May the weak force be with you: The power of the mass media in modern politics

Transcription

1 European Journal of Political Research 45: , May the weak force be with you: The power of the mass media in modern politics KENNETH NEWTON Department of Political Science, University of Southampton, UK Abstract. The idea that the modern mass media have a strong and malign effect on many aspects of social and political life is widely and strongly held. Television is often said to undermine democratic government popular support for leaders and institutions. In spite of all that has been written about media malaise, however, both theory and evidence suggests that the media are a comparatively weak force whose effects can be deflected, diluted and diffused by stronger forces. These include bedrocks political values associated with class, religion, age, gender and education, as well as social networks and discussions, distrust of the mass media, and personal knowledge and experience. Equally, the variables that mediate the media may also magnify its effects so that what appears to be a large media effect is, in fact, the result of an interaction between the media and other forces. This article lays out the argument of the media malaise literature that covers government and politics, then outlines the social forces that mediate the media, and finally provides some evidence to illustrate the argument that the media are generally a weak force in society. Introduction Many social scientists, journalists and social commentators share a worry about the increasingly powerful and malign effects of the mass media. These effects are powerful, they claim, because the mass media permeate almost every corner of society, and have a strong impact on almost everywhere they touch. Media impacts are said to be malign because of their strong tendency to undermine, even destroy, many of the mass attitudes and behavioural patterns upon which democracy depends and because of their tendency to undermine democratic leaders and institutions. Originally the term videomalaise was coined to describe the effects of television news on political attitudes and opinion (Robinson 1976a, 1976b), but the claim has broadened in the past twenty-five years to cover all forms of television, newspapers, radio, films and, most recently, and the World Wide Web. Therefore the term media malaise is used here as an umbrella term to cover the claim that the mass media have a substantial and malign impact on politics and social life. Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA

2 210 kenneth newton Media malaise is not a school of thought, even less a coherent or well articulated theory of media effects. It is mood, or climate of opinion, but it is strongly and widely held among politicians, journalists and the general public, as well as academics in the social sciences. It covers far more than politics, extending to anti-social behaviour (violence in the media), poor school performance and illiteracy (watching television rather than reading), poor health and eating habits (the couch-potato ), passivity rather than activity (watching television rather than doing), an inability to develop social skills (the computer nerd ), the decline of community (television and social capital) and the growth of an aggressive possessive individualism (advertisements and entertainment media). It is not claimed here that all social scientists, even less all media experts, share a common concern with media malaise. On the contrary, some contest the idea, but they are a small group. As Norris (2000: 11) puts it, the voices of those who are sceptical about the mass media have been drowned out by the Greek chorus of popular lament for the state of modern journalism. Nor is it true that there is no good theory or empirical research to support the idea of media malaise. On the contrary, there is evidence to show that the media can be powerful and sometimes malign. The central argument here, however, is that neither theory nor evidence is strong enough to sustain the broad and general claims found in the media malaise literature. This article is concerned primarily with the political impact of the mass media, arguing that they are generally a weak force in politics and government. They can and do exercise some direct and independent influence over some aspects of political life, and can even exercise a strong or crucial one under certain circumstances, but normally their impact is mediated and conditioned by a variety of other and more powerful forces. The second part of the media malaise claim, that the media exercise a malign influence, will not be tackled here, in part because it is dealt with elsewhere (see Holtz-Bacha 1990; Bennett et al. 1999; Newton 1999; and especially Norris 2000). To make its case this article presents an argument in three parts. The first part summarises the large amount of literature on the powerful and pernicious political effects of the mass media in order to show that media malaise theory is not a straw man set up to be knocked down with ease, but a widespread argument developed by a large number of social scientists. The second part reviews the various ways in which media messages are themselves mediated by forces that can dilute, deflect or even destroy them in some cases, or, alternatively, magnify their effects in other cases. The third part will present some evidence to illustrate aspects of the claim that the mass media are generally a weak force.

3 may the weak force be with you 211 Media malaise Table 1 presents an analysis of the various ways that the media are said to have an adverse effect on modern government and politics, together with references to some certainly not all of the English-language literature on the subject. It makes the point that a great many writers have made a great many claims of a great many kinds about the ways in which the mass media have an adverse impact on democratic government and politics. Some of the work is by journalists, but the great majority is by specialists in media research, many of them distinguished in the field. To put flesh on the bare bones of this list of claims and authors, the Appendix illustrates the claims of the media malaise literature with some quotations. Once again this is a selection, and only covers the English-language writing. 1 Not all the authors appearing in Table 1 and the Appendix argue that the mass media are the only cause of concerns about modern democracy, or even the main cause. Nor do all of them argue that the media have only negative effects. Yet a great many dwell on the negative effects, and some concentrate almost exclusively on them. Nor is it contended that all the statements in Table 1 are wrong; many are partly right, as often as not because they make correct or partially correct observations about the nature or content of the mass media, but then proceed to speculate, assume or assert that these will have adverse effects on government and politics. For example, it is claimed that attack journalism highly critical, muck-raking, investigative journalism shortens the political lives of democratic leaders, or can even destroy them (Ranney 1983: ; Meyrowitz 1995: 133). One can think of examples to fit the theory, from Gary Hart, Richard Nixon, Michael Dukakis and Gerald Ford, to Edward Heath, John Major, Neal Kinnock and Lionel Jospin. All were attacked by the media and all soon faded from national political life. This, however, is to cherry-pick examples to suit the theory. For all the destructive power claimed for attack journalism, it should not be forgotten that the modern world has some unusually long-lived political leaders, including Thatcher, Major, Blair, Kohl, Mitterand, Chirac, Gonzales, Fraser, Hawke, Keating, Howard, Trudeau, Chrétien and Mulroney. John Major served as prime minister for a long time in spite of a particularly bad press. Ken Livingston, villainised by the British media in the 1980s and 1990s as a loony-lefty, bounced back without public relations or party support to become Mayor of London and a popular political figure. More systematic evidence on government longevity shows that it did not decline in twenty Western states from 1950 to 1983 (Budge & Keman 1990: 162), which were also the years in which the attack power of the mass media is reputed to have grown substantially.

4 212 kenneth newton Table 1. The mass media as a powerful and/or malign force: Summary of claimed effects Mass Attitudes and Opinions Ignorance and incomprehension. The constant flow of new news, combined with increasingly brief and superficial treatment of unconnected and unexplained events, contributes to public ignorance and incomprehension of politics (Ansolabehere et al. 1991; Hart 1994; Gabler 1998; Debord 1990; Blumler & Gurevitch 1995: 213; Ranney 1983: 80, 82; Baudrillard 1987; Schiller 1973: 24 29; Kalb 1998; Shawcross 1984; Adatto 1990). Debased public discourse. The sensational, superficial and sound-bite content of the news media debase the quality of public debate and understanding of politics (Dautrich & Hartley 1999; Fallows 1997; Schudson 1995; Hachten 1998; Kalb 1998; Schulz 1998; Patterson 1980, 1994). The news media reduce complex, many-sided issues to two antagonistic camps (Epstein 1973: 227), turn politics into infotainment or show business (Gabler 1998; Hallin 1991; Dautrich & Hartley 1999; Fallows 1997; Schudson 1995; Hachten 1998; Patterson 1994; Dahlgren 1995). The news is impoverished by the conflict between politicians and journalists (Blumler 1997). Some claim that by its very nature, television (including news and current affairs programmes) is doomed to entertain and amuse (Postman 1985). Political fatigue.voters have sometimes become so bored and irritated by the huge amount of election news that they avoid television news and newspapers during the campaigns. For these people, there is not too little serious political news and comment in the mass media, but a great deal too much (Franklin 1994: 131, 151; Wober 1992: 2; MacArthur & Worcester 1992: 5). Mainstreaming. Television is said to homogenize us (Sartori 1989: 43; Kubey & Csikszentmihalyi 1990: 100). The more we watch television, the more we conform to its beliefs, attititudes and values and the more we take up mainstream opinions (Kerbel 1995: 8; Gerbner et al. 1982). The mean world effect. The mass media, especially television, create fear, alienation, distrust and cynicism because of its attack journalism and its focus on conflict and bad news (Lang & Lang 1966, 1968; Robinson & Sheehan 1983; Robinson 1976a, 1976b; Gerbner et al. 1984; Edelman 1987; Cappella & Hall-Jamieson 1996; Philo 1990; Patterson 1994: 93; Kerbel 1995: 6, 124; Blumler & Gurevitch 1995: 215; Ranney 1983: 79; Schulz 1998; Holtz-Bacha 1990). Undermining social capital.television drags people from their communities and its associations, and isolates and privatizes them in their living rooms (Putnam 1995). Attitude instability. The rapidly changing flow of news and issues, coupled with fluctuating opinion polling figures, causes instability in public opinion (Smith 1981: 178). Mass and Elite Behaviour Falling election turnout. According to Ranney (1983: 80 86) and Maarek (1995: ), the media contribute to falling election turnout because they bore electors with too much politics and make elections foregone conclusions by predicting election winners. Others emphasise the importance of negative campaigning and bad news as a cause of declining turnout (Ansolabehere et al. 1993, 1995: 24 26; Entman 1995: 153).

5 may the weak force be with you 213 Table 1. Continued Falling party membership and identification.the shift from news and commentary about parties and policies to candidates and personalities has weakened party ties and partisanship (Wattenberg 1984; Fiorina 1980; Pfetsch 1996). Packaging and presentation are favoured over political substance.the mass media encourage the concern of politicians with packaging and presentation rather than policy content (Maarek 1995; D.K. Davis 1995: 330; Franklin 1994; Hall-Jamieson 1984). Policy instability and short-termism. Because of the way the media covers the rapid flow of political events and fluctuating opinion poll figures about them, politicians are encouraged to become short-term pragmatists (Maarek 1995: 226). Political Processes Incumbancy effect, shortening political lives. Some argue that the mass media strengthen the electoral position of incumbents (Graber 1993: ), others that political lives are shortened by attack journalism and the pitiless glare of publicity (Ranney 1983: ; Meyrowitz 1995: 133). Fast forward effect. As competing channels of news try to outdo each other with new news and scoops, the pace of political life accelerates (Ranney 1983). Privatisation and the re-feudalisation of politics.the commercialisation of the press, and its concentration of ownership and control, has re-feudalised the public sphere and turned it into a private matter between the state and media corporations (Habermas 1979: 198). Democracy and Its Institutions Decline of parties.the mass media undermine the need for party members and so undermine party membership (Ansolabehere et al. 1991; Maarek 1995: 204; Negrine & Papathanassopoulos 1996) The presidentialisation of leadership. Focus on a few well-known political leaders creates or strengthens a presidential style of politics (Ranney 1983). Diminished responsibility and accountability of leaders.the heavy concentration of episodic news stories of a human interest kind serves to draw attention from general policy issues and hence undermines the responsibility of leaders for the consequences of their policies (Iyengar 1991; Entman 1995: 155). Political overload and ungovernability.the media fuel public demands and so overloads governments and creates ungovernability (Crozier et al. 1975; Ranney 1983: 154). Loss of political trust and confidence in institutions.the mean world effect results in loss of trust in political leaders, loss of confidence in democratic institutions and loss of satisfaction with democracy itself (McKeod et al. 1977). Undermining democracy.the mass media undermine democratic leaders and cause loss of confidence in democracy and its institutions (Crozier et al. 1975).

6 214 kenneth newton Even if it were true that the mass media increasingly attack governments and political leaders by focusing on bad news, it is still necessary to show that it is the media and not political events that cause the damage. Did Nixon resign because the media attacked him, or because of the events of Watergate? Did the press do the damage or was it mainly the messenger that brought the news? Did Kinnock, Dukakis and Jospin fail to achieve the highest office, and did Heath, Ford, Spiro Agnew and (eventually) Thatcher fall from grace because journalists did not like them or because they failed to impress voters and/or their political colleagues? In these cases, as in so many others, it is difficult to understate the methodological problems of showing clear cause and effect relationships between the mass media and political outcomes. This point about the methodological problems of demonstrating mass media causes and effects is important, and needs to be heavily stressed. It applies, of course, as much to media malaise writings as it does to the present argument that the media are a weak force. However, the point is methodological problems allow exaggerated or false claims to be made for media effects without fear of empirical rebuttal. Given the lack of hard evidence and the great difficulties of establishing clear cause and effects relations, assumption and speculation fill the gap, and since it is difficult to disprove these, then prima facae plausibility is often the toughest test of the assertions. What follows is an attempt to introduce a broader theoretical framework, with some evidence, into thinking about mass media effects on government and politics. Mediating the media Some of the forces mediating media effects are well understood, and widely known. These will be passed over quickly in order to concentrate on more recent or less commonly discussed considerations. Minimal effects: Psychological mechanisms and the media market. The minimal effects tradition of media research stresses the great importance of individual and structural factors in restricting the mass media to a reinforcing role (Lazarsfeld 1968; Blumler & McQuail 1968; McQuail 1987: , ; Miller 1991: 1 4). On the individual level, people use a variety of psychological mechanisms to minimise media effects, including selfselection, distortion, misinterpretation and suppression. At the structural level, a competitive media market provides consumers with what they want to see, hear and read, in much the same way that supermarkets deliver goods at the

7 may the weak force be with you 215 price consumers are able and willing to pay. To the extent that the commercial media are bound by the golden chains of the market to satisfy consumer demand, it is as much a matter of audiences shaping the media as the other way round. Competition also means that the mass media are not a single entity delivering the same message to a single mass audience, but a varied and competing set of mediums delivering varied and competing messages to varied audiences. Some media markets are more oligopolistic than competitive, and increasing concentration of ownership and control weakens media pluralism. Even so, Western societies have not produced media monopolies along the lines of totalitarian system, and to the extent that there is pluralism and competition, different channels of communication must bow to consumer demand, political and otherwise. For example, in Britain, the Observer newspaper opposed the Suez War of 1956, promptly lost a large proportion of its readers and provided itself and other papers with a lesson about the commercial importance of swimming with the tide. It is also clear that voters in the West use a wide variety of sources of political information (Dautrich & Hartley 1999: 45), and thereby expose themselves to competing views and messages. To this extent, the impact of any one channel or message may be off-set, counter-balanced or neutralised by others (Zaller 1992: ; 1996: 20). It will not do to assume either that the Western media are a monolithic block, selling essentially the same political message, or that citizens are fools who believe whatever they read in the newspapers. The mass media are embedded in society Implicit in many statements about media effects on society is the idea that somehow the media are quite separate and distinct from society, firing their poison arrows into it from a distance. In fact, the mass media are an integral part of society, sharing many of its values, operating within many of its constraints (organisational, economic, cultural and legal), drawing its journalists from it, and reflecting its concerns to a greater or lesser extent. In other words, the media are deeply embedded in and part of society. They are subject to its influences much like other institutions: journalists and editors do not arrive on earth from Mars or Venus, they are social products like the rest of us, albeit, maybe, rather special ones, like many other occupations. This not only makes it difficult to sort out the great entanglement of cause and effect relationships running between the media and society, but suggests caution in making statements about how the media affect society without regard to how the media and its messages are themselves products of society and influenced or determined by it.

8 216 kenneth newton Trust in the mass media The less a medium is trusted and the less it is believed, the less its influence (Schiller 1973: 79 80). One of the most notable features of the Western media is the generally rather low esteem it commands from the general public. Two waves of World Values Surveys in seventeen democracies in the early 1980s and early 1990s show that the press ranks with trade unions at the very bottom of a table covering ten sets of public and private institutions (Newton & Norris 2000: 55; see also Dautrich & Hartley 1999: 82 90; Kerbel 1995: 10 12). While confidence ratings for the press are 40 per cent or lower, those for the police and the education system are 60 per cent or higher. Another survey of trust in the media in the Member States of the European Union (Eurobarometer 57, Spring 2002) shows that an average of 44 per cent of adults trust the press, 61 per cent trust the radio and 55 per cent trust television. Tabloid newspapers are generally trusted far less than broadsheets, but tabloids comfortably outsell broadsheets. In general, the power and influence of the media are reduced to the extent that trust in them is not high, and trust in the mass media is still lower. Values, attitudes and opinions Public opinion has three main layers: opinions are the most superficial and most changeable; attitudes are more deeply rooted and less changeable; values are the core foundations on which opinions and attitudes are built. Values are the least susceptible to outside influences, and have a general and pervasive influence over attitudes and opinions (Zaller 1992: 23; Van Deth & Scarbrough 1998). How are values formed and changed? The answer seems to be that they are shaped mainly by such things as social class, religion, ethnicity, age, gender, education and personal experience. These are the strong forces that mould public opinion the classical variables of the behavioural sciences. Where values, attitudes and opinions are strongly held, where individuals have first hand experience and knowledge of an issue, and where the issue is seen as closely tied to class, race, religious, age and gender interests, then the impacts of the mass media are likely to be secondary. Zaller s (1996: 17 78) impressive attempt to demonstrate massive media effects illustrates the point. He found that highly aware liberals in the United States reduced their support for the Vietnam War when anti-war communications in the American media increased in intensity between 1964 and In strong contrast, highly aware conservatives became more supportive of the Vietnam War in the same period, in spite of the increased intensity of anti-war communications. They strengthened their views because they tagged anti-war

9 may the weak force be with you 217 messages as liberal, and were therefore able to reject them. Zaller writes (1996: 57): In fact...there was as much support for the Vietnam War in 1970 among highly aware conservatives as there had been in Such doggedness in the face of extremely frustrating real-world outcomes is explained by the fact that highly aware conservatives received a consistent set of prowar messages and cues from people they respected. In other words, in their battle with real-world outcomes and the liberal press, conservative values triumphed among highly aware conservatives. Yet where liberal values coincided with the increasingly liberal and critical account of the progress of the Vietnam War in the mass media, the liberal point of view was strengthened. It seems that people do not so much believe what they read in the newspapers, but read what they believe in the newspapers. The import of Zaller s careful research seems to be that the liberal press did have the effect of changing attitudes towards the war, but only among liberals who were predisposed to believe the news about the real world. A different body of literature on the importance and effect of political campaigns reaches exactly the same conclusions. If the mass media are a political weak force, then one would expect political campaigns, a form of political persuasion that operates primarily through the mass media, also to be a weak force. The conclusions of Schmitt-Beck and Farrell (2002) in a book on political campaigns suggests that this is the case. They found that campaigns do matter in some respects, but this depends on upon circumstances. As they put it: [I]f the voters are not buying then there is not much a campaign can do about it...referendum campaigns have the best chance of converting opinion on new, unclear and complex issues that are unrelated to existing political cleavages, but on established issues with clear partisan connotations, the best they can hope is to mobilise their supporters... the more aware voters are, and the more clear their political predispositions are, the less likely campaigns are to affect opinion, while the more likely they are to mobilise people. (Schmitt-Beck & Farrell 2002: ) This conclusion is consistent with Zaller s finding (1996: 57) that highly aware conservatives in the United States did not buy the anti-vietnam War messages of the liberal press between 1964 and 1970 because news about what was actually happening in the war was overridden and discounted by their conservative values.

10 218 kenneth newton Social networks Recent research has revived the Katz-Lazarsfeld research on the importance of social networks and discussions as an influence that filter media messages and helps individuals interpret them. Recent work of this kind tends to emphasise the impact of social networks, rather than the more top-down view of opinion leaders and the two-step flow of communication developed by Katz and Lazarsfeld. According to Schmitt-Beck s (2003: 258) study of public opinion in Britain, Spain, the United States and West Germany: If media messages are not in accord with the prevailing opinion of a recipient s discussion network they will be rejected and not taken into account at the ballots. According to an American study (Beck et al. 2002: 68 69), the primary sources of political cues in the 1992 presidential campaign are personal networks and groups, not the modern mass media, which has often been ceded greater electoral significance. Organizations and personal discussants serve as more consequential carriers of partisan messages than the media (see also Robinson & Levy 1986; Roessler 1999; Wright et al. 1989; Huckfeldt & La Due Lake 1998; and on the importance of conversations as an influence on voting, see Pattie & Johnston 1999). These studies show that while the mass media carry messages, it is personal networks and discussion that exercise a strong influence, even determine, how these messages are received and interpreted. The mass media do not so much influence opinion as provide the raw materials that social networks mould into different shapes. If this is the case, then a further important conclusion may follow. If social networks and discussions are important for the way in which social groups interpret media messages, then what appear to be media effects, even what appear to be massive media effects, may be the result of interaction between media content and social networks. In other words, uncovering a strong association between media messages and public opinion may tell us less about media effects than about how they are amplified by networks and discussions. What appears to be a media impact may, in fact, be a network effect. To summarise, this section of the article has argued that the media are mediated by an array of factors that can modify their impact on individuals and institutions. Where values and beliefs are strongly held, where individuals have firsthand knowledge and experience of an issue, or where the issue is tied to the interests of class, race, religion, age and gender, and the discussion networks associated with them, then the impact of the media is likely to be weaker. Where people know and care little about the issue, and where it is remote from their everyday experience of life and their values, then the impact of the media may be greater. This argument is sketched out in a simplified diagrammatic form in Figure 1.

11 may the weak force be with you 219 Individual Values Self Selection/ Political Personal Variables Psychological Interest/ID Knowledge/ Mechanisms Experience Market Forces/ Public Regulation Media Messages Media Impacts Class, education, religion Social Trust in the Structural/ ethnicity, age, gender Networks media Social Variables Causal relations Intervening variables Figure 1. Mediating the media. The mass media as a weak force: Some evidence This section of the article will present some evidence to illustrate the claim that the mass media are a weak force whose effects may be modified, diluted or even negated by mediating factors. Telemythology: Clinton and Reagan Probably the best single example of attack journalism in recent times is the feeding frenzy over the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal in the American mass media. According to media malaise theory, no president could possibly withstand such enormous and concerted pressure of media criticism. Unfortunately for the theory, not only did Clinton s ratings as a president remain comparatively high, but the Democrats actually gained Congressional seats a few months after the scandal broke, much to the surprise of political scientists who know about mid-term elections. Clinton s ratings as an individual plummeted, but his comparatively high ratings as a president barely wavered. Zaller s (1998, 2001) explanation is that his presidential ratings were not affected so much by the media coverage of the scandal as by the mainsprings (i.e., the strong forces) of American politics namely, peace, economic prosperity and ideological moderation. Zaller writes (1998: 186): No matter how

12 220 kenneth newton poorly informed, psychologically driven, and mass mediated public opinion may be, it is capable of recognizing and focusing on its own conception of what matters. And this in the United States, which is reputed to have the worst informed, most psychologically driven and heavily mass-media-influenced public opinion in the world. If the mass media have the power to shorten or destroy political careers then presumably they can use the same power to build up and support political leaders and prolong their lives. Ronald Reagan is a prime example: the camera loved him, his style was warm and re-assuring, and he was the kind of guy you couldn t stay mad at for long. He was much admired by the Washington press corps who presented him as a very popular president whose appeal was based largely on his use of the media to establish rapport with the people. As Iyengar (1991: 1) writes: The unprecedented public popularity and significant policy success of President Reagan, for instance, have been widely attributed to his mastery of television. A charisma, it must be said, that was backed up by a large, skilled and effective team of spin-doctors. The only fault with this account is that, in his own time, Reagan had the lowest ratings of any president since His popularity has, nonetheless, became part of modern telemythology created by the Washington press corps and academic media specialists (see Schudson 1995: ), who were impressed by his communication skills. The press corps persuaded itself of two falsehoods. First, Reagan s outstanding ability to perform for the cameras must have made him a smash hit with the voters. And second, since the Washington press corps told the public that Reagan was immensely popular, the public would act accordingly and make him so. Thatcher and the failure of political marketing Britain in the 1980s is an excellent place to test the strength of the mass media, especially of newspapers. The country had a highly centralised national newspaper system, and most regular newspaper readers see one of the eleven national dailies and/or one of the nine national Sunday papers. As a result, Britain had nine of Western Europe s eleven biggest selling newspapers, with sales of the dailies totalling 13.5 million and the Sundays, 13.7 million. The national press in Britain was also highly partisan, nailing their party political sympathies firmly to their mastheads. Moreover, Conservative newspapers accounted for between 65 and 75 per cent of national sales in the three election years, most being not just Conservative, but strongly Thatcherite in their politics. For its part, the government was eager and able to provide the material that most Fleet Street editors were seeking. The government firmly believed

13 may the weak force be with you 221 in the power and importance of public relations and was prepared to spend ever-increasing amounts of time, effort and money on the packaging and presentation of its politics for public consumption. It built up a powerful, efficient and highly centralised public relations machine under the leadership of Thatcher s press secretary, Bernard Ingham. By the end of the 1980s Ingham s office, the Government Information Service (GIS) in Downing Street, controlled the entire government s propaganda efforts, serving as a clearing and coordinating centre for all central government departments (Cockerell et al. 1988; Franklin 1994: 82 95). In effect, Ingham had become the country s Minister of Information, or as one journalist said, the real Deputy Prime Minister (quoted in Franklin 1994: 85). He certainly ran one of the largest government public relations operations anywhere in the democratic world. By 1989, it had increased its annual budget to very nearly 200 million and employed a staff of 1,200 press officers, journalists, radio producers, film makers, editors and support staff. From 1986 to 1989, government expenditure on advertising was second only to the multinational conglomerate, Unilever (Scammell 1990). In 1987 and 1988 the Central Office of Information paid for over 30,000 television advertising spots, more than 9,000 newspaper advertisements, and in excess of 100 publicity campaigns, 1,800 publications, 140 films, videos and commercials, and 140 separate exhibitions (Franklin 1994: 100). It should be emphasised that a good proportion of this spending was mainly devoted to apolitical matters such as safety in the home, public health and safe driving, but increasingly large amounts were devoted to political matters of direct relevance to controversial aspects of government policy. In short, Britain in the 1980s is an excellent limiting case in which to study media and government propaganda effects. There can be few other times or places in the Western world when circumstances were so favourable to massive media effects. Among the issues of importance to the Thatcher government, four stand out as vital to its core interests: the poll tax, privatisation, taxing and spending, and Thatcher s personal image. The poll tax was a flagship of the Thatcher government. Staking her own and her government s reputation on its success, she put huge effort and budgetary resources behind its publicity campaign. A high-pressure media campaign was launched in which more than 10 million was spent on videos, tape recordings and press releases. Some 25 million leaflets for individuals, 1.5 million booklets for businesses and a special leaflet about tax rebates were produced. In 1989, 23 million leaflets were distributed at a cost of 1.8 million, followed by a 3.1 million campaign aimed at television and the local and national press (Deacon & Golding 1991). Public approval of the tax was fairly constant at around 25 per cent between 1987 and 1990, but opposition rose steadily from 45 to 76 per cent. At the peak of one of the biggest publicity campaigns ever launched by a

14 222 kenneth newton British government, and large by the standard of democratic governments and businesses anywhere, 71 per cent of the populace thought the poll tax was a bad idea. In 1990, when the tax was introduced in England and Wales, 54 per cent were very strongly opposed and another 22 per cent were fairly strongly opposed ; 22 per cent were in favour. When the tax was abolished a year after its introduction, two-thirds of the population thought it a bad idea and wanted rid of it, while only 7 per cent thought it a good idea worth keeping (Butler et al. 1994: 260). The government even failed to get its own positive sounding name attached to the tax ( Community Charge ), which was always known as the anachronistic and bad poll tax. The government also failed to lay the blame for the failure of the tax at the door of local government, though it tried hard to do this. Central government was clearly blamed for what came to be known as the worst idea in the world. The failure of the huge public relations campaign for the poll tax is easy to explain with weak force theory. It is not possible to convince the public of something it does not want to believe, especially if it has firsthand knowledge and experience of the matter. Everyone was required to pay the poll tax. The campaign to persuade the British public of the merits of privatisation was equally expensive and time consuming, and met with no more success. Well over 240 million was spend on the attempt to sell privatisation to the British public, but the opinion polls (Table 2) show that it was never popular. At no point in any given privatisation campaign was it approved by much more Table 2. Advertising costs and approval ratings (in per cent) of privatisation campaigns Public approval Public disapproval Cost ( m) High Low High Low Dates British Telecom (BT) /83 12/94 British Aerospace British Gas /85 12/94 Water /88 12/94 Electricity /88 12/94 Coal Board Not known /88 3/91 Steel Not known /88 7/98 British Rail Not known /88 5/94 Post Office Not known /94 10/94 Sources: costs: Franklin (1994: 103); approval/disapproval figures: Gallup Political and Economic Index. Figures for the last four privatisations are not available.

15 may the weak force be with you 223 than 40 per cent of the population. In fact at no time in the history of any privatisation campaign was the highest point of popularity higher than the lowest point of unpopularity. The more the government campaigned, the more money it spent and the longer the programme lasted, the more unpopular the issue became. It might be claimed that privatisation would have been even more unpopular without the campaigns, but this is implausible given the abysmal levels of approval to start with. By the early 2000s, privatisation was more popular, but this may tell us more about how people get used to what they have, than about the persuasive powers of advertising. A third policy area of critical importance to the government was the political battle for cutting taxes and public services. Once again Thatcher and her governments fought long and hard, using the full weight of the government s large and expensive public relations machine, plus the huge support she had from the national press. The British public never bought the idea. Throughout the 1980s, tax spenders outnumbered cutters by a clear margin, and the balance shifted heavily towards the spenders year on year. In 1979, when Thatcher came to power, spenders and cutters were equal at 37 per cent each, but by 1987 tax cutters were 11 per cent and service extenders were 66 per cent (Crewe 1988: 38). 2 Thatcher got a very favourable press for most of the 1980s from Fleet Street, which heavily supported her and her policies. She also put huge amounts of money, time and effort into constructing a favourable image of herself. Her clothes were chosen carefully, her voice modulated, her speechmaking coached, her body language schooled, her hairstyle softened, her interview technique honed and her television style trained by experts. Public appearances, photo-opportunities and sound bites were stage managed down to the last detail (Franklin 1994: ; Bruce 1992: 55; Seymour-Ure 1991). What effect did all this have? Not a lot, it seems. Throughout her time as prime minister, the British public saw her realistically there is ample polling data showing that she was seen as tough, determined, shrewd, decisive, able and a leader, but she was also seen as uncaring, unlistening, unlikeable, divisive, out of touch and destructive (see Tables 3 and 4). By comparison, the leader of the opposition, Neil Kinnock, was perceived as a far poorer politician, but a better human being (Table 3). In case it is thought misleading to compare a prime minister in the hot seat to a leader of the opposition who has an easier job and has served for a shorter time, Table 4 compares Thatcher and Major as prime ministers. The same picture emerges: Thatcher was highly rated as a politician, but poorly rated as an individual. Major s scores were the reverse. In spite of ten years of concentrated public relations effort, Thatcher s image did not change much. She was always seen as being a bit out of touch, divisive and destructive (Table 5), although these views grew over time.

16 224 kenneth newton Table 3. Popular perceptions of Thatcher and Kinnock (May 1986) (in per cent) Thatcher Kinnock Tough Determined Sticks to principles Shrewd Decisive Caring 8 42 Listens to reason 6 44 Likeable as a person 5 50 Source: Gallup Political and Social Index, Table 4. Popular perceptions of Thatcher and Major (September 1990) (in per cent) Thatcher Major Strong personality 79 9 Ability to deal with other world leaders Ability to lead Ability to talk straight Knows what they are talking about Able to unite the country Sincere Honesty 9 37 Friendliness and warmth 6 68 Understands problems of ordinary people 4 72 Willing to listen 3 84 Source: Gallup Political and Social Index, Moreover, in spite of her electoral success and for all her media support from the press, she had, after Heath, the lowest satisfaction ratings of any postwar prime minister from her very first term in office (Table 6). Thatcher s popularity was, like Clinton s, divided between Thatcher the person and Thatcher the prime minister. Like Reagan s popularity as president, her popularity as a prime minister was more myth than reality. British citizens saw her daily on television and they were well able to make up their own minds about what they saw.

17 may the weak force be with you 225 Table 5. Thatcher s image April 1979 April 1989 Tries hard in her job Speaks her mind Strong personality Good speaker Knows what she s talking about Knows about the problems of the cost of living Thinks a lot of herself Not in touch with ordinary people Doesn t come over well Talks a lot but doesn t do much A snob Divides the country Destructive ideas Source: Gallup Political and Economic Index, Conclusions Any attempt to establish media effects is riddled with tricky methodological problems, and any conclusions about them must be exceedingly cautious and accompanied by all sorts of caveats including the weak force theory propounded here. Nevertheless, weak force theory seems to have more theoretical and empirical plausibility than strong force theory. The powers of the mass media are weak because they are often diluted, deflected or even destroyed by more powerful influences that mediate the media by intervening between them and their effects on wider society. The mediating strong forces are mainly those of social class, religion, age, education, gender, social networks and discussions, trust in the media, personal values, and personal knowledge and experience. Equally, these strong forces may also heighten media effects so that what appears to be a media impact is, in fact, the result of an interaction between the media and their mediating forces. The evidence presented here (about the Vietnam War, the Clinton and Lewinsky affair, Reagan, political campaign effects and Thatcher s public relations) suggests that media impacts are constrained by three paradoxes. First, those who are least interested, involved and knowledgeable about politics are the most susceptible to media influence, but the least likely to expose themselves to their influence. Second, the more people know about and have

18 226 kenneth newton Table 6. Satisfaction with Thatcher as a prime minister compared to other postwar leaders (in per cent) Average satisfaction score Low High Atlee Churchill Eden Macmillan Douglas-Hume Wilson Wilson Heath Wilson Callaghan Thatcher Thatcher Thatcher Major Major Blair Note: The question asked was Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with...as Prime Minister? Source: Gallup, Political and Economic Index 418, July 1995: 10 ( figures) and Gallup monthly reports thereafter. firsthand experience of something, the more likely they are take an interest in media coverage of it, but the more likely they are to trust their own judgements rather than media s. Third, the more partisan the mass media and the more they try to persuade people of a political position, the less likely they are to be seen as impartial and neutral, and the less likely they are to be influential. The most partisan press is the least trusted and least influential. This is not to say that the media cannot be a force or a strong force. To say that they are a weak force is to acknowledge that they are a force, and to say that they are normally or usually a weak force is to acknowledge that they can be a strong force under the right circumstances. Zaller s studies of the Vietnam War era and the Clinton-Lewinsky affair, as well as the evidence about the effect of political campaigns, show that media are weak where people already have entrenched values and opinions, but may be stronger on matters that are new, complex and unrelated to existing cleavages and values. Finally, the merit

19 may the weak force be with you 227 of arguing that the mass media are a weak force is that it avoids the false dilemma of whether the media have either minimal or massive effects. It suggests that one should focus instead on the sorts of circumstances in which the mass media have weaker or stronger effects, an approach that seems likely to be a more productive research agenda than arguing about whether they are or are not a powerful force. Acknowledgments An earlier form of this article was presented to the Second ECPR European Conference, September 2003, Marburg, Germany. I am grateful to two anonymous referees for suggestions, gladly taken up, about how to turn a rather sprawling lecture into a more concise and focused article. I would like to thank the Political Science programme of the Australian National University where I spent time as a Visiting Fellow and where the final version of this article was written. Appendix. Media Malaise: Some illustrative quotations Someone was it Burke? called journalism the fourth estate. In his time, that was doubtless true. But in our time, it is actually the only estate. It has gobbled up the other three. (Kraus, quoted in Theobald 2000: 14) [T]elevision enjoys a de facto monopoly on what goes into the heads of a significant part of the population and what they think....[w]ith their permanent access to public visibility...journalists can impose on the whole of society their vision of the world, their conception of problems, and their point of view. (Bourdieu 1998) [T]he mass media have become a significant anti-democratic force in the United States and, to varying degrees, worldwide. (McChesney 2000: 2). The press is not the only cause of our jaded public and tattered institutions, but it is a prime contributor. (Patterson 1994: 250) Many believed and some continue to hold that television lost the war in Vietnam by turning American viewers steadily against their country s military commitment in South-East Asia. (Carruthers 2000: 108) In summary, research into the effects of mass communications has come full circle. Initial concern about the vulnerability of voters to propaganda campaigns gave way to findings of minimal consequences. Effects research was rejuvenated by more limited conceptions of media influence, as manifested by the learning, agenda-setting, and priming paradigms. As these paradigms have

20 228 kenneth newton matured, discussions of massive consequences have been revived. (Iyengar 1997: 216) Many commentators have argued that democracy is under threat from cross-media ownership and the excessive influence of tabloid newspapers and television....the ordinary voter, it is said, stands mesmerized by media images like a child in a sweet shop. (Calcutt 1998) We have shown that by ignoring some problems and attending to others, television news programmes profoundly affect which problems viewers take seriously....we have also discovered another pathway of media influence: priming. (Iyengar et al. 1982) [O]ne can wonder, along with Debord, whether [the] media have not in fact negated the possibility of democracy. (Raboy & Dagenais 1992: 5) And so democracy in the United States is imperilled because the mainstream media are controlled by conservative corporate forces that use television especially to further their own interests and agenda. (Kellner 1990: 61) Attack advertisements resonate with the popular beliefs that government fails, and that voting is a hollow act. The end result: lower turnout and lower trust in government, regardless of which party rules. (Ansolabehere & Iyengar 1995: ) The unprecedented public popularity and significant policy success of President Reagan, for instance, have been widely attributed to his mastery of television. (Iyengar 1991: 1) [T]elevision s unswerving focus on specific episodes...make elected officials and public institutions less accountable to the American public. (Iyengar 1991: 5) Deep forces in America s political, social, and economic structures account for most of the frustration of today s politics, but the media s attitudes have played a surprisingly important and destructive role. (Fallows 1997: 7) Television has become not only a powerful force, but often the principle forum in American politics. (Purvis 2001: viii) The power of the press in America is a primordial one. It sets the agenda of public discussion; and this sweeping political power is unrestrained by any law. It determines what people will think and talk about an authority that in other nations is reserved for tyrants, priests, parties, and mandarins. (White 1973: 327) Those who rely upon television in following politics are more confused and cynical than those who do not. And those who rely totally upon television are the most confused and cynical of all. (Robinson 1975: 101) Yet I believe it is now well established that television s special way of presenting political news and information has had a powerful impact on American political culture. (Ranney 1983: 86)