Rights-Based Management in International Tuna Fisheries. Dale Squires IIFET 2014

Transcription

1 Rights-Based Management in International Tuna Fisheries Dale Squires IIFET 2014

2 Organization 1. Introduction 2. Self-Enforcing Voluntary Multilateral Cooperation 3. Types of Rights with International Fisheries 4. Allocation 5. Right of Entry 6. Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission in the Eastern Pacific Ocean 7. Parties to the Nauru Agreement Vessel Day Scheme in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean 8. Some Issues That Make RBM Difficult 1

3 1. Introduction 2

4 Exclude bluefin tunas Not a game-theoretic discussion Discussion of what is, institutional features, & some practical issues that arise based on my experiences 3

5 4

6 Background Highly migratory species Fugitive resources that are transboundary crossing multiple EEZs and high seas Only bluefin and albacore actually migrate across rest of ocean basins Other major tropical species of yellowfin, skipjack, and bigeye move within overlapping eliptical areas on both sides of equator 5

7 Bigeye Fishery as Illustration 6

8 Purse Seine Areas 7

9 Types of Rights That Are In Play Catch (ITQ, Group) Nothing yet Effort (ITE, Group) Parties to Nauru Agreement Vessel Day Scheme Vessel days and access to PNA EEZs Purse seiners, extending to longliners Limited Entry (Closed Regional Vessel Registry) IATTC in EPO Capacity Cubic meters of well capacity IATTC in EPO for purse seiners Combined with limited entry with goal of 158,000 m 3 well capacity 8

10 2. Self-Enforcing Voluntary Multilateral Cooperation

11 Self-Enforcing Multilateral Cooperation Whether formal treaty and RFMO or PNA, agreements are voluntary and multilateral Rights programs under auspices of RFMO must be self-enforcing due to national sovereignty Same with PNA Vessel-Day Scheme 10

12 3. Types of Rights with International Fisheries

13 Two General Levels of Rights (1) Property Right is allocated to participating states. (2) Use Rights are then allocated to individuals or groups in fishery. Note vessel ownership is another right & asset that is not discussed further. 12

14 Rights in National Fisheries within EEZs Flag state & access right & vessel license are bundled together Access right = vessel license Flag state implicit and unstated Catch/effort use right Strength of right between use right and property right varies between countries 13

15 Flag State & Access Rights Flag state registry Gives access to flag state EEZ & high seas if flag state is RFMO member or cooperating nonmember But access to other EEZs requires separate access right from that EEZ state License in practice combined with flag state registry, but not necessarily with access right 14

16 Examples All parties are members of RFMOs in examples Example of flag & own EEZ access right combined: Ecuador-flagged purse seiner holding IATTC- Ecuador capacity right fishing on high seas and Ecuadorian EEZ Example flag not combined with access right to another EEZ: DWFN-flagged purse seiner with vessel-day right from PNA state 15

17 Reminder: Catch & Effort Use Rights with RFMOs Catch/effort rights that can be exercised anywhere within a RFMO area do not eliminate the requirement of having access rights to EEZs. Despite holding an allocated Use Right, vessels wishing to fish within an EEZ must also obtain an access license. To do this, they may or may not reflag 16

18 Catch/Effort/Capacity Right May or May Not be Combined with Limited Entry to Fishery IATTC has limited entry as part of capacity rights program established under Resolution C2-03 PNA abolished license limitation program (Nauru Agreement) to their EEZs & only vessel day scheme IOTC has form of limited entry for purse seiners on high seas for right now 17

19 4. Allocation of Catch & Effort Rights

20 Some Issues (1) Distribution conflicts are inherent in allocation Must be increase in overall net benefits that can benefit all parties Considerable uncertainty over gains in economic rents and what the losses are with property rights that varies by gear type and RFMO Compounded by multiple species and gears and considerable heterogeneity among countries (DWFNs, coastal developing states, SIDS) 19

21 Some Issues (2) Individual states, coalitions of states, and all parties must gain Transfer payments are required Typically solve by overallocation (borrow from future) and allocate by biomass not just grandfathering through catch rights 20

22 Allocation In principle, can be allocated to either states or individuals In practice, allocated to states, as states increasingly exert their sovereignty 21

23 Allocation to States with EEZs Big issue within IOTC & ICCAT, not so much IATTC, WPFMC Because already have allocation Allocate according to catch history or biomass within EEZs/size of EEZs? To coastal states/sids whose EEZ it is? (will predominate) Allocate to DWFNs that have historically fished within state s EEZs? To DWFNs with their catch history? 22

24 Allocation of Rights to Fish on High Seas is Unclear (1) Flag state DWFNs would like right to be associated with catch history Coastal developing states and SIDS not already fishing on high seas would like right to be associated with membership Coastal developing states and SIDs already fishing on high seas? 23

25 Allocation of Rights to Fish on High Seas is Unclear (2) My guess is high seas right will have limited duration to handle this & be compromise favoring DWFNs on high seas and their catch rights that changes over time Market transfers Likely will vary by RFMO 24

26 5. Right of Entry

27 Right of Entry (1) International law allows free entry for states with real interest under conditions of joining RFMO or becoming cooperating non-member, following regulations, etc. RFMO decision-making too cumbersome given number of states and their heterogeneity for preemptive types of decisions to deter entry 26

28 Right of Entry (2) Leads to requirement for special design features Transferability allows transfers to new members or to coastal states/sids asserting right to fish on high seas Limited durability allows reallocation to new members or to coastal states/sids asserting rights to fish on high seas Set-asides of allocation Commensurate reductions by the other participants in the fishery over time 27

29 6. Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission in the Eastern Pacific Ocean 28

30 4. Eastern Pacific Ocean 29

31 IATTC Capacity in EPO (1) Established by Resolution C2-03 for purse seine vessels Program initially developed to address clear overcapacity Rights were allocated to vessels on the active Regional Vessel Registry according to the amount of cubic meters of well capacity they had Rights allocated in perpetuity 30

32 IATTC Capacity in EPO (2) Two forms of side payments to insure all parties gain Rational for individual states, coalitions of states, and collectively (1) Initial over-allocation based on grandfathering (2) Some coastal states without fleets still received allocation based on their EEZ Some states still claiming they did not receive their fair allocation and a capacity committee continually reviews it 31

33 IATTC Capacity in EPO (3) Backed into the allocation and rights program Capacity property rights initially allocated to vessels But flag states have exerted their authority and claimed the property right States allow their own flagged vessels to use state capacity property right as a use right 32

34 IATTC Capacity in EPO (4) Some states have allowed vessels to reflag But sometimes states have retained the capacity property and use rights and sometimes states have relinquished these capacity rights So some transferability Reflagged vessels without capacity right must obtain capacity right from new flag state 33

35 IATTC Capacity in EPO (5) Clearly recognized that over-capacity IATTC has been discussing vessel buybacks and individual transferable quotas Some states are ready, but many others are not 34

36 7. PNA Vessel Day Scheme in Western and Central Pacific Ocean 35

37 36

38 PNA Vessel-Day Scheme (1) EEZs of PNA states in WCPO are 80% of area Most RFMO areas high seas much higher Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) are eight Pacific Island countries that control the bulk of the best tropical tuna stocks within their EEZs and Archipelagic Waters Considerable homogeneity among PNA States Some domestic ownership of purse seiners, many reflagged vessels (from Taiwan), some port facilities (Majuro, PNG), various states of processing (especially PNG) 37

39 PNA Vessel-Day Scheme (2) In 2007, the PNA countries implemented the Vessel Day Scheme (VDS) that limited the number of fishing days for the shared purse seine tuna fishery occurring within their collective EEZs 38

40 PNA Vessel-Day Scheme (3) PNA dropped the Nauru Agreement license limitation program (vessel license) PNA states own the vessel day right DWFNs and others purchase use right Right to a derived demand, days Duration for three years Combines use right to access conferring state s EEZ & specified number of days 39

41 ICCAT TACs ICCAT sets TACs and allocates TACs on limited duration to different states Use right Limited duration 40

42 8. Some Issues That Make RBM Difficult 41

43 High Transactions Costs within RFMOs Large numbers of states Heterogeneity between and within states Even among coastal developing states and SIDS 42

44 Who Gains and Who Loses?...(1) Uncertainty over gains in benefits and losses and their distribution Until recently, exceptionally high prices and profits Major stocks are pretty well managed by hard or soft TACs MSY is written into international law 43

45 Who Gains and Who Loses?...(2) Ostensibly, main demanders of property rights are DWFNs with: Well developed capital stocks and expertise for fishing, processing, and marketing Most coastal developing states and SIDS do not have Exceptions include Ghana & EPO 44

46 Decision Making Consensus or super-majorities make reaching decisions difficult Many problems essentially over distribution of costs and benefits over regulatory decisions 45

47 Relative Sizes of High Seas vs. EEZs Complicating factor is size of high seas relative to EEZs Most t-rfmos have high seas with 50-60% of biomass PNA states realized they control 80% of biomass in WCPO 46

48 Accommodating New Entry Who has a real interest? International law allows accommodating new entry But ways to design RBM systems to accommodate I personally think it is time to change this to existing DWFNs and coastal developing states and SIDS within each RFMO 47

49 Thanks! Questions? 48