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1 DIVERSITY, COHESION, AND DEMOCRACY: STATE IDENTITY AND A CALL FOR THE RECONCEPTUALIZATION OF COHESION Ahmed Maati Paper for The 24 th Congress for Political Science IPSA Panel: Multiculturalism and its Critics 1 st of Juli 2016 Please Do Not cite or circulate without the author s permission 1

2 Abstract: The relation between cultural and ethnic diversity and democracy has long been debated in comparative political science. Does diversity enrich democracy by facilitating pluralism? Or does diversity paralyze democracy and democratization by propagating factionalism and division? Answers to these questions have fallen into two categories. First, some answers consider diversity to facilitate democracy. The second cites diversity as one of the main obstacles to democracy. The common ground among these approaches is that they measure diversity on three grounds: 1) Ethnic. 2) Linguistic. 3) Religious. In this paper, I argue that the disagreement between these two approaches stems from the faulty association between diversity and cohesion. This is the reason these two schools disagree on the effect of diversity on democracy. Advocates of the view that hold diversity an obstacle to democracy argue that diversity jeopardizes social cohesion, and in turn democracy. The other view cites consociational democracies and successfully diverse democratic societies as evidences diversity is not alien to democracy. I argue that differences in themselves do not constitute cleavages that hinder democracy. Rather, the psychological and socio-political meanings associated to these differences are the factors that arbitrate whether differences are divisive or not. In this light, I advocate a focus-shift regarding the independent variable. Instead of measuring cohesion by diversity, I measure cohesion by consensus on state identity. Ultimately, I show that differences that induce disagreement on state identity are those that jeopardize cohesion There is no doubt that by the turn of the 21 st century, and most likely decades before, democracy has been widely accepted as the only game in town when it comes to political regimes. To be sure, autocratic regimes around the world are keen on strengthening their façade democratic credentials and to pay lip service to democracy. Modern democracy, in contradistinction to both its ancient Greek predecessor and to its more recent manifestation in the post WWII period, is based on the idea of universal suffrage. In this context, diversity sometimes become institutionalized in democratic systems, and some other times threatens not only democracy, but also the peaceful existence of a society. In reviewing the literature addressing social and political cleavages on one hand and democracy on the other, I encounter two contradictory views regarding the matter: some authors argue that the existence of differences is conducive to democracy and others argue that those differences jeopardize social cohesion, and in turn, endanger democracy. I disagree with both views in regards to their conceptualization of cohesion and their over-focus on violence as the causal link 2

3 between fragmentation and democracy. Both strands measure cohesion by the extent to which diversity exists in society; they consider ethnic, religious, and linguistic diversity as measurements of the extent to which a society is cohesive. I argue that disagreement between both literatures regarding the effect of diversity on democracy stems from this faulty association between diversity and cohesion. I argue that differences in themselves do not constitute cleavages that hinder democracy; rather, it is the meanings associated to these differences that render them divisive, and in turn, jeopardizes democracy. It is in light of this argument that I propose consensus on state identity as the definition of social and political cohesion. 1 Furthermore, I argue that contrary to the reviewed literature, social and political cleavages might exist in spite of ethnic, religious, and linguistic homogeneity. In doing so, I highlight the literature s fixation on violence as an intermediate variable through which the lack of cohesion negatively affects democracy; to the contrary, this paper asserts that whereas violence erupting out of division is sufficient to halt democracy, it is not necessarily the only way through which cohesion- defined as consensus on state identity- affects democracy. This paper starts by highlighting the two contradictory views regarding the effect of diversity on democracy. Since I propose consensus on state identity as the definition of cohesion, this paper will then engage with the literature that conceptualizes the effect of cohesion on democracy; in so doing, it attempts to show the dynamics through which cohesion impacts democracy. Consequently, it will make the case for consensus on state identity as the appropriate definition of cohesion by showing that the former enjoys widespread applicability in light of the dynamics through which cohesion is hypothesized to impact democracy. In other words, it will argue that consensus on state identity is in line with the literature s conceptualization of the effects 1 I define Consensus on state identity as the consensus on which symbolic identity the state represents. 3

4 of cohesion on democracy. Finally, I will discuss a strand of literature that seems, at first sight, to contradict the hypothesis that cohesion is important to democracy. This literature on consociational democracy when thoroughly considered, however, strengthens the case for consensus on state identity. Before embarking on such a task, it is important to highlight that the two views regarding the effect of cohesion on democracy could be found on literature concerned with democratization. On the other hand, literature emphasizing the importance of cohesion on democracy is primarily engaged with democratic consolidation and democratic stability. I consider the dynamics highlighted in the latter as applicable both in the case of democratic stability and democratization. It is, however, not entirely clear whether the former literature engages solely with questions of democratization or do the arguments presented also apply to cases where democracy already exists. Is Diversity Conducive to Democracy: Yes and No Generally, literature engaging with the relation between diversity and prospects of democracy is divided between two views; both views mistakenly equate ethnic, religious, and linguistic diversity with factionalism, and homogeneity with cohesion. The first holds that a homogenous polity is necessary and conducive to the emergence of democracy; for example, Bingham Powel argues that there exists a negative relationship between ethnic factionalism and government stability, civil peace, and prospects of democracy. 2 Similarly, John Stewart Mill states that free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities. 3 With 2 G. Bingham Powell Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability, and Violence. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, John Stuart Mill Considerations on Representative Government. Vol. no. 71. New York: Liberal Arts Press,

5 a slight change of focus from democracy as the dependent variable to conflict, which is understood as being detrimental to the prospects for democracy, Gabriel Almond argues that the likelihood of conflict increases with diversity. 4 In light of these works, factionalism either directly hinders democracy, or is bridged by an intervening variable- violence- that in turn hinders democracy. In one of the seminal works on democratization theory, Rustow argues that the only pre-condition for the emergence of democracy is national unity. 5 He articulates that the emergence of democracy takes several phases; the preparatory phase that is characterized by polarization and the rising of new elite that arouses a depressed and previously leaderless social groups into concerted action. 6 The decision-making phase in which political leaders take the conscious decision to institutionalize diversity, an example of which is Sweden s great concession of Finally, the habituation phase in which common citizens belief in democracy is enhanced when they find that it resolved major social and economic issues. 8 On another front, politicians would not only confirm their belief in democracy, but also new generations of politicians who are ardent believers of democracy would emerge. Finally, the citizens at large would be fitted into the new structure by forging effective links of party organization that connect the politician in the capital with the mass electorate throughout the country. 9 We can conclude from Rustow s argument that a) democratization depends on a deliberate elite decision, and b) a successful democratization relies 4 Gabriel A. Almond Comparative Political Systems. The Journal of Politics 18 : See also Gabriel A. Alond, G. Bingham Powell, and Robert J. Mundt Comparative politics: A Theoretical Framework. New York, NY: HarperCollins College Publishers. 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid. 7 Rustow, Dankwart A Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model. Comparative Politics 2, (3): Rustow 1979, Rustow 1979,

6 on the ability of the democratic system to address stressing socio-economic issues. The coming sections highlight on how consensus on state identity is instrumental in signaling points a and b. The second view holds that, in fact, diversity and heterogeneity facilitate the emergence of democracy. For instance, Benjamin Reilly maintains that the success of the democratic experience in New Guinea is a result of the cultural diversity of its population which hinders any single faction a monopoly over political power. 10 In a similar fashion Robert Hardgrave maintains that a similar situation exists in India where diversity was conducive to the emergence of a democratic experience. 11 In contrast to the view that holds diversity to invoke civil violence, James Fearon and David Laitin argue that, unlike common belief, diversity does not increase the likelihood of civil war. 12 This line of argumentation is taken further by Steven Fish; occupied by the challenge of statistically testing for the impact of cleavages on conflict and democracy, Fish asserts that there is neither a relationship between factionalism, defined in its ethnic, religious, or linguistic terms, and democracy nor on civil violence. 13 Nevertheless, he maintains that there is a statistically significant negative relationship between civic violence and democracy. 14 Fish s findings are in line with this paper s conceptualization of cohesion; in fact, Fish did not find any relation between diversity and democracy and/or violence. Rather, he found a statistically significant relation between one political manifestation of diversity, violence, and democracy. Some scholars argue that polarization 10 Benjamin Reilly Democracy, Ethnic Fragmentation, and Internal Conflict. International Security 25 (3): Hardgrave, Robert L India: The Dilemmas of Diversity. Journal of Democracy 4 (4): James D. Fearon, and David D. Laitin Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. American Political Science Review 97 (1): See also Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin Explaining Interethnic Cooperation. The American Political Science Review 90 (4): Steven Fish, M., and Matthew Kroenig Diversity, Conflict and Democracy: Some Evidence from Eurasia and East Europe. Democratization 13 (5): Ibid. 6

7 not diversity is what hinders the emergence of democracy and induce violence. 15 Fish, however, maintains that, even after running his statistical tests substituting diversity with polarization as the independent variable, there remains no statistically significant relation between polarization and violence nor democracy. 16 Fish dissects three types of cleavages: ethnic, linguistic, and religious; he, moreover, argues that in some cases, polarization could facilitate democracy. For example, he argues that, statistically, the polarization of language facilitates the emergence of democracy in Bulgaria 17, articulating on some possible ways polarization could facilitate the emergence of democracy. 18 The conclusion taken out from his statistically loaded work is that If ethnic diversity ever encourages conflict and blocks democratization, there must also be cases where it reduces conflict and aids democratization. 19 To sum up, this section illustrates that there is an inherent soundness to both competing arguments regarding the effect on diversity on democracy. This soundness of two seemingly conflicting literatures stems from a faulty identification of the independent variable; homogeneity and heterogeneity of a society in themselves do not constitute cohesion nor divisions. In fact, the common denominator amongst these literatures is that they both consider cohesion in terms of homogeneity, as oppose to heterogeneity, of a given polity, a fact that this paper will highlight using Fish s work. The next session offers a more engaged reading with the dynamics through which cohesion is hypothesized to affect democracy. The aim is to sketch the basis on which the paper argues that 15 Paul Collier, and Anke Hoeffer On economic causes of civil war. Oxford Economic Papers, 50 (4): 571. Also see Donald L. Horowitz Ethnic groups in conflict. Berkeley: University of California Press. 16 Fish 2006, Diversity Conflict and Democracy, Ibid. 7

8 consensus on state identity is the right independent variable; the politicization of diversity in a way that jeapordizes identity consensus in non-conducive to democracy. How does cohesion impact Democracy? Literature on democratic stability, especially focused on unconsolidated and newly born democracies, points out different ways in which cohesion, or lack thereof, affects democracy. This literature stresses the different contents of cleavages that could exist in a society and the different effects they have on democracy. Moreover, it pin-points the structural differences between different cleavages and their subsequent effects on democratic dynamics. This paper maintains that the arguments presented in this section are valid, as far as we define cohesion by consensus on state identity, both for democratization and democratic stability. Lipset argues that the character and content of the major cleavages affecting the political stability of a society are largely determined by historical factors which have affected the way in which major issues dividing society have been solved or left unresolved over time. 20 Similarly, Zuckerman maintains that there seems to be general agreement that cleavage-membership perceptions that are highly intense will result in a polarized cleavage system and thereby in violent political conflict. 21 Dahl argues that conflicts concerning sub-cultures within a polity are impossible to solve within democratic procedures. 22 This comes in light of these issues explosive nature and ability to halt democratic procedures. 23 Rae and Taylor argue that there are three fundamental types of cleavages; ascriptive (race, ethnicity etc.), attitudinal concerning opinion 20 Seymour Martin Lipset 'Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development And Political Legitimacy'. Am Polit Sci Rev 53 (01): Alan Zuckerman Political Cleavage: A Conceptual and Theoretical Analysis. Brit. J. Polit. Sci. 5 (02): Robert A. Dahl Political Oppositions In Western Democracies. New Haven: Yale University Press, Ibid 8

9 and ideology, and behavioral cleavages that manifest themselves in voting and other political procedures 24. Bartolini and Mair identified similar types of cleavages; however, they argue that cleavages are not simply social differences. Rather, it takes a combination of all three elements of cleavages to produce a social closure. 25 Deegan Kraus takes this argument a bit to its moderate face, arguing that the combination of at least two of the three different forms produces different types of cleavages with varying political and social significance; their total overlap constitutes an ideal type of cleavage and social closure. 26 It is important to note here that Kraus asserts that cleavages that are ideological are the least serious in impeding democracy; although he did not explicitly situate identity in any category of his typology of cleavages, it is clear that he gives primary importance to ascriptive differences, and their effect on cleavage system. This debate concerns itself with the content and dimensions of cleavages in society. Another scholarship occupies itself with studying the structure of cleavages in society. Nicholas Miller argues that all societies are divided among one or the other lines that leave their individuals in different sets; those sets have different preferences and orientations in regards to public policy. Some large and complex societies are divided by a pluralism of cleavages that are often related to one another in a cross-cutting rather than reinforcing pattern. 27 In such society, two individuals who belong to different sets have conflicting views in regards to some issues but also agree on many issues. This idea of pluralistic identification and cross-cutting affiliations is highlighted in 24 Douglas W. Rae,and Michael Taylor The analysis of political cleavages. New Haven:Yale University Press, Stefano Bartolini, and Peter Mair Identity, Competition and Electoral Availability. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Kevin Deegan-Kraus Slovakia. In The Handbook of Political Change In Easter Europe, ed., Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, Nicholas Miller 'Pluralism And Social Choice'. In The Democracy Sourcebook, ed. Robert Dahl. Cambridge: MIT Press,

10 contradistinction to reinforcing cleavages; those kind of polarized reinforcing cleavages are characterized by the lack of individual membership in overlapping sets. Accordingly, in those societies two individuals are likely to have conflicting views in regards to many aspects of political and social life, showing little agreement on any single or set of issues. 28 Having highlighted this difference, the significance of this structural difference in the nature of cleavages existing in society becomes significant for democracy because in so far as members of a society affiliate with cross-cutting memberships, resolving issues of conflict becomes more likely to take place within a democratic dynamic. Lipset and Rokkan argue that the stability of democratic regimes often depends on salient, crosscutting cleavages where individuals various memberships and identifications with groups create cross-allegiances to different political positions or support for catchall, large political parties. However, if cleavages are reinforcing rather than cross-cutting, the probability of mass conflict and political instability increases. 29 If cleavages are deeply polarized to the point where the winning of one faction is regarded as the total annihilation of the other in a zero sum game, it becomes hard for conflict issues to be resolved within a democratic dynamic. The political game inherently produces losers and winners; the question of political stability is how to convince losers to continue to play the political game, to continue to work within the system rather than throw it. 30 Losers in a democratic game would think to wait till the next elections if they believe that there is a prospect for producing different outcomes; 31 this belief naturally arises from the assertion that political preferences change over time. However, in a society 28 Ibid 29 Craig J. Calhoun Dictionary of The Social Sciences. New York: Oxford University Press. 30 Miller 2003,

11 where cleavages are reinforcing rather than cross-cutting, preferences change slowly overtime. In pluralistic societies where cleavages are cross cutting, there is more reason to believe that the next election would produce different results. 32 I argue here that this argument holds for the emergence of democracy as much as it does for the maintenance and consolidation of a stable democratic system. In other words, I argue that without this understanding on part of all factions that in a potential democratic game the loss of one faction does not entail its total annihilation, it becomes impossible for different factions to seek or establish a democratic dynamic. 33 If reinforcing cleavages are divisive to the point where different factions regard their democratic loss as their total political loss in a zero-sum game dynamics, it becomes unlikely for these political actors to consciously resort to the institutionalization of their differences in a democratic configuration. The following Diagram presents this argument: Why consensus on state identity? As we have seen, there are two competing views regarding the effect of diversity- which is commonly used to measure cohesion- on democracy. If we define cohesion to be consensus on state identity, both views seize to be conflicting. If diversity itself is not the determinant of 32 ibid 33 Rustow A Transitions to democracy: Toward a dynamic model. Comparative Politics 2 (3):

12 cohesion, then it is sound to assume that both literatures are not mistaken: There are cases in which diversity does not hinder democracy, and others in which diversity threatens democracy. This section starts with stretching the points of disagreement it has with the existing literature; in doing so, I make the case for the proposed redefinition of cohesion. Fish s findings, presented earlier, 34 seem to contradict this paper s hypothesis that cohesion is instrumental for the emergence and maintenance of democracy; nevertheless, this paper understands division and social cohesion differently. Fish measures cohesion by the numerical distribution of citizens among different religious, linguistic, and ethnic lines. He concludes that there is no significant relation between diversity, what he mistakenly conceptualizes as lack of cohesion, and democracy. Moreover, he asserts that there is a negative relation between violent conflict and democracy; yet, he proves a non-significant relation between diversity and conflict. A deeper insight into Fish s measures and conceptualization of diversity and polarization is noteworthy to highlight points of disagreement between my work and Fish s; moreover, in doing so I shall also highlight points of disagreement with the wider literature on cohesion, factionalism and democracy. First, Fish measures polarization using data from the World Fact Book; according to his operationalization, a society is polarized when a group constitutes more than 49 percent and another group constitutes more than 7 percent of the population. If only one group exceeds 49 percent without another group that passes the 7 percent threshold, the society becomes not polarized, rather dominated by a single faction. Finally, if there is no dominating group, and the population is divided among different lines, the situation becomes one of dispersion rather than polarization. This paper argues that the problem in such conceptualizations of diversity and polarization is that they reduce 34 Check page 6 of this paper. 12

13 those societal and political phenomena to mere numbers. It is logical to believe that divisions exist in all societies of the world to one or the other degree; the question, thus, becomes not to what extent, in numbers, is a polity diverse/ polarized; rather, it becomes what do members of the concerned polity make out of their differences? What psychological and political meaning do they construct and attribute to these differences? Here I will have to problematize, agreeing with the earlier discussed literature, the difference between societal and political cleavages and, in turn, bring to the fore questions regarding the nature of divisions and whether there exist a necessity to a division s location-whether in the political or in the social realm-for it to constitute a cleavage capable of impeding democracy. These questions have no ready answer and are a matter of academic disagreement; nevertheless, I argue that, as far as cohesion s impact on democracy is concerned, consensus on state identity is the relevant definition of both social and political cohesion. In doing so, I assert that this definition would enjoy a widespread agreement among different views engaging with the nature of cleavages, and the latter s effect on democracy. In other words, the first disagreement between my work and the discussed works is that whereas the discussed works consider the existence, or non-existence, of divisions as the independent variable, I rather consider the political significance associated to these differences- defined as consensus on state identity- as the independent variable. I also take the over-emphasis on violence as the only way through which cleavages could affect democracy to be, at least theoretically, flawed. The existence of deep cleavages regarding the identity of the state could hinder the emergence of democracy without incidents of violence. The second point of departure this research embarks on is that, in defining cohesion as consensus on state identity and lack of cohesion as the lack thereof, I do not argue that lack of identity consensus is only possible in ascriptively heterogeneous societies. Consequently, I depart 13

14 from the literature engaging with the question of factionalism/cohesion/divisions and democracy, which either overlooks the divisive potential of disagreement on state identity, or understands the latter to be the consequence of ethnic, religious, and linguistic divisions. 35 This paper argues that identity cleavages do not necessarily stem out of differences in religion, ethnicity, or language; there are cases where a homogenous polity develops a disagreement on the nature of its identity. 36 Nevertheless, this paper does not propose an understanding of cleavages that is solely focused on identity, refuting any ethnic, linguistic, or religious bases to cleavages; in fact, it is logical to conclude that linguistic, ethnic, and religious divisions are among key dimensions that motivate identity divisions. However, I argue that whereas ascriptive divisions could serve as social ingredients that facilitate the construction of identity cleavage, their mere existence does not necessarily entail lack of cohesion, and their non-existence does not automatically entail cohesion. The problem here becomes that the literature s overlooking of identity cleavages that evolve without clear ethnic, religious, or linguistic divisions, forces the former to fall in a trap of essentializing a link between certain social distributions and identity. In other words, it is not necessary that a society that shares the same religion, language and ethnicity to be a cohesive society. Few points need to be restated: 35 These works have been discussed earlier. Benjamin Reilly s argument that diversity in New Guinea was conducive to democracy, and Hardgrave s similar argument regarding India, are perfect examples of the over emphasis on the sheer existence of diversity and not on cleavages. Laitin and Fearon argument exemplify the relationship between diversity, whether qualified to be cleavages or not, and democracy through the former s impact on the likelihood of violence. Steven Fish s work empirically exemplifies both pillar of a conceptualization that my paper refutes. 36 A perfect example would be the recent failed transition attempt in Egypt 14

15 1) This paper maintains that, in all ways, it is not accurate to measure cohesion by assessing the percentages of people that belong to different ethnicities, religions, or linguistic communities; differences in themselves do not constitute cleavages; it is the meaning assigned to those differences that construct those differences as cleavages. 2) Lack of cohesion does not necessarily stem from ascriptive differences of race, religion etc. 3) Identity cleavages whether stemming from ascriptive difference or not, are in themselves divisive enough to constitute societal division that hinders the emergence of democratic dynamics; the disagreement among ethnically homogenous societies regarding state identity is no less divisive, as far as democracy is concerned, than that of ethnically or linguistically diverse societies. In light of point 3, I conditionally agree with Bingham Powel that there does seem to be something distinctive about severe ethnic conflicts, however, and they seem particularly hard to resolve within purely democratic bounds. 37 I argue that the particular thing about ethnic conflict is that it usually entails division on the question of identity, and more usually, state identity. I propose four concrete points that motivate this research to consider consensus on state identity as the definition of cohesion: First, in context of the literature differentiating cross-cutting and reinforcing cleavages and their different impacts on democracy, identity serves as a perfect example of the kind of cleavage which results in a perception of a zero-sum game between factions. It is a reinforcing cleavage that is very unlikely to be resolved through democratic dynamics. 37 G. Bingham Powell 1982,43. 15

16 Second, in light of the literature emphasizing a difference between social and political cleavages, lack of agreement on identity constitutes both a societal and political cleavage. Identity is inherently social and is hard to think about identity cleavage as such without a political manifestation. Third, history teaches us that cleavages resulting from lack of agreement on identity, and specifically state identity, are explosive in nature and are the hardest to peacefully resolve. The case of the disintegration of the Yugoslavian state, the case of post 2003 Iraq, and the current situations in Libya and Yemen and arguably across the Middle East remind us that those identity cleavages impede the possibility of democracy and put the very existence of the state in question. All these cases entail an ethnic component to their conflicts, and they were all undemocratic before conflict. However, it was not until the weakening of the state s formal identity, and the resulting competition among different identities, that different ethnic groups adopted violence as a means of settling the dispute. In a lot of those, among other, cases lack of consensus on state identity questioned the very existence of the state. It is important to highlight that in light of my argument, social and political cohesion, defined as consensus on state identity, is not understood to be the total homogeneity of a society in terms of ethnic, linguistic, or religious composition. As I have discussed earlier, it is not the existence of these divisions that matter; rather, it is whether they are regarded and utilized to generate conflict regarding state identity. Furthermore, I equally try to avoid an operationalization of state identity to mean that all factions in society agree that a certain component of identity (religion, ethnicity etc.) to be the official identity of the state. Whereas this could be the case, there could be other cases where the content of the consensus is, rather, diversity or a consensus on addressing the cleavage within an agreed on framework. The most obvious examples of these cases fall under the category of consociational democracies 16

17 This takes us to the fourth point. I argue that despite the seeming contradiction between this paper s hypothesis- that cohesion is critical for democracy- and consociational theory, a closer look at the theory of consocoational democracy strengthens my conceptualization of cohesion. With the coming discussion of consociational democracy, this paper consolidates its belief in advocating for the case of identity as the determinant of cohesion. Consociational Democracies: A Counter-Argument? In 1969 Lijphart published his work consociational democracy in which he argues that Gabriel Almond s classification of homogeneous stable democracies, and unstable democracies that operate in fragmented societies characterized by degree of immobilism, misses an important third category; this category includes countries that are characterized by an obvious degree of fragmentation, yet manage to maintain a stable democratic system. 38 Through a close inspection of the way consociational democracy presents itself, it is clear that it admits to the ailments of fragmentation; moreover, it stresses the importance of elite consensus on an agreed-upon framework to mitigate differences. I argue that this elite consensus is consensus on state identity. Moreover, I argue that, in all cases, consociational democracy necessitates a set of charactersitics existing a polity, making its applicability severely limited to very specific cases. Consociational democracies are polities characterized by deep ethnic, linguistic, or religious cleavages; those cleavages serve as obstacles in the way of democracy. Nevertheless, those polities manage to achieve a degree of political stability quite out of proportion to its social homogeneity. 39 It is important to note here that the framing of this degree of stability as out of proportion to [those countries degrees of] social homogeneity indicates the acknowledgement that homogeneity is important for democracy. Similarly, Lijphart argues that The formation of 38 Arend Lijphart Consociational democracy. World Politics 21 (2): Claude Ake A theory of political integration. Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press,

18 a grand coalition cabinet or an alternative form of elite cartel is the appropriate response to the internal crisis of fragmentation into hostile subcultures 40 ; by framing consociationalism as a solution for a fragmented system, Lijphart acknowledges the threat of fragmentation to democracy 41. Principally, Lijphart maintains that consociational democracy rests on elite accommodation and their commitment to the maintenance of the system and improvement of its cohesion and stability. 42 Similarly, Boynton and Kwon state that Implicit in politics by accommodation is the idea that there is something that is problematic ; this problematic is the unfortunate existence of cleavages that would hinder democracy. 43 In addition, Lijphart argues that Fragmented societies have a tendency to immobilism, which consociational politics are designed to avoid. 44 In doing so, Lijphart follows Almond and Rustow in arguing that immobilism threatens democracy; in 1969 he argues that the immobilism in continental European democracies that exits as a consequence of the latter s fragmentation, threatens a lapse into totalitarianism. 45 In 1996, he argues that the weakness of power sharing in post 1969 India that resulted in the threatening of the democratic experience came in light of increasing immobilism. 46 This shows that consociationalism does not conceptualize diversity, in itself, as the problem; rather, that the absence of homogeneity is likely to produce fragmentation among relevant political 40 Lijphart 1969, Consociational Democracy, Ibid, Ibid, G. R. Boynton, and W. H. Kwon An analysis of Consociational democracy. Legislative Studies Quarterly 3 (1): Lijphart 1969, Lijphart 1969, Arend Lijpart The puzzle of Indian democracy: A Consociational interpretation. The American Political Science Review 90 (2):

19 actors, and in turn, jeopardizes democracy. Accordingly, fragmentation that is framed as an internal crisis for democracy is the inability of elites to craft agreement on a framework. This inability, in the eyes of consociational theory, is a function of diversity that renders fragmentation likely, and, therefore, the extent of democracy in consociational democracies is framed as out of proportion in relation to the degree of diversity. Furthermore, consensus on state identity is as crucial for consociational democracies as it is for non-consociational democracies. Consensus on state identity entails that different political actors agree on the social boundaries of the state; this entails a mutual understanding among different groups on their collective identity represented in the state. In consociational democracies, the content of this agreement is the acknowledgement and tolerance of differences. In fact, Boynton and Kwon argue that elite commitment to maintaining the national society is one of the most important success factors to the elite accommodation in Consociational politics. 47 Whether this process exists in all consociational democracies or not is not the subject of this section; nevertheless, Lijphart highlights that consociationalism depends on a consensus among political elites to sustain an environment of accommodation and consensual decision making. For the purposes of this thesis, this consensus is necessarily manifested in consensus on identity; in other words, if elites have to develop this common understanding of the nature of politics and decision making, they should necessarily settle disputes regarding the state identity of the community. The content of this settlement could be the realization and acknowledgment of differences and the agreement on maintaining a state identity tolerant of all factions. 47 Boynton, and Kwon. 1978,

20 B) Conditions conducive to Consociationalism: a limitation to its applicability There exist a set of special structures that pave the way for the emergence of consociationalism; I argue that these special structures are not characteristics of the general order found in pluralistic societies. Accordingly, even if another reading of consociational democracy envisions that various conceptions of state identity constitute the diversity that aids the emergence of democracy, it remains unable to present itself as a general configuration applicable to a wide variety of cases in which this diversity occurs. Moreover, I highlight that consociational theory itself acknowledges the peculiarity of structures needed for its emergence and admits that, in the absence of these specific structures, consociationalism cannot take place. Lijphart argues that widespread approval of the principle of governing by elite cartel is among the cornerstones of consociationalism. 48 He summarizes the role of the elite in the following statements: Consociational Democracy requires 1) that elites have the ability to accommodate divergent interests and demands of the subcultures. 2) This requires that they have the ability to transcend cleavages and to join in a common effort with the elites from rival subcultures. 3) This in turn depends on their commitment to the maintenance of the system and to the improvement of its cohesion and stability. 4) Finally, all of the above requirements are based on the assumption that elites understand the perils of political fragmentation. 49 Another factor conducive to consociational democracy is cohesion within each subculture; in this way, political elites are able to represent their sub-cultures as they enjoy support of their rank and file memberships 50. Accordingly, distinct clear-cut cleavage lines are essential for consociationalism 51 ; these clear-cut divisions between factions, consequently, allow elites to form 48 Lijphart 1969, Lijphart 1969, Lijphart 1969, 219, and 224. Also see Lijpset 1996, The Puzzle of Indian Democracy, 260, Ibid. 20

21 coalition government that is based on principles of cooperation and non-competition 52. Those principles are emphasized in contradistinction to the common majoritarian dynamics of competition in majoritarian democracies. Lijphart pinpoints other structural factors in signaling the likelihood of consociationalism; he argues that the existence of an external threat, the mutual balance of power among sub-cultures, and the success of reducing strain on the system by adequately addressing social and economic issues, are pillars that pave the way for the emergence of a consociational democracy 53. These dynamics specific to the emergence of consociational democracy are far from common among divided societies; wide spread approval on elite led politics, distinct cleavage lines, clear elite-non-elite distinction, and cohesion within the subcultures, are all difficult to find in divided societies. Those structures are likely to exist only in small states; in fact, Lehmbruch argues that politics found in consociational democracies seem to work in small states only 54. The likelihood of consociationalism to work in small states is also a result of the reduced general strain on the system. As discussed earlier, the success of consociational democracy is partially dependent on the success of elites, through cooperation, to address major socio-economic issues; in light of this logic, states with small population size are easier to administer in a way that tackles economic and social issues. Nevertheless, it is common to find among divided societies friction between the different sub-cultures in a way that does not conform to consociational theory s model of cultural autonomy 55. In addition, a clear-cut division between elite and non-elite within a single group is 52 Lijphart 1996, Lijphart 1969, Lehmbruch, Gerhard Consociational democracy and corporatism in Switzerland. Publius 23 (2): Lijphart 1996,

22 hardly a common characteristic of any society, let alone divided ones; Boynton and Kwon add that consociationalism assumes that [T]he elites of each bloc are relatively independent of the nonelites of their bloc 56. In contrast, mass non-elite mobilization within the subcultures is a common characteristic that pressures elites, even in consociational setting; for example, Lijphart argues that mass mobilization is one of the key causes to the weakening of power sharing and the resulting instability in 1970s India 57. Similarly, the many times in which the consociational experience in Lebanon came under the threat of mobilization or elite incoherence, serve as another evidence that societal characteristics that render consociationalism possible do not commonly exist in divided societies. The reason these examples are taken from consociational democracies is to show that, even in societies that qualify for consociationlaism, the requisites of this type of democracy are hard to maintain. Of course, some of my arguments are clearer in big divided societies, for example, in those in which mass mobilization is a characteristic of their political dynamics. It is in light of this understanding I argue that consociational democracy does not refute the fact that social cohesion is a crucial pillar of democracy. Moreover, this discussion concludes that, despite consociational theory s seeming disagreement with the thesis of this paper, it actually strengthens my argument on two main grounds; 1) by closely examining consociational theory, it becomes clear that it constructs itself as a peculiar solution to the ailments of fragmentation; it, therefore, assumes that diverse societies are more prone to fragmentation than homogenous ones. However, consociational theory maintains that in those societies, this likelihood of fragmentation that would obstacle democracy is treated by elite consensus on a shared framework in which diversity is utilized in a way that does not result in a cleavage that hinders democracy. 56 Boynton and Kwon 1978, Lijphart 1996,

23 Having said this, consociational democracy, thus, does not equate diversity to political or social cleavages; rather, it falls in line with my conceptualization of cleavages, asserting that fragmentation, i.e. cleavages, occurs in cases where elites fail to arrive at a consensus that mitigates differences into a cohesive framework. In light of this reading of consociational democracy, I argue that this consensus among elite is best conceptualized as consensus on state identity; it is only when elites agree on a shared understanding of state identity, even if this understanding is the acknowledgement of differences, that they are able to mitigate their diversities. The second ground on which consociational theory strengthens my argument is that, after all, even if another reading of consociationalism asserts that diversity regarding the interpretation of state identity is the facilitator of consociational democracy, 2) it maintains a self-proclaimed limitation on its scope of applicability. The theory s assumptions regarding polities in which it functions are, in themselves, controversial and hardly representative of conditions commonly found in divided societies. This limitation is acknowledged by literature on consociational democracy; in fact, it presents itself as a peculiar solution to diversity that is only applicable under certain circumstances. Conclusion The discourse around Multiculturalism revolves around the problematics of democratic deliberations and equality among racially, linguistically, or religiously diverse populations. The over-focus on the impact of diversity on democracy comes in light of the increasingly observable phenomenon of politicizing differences for political ends. More often than not, this politicization of differences entails a degree of disruptive violence among ascriptively diverse groups. This observation is true in a cross-continental fashion. Yugoslavia, Sri Lanka, and Syria are few of the many examples that testify to this observation. In some other cases, however, we do not see a prolonged violence emanating from such differences. Cases like Indonesia (barring the

24 killings), India, and the more post-industrial Belgium are all diverse societies with little violence compared to the previously mentioned cases. The question this arises: Is diversity conducive to democracy? Or does it hinder democracy by invoking violence and immobility? As we have seen, the answer to this question receives no consensus. Empirically, there is no single correlation between diversity and any political regime type. In this paper, the aim is to highlight that diversity in itself does not mean much; rather, it is the politicization of this diversity in a way that jeopardizes consensus on the identity of the state that threatens democracy. Identity conflicts are not only explosive in nature and are likely to induce violence, but are also structurally emanating from reinforcing cleavages. These kinds of cleavages craft a zero-sum game dynamic among different political actors. Therefore, these actors are unlikely to resort to democracy in mitigating their differences. In a zero-sum game, sound electoral politics are near to impossible; the loss of one player means its total annihilation rather than a potential win next election round. For these reasons, shifting the focus from diversity to identity helps both academia and policy making circles in accurately identifying the problem they face in diverse societies. It will also help us as stdents of comparative politics to engage more meaningfully with the dynamics of civil war, violence, democratization, and majoritarian politics. In fact, further this paper is far from conclusive. Further research is needed to answer questions that are beyond the scope of this paper. If we shift the focus from the dependent variable of democracy, does the traditional definition of cohesion (measured by diversity) helpful to answer other questions? What are the factors that cause the politicization of differences to begin with? When does this politicization result in violence and why? Finally, does this argument hold in a nonstate context? All are questions that are very important to answer of we are to better understand multiculturalism, its ailments, and merits. 24

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