Maximising Forensic DNA U3lity: ETHICAL, SOCIAL AND LEGISLATIVE CHALLENGES

Transcription

1 Maximising Forensic DNA U3lity: ETHICAL, SOCIAL AND LEGISLATIVE CHALLENGES

2 Introduction u 60 countries operate national DNA databases (incl. 26 EU MS) u ENFSI (June 2016) 800m+ persons on 45 DNA DBs in EU. u Databases being expanded or newly established in 34+ additional countries. u Forensic Genetics Policy Initiative, Global Summary

3 Overview Forensic DNA Databases Need to be cost-effective & benefits demonstrable so efforts to maximise utility of DBs intensified: 1) Expansion 2) Increase access/ uses 3) Sharing ECtHR left EU States wide discretion: are balances originally struck destabilised by subsequent reforms, or changes in practice? Scientific and technological advances attract attention BUT governance/ legal regimes opaque. Continue to raise questions of legitimacy & acceptability.

4 1 - Expansion u Moving from limited to expansive regime for collection and retention. u US: 31 States have implemented DNA testing at the point of arrest. Ave. 1-3 years removal if no felony charges brought (must apply). u UAE and Kuwait: attempts to instigate universal DNA DBs. Both so far failed.

5 e.g. Indiana: DNA upon felony arrest.. u Extra $850,000+ 1st year (equip/ staff/ kits). Annually $650,000. u Provisions for people acquitted, have felony case dismissed or have charge reduced to misdemeanour: can request the expungement of DNA sample through court order. u If no felony charges within a year, county prosecutor responsible for having DNA sample expunged. u it's a great tool because there's going to be more DNA samples in the CODIS bank"

6 u France: More than doubled in size in last 5 years. Database ruled constitutional (with reservations) in Since then: inclusion of children and protestors (and prosecutions for non-provision). u Germany: critics have questioned the inclusion of some categories of persons.

7 2 Increased uses/ access u Making available the DB to other agencies & using other agencies data to add to DB. u RapidDNA speed up/ maximise/ de-professionalise. u Permitting extra searches/ uses of the data. u Familial searching/ phenotyping (Germany)/ ancestry. u Op. Gallant Phoenix: Police access to DNA collected by military ( breaking down barriers ). US foreign fighters DNA db. u Netherlands (inter alios): Police access to medical DNA databases.

8 e.g. UK u Memorandum of Understanding: DWP non-supporting fathers. u Use of MOU circumvents public/parliamentary debate. u Amending use but still criminal so no need for legislative amendments. u Expansive definition of criminal u (also recent rulings on DNA only convictions).

9 3 - Sharing u Interpol Gateway/ ISRN (US, UK, Canada, Australia). u Prum treaty (pressure): Europol to become partner to enable matching with third countries with which Europol has an agreement? (2018) u US agreement with Germany includes automated DNA searching: Following the example of Prum Expecting that the US and other MS may consider this Agreement as a model for similar agreements.., seeking to enhance and encourage cooperation between the Parties.

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11 Legitimacy/ Legality u Int. Dec. on Human Genetic Data BUT forensic DBs: subject to domestic law that is consistent with international law of human rights. u BUT what international standards? No agreement. u CJEU Judgment 21 Dec 2016 (Tele 2): stressed principles of necessity and proportionality with a framework of necessary safeguards and guarantees, DP and other fundamental rights considerations. What is "strictly necessary and justified within a democratic society"?

12 Protecting citizens? u Privacy and data protection are core values, fundamental rights and norms in the EU. MS have the obligation to protect and ensure the security of its citizens. Therefore the protection of citizens and the principles of privacy and data protection are complementary and mutually reinforcing. EU Council, Roadmap to enhance information exchange and information management including interoperability solutions in the Justice and Home Affairs area 6 th June 2016, (9368/1/16 Rev 1).

13 Conclusions? u Unclear safeguards/ over-reaching provisions. u LOTS of countries relying upon policies. Often not publicly available. Not publicly debated. u Need to (im)prove value of DBs. u Public/ States becoming more demanding? u Bigger does not = better. u Science marching on while law still dragging heels.

14 Thanks u Speaker was provided travel and hotel support by Thermo Fisher Scientific for this presentation, but no remuneration u When used for purposes other than Human Identification or Paternity Testing the instruments and software modules cited are for Research Use Only. Not for use in diagnostic procedures. u Thermo Fisher Scientific and its affiliates are not endorsing, recommending, or promoting any use or application of Thermo Fisher Scientific products presented by third parties during this seminar. Information and materials presented or provided by third parties are provided as-is and without warranty of any kind, including regarding intellectual property rights and reported results. Parties presenting images, text and material represent they have the rights to do so.