IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA CASE NO. 05- VONDA DENISE CHRISTIE, Petitioner, -vs.- STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondent.

Transcription

1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA CASE NO. 05- VONDA DENISE CHRISTIE, Petitioner, -vs.- STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondent. BRIEF OF PETITIONER ON JURISDICTION ON PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA, THIRD DISTRICT BENNETT H. BRUMMER Office of the Public Defender Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida 1320 N.W. 14th Street Miami, Florida (305) HOWARD K. BLUMBERG Assistant Public Defender Florida Bar No Counsel for Petitioner

2 TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE INTRODUCTION...1 STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS...2 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT...4 ARGUMENT...5 THE DECISION OF THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD DISTRICT, IN THE PRESENT CASE EXPRESSLY AND DIRECTLY CONFLICTS WITH THE DECISIONS OF THIS COURT IN DuFresne v. State, 826 So.2d 272 (Fla.2002); Florida Department of State, Div. of Elections v. State, 30 Fla. L. Weekly S780 (Fla. November 10, 2005); AND Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So.2d 452 (Fla.1992)...5 CONCLUSION...9 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE CERTIFICATE OF FONT i

3 TABLE OF CITATIONS CASES PAGE(S) DuFresne v. State, 826 So.2d 272 (Fla.2002) Florida Department of State, Div. of Elections v. State, 30 Fla. L. Weekly S780 (Fla. November 10, 2005)...4, 5, 8, 9 Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So. 2d 452 (Fla.1992)...4, 5, 8, 9 FLORIDA STATUTES (2003) OTHER AUTHORITIES Section 39.01(47)... 2, 3, 4, 6, 8 Section (1)... 2, 3, 4, 6, 8 Section (3)(a)...2, 4, 6, 8 FLORIDA STATUTES (Supp.1998) Section 39.01(44)...4, 6, 7 FLORIDA STATUTES (Supp.1996) Section (1)...5, 6, 8 ii

4 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA CASE NO. 05- VONDA DENISE CHRISTIE, Petitioner -vs.- STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondent. ON PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA, THIRD DISTRICT BRIEF OF PETITIONER ON JURISDICTION INTRODUCTION This is a petition for discretionary review on the grounds of express and direct conflict of decisions. In this brief of petitioner on jurisdiction, all references are to the appendix attached to this brief, paginated separately and identified as "A", followed by the page number(s). All emphasis is supplied unless the contrary is indicated. 1

5 STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS Vonda Christie, a public school teacher, was charged with the criminal offense of child neglect under section (3)(a), Florida Statutes (2003), based on her failure to intervene when a teacher s aide took certain actions against students in the classroom (A. 2). Christie filed a motion to dismiss the charges on the ground that a public school teacher is not subject to prosecution for the criminal offense of child neglect as that offense is defined in the Florida Statutes (A. 2-3). Specifically, she asserted that a public school teacher is not subject to prosecution under section (3)(a) because (1) only neglect of a child by a caregiver is proscribed by section (3)(a); (2) the term caregiver is defined in section (1) as a parent, adult household member, or other person responsible for a child s welfare; and (3) a public school teacher is specifically excluded from the definition of the term other person responsible for a child s welfare in section 39.01(47). (A. 2-3). The State argued that the definition of the term other person responsible for a child s welfare in section 39.01(47) should not be used to define that term in section (1) (A. 3). The State also argued that the doctrine of in loco parentis should be used to define that term so as to impose criminal responsibility on a public school teacher for child neglect (A. 3). The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, and the State appealed (A. 3). 2

6 On appeal, the Third District Court of Appeal reversed the order granting the motion to dismiss and remanded to the trial court with directions that the criminal charges be reinstated (A. 7). The district court of appeal ruled that the statutory construction doctrine of in pari materia did not require that section (1) be construed together with Chapter 39, and refused to consider the definition of the term other person responsible for a child s welfare in section 39.01(47), Florida Statutes (2003) in construing the meaning of that identical term in section (1): We agree with the State that there is no need to refer to the section 39.01(47) definition of "other person responsible for a child's welfare" in considering a neglect charge under section That is because we conclude that a teacher falls within the plain meaning of "caregiver" during school hours as that word is defined in section (1). * * * * * Christie nevertheless urges that we are required to look at the Chapter 39 definition of other person responsible for a child's welfare[ ] as the Florida Supreme Court did in DuFresne v. State, 826 So.2d 272 (Fla.2002). Using the Chapter 39 definition, Christie maintains that public school teachers are excluded as an "other person responsible for a child's welfare." Contrary to Christie's argument, because the phrase "other person responsible for a child's welfare" has a plain and obvious meaning in everyday parlance, there is no need to resort to the statutory definition given in section 39.01(47) as in DuFresne. (A. 3, 5). A motion for rehearing was filed November 17, 2005, and that motion was denied December 7, Notice of invocation of this Court's discretionary jurisdiction was filed December 16,

7 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT In DuFresne v. State, 826 So.2d 272 (Fla.2002), this Court ruled that the doctrine of in pari materia required that the definition of the term mental injury set forth in section 39.01(44), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998) be used to define the identical undefined term in the provisions of chapter 827 proscribing the criminal offense of child abuse because the criminal provisions in chapter 827 and the child protective provisions located in chapter 39 relate to the same subject. In its decision in the present case, the district court of appeal ruled that it was not required to use the definition of the term other person responsible for a child s welfare set forth in section 39.01(47), Florida Statutes (2003) to define the identical undefined term in the provisions of chapter 827 proscribing the criminal offense of child neglect. By refusing to apply the doctrine of in pari materia and consider chapter 827 together with chapter 39 in determining the proper definition of the term other person responsible for a child s welfare, the decision of the district court of appeal in this case expressly and directly conflicts with the decisions of this Court in DuFresne; Florida Department of State, Div. of Elections v. State, 30 Fla. L. Weekly S780 (Fla. November 10, 2005), and Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So.2d 452 (Fla.1992). 4

8 ARGUMENT THE DECISION OF THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD DISTRICT, IN THE PRESENT CASE EXPRESSLY AND DIRECTLY CONFLICTS WITH THE DECISIONS OF THIS COURT IN DuFresne v. State, 826 So.2d 272 (Fla.2002); Florida Department of State, Div. of Elections v. State, 30 Fla. L. Weekly S780 (Fla. November 10, 2005); AND Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So.2d 452 (Fla.1992). In DuFresne v. State, 826 So.2d 272 (Fla.2002), the issue before this Court was how to define the term mental injury in section (1), Florida Statutes (Supp.1996), which proscribed the criminal offense of child abuse. The term mental injury was not defined in section (1). This Court ruled that because the criminal provisions in chapter 827 and the child protective provisions in chapter 39 relate to the same subject, the doctrine of in pari materia required that section (1) be considered together with chapter 39 in determining the proper definition of the term mental injury : As we believe the above discussion demonstrates, the child protective provisions previously located in sections and now located in chapter 39, and the criminal provisions enumerated in section are plainly interrelated. Moreover, the fact that these statutes have essentially the same underlying purpose, i.e., the protection of children, lends further support to our conclusion that, as in [State v. Fuchs, 769 So.2d 1006 (Fla.2000)], these provisions should be read in proper relation to one another. Furthermore, we note, the definition of "mental injury" now found in chapter 39 is a limiting definition, as opposed to a broad definition, which benefits the defendant. Thus, mental injury, as defined, will be present only in limited circumstances, thereby discouraging arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. 5

9 826 So.2d at 278. Accordingly, this Court held that the definition of the term mental injury in section 39.01(44), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998) must be used to define that term in section (1). In the present case, the issue before the district court of appeal was how to define the term other person responsible for a child s welfare in sections (1) and (3)(a), Florida Statutes (2003), which proscribe the criminal offense of child neglect. The term other person responsible for a child s welfare is not defined in section (1) or (a). The district court of appeal ruled that the statutory construction doctrine of in pari materia did not require that sections (1) and (3)(a) be construed together with chapter 39, and refused to consider the definition of the term other person responsible for a child s welfare in section 39.01(47), Florida Statutes (2003) in construing the meaning of that identical term in sections (1) and (3)(a): We agree with the State that there is no need to refer to the section 39.01(47) definition of "other person responsible for a child's welfare" in considering a neglect charge under section That is because we conclude that a teacher falls within the plain meaning of "caregiver" during school hours as that word is defined in section (1). * * * * * Christie nevertheless urges that we are required to look at the Chapter 39 definition of other person responsible for a child's welfare[ ] as the Florida Supreme Court did in DuFresne v. State, 826 So.2d 272 (Fla.2002). Using the Chapter 39 definition, Christie maintains that public school teachers are excluded as an "other person 6

10 responsible for a child's welfare." Contrary to Christie's argument, because the phrase "other person responsible for a child's welfare" has a plain and obvious meaning in everyday parlance, there is no need to resort to the statutory definition given in section 39.01(47) as in DuFresne. (A. 3, 5) The express and direct conflict between the decision of this Court in DuFresne and the decision of the district court of appeal in the present case is readily apparent. In DuFresne, this Court ruled that the doctrine of in pari materia required that the definition of the term mental injury set forth in section 39.01(44) be used to define the identical undefined term in the provisions of chapter 827 proscribing the criminal offense of child abuse. In its decision in the present case, the district court of appeal ruled that it was not required to use the definition of the term other person responsible for a child s welfare set forth in section 39.01(47) to define the identical undefined term in the provisions of chapter 827 proscribing the criminal offense of child neglect. In its decision in this case, the district court of appeal justified its refusal to follow this Court s decision in DuFresne by concluding that application of the doctrine of in pari materia was not mandatory: DuFresne, however, does not mandate that chapter 39 always be read in pari materia with section (A. 6)(emphasis in original). This ruling expressly and directly conflicts with two decisions of this Court. The doctrine of in pari materia is a principle of statutory construction that requires that statutes relating to the same subject or object be 7

11 construed together to harmonize the statutes and to give effect to the Legislature's intent. Florida Department of State, Div. of Elections v. State, 30 Fla. L. Weekly S780, 781 (Fla. November 10, 2005) "Where possible, courts must give full effect to all statutory provisions and construe related statutory provisions in harmony with one another." Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So.2d 452, 455 (Fla.1992). As this Court determined in DuFresne that the criminal provisions in chapter 827 and the child protective provisions located in chapter 39 relate to the same subject, the doctrine of in pari materia requires that sections (1) and (a) be considered together with section 39.01(47) in determining the proper definition of the term other person responsible for a child s welfare. The district court of appeal s ruling in this case that it was not required to consider the definition of that term in section 39.01(47) thus expressly and directly conflicts with the decisions of this Court in Florida Department of State, Div. of Elections v. State and Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., as well as the decision of this Court in DuFresne. The Florida Legislature has determined that public school teachers are not to be classified as persons responsible for the welfare of a child in the context of the statutory provisions dealing with child abuse and neglect. The decision of the district court of appeal in this case refuses to follow this determination by the 8

12 legislature, and in doing so imposes criminal liability on public school teachers for negligent acts committed in public classrooms. This ruling, which expressly and directly conflicts with this Court s decisions in DuFresne, Florida Department of State, Div. of Elections v. State and Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., has significant ramifications for the many public school teachers in Florida. Accordingly, it is respectfully submitted that this Court should exercise its discretionary jurisdiction to review the decision of the district court of appeal in this case and determine whether the present statutory scheme allows for the criminal prosecution of public school teachers for negligent acts committed in public classrooms. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing facts, authorities and arguments, petitioner respectfully requests this Court to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction to review the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal. Respectfully submitted, BENNETT H. BRUMMER Public Defender Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida 1320 N.W. 14th Street Miami, Florida BY: HOWARD K. BLUMBERG Assistant Public Defender 9

13 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was delivered by hand to the Office of the Attorney General, Criminal Division, 444 Brickell Avenue, Suite 650, Miami, Florida 33131, this 27th day of December, HOWARD K. BLUMBERG Assistant Public Defender CERTIFICATE OF FONT Undersigned counsel certifies that the type used in this brief is 14 point proportionately spaced Times New Roman. HOWARD K. BLUMBERG Assistant Public Defender 10