Bahrain: Youth Perspectives on the Future

Transcription

1 Middle East and North Africa Programme Workshop Summary: Future Trends in the GCC Bahrain: Youth Perspectives on the Future June 2012 The views expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the view of Chatham House, its staff, associates or Council. Chatham House is independent and owes no allegiance to any government or to any political body. It does not take institutional positions on policy issues. This document is issued on the understanding that if any extract is used, the author(s)/ speaker(s) and Chatham House should be credited, preferably with the date of the publication or details of the event. Where this document refers to or reports statements made by speakers at an event every effort has been made to provide a fair representation of their views and opinions, but the ultimate responsibility for accuracy lies with this document s author(s). The published text of speeches and presentations may differ from delivery.

2 INTRODUCTION This is a summary of discussions that took place at a roundtable held at Chatham House in June Part of Chatham House s Future Trends in the GCC project, the event brought together a diverse group of young people, mostly Bahrainis, from different political backgrounds to discuss scenarios for the future of Bahrain, principles of dialogue and negotiation, and key issues of contention (political representation; socio-economic issues; policing, protests, human rights and public order; and the role of religion and identity politics). The group included researchers, diplomats, activists, economists, entrepreneurs and academics, all attending in a personal capacity. Some of the main findings of the meeting include: While views on the uprising of 2011 remained profoundly polarized, Bahraini participants generally shared a frustration with the current situation in their country although they differed sharply on who they held to be most responsible, and on whether they would prefer the situation to go back to normal. Participants said that the country s long-term development, including strategies for reducing oil dependence and managing demographic pressures (with one of the fastest rates of population growth in the world), is at serious risk of being neglected by political leaders who are focusing on short-term zero-sum games. Some were optimistic that youth leaders could take a more constructive and long-term approach, and perhaps move beyond the traditional zero-sum sectarian and political divides. Participants flagged the existence of building blocks for a political dialogue, such as Bahrain s 2001 National Charter and the seven principles announced by the country s Crown Prince in early The most contentious issues discussed were the need for democracy and the role of religion in politics and society though it was noted that the Islamist/secularist divide cuts across opposition/pro-government and Sunni/Shi a lines. While issues of policing, protests and human rights were also contentious, there was an agreement that too many people are suffering from clashes between police and protestors, that tear 2

3 gas is being used excessively, and that children and old people should be better protected from violence. Community policing, more recruitment of local (including Shi a) police and better communications could all help to de-escalate the clashes. However, it was emphasized that protests are not purely a policing or security problem, but a reflection of the shortage of effective and credible forums for political dialogue and negotiations. There has been an argument over whether the problem in Bahrain is primarily political or sectarian in nature. But most participants agreed that political reform, social reconciliation and economic development are far from mutually exclusive; all three tracks would be needed for Bahrain to progress. The meeting was held under the Chatham House Rule and the views expressed are those of the participants, although not all participants necessarily agreed. The following summary is intended to serve as an aidemémoire to those who took part and to provide a general summary of discussions for those who did not. The Chatham House Rule When a meeting, or part thereof, is held under the Chatham House Rule, participants are free to use the information received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may be revealed. 3

4 BAHRAIN IN 2020 SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE Participants began by discussing their country s long-term future and the socio-economic challenges that are likely to affect all Bahrainis over the next decade. With one of the highest population growth rates in the world, Bahrain is experiencing growing pressure on land, resources and services. Its budget remains heavily dependent on oil, raising the question of whether taxation will need to be introduced in the medium term, while the private-sector labour market mainly employs expatriate workers. Efforts to address these critical long-term challenges are being neglected as political leaders are preoccupied with the short term. Various participants suggested that paying serious attention to shared economic challenges could be a useful basis for constructive, strategic thinking about the ways forward for Bahrain. Demographics and migration Although Bahrain is a port city with a long history of migration, it has seen a huge increase in the number of migrants since the oil boom of the 1970s, and in 2008, Bahraini nationals became a minority of the population. 1 Mass migration has changed the way in which Bahrainis regard the concepts of identity and citizenship. A participant argued it wrought two major changes in the political landscape: The end of Bahrain s radical labour movement as Bahrainis started to become a minority in the private-sector workforce. The previously vibrant cross-sectarian opposition became less active. The Bahraini government has adopted policies to promote Bahrainization greater employment of nationals in the private sector, particularly after the 1990s. The Bahrain Economic Development Board (EDB) put a system of labour fees and training subsidies in place in an attempt to narrow the cost and skills gap between Bahrainis and expatriates. Despite this, the proportion of both private-sector jobs held by Bahrainis (17.8% in 2010) and publicsector jobs held by Bahrainis (87%) has been in decline for years. Many of the jobs generated in the recent economic boom ( ) went to 1 Data from Central Bank of Bahrain, Economic Indicators, December 2011, accessed at: 4

5 expatriates, not Bahrainis. Moreover, the labour fees have been suspended following the 2011 unrest in order to appease the business community, which was opposed to them from the start. Local trade unions played a role in the 2011 uprising but there has been little cooperation between local and migrant workers. To most working-class Bahrainis, migrant workers are seen as competitors. However, participants suggested that if migrant workers were able to unionize, it could be beneficial to both sets of workers, improving human rights and pay for migrants, and thus reducing the cost gap compared with locals. Employers would be likely to resist this, however. Some participants argued that in the public sector Bahrainization is likely to be reduced further as a result of politically motivated discrimination against workers perceived as being from the opposition (mainly Shi a). Hundreds of (mostly Shi a) Bahrainis were fired in 2011 on suspicion of protesting and while most have now resumed work, there is an increasing likelihood of brain drain as they see only limited opportunities to work at home. Another highly contentious issue is the rate of naturalization, which has increased greatly over the past decade, adding to population pressures. It is widely believed that most of those naturalized are Sunni Muslims. The newly naturalized communities have bolstered the government s support base and the opposition has failed to reach out to them but over time they might start to demand more rights (as was the case in Kuwait after mass naturalization in the 1960s and 1970s). The economy Although Bahrain has one of the most diversified economies in the Gulf, with financial services representing a bigger share of the economy than oil, it is still very dependent on oil to fund the government s budget (oil provides around 80% of government revenue). A recent International Monetary Fund (IMF) report highlighted that the breakeven oil price for Bahrain is now $ In addition, between 2008 and 2010 the country s debt-to-gdp ratio increased from 6% to 35%. Fiscal sustainability will need to be addressed over the next decade, especially in the light of the population pressures mentioned above. This is likely to require a major rethinking of policies on 2 International Monetary Fund, Public Information Notice No. 12/39, 24 April 2012, 5

6 subsidies and tax, which in turn may alter the relations between citizens and the state. One participant noted that Bahrain s subsidy system is regressive: the bottom 10% of Bahraini households receive approximately 3.5% of subsidy spending, while the richest 10% receive 17%. Furthermore, it was highlighted by several participants that relative poverty has been rising: the share of national income going to the poorest 40% of households was lower in 2006 (the latest data available) than in It was emphasized that economic factors alone did not explain the protests. Moreover, economic pressures and problems such as poverty are much less severe in Bahrain than in Egypt or Tunisia. There were no food shortages or severe economic shocks. Nonetheless, participants noted that relative poverty matters, especially when it is perceived to be the result of social injustice or crony capitalism. It was argued that perceptions of corruption have helped to drive unrest across the Arab world. One participant viewed the economic situation after 14 February 2011 as largely steady but not very comfortable. Economic growth has slowed, with tourism in particular affected, but Bahrain is not in recession. However, inequality, dependence on oil, very high dependence on expatriate labour and persistent unemployment (unofficially estimated at around 15%) were all flagged as problems that need to be addressed. It was argued that economic support from Saudi Arabia was allowing Bahrain to continue behaving like a rentier state despite its limited domestic oil production. It was also suggested that Saudi and GCC aid would be useful in addressing Bahrain s housing crisis and in improving the country s infrastructure, but that on the other hand, it could perpetuate rent-seeking behaviour, and delay the country s economic transformation into a postrentier, knowledge-based economy. The changing region Many participants said that any political change in Bahrain must come from within, rather than being imposed by outside forces, whether Iran, Saudi Arabia or Western countries. Yet it was acknowledged that given Bahrain s small size, the country would continue to be affected by changes in regional 3 Bahrain Economic Development Board, Bahrain Economic Quarterly, Third Quarter 2011, 1%20%2820%2012%202011%29.pdf. 6

7 and global politics. Much would depend on the political future of its large and rivalrous neighbours, Iran and Saudi Arabia. If, in the long run, those countries became more democratic, this would reduce the obstacles to positive political change in Bahrain. It was argued that Saudi Arabia did not want to see any democratic change in Bahrain in case this encouraged political pressures in Saudi Arabia itself. A participant argued that the country would have to change before Bahrain did, and that a new generation of young Saudis was more active and waiting for an opportunity to ignite change in the country. Some participants disagreed with the assessment that Saudi Arabia does not want to see change in Bahrain, arguing that the Saudi priority is to see a stable Bahrain that bears Saudi interests in mind, without any Iranian intervention. This would not necessarily rule out a constitutional monarchy for Bahrain. From the point of view of those who do not support the opposition, there is a fear that change would result in greater Iranian influence (which the opposition argues is unfounded). In the short term Iran s internal political pressures might encourage it to take up more aggressive rhetoric towards the GCC countries, but some felt that over the next decade Iran s political system would have to change. Participants generally agreed that greater integration among the Gulf Arab states was desirable. It was said that the countries had close historical connections and had a lot to gain from greater unity. If integration means it s easier to travel, study and work, then everyone would welcome it, said one, but not if it is greater security cooperation against the people. 7

8 PRINCIPLES OF DIALOGUE AND NEGOTIATION It was agreed that young people all around the world want a fresher sort of discourse. Young people no longer look to official newspapers or traditional media to form their ideas, nor do they necessarily wait for senior leaders to direct them. Some expressed hope that young Bahrainis could play a constructive role in a political dialogue, by focusing on the longer-term needs of the country and by breaking out of the old moulds of thinking. It was noted that large numbers of them do not trust either the government or political societies, and that there is a risk that they will not be represented in formal political negotiations. It was said that the object of any negotiation process should not be to win at all costs but to get an agreement that can bring stability to the country. A participant said that it had been observed in other contexts that parties to a conflict would often come to the negotiating table after the eventual realization that neither of them would win outright and that both were losing from the standoff, sometimes described as a hurting stalemate. In Bahrain it was not yet clear if the need for a compromise had truly been recognized. But participants emphasized that the current situation was damaging the country s economy and social fabric. Although the unrest had begun over political disputes rather than social disputes, the political divide had become increasingly sectarian and many cited cases where former friends and neighbours had come to fear and distrust one another. For a dialogue process to be successful, each side needs to clearly identify the other s interests and position, taking into consideration its fears and suspicions (including perceptions of victimhood, which both sides may genuinely feel; such feelings should be recognized as sincere even if thought to be unjustified). It was argued that one way to begin a dialogue could be to sketch out broad principles of common ground, such as a shared search for stability and prosperity, greater social justice, and independence from external actors. A participant pointed out that these principles along with others, such as rule of law meant very different things to different groups. But defining them might help improve understanding of the different perspectives. Open- versus closed-door talks Most participants felt they would prefer an open dialogue to closed-door talks. It was argued that this would reduce mistrust and help all Bahrainis to feel included in the process. Conversely, however, it was argued that the media 8

9 spotlight and the pressure of public relations can impede successful negotiations on sensitive issues. Negotiators are often reluctant to be seen considering concessions. Many successful negotiations have begun through back channels. Some participants suggested a hybrid system for the dialogue, with some aspects being open while others are kept private. Negotiators need to understand the need to communicate with their own constituencies, manage expectations and ensure public comprehension of the process. It was said that, for instance, during the Good Friday Agreement negotiations in Northern Ireland in the late 1990s, representatives of the Sinn Fein republican party spent an enormous amount of time ensuring that everyone, including the general public, understood the impact of the decisions and negotiations. Negotiating parties also need to be prepared for the role of spoilers factions that are left out or feel they would lose out, which could come from a variety of sides in Bahrain and to find ways to stop them derailing the process. Spoilers were almost inevitable, but their potential could be reduced by making talks more inclusive and ensuring the participation of trusted representatives from the full spectrum of Bahraini politics. Negotiations may need to continue over a significant period of time but confidence will be increased if tangible confidence-building measures can be taken early on, and if incremental change is seen to be happening. Building blocks It was noted that Bahrain still has many positive elements to build on, including a traditionally peaceful and tolerant society, a variety of connections and contacts between people from different political viewpoints, and a number of previous documents and agreements that could act as building blocks for a future political agreement. These could include the 2001 National Charter, 4 which promised a constitutional monarchy, and which was ratified by a majority of the population in a referendum (much of the political controversy of the last decade has centred on the degree to which the 2002 constitution reflected the popularly accepted charter, notably when it came to the role of appointed MPs in the parliament). 4 National Charter, 2001, available at Bahrain s Shura Council website: 9

10 They could also include the seven principles proposed by the Crown Prince as an agenda for dialogue in March 2011: A parliament with full authority; A government that represents the will of the people; Fair voting districts; Discussion of naturalization policy; Combating corruption; State properties; Addressing sectarian tensions. 10

11 BREAKOUT GROUPS Political representation Perhaps the most contentious discussions of the day concerned attempts to define a consensus on political representation and the value of democracy. Proponents of democracy tended to speak of the people seeking democracy, while those opposed to democratizing Bahrain in the near future claimed that the silent majority wanted to keep their existing system. Some said they aspired to live in a democracy but felt the Islamist opposition would simply be new autocrats, threatening their personal freedoms (notably in terms of family law and dress code) more than the existing system did. One participant argued that the fear of the unknown was a key factor limiting appetite for political change, especially democracy, among a section of Bahraini society. Others felt the fear of Islamists was used as an excuse by those with an interest in resisting reforms. It was noted that there were debates within the Islamist movements, for instance with some female Islamist activists challenging traditional positions on family law. A third approach was sought by secular opposition activists who argued they shared an interest in limiting the potential tyranny of the majority of Islamist groups but that this should not be used as an excuse for postponing democracy indefinitely. It was noted that democratic systems vary and that most systems try to find ways to limit majoritarian rule in order to protect certain rights. Participants suggested that political reform in Bahrain therefore needs to cover not only the parliament but also the judicial system, the media and other institutions that could help to safeguard individual rights against any political force seeking to dominate the diverse society. Alternative electoral systems might also be considered, such as proportional representation. Some participants wanted to see more space opened up for secular youth movements that might bridge Sunni Shi a divides. Participants felt that many young people of different viewpoints were unrepresented by existing institutions or political societies, from street activists who were challenging both the government and the formal opposition, to silent moderates who felt themselves caught between two extremes. There was a consensus that the political culture around democracy needs to be developed further although this could be said of many countries, including advanced democracies, and is not necessarily an excuse for deferring the introduction of a democratic system. Many said they would like to see more grassroots and civil society initiatives to address issues of 11

12 citizenship and participation; to promote nonviolent approaches to societal change and conflict resolution; to raise awareness of the benefits of respecting human rights and tolerating differences of opinion; and to avoid making judgements on the basis of religious or family identity. A participant also cautioned that democracy would not be the solution to all problems; rather, it was a process for people to resolve their disagreements by discussing issues in a civilized way. Policing, protests, human rights and public order Despite the polarized nature of the debate within Bahrain over protests and policing, participants in this session agreed that clashes between police and protestors were symptoms of a political problem, not simply a policing or security issue. The frequency and heated nature of protests reflected an absence of meaningful political dialogue, though participants differed as to whether they blamed the government or the opposition for this. It was said there needed to be more trusted and effective mechanisms to resolve political disputes through negotiation. Nevertheless, resuming a political process would be easier if the level of tensions on the street could be de-escalated. While police tactics alienated the opposition, government supporters saw the constant protests as tantamount to anarchy ; and while most deaths had been at the hands of the security forces, the increasing attacks by protestors against police were leading government supporters to call for tougher security measures. Participants discussed a recent incident in which a four-year-old boy had been shot in the eye on the sidelines of a protest. Accounts of the incident varied; some activists argued he had been deliberately targeted while others blamed crossfire when police were trying to disperse protestors who were throwing Molotov cocktails. At a minimum, however, it was agreed that the population in Shi a villages was suffering from the frequent use of force; that children should be kept away from the clashes to avoid such tragic incidents; and that steps needed to be taken to reduce the levels of violence affecting these areas. It was also agreed that tear gas had been used excessively. One participant said his father was regularly taken to hospital from the ill effects of tear gas entering the family home. Others agreed this should not be happening but asked what other measures police could use to disperse unlicensed 12

13 demonstrations. A participant suggested the criteria for licensing protests could be eased and made more transparent. 5 Demonstrations There was some discussion as to whether and why unlicensed demonstrations needed to be dispersed at all. One participant said this would happen if protestors were blocking roads or throwing Molotov cocktails but that police did not always break up unlicensed demonstrations if they were non-violent and contained within Shi a villages. Others reported seeing peaceful demonstrations being met with rubber bullets, birdshot, 6 tear gas and sound grenades because they were unlicensed and involved antimonarchy slogans (which are technically against the law). It was argued that the hard security response to protests was concerned not just with preventing disruption to business and traffic, but with preventing certain kinds of political expression. 7 The continued closure of the site of the Pearl Roundabout was cited as an example where the symbolic importance of the area led it to be seen as a security threat (this was a contentious area of discussion, with participants even disputing the name of the area). Anger also tended to be inflamed by the sight of police smashing or tearing down memorials to some of the protestors who died in last year's demonstrations or in police custody. Relations with the riot police There is a vicious circle of clashes between police and protestors in villages that have a long history of unrest. In these areas, the riot police who are sent to disperse protests are themselves seen as a provocation. There is a severe lack of communication between the local population and the police, some of whom do not speak Arabic. They tend not to have personal or family links. 5 It was asked whether an online notification could be sufficient for instance, whether local residents could simply tweet the ministry of the interior to inform them about a planned protest, though others felt this would not be enough. 6 Shortly after the workshop, the leader of Al-Wefaq, the main opposition group, was injured with birdshot when riot police dispersed a small unlicensed gathering outside his home. 7 It was noted that the king had said last year that people who had been imprisoned for insulting his person would be forgiven, and after the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry report, charges relating to political expression had been dropped for over 300 people. However, there had been a recent uptick in arrests relating to freedom of expression (it was noted that Nabeel Rajab alone had been charged with five separate offences in the preceding few weeks, while a young fixer, Mohammed Hassan, had been taken in for questioning after sending tweets about Bahrain to an Al Jazeera show). 13

14 Virtually no one living in a Shi a-majority village has a relative in the police. 8 Increasing numbers of police have been recruited from Pakistan since the uprising started, and some opposition activists call the police 'foreign mercenaries'. Yet many of Bahrain's Sunni community find this offensive, as they are far more likely to have brothers or cousins in the police and far less likely to have been at the receiving end of police violence. Views of the police are deeply polarized as different political and social groups have very different experiences of the institution. The events of the past 18 months have further eroded trust in the police among the Shi a community, especially in the villages. Police have been filmed smashing parked cars and ransacking shops owned by a well-known Shi a businessman, Faisal Jawad. A participant argued that police reforms especially much-needed retraining would take time. Others said things seemed to have gone backwards since the early years of the king's rule, when there had been some important police reforms and for a while the use of torture had seemed to disappear. It was agreed that there needed to be accountability for police reforms to work, though participants disagreed about the extent to which accountability processes were already under way. It was noted that there had been a number of investigations into police crimes. So far, two had been convicted. It was suggested that the authorities needed to understand that accountability was not just a 'nice to have' recommendation, but a basic means of forestalling the desire for revenge. Participants noted that while villagers would not regard the riot police as being there to help or protect them, better relations existed with the community police, who are relatively small in numbers but tend to be more linked to the local communities (and are believed to include more Shi a officers). A participant proposed a process whereby the riot police were kept out of villages in return for community police and village elders keeping the peace locally. The role of religion and sectarian identity politics Various participants blamed both the authorities and political societies for encouraging a sect-based approach to politics. It was said that historically the government had benefited from divide and rule policies towards different 8 There is a long history, dating back to the colonial era, of recruiting policemen from Sunni countries overseas in preference to the local Shi a population. 14

15 tribal, ethnic and religious groups, and that it tended to reach out to each group on a bilateral basis to maximize its bargaining power. At the same time, political societies (with few exceptions) tended to appeal to existing religious community identities as an easy way to mobilize support. Some participants expressed nostalgia for the 1950s and 1960s, when opposition groups were cross-sectarian and nationalist. External factors had contributed too. The situation in Iraq had intensified fears of one sect prevailing over another in the country. It was said that the last 18 months in particular had seen growing radicalism within both the Shi a and Sunni communities. Participants spoke of a spiral of silence, whereby many Bahrainis feel they cannot criticize the actions of fellow members of their religious or political group for fear of being ostracized or isolated within their own community. This created an exaggerated sense of polarization, deterring healthy internal debates within each religious or political group, and encouraging outsiders to see each group as a monolith. Participants said that moving forward would require an examination of the past, in order to understand how sectarianism had risen to a degree that surprised many Bahrainis. Each community needed a degree of introspection to assess its own contribution to this problem. One participant suggested creating a state department for religion that would work on behalf of all different schools of Islam, promote dialogue between all groups regarding Islam and its role in society, and ultimately help to remove the sect mentality that is prevalent in Bahrain. Bahrainis needed to view themselves primarily as Bahraini rather than Shi a or Sunni, it was said. Job, services and the economic role of the state The greatest consensus between participants with diverse political viewpoints was found in the group that discussed socio-economic issues, though there were disagreements about the extent to which political reform was a prerequisite for economic reform to be effective. Participants flagged the need to diversify the economy away from oil, to reduce the government s dependence on oil and grants as the main sources of revenue, and to bring more Bahraini labour into the private sector in order to reach a more sustainable long-term growth path. While participants sympathized with many elements in the Economic Development Board s Vision 2030, it was said there had not been enough transparency or clarity about the plans for implementation and the benchmarks that would be used to assess progress. Participants noted the existence of a large number of rentier 15

16 and parasitic businesses in the country that are dependent on the generosity of the system and a cosy relationship with the government. Such vested interests can act as a brake on reforms. One said that the US-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement had helped reformists within Bahrain to push for the liberalisation of some sectors of the economy, such as telecommunications. Some argued that the absence of a political solution would undermine any reform plans, mainly because of the problem of corruption. Others argued that even if the current political stalemate continues, the government could still be pushed to be more transparent in its procurement, to spend more efficiently and to make progress with privatization although few expected major employers, notably Gulf Air, to be privatized, since they perform a political and social function in terms of providing jobs. Participants suggested that the government should: Create a long-term fund for future generations, following the example of Norway; Reform the incentive scheme for nationals to seek employment; Permit unionization of foreign workers to lead to fairer remuneration; Focus on Bahrain s assets and maximize potential development and export opportunities. 16

17 Conclusions The situation in Bahrain should not be simplified into either two or three monolithic political camps, and there is potential to build cross-cutting coalitions of support for particular issues related to reforms which could also help break down barriers between different religious communities. The lack of representation of young people, either those who started the protests or those who have only recently become politically aware, means important ideas are being left out of the debate and may encourage people to protest. With protests likely to continue, ways urgently need to be found to stem the escalation in violence; while most of the violence has been on the part of the regime, protestors often young teenagers have increasingly been using Molotov cocktails against the police, justifying this by the rhetoric of self-defence. All this emphasizes the importance of re-starting a process of meaningful political dialogue to enable disputes to be resolved in a peaceful manner rather than violently on the streets. 17

18 ABOUT THE MENA PROGRAMME The Middle East and North Africa Programme, headed by Dr Claire Spencer, undertakes high-profile research and projects on political, economic and security issues affecting the Middle East and North Africa. To complement our research, the MENA Programme runs a variety of discussion groups, roundtable meetings, workshops and public events which seek to inform and broaden current debates about the region and about UK and international policy. We also produce a range of publicly available reports, books and papers. FUTURE TRENDS IN THE GCC The MENA Programme s ongoing project on 'Future Trends in the GCC aims to research, analyse and anticipate future scenarios for the political and economic development of the GCC states. The research has two main tracks: political and economic development, looking at the prospects for the GCC countries to adapt and develop their systems to meet the aspirations of their citizens; and identity politics, assessing the politics of sectarianism and prospects for developing more inclusive national identities. These themes are explored in the context of relevant changes in the wider Middle East region, with input from a growing network of researchers from the Gulf countries