Global Climate Governance after Paris

Transcription

1 Global Climate Governance after Paris Delivering a safe climate in a world of populism, authoritarianism and fragmenting geopolitics Nick Mabey, E3G, May

2 Introduction to E3G E3G Independent, non-profit European organisation working to accelerate the transition to sustainable development. Based in London, Brussels, Berlin & Washington DC; working across the EU and in Western Balkans, Latin America, SE Asia and China. Programmes of work on climate diplomacy; climate security and risk; finance; energy and infrastructure systems; and just transition. Advises EC & EU governments, NGOs and charitable foundations. My Background Engineer and academic economist working on energy/climate change issues. WWF-UK Head of Economics and Development: Kyoto; WTO; Development Policy. UK Foreign Office: Green Diplomacy Network; Sustainable Development; G8; WSSD. UK Prime Minister s Strategy Unit: energy/climate change; security; organised crime. E3G 2

3 Key Takeaways Climate change is a unique challenge to global governance requiring a transformation of all economic systems in all countries in two generations. We need strong international cooperation (and some luck) to avoid the worst impacts of climate change. Climate change illustrates the future of global governance as it is the first major global regime designed with emerging powers. Paris makes us safer but not safe. Paris has built shared goals, momentum and a platform for action but shifted the big politics of climate change ambition outside the UNFCCC. Climate change is now a shaper, not just a taker, of geopolitics. Barriers to ambition are political & institutional, not technical & financial. Climate politics are deeply entangled with globalisation, social cohesion & populism. Building effective governance of climate change can help support a sustainable system of broader global rules; if we invest in the diplomacy to create it. Paris will not deliver itself. We have 6 years to use the political leverage it created to maintain a high likelihood of preserving climate security 3

4 Outline The challenge of climate governance What does Paris do? The politics of climate ambition The new governance of climate change October 2013 E3G 4

5 Human civilisation has evolved in an unusually stable climatic period February 2015 E3G 5

6 Rising CO2 emissions are pushing us into unprecedented risk areas February 2015 E3G 6

7 By 2040 a 100 year global food crisis could occur every 30 years (or 10 years) May 2017 E3G 7

8 Climate System Tipping Points become high risk above increases of 1.5-2C Source: Lenton, 2010 February 2015 E3G 8

9 Global stability and security depends on interplay of cooperation and climate sensitivity Scenarios for 2050 based on global agreement to keep temperatures well below 2C High Climate Sensitivity Failed Cooperation Collapse and Competition 6-8C Crash Response 3-5C Defensive Adaptation 2.5-4C Robust Regime C Successful Cooperation Low Climate Sensitivity E3G 9

10 Climate matters to global governance Winning late is losing: Keeping climate change risks manageable requires unprecedented international cooperation against a ticking clock Security is Security is Security: failing to cooperate on climate change to protect economic or energy security will amplify move to power based and closed international relations; Global Systemic Risks: Climate and resource depletion could drive failure of major international systems of food, finance, water & energy trade amplifying stressors on vulnerable countries Charity begins at home: Resulting instability, conflict and unmanaged migration flows especially into Europe undermines shared security and could destroy humanitarian and human rights norms. E3G 10

11 How much risk will you take? June 2014 E3G 11

12 Outline The challenge of climate governance What does Paris do? The politics of climate ambition The new governance of climate change October 2013 E3G 12

13 MToe MToe 2C>> Transformation means by Global oil consumption 5,000 Global coal consumption 4,500 5,000 4,000 4,500 3,500 4,000 3,500 3,000 2,500 2,000 Shell Scenarios IEA 450 3,000 2,500 Shell Scenarios IEA 450 2,000 1,500 1,500 1,000 1, Peak oil demand around Sharp decline in coal consumption Percentage low carbon energy consumption..and much more low carbon energy 35% $90 trillion in 30% infrastructure investment 25% to 2030 needs to be 20% IEA 450 Shell Scenarios made low carbon and 15% climate resilient; 80% in 10% emerging economies. 5% June %

14 International Climate Regime UNFCCC February 2015 E3G 14

15 Potential Functions of an International Climate Agreement Goal: agree threshold for dangerous climate change Impact: ensure aggregate mitigation efforts keep climate change below collective threshold Equity: allocate effort fairly among countries Transparency: ensure everyone keeps their promises Compliance: consequences if countries don t deliver Assistance: help for countries to implement goals Resilience: support global and country resilience E3G 15

16 Climate dropped off the public agenda catastrophically after Copenhagen September 2013 E3G 16

17 The Copenhagen Legacy lowered expectations for Paris Political elites and publics had not considered climate change since Copenhagen Climate fell out of political fashion in most countries Copenhagen's failure left a legacy assumption that climate change is too hard to solve This was re-enforced by a systemic decrease in global cooperative capacity in the post-crisis world Why was Paris different to Copenhagen? September 2013 E3G 17

18 Global climate politics changed Power (and blame) in climate politics shifted. In 1990 China was 10% of fossil CO2 emissions in 2016 it was 30%. In 1990 per capita Chinese emissions were ¼ of the EU s; in 2015 they were equal. Alliances changed: climate negotiations have seen rapidly shifting alliances such as the BASIC group (Brazil, South Africa, India, China). Growing shift from North-South dynamics to climate makers vs takers with vulnerable states growing their voice. Economic Opportunities grew: global low carbon economy grew to over $5 trillion in Clean energy costs were falling much faster than expected. Climate change impacts became more visible and costly in all parts of the world. Scientific evidence has strengthened on attribution of climate change contribution to the risk of extreme weather events. Political risk of climate inaction grew, and the risks of action fell July

19 And better diplomacy created conditions for compromise China committed internationally to decarbonise its economy because it feared being blamed for failure and the US at least accepted an emissions target. The US accepted a binding regime because China and India also agreed to be commitments that are (equally) internationally verifiable. Europe accepted a weak US commitment because it brought China into the agreement and agreed a binding MRV and review process Other developing countries agreed because of tougher overall goals (efforts towards 1.5C) and significant new public finance and cooperation for adaptation, forestry and clean energy. The bottom-up system of country pledges fails to deliver necessary reductions but top down goals and 5 year review and ratchet generates coordinated future international moments to increase efforts Everyone moved their position to deliver a global deal September 2010 E3G 19

20 Paris hybrid top down-bottom up framework was better than expected Agreement has legal force (and strong political backing including from non-state actors) It contains commitments to limit emissions from all countries It has a binding system for monitoring and reporting Strengthens goal to well below 2C and efforts to reach 1.5C No backsliding clause and five yearly cycle of assessing progress and countries increasing mitigation ambition New goal of GHG neutrality in second half of the century Puts adaptation and resilience on equal footing to mitigation Durable regime for next years? E3G 20

21 Paris made the world safer but not safe. Emissions must be 40GT> by 2030 Probability of > 4C reduced by 80%; 2.7C-3.5C likely outcome 21

22 What Paris didn t give us Allocate necessary levels of emission reduction between countries to ensure overall Paris goals are met No ability to agree an equity formula or process Not if but when - all countries have a net zero goal A punitive mechanism for sanctioning countries who are non-compliant or non joiners (but does give some cover for WTO sanctions to be used) A clear social contract between climate impacted countries and big emitters on compensation for excess damage Countries agreed to do what is possible not what is necessary E3G 22

23 Paris keeps us in a cooperative scenario but science suggests higher climate sensitivity Scenarios for 2050 based on global agreement to keep temperatures well below 2C High Climate Sensitivity Failed Cooperation Collapse and Competition 6-8C Paris Outcome Crash Response 3-5C Defensive Adaptation 2.5-4C Robust Regime C Successful Cooperation Low Climate Sensitivity E3G 23

24 Paris establishes a risky regime Politics of gaining agreement in Paris required a trade-off between inclusiveness and rigour The politics of climate ambition were shifted out of the UNFCCC to major power relations, disadvantaging smaller and vulnerable countries. Paris sets up coordinated 5 year political moments for national political debates on need for more climate ambition. Previous ambition reviews under the UNFCCC had in general failed to deliver more effort Architects of Paris knew it was a platform for tackling climate change not a complete solution 24

25 Outline The challenge of climate governance What does Paris do? The politics of climate ambition The new governance of climate change October 2013 E3G 25

26 Paris survived Trump 1 but mixed political context for greater climate ambition Technology Leads: global markets have reduced clean energy costs 15 years earlier than anticipated. Countries will deploy clean technology faster for national economic reasons. But politics still matters: lower costs alone will not retire fossil infrastructure fast enough, or remove the barriers to clean solutions from incumbent interests. Poor social management of transitions will present opportunities for populists to toxify national climate politics. Climate geopolitics become harder: global politics will continue to fragment into regional blocks with rising security, trade & investment frictions. Stronger state-to-state diplomacy is needed to manage these tensions; keeping climate cooperation strong & markets open. Success in 2020 masks risks for 2025: Cheaper technology, strong energy efficiency & inflated baselines likely to deliver aggregate over-achievement of Paris pledges in With leadership from key countries & non-state actors this could keep Paris on track politically in Need to prepare politics of deep decarbonisation now: in 2023 countries must consider deep cuts in sectors with no easy fixes such as industry & agriculture. Weak US action (Trump 2?) and rogue states will make global alignment on deep decarbonisation much harder in

27 Ambition Politics will be increasingly driven by Perceptions of Trends and Events Tailwinds Falling technology costs and multiple national/local benefits Climate risks integrated into the financial system Climate impacts shifting public opinion and growth of attribution science Non-state actor commitments and momentum around local coal/ice phase-outs Headwinds Rising nationalism & instability in fragile regions undermines cooperation and leadership Growing authoritarianism suppresses non-state actor influence Incumbent asset owners & inertia in regulatory frameworks Poorly managed social & industrial transitions & costs/distraction of climate impacts 27

28 Mapping of Major Power Dynamics Supportive Divided Against National Conditions Political System More supportive and active in structural change EU China MtCo2e < ,000 1,000-2,000 >2,000 Mexico Canada Countries political system positions are based on analysis of balance of government, business and public stakeholders Countries national conditions are based on analysis of alignment of economic, energy, technology, public goods and fiancé interest with moving to a low carbon and climate resilient economy Less active in climate diplomacy Argentina Japan Indonesia South Korea Russia Turkey Australia Saudi Arabia Brazil South Africa USA Less supportive and active in structural change India Source: Summaries based on E3G PEMM mapping More active in climate diplomacy 28

29 Business as usual results in little pressure on G20 to increase ambition in This can be changed. Blocked Greens: high level political engagement can encourage more leadership from countries who s national interests are aligned with climate ambition but have mixed or negative internal politics; Japan, South Korea, Mexico are key G20 targets. Weak Champions: partnership for low carbon reform and maximising national co-benefits can help shift countries with strong or mixed politics but contested national interests; China, India, Brazil, Canada, Argentina. Outliers South Africa & Indonesia are dependent on high carbon industries and will need strong support to provide credible low carbon alternatives. Political Blockers: engagement on broader geopolitical issues and private sector restrictions on high carbon financing could help shift countries with negative political views but mixed real economy incentives to a more neutral position; Turkey, Australia, USA (if a 4 year Trump) Fossil Rogues: Russia & Saudi are not powerful enough to block progress towards 2C>> on their own. An active US and/or a Trump re-election could change this resulting in a coalition of fossil dependent states significantly disrupting progress; India, Turkey & Japan are at risk. Bigger is not always better. Non-G20 countries are deploying major fossil investments and have key role in demonstrating transformational climate transitions. 29

30 Stronger climate ambition in 2020 relies on creation of positive feedbacks between real economy progress, political interests and diplomacy How to build national politics for greater action? Climate Ambition Politics Sharing & Supporting Models of Climate Action Building Shared Leadership Structural Reform Climate & Energy Diplomacy Showing Progress in the Real Economy How can collective action make countries do more? Where can decarbonisation trends be accelerated? Real Economy Change Over-Achievement What changes are needed now to support deep decarbonisation? 30

31 Wide range of interventions. Critical to focus on the most impactful areas with key partners. Climate Politics o Aligning climate with geopolitical interests e.g. security, trade, investment, SDGs etc o Aligning national climate goals with broader development debates and objectives o Managing transition politics o Aligning regional interests with climate change, including energy security Climate Ambition Politics 2020 Ambition Coalitions o NDC Delivery Support o Coal Phase Out/Moratoria o Public climate funding/gcf etc o Development Bank Reforms o Climate Disclosure/Divestment o National Green Finance Reform cooperation o City and Company 2C>> Pledges o Kigali implementation o Implementation of avoided deforestation Structural Reform Real Economy Change Over-Achievement Climate & Energy Diplomacy Climate and Energy Diplomacy o Building stronger diplomacy around climate risk o UNFCCC Rulebook and Ambition Process o High Ambition Coalition 2.0 o Technical assistance and financial support o Building sub-national ambition diplomacy o Common approach for dealing with low ambition states o Regime for geo-engineering & negative emissions Support for Deep Structural Change o Long term strategy e.g Roadmaps o Oil & Gas orderly decline strategies o ICE phase-out o Mission Innovation/CEM focused on energy intensives o Food, diet and land use reforms o Regulatory cooperation o Learning and capacity building o Deep resilience cooperation o Clean energy integrated into trade and investment agreements 31

32 Enabling transitions & building strategic trust needs three level diplomacy Regime Politics 2018/19: building renewed alliances between vulnerable countries and OECD progressives to deliver credible (undifferentiated) rulebook, manage finance issues and avoid disputes over 1.5C fracturing govt & non-govt progressive coalitions. Politics of 2020 Ambition: build shared leadership approach to climate ambition with China and major economies. Build a critical mass of countries who can enhance/increase NDCs and deliver mid century goals/plans to Use country & sector partnerships (coal phase out, Green Finance, MDB reform, resilience etc) to increase confidence in national benefits of low carbon transition. Politics of Deep Decarbonisation: invest in demonstrating solutions in difficult sectors: heat, smart infrastructure, construction, heavy industry, agriculture etc. Build deeper engagement on low carbon economic reforms & social transition for deep decarbonisation. Build shared understanding of the security & geopolitical risks of failing to deliver Paris Goals in 2025 between EU, China, India etc Requires aligned govt and non-govt diplomacy & more diplomatic capacity 32

33 Outline The challenge of climate governance What does Paris do? The politics of climate ambition The new governance of climate change E3G 33

34 Paris Agreement-led climate regime is not sufficient to deliver 2C>> let alone 1.5C Geopolitics of climate ambition depends on synergies with other global regimes. Open enough global markets & supply chains to lower clean energy costs & drive technology diffusion Resilient enough international food, water management, finance & migration management systems to reduce climate instability contagion Deep enough global cooperation to support transitions in all countries to net zero climate resilient economies Major powers must believe that effective global rules are critical to deliver their national security and prosperity 34

35 Is there a grand EU-China alliance on Clean and Green Belt & Road? Coal plants planned in BRI countries would break Paris carbon budget Public funding coming from China, Japan and Korea China discussing green BRI. Japan, Australia and US discussing fossil investment alliance? Can EU support China s BRI on climate without undermining broader foreign policy goals? E3G 35

36 China plans dominance in EVs. How to manage trade & keep open markets? May 2017 EU car industry employs 12.6m people 5.7% of workforce. Need perception of fair competition and transition to keep public support. E3G 36

37 Flat oil prices, lower demand & climate risks undermine EU fossil supplier stability (Russia?) May 2017 E3G 37

38 UN system is not climate risk ready UN system is critical for improving global climate resilience on food, health, water, migration UNSC should have oversight of critical climate security risks including tipping points No capacity in UN system to analysis climate security threats & prioritise reform Launch major reforms at UNSG Summit in 2019? E3G 38

39 To solve a problem make it bigger Global rules-based governance faces fundamental challenges based on its legitimacy, effectiveness and enduring support from Major Powers Climate change is a shared challenge that requires stronger international cooperation across all global governance systems Poorly managed climate change will impact the fundamental security and prosperity of all states The imperative of climate change provides a strong political impetus to reform and strengthen global governance E3G 39

40 Thank You & Further Information _Understanding_Climate_Diploma cy.pdf d_we_stand.pdf _EU_foreign_policy_in_a_changing_clim ate_-_june_16.pdf ees-of-risk 40