IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA. Petitioner/Appellant, CASE NO. vs. DCA CASE NO. 4D PETITIONER S BRIEF ON DISCRETIONARY JURISDICTION

Transcription

1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA COREY STUDEMIRE, Petitioner/Appellant, CASE NO. vs. DCA CASE NO. 4D STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondent/Appellee. / PETITIONER S BRIEF ON DISCRETIONARY JURISDICTION CAREY HAUGHWOUT Public Defender Fifteenth Judicial Circuit of Florida MARGARET GOOD-EARNEST Assistant Public Defender Chief, Appellate Division Florida Bar No.: Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant The Criminal Justice Building 421 Third Street, 6th Floor West Palm Beach, Florida (561) appeals@pd15.state.fl.us

2 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page TABLE OF CONTENTS...ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES...iii PRELIMINARY STATEMENT...1 STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS...2 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT...3 ARGUMENT...4 THIS COURT HAS DISCRETIONARY JURISDICTION AS THE DECISION OF THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL IN PETITIONER S CASE DIRECTLY AND EXPRESSLY CONFLICTS WITH A DECISION OF ANOTHER DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL ON THE SAME POINT OF LAW, WHETHER INFORMING DEFENDANT OF HIS MIRANDA RIGHTS, HANDCUFFING HIM AND PLACING HIM IN A POLICE CAR CONSTITUTES AN ARREST FOR WHICH THE POLICE MUST HAVE PROBABLE CAUSE OR THE RESULTING EVIDENCE MUST BE SUPPRESSED...4 CONCLUSION...7 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE...7 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE...8 ii

3 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES PAGE Adams v State, 830 So.2d 911 (Fla. 3 DCA 2002)...6 Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983)...6 Mancini v. State, 312 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 1975)...4, 5 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)...5 Poey v. State, 562 So.2d 449 (Fla. 3 rd DCA 1990)...5 Royer v. State, 389 So.2d 1007 (Fla.3 rd DCA 1980)...6 Studemire v. State, --- So.2d ----, 2007 WL , 32 Fla. Law Weekly D1352 (Fla. 4 DCA May 23, 2007)...5 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)...5 UNITED STATE CONSTITUTION Fourth Amendment...6 FLORIDA CONSTITUTION Article V, Section 3(b)(3)...4, 6 FLORIDA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 9.030(a)(2)(A)(iv)...4 iii

4 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT Petitioner was the Defendant in the Criminal Division of the Circuit Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Palm Beach County, Florida, and the Appellant in the Fourth District Court of Appeal. Respondent was the Prosecution and the Appellee below. In the brief, the parties will be referred to as they appear before this Court. A = Petitioner s Appendix. 1

5 STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS Petitioner was convicted after a jury trial of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon after denial of his motion to suppress his statements to police. His appeal to the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District was denied in a written decision that addressed his suppression issue, finding Officer MacVane had a reasonable suspicion for a Terry 1 stop, to handcuff petitioner and detain him in the backseat of a patrol car for officer safety. Relying on Reynolds v. State, 592 So 2d 1082 (Fla. 1992), the Fourth District said the detention on less than probable cause did not become a de facto arrest, that petitioner s incriminating statements in those circumstances in response to police questioning after being advised of his Miranda 2 rights were admissible. Studemire v. State, --- So.2d ----, 2007 WL , 32 Fla. Law Weekly D1352 (Fla. 4 DCA May 23, 2007) (Appendix- 1-5) Petitioner timely filed his motion to invoke this Court s discretionary review jurisdiction after the decision was changed on rehearing, but only to reflect what day, New Year s Day, Officer MacVane heard shots fired at 1 a.m. shortly before he came in contact with Mr. Studemire. 1 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, (1968). 2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) 2

6 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT Petitioner respectfully submits that this Court has discretionary jurisdiction to review the instant written decision because the Fourth District reached a different result on the same facts than the Third District in its decision in Poey v. State, 562 So.2d 449 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1990). In Poey, the Third District found the defendant was arrested when he was informed of his Miranda rights, handcuffed, and placed inside the patrol car so that suppression of evidence was required as the officers had no probable cause to arrest Poey. Here the Fourth District found no arrest occurred even though the petitioner was in similar circumstances, he was informed of Miranda, handcuffed and placed in the backseat of a police car on less than probable cause. Both Poey and petitioner were subject to the same police conduct. The Third District found Poey s arrest without probable cause required suppression of the evidence but the Fourth District found these facts do not amount to an arrest, only a Terry stop, which did not need probable cause so the evidence was not suppressed. What continues to be a de facto arrest within the Third District is not a de facto arrest in the Fourth District under Studemire. See Adams v State, 830 So.2d 911 (Fla. 3 DCA 2002). The decisions expressly and directly conflict on the same point of law so this Court s jurisdiction is available for this Court to review the instant decision and explicate the constitutional principles at risk where custodial interrogation is allowed to proceed on less than probable cause. 3

7 ARGUMENT THIS COURT HAS DISCRETIONARY JURISDICTION AS THE DECISION OF THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL IN PETITIONER S CASE DIRECTLY AND EXPRESSLY CONFLICTS WITH A DECISION OF ANOTHER DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL ON THE SAME POINT OF LAW, WHETHER INFORMING DEFENDANT OF HIS MIRANDA RIGHTS, HANDCUFFING HIM AND PLACING HIM IN A POLICE CAR CONSTITUTES AN ARREST FOR WHICH THE POLICE MUST HAVE PROBABLE CAUSE OR THE RESULTING EVIDENCE MUST BE SUPPRESSED. Under Article V, Section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution, this Court may review a decision of a district court of appeal that expressly and directly conflicts with a decision of another district court of appeal or the Supreme Court on the same question of law. "Conflict" jurisdiction is properly invoked when: 1) the District Court announced a rule of law which conflicts with a rule previously announced by the Supreme Court or by another district, or 2) the District Court applies a rule of law to produce a different result in a case which involves substantially the same facts as another case. Mancini v. State, 312 So. 2d 732, 733 (Fla. 1975). Thus, in order for two court decisions to be in express and direct conflict for purposes of invoking this Court's discretionary jurisdiction under Fla. R. App. P (a)(2)(A)(iv), the decision should speak to the same point of law, in factual contexts of sufficient similarity to compel the conclusion that the results 4

8 in each case would have been different had the deciding court employed the reasoning of the other court. See Mancini, supra. Petitioner submits that this Court has discretionary jurisdiction to review the instant decision because a decision of another district court of appeal reaches an expressly different result on whether a defendant is arrested when he is handcuffed, advised of Miranda and placed in a patrol vehicle. In Poey v. State, 562 So.2d 449 (Fla. 3 rd DCA 1990), the Third District found the defendant was arrested when he was informed of his Miranda rights, handcuffed, and placed inside the patrol car so that suppression of evidence followed as the officers had no probable cause to arrest that defendant. Here the Fourth District found no arrest occurred even though the petitioner was in similar circumstances; he was informed of Miranda, handcuffed and placed in the backseat of a police car on less than probable cause. This Court should accept jurisdiction as the District Court set in motion a new rule of law that greatly exceeds the bounds of a Terry stop. Reynolds limits the scope of a custodial detention but Studemire expands Reynolds to legitimize the detention and handcuffing of a suspect in a patrol car for reasons other than to frisk and determine if the suspect is armed. Allowing petitioner s detention, not for a pat down, but just for purposes of the officer s developing investigation by interrogation on less than probable cause should be addressed by this Court as a matter of public policy and proper interpretation of the protections of the Fourth 5

9 Amendment. Forcibly placing a handcuffed defendant in a police car for purposes of custodial interrogation continues to be regarded as a de facto arrest in the Third District requiring probable cause under the Fourth Amendment. See Adams v State, 830 So.2d 911, 914 (Fla. 3 DCA 2002) ( Here, the police forcibly placed the handcuffed defendant in a police car and told the defendant that he was not under arrest. The trial court correctly held that this clearly illegal behavior constituted a defacto arrest. ) Accord Royer v. State, 389 So.2d 1007 (Fla.3 rd DCA 1980) affirmed Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499 (1983) ("reasonable suspicion of crime is insufficient to justify custodial interrogation even though the interrogation is investigative.") This Court should exercise its discretionary jurisdiction pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution and hear the issue on the merits. 6

10 CONCLUSION Wherefore, this Court should exercise its discretionary review jurisdiction in order to afford Petitioner a resolution consistent with similarly-situated defendants in the Third District and to decide whether the Constitution allows the expansion of the purpose of a Terry stop as articulated by the Fourth District in petitioner s case. Respectfully Submitted, CAREY HAUGHWOUT Public Defender Fifteenth Judicial Circuit of Florida MARGARET GOOD-EARNEST Assistant Public Defender Chief, Appellate Division Florida Bar No.: The Criminal Justice Building 421 3rd Street, 6th Floor West Palm Beach, Florida (561) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of Petitioner s Brief on Jurisdiction and Appendix has been furnished by courier to Don Rogers, Assistant Attorney General, 1515 N. Flagler Drive, 9 th Floor, West Palm Beach, Florida 33401, this day of June Margaret Good-Earnest Assistant Public Defender 7

11 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE I HEREBY CERTIFY that Petitioner s Brief on Jurisdiction has been prepared with 14 point Times New Roman type. Margaret Good-Earnest Assistant Public Defender 8