Conflict Studies and Management: Theories and Concepts

Transcription

1 Conflict Studies and Management: Theories and Concepts Role of Amnesty to Peacebuilding: A Case of the Niger Delta An Assessment of the Relationship Between Shortcomings of the Amnesty Programme and Resurgence of Grievances and Conflicts in the Region FEBRUARY 2017 RAHMATULLAH BATOOR ERFURT, GERMANY All Rights Reserved.

2 I. INTRODUCTION On 25 th of June 2009, Nigeria s President Umaru Musa Yar Adua signed an amnesty package to address the violent conflicts in the Niger Delta known as the Presidential Amnesty Programme (PAP). The Programme offered unconditional amnesty, pardon and freedom from persecution to all the militants who were directly or indirectly involved in the armed struggle against the state, and who surrendered their weapons and ammunitions and renounced militancy in all its ramifications (Idonor, 2009). The PAP was offered within a 60 days period, from 6 th of August to 4 th of October 2009 during which the militants could surrender their arms to the collection centers and become beneficiaries of the amnesty package. The pogramme aimed to induce peace and stability, secure the region for better exploration and extraction of crude oil, and facilitate sustainable development in the in the resource rich and conflict-torn Niger Delta region (Omokhoa & Ikelegbe, 2016). The amnesty programme was theoretically set up with three phases: first, the disarmament and demobilization phase, then the rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-militants, and following these processes, the post-amnesty package of large infrastructure development of the Niger Delta region (Austine & Sunday, 2013, p. 133). As the Federal Government launched the PAP, many of the militants operating in Niger Delta responded positively to the government s call for peace and accepted the amnesty offer. Within the specified 60 days period, around 26,358 militants registered for the amnesty. In an extended second phase of the programme during November 2010, another cohort of 6,616 militants surrendered their weapons (Austine & Sunday, 2013). But the disgruntled militants who remained out of the programme, continued their agitations and acts of violence which meant that the conflict is not completely is resolved (Oluduro & Oluduro, 2012). The militants who accepted the Programme were entitled to a monthly cash stipend. Further, as part of the re-integration process, some of the participants were provided with different vocational training, entrepreneurship training and educational programs both in Nigeria and abroad. The amnesty programme was expected to increase the human capital of the Niger Delta and Nigeria - as the government proclaimed that many of these militants are able-bodied youths whose energies could be harnessed for the development of Niger Delta and the Nation at large (Idonor, 2009); and facilitate employment and re-integration of the ex-militants to the society.

3 Research Question The generally asked question in the academic sphere is to what extent has the presidential amnesty programme contributed to peacebuilding in the region. The continued restiveness and attacks on oil installations (see Laessing, 2016), seven years after the launch of the amnesty programme indicate that the programme has not been able to facilitate a sustainable peace and development in the region. Increasing militant activities and widespread grievances still obscure the image of peacebuilding in the region. Based on a critical assessment of the existing literature, reports and academic articles on the formulation, implementation and impacts of the presidential amnesty programme, this paper is geared towards explaining the relationship between the exclusiveness property & the resultant shortcomings of the presidential amnesty package and the subsequent resurgence of conflicts in the Niger Delta region. The term exclusiveness or exclusivity, throughout this paper refers to the following three areas of non-inclusion of key stakeholders or complementary instruments of peacebuilding and post-amnesty development interventions: 1. An elite- centred, non-participatory consultation during the formulation process of the programme i.e. adoption of a top-down approach in which only the highest-level militant commanders and the Federal Government officials participated, and the militants on the ground had no say in the process. 2. Limited scope of the of the amnesty programme. Only a small number of militants who yielded their ammunitions take advantage of the package. The victims, families without militant member (killed or not joined the programme), the rest of militants and unemployed youth, and the community at large are excluded from the amnesty benefits. 3. Amnesty as a signal (exclusive) instrument, is not sufficient to resolve a protracted conflict with the long ingrained political, economic and social roots, like Niger Delta s. Organization of the paper The upcoming section of this reviews the formation of the presidential amnesty programme with an overview of the conflicts evolution. Then, the section three will analyse the utility of amnesty to peacebuilding with reference to Galtung & Fischer's (2013) theoretical model of peacebuilding. Under this section, the challenges before the PAP arising from an exclusive formulation and a subsequent defective implementation will be assessed. The paper further argues that amnesty alone (as an exclusive instrument) can only address one layer of the conflict i.e. direct violence. For a sustainable peace, a more diverse and holistic measure need to be taken that could address the root causes of the conflict in the post-amnesty stage. At the end,

4 the conclusion will sum up and iterate the paper s findings related to relationship between the exclusivity limitation of amnesty and the current unrests in the Niger Delta region. *** II. THE NIGER DELTA CONFLICT AND FORMATION OF THE AMNESTY The discovery of oil reserves in great quantities in Oloibiri village of Bayelsa State in 1956, and subsequent expansion into other areas in the Niger Delta, switched the mode of conflict from previously palm oil to petroleum (crude oil) and increased the strategic importance of the region (Oluwaniyi, 2011). Subsequently, major transnational oil companies such as Shell, ExxonMobil, Total, Chevron, Elf, Agip and Texaco, and the state run Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) entered in the region for exploration and extraction of crude oil (Oluwaniyi, 2011, 9. 48). With hopes on the horizon, the local inhabitants who mostly rely on agricultural lands and fishing creeks as their main sources of livelihoods, saw the oil exports as a new hope for the development and welfare of the region. But to their mischief, the exploration and extraction of oil started to make the local communities poorer and their environment contaminated (Oluduro & Oluduro, 2012). According to Okonofua (2011), as a result of the commencement of oil extraction in the region, Overnight, the serene and peaceful creeks and swamps were turned into a convoluted sprawling mass of industrial waste, noise, pollution, overpopulation, exploitation, poverty, deprivation, and squalor (p. 44). The agitations over the environmental impacts of oil exploration and persistent political negligence of the Nigerian state towards the issue led to popular grievances. In addition to the negative environmental effects of oil production, the oil-rich ethnic minorities in the Niger Delta region were left in abject poverty, and marginalized politically by Nigeria s military governments. Due to these problems, the oil rich communities of Ogoni ethnic minority formed of the Movement for Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) in 1990s which organized nonviolent protests to raise the issue of environmental impacts of oil extraction activities, and economic and political discrimination against the Ogoni people. The nonviolent protests in Ogoniland were confronted with terror and suppression by the government s Security Task Forces. Crushing the protesters, MOSOP s leader an Ogoni activist Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other members were hanged after a short jungle trial in November (Austine & Sunday, 2013; Oluwaniyi, 2013; Okonofua, 2011, p. 46)

5 As a reaction to this and other incidences, the aggrieved and unemployed youth population of Niger Delta found themselves in a conflict with the central government and the multinational oil companies. Consequently, in the 1990s several armed militant groups emerged claiming to fight for justice, equality in distribution of oil rents and compensation for the environmental damages. Even after Nigeria s government turned to democracy in 1999, the Niger Delta did not see any improvement in the situation. To cope with the problem, the government initiated several strategies including appointing commissions and development boards, before and after 1999, such as Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) in 1992; and the Petroleum (Special) Trust Fund (PTF) in 1995 Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) in 2000, to mention but a few. They could neither bring stability nor help development of the region. (Oluwaniyi, 2011) and the armed struggles continued in the Niger Delta. From 2006 to 2009 the violent conflicts intensified when militants carried effective attacks on oil installations, challenged the state deployed security forces, resorted to kidnapping of the employees of oil companies, oil bunkering, piracy, oil theft and proliferation in illegally setup refineries causing substantial reduction in oil production and government revenues. In 2008 and 2009 Nigeria s oil export losses were reported to be 1.4 million barrels per day, or $34 billion lost per year (Newsom, 2011) and about 1,000 people lost their lives, 300 were taken hostage; and the high incidences of violence led to government s launch of amnesty (Oluduro & Oluduro, 2012, 51). *** III. UTILITY OF THE AMNESTY TO PEACEBUILDING IN NIGER DELTA The Niger Delta Amnesty Programme was supposed to build sustainable peace and facilitate development in the region. Hence, it seems appropriate to look at the programme from a peacebuilding point of view. According to Galtung & Fischer (2013), any concept of peace includes absence of direct violence; but peace would be a strange (incomplete) concept when it does not the absence of structural violence (the unintended slow, massive suffering caused by economic and political structures in the form of massive exploitation and repression; and the absence of cultural violence that legitimizes direct and-or structural violence (Galtung & Fischer, 2013, p.173). They maintain that the process of peacebuilding consists of the tasks of building direct, structural and cultural peace. A negative peace is the absence of direct violence; it is like a point of neither violence, nor positive peace which is a passive coexistence. While positive peace encompasses both, the absence of direct violence, structural

6 injustice and exploitation, and the existence of mutual cooperation, equality and understanding among the parties. (Galtung & Fischer, 2013). Hence, considering these peace studies concepts, the following part will assess the contributions of the Niger Delta Presidential Amnesty Programme to (positive) peacebuilding in the region. Direct and Indirect Violence in the Niger Delta Ebiede (2016) observes different types of (direct) violent conflicts among the communities in the Niger Delta region: The struggle for natural resources in the Niger Delta has not only pitted the people against the state; it has also created internal conflicts that form part of the overarching conflict narrative in the region. Apart from the rebel-state dimension, communities are divided by intra-communal, intercommunal, interethnic, political, and criminal violence, with rebel groups featuring prominently. (African Peacebuilding Network APN Working Papers No. 5, 2016) These various types of violent conflicts and militancy rising on the top of the list, spring from an enabling socio-politician and economic situation. The Niger Delta has spawned a confusing array of armed groups, many of which mix ideological aims with criminal enterprises such as drug dealing, the kidnapping of oil workers, and oil bunkering as Asuni (2009) reports. Some of the militant groups and gangs responsible for the attacks and other acts of violence have connection with the other actors in the region whose economic interests and political motivations sometimes contrast with the hold a sustainable peace in the region. According to Asuni (2009), they often enjoy the protection of senior politicians and are armed and paid by their patrons to mete out violence on their opponents and deliver the desired results at elections. Once the groups are given weapons, it is virtually impossible to demobilize them, even after their patrons no longer require their services. The evidences refer to an established correlation between the existence of structural chaos, lack of accountability of the local and international actors working in the region, with the violent conflicts that emerge in various forms as product or symptoms of the fundamental problems. However, most of the fundamental types of violence in the region relate to implicit or Indirect Violence such as the negligence of political authorities and leaders towards the political and economic demands of the Niger Delta, widespread corruption mainly caused by the oil income, lack of corporate social responsibility of the oil industry and ethnic politics at the national, and Niger Delta regional level. A United States Institute of Peace report during the armed conflicts of 2009 refers to the strong presence of cultural violence: The federal government virtually ignored the Niger Delta during the 1990s, leaving development in the hands of the oil companies. The oil industry exploited and polluted the area, wiping out the traditional livelihoods of fishing and farming and providing few jobs or benefits in return. (Asuni, 2009)

7 Further, in addition to the lack of environmental accountability, security strategies of the oil companies fuel violence in the region. According to Amunwa (2012), the companies direct involvements with the militant groups promote conflicts in the region. A part of the report explains the issue: The routine payments to armed militants made by Shell, Chevron, NNPC (Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation) and other companies have fuelled violence in the Niger Delta over the past decade. It is estimated that the distribution of cash and contracts by oil companies has contributed to the killing and displacement of thousands of local people in communal and ethnic conflicts. Company security contracts have rewarded violence by channelling funds towards the most powerful armed groups For instance, Shell and Chevron have paid $300 per month to individual armed militants in Warri in 2003, which added to the weapons piles of the militants. According to the report, an estimated 500 people were subsequently killed in the Warri conflict (Amunwa, 2012) Newsom (2011) observes the other link between the lack of structural reforms and emergence of violence in the country. As per Newsom s observations of the situation, the lack of democratization in Nigeria has crippled even nascent efforts at reform, and the resulting social, economic, and political stagnation relates directly to the rising trend of violence The interrelations between state priorities, structural deficiencies, oil industry s operations and competition over the share of revenues, and existence of widespread poverty and underdevelopment, environmental and militancy and criminal violence have encircled the Niger Delta region in a perpetual conflict trap. Cultural violence and structural violence in the region seem to mutually reinforce each other; while both contributing, and being affected by direct violence (hard conflicts) in the region. Figure 1. The Existing Forms of Violence and the Amnesty Direct Violence Amnesty Programme Cultural Violence (Indirect) Structural Violence (Indirect) Source: The Author, based on Galtung & Fisher (2013)

8 Utilities of the Amnesty Package The Niger Delta amnesty programme was particularly launched to tackle the direct violence which presented itself in form of armed rebellion and militant activities in the region. The programme s implementation was followed by a period of relative stability in the region because a large proportion of the active militants, including their commanders, accepted the offers of the amnesty package. As Ogege (2011) puts it: It is worthy to note without equivocation that the amnesty initiative successfully but temporarily put an end to militancy and insecurity in the region thereby paving way for uninterrupted exploration and exploitation by the multinational oil companies (Ogege, 2011, p. 254) With the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process in place, a considerable number of the militants surrendered their weapons and consequently, the programme appeared to have reduced the incidence of conflict and the accumulation and influx of arms by militants across the eight Niger Delta states (Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Delta, Rivers Cross River, Edo, Imo and Ondo)(Austine & Sunday, 2013, p. 133). Based on the geographical distributions, almost 85% of the disarmed ex-militants come from the main oil-producing states of Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers which were the hotspots of militant activities and conflicts (Ushie, 2013, p. 34) Another notable outcome of the amnesty programme was its contribution to improvement of Nigerian state s relations with her international partners, and showing the goodwill of Nigerian leaders in dealing with insecurity and threats in the Niger Delta region. The period was marred by increasing rates of kidnapping of employees and general insecurity in the Niger Delta which threated Nigeria s international diplomatic relations, especially with the home countries of the foreign employees of the oil industry in the region. The immediate reduction of rates of violence and hostage taking due to disarmament of the militants, according to (Ogege, 2011) rebranded and gave Nigeria a positive image among the comity of nations but for the spate of kidnapping for ransom that became pervasive in the south-east geo-political zone of Nigeria Perhaps the most important achievement of the programme could be seen in the quick rise of oil revenues of Nigerian government. Soon after the implementation of the programme the income from crude oil exports from the region increased by a staggering million dollars per day (Ogege, 2011) because the oil companies had a much favourable situation then before. Therefore, they increased production and exports.

9 However, the amnesty did not bring about a sustainable peace or development in the region. The Nigerian government used the programme as an instrument of eliminating the militancy (direct violence) while the root issues were not appropriately addressed. The programme may have produced relative stability in the region but a comprehensive peace requires much more than dealing with rebels only through payment of cash or other programmes, as the potential for other youth to begin militancy gets even higher. The amnesty benefits only to the militants implied to the rest that one can earn advantages with having a gun ; the weapons paid off and those who were not members of the militant groups remained outside the scope of the amnesty programme and the opportunities it created. The communities plight in terms of development and employment should have been addressed. As Akinwale (2010) puts it, The amnesty was politically motivated as the Nigerian government used it to demonstrate its interest in promoting peace and development in the region. A major motivation for the use of amnesty in the management of oil-driven militancy Nigeria is the belief that peace rather than violence is a necessary condition for sustainable development. However, peace cannot solidify when majority of the people live in abject poverty and just a few enjoy the proceeds of the endowments, or trade the amnesty benefits with weapons. An Exclusive Approach; a Negative Peace & Resurgence of Violence Despite the commendable achievements, the Niger Delta amnesty programme has not been able to produce sustainable peace and address the conflict in a comprehensive way. In contrast, mainly because of its exclusiveness in several ways, the amnesty package has caused emergence of new grievances and re-emergence of violence in the region. Based on the prior description of exclusivity as a term referring to all three aspects of the programme: exclusivity during the process of formulation, at the implementation stage (distribution of benefits) and the choice of instrument (only amnesty from the set of recommended strategies by the Technical Committee), this characteristic of the programme contributes to the resurgence of violent conflicts in Niger Delta. First, the amnesty programme was formulated without a thorough listening to the popular grievances or even the militias opinions. The foot soldier- militants were excluded from the process of consultation. As Oluwaniyi (2011, p. 51) puts it, unlike the recommendations for open negotiations between the government and militias, consultations were at the highest levels of government, and involved members of the Niger Delta elite and top command officials of the Niger Delta region negotiating with militia commanders

10 In such a complex and multilateral conflict, any solution requires a multi-stakeholder approach that could consolidate the needs and demands of, at least, the majority of the population. However, as Ogege (2011) rightly picks up the problem, the Niger Delta amnesty programme does not incorporate in its packages credible and comprehensive stakeholders consultation. The Niger Delta communities, according to him, suffered the brunt of the environmental degradation were ignored and whatever consultation and endorsement they got were from governors and few traditional rulers who not only did not feel the negative impact of oil exploration but also connived with the managers of the Nigerian state to undermine the devastating impact suffered by the people (Ogege, 2011) To realize a sustainable peace and development in the Niger Delta, the state should adopt a bottom-up approach through the inclusion of elements of democracy, accountability, equity and active public participation of all stake holders including the grassroots people militants, youth organizations, women groups and civil society. (Oluduro & Oluduro, 2012, p. 51) Figure 2. Distribution of Amnesty Benefits Commanders Militants High Gains and Rewards Monthly stipends Grassroots & Victims Source: The Author, Based on Text References Because of a defective (exclusive) formulation process, the programme s implementation was marred by several flaws. One of the main critiques to the amnesty implementation is the existence of corruption and top-down distribution of benefits. A large portion part of the amnesty largesse landed in the pockets of the militant commanders, contractors, top level officials (and contractors linked to these parties). As per the panel review of the DDR process, about 80% of the budget had gone on payments to consultants and contractors, leaving just 20% for the rehabilitation of ex-militants. It has also been observed that vast constituencies of people alienated by petro-business interests, but lacking the means of violent action, have been excluded from the post-amnesty deal. Above that, sometimes the monthly stipends to the exmilitants are delayed not paid for months- and when paid, the amounts are less than designated. The commanders benefited from the largesse and state patronage while their foot soldiers were short-changed. And due to problems of delay or non-payment, the ex-militants threaten

11 publicly that they would resume militancy in the region. (Okogba, 2017; Oluwaniyi, 2011; Osahon & Okafor, 2016). Furthermore, the militias who, for reasons of doubting the state s goodwill or not being able to surrender their arms during the period specified by the amnesty programme were excluded from the programme s benefits. The series of car bombings in March and October 2010 by MEND militants (short after the introduction of the amnesty) which killed several people indicated that not all the militants were disarmed or happy with the governments amnesty programme (Oluduro & Oluduro, 2012). Also, some of the militants who registered in the disarmament demobilization and reintegration process, had openly confessed that they had their Plan B, which is, returning back to the creeks and resuming militancy (Akinwale, 2010, p. 206) Such a non-participatory approach with exclusive scope leading to, and coupled with a defective implementation process, reduced the Niger Delta amnesty programme to an instrument of poorly dealing with parts of the symptoms of the conflicts. Consequently, after a period of reduced rates of violence in the region, the militant activities and has re-emerged. Currently, 32 different militant groups operate against the government and oil companies in various parts of the region (according to Lagos Chamber of Commerce and Industry) which are dispersed and lack a united leadership (Liewerscheidt, 2017). As a country that derives 95 percent of its export earnings from oil revenues and 70 percent of government incomes depend on oil production (Federal Ministry of Budget and National Planning), the insecurities in 2016 not only adversely affected the Nigeria s economy; it has also contributed to obstruct any efforts for development of Niger Delta region. Some argue that the payments under the amnesty programme has had counterproductive effects: Oil companies and the Nigerian government have used payments and contracts to pacify the militants. Yet these practices have fuelled the conflict in the Delta, which claimed an estimated 1,000 lives a year. Despite repeated promises over the past decade, oil companies have continued making these harmful payments. Ex-militant leaders have recently been awarded lucrative government and oil company contracts worth millions of dollars. In 2012 the government plans to spend over $405 million on its amnesty programme for militants, more than it spends on children s basic education. Yet the underlying problems of poverty, unemployment, environmental devastation and political grievances that stirred militancy in the Delta s creeks remain unresolved. (Amunwa, 2012) The new wave of violent conflicts and instabilities rose rapidly since the beginning of 2016 as in January 2016 a new militant group who call themselves the Niger Delta Avengers has carried sophisticated attacks on the oil installations and quickly put the Nigerian oil industry in a crisis. (Laccino, 2015; Deutsche Welle, 2016; also see Niger Delta Avengers, 2016).

12 All in all, the lack of an inclusive and comprehensive peace strategy and development programme to deal with the grievances, unemployment, poverty and marginalization of the Niger Delta ethnic groups seems to be causing further escalation of conflicts in the region. The amnesty is not a sufficient tool for sustainable peace and stability in Niger Delta. Based on Galtung and Fischer's (2013) six peace tasks, eliminating direct violence (such as through a ceasefire or collection of militants from the Niger Delta) is only 1/6 th of the peacebuilding process. (See Table) below. Direct Violence, Structural Violence; Cultural Violence; intended or Violence intended harming unintended harming, unintended justifying violence Negative peace (1) Ceasefire (2) No exploitation (3) No justification Positive peace (4) Presence of (5) Presence of equity (6) Cultural peace Cooperation and justice and dialogue Peace Negative+ Positive Negative + Positive Negative + Positive Source: (Galtung & Fischer, 2013, p. 174) The other 5 peace tasks including the structural (exploitation, inequality and injustice), and cultural violence (justification of or negligence of officials or the governing elites toward the suffering of the ethnic minorities in Niger Delta) need to be addressed for peace, and development to be sustainable in the region. These tasks require extensive political, economic and social reform by the Nigerian Government and her international partners in the region.

13 IV. CONCLUSION Within the framework of peacebuilding, three tasks were anticipated from the presidential amnesty programme: (1) disarmament and demobilization of the militants whose presence disturbed security situation and export flow of crude oil from the Niger Delta. (2) vocational training and re-integration of the ex-militants to the society with decent jobs that could prevent them from restoring insurgency and hurting the country s export-dependent economy on the one hand, and increasing the human capital and employment in the Niger Delta region on the other. (3) After implementation of the amnesty programme, the Nigerian Government was expected to invest in large (post-amnesty) infrastructural development programmes to address the root causes of the rise of grievances and militancy. The programme achieved commendable results in terms of reducing the rates of attacks, hostage taking and physical violence in general which created a favourable environment for the oil corporations to increase exports. However, the programme s peacebuilding goal remained unattained as the grievances and violent conflicts re-emerged due to several reasons. First, majority of the militants were excluded from the consultation process. This non-participatory formulation process, led to a top-down approach to the implementation of the programme and distribution of the amnesty benefits which marred the process with loads of corruption, nonpayment or short-charging of the monthly cash stipends to militants, and exertion of extensive power form the militant commanders in the process. Second, as the amnesty offer expected the militant s individual surrender within a specific period, some militants could not or did not join the process. Hence, the amnesty benefits were allotted exclusively to the registered militants; others remained disgruntled. Third, the promised post-amnesty development projects did not materialize. The PAP has reduced to an exclusive DDR process that did not address the economic and environment related grievances of the Niger Delta communities. These three shortcomings, which the paper refers to as the three forms of exclusivity overshadow the achievements of the amnesty programme, and the new conflicts and militancy have grown from the development and equality gaps in the Niger Delta Region. Beside addressing the direct violence through negotiations with the militants, the Nigerian Federal Government should show a strong political commitment to peace and development in the Niger Delta and comprehensive reforms in the governance structures, oil industry and economic sectors in the region that could to eliminate the causes of the restiveness and pave the way for development of the Niger Delta region.

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