of agreed principles, will no longer be applicable to the new situation. Admittedly this concept already lost its relevance a long time ago, at the time when the EC abandoned its role as an association merely serving the purpose of functional integration. But in the enlarged Union this concept will come under increasingly fierce attack. The political style of the Union will be characterized to a greater extent by coercion, forcing countries to deal with problems arising in certain situations in an ad-hoc manner and thus meet the requirements of crisis management. This will change the conditions which inform the shaping of political will.