IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA. Case No. SC04-156

Transcription

1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA Case No. SC Petition for Discretionary Review of A Decision of the District Court of Appeal of Florida First District Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission, Petitioner, v. Howard W. Doig Respondent. AMENDED JURISDICTIONAL BRIEF OF PETITIONER FLORIDA UNEMPLOYMENT APPEALS COMMISSION John D. Maher Fla. Bar No Suite 300, Webster Building 2671 Executive Center Circle, West Tallahassee, FL (850) Deputy General Counsel for Petitioner Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission -1-

2 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page(s) Table of Citations... ii Statement of the Case and the Facts Summary of Argument... 4 Argument 7 THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL IN THIS CASE DECLARES THAT STEWART V. DOLLAR TREE, 635 So.2d 73 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), IS GOOD LAW AND CONTROLS THE OUTCOME OF THIS CASE. THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL IN ROCHUSSEN V. UNEMPLOYMENT APPEALS COMMISSION, 795 So.2d 1075 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) AND GROUDAS V. PINELLAS COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, 793 So.2d 983 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), DECLARES THAT STEWART HAS EXPRESSLY BEEN OVERTURNED BY AN AMENDMENT TO THE STATUTE. THE COURTS' OPINIONS EXPRESSLY AND DIRECTLY CONFLICT WITH EACH OTHER Conclusion... 8 Certificate of Service -2-

3 TABLE OF CITATIONS Cases Page(s) Doig v. Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission, 28 Fla. L. Weekly D2633 (Fla. 1st DCA Nov. 13, 2003) Groudas v. Pinellas County School Board, 793 So.2d 983 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) ,5,6,8 Rochussen v. Unemployment Appeals Commission, 795 So.2d 1075 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) ,5,6,8 Stewart v. Dollar Tree, 635 So.2d 73 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) passim Statutes Section (1)(a), Florida Statutes ,2,5,6 Section (1)(a)1., Florida Statutes Section (4)(e), Florida Statutes Other Authority Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030(a)(2)(A). 1 Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure

4 STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND THE FACTS This is a petition for discretionary review pursuant to Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.030(a)(2)(A) and of a decision of the First District Court of Appeal that reversed a final administrative order of the Unemployment Appeals Commission. The Commission seeks the Court's review of the decision because it expressly and directly conflicts with decisions of the Second District Court of Appeal on the same rule of law. The case originated with the unemployment compensation claim of Howard W. Doig. Doig (hereinafter referred to as the claimant) filed for benefits after being laid off a full-time job of several years. While claiming benefits, he found a part-time job with Sears Roebuck and Company. He continued his claim and received reduced benefits, depending on his earnings from Sears. The claimant continued working for Sears until he found a better paying part-time job with Home Depot. He quit the job with Sears to accept the position with Home Depot. The unemployment statute denies benefits to workers who quit their jobs, except when their employers give them good cause to quit, or the worker has a disabling medical condition requiring him or her to quit. See (1)(a), Fla. Stat. The claimant did not have good cause attributable to Sears to quit and he did not work -4-

5 at Home Depot long enough to remove the statutory penalty imposed by quitting. Consequently, he was disqualified for unemployment benefits until he earned sufficient income to remove the disqualification. The claimant protested the administrative action and requested a hearing. The claimant and a representative of Sears appeared at a hearing before an unemployment compensation appeals referee. At the conclusion of the hearing, the appeals referee entered a written decision containing findings of fact and a conclusion of law that upheld the initial administrative denial of benefits. The claimant appealed the decision to the Unemployment Appeals Commission. Upon review, the Commission affirmed the referee's decision. The claimant appealed the Commission's order to the First District Court of Appeal. The Unemployment Appeals Commission is a statutory respondent to appeals taken from its orders. See (4)(e), Fla. Stat. The First DCA ruled that Stewart v. Dollar Tree, 635 So.2d 73 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), was controlling on the case before it. The court held that, in this case, like Stewart, Section (1)(a), Florida Statutes, did not apply and reversed the Commission's order. As a result, the claimant was awarded benefits proportionately chargeable against the -5-

6 accounts of Sears and the claimant's former full-time employer. The Commission has petitioned the Court for review of the decision because it expressly and directly conflicts with decisions of the Second District Court of Appeal that have declared Stewart to have been overruled by a 1999 amendment to the statute. -6-

7 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT The claimant in this case quit a part-time job to accept another part-time position. The unemployment compensation statute disqualifies workers who quit employment. In Stewart v. Dollar Tree, 635 So.2d 73 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), the First District Court of Appeal held that a claimant in a factual situation identical to the claimant's situation in this case was not disqualified. The First District Court of Appeal in this case professes that Stewart is good law and controls this case. In Rochussen v. Unemployment Appeals Commission, 795 So.2d 1075 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) and Groudas v. Pinellas County School Board, 793 So.2d 983 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), the Second District Court of Appeal declared that Stewart had been expressly overruled by an 1999 amendment to the applicable statute. The decision of the First District Court of Appeal in this case expressly and directly conflicts with Rochussen and Groudas decided by the Second District Court of Appeal. Petitioner seeks the jurisdiction of this Florida Supreme Court to resolve the conflict to permit the Commission to apply the law uniformly throughout the state. -7-

8 ARGUMENT THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL IN THIS CASE DECLARES THAT STEWART V. DOLLAR TREE, 635 So.2d 73 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), IS GOOD LAW AND CONTROLS THE OUTCOME OF THIS CASE. THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL IN ROCHUSSEN V. UNEMPLOYMENT APPEALS COMMISSION, 795 So.2d 1075 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) AND GROUDAS V. PINELLAS COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, 793 So.2d 983 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), DECLARES THAT STEWART HAS EXPRESSLY BEEN OVERTURNED BY AN AMENDMENT TO THE STATUTE. THE COURTS' OPINIONS EXPRESSLY AND DIRECTLY CONFLICT WITH EACH OTHER. This case involves two district courts of appeal with two completely different interpretations of a provision the unemployment compensation statute. Section (1)(a), Florida Statutes (2002) disqualifies claimants who quit their employment. To remove the disqualification, the claimant must become reemployed and earn at least 17 times his weekly benefit amount. See (1)(a)1., Fla. Stat. The only exceptions contained in the provision are for those who leave with good cause attributable to their employers and those who leave because of an illness or disability. In Stewart v. Dollar Tree, 635 So.2d 73 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), the First District Court of Appeal held that the provision did not apply to a claimant who quit employment under circumstances very similar to those present in this case. Like the claimant in this case, the claimant in -8-

9 Stewart quit one part-time job to accept another part-time job that paid better. In this case, the First District Court of Appeal quoted extensively from the Stewart opinion. The court concluded: In this regard, as in Stewart, section (1)(a) does not apply.... Doig v. Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission, 28 Fla. L. Weekly D2633 (Fla. 1st DCA Nov. 13, 2003), reh. denied, Jan. 5, 2004, pet. for review filed Feb In Rochussen v. Unemployment Appeals Commission, 795 So.2d 1075 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) and Groudas v. Pinellas County School Board, 793 So.2d 983 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), the Second District Court of Appeal was presented with cases that were similar to Stewart. In both cases, the Second District Court of Appeal declared that Stewart and similar cases might have influenced its decision, but for the fact that they had been overturned by a 1999 amendment to Section (1)(a), Florida Statutes. In Groudas, the court observed that the legislative history of the amendment revealed that the amendment was "expressly enacted to overrule" cases such as Stewart. 793 So.2d at 985. The First District Court of Appeal in this case acknowledges the existence of Groudas and Rochussen. The -9-

10 court points out some factual differences between them and this case, but does not address the rationale underlying Groudas and Rochussen that creates the conflict here. Either the First District correctly applied Stewart or the Second District is right and Stewart has been overruled. The conflicting opinions must be resolved in order for the Commission to uniformly apply the law to similar factual situations. -10-

11 CONCLUSION In this case, the First District Court of Appeal has expressly followed Stewart v. Dollar Tree, 635 So.2d 73 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). In Rochussen v. Unemployment Appeals Commission, 795 So.2d 1075 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) and Groudas v. Pinellas County School Board, 793 So.2d 983 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), the Second District Court of Appeal has declared that the legislature enacted a 1999 amendment to the applicable statute for the purpose of expressly overturning Stewart and similar cases. The decisions of the two districts expressly and directly conflict. Since the Unemployment Appeals Commission must uniformly apply the unemployment statute statewide, the Commission petitions the Court to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction to resolve the conflict. Respectfully Submitted, John D. Maher Fla. Bar No Webster Building, Suite Executive Center Circle, West Tallahassee, Florida (850) Deputy General Counsel for Petitioner, Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission -11-

12 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing was mailed to the following persons on this 26 th day of February 2004: Howard W. Doig, 1241 Foxridge Place, Melbourne, FL 32940; and Sears Roebuck and Company, 3825 Forsyth Rd., Winter Park, FL ; and CERTIFICATE OF TYPEFACE COMPLIANCE I HEREBY CERTIFY that the Courier New 12-point font was used to prepare this brief and complies with Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.210(a)(2). John D. Maher Fla. Bar No Webster Building, Suite Executive Center Circle, West Tallahassee, Florida (850) Deputy General Counsel for Petitioner, Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission -12-