NGOs and Instable Power Dynamics

Transcription

1 NGOs and Instable Power Dynamics A case study of a local NGO in the Niger Delta Judith de Visser Wageningen University International Development Studies (MID) May, 2017

2 Abstract The Niger Delta is a region which characterised by poverty, marginalisation, lack of good governance, economic problems, environmental degradation and ethnic tensions. It is a place where many different actors try to gain legitimacy and power. A space that exists due to a governance gap, which they are eager to fill to be able to get what they want. Actors such as the government and customary leaders, but also actors such as militant leaders, cult leaders and vigilantes. All those actors create a fluid and dynamic power context in which struggles and conflicts are used as ways of consolidating one s power or as ways of getting more power. To be able to understand how NGOs deal with the security threats that exist because of those fluid power dynamics and the conflicts that accompany it, a local NGO is used as a case study. The local NGO, based in the Niger Delta, has extensive experience in working on topics such as violence, human rights, security, poverty, governance and development. An organisation that implements projects that addresses the many problems that the people in the region face in the midst of those instable and complex power dynamics,. As an organisation that focusses on good governance, human rights and conflict resolution, the local NGO is involved in the power dynamics as they influence how people think about the different governing entities and they tactics they use to gain legitimacy and power. Threats that the organisation faces are minimised by making sure they have knowledge of what is happening in communities, building networks that provide them with that information and building trust of both community leaders and community members. Besides dealing with different governing entities that try to gain legitimacy, sometimes also through the implemented development projects, the organisation also has to deal with donor agencies. Those donor agencies have standards concerning security risks as well that have to be dealt with when working in a region like this. Besides that, the donor agencies might also miss knowledge of local peculiarities which hinders the local NGO in its ability to deal with the instable power dynamics. Conflict, violence and a hybrid governance is a demanding context for an NGO to work in. Keywords: Governance, Hybrid Governance, Conflict, Security, Violence, Power Dynamics, Nigeria, Niger Delta, Development, Non-Governmental Organisation. 2

3 Frequently used Abbreviations CSO - Civil Society Organisation CBO - Community Based Organisation NGO - Non-Governmental Organisation LGA - Local Government Area NDI - Niger Delta Institutions 3

4 Table of Contents Introduction 6 1. Setting the Scene - The Niger Delta Nigeria and the Niger Delta Introducing the Actors Civil Society and Grass-Root Organisations Introducing the Organisation Changing Dynamics NGOs, Conflict, Governance and Security Theoretical Notions Liquidity, Legitimacy and Competition Twilight institution Governable Spaces Patrons, Strongmen or Big Men Development and Instability Methodology A Case Study Data Collection as an Intern in the Niger Delta Methods Researcher s Perceptions Limitations and Problems Power dynamics in the Niger Delta, an Insight A Hybrid Governance System Ungovernable Spaces or power dynamics? Competition, Legitimacy and Power Struggles Service Delivery or the Lack of It A Local NGO - Involvement and Insecurities The Organisation s Take on Power and Legitimacy in the Region Being Part of the Power Dynamics Local Staff Insecurities and Threats Donor Dependency Navigation of a Local NGO in a Complex Power Arena Dealing with big men 70 4

5 6.2 Knowledge and Networks Gaining and Keeping Trust Transparency Dealing with Donor Involvement 79 Conclusion and Discussion 82 References 86 5

6 Introduction It is a sunny afternoon in the office of a local NGO based in the Niger Delta. We just stood in a traffic jam for an hour. A traffic jam that existed while the patrol station in the street on the way to the office had patrol on that day. It seemed that half of Effurun-Warri stood in line to try to get some patrol. One of the drivers parked the car already in line the night before to try to get some patrol so we would be able to visit some of the communities as part of a project activity. My company lamented that it is typical that in a place where vast amounts of the country s riches lie beneath the surface in the form of oil, people have to stand in line to be able to get some of the patrol. When I get in the office I talk with one of the people there about the situation in the Niger Delta. I try to understand the existence of certain governance groups. Groups that seem to hurt the prospects of the Niger Delta. Groups that seem to further increase insecurity and violence in the region. There was explained that 1 : Communities are like a no-man s land where everybody strategically positions himself to capture some [of the] benefits. Even though they [the political elite] claim they are fighting for the people, they are really fighting for their own pocket. The reality is a governance gap and the [militant groups] try to fill that void for their own benefit, not for the people. The quote talks about a governance gap, a reason for groups in the case of this quote militant groups to exist. It started my thinking about the reasons for the existence of those groups and whether the financial benefits where enough to create a space for those groups. The quote also seemed to describe a context in which development work was extremely challenging. A context in which groups struggle to create a space for their own and in which new groups are established while there are governance gaps. This scene took place during my time as an intern at a local NGO in the region. I got the chance to work with an organisation on project implementation and project development. When doing so, I saw the problems that the organisation faced and observed how they dealt with them. This time also gave me the chance to get a better understanding of the context of the conflict that is going in the Niger Delta for decades, and it was salient that an adequate solution to end conflict and violence in the region and addressing the reasons that fuel, influence, affect or trigger the conflict has not been found by the actors involved. Instability, insecurity and uncertainty about who is in charge and what the future holds are ongoing issues in the region. In those circumstances, NGOs are implementing projects to improve the livelihoods of people, decrease marginalisation, eradicate poverty, improve conflict resolution, end violence and advocate for more transparency and accountability of government institutions. It was evident that the liquid power dynamics seriously affected the plans and the behaviour of the organisation. Questions that arose when working in such a context, were what are those power dynamics, how do they influence the work, in what way do they make the work of the NGO dangerous, how do they respond to those dangers, are there actual examples of situations in which instability and liquidity made a situation unsafe, how does it affect employees, how are they involved in those dynamics and how is the instability explained by people who are born and bred in the region and who work in the development scene now. 1 Author s Personal Conversation with Interviewee D. 6

7 In this research I want to look at the power dynamics in the region, at the effects of those dynamics on local NGOs and at how they navigate through those circumstances. The question that will be answered is how do local NGOs deal with the instable power dynamics in the Niger Delta. The research focuses on two aspects, security and ability to implement projects. How is space to work affected by power dynamics, how do local NGOs still create that space and how do they deal with limited space. To do this, a case study of a local NGO is done. The first chapter explains the context of the Niger Delta and the second chapter describes the theories that are used to analyse the data that is gathered. After that, three empirical chapters unravel the power dynamics in the Niger Delta and how NGOs are dealing with that. Firstly, the situation in which the NGO is implementing projects is unfolded. After that, the place of the NGO that is researched in the situation that is sketched is analysed. This chapter explains the NGOs view on the power dynamics in the region and how that effects security, ability to work, successfulness of projects and donor involvement. The third empirical chapter will pinpoint how the NGO is navigating in this situation of fluid power dynamics that affect the space in which it can work. The topic of this research derived from unanswered questions and striking facets of the situation in the Niger Delta and the different aspects of its context. The Niger Delta is a region in the South-East of Nigeria, characterised by many different ethnic groups who differ culturally and linguistically. The region is rich with natural resources, especially oil, which accounts for a large part of Nigeria s revenues, therefore the region is of huge economic importance to the country. People living in the Niger Delta deal with the huge environmental and social consequences of extensive oil extraction. Livelihoods of people are threatened due to environmental degradation. Moreover, people living in the region see the wealth that oil can bring, but that money is divided among a happy few. Marginalisation, under-development, violence and corruption seem to be endemic to the region, fuelling feelings of dissatisfaction, anger and hopelessness among its citizens. Talking to people, one realises that resource access and the billions that can be earned with oil is something that is on everyone s mind. Amid those and due to those destabilising facets and uncertainties about whether things are going to change or whether one has a home and a way to provide for one s family next month, a power struggle between different actors in the region is going on. This instable power arena further destabilises the region and has effects on the work of organisations that try to foster development, good governance, conflict resolution, accountability and an end to violence. Having organisations that work in those complex and fluid power dynamics is important, but people involved in implementing projects need to be safe. Furthermore, it is difficult to make sure that negotiation, communication or cooperation do not affect future project activities in other communities or with other leaders. Because of this, it is very important to understand the power dynamics, to know who is in charge, to understand who should be asked for permission for projects to be implemented in communities and to detect and sufficiently respond to changes in the power structures in the region. 7

8 1. Setting the Scene - The Niger Delta To put this research in perspective, it is necessary to know more about the relevant specifics of the region. Obviously, there is a lot that can be said about Nigeria and the Niger Delta concerning ethnicities, politics, economics, environmental issues and international involvement. Often the Niger Delta is known, if at all, for the oil struggles, the environmental degradation, the involvement of Shell and other big oil companies and the fight of indigenes for retribution of the losses the have due to oil spillages and an inability to share in the billions of oil dollars. This chapter touches upon those dynamics to help explain the issues in the region. 1.1 Nigeria and the Niger Delta Nigeria, one of the most populous countries in the world, is located in West Africa. It borders Benin in the west, Niger in the north, where it also touches Chad, in the west its neighbour is Cameroon and south is dominated by the coastline of the Gulf of Guinea which is part of the Atlantic Ocean. On the first of October of 1960, Nigeria gained independence from Great Britain. The Hausa-Fulani which are terms that both refer to a group of people in West-Africa, the Yoruba and the Igbo are the three largest groups. The Ijaws follow right after that 2. All the groups have their own language and not all people speak the official language of the country. The official language of Nigeria is English, however the country knows a staggering number of over 250 different ethnic groups 3. Besides English, Pidgin English is a language spoken by many people in Nigeria, especially in the Niger Delta region. Pidgin English is a creole language based on English. In Nigerian pidgin one can still find some Portuguese influences from the time that Portuguese trade ships anchored in the Bight of Benin for the slave trade. The North of the country is mostly Muslim and the South Christian. In the Niger Delta there are still some influences of indigenous beliefs 4. The NGO studied is located in the southeast of the country which is referred to as the Niger Delta of Nigeria. The region comprises the following states: Ondo State, Edo State, Delta State, Bayelsa State, Rivers State, Imo State, Abia State, Akwa Ibom State and Cross Rivers. Those states comprise of several Local Government Areas (LGAs) that are headed by the Local Government Council. This council is the institution of the state that is closest to the communities, it will be further brought forward in Chapter 4 which talks about the power dynamics in the region. The main cities of the region are Port Harcourt, Warri and Benin. Port Harcourt has, as the name already suggests, a port of the Atlantic Ocean and is the economic centre of the region, Warri was and is the centre of struggles between different ethnic groups. It is also the main centre for crude oil hustle and bustle and one can find several refineries around the city. Nowadays, Warri is also sometimes referred to as greater Warri, which includes cities that are connected to it, such as Efferun. Efferun is 2 The World Factbook: Nigera. (2007, January 12). Retrieved March 22, 2017 from: 3 The World Factbook: Nigeria [ ] 4 The World Factbook: Nigeria. [ ] 8

9 the place where the NGO studied is located. Benin City is known for its ancient history of the highly developed Benin empire. Politics Nigeria is a federation, composing of 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory. Since March 2015, the Federal Government is headed by Muhammadu Buhari from the All Nigerians People s Party (ANPP), a Fulani from the north of the country and a Muslim. Buhari is a major general who led a military coup in 1983, making him head of state and commander-in-chief. Within two years, another coup overthrew his rule, however he remained politically involved and influential as his election for president showed 5. In a speech given just weeks before he would be voted in as president, Buhari commented on the coupe that he led in He mentioned that there was 6 : Intervened because we were unhappy with the state of affairs in our country. [ ] Driven by patriotism, influenced by the prevalence and popularity of such drastic measures all over Africa and elsewhere, we fought our way to power. But the global triumph of democracy has shown that another and a preferable path to change is possible. It is an important lesson I have carried with me since, and a lesson that is not lost on the African continent. When Buhari took office, expectations were raised both nationally and internationally. He was expected to actively try to diminish corruption in the country as part of his strive to revitalise the economy. Also the security threats in the country were expected to be addressed, most notably the Islamic extremist group Boko Haram that is active in countries in the Lake Chad Basin, including the north of Nigeria. Although this was all promising and Buhari was cheered for also internationally, human rights organisations soon expressed concerns about how the new presidency was handling security threats of Boko Haram in the north of the country and in the southeast of militancy and ethnic tensions. As Human Rights Watch highlighted 7 : Old tensions and agitations for the independent state of Biafra in the southeast and renewed Niger Delta militancy was met with violent military crackdown, as government promises of security sector reform failed to translate to genuine concrete action. With this military response to disillusionment of people and instability due to a search for more independence, the administration of Buhari showed that it was in many ways not different from the former administrations despite what was promised. Buhari would not come to the rescue for all the Nigerians. It was mentioned often by people in the Niger Delta that they were unsure of the direction of the current administration, which shows distrust in it and lack of transparency of the government. The government decided on a military invasion of one of the villages in the Gbaramatu Kingdom the communities that combined form the Ijaw lands once again. The attack was just days before the NGO studied was supposed to visit one of the communities in the kingdom to talk about the ending of the 5 Falola, T., & Heaton, M. M. (2008). A history of Nigeria. Cambridge University Press. 6 Buhari, M. (2015). Prospects for democratic consolidation in Africa: Nigeria s transition. Chatham House, London, Nigeria. (2017). Retrieved March 20, 2017, from: 9

10 conflict-resolution project, making the visit impossible. People fled the village that was attacked. Some of them came to Effurun-Warri and in the office we discussed the end of the project as well as the military invasion. One of the community leaders of one of the communities tried to explain the situation during a project activity as follows 8 : We are not happy with the government. People are displaced, so they are not happy. Everyone has left the community, except for some elders. We are trying to get them out, but it is difficult. We cannot use the waterways as the military is everywhere and they will arrest everyone they see, so we have to track through the forest. There is no reason for arrest, there is not told on what account people are arrested, they don t ask any questions. Not about the [Niger Delta] Avengers and not about Tompolo. We all had to leave, we are displaced. This makes people unhappy and angry. Something has to change. We pray for a new government; this government has to go. People have lost all their trust in it. There has to be a new government. A government should protect its citizens, but this government is attacking them. We hope it will get better, people want change and until they get it they are tensed. It needs not much explanation that the situation is taking a turn for the worse. The situation also once again puts pressure on the existing power dynamics in the region. Economy In 1961, Chevron set foot on Niger Deltan soil by building a storage tank in Escravos, a riverine community relatively close to Warri. Shell followed in 1965 by inaugurating its headquarters of the western operations in Warri city 9. Although the headquarters have disappeared over the years, due to militant attack and the inability to safeguard the security of western personnel in the region, remnants of those days are still clearly visible when driving through Delta State. Huge compounds that used to be built for expats are now taken over by people from the region, since the walls that surround those compounds offer extra protection. The compounds have become little communities on their own. An important aspect is that oil companies are closely connected to the state, since they are in a joint venture together. The state legally owns all minerals, oil and gas in Nigeria, which is the what oil companies are obviously most concerned with. The Nigerian Constitution of 1999, holds in article 44(3) that: Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this section, the entire property in and control of all minerals, mineral oils and natural gas in under or upon any land in Nigeria or in, under or upon the territorial waters and the Exclusive Economic Zone of Nigeria shall vest in the Government of the Federation and shall be managed in such manner as may be prescribed by the National Assembly. This ownership is backed by several decrees and acts, among which the Petroleum Act (which was first promulgated in 1969), Petroleum Profits Act (1959), Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Act (1990, 1993), Land Use Act (1976), Oil Pipelines Act (1978), and the Oil in Navigable Waters Act (1979). The state controls the oil and deals with the oil multinationals, however the people of the Niger Delta bear the costs. Costs such as environmental degradation, diseases due to gas flaring and oil spillages and loss of livelihoods. Money is flowing in the Niger Delta, but the state is doing everything to keep that 8 Author s Personal Observation, June 2016, Effurun-Warri, Nigeria. 9 Ukiwo, U. (2007). From pirates to militants : A historical perspective on anti-state and anti-oil company mobilization among the Ijaw of Warri, Western Niger Delta. African Affairs, 106(425),

11 flow of cash in their own hands. It makes sense, for the reason that the export of petroleum is more than 90 per cent of the total export revenues, as the OPEC mentions. Besides that, oil and gas winning account for 35 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 10. However, it further alienates the people of the Niger Delta from their government as they feel left out, marginalised and unable to profit from the oil themselves. Oil is very important for the Nigerian economy and thus for the Nigerian government. As the factbook of the CIA 11 mentions, Nigeria is considered to be the largest economy in Africa, oil being the largest source of wealth. However, the same source also underlines that the Nigeria is characterised by inadequate power supply, lack of infrastructure, delays in the passage of legislative reforms, an inefficient property registration system, restrictive trade policies, an inconsistent regulatory environment, a slow and ineffective judicial system, unreliable dispute resolution mechanisms, insecurity and pervasive corruption (CIA, 2017). All those problems prevent sustainable wealth as well as an actual impact for all Nigerians. Furthermore, the economy is stooled on just one thing which is crude oil, mostly found in the South-East region of Nigeria, also known as the Niger Delta. The economy of Nigeria was hit hard by the dropping oil prices of 2015, negatively influencing the official currency of the country, the Naira. The black market for dollar exchange was thriving during the time of the research, dollars being worth more than twice as much than official rates at the banks. The economy and its reliance on oil leads to a necessity to protect the oil facilities at all costs, resulting in the presence of many security agents in the region. This in itself can be seen by people in the region as a threat, as those security agents protect oil facilities rather than people. Besides that, the existence of oil in the region cuts two ways for many of the inhabitants of the region. First, the oil exploitation has negatively affected the environment and with that the possibility of people to sustain their livelihoods. Those livelihoods were mostly based on fishery, forestry and small-scale agriculture. Secondly, the oil highlights the inequality between the tiny elite who has all the money and the bunk of people who have to do with a very little amount. Environment The oil business in the Niger Delta has created huge problems for the environment and with that for sustainable livelihoods of people. Gas flaring and oil spillages among other things such as dumping of waste and inadequate sewerage systems have destroyed the environment. Amnesty International iterates on an article that was published on their website that 12 : Oil spills have a devastating impact on the fields, forests and fisheries that the people of the Niger Delta depend on for their food and livelihood. Living and working in the Niger Delta does prove this impact. You can see and smell the impact of the environmental degradation in the region as there is a shade of shiny oil on almost every bit of water in 10 Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries. (2016). Nigeria. Retrieved May 03, 2017 from the website The World Factbook: Nigeria. [ ] 12 Amnesty International. (2015, November 3). Retrieved June 5, 2017 from the website

12 the region, as the rain that falls leaves black marks on white tiles, as the sun always shines through a cloud of polluted air, as you see the size of crops that are produced in the region and as you smell the air. A report of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) about environmental degradation due to oil in the Niger Delta, published in 2011, concluded that the soil and the groundwater is contaminated, vegetation suffers from the environmental degradation, the water that is used for drinking and which is part of the livelihoods of people such as farmers and fishers is polluted, the public health is suffering from the environmental degradation and that institutional issues as well as actions of oil multinationals hinder real change 13. It is a whole research on its own to look into the once that are to blame, as everyone is pointing fingers. The government owns the oil, the oil multinationals have their share to play in the flaring of gas and the spillage of oil, the militants and their attacks on oil facilities and pipelines have their hand in some of the oil spillages and allegedly people living in the Niger Delta are to blame for opening pipelines to steal raw oil Ethnic Diversity The Niger Delta is, like Nigeria at large, a melting pot of different ethnic groups that are more or less related to one another and who speak more than 200 different languages or dialects. Among the main ethnic groups are the Ijaw, Itsekiri, Urhobo, Ogoni, Yoruba, Igbo and Isoko. Some specifics are worth mentioning in the light of this research. Ethnic lines are strong in the region. In the cities, the different ethnicities merge, but in the communities this is usually not the case. In a populous place like the Niger Delta where fertile soil becomes rare and where the air is toxic of gas flaring and oil spills, conflicts about territory and power are not unexpected. The Ijaws and the Itsekiris have not been on very good terms already since colonial times. One of the people from the organisation researched explained that the Ijaw have always felt having less opportunities for proper education and that they thought Itsekiris always were more educated and developed. It created and creates tensions. Besides that, the Itsekiris and the Urhobos are having a conflict too. The Ijaws claim they provide for about ninety per cent of the oil and mineral resources in the region, as the Itsekiri have a claim to some. Politically, the Itsekiri want to overpower the Ijaws, which they would not allow 16. According to the local NGO studied, the ethnic strives are influential and have been a major influencing part of the ongoing conflict in the Niger Delta 17 : There was a crisis between the Ijaws and the Itsekiris on the one hand and between the Itsekiris and Urhobos on the other hand. The Ijaws claim they are host to some of the oil multinationals. The Ijaws claim they provide about 90% of the oil and mineral resources of the region, as the Itsekiri also have 13 UNEP. (2011). Environmental Assessment Ogoniland. Retrieved June 5, 2017 from: 14 Deutche Welle. (20 March, 2015). Oil spills keep devastating Niger Delta. Retrieved 5 June, 2017 from Campbell, A. J. (August 17, 2017). Oil pollution in the Niger Delta: Whose fault? Retrieved June 6, 2017 from Author s Personal Conversation with Interviewee A. 17 Author s Personal Conversation with interviewee A. 12

13 some. In terms of politics, the Itsekiris want to have dominance over the Ijaws. The Ijaws would not allow this. In 1997, conflict was fired up when the Ijaws and the Itsekiris got into a violent fight about moving the LGA headquarters of Warri South West from an Ijaw to an Itsekiri community In 2003, a conflict between the two ethnicities ended up in destroying an Itsekiri village to the ground 20. The tensions between the Itsekiri and the Ijaw is coming together in the city of Warri. As explained by one of the members of the organisation researched 21, the main road dividing the city centre also divides the two ethnicities. Distrust between the different ethnic groups runs deep, although their struggles are often similar. Most of the ethnic groups strive for more self-determination, more independence and access to and power over their own territory. Besides this conflict between the Itsekiri and the Ijaw, there are conflicts between other groups, such as the Ijaw and the Yoruba who have similar features. 1.2 Introducing the Actors There are various groups, people or big men that are linked to having power in the Niger Delta. In Chapter 4, the existence and dynamics is discussed. However, in this background chapter it is useful to already introduce some of the peculiarities of the different groups, to get a grip of what they are, what they mean to community members and how they came into existence. Groups that will come back often are militants, militant leaders, cult groups, vigilantes, chiefs or traditional leaders and the state. The chiefs and traditional leaders as well as the state are well known notions in governance, however militants, cult members and vigilantes might be less known. What is good to realise already here is that if a person is part of a cult group, it does not mean that he is not involved in local governance systems or in militancy. Ethnic ties have always been extremely strong, but even that can now be broken due to the cult groups. In addition to the inter-ethnic conflicts, the feeling of distrust, government failure, marginalisation and an inability to benefit from the oil dollars has fuelled conflicts between ethnic groups and the Nigerian government. Those conflicts resulted in several grass-root organisations of different ethnic groups. The Ogoni people struggled for emancipation and independence for years for which they founded the MOSOP the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People which was connected to Ken Saro- Wiwa after he wrote the Ogoni Bill of Rights. This bill asked most importantly for more political independence and self-determination of the Ogoni people, because 22 we are faced with a situation where we have no food to eat, no water to drink and no air to breathe (p.251). Talking about the environmental degradation due to oil extraction thus meant that he was not only opposing the Nigerian government, but also the oil multinationals active in the region, most notably the Anglo-Dutch Shell. Saro-Wiwa became known and important, since he was executed by the Nigerian government in a military trial that was condemned by human rights organisations and the international community 18 Ojakorotu, V. (Ed.). (2009). Contending issues in the Niger Delta crisis of Nigeria. JAPSS Press. 19 Charles Ukeje & Wale Adebanwi (2008) Ethno-nationalist claims in southern Nigeria: insights from Yoruba and Ijaw nationalisms since the 1990s, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 31:3, Author s Personal Observation, June 2016, Effurun-Warri, Nigeria. 21 Author s Personal Observation, May 2016, Warri South LGA, Nigeria. 22 Omadjohwoefe, O. S. (2011). Amnesty initiative and the dilemma of sustainable development in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. Journal of Sustainable Development, 4(4),

14 at large as being unfair and politically driven 23. The non-violent strive of the Ogoni people ended in violence from the Nigerian government. Besides the Ogoni people, other ethnic groups also voiced their anger about the marginalisation that fell upon them in non-violent ways. The Ijaws published the Kaiama Declaration in In this declaration the Ijaws demanded self-determination, equality and social justice and it also established the Ijaw Youth Council 24. In 1999, the Ikwerre Youth Convention declared the Ikwerre Rescue Charter. The Oron and the Urhobo published respectively the Oron Bill of Rights and the Urhobo Bill of Rights 25. Militancy Militancy in the Niger Delta is not a new concept. Militant groups were created during as a reaction to the oppressive military regime which started with a military coup in 1985 and lasted until 1998, as a reaction to marginalisation of (some of) the ethnic groups and as a way to fight inter-ethnic conflicts. The Ogoni people introduced the region to a fight for independence, although their strive was characterised by non-violence in the beginning of the nineties. Ukiwo 26 explains the rise of militancy in the region from the Ijaw perspective, explaining their long strive for independence and equal opportunities for development. He mentions that after the Kaiama Declaration, Ijaw youth saw the need for the establishment of militias that used violence to make their wishes and goals known to the people. Many other ethnicities followed and by the end of the nineties, pipeline attacks, kidnappings and violence were understood as necessary ways of achieving what the groups wanted to achieve. Making oil facilities the major target of militant attacks has already and continues to threaten the economy of the country as it leans heavily on the export of crude oil. It makes solving the militant issue in the Niger Delta an important concern, not just for the sake of security and peace but also for the sake of money 27. Militant groups are like a military formation. They are well-organised and have, for example, a general chief and a second in command. Besides that, the militant groups are well equipped, and when they offshore oil refineries they use up to ten boats. The have the equipment to attack from far away 28. As Omadjohwoefe 29 mentions: These groups are armed with sophisticated weapon of terror, adopt guerrilla tactics of confrontation (p.253). Militants have been part of the Niger Delta for more than twenty years now and many of the youth if not all have has connections to one or more militant groups, some as being a member, some as having friends or relatives who are members. 23 The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica. (2016, March 17). Ken Saro-Wiwa. Retrieved March 21, 2017 from 24 The Ijaw Youths of the Niger Delta. (1998). The Kaiama Declaration. Retrieved March 21, 2017 from: 25 Omadjohwoefe, O. S. (2011).[...] 26 Ukiwo, U. (2007). From pirates to militants : A historical perspective on anti-state and anti-oil company mobilization among the Ijaw of Warri, Western Niger Delta. African Affairs, 106(425), Oluduro, O., & Oluduro, O. F. (2012). Nigeria: In search of sustainable peace in the Niger Delta through the Amnesty Programme. Journal of Sustainable Development, 5(7), Author s Personal Observation, March-June 2016, Effurun-Warri, Nigeria. 29 Omadjohwoefe, O. S. (2011). [ ] 14

15 What is important to notice is that militancy found its way due to several local realities. Militancy finds its origin in the fight for self-determination and independence of the Ijaw ethnic group. It was and is as much about a fight against an oppressive government as it is about inter-ethnic conflicts. Conflicts that revolve around land and power and conflicts that saw a rise in importance when the first oil companies found their way to the Niger Delta and actual money started playing a more important role. Conflicts that are most visible between the Ijaws and the Itsekiris, which was sketched before. However, it was also then when environmental degradation and its effects became vivid. Just as the cultists, militants were given money and supplies by different powerful people, political leaders not excluded. In 2006, an umbrella organisation claiming to combine all the relevant militant groups in the region named MEND the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta entered the stage. The spokespersons of MEND declared that the organisation was apolitical, but Watts refutes this. I follow his argument which states that MEND was a clear political platform that demanded the release of several community leaders and the payment of a compensation from Shell for the impact of the extraction of oil from their lands 30. MEND attacked the military, bombed oil installations and embarked on kidnappings of oil expats to get money. The oil business was crippled due to destruction of facilities and fear of kidnappings. During this time, the Niger Delta became a dangerous place especially for Western people as they were the target for kidnappings that mostly had a financial motif 31. During the last years, the Niger Delta knew a period of relevant rest. In 2009, an amnesty programme was introduced by former President Umar Musa Yar'Adua as part of conflict resolution in the region. It involved disarmament of militants and resulted in relative peace and security in the region. The programme provided for financial stimulus for militants to rehabilitate and learn skills to be able to provide for them and their families without feeling the need to use militancy 32. Besides that, the programme also intended to spark development in the region 33. The Amnesty programme was a necessary follow up of the military-led Joint Task Force (JTF). The JTF was installed by the Nigerian government to fight militancy in the Niger Delta, and they did so with great effort. The JTF is stained with distrust, anger of people in the Niger Delta and failure to secure a peace due to use of violence and to violent and disproportionate attacks on whole communities, such as the genocide in Ogoni land in 1993, Odi massacre of 1999 and the Gbaramatu ethnocide of Answering violence with more violence proved to be a failure when talking about restoring security, ending militancy and making sure that the oil export did not suffer, which is why the non-violent amnesty programme was to make a difference. The programme was useful, as one of the interviewees underscored by saying 35 : Before [the Amnesty programme] there was hardly a month without a record of pipeline vandalism, but with this Amnesty programme that vandalism has reduced. [ ] The programme has contributed to the peace and stability in the region which we are experiencing now. 30 Watts, M. (2007) [ ] 31 Rijksoverheid. (2017, April 4). Reisadvies Nigeria. Retrieved June 6, 2017 from Agbiboa, D. E. (2013). Armed Groups, Arms Proliferations and the Amnesty Program in the Niger Delta, Nigeria. Journal of Third World Studies, 30(2), Omadjohwoefe, O. S. (2011). [ ] 34 Omadjohwoefe, O. S. (2011). [ ] 35 Author s Personal Conversation with Interviewee A. 15

16 As an addition to the amnesty programme of the federal government that mostly focused on disarmament and financial aid, a project was implemented by several local NGOs based in the Niger Delta focusing on the social aspects, such as conflict resolution, reintegration of former militants and to create sustainable peace. The project activities were much more focused on creating awareness on the effects of violence and militancy on people in the region and the possibilities of non-violent negotiation in the communities, to end the circle of violence and to build the capacity of communities to respond differently than with militancy, and they brought the community members together to discuss, talk and get to terms with the past to do different in the future. Lately, however, militancy and dissatisfaction fired up once again. When Buhari came to power, representatives of the Amnesty Programme underlined that the fragile peace in the region could only hold if the lucrative pipeline protection contracts awarded to key ex-militant leaders by the Jonathan administration were reinstated; the amnesty programme was extended beyond the 2017 deadline; the trials of some Niger Delta indigenes charged with corruption were suspended; and some former militant leaders serving jail terms for post-amnesty gun-running crimes and terrorism were released (p.98) 36. Actions of which some are clearly opposing Buhari s position concerning corruption and ending insecurity in the country and in the region. Following his ideals, Buhari started prosecutions of former militant leaders and big men in the region for corruption and misuse of power. According to the people in the Niger Delta, those prosecutions were inconsistent and the cover of corruption was merely used to arrest the former militant leaders, although amnesty was promised if they would cooperate in the government-led Niger Delta Amnesty Programme. The leaders opposed the new tactics of the government and fled back into the creeks and their former militant camps because they were afraid of being arrested, creating an environment of unrest. On top of this, the new administration declared that the Niger Delta Amnesty Programme of the Federal Government will either end or continue in a different way. As a result, some former militants and followers of the former militant leaders declared they would consider going back to militancy to be able to get what they think they deserve. A clear example of the willingness to return to the militant camps is the coming into being of a new militant group in the beginning of the year 2016 named the Niger Delta Avengers. The reasons for the attacks that this group has undertaken since their establishment are, according to them, injustice against the people of the Niger Delta, fraudulent practices of the Federal Government of Nigeria, corruption and oppression. They claim to protect the interests of the people of the Niger Delta and to do so they try to get international attention for their struggle. The following quote from a document posted on their website in January 2017 gives an impression of the tone the organisation is using and shows that the group is serious, also beyond : To our Niger Delta people, we feel your pains from these dashed hopes of a genuine talk once again. All fighters and commands are hereby placed on high readiness in your webs of operations to hit and knock the enemy very hard. [ ] We are determined to hit him very hard and deadly that even his eyes will shed blood, his ear will be more deafened and his heart shall quake [ ]. 36 Aghedo, I. (2017). The Ubiquity of Violent Conflicts in Nigeria. The Round Table, 106(1), Operation walls of Jericho and hurricane Joshua. (2017, January 6). Retrieved January 25, 2017 from

17 This quote shows the readiness of the militant group to take violent action, but it also resembles and addresses the hopelessness and even anger of people in the Niger Delta as they feel left alone by their government once again. It is an emotional explanation of why the violence they have used or are going to used is legitimate and it shows a deep-rooted distrust and disappointment in the Nigerian state, which is the enemy as can be seen in the reasons for their existence. Another instigator for further anger was the abolishment of the Maritime University that was planned to be opened close to the riverine communities in the Niger Delta. The impact of this decision was strongly put by one of the interviewees, saying 38 : The educational project should bring the minds of the youths at ease. It would attract development. Since the pronouncement [of president Buhari to abolish the university, there were a lot of negative reaction, preparing the minds of the youths towards violence. The quote shows that the abolishment of the promised university is explained as a failure the government to provide for their citizens and to care about their well-being. It is explained as further prove that one can never trust the government to stand up for the people of the Niger Delta as promises are broken repeatedly. Besides the failure of the government to address the security issues in the region sustainably, the project focusing on the social aspects of conflict resolution came to a sudden ending due to donor issues. The first part of the project was implemented, but when the second part of the programme supposed to start, financial assets from the donor organisation did not reach the implementing partners that were local NGOs with a high focus on community-based project implementation. Some of the activities were continued in the beginning, but as it is expensive to reach the riverine communities soon visits of the implementing partner ended and community leaders and community members were left with little to explain what was happening and why. The riverine communities where the project was implemented were communities where many militant were residing and one of the communities was the place where the Ijaw militant leader Tompolo grew up. This is important, as it means that those are the communities where militancy in the Niger Delta finds its roots and so when one wants to address militancy in the region those are the places where you can work on root causes of it. Premature endings of projects focused on conflict resolution are always a dangerous thing, but in the Niger Delta at this specific timing and in those specific communities it is one more reason for a change for the worse. If root causes are not addressed, there are too many reasons and there are too little barriers to return to militancy. During a discussion about the ending of the project, there was mentioned by an employee of one of the NGOs that there is no doubt that war is coming 39. This is not to say that war is coming due to the ending of this specific project failure, however it is one more reason to lose trust and to take matters in once own hands. The second concern is that due to a unexpected and unintended project ending, trust that has been built over the years is easily shattered which means local NGOs may find it difficult to work with those communities in the future. If war is coming there will be a need for organisations like those local NGOs, but in conflict situations trust is ever so important to assure safety. 38 Autor s Personal Conversation with Interviewee A. 39 Author s Personal Observation, June 2016, Port Harcourt, Nigeria. 17

18 Cult groups Cultism in Nigeria knows its origin in the 1950s at universities where groups were established as confraternities aiming at improving Nigeria by fighting corruption and colonial legacies. Important to realise is that the groups that are now known as cults did not start as violent, secret and dangerous groups. Words that they are now so often described with. Only from the 80s onwards, the groups started to become involved in violence and politics. This happened mainly because military rule used the groups to forward their vision, giving them both money and weapons to be able to do so 40. This patrimonial system resulted in the once peaceful groups turning into the violent and secret cult groups that are now widely spread in Nigeria and who have also established their place in communities in the Niger Delta. Militant groups and cult groups are sometimes difficult to separate, as there are many similarities between the two groups and as militants can be cultists and vice versa. This was explained by one of the interviewees when talking about a militant leader of the eastern command of MEND, Ateke Tom. This militant leader was once a cultist, and being in the powerful position that he is in now other members of the cult group he was part of still pay him allegiance. Only Delta State where Effurun-Warri is located knows a different context, since the militant leader there Tompolo was never known to be connected to any cult. Still, it is clear that one cannot deny that Tompolo has substantial power over cult groups. One of the interviewees 41 iterated that if somebody like Tompolo identifies a cult, he can tell the cult leader I want you to stop this in that place and the cult leader will obey. It shows that it is believed that militant leaders hold more power than the cult leaders, however the strength of the cult groups lies within their ability to control society with fear. In a way this also counts for militant groups, however their violence is directed towards the Nigerian government and international oil multinationals. They gain their legitimacy of the people by taking their concerns seriously and fighting for independence, development and an end to the actions of oil multinationals that worsen the environment even more. A concern mentioned by one of the respondents 42 on cultism in the region was that they are beginning to come out openly and wrack havoc, continuing by mentioning that they engage in actual fights where people are killed. Besides that, the cult groups that used to be connected to university, a selective group of society, now spread to secondary education and sometimes even at primary education. One more concern that makes cult groups a dangerous endeavour is their ability to crosscut ethnic ties. Where it used to be certain for people in the Niger Delta that one s own kin would always have one s back, it is now uncertain due to the interference of cultism. Cult-ties are stronger than ethnic ties, which is something that has never happened before. Lastly, the inability to leave a cult group distinguishes it from militancy. While projects like the Amnesty Programme and the project that tries to rehabilitate former militants show that militants can turn their back to their militant life, it is hardly impossible for cult members to do so, due to the secret nature of the groups. 40 Matusitz, J., & Repass, M. (2009). Gangs in Nigeria: an updated examination. Crime, law and social change, 52(5), ; Ololube, N. P., Agbor, C. N., & Uriah, O. A. (2013). Vicious Hazard to Peace Culture in Tertiary Education: The Activities of the Secret Cults. British Journal of Education, Society & behavioural Science, 3(1), Author s Personal Conversation with Interviewee B. 42 Author s Personal Conversation with Interviewee D. 18