Handbook Of The Law Of Antitrust. By Lawrence A. Sullivan, St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Company
|
|
- Flora Austin
- 5 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 Washington and Lee Law Review Volume 35 Issue 1 Article 15 Winter Handbook Of The Law Of Antitrust. By Lawrence A. Sullivan, St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Company Joseph E. Ulrich Follow this and additional works at: Recommended Citation Joseph E. Ulrich, Handbook Of The Law Of Antitrust. By Lawrence A. Sullivan, St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Company , 35 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 339 (1978), This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
2 BOOK REVIEW HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST. By Lawrence A. Sullivan, St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Company The author states that the goal of his hornbook is to present a "[t]extual treatment of [antitrust] adequate for the needs of the modern student or to the needs of the practitioner in search of an integrated treatment of the major areas of this subject."' I think this book achieves its goal better than its predecessors. 2 All prior single volume antitrust treatises set out to explain how the major cases in each area fit together as well as indicating the interrelationships which exist between these areas. This work, unlike the others, takes all the various aspects of antitrust and integrates them into a coherent whole. Sullivan is not content merely to state the evolution and current status of the law in any area; in addition, he pulls together not only the political, social and economic factors which underlie the rules but also indicates the practicalities of judicial administration which have been significant in the development of antitrust doctrine. This treatise alone deals with the subject at the same level as the casebooks 3 now on the market. The author goes beyond merely summarizing the, foundation cases: he gets his readers, particularly law students, thinking about antitrust in the proper way. For example, he gives detailed consideration to the inconsistencies of the leading Supreme Court cases in several areas. In his discussion of price fixing, he emphasizes that such cases as Chicago Board of Trade' and Appalachian Coals 6 cannot be adequately reconciled with I L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST XV (1977) [hereinafter cited as Sullivan]. I The ones with which I am most familiar are E. GELLHORN, ANTITRUST LAWS AND Eco- NOMICS IN A NUTSHELL (1976); KINTNR, AN ANmTIRUST PRIMER (2d ed. 1973); A. STICKELLS, FEDERAL CONTROL OF BUSINESS (1972); A. NEAT, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (2d ed. 1970); Arty GEN. NAT'L. ANTITRUST CoMm. REP. (1955). The American Bar Association has supplemented the 1955 Report of the Attorney General's Committee; see, ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS (1968) and (1975). Of these books, I prefer Neale's, although his analysis of the cases, particularly their economic aspects, leaves something to be desired. Kintner's book is intended to be a guide for businessmen, not lawyers or law students. Despite the eminence of its members, the Attorney General's Report is quite superficial, providing little support for the rules stated therein. Professor Gellhorn's book is intended to provide an "overview" of antitrust, but I think it is too brief to be of much assistance to anyone. Professor Stickell's work is inadequate for the reasons stated in Shaefer, Book Review, 15 WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. 203 (1973). 3 P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS, PROBLEMS, TEXT & CASES (2d ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as Areeda]; M. HANDLER, H. BLAKE, R. PrrOFSKY & H. GoLDSCHMID, CASES & MATERIALS ON TRADE REGULATION (1975); S. OPPENHEIM & G. WESTON, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS (3rd ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as Oppenheim & Weston]; R. POSNER, ANTITRUST, CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES AND OTHER MATERIALS (1974) [hereinafter cited as Posner]; B. SCHWARTZ & J. FLYNN, FREE ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (5th ed. 1977). Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). B Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
3 340 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXV Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 8 Trenton Potteries and Socony Vacuum.' 0 His analysis indicates to students that there are two streams of price fixing cases, and while Socony Vacuum represents the main current the Supreme Court keeps the Chicago Board channel available for the proper case." The point is, of course, that the judges recognize the need to give themselves room to maneuver in the ongoing effort to develop a policy of competition. Sullivan is also quite willing to criticize cases when this is necessary to improve understanding. Most students are totally nonplussed by Learned Hand's decision in Alcoa, ' 2 especially his holding on the element of conduct necessary to finding monopolization. A specific intent to monopolize is unnecessary; that monopoly is achieved is enough. Judge Hand subsequently tells us that we ought not turn on Alcoa just because it was successful, but then proceeds to turn on the defendant for engaging in an efficient and rational business strategy-stimulating demand and subsequently expanding to meet it. A similar point of view seems to underlie United Shoe, ' 3 the second leading modern case under section 2. Defendants are branded as monopolists because of their "exclusionary"" practices, many of which were favored by and requested by their customers. Like Judge Hand in Alcoa, Judge Wyzanski seems to be condemning practices which were "exclusionary" because they were successful in obtaining business for the user.' 5 Sullivan is of considerable assistance to the students on this question due, in large measure, to his willingness to attack Judge Hand's rationale rather than forcing the facts to harmonize this case with earlier and later cases. Alcoa's "deliberateness"' 6 test should be rejected, says the author, since it "does not provide the firm which wishes to obey the law with rational guides to conduct, nor does it leave open the opportunity for a market response which is both rationally self-regarding and Sullivan, supra note 1, 66 at Trans-Missouri Freight Association v. United States, 166 U.S. 290 (1897). United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).,o United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). " Compare Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division (Part I), 74 YALE L. J. 775 (1965) with Handler, The Judicial Architects of the Rules of Reason, in ANTITRUST IN PERSPECTIVE (1957). Sullivan would appear to agree more with Bork on this matter.,2 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).,S United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), afi'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). " The exclusionary test is defined as covering actions "which at the time they were taken could be identified as tending to increase entry barriers." Sullivan, supra note 1, 36 at 100. Sullivan terms Judge Wyzanski's two alternative standards the classic test, since it was based on the judge's reading of Standard Oil v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) and United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911), and the prima facie approach, for it would put the burden of proof on the defendant once the plaintiff demonstrated that the defendant possessed monopoly power. Sullivan, supra note 1, 35 & 37.,1 In addition to my students, this view is exemplified by such commentators as D. ARMENTANO, THE MYTHS OF ANTITRUST (1973).," Sullivan, supra note 1, 34.
4 1978] BOOK REVIEW lawful.' ' 7 On the other hand, Judge Wyzanski's "exclusionary" test satisfies this objection. Since it focuses on conduct which tends to raise entry barriers and for which firms will be able to find alternatives, this decision sets forth a standard which judges can administer and "does not strain against the realities of the market place." 1 8 Yet, while he personally favors the "exclusionary" test, the author stresses that the Supreme Court has not placed its imprimatur on the exclusionary standard and that the exact state of the law on this point is uncertain." 9 Once again, his treatment clearly indicates to the student the fluid character of antitrust. Even on a question as fundamental to section,2 as this, the law has not been settled. In addition the author's treatment effectively emphasizes the fact that antitrust rules can never be reduced to simple single paragraph solutions. A significant difference between this book and its predecessors is the author's emphasis on the process considerations which bear so heavily in antitrust decisions." 0 What is required, Sullivan asserts in several places, are standards which judges can employ to decide cases. On this point, he clearly sides with the Harvard School rather than the Chicago School. In another place the author more fully explains the basis for their disagreement on this matter: 2 ' It [the Harvard School] sees a need to mediate in deliberate and rational ways between the ideal, and the attainable, which requires attention to both empirical issues and to the limits of judicial and administrative process. It seeks to fashion rules which can be applied to the kinds of facts which can be ascertained judicially and administratively. The objective is to achieve results through the judicial and administrative processes which approximate those that would be attainable if it were feasible to do more rigorous and complete empirical studies and then prescribe the ideal intervention... [The Chicago School] assumes instead that a problem cannot be dealt with at all if the law cannot get hold of all facts which theory suggests are relevant. 2 This accent on process runs throughout the book. It serves as a partial basis for Sullivan's preference for Judge Wyzanski's "exclusionary" test noted above. Two other examples seem noteworthy. In discussing the problem of 11 Id. at 28, 102. Sullivan also criticizes Judge Wyzanski's classic test as stating too narrowly the rule of the old cases id at 35. 'A Id. " Id. at Process considerations are crucial in all areas of law. See Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases (Part I), 28 COLtJM. L. REv. 1014, (1928). 21 Sullivan, Book Review, 75 COJM. L. REv (1975). This difference in the point of view of the two schools is not explicitly set forth in the book. Since it is so crucial to Sullivan's exposition, I think that he should have stated the dichotomy more clearly. " Id. at See also Sullivan, Economics & More Humanistic Disciplines: What Are the Sources of Wisdom for Antitrust? 125 U. PA. L. REv (1977).
5 342 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXV defining the relevant market,2 Sullivan carefully indicates why economics will not necessarily resolve all difficulties in this area. The Supreme Court's use of the concept of cross elasticity of demand as an aid to defining the relevant market in the Cellophane 24 case demonstrated that a little scientific knowledge may lead to a wrong result. Lack of knowledge, however, might be cured. The difficulty involved, however, is inherent in the way the judicial system operates. It concerns whether our adjudicatory institutions-the judge, jury, advocacy system, rules of evidence, expert testimony, cross examination, argument and instructions-are appropriate and adequate for processing the materials and making the judgments involved in the kind of analysis which an adequately sophisticated use of economic theory demands. 25 What is demanded, the author suggests, is the development of judicial norms which will permit the courts to make better use of economic doctrine. Defining the relevant market calls for an act of judgment. Economic theory can be of assistance to the judge only if the norms are fashioned with this goal in mind." Sullivan also strongly underlines process considerations in his section on price fixing. 27 The per se rule against price fixing is justified, in large part, 2 8 on the grounds that it leads to efficient use of judicial resources by simplifying cartel litigation, precludes courts from engaging in extended regulation of entire industries, a task for which they are ill-suited, and creates a bright line prohibition which is more likely to be obeyed than if the rule were stated with less clarity. 29 For similar reasons Sullivan would limit the number of defenses which can be raised for arrangements which have the requisite affect on price to two, those which make markets more competitive and those which are ancillary to a partial integration of assets of competitors. 30 Neither of these can be raised in most cases, and both are easily recognizable when they do exist. Creation of bright line defenses are a natural corollary to the bright line prohibition of the per se rule. This repeated emphasis on process seems most appropriate given the Supreme Court's propensity to amplify this consideration Sullivan, supra note 1, United States v. E. L Dupont De Nemours & Co.,351 U.S. 377 (1956). Sullivan, supra note 1, 18 at Sullivan, supra note 1, Sullivan, supra note 1, Sullivan's approach is rather similar to Areeda's in this area. See Areeda, supra note 3, at How Sullivan differs from the Chicago School is evident when one compares Posner, supra note 3, at Of course, Sullivan also details the economic arguments against cartels. See Sullivan, supra note 1, 75 especially. 2 Sullivan, supra note 1, Compare analysis suggested by Areeda, supra note 3, at See Sullivan, supra note 1, 76 & 77 respectively. 31 See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); United States v.
6 1978] BOOK REVIEW Another strong point of the book is its extended examination of remedies. Many commentators have asserted that antitrust remedies are commonly inadequate. 2 One criticism of the monopoly cases, for example, has been that the courts have mandated only conduct remedies where structural changes in the industry were required. The complaint is then made that the judges are timid. As Sullivan views the matter, the problem often lies more with the antitrust plaintiff, especially the Government. Judge Wyzanski implied in United Shoe 34 that the Government's efforts on the remedy issue were inferior to the presentation of the rest of its case. As Sullivan wisely observes: [S]urely a judge, with little guidance other than broad statements of economic theory; will hesitate before entering upon the unaccustomed judicial business of disrupting myriad existing relationships in an effort to make over the structure of an entire industry. 5 Before the plaintiff can request that an industry be restructured, he should thoroughly understand the operation of the industry itself and its connection with related industries. If this pattern were followed, the very theory of the case would suggest the remedial proposal. While the good aspects of this book predominate, there are some parts which might not call forth uniform praise. At many points Sullivan does not attempt to state the law neutrally: instead he is an advocate for his own point of view. In his treatment of exclusive dealing, for example, he concentrates too much attention on his own system for solving problems of this kind but does not indicate the present state of the law. 3 1 While he does analyze Standard Stations 3 1 and Tampa Electric 39 in detail, he totally Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333 (1969); United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966); Standard Oil of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949); United States v. Trenton Potteries, 273 U.S. 392 (1927). 2 See, e.g., Adams, Dissolution, Divorcement, Divestiture; The Pyrrhic Victories of Antitrust, 27 IND. L. J. (1951); Elzinga, The Antimerger Law: Pyrrhic Victories? 12 J. LAw & EcoN. (1969). 3 See Sullivan, supra note 1, United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). Sullivan, supra note 1, 55 at 145. "[D]issolution is not a self-defining remedy. To restructure an industry sensibly one must deeply understand it and the interrelationships of its various parts.... The ideal preservation in a monopoly case would be one in which the remedial proposal arose organically out of the theory of the case. The government, through the staff work of its economists and lawyers (and utilizing discovery as extensively as necessary) would develop a dynamic conception of the industry in question, a conception which would both identify the loci of excessive power, the media through which that power was obtained or maintained, and the means through which excessive power could be terminated." Id. at Sullivan, supra note 1, See especially 165 in which the author analyzes the television manufacturing industry and proposes a standard based on the Justice Department guidelines for vertical mergers, modified for requirement contracts. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949). Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
7 344 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXV ignores Brown Shoe II, 1 a quixotic decision 4 ' which does not seem consistent with either of its two earlier decisions. 42 To a lesser degree this criticism applies to his discussion of boycotts. 3 In a similar manner when Sullivan turns to what was known as the Schwinnl problem, his unabashed advocacy of the old per se rule may get in the way of understanding. 4 " Despite the numerous lower court decisions" distinguishing Schwinn and law review articles attacking it," Sullivan gives the reader the impression that no bona fide issues as to Schwinn's correctness could be raised. At no place does the author set out the arguments against Schwinn in sufficient detail to permit the reader to judge their validity for himself. It is understandable that Sullivan had some difficulty maintaining his objectivity with regard to Schwinn. He was counsel for the plaintiff in Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.," a fact he points out to the reader," during the time he was writing this book. In his brief 5 " to the Supreme Court in GTE Sylvania, Sullivan relied heavily on Schwinn. Although the forum is different, the hornbook reflects the position the author took as counsel before the Supreme Court. While I may sympathize with his difficulty (and even agree with his position), I must criticize the writer of a hornbook aimed primarily at students for his failure to set forth the arguments on this controversial question more evenhandedly.' 0 FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (V66). ' See, e.g., Pearson, Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act as Antitrust, A Comment, 47 B. U. L. Rav. 1 (1967); Areeda, supra note 3, at Sullivan characterizes Brown Shoe II as a tying case. Sullivan, supra note 1, 16. While the case can certainly be fitted into that pigeonhole, the Supreme Court seems to treat it as an exclusive dealing case. Because everyone will not read the book straight through, Sullivan ought to put the reader on notice of the way in which he has decided to treat this case. 3 Sullivan, supra note 1, " United States v. Arnold, Schwinn, & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967). See Sullivan, supra note 1, , especially 145 in which the author reviews and evaluates "the arguments which are pressed in favor of these kinds of restrictions." Id. at See, e.g., Good Inv. Promotions, Inc. v. Coming Glass Works, 493 F.2d 891 (10th Cir. 1974); Colorado Pump & Supply Co. v. Felaco, Inc., 472 F.2d 637 (10th Cir. 1972), Janel Sales Corp. v. Lenvin Perfumes, Inc., 396 F.2d 398 (2nd Cir. 1968);. Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. United States, 449 F.2d 1374 (Ct. Cl. 1971). 11 See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 97 S. Ct. 2549, 2557 n.13 (1977) (citing numerous articles). ' 97 S. Ct (1977). ' Sullivan, supra note 1, at 404 n.10. Brief for Petitioners. Nonetheless, this section of the book is most interesting, for the author has carefully marshalled all the pro Schwinn arguments in one place. Sullivan, supra note 1, 145. At least the author's treatment of vertical restraints is internally consistent. This is more than can be said for the Supreme Court's decisions in the area through G.T.E. See Posner, Antitrust Policy & The Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger & Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. J. 282 (1975) in which the author critisizes the Court for its failure to develop a coherent theory dealing satisfactorily with the various kinds of vertical restraints manufacturers place upon their own dealers for the purpose
8 1978] BOOK REVIEW I have two other adverse comments about the book. First, Sullivan states the law of tie-ins 5 with greater certainty than actually exists. In short, tying violates Sherman... whenever a quantatively substantial amount of commerce is affected by the tie and when the tying product is either patented, copyrighted, or in some other way significantly differentiated in the view of some buyers. Moreover, if a substantial number of ties have been imposed, the existence of power can be inferred from that fact alone." While the leading cases might be read this way and this may indeed become the rule in the future, it seems to me that Fortner I1 precludes this statement of the rule. Fortner I teaches that the tying product must be more than significantly differentiated; it must be unique." Further, defendants are entitled to show justification for a substantial number of ties. 6 Second, while I found the author's treatment of monopoly excellent, his section on attempts to monopolize is superficial. 7 With regard to most areas, Sullivan carefully shows how the law evolved to its present state, often noting arguments which the courts had considered and rejected, and in some places he includes an essay on what he and other commentators think will be the problems n the next decade." Since the law of attempts to monopolize ha s'been developing rapidly in recent years, I would have expected Sullivan to do more with it. Yet, he has little to say about the implications of Otter Tail" 5 and other recent cases involving attempts, nor does he call to the reader's attention analysis offered by other writers who have made recent contributions to the thinking in this area." In addition, I would suggest increased coverage for two areas-the state action exemption and the Robinson-Patman Act. The state action exemption is discussed in a catch-all chapter which the author describes as "something of a miscelliny, deal(ing) briefly with several loosely related topics" 6 ' This is a technique employed by several casebooks: full treatment of restricting intraband competition. For a general discussion of the G.T.E. decision, see Carstensen, Annual Survey of Antitrust Developments, 35 WASH. & LEE L. Rxv. 1 (1978). 52 Sullivan, supra note 1, Id., 142 at 440. United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 97 S. Ct. 861 (1977). Id. at ' Id. at 867 n.10. Sullivan, supra note 1, ' See, e.g., in which the author considers various types of joint activities involving competitors including joint research, joint advertising, joint activities making a market and his chapter on oligopoly markets ' Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973). " See, e.g., Cooper, Attempts and Monopolization: A Mildly Expansionist Answer to the Prophylactic Riddle of Section Two, 72 MICH. L. REv. 373 (1974); Blecher, Attempt to Monopolize under 2 of the Sherman Act: "Dangerous Probability" of Monopolization Within the "Relevant Market" 38 GEo. WASH. L. Rzv. 215 (1969). 11 Sullivan, supra note 1, 232 at 708.
9 346 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXV is limited to the major substantive areas of the law. 2 Yet, Sullivan himself describes Cantor v. The Detroit Edison Company 3 as a decision which ''may prove to be one of the most important antitrust decisions in recent years." 64 Fuller treatment of this burgeoning area seems appropriate even if it would destroy the symmetry of the concluding chapter. The author's consideration of the Robinson-Patman Act" is very sketchy. He frankly admits as much. 7 One gets the impression that he did not wish to consider this statute at all since its underlying policy and the decisions interpreting it so often conflict with the other antitrust laws." He tells his readers to consult the earlier texts of Rowell and Edwards 7 " if they are interested in the technical aspects of this highly technical statute. If the price discrimination law did not merit the consideration devoted to the other substantive parts of antitrust, I think this chapter should have been omitted entirely. 7 ' No reader could follow the text unless he or she were quite familiar with the Act already. Despite these criticisms, I would recommend this book to my students in Antitrust. Overall, it is an excellent treatment of the field. On the other hand, I doubt that it would be as valuable to the practicing attorney. Much of its content is too basic to be of assistance to the specialist in antitrust. Those parts of the book, however, in which Sullivan considers questions on the frontiers of antitrust could be used like any sophisticated law review article, as a source for ideas and authority. This book may be more helpful to the attorney who does not specialize in this field. It is a good place to begin ones self-education about antitrust. Yet, because the book is aimed primarily at students, there is a lot of material which the attorney probably will not want. My guess is that the non specialist would want a more definite statement of the rules and less about the possibilities than Sullivan ordinarily gives him. 72 Furthermore, the book is not a good source for authority. In most chapters the author cites only the leading Supreme 62 See especially Areeda, supra note 3, at ch. I; Oppenheim & Weston, supra note 3, at ch U.S. 579 (1976). 64 Sullivan, supra note 1, 238 at 736. See, for example, the numerous cases cited in Handler, The Current Attack on the Parker v. Brown State Action Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1976) at footnotes 4 & 3 respectively. " Sullivan, supra note 1, ch. 8. "This chapter is a brief introduction to major issues under the law [Robinson-Patman Act] and stresses their relationship with antitrust policy." Sullivan, supra note 1, 217 at 677. See Sullivan, supra note 1, F. ROWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT (1962). o C. EDWARDS, THE PRICE DISCRIMINATION LAW (1959). 7, Compare S. OPPENHEIM & G. WESTON, THE FEDERAL TRADE LAWS (1968) with S. OPPEN- HEIM & G. WESTON, UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES (1974). The editors put the Robinson-Patman Act case., and materials in the latter volume on the ground that this statute does not fit into the antitrust scheme. 72 This technique is precisely what makes this such a good book for students.
10 1978] BOOK REVIEW Court cases and totally ignores decisions of the lower federal courts. While I feel this is acceptable practice in a student hornbook, this may not fill the needs of the bar. Finally, the book loses much of its excellence if one reads only a part of it rather than going straight through. In his introductory chapter Sullivan sets forth his general approach to the subject, especially the role of economics in antitrust." In the Chapter on monopoly he sets out much of the economic material which serves as background for the development of subsequent chapters. 74 One who merely reads the chapter on Mergers, for example, misses this economic background necessary to appreciate all that Sullivan has to say. An "integrated treatment of the major substantive areas" necessarily suffers if.used in this way. Notwithstanding these possible defects, I think that the practicing lawyer who intends to buy an antitrust book does best by choosing Sullivan. JOSEPH E. ULRICH* 73 Sullivan, supra note 1, especially 1 & 2. " Sullivan, supra note 1, *Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University
11
ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS ADJUNCT PROFESSOR PAUL BARTLETT, JR LA TROBE UNIVERSITY, Melbourne, Australia
To: Students, Antitrust Law And Economics Greetings and welcome to the class. Regarding the class syllabus, the cases which are in bold print are for student class recitation. In view of time constraints,
More informationHorizontal Territorial Restraints And The Per Se Rule
Washington and Lee Law Review Volume 28 Issue 2 Article 12 Fall 9-1-1971 Horizontal Territorial Restraints And The Per Se Rule Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
More informationWorking Party No. 3 on Co-operation and Enforcement
Unclassified DAF/COMP/WP3/WD(2016)10 DAF/COMP/WP3/WD(2016)10 Unclassified Organisation de Coopération et de Développement Économiques Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 02-Jun-2016
More informationMarquette Law Review. James H. Gormley Jr. Volume 62 Issue 2 Winter Article 5
Marquette Law Review Volume 62 Issue 2 Winter 1978 Article 5 Antitrust: Professions: Per Se Rule Applied to Ethical Canon Against Competitive Bidding. (National Society of Professional Engineers v. United
More informationConstitutional Law -- Sherman Act -- Cross- Elasticity in Determining Percentage of Market Control
University of Miami Law School Institutional Repository University of Miami Law Review 5-1-1957 Constitutional Law -- Sherman Act -- Cross- Elasticity in Determining Percentage of Market Control Edgar
More informationAnti-Trust Law - Applicability of Section 7 of the Clayton Act to Bank Mergers - United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S.
DePaul Law Review Volume 13 Issue 1 Fall-Winter 1963 Article 12 Anti-Trust Law - Applicability of Section 7 of the Clayton Act to Bank Mergers - United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321
More informationUNITED STATES ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS
UNITED STATES ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS by ElNER ELHAUGE Petrie Professor of Law, Harvard University FOUNDATION PRESS ^ANNIVERSARY] THOMSON "WEST TABLE OF CASES xiii CHAPTER 1 Introduction 1 A. The Framework
More information"JUSTICE" AND OTHER NON-ECONOMIC GOALS OF ANTITRUST Louis B. ScHwA-rz [
"JUSTICE" AND OTHER NON-ECONOMIC GOALS OF ANTITRUST Louis B. ScHwA-rz [ [Vol. 127:1076 (Comments on Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust) Commissioner Pitofsky's admirable delineation and defense
More informationDISTRIBUTION CONTRACTS Outline by Andre R. Jaglom*
DISTRIBUTION CONTRACTS Outline by Andre R. Jaglom* I.Methods of Distribution; Scope of Checklist There are many ways for a supplier to bring its products or services to market. It may sell directly through
More informationAntitrust Law - The Requirement of an Instruction on Intent in Per Se Criminal Violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act
Volume 25 Issue 6 Article 5 1980 Antitrust Law - The Requirement of an Instruction on Intent in Per Se Criminal Violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act Andy Susko Follow this and additional works at:
More informationTying Arrangements: Requisite Economic Power, Promotional Ties and the Single Product Defense
Boston College Law Review Volume 11 Issue 2 Number 2 Article 10 2-1-1970 Tying Arrangements: Requisite Economic Power, Promotional Ties and the Single Product Defense Raymond J. Brassard Follow this and
More informationAntitrust Law - The Per Se Rule - Naked Horizontal Territorial Restraints Held to Be Illegal Per Se
Volume 18 Issue 1 Article 7 1972 Antitrust Law - The Per Se Rule - Naked Horizontal Territorial Restraints Held to Be Illegal Per Se A. Roy DeCaro Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr
More informationAntitrust Regulation Inclusion of Substitute Products Within the Relevant Market, United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S.
Washington University Law Review Volume 1957 Issue 1 January 1957 Antitrust Regulation Inclusion of Substitute Products Within the Relevant Market, United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S.
More informationANTI-TRUST: COURT OF APPEALS APPLIES BROWN SHOE INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 7 OF THE CLAYTON ACT TO PROHIBIT VERTICAL MERGER
ANTI-TRUST: COURT OF APPEALS APPLIES BROWN SHOE INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 7 OF THE CLAYTON ACT TO PROHIBIT VERTICAL MERGER SINCE the passage of the Sherman Act' in 1890 Congress has repeatedly expressed
More informationProof of Economic Power in a Sherman Act Tying Arrangement Case: Should Economic Power be Presumed When the Tying Product is Patented or Copyrighted?
Louisiana Law Review Volume 48 Number 1 September 1987 Proof of Economic Power in a Sherman Act Tying Arrangement Case: Should Economic Power be Presumed When the Tying Product is Patented or Copyrighted?
More informationFordham Urban Law Journal
Fordham Urban Law Journal Volume 4 4 Number 3 Article 10 1976 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW- Federal Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act of 1972- Jurisdiction to Review Effluent Limitation Regulations Promulgated
More informationThe Expansion of Horizontal Merger Defenses After General Dynamics: A Suggested Reconsideration of Sherman Act Principles
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal Volume 12 Issue 3 Spring 1981 Antitrust Symposium: Mergers Article 4 1981 The Expansion of Horizontal Merger Defenses After General Dynamics: A Suggested Reconsideration
More information3.2 Antitrust Sherman Act (Section 1, Per Se Violation) Tying Agreement Defense Of Justification
3.2 Antitrust Sherman Act (Section 1, Per Se Violation) Tying Agreement Defense Of Justification In this case the Plaintiff claims that the Defendant violated Title 15, United States Code, Section 1, commonly
More informationLecture Notes: Industrial Organization in Context (to be distributed).
Stephen Martin EC 361 Economics of Antitrust & Regulation Spring 2008 smartin@purdue.edu T & Th 9:00-10:15 494 4402 KRAN G012 Office hours: T, Th 10:30-11:30 and by appointment, 4027 Rawls. Course web
More informationAntitrust Problems in International Technology Transfers United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 648 F.2d 642 (9th Cir.
Washington Law Review Volume 57 Issue 4 11-1-1982 Antitrust Problems in International Technology Transfers United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 648 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 2981) Christina Marie Ager
More informationFollow this and additional works at:
Hofstra Law Review Volume 6 Issue 2 Article 7 1978 CBS, Inc. v. ASCAP Randi B. Rosenblatt Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr Recommended Citation Rosenblatt,
More information10 TH ANNUAL HEALTH CARE PRACTITIONER S ROUNDTABLE VBA HEALTH LAW SECTION
10 TH ANNUAL HEALTH CARE PRACTITIONER S ROUNDTABLE VBA HEALTH LAW SECTION ANTITRUST SCRUTINY OF HEALTH CARE TRANSACTIONS HEMAN A. MARSHALL, III Woods Rogers, PLC 540-983-7654 marshall@woodsrogers.com November
More informationSOME PREDICTIONS ABOUT FUTURE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
2009] 895 SOME PREDICTIONS ABOUT FUTURE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT Robert Pitofsky * INTRODUCTION I have been given the challenge of discussing what antitrust enforcement is likely to be over the next four
More informationAntitrust Policy in Mexico
Law and Business Review of the Americas Volume 7 2001 Antitrust Policy in Mexico Daniel J. Slottje Stephen D. Prowse Follow this and additional works at: http://scholar.smu.edu/lbra Recommended Citation
More informationAntitrust and Refusals To Deal after Nynex v. Discon
Antitrust and Refusals To Deal after Nynex v. Discon Donald M. Falk * Your client really can say "no" without running afoul of the antitrust limitations. NO ONE LIKES to lose business. On the other hand,
More informationWhat, Never? Well, Hardly Ever : Strict Antitrust Scrutiny as an Alternative to Per Se Antitrust Illegality, 38 Hastings L.J.
John Marshall Law School The John Marshall Institutional Repository Faculty Scholarship 1-1-1987 What, Never? Well, Hardly Ever : Strict Antitrust Scrutiny as an Alternative to Per Se Antitrust Illegality,
More informationAntitrust Regulation And Problems Of Oligopoly Structure: Helix Milling Co. V. Terminal Flour Mills Co., 523 F.2D 1317 (9Th Cir. 1975).
Washington and Lee Law Review Volume 33 Issue 3 Article 6 Summer 6-1-1976 Antitrust Regulation And Problems Of Oligopoly Structure: Helix Milling Co. V. Terminal Flour Mills Co., 523 F.2D 1317 (9Th Cir.
More informationINTERNATIONAL SUPPLY AND DISTRIBUTION ARRANGEMENTS: CURRENT TRENDS & ISSUES. By David B. Eberhardt and John E. McCann, Jr.
INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY AND DISTRIBUTION ARRANGEMENTS: CURRENT TRENDS & ISSUES By David B. Eberhardt and John E. McCann, Jr. In today s global economy, and with the advent of purchasing via the Internet,
More informationSyllabus -- Franchise and Distribution Law/Professor Devlin/Fall 2008
Preliminary (subject to change) Syllabus -- Franchise and Distribution Law/Professor Devlin/Fall 2008 Meets Tuesday and Thursday 10:30 Noon Room TBD Casebook Schneider and Ney - Business Franchise Law:
More informationNew Twists on Old Wrinkles: Primary Jurisdiction and Regulatory Accommodation with the Antitrust Laws
Boston College Law Review Volume 15 Issue 1 Number 1 Article 4 11-1-1973 New Twists on Old Wrinkles: Primary Jurisdiction and Regulatory Accommodation with the Antitrust Laws Follow this and additional
More informationDoes Antitrust Have a Comparative Advantage?
University of Chicago Law School Chicago Unbound Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship 1999 Does Antitrust Have a Comparative Advantage? Frank H. Easterbrook Follow this and additional works at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles
More informationIntroduction into US business law VIII FS 2017
Introduction into US business law VIII FS 2017 Repetition last time: torts > Torts > Civil wrong > Relevance (incl. Excessive damages reforms?) > Intentional > Negligence > To proof: > Duty to care, breach
More informationTRADE REGULATION: VERTICAL TERRITORIAL RESTRICTIONS UPHELD BY SEVENTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
TRADE REGULATION: VERTICAL TERRITORIAL RESTRICTIONS UPHELD BY SEVENTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR YEARS manufacturers have submitted without litigation to the Government's position that vertical territorial
More informationLEGAL UPDATE MICROSOFT: EXCLUSIVE DEALING UNDER SECTION 1 OF THE SHERMAN ACT: A NEW STANDARD? Shannon A. Keyes
LEGAL UPDATE MICROSOFT: EXCLUSIVE DEALING UNDER SECTION 1 OF THE SHERMAN ACT: A NEW STANDARD? Shannon A. Keyes I. INTRODUCTION The United States Supreme Court has denied the Justice Department s petition
More informationToward a Coherent Antitrust Policy: The Role of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act in Price Discrimination Regulation
Boston College Law Review Volume 16 Issue 2 Number 2 Article 1 1-1-1975 Toward a Coherent Antitrust Policy: The Role of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act in Price Discrimination Regulation
More informationWhither Price Squeeze Antitrust?
JANUARY 2008, RELEASE ONE Whither Price Squeeze Antitrust? Jonathan M. Jacobson and Valentina Rucker Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati Whither Price Squeeze Antitrust? Jonathan M. Jacobson and Valentina
More informationAntitrust Standards Of Illegality For Tying Arrangements
Washington and Lee Law Review Volume 22 Issue 2 Article 5 Fall 9-1-1965 Antitrust Standards Of Illegality For Tying Arrangements Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
More informationLoyola University Chicago Law Journal
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal Volume 1 Issue 1 Winter 1970 Article 10 1970 Antitrust - Tying Arrangements - Conditioning Grant of Credit upon Purchase of Seller's Product Held to Be Tying Arrangement
More informationThe Future of Reciprocity: A Study in Antitrust Decisional Technique
Valparaiso University Law Review Volume 1 Number 1 pp.114-138 Fall 1966 The Future of Reciprocity: A Study in Antitrust Decisional Technique Recommended Citation The Future of Reciprocity: A Study in Antitrust
More informationPCI SSC Antitrust Compliance Guidelines
Document Number: PCI-PROC-0036 Version: 1.2 Editor: Mauro Lance PCI-PROC-0036 PCI SSC ANTITRUST COMPLIANCE GUIDELINES These guidelines are provided by the PCI Security Standards Council, LLC ( PCI SSC
More informationAntitrust Injury in Robinson-Patman Cases: What s Left?
NOVEMBER 2008, RELEASE TWO Antitrust Injury in Robinson-Patman Cases: What s Left? Scott Martin Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP Antitrust Injury in Robinson-Patman Cases: What s Left? Scott Martin* lthough
More informationTrade and Commerce Laws
CHAPTER 4 Trade and Commerce Laws IN GENERAL All aspects of our federal and state trade and commerce laws apply to any and all business and professions (including actuaries) except that such application
More informationHow Italian Colors Guts Private Antitrust Enforcement by Replacing It With Ineffective Forms Of Arbitration
How Italian Colors Guts Private Antitrust Enforcement by Replacing It With Ineffective Forms Of Arbitration The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits
More informationWORKER'S COMPENSATION LAW AND PRACTICE Second Edition. By Wex S. Malone and H. Alston Johnson, III. West Publishing Co Pp. xvi and 654.
Louisiana Law Review Volume 41 Number 1 Fall 1980 WORKER'S COMPENSATION LAW AND PRACTICE Second Edition. By Wex S. Malone and H. Alston Johnson, III. West Publishing Co. 1980. Pp. xvi and 654. Marcus L.
More informationCPI Antitrust Journal November 2010 (1)
CPI Antitrust Journal November 2010 (1) Supreme Court Verdict in CCI v SAIL: Setting the Ground Rules for the Commission and the Appellate Tribunal Parthsarathi Jha Trilegal www.competitionpolicyinternational.com
More informationInvestigation No. 337-TA International Trade Commission
Investigation No. 337-TA-1002 International Trade Commission In the Matter of CERTAIN CARBON AND STEEL ALLOY PRODUCTS Comments of the International Center of Law & Economics Regarding the Commission s
More informationCase 1:05-cv MRB Document 27 Filed 09/08/2006 Page 1 of 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO WESTERN DIVISION
Case 1:05-cv-00519-MRB Document 27 Filed 09/08/2006 Page 1 of 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO WESTERN DIVISION Total Benefits Planning Agency Inc. et al., Plaintiffs v. Case No.
More informationNational Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma and University of Georgia Athletic Association
Chicago-Kent Law Review Volume 61 Issue 3 Article 5 June 1985 National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma and University of Georgia Athletic Association Susan
More informationThe Federal Trade Commission: Progress and a New Profile
Case Western Reserve Law Review Volume 22 Issue 1 1970 The Federal Trade Commission: Progress and a New Profile Caspar W. Weinberger Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
More informationWhatever Happened To Quick Look?
University of Miami Law School University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository University of Miami Business Law Review 12-13-2017 Whatever Happened To Quick Look? Edward D. Cavanagh Follow this
More informationRegulatory Studies Program. Public Interest Comment on Establishing Procedural Requirements to Govern Section 10 Forbearance Petition Proceedings 1
Regulatory Studies Program Public Interest Comment on Establishing Procedural Requirements to Govern Section 10 Forbearance Petition Proceedings 1 March 7, 2008 WC Docket No. 07-267; FCC No. 07-202 The
More informationHow Much Light has Sun Oil Shed on "Meeting Competition" Under the Robinson-Patman Act?
Boston College Law Review Volume 4 Issue 3 Article 15 4-1-1963 How Much Light has Sun Oil Shed on "Meeting Competition" Under the Robinson-Patman Act? Joseph H. Spain Follow this and additional works at:
More informationCases and Materials on Remedies
Fordham Law Review Volume 51 Issue 1 Article 6 1982 Cases and Materials on Remedies Margaret S. Bearn Recommended Citation Margaret S. Bearn, Cases and Materials on Remedies, 51 Fordham L. Rev. 196 (1982).
More information12/6/ :35:59 AM
The Untwining of Patent Law and Antitrust: No Presumption of Market Power in Patent Tying Cases According to the Supreme Court in Illinois Tool Works v. Independent Ink Sue Ann Mota 1 I. INTRODUCTION Congress
More informationIn The Supreme Court of the United States
No. 06-480 ================================================================ In The Supreme Court of the United States LEEGIN CREATIVE LEATHER PRODUCTS, INC., v. Petitioner, PSKS, INC., doing business as
More informationJOSEPH P. BAUER. and FAX: (574) Cambridge, Massachusetts J.D. 1969
Page 1 JOSEPH P. BAUER LOCAL Home: Office: ADDRESS: 1426 East Wayne Street Notre Dame Law School South Bend, IN 46615 Notre Dame, IN 46556 (574) 288-6428 (574) 631-6514 EMAIL and FAX: Bauer.1@nd.edu (574)
More informationWikiLeaks Document Release
WikiLeaks Document Release February 2, 2009 Congressional Research Service Report RS22700 Resale Price Maintenance No Longer a Per Se Antitrust Offense: Leegin Creative Leather Products v. PSKS, Inc. Janice
More informationMaricopa County and the Problem of Per Se Characterization in Horizontal Price Fixing Cases
Valparaiso University Law Review Volume 18 Number 4 pp.1007-1067 Summer 1984 Maricopa County and the Problem of Per Se Characterization in Horizontal Price Fixing Cases Rocco J. De Grasse Recommended Citation
More informationHow Should Competition Law Be Taught?
How Should Competition Law Be Taught? The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters. Citation Published Version Accessed Citable
More informationSupreme Court of the United States
NO. 13-720 In the Supreme Court of the United States STEPHEN KIMBLE, ET AL., Petitioners, v. MARVEL ENTERPRISES, INC., Respondent. On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
More informationFollow this and additional works at:
St. John's Law Review Volume 36 Issue 1 Volume 36, December 1961, Number 1 Article 4 May 2013 Antitrust Law--Price Discrimination--Defense of "Meeting Competition" Under Robinson-Patman Act (Sun Oil Co.
More informationThe Scope of the Insurance Industry's Sherman Act Exemption: New Considerations
Boston College Law Review Volume 19 Issue 2 Number 2 Article 3 1-1-1978 The Scope of the Insurance Industry's Sherman Act Exemption: New Considerations Leonard M. Singer Follow this and additional works
More informationPrice Fixing Agreements --- Patented Products
Louisiana Law Review Volume 9 Number 3 March 1949 Price Fixing Agreements --- Patented Products Virginia L. Martin Repository Citation Virginia L. Martin, Price Fixing Agreements --- Patented Products,
More informationAnglo-American Law. Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. V. Psks, Inc., Dba Kay s Kloset, Kay s Shoes. Aykut ÖZDEMİR* * Attorney at law.
Anglo-American Law Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. V. Psks, Inc., Dba Kay s Kloset, Kay s Shoes Aykut ÖZDEMİR* * Attorney at law. Introduction Mainly, agreements restricting competition are grouped
More informationGraduate Industrial Organization Some Notes on Antitrust.
Graduate Industrial Organization Some Notes on Antitrust. John Asker October 17, 2011 The purpose of these notes is not to give an introduction to the law of antitrust in any comprehensive way. Instead,
More informationThe Interstate Commerce Act and the Sherman Act: Playing Railroad Tycoon
University of Chicago Law School Chicago Unbound Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship 2011 The Interstate Commerce Act and the Sherman Act: Playing Railroad Tycoon Randal C. Picker Follow this and additional
More informationby Harvey M. Applebaum and Thomas O. Barnett
ANTITRUST LAW: Ninth Circuit upholds Kodak's liability for monopolizing the "aftermarket" for servicing of its equipment but vacates some damages and modifies injunction. by Harvey M. Applebaum and Thomas
More informationOffer and Acceptance. Louisiana Law Review. Michael W. Mengis
Louisiana Law Review Volume 45 Number 3 The 1984 Revision of the Louisiana Civil Code's Articles on Obligations - A Student Symposium January 1985 Offer and Acceptance Michael W. Mengis Repository Citation
More informationAN IMPLICIT EXEMPTION, IMPLICITLY APPLIED: BLURRING THE LINE OF ACCOMMODATION BETWEEN LABOR POLICY AND ANTITRUST LAW IN HARRIS v.
AN IMPLICIT EXEMPTION, IMPLICITLY APPLIED: BLURRING THE LINE OF ACCOMMODATION BETWEEN LABOR POLICY AND ANTITRUST LAW IN HARRIS v. SAFEWAY Abstract: On July 12, 2011, in Harris v. Safeway, the U.S. Court
More informationPatent Portfolio Management and Technical Standard Setting: How to Avoid Loss of Patent Rights. Bruce D. Sunstein 1 Bromberg & Sunstein LLP
Patent Portfolio Management and Technical Standard Setting: How to Avoid Loss of Patent Rights I. The Antitrust Background by Bruce D. Sunstein 1 Bromberg & Sunstein LLP Standard setting can potentially
More informationNCAA v. Board of Regents: Supreme Court Intercepts Per Se Rule and Rule of Reason
University of Miami Law School Institutional Repository University of Miami Law Review 5-1-1985 NCAA v. Board of Regents: Supreme Court Intercepts Per Se Rule and Rule of Reason Peter W. Bellas Follow
More informationAntitrust and Intellectual Property
and Intellectual Property July 22, 2016 Rob Kidwell, Member Antitrust Prohibitions vs IP Protections The Challenge Harmonizing U.S. antitrust laws that sanction the illegal use of monopoly/market power
More informationTORTS-THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT-ABSOLUTE LIABILITY, THE DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION, SONIC BooMs. Laird v. Nelms, 92 S. Ct (1972).
TORTS-THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT-ABSOLUTE LIABILITY, THE DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION, SONIC BooMs. Laird v. Nelms, 92 S. Ct. 1899 (1972). J IM NELMS, a resident of a rural community near Nashville,
More informationFollow this and additional works at: Part of the Law Commons
Case Western Reserve Law Review Volume 22 Issue 4 1971 Recent Case: Antitrust - Parens Patriae - State Recovery of Money Damages [Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 431 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. granted,
More informationANTITRUST LAW: SUPREME COURT HOLDS UNREASON- ABLE SECURITIES EXCHANGE REGULATION OF NON- MEMBER TO BE VIOLATION OF SHERMAN ACT
ANTITRUST LAW: SUPREME COURT HOLDS UNREASON- ABLE SECURITIES EXCHANGE REGULATION OF NON- MEMBER TO BE VIOLATION OF SHERMAN ACT THE modern securities exchange has attributes of both the governmental agency
More informationSelf-Assessment of Agreements Under Article 81 EC: Is There a Need for More Commission Guidance?
OCTOBER 2008, RELEASE TWO Self-Assessment of Agreements Under Article 81 EC: Is There a Need for More Commission Guidance? Michele Piergiovanni & Pierantonio D Elia Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP
More informationCOMMENTS. 8 Ibid. Id., at Stat (1936), 15 U.S.C.A. 13 (1952).
COMMENTS COST JUSTIFICATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT The recent decision by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Simplicity Patterns Co. v. FTC' represents a novel judicial approach
More informationThe Facial Unreasonableness Theory: Filling the Void Between Per Se and Rule of Reason
St. John's Law Review Volume 55 Issue 4 Volume 55, Summer 1981, Number 4 Article 3 July 2012 The Facial Unreasonableness Theory: Filling the Void Between Per Se and Rule of Reason Daniel F. De Vita Follow
More informationMEMORANDUM. Criminal Procedure and Remedies Issues Recommended for Commission Study
MEMORANDUM From: To: cc: Criminal Procedure and Remedies Working Group All Commissioners Andrew J. Heimert and Commission Staff Date: December 21, 2004 Re: Criminal Procedure and Remedies Issues Recommended
More informationThe Per Se Rule That Ate Maricopa Country: Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society
Boston College Law Review Volume 24 Issue 4 Number 4 Article 6 7-1-1983 The Per Se Rule That Ate Maricopa Country: Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society Brian J. Knez Follow this and additional works
More informationANTITRUST LAW, POLICY AND PROCEDURE
ANTITRUST LAW, POLICY AND PROCEDURE Cases, Materials, Problems Sixth Edition E. Thomas Sullivan Senior Vice President and Provost & Julius E. Davis Chair in Law University of Minnesota 'Law School Herbert
More informationTPP Competition Chapter Prepared by the Competition Working Group of the U.S. Business Coalition for TPP. Competition Enforcement
TPP Competition Chapter Prepared by the Competition Working Group of the U.S. Business Coalition for TPP This submission, the second from this working group, serves as a short narrative explaining the
More informationNotre Dame Law Review
Notre Dame Law Review Volume 41 Issue 3 Article 5 2-1-1966 Note Martin F. Idzik Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Martin
More informationPer Se Rules and Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
California Law Review Volume 54 Issue 5 Article 4 December 1966 Per Se Rules and Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act David Alan Leipziger Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/californialawreview
More informationANTITRUST COMPLIANCE STANDARDS MISSOURI TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION
ANTITRUST COMPLIANCE STANDARDS MISSOURI TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION I. Association Policy As members of the Missouri Telecommunications Industry Association (MTIA), member companies enjoy the
More informationDevelopment in Competition Law and Policy (Indonesia Progress) *
Development in Competition Law and Policy (Indonesia Progress) * I. Introduction : Since March 5, 1999 the Government of Indonesia has enacted The Law No. 5 of 1999 concerning Prohibition of Monopolistic
More informationOf Burdens of Proof and Heightened Scrutiny
Of Burdens of Proof and Heightened Scrutiny James B. Speta * In the most recent issue of this journal, Professor Catherine Sandoval has persuasively argued that using broadcast program-language as the
More informationClient Advisory. United States Antitrust Guidelines. Corporate Department. I. The U.S. Antitrust Laws. July 2013
Client Advisory Corporate Department United States Antitrust Guidelines The American economic system depends upon free enterprise and open competition. The U.S. antitrust laws were enacted to help preserve
More informationUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA SAN JOSE DIVISION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA SAN JOSE DIVISION 0 MATHEW ENTERPRISE, INC., Plaintiff, v. CHRYSLER GROUP LLC, Defendant. Case No. -cv-0-blf ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT S PARTIAL
More informationFTC AND DOJ ISSUE JOINT REPORT REGARDING ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
OF INTEREST FTC AND DOJ ISSUE JOINT REPORT REGARDING ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS Interesting and difficult questions lie at the intersection of intellectual property rights and
More informationGCR THE HANDBOOK OF COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES. A Global Competition Review special report published in association with: NOTES.
NOTES THE HANDBOOK OF COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 2015 A Global Competition Review special report published in association with: GCR GLOBAL COMPETITION REVIEW www.globalcompetitionreview.com www.globalcompetitionreview.com
More informationAntitrust More than a Century After Sherman: Why Protecting Competitors Promotes Competition More than Economically Efficient Mergers
From the SelectedWorks of Andreas Koutsoudakis, Esq. 2009 Antitrust More than a Century After Sherman: Why Protecting Competitors Promotes Competition More than Economically Efficient Mergers Andreas Koutsoudakis,
More informationANTITRUST LAW, POLICY, AND PROCEDURE. Cases, Materials, Problems. Seventh Edition
ANTITRUST LAW, POLICY, AND PROCEDURE Cases, Materials, Problems Seventh Edition. Thomas Sullivan President ofthe University of Vermont and Dean Emeritus, University of Minnesota Law School Herbert Hovenkamp
More informationMotion Picture Split Agreements: An Antitrust Analysis
Fordham Law Review Volume 52 Issue 1 Article 5 1983 Motion Picture Split Agreements: An Antitrust Analysis William J. Borner Recommended Citation William J. Borner, Motion Picture Split Agreements: An
More informationSTATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS ADRIAN ENERGY ASSOCIATES, LLC, CADILLAC RENEWABLE ENERGY LLC, GENESEE POWER STATION, LP, GRAYLING GENERATING STATION, LP, HILLMAN POWER COMPANY, LLC, T.E.S. FILER CITY
More informationSeptember 1, Via Electronic Mail
Via Electronic Mail Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia 244 Washington Street SW Room 572 Atlanta, Georgia 30334 Re: Proposed Rule 6.8 Dear Ms. Barnes: In response to Justice Nahmias memorandum, dated
More informationState Regulation of Resale Price Maintenance on the Internet: The Constitutional Problems with the 2009 Amendment to the Maryland Antitrust Act
State Regulation of Resale Price Maintenance on the Internet: The Constitutional Problems with the 2009 Amendment to the Maryland Antitrust Act Katherine M. Brockmeyer * Table of Contents I. Introduction...
More informationMedia Today 5th Edition Chapter Recaps & Study Guide. Chapter 5: Controls on Media Content: Government Regulation, Self-Regulation, and Ethics
1 Media Today 5th Edition Chapter Recaps & Study Guide Chapter 5: Controls on Media Content: Government Regulation, Self-Regulation, and Ethics This chapter provides an overview of the different ways that
More informationFourth Circuit Summary
William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review Volume 29 Issue 3 Article 7 Fourth Circuit Summary Samuel R. Brumberg Christopher D. Supino Repository Citation Samuel R. Brumberg and Christopher D.
More informationBook Review: The Judicial Process in Tort Cases
Yale Law School Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository Faculty Scholarship Series Yale Law School Faculty Scholarship 1-1-1940 Book Review: The Judicial Process in Tort Cases Fleming James Jr. Follow
More information