Fairness as a constraint on trust in reciprocity: earned property rights in a reciprocal exchange experiment
|
|
- William Baldric Boone
- 6 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 Economics Letters 66 (2000) locate/ econbase Fairness as a constraint on trust in reciprocity: earned property rights in a reciprocal exchange experiment Rene Fahr, Bernd Irlenbusch a b, * a Bonn Graduate School of Economics, Universitat Bonn, Adenauerallee 24 26, D Bonn, Germany Laboratorium f ur Experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung, Universitat Bonn, Adenauerallee 24 26, D Bonn, Germany b Received 22 February 1999; accepted 23 September 1999 Abstract We igate the concept of mindreading in a trust reciprocity experiment. Our results show that the Trustees send back more, the stronger the Trustors property rights are. But instead of strategically relying on this reciprocal behavior, Trustors tend to unilaterally implement a fair outcome Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved. Keywords: Mindreading; Fairness; Trust; Reciprocity; Property rights; Real effort; Experiments JEL classification: C70; C78; C91; D63 1. Introduction 1 Several experimental studies show that in ultimatum games (Guth et al., 1982) the behavior of the 2 first mover changes when participants earn different property rights (Hoffman et al., 1994, 1996; Ruffle, 1998). If the Proposer holds property rights, she offers substantially lower amounts to the Responder compared to the situation with no property rights. On the other hand, if the Responder holds property rights, the proposal is much more generous than in a no property rights setting. The *Corresponding author. Tel.: ; fax: address: bi@uni-bonn.de (B. Irlenbusch) 1 In an ultimatum game the first mover, i.e., the Proposer, has to offer some proportion of a fixed amount of money. The second mover, i.e., the Responder, either accepts or rejects the offer. If the offer is accepted the money is allocated accordingly. If the Responder rejects nobody receives anything. 2 In accordance with the cited literature we use the term property rights in the sense of an entitlement obtained by performing a (working) task / 00/ $ see front matter 2000 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved. PII: S (99)
2 276 R. Fahr, B. Irlenbusch / Economics Letters 66 (2000) fact that the rejection rates remain virtually the same in all settings (see Hoffman et al., 1994) is 3 particularly interesting. Smith (1998) explains these observations with the concept of mindreading. According to this concept there is a mental process which enables human beings to infer the reactions of others from the consciousness of their own behavior: [Mindreading] enables me to see not only the value to me of possessing certain rights to act [i.e., property rights], but also to know intuitively the value of such rights for others (Smith, 1998, p. 8). By applying the concept of mindreading to the ultimatum game, Smith claims that the Proposer as a property rights holder offers less because, due to mindreading, she expects the Responder to reward her property rights. Similarly, if the Responder holds the property rights, offers are supposed to be high because the Proposer may fear that the offer will be rejected otherwise. We doubt whether Smith s concept of mindreading really characterizes the main driving force behind the observed behavior. Instead, we argue that, concerning property rights effects, unilateral fairness considerations (compare Kahneman et al., 1986) are much more important. As a test this paper igates whether in a slightly different game the trust reciprocity game the first mover really strategically acts according to the expected behavior of the second mover, as mindreading would predict. In our one-shot trust reciprocity game (see Fehr et al., 1993, 1997; Berg et al., 1995) the first mover (Trustor) is endowed with DM 10 to make an ment x while keeping the rest for herself (0 # x # 10). In a second stage the second mover (Trustee) receives a multiple (3x) of the ment and may return an amount y to the Trustor (0 # y # 3x). Trivially, the game is reduced to one stage if the Trustor passes nothing to the Trustee. In fact, x 5 0, y 5 0 ; x is the subgame perfect solution of the trust game, given the players are mere money-maximizers. In contrast to other reciprocity studies, we conducted three treatments along the property rights dimension, i.e., previous to the trust reciprocity game various participants earn property rights by performing a real effort working task. In 4 treatment WL only the Trustor holds a property right, whereas in treatment LW a property right is obtained by the Trustee, but not by the Trustor. In a control treatment WW none of the two players is entitled to more than the other one. In the following we speak of subjects as holding a stronger property right, if they worked more than the participant they are paired with. 2. Experimental design and procedure: entitlement in a trust game The experiment was conducted at the Laboratorium fur Experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung at the Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universitat Bonn. Participants were students of different disciplines, but most of them were law or economics students. Depending on the treatment, some participants (the workers) had to perform a real effort working 5 task, i.e., they were asked to crack walnuts. In order to succeed they had to come up with at least 3 This concept is taken from the literature on evolutionary psychology (see Baron-Cohen, 1995). 4 WL (LW) indicates that the Trustor Worked (had Leisure time) while the Trustee had Leisure (Worked) time. WW indicates that both participants Worked. 5 We wanted the working task to make the workers suffer to a certain extent in order to guarantee that they really felt entitled to the property rights. Furthermore, we chose to let subjects crack walnuts because the experiments were conducted some weeks before Christmas and, therefore, we could credibly assure that the work created a surplus. In fact, the walnut kernels were indeed sold in a supermarket as ingredients for cookies.
3 Table 1 Experimental design and procedure R. Fahr, B. Irlenbusch / Economics Letters 66 (2000) Treatment WL Treatment LW Treatment WW Number of observed pairs I. Working phase a Instructions for the working phase are read aloud to all the participants. Roles are randomly determined by drawing a card. Trustor Works Trustor has Leisure Trustor Works Trustee has Leisure Trustee Works Trustee Works II. Trust reciprocity game Instructions for the trust reciprocity game are read aloud to all the participants. Trustors are endowed with DM 10 in coins (contained in an envelope): If Trustor meets Unconditionally If Trustor meets working requirements working requirements Trustor decides to send x, 0#x#10. Trustee receives 3x: Unconditionally If Trustee meets If Trustee meets b working requirements b working requirements Trustee decides to return y, 0#y#3x (if x.0). III. Payment All participants are paid an additional DM 5 show-up fee. a The instruction sheets and the raw data can be obtained from the authors on request. b At the time when the Trustor made her ment decision she did not know whether the Trustee had succeeded in his working task. This would have created a situation of incomplete information for the Trustor in which she would have to estimate the success probability of the Trustee. Because we wanted the game to be one of perfect information, we set up the rule that a Trustor would get back her original ment if she was matched with a Trustee who did not accomplish his work. 150 g of walnut kernels in half an hour. The subjects who did not have to work were at leisure to do what they wanted. For example, they could leave the laboratory to drink coffee, read newspapers, study their lecture notes, play cards, or watch the workers. The design and procedure of the experiment is depicted in Table 1. The trust reciprocity game was conducted under anonymous conditions, i.e., participants did not know with whom they were matched. 3. Research hypotheses The main aim of this study is to analyze whether property rights alter the behavior in the trust reciprocity game and if so, whether we can predict this influence with the mindreading concept. Testing for the equity principle (Selten, 1978) in the trust reciprocity game was the second objective we had in mind when designing the present experiment Hypothesis implied by mindreading versus that emerging from fairness If the concept of mindreading is applicable, the Trustor implicitly has to form a hypothesis on the expected behavior of the Trustee. It is reasonable for the Trustor to assume that the Trustee tends to return more, the stronger the Trustor s property rights are. This hypothesis is in line with the
4 278 R. Fahr, B. Irlenbusch / Economics Letters 66 (2000) experimental results in Hoffman et al. (1994), on the dictator game. They find that the Allocator gives less if he holds stronger property rights. If the Trustee in our game has received money, he faces a situation which is strategically equivalent to that of the Allocator in the dictator game. Thus, let us first consider the reactions of the Trustee. We use F return(? ) to denote the cumulative distribution 7 function of returns on an ment of DM 10 for each of the three treatments: H return: the stronger the property rights of the Trustors, the higher the returns (on ment of DM 10): F return(wl), F return(ww), F return(lw) According to the concept of mindreading the Trustor should anticipate the Trustee s behavior as outlined in H return. Thus, if the Trustor tries to strategically exploit the knowledge obtained from mindreading, it would be profitable for her to more, the more she is entitled. This would enable the Trustee to reciprocate, i.e., to send back more money. With F (?) denoting the cumulative distribution function of ments, we have the mindreading hypothesis: mind H : The stronger the property rights of the Trustors, the higher the ments: F (WL), F (WW), F (LW) Alternatively, Trustors could unilaterally implement an outcome that can be considered to be fair, i.e., the one who has higher property rights should earn more. The latter means that Trustors only place confidence in the Trustees with a high ment if this ment does not conflict with their own fairness considerations. In this case, higher ments should be observed if the Trustees are the ones who deserve the higher payoffs by holding stronger property rights. This gives us the hypothesis emerging from fairness considerations: fair H : the stronger the property rights of the Trustees, the higher the ments: F (LW), F (WW), F (WL) 3.2. Hypotheses implied by the equity principle One important fairness norm is the equity principle: an allocation is perceived as fair if the ratio of the outcome to the input is equal to the outcome/input ratio of others. This is formulated in a qualitatively similar way by Burrows and Loomes (1994, p. 203): differentials in payoffs are deserved, and are, therefore, fair if they correlate positively with the amount of effort involved in obtaining them. According to the equity principle, the difference in entitlement should make a difference in payoffs, namely Trustors deserve the highest (lowest) payoff in treatment WL (LW), in which they have a strong (weak) property right (vice versa for the Trustee). Because in treatment WW the property rights 6 In the dictator game one player (the Allocator) receives a sum of money from the experimenter which he can unilaterally distribute between another person (the Recipient) and himself. 7 We compare the returns of those pairs in which the Trustor ed DM 10 because, besides zero, DM 10 is by far the most frequently occurring ment. Moreover, only the ment of the full endowment is certainly perceived as a friendly action, which is a necessary condition for positive reciprocal behavior.
5 R. Fahr, B. Irlenbusch / Economics Letters 66 (2000) of the two players are equal, we expect the payoffs of this treatment to lie in between. Let F P(?) (?) be the cumulative distribution function of payoffs for each of the three treatments. Thus, our hypotheses about the payoffs are: H P(Trustors) : the stronger the property rights of the Trustors, the higher their payoffs: F (WL), F (WW), F (LW) P(Trustors) P(Trustors) P(Trustors) H P(Trustees) : the stronger the property rights of the Trustees, the higher their payoffs: F (LW), F (WW), F (WL) P(Trustees) P(Trustees) P(Trustees) We will test all our hypotheses against the null hypothesis that the distributions are identical. 4. Results and conclusion By applying the nonparametric Jonckheere test for ordered alternatives, we find the following results. We can weakly significantly reject the null hypothesis that the distributions of payoffs are equal in all treatments in favor of H P(Trustors) (P , see Fig. 1). Analogously, we reject the null hypothesis in favor of H P(Trustees), which is highly significant (P , see Fig. 2). Thus, our results underline the robustness of property rights effects found in a number of experimental settings. Final payoffs of both the Trustors and the Trustees tend to increase if they hold stronger property rights. It is amazing that even in such an extreme asymmetric bargaining situation as the reciprocal exchange, the observed total payoffs qualitatively reflect the equity principle. Fig. 1. Cumulative distributions of Trustors payoffs.
6 280 R. Fahr, B. Irlenbusch / Economics Letters 66 (2000) Fig. 2. Cumulative distributions of Trustees payoffs. We can significantly reject the null hypothesis that the distributions of the considered returns are the same, in favor of our hypothesis H return (P , see Fig. 3). This means that Trustees return significantly more, the stronger the property rights of the Trustors are. According to the concept of mindreading proposed by Smith (1998), bargainers are able to foresee the tendency of the reactions of others. If we apply this concept to our trust game, the Trustor would expect the observed behavior of Fig. 3. Cumulative distributions of returns.
7 R. Fahr, B. Irlenbusch / Economics Letters 66 (2000) Fig. 4. Cumulative distributions of ments. the Trustee. Thus, a Trustor should more if she holds stronger property rights and thereby strategically exploit the expected reciprocal behavior of the Trustee. However, we do not observe such mind behavior and thus cannot significantly reject the null hypothesis in favor of the hypothesis H. fair Instead, the null hypothesis is rejected very clearly in favor of our hypothesis H (P , see Fig. 4). This is clear evidence against the implications of mindreading. Trustors unilaterally implement a fair outcome by ing more, the more the Trustee is entitled. Unilateral fairness considerations seem to be sufficiently strong to abandon strategic opportunities, which would arise from trust in the norm of reciprocity. Our result that the Trustor tends to less, the more the Trustee is expected to reciprocate rejects the applicability of the concept of mindreading in a trust reciprocity game and thereby raises severe doubts as to whether the concept really explains what is observed in the ultimatum game. Acknowledgements The authors thank the anonymous referee, Klaus Abbink, Simon Gachter, Werner Guth, Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel, Manfred Konigstein, Bettina Kuon, Abdolkarim Sadrieh, Wendelin Schnedler and Reinhard Selten and the participants of the GEW-Workshop 1998 for helpful comments. Financial support by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through Sonderforschungsbereich 303 at the University of Bonn, the Ministerium fur Wissenschaft und Forschung des Landes Nordrhein- Westfalen, and the European Union through the EU-TMR Research Network ENDEAR (FMRX- CT ) is gratefully acknowledged.
8 282 R. Fahr, B. Irlenbusch / Economics Letters 66 (2000) References Baron-Cohen, S., In: Mindblindness. An Essay on Autism and Theory of Mind, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. Berg, J., Dickhaut, J., McCabe, K., Trust, reciprocity, and social history. Games and Economic Behavior 10, Burrows, P., Loomes, G., The impact of fairness on bargaining behaviour. Empirical Economics 19, Fehr, E., Kirchsteiger, G., Riedl, A., Does fairness prevent market clearing? An experimental igation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 108 (2), Fehr, E., Gachter, S., Kirchsteiger, G., Reciprocity as a contract enforcement device: experimental evidence. Econometrica 65 (4), Guth, W., Schmittberger, R., Schwarze, B., An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 3, Hoffman, E., McCabe, K., Shachat, K., Smith, V.L., Preferences, property rights, and anonymity in bargaining games. Games and Economic Behavior 7, Hoffman, E., McCabe, K., Smith, V.L., On expectations and the monetary stakes in ultimatum games. International Journal of Game Theory 25, Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J.L., Thaler, R., Fairness as a constraint on profit seeking: entitlements in the market. The American Economic Review 76 (4), Ruffle, B.J., More is better, but fair is fair: tipping in dictator and ultimatum games. Games and Economic Behavior 23, Selten, R., The equity principle in economic behavior. In: Gottinger, H.W., Leinfellner, W. (Eds.), Decision Theory and Social Ethics, Issues in Social Choice, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, pp Smith, V.L., Distinguished guest lecture. The two faces of Adam Smith. Southern Economic Journal 65 (1), 1 19.
Staff Rotation: A Powerful Weapon Against Corruption?
Staff Rotation: A Powerful Weapon Against Corruption? by KLAUS ABBINK October 1999 Abstract The German federal government intends to introduce regular staff rotation as a precautionary measure against
More informationAre Dictators Averse to Inequality? *
Are Dictators Averse to Inequality? * Oleg Korenokª, Edward L. Millnerª, and Laura Razzoliniª June 2011 Abstract: We present the results of an experiment designed to identify more clearly the motivation
More informationSupporting Information Political Quid Pro Quo Agreements: An Experimental Study
Supporting Information Political Quid Pro Quo Agreements: An Experimental Study Jens Großer Florida State University and IAS, Princeton Ernesto Reuben Columbia University and IZA Agnieszka Tymula New York
More informationDISCUSSION PAPERS Department of Economics University of Copenhagen
DISCUSSION PAPERS Department of Economics University of Copenhagen 06-24 Pure Redistribution and the Provision of Public Goods Rupert Sausgruber Jean-Robert Tyran Studiestræde 6, DK-1455 Copenhagen K.,
More informationErnst Fehr; Michael Näf und Klaus M. Schmidt: The Role of Equality and Equity in Social Preferences
Ernst Fehr; Michael Näf und Klaus M. Schmidt: The Role of Equality and Equity in Social Preferences Munich Discussion Paper No. 2005-19 Department of Economics University of Munich Volkswirtschaftliche
More informationResource Allocations and Disapproval Voting in Unequal Groups
Article Resource Allocations and Disapproval Voting in Unequal Groups Journal of Conflict Resolution 57(4) 627-652 ª The Author(s) 2012 Reprints and permission: sagepub.com/journalspermissions.nav DOI:
More informationGoods, Games, and Institutions : A Reply
International Political Science Review (2002), Vol 23, No. 4, 402 410 Debate: Goods, Games, and Institutions Part 2 Goods, Games, and Institutions : A Reply VINOD K. AGGARWAL AND CÉDRIC DUPONT ABSTRACT.
More informationDISCUSSION PAPER SERIES. No THE ROLE OF EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY IN SOCIAL PREFERENCES. Ernst Fehr, Michael Naef and Klaus M.
DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES No. 5368 THE ROLE OF EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY IN SOCIAL PREFERENCES Ernst Fehr, Michael Naef and Klaus M. Schmidt INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION ABCD www.cepr.org Available online at: www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/dp5368.asp
More informationExperimental and Behavioral Economics
Experimental and Behavioral Economics Ernst Fehr University of Zürich and MIT Preliminary Version Fall 2003 This course provides an introduction into the techniques of experimental economics and applies
More informationUNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
2000-03 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS JOHN NASH AND THE ANALYSIS OF STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR BY VINCENT P. CRAWFORD DISCUSSION PAPER 2000-03 JANUARY 2000 John Nash and the Analysis
More informationIllegal Migration and Policy Enforcement
Illegal Migration and Policy Enforcement Sephorah Mangin 1 and Yves Zenou 2 September 15, 2016 Abstract: Workers from a source country consider whether or not to illegally migrate to a host country. This
More informationPolitical Quid Pro Quo Agreements: An Experimental Study. Jens Großer Ernesto Reuben Agnieszka Tymula
Political Quid Pro Quo Agreements: An Experimental Study Jens Großer Ernesto Reuben Agnieszka Tymula Political Quid Pro Quo Agreements: An Experimental Study * Jens Großer Florida State University and
More informationfile:///j /STUDENT%20SERVICES/UGRAD%20PROGRAM/STUDENT% %20WI07%20Andreoni/Econ%20182%20WI07%20Andreoni.txt
file:///j /STUDENT%20SERVICES/UGRAD%20PROGRAM/STUDENT%20...20182%20WI07%20Andreoni/Econ%20182%20WI07%20Andreoni.txt UCSD Econ 182 DescriptionEcon 182 EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS Professor James Andreoni andreoni@ucsd.edu
More informationHow Mediator Compensation Affects the Conflicting Parties, and the Mediator s Behavior. An Economic and Experimental Analysis.
How Mediator Compensation Affects the Conflicting Parties, and the Mediator s Behavior. An Economic and Experimental Analysis. by Annette Kirstein draft (01) September 2004 Abstract This paper examines
More informationTrust and Social Capital in Immigrant Networks
Trust and Social Capital in Immigrant Networks James C. Cox Noah Langdale Jr. Chair in Economics Andrew Young School of Policy Studies Georgia State University 14 Marietta Street NW, Atlanta, GA 30303
More informationA New Paradigm for the Study of Corruption in Different Cultures
A New Paradigm for the Study of Corruption in Different Cultures Ya akov (Kobi) Gal 1, Avi Rosenfeld 2, Sarit Kraus 3,4, Michele Gelfand 4, Bo An 5, Jun Lin 6 1 Department of Information Systems Engineering,
More informationJan Theodor Schikora: Bringing good and bad Whistle-blowers to the Lab
Jan Theodor Schikora: Bringing good and bad Whistle-blowers to the Lab Munich Discussion Paper No. 2011-4 Department of Economics University of Munich Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität
More informationTacit Lobbying Agreements: An Experimental Study
DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES IZA DP No. 5332 Tacit Lobbying Agreements: An Experimental Study Jens Großer Ernesto Reuben Agnieszka Tymula November 2010 Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit Institute for
More informationPublic Choice by Referenda or Delegation. An Experimental Comparison of Direct and Indirect Democracy
Public Choice by Referenda or Delegation. An Experimental Comparison of Direct and Indirect Democracy Werner Güth, Martin Kocher, Katinka Pantz and Matthias Sutter January 13, 2004 Abstract Direct democracy
More informationNorms of Distributive Justice in Rural Malawi
Norms of Distributive Justice in Rural Malawi Annika Mueller Harvard University amueller@fas.harvard.edu 2012 World Bank Conference on Equity Two-Part Study Research Questions Part 1 Which norms of distributive
More informationThe Financial Crises of the 21st Century
The Financial Crises of the 21st Century Workshop of the Austrian Research Association (Österreichische Forschungsgemeinschaft) 18. - 19. 10. 2012 Economic Attitudes in Financial Crises: The Democratic
More informationThe Governance Game. GOVERNANCE and THE LAW BACKGROUND PAPER. Sheheryar Banuri University of East Anglia
BACKGROUND PAPER GOVERNANCE and THE LAW The Governance Game Sheheryar Banuri University of East Anglia David Bulman, Luis F. Lopez-Calva, Ezequiel Molina, Abla Safir, and Siddharth Sharma The World Bank
More informationTHREATS TO SUE AND COST DIVISIBILITY UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION. Alon Klement. Discussion Paper No /2000
ISSN 1045-6333 THREATS TO SUE AND COST DIVISIBILITY UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION Alon Klement Discussion Paper No. 273 1/2000 Harvard Law School Cambridge, MA 02138 The Center for Law, Economics, and Business
More informationImmigrant Assimilation, Trust and Social Capital
DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES IZA DP No. 5063 Immigrant Assimilation, Trust and Social Capital James C. Cox Wafa Hakim Orman July 2010 Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit Institute for the Study of Labor
More informationLong Tenure and Punishment Effect on Corrupt Behaviour
Long Tenure and Punishment Effect on Corrupt Behaviour Rijadh Djatu Winardi 1*, Wisnu Setiadi Nugroho 1, and Amanda Wijayanti 1 1 Faculty of Economics and Business, Universitas Gadjah Mada, Jl. Humaniora
More informationHOTELLING-DOWNS MODEL OF ELECTORAL COMPETITION AND THE OPTION TO QUIT
HOTELLING-DOWNS MODEL OF ELECTORAL COMPETITION AND THE OPTION TO QUIT ABHIJIT SENGUPTA AND KUNAL SENGUPTA SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY SYDNEY, NSW 2006 AUSTRALIA Abstract.
More informationTrust and Trustworthiness of Immigrants and Native-Born Americans *
Trust and Trustworthiness of Immigrants and Native-Born Americans * James C. Cox Noah Langdale Jr. Eminent Scholar Chair Experimental Economics Center and Department of Economics Georgia State University
More informationthe social dilemma?» Emmanuel SOL, Sylvie THORON, Marc WILLINGER
«Do binding agreements solve the social dilemma?» Emmanuel SOL, Sylvie THORON, Marc WILLINGER DR n 2007-09 Do binding agreements solve the social dilemma? 1 Emmanuel Sol a, Sylvie Thoron 2b, Marc Willinger
More informationTesting Leniency Programs Experimentally
Testing Leniency Programs Experimentally Jana Krajčová AAU with Andreas Ortmann UNSW, Sydney Conference ANTIcorruption&fraud:DETECTION & MEASUREMENT Prague, April 7 2017 CONTENTS Motivation Literature
More informationImmigrant Assimilation, Trust and Social Capital
Immigrant Assimilation, Trust and Social Capital James C. Cox Noah Langdale Jr. Chair in Economics Andrew Young School of Policy Studies Georgia State University 14 Marietta Street NW, Atlanta, GA 30303
More informationResidential segregation and socioeconomic outcomes When did ghettos go bad?
Economics Letters 69 (2000) 239 243 www.elsevier.com/ locate/ econbase Residential segregation and socioeconomic outcomes When did ghettos go bad? * William J. Collins, Robert A. Margo Vanderbilt University
More informationPreferential votes and minority representation in open list proportional representation systems
Soc Choice Welf (018) 50:81 303 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1084- ORIGINAL PAPER Preferential votes and minority representation in open list proportional representation systems Margherita Negri
More informationThe determinants of voting in multilateral bargaining games
J Econ Sci Assoc (2017) 3:26 43 DOI 10.1007/s40881-017-0038-x ORIGINAL PAPER The determinants of voting in multilateral bargaining games Guillaume R. Fréchette 1 Emanuel Vespa 2 Received: 24 February 2017
More informationREVIEW OF FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN SOCIALITY: ECONOMIC EXPERIMENTS AND ETHNOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE FROM FIFTEEN SMALL-SCALE SOCIETIES
REVIEW OF FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN SOCIALITY: ECONOMIC EXPERIMENTS AND ETHNOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE FROM FIFTEEN SMALL-SCALE SOCIETIES ANITA JOWITT This book is not written by lawyers or written with legal policy
More informationIncentives for separation and incentives for public good provision
Discussion Paper No. 104 Incentives for separation and incentives for public good provision Klaas Staal* March 006 *Klaas Staal, Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung ZEI(b), Walter-Flex-Straße
More informationISSN , Volume 13, Number 2
ISSN 1386-4157, Volume 13, Number 2 This article was published in the above mentioned Springer issue. The material, including all portions thereof, is protected by copyright; all rights are held exclusively
More informationAgendas and Strategic Voting
Agendas and Strategic Voting Charles A. Holt and Lisa R. Anderson * Southern Economic Journal, January 1999 Abstract: This paper describes a simple classroom experiment in which students decide which projects
More informationMORALITY - evolutionary foundations and policy implications
MORALITY - evolutionary foundations and policy implications Ingela Alger & Jörgen Weibull The State of Economics, The State of the World Conference 8-9 June 2016 at the World Bank 1 Introduction The discipline
More informationSelection in migration and return migration: Evidence from micro data
Economics Letters 94 (2007) 90 95 www.elsevier.com/locate/econbase Selection in migration and return migration: Evidence from micro data Dan-Olof Rooth a,, Jan Saarela b a Kalmar University, SE-39182 Kalmar,
More informationSubject pool effects in a corruption experiment: A comparison of Indonesian public servants and Indonesian students
Exp Econ DOI 10.1007/s10683-008-9207-3 Subject pool effects in a corruption experiment: A comparison of Indonesian public servants and Indonesian students Vivi Alatas Lisa Cameron Ananish Chaudhuri Nisvan
More informationEXAMINATION 3 VERSION B "Wage Structure, Mobility, and Discrimination" April 19, 2018
William M. Boal Signature: Printed name: EXAMINATION 3 VERSION B "Wage Structure, Mobility, and Discrimination" April 19, 2018 INSTRUCTIONS: This exam is closed-book, closed-notes. Simple calculators are
More informationCooperation and Self-interested behavior A Field Experiment in Ivorian plantain sector 1
8 th International Conference of the french Association of Experimental Economics Cooperation and Self-interested behavior A Field Experiment in Ivorian plantain sector 1 Keywords: Agriculture, Cooperation,
More informationpolitical budget cycles
P000346 Theoretical and empirical research on is surveyed and discussed. Significant are seen to be primarily a phenomenon of the first elections after the transition to a democratic electoral system.
More informationThe Citizen Candidate Model: An Experimental Analysis
Public Choice (2005) 123: 197 216 DOI: 10.1007/s11127-005-0262-4 C Springer 2005 The Citizen Candidate Model: An Experimental Analysis JOHN CADIGAN Department of Public Administration, American University,
More informationFrom Experimental Economics toward Integral Human Rationality
Journal of Markets & Morality Volume 16, Number 1 (Spring 2013): 37 51 Copyright 2013 From Experimental Economics toward Integral Human Rationality Assistant Professor of Economics School of Business and
More informationCoalition Governments and Political Rents
Coalition Governments and Political Rents Dr. Refik Emre Aytimur Georg-August-Universität Göttingen January 01 Abstract We analyze the impact of coalition governments on the ability of political competition
More informationOn Preferences for Fairness in Non-Cooperative Game Theory
On Preferences for Fairness in Non-Cooperative Game Theory Loránd Ambrus-Lakatos 23 June 2002 Much work has recently been devoted in non-cooperative game theory to accounting for actions motivated by fairness
More informationCommittee proposals and restrictive rules
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA Vol. 96, pp. 8295 8300, July 1999 Political Sciences Committee proposals and restrictive rules JEFFREY S. BANKS Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute
More informationAuthority and Centrality
15-23 Authority and Centrality Power and Cooperation in Social Dilemma Networks Boris van Leeuwen, Abhijit Ramalingam, David Rojo Arjona and Arthur Schram Authority and Centrality Power and Cooperation
More informationWhat you donõt know wonõt hurt me: Costly (but quiet) exit in dictator games
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 100 (2006) 193 201 www.elsevier.com/locate/obhdp What you donõt know wonõt hurt me: Costly (but quiet) exit in dictator games Jason Dana a, *, Daylian
More informationGeorge Mason University
George Mason University SCHOOL of LAW Two Dimensions of Regulatory Competition Francesco Parisi Norbert Schulz Jonathan Klick 03-01 LAW AND ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER SERIES This paper can be downloaded without
More informationMERIT-Infonomics Research Memorandum series. Inequality Aversion, Efficiency, and Maximin Preferences in Simple Distribution Experiments
MERIT-Infonomics Research Memorandum series Inequality Aversion, Efficiency, and Maximin Preferences in Simple Distribution Experiments Dirk Engelmann & Martin Strobel 2002-013 MERIT Maastricht Economic
More informationThe Envious Punisher: Understanding Third and Second Party Punishment with Simple Games
Institute for Empirical Research in Economics University of Zurich Working Paper Series ISSN 1424-0459 Working Paper No. 373 The Envious Punisher: Understanding Third and Second Party Punishment with Simple
More informationConditional Clauses in GHG Abatement Legislation
Lund University Department of Economics Bachelor Thesis 15 ECTS Conditional Clauses in GHG Abatement Legislation - An Economic Explanation NEKK01 Author: Jesper Bergkvist Supervisor: Jerker Holm January
More informationWhen users of congested roads may view tolls as unjust
When users of congested roads may view tolls as unjust Amihai Glazer 1, Esko Niskanen 2 1 Department of Economics, University of California, Irvine, CA 92697, USA 2 STAResearch, Finland Abstract Though
More informationEquality and Priority
Equality and Priority MARTIN PETERSON AND SVEN OVE HANSSON Philosophy Unit, Royal Institute of Technology, Sweden This article argues that, contrary to the received view, prioritarianism and egalitarianism
More informationResponsibility judgments in voting scenarios
Responsibility judgments in voting scenarios Tobias Gerstenberg 1 (tger@mit.edu) Joseph Y. Halpern 2 (halpern@cs.cornell.edu) Joshua B. Tenenbaum 1 (jbt@mit.edu) 1 Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences,
More informationF E M M Faculty of Economics and Management Magdeburg
OTTO-VON-GUERICKE-UNIVERSITY MAGDEBURG FACULTY OF ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT The Immigrant Wage Gap in Germany Alisher Aldashev, ZEW Mannheim Johannes Gernandt, ZEW Mannheim Stephan L. Thomsen FEMM Working
More informationSocial Norms. Prepared for the New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics H. Peyton Young
Social Norms 18 July 2006 Prepared for the New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics H. Peyton Young Social norms are customary rules of behavior that coordinate interactions among people. Once a particular
More informationPolitical Economics II Spring Lectures 4-5 Part II Partisan Politics and Political Agency. Torsten Persson, IIES
Lectures 4-5_190213.pdf Political Economics II Spring 2019 Lectures 4-5 Part II Partisan Politics and Political Agency Torsten Persson, IIES 1 Introduction: Partisan Politics Aims continue exploring policy
More informationDoes Willful Ignorance Deflect Punishment? An Experimental Study
Does Willful Ignorance Deflect Punishment? An Experimental Study Björn Bartling Florian Engl Roberto A. Weber CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 4316 CATEGORY 13: BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS JUNE 2013 An electronic version
More informationLegal Change: Integrating Selective Litigation, Judicial Preferences, and Precedent
University of Connecticut DigitalCommons@UConn Economics Working Papers Department of Economics 6-1-2004 Legal Change: Integrating Selective Litigation, Judicial Preferences, and Precedent Thomas J. Miceli
More informationThe Costs of Conflict
Johnson & Wales University ScholarsArchive@JWU Economics Department Faculty Publications & Research College of Arts & Sciences 2014 The Costs of Conflict Adam Smith Johnson & Wales University - Charlotte,
More informationIMPERFECT INFORMATION (SIGNALING GAMES AND APPLICATIONS)
IMPERFECT INFORMATION (SIGNALING GAMES AND APPLICATIONS) 1 Equilibrium concepts Concept Best responses Beliefs Nash equilibrium Subgame perfect equilibrium Perfect Bayesian equilibrium On the equilibrium
More informationIntro Prefs & Voting Electoral comp. Voter Turnout Agency GIP SIP Rent seeking Partisans. 4. Voter Turnout
4. Voter Turnout Paradox of Voting So far we have assumed that all individuals will participate in the election and vote for their most preferred option irrespective of: the probability of being pivotal
More informationBargaining in Legislatures: An Experimental Investigation of Open versus Closed Amendment Rules*
Bargaining in Legislatures: An Experimental Investigation of Open versus Closed Amendment Rules* Guillaume R. Frechette Ohio State University John H. Kagel Ohio State University Steven F. Lehrer University
More informationHARVARD NEGATIVE-EXPECTED-VALUE SUITS. Lucian A. Bebchuk and Alon Klement. Discussion Paper No /2009. Harvard Law School Cambridge, MA 02138
ISSN 1045-6333 HARVARD JOHN M. OLIN CENTER FOR LAW, ECONOMICS, AND BUSINESS NEGATIVE-EXPECTED-VALUE SUITS Lucian A. Bebchuk and Alon Klement Discussion Paper No. 656 12/2009 Harvard Law School Cambridge,
More informationVeto Power in Committees: An Experimental Study* John H. Kagel Department of Economics Ohio State University
Power in Committees: An Experimental Study* John H. Kagel Department of Economics Ohio State University Hankyoung Sung Department of Economics Ohio State University Eyal Winter Department of Economics
More informationCooperative membership as a signal of trust and trustworthiness in a low income economic environment: a randomized experiment in the Philippines
Cooperative membership as a signal of trust and trustworthiness in a low income economic environment: a randomized experiment in the Philippines Leonardo Becchetti, University of Rome, Tor Vergata * Stefano
More informationVeto Power in Committees: An Experimental Study* John H. Kagel Department of Economics Ohio State University
Power in Committees: An Experimental Study* John H. Kagel Department of Economics Ohio State University Hankyoung Sung Department of Economics Ohio State University Eyal Winter Department of Economics
More informationInternational Cooperation, Parties and. Ideology - Very preliminary and incomplete
International Cooperation, Parties and Ideology - Very preliminary and incomplete Jan Klingelhöfer RWTH Aachen University February 15, 2015 Abstract I combine a model of international cooperation with
More informationGender, Risk, and Corruption Insights from an Experimental Analysis 1
International Journal of Research on Social and Natural Sciences Vol. II Issue 2 December 217 ISSN (Online) 2455-5916 Journal Homepage: www.katwacollegejournal.com Gender, Risk, and Corruption Insights
More informationLegislative Bargaining and Partisan Delegation
Legislative Bargaining and Partisan Delegation Thomas Choate a, John A. Weymark b, Alan E. Wiseman c a Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, 655 Knight Way, Stanford, CA 94305, USA. E-mail:
More informationVeto Power in Committees: An Experimental Study* John H. Kagel Department of Economics Ohio State University
Power in Committees: An Experimental Study* John H. Kagel Department of Economics Ohio State University Hankyoung Sung Department of Economics Ohio State University Eyal Winter Department of Economics
More informationUniversity of Toronto Department of Economics. Party formation in single-issue politics [revised]
University of Toronto Department of Economics Working Paper 296 Party formation in single-issue politics [revised] By Martin J. Osborne and Rabee Tourky July 13, 2007 Party formation in single-issue politics
More informationDo Liberals Play Nice? The Effects of Party and Political Ideology in Public Goods and Trust Games
Do Liberals Play Nice? The Effects of Party and Political Ideology in Public Goods and Trust Games By Lisa Anderson Department of Economics College of William and Mary Jennifer Mellor Department of Economics
More informationBribery and the Fair Salary Hypothesis in the Lab
Bribery and the Fair Salary Hypothesis in the Lab Roel van Veldhuizen October 5, 2011 Abstract Previous studies have proposed a link between corruption and wages in the public sector. This paper investigates
More informationPreferences for Redistribution and Pensions: What Can We Learn from Experiments?
D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E S IZA DP No. 5090 Preferences for Redistribution and Pensions: What Can We Learn from Experiments? Franziska Tausch Jan Potters Arno Riedl July 2010 Forschungsinstitut
More information14.770: Introduction to Political Economy Lecture 11: Economic Policy under Representative Democracy
14.770: Introduction to Political Economy Lecture 11: Economic Policy under Representative Democracy Daron Acemoglu MIT October 16, 2017. Daron Acemoglu (MIT) Political Economy Lecture 11 October 16, 2017.
More informationIntroduction to Political Economy Problem Set 3
Introduction to Political Economy 14.770 Problem Set 3 Due date: October 27, 2017. Question 1: Consider an alternative model of lobbying (compared to the Grossman and Helpman model with enforceable contracts),
More informationMultilateral Bargaining: Veto Power PS132
Multilateral Bargaining: Veto Power PS132 Introduction Some members have veto right - ability to block decisions even when a proposal has secured the necessary majority Introduction Some members have veto
More informationCorruption and Cooperation
University of Zurich Department of Economics Working Paper Series ISSN 1664-741 (print) ISSN 1664-75X (online) Working Paper No. 26 Corruption and Cooperation Justin Buffat and Julien Senn August 217 Corruption
More informationViktor J. Vanberg. Corporate Social Responsibility and the Game of Catallaxy : The Perspective of Constitutional Economics
Viktor J. Vanberg ALBERT-LUDWIGS- UNIVERSITÄT FREIBURG INSTITUT FÜR ALLGEMEINE WIRTSCHAFTSFORSCHUNG Abteilung für Wirtschaftspolitik Corporate Social Responsibility and the Game of Catallaxy : The Perspective
More informationSocial Polarization and Political Selection in Representative Democracies
Social Polarization and Political Selection in Representative Democracies Dominik Duell and Justin Valasek Abstract While scholars and pundits alike have expressed concern regarding the increasingly tribal
More informationLearning and Belief Based Trade 1
Learning and Belief Based Trade 1 First Version: October 31, 1994 This Version: September 13, 2005 Drew Fudenberg David K Levine 2 Abstract: We use the theory of learning in games to show that no-trade
More informationSubject Pool Effects in a Corruption Experiment: A Comparison of Indonesian Public Servants and Indonesian Students 1
Subject Pool Effects in a Corruption Experiment: A Comparison of Indonesian Public Servants and Indonesian Students 1 Vivi Alatas a, Lisa Cameron b, Ananish Chaudhuri c, Nisvan Erkal b, Lata Gangadharan
More informationMigration, Intermediate Inputs and Real Wages
Migration, Intermediate Inputs and Real Wages by Tuvana Pastine Bilkent University Economics Department 06533 Ankara, Turkey and Ivan Pastine Bilkent University Economics Department 06533 Ankara, Turkey
More informationInternational Environmental Agreements with Endogenous Minimum Participation and the Role of Inequality
International Environmental Agreements with Endogenous Minimum Participation and the Role of Inequality David M. McEvoy Department of Economics Appalachian State University Todd L. Cherry Department of
More informationThe Transfer of the Remittance Fee from the Migrant to the Household
Journal of Economic Integration 25(3), September 2010; 613-625 The Transfer of the Remittance Fee from the Migrant to the Household Akira Shimada Nagasaki University Abstract This paper discusses the problem
More informationCenter for the Study of Neuroeconomics GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY, 4400 University Dr., MSN 1G3, Fairfax, Va.
Vita Kevin A. McCabe KMCCABE@GMU.EDU Center for the Study of Neuroeconomics GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY, 4400 University Dr., MSN 1G3, Fairfax, Va. 22030 EDUCATION 1972-76 Undergraduate Student, Villanova
More informationMoral Obstinacy in Political Negotiations
Moral Obstinacy in Political Negotiations Andrew W. Delton Assistant Professor Department of Political Science Social and Behavioral Sciences Building Stony Brook University Stony Brook, NY 11794 805-895-5219
More informationWhat is Fairness? Allan Drazen Sandridge Lecture Virginia Association of Economists March 16, 2017
What is Fairness? Allan Drazen Sandridge Lecture Virginia Association of Economists March 16, 2017 Everyone Wants Things To Be Fair I want to live in a society that's fair. Barack Obama All I want him
More informationTHE LIMITED POWER OF VOTING TO LIMIT POWER
Erschienen in: Journal of Public Economic Theory ; 13 (2011), 5. - S. 695-719 https://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2011.01517.x THE LIMITED POWER OF VOTING TO LIMIT POWER HONG GENG Laboratory for Experimental
More informationVoting Power in Weighted Voting Games: A Lobbying Approach by Maria Montero, Alex Possajennikov and Martin Sefton 1 April 2011
[Very preliminary please do not quote without permission] Voting Power in Weighted Voting Games: A Lobbying Approach by Maria Montero, Alex Possajennikov and Martin Sefton 1 April 2011 Abstract We report
More informationBilateral Bargaining with Externalities *
Bilateral Bargaining with Externalities * by Catherine C. de Fontenay and Joshua S. Gans University of Melbourne First Draft: 12 th August, 2003 This Version: 1st July, 2008 This paper provides an analysis
More informationBOOK REVIEW BY DAVID RAMSEY, UNIVERSITY OF LIMERICK, IRELAND
B A D A N I A O P E R A C Y J N E I D E C Y Z J E Nr 2 2008 BOOK REVIEW BY DAVID RAMSEY, UNIVERSITY OF LIMERICK, IRELAND Power, Freedom and Voting Essays in honour of Manfred J. Holler Edited by Matthew
More informationDETERMINANTS OF IMMIGRANTS EARNINGS IN THE ITALIAN LABOUR MARKET: THE ROLE OF HUMAN CAPITAL AND COUNTRY OF ORIGIN
DETERMINANTS OF IMMIGRANTS EARNINGS IN THE ITALIAN LABOUR MARKET: THE ROLE OF HUMAN CAPITAL AND COUNTRY OF ORIGIN Aim of the Paper The aim of the present work is to study the determinants of immigrants
More informationGamson s Law versus Non-Cooperative. Bargaining Theory
Gamson s Law versus Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory Guillaume R. Fréchette New York University John H. Kagel Ohio State University Massimo Morelli Ohio State University September 24, 2004 Morelli s research
More informationStrong Reciprocity and the Welfare State. Christina M. Fong, Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis. July 3, 2004
Strong Reciprocity and the Welfare State Christina M. Fong, Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis A man ought to be a friend to his friend and repay gift with gift. People should meet smiles with smiles and
More informationWhat is the Nature and Social Norm within the Context of In-Group Favouritism?
What is the Nature and Social Norm within the Context of In-Group Favouritism? Donna Harris, Benedikt Herrmann, and Andreas Kontoleon 1 December 2010 CWPE 1062 What is the Nature of Social Norm within
More information