June 27, Kavita Kale Executive Secretary Michigan Public Service Commission 7109 West Saginaw Highway, 3 rd Floor Lansing MI 48909

Transcription

1 Dykema Gossett PLLC Capitol View 201 Townsend Street, Suite 900 Lansing, MI Tel: (517) Fax: (517) Richard J. Aaron Direct Dial: (517) Direct Fax: (855) June 27, 2018 Kavita Kale Executive Secretary Michigan Public Service Commission 7109 West Saginaw Highway, 3 rd Floor Lansing MI Re: Case No. U Dear Ms. Kale: Enclosed for electronic filing is Indiana Michigan Power Company s Exceptions to the Proposal for Decision and Proof of Service of same. If you have any questions, please contact me. Sincerely, DYKEMA GOSSETT PLLC Richard J. Aaron RJA/rlg Enclosures California Illinois Michigan North Carolina Texas Washington, D.C ID\AARON, RICHARD \000001

2 STATE OF MICHIGAN BEFORE THE MICHIGAN PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION * * * * * In the matter, on the Commission s own motion, ) regarding the regulatory reviews, revisions, ) determinations, and/or approvals necessary for ) Case No. U INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER COMPANY to ) fully comply with Public Act 295 of 2008 ) I. INTRODUCTION INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER COMPANY S EXCEPTIONS TO THE PROPOSAL FOR DECISION On June 6, 2018, Administrative Law Judge Sally L. Wallace ( ALJ ) issued the Proposal for Decision ( PFD ) in Case No. U Indiana Michigan Power Company ( I&M or the Company ) submits that the ALJ s conclusion that the Net Loss Revenue Tracker ( NLRT ) is identical to a Revenue Decoupling Mechanism ( RDM ) is an erroneous finding that is inconsistent with the evidentiary record and the ALJ s own conclusions. Moreover, the ALJ s recommendation that I&M be directed to refund any revenues that were collected from customers pursuant to the Michigan Public Service Commission s ( Commission ) order in Case No. U falls outside the scope of the remand, represents prohibited retroactive ratemaking, violates the Company s due process rights, and would lead to confiscatory rates. Accordingly, I&M is filing these Exceptions pursuant to the schedule established by the ALJ in this matter. II. EXCEPTION REGARDING THE CORRECT DEFINITION OF THE NLRT A. The ALJ correctly found that the NLRT is factually distinct from approved RDMs but erred in concluding that the NLRT is an unlawful RDM. The evidentiary record demonstrates the NLRT is factually distinct from the RDMs previously approved by the Commission. On page 26 of the PFD, the ALJ expressly recognized 1

3 this fact, concluding that the NLRT is factually different from the RDMs initially approved for Consumers, Detroit Edison, and UPPCo.... However, in a confounding shift in logical consistency, the ALJ proceeded to conclude that the NLRT is an RDM, despite recognizing the NLRT was indeed factually different from the previous Commission approved RDMs. U PFD, page 28. In doing so, the PFD adopted an inconsistent and overly broad definition of what constitutes an RDM that resulted in the Company s NLRT being improperly swept under the same definition as an RDM. The Commission should reject the PFD s comparative analysis as being unreasonable and inconsistent with the evidentiary record. Instead, the Commission should adhere to the Court of Appeals remand instructions to determine whether the NLRT is factually distinct from RDMs approved by the PSC in other cases and find, like the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners ( NARUC ) has already found, that lost revenue recovery mechanisms are distinct from decoupling mechanisms. Decoupling for Electric and Gas Utilities: Frequently Asked Questions, NARUC, 2007 (NARUC FAQs); Exhibit IM-17, page 5. The record evidence shows the NLRT is a limited rate adjustment mechanism that is not tied to sales and only applies to recovery of fixed costs lost as a direct result of EO efforts. (4 Tr. 71). In contrast to the RDMs that were approved for Detroit Edison Company in Case No. U and Upper Peninsula Power Company in Case No. U-16568, the NLRT is not designed to track actual sales revenues or reconcile actual sales-to-sales levels set in a rate case. The NLRT relies on a computation of lost sales that directly result from energy efficiency programming efforts. The NLRT only replaces the fixed cost recovery that has been lost due to verified savings from EO programs, and it does not follow actual sales revenue which can and does vary 2

4 based upon a number of other factors, such as weather, the economy, etc., that RDMs seek to address. (4 Tr. 72). In reaching the conclusion that the NLRT is identical to an RDM, the ALJ relied on the Regulatory Assistance Project s ( RAP ) definition of decoupling a mechanism severing the link between energy use and revenues, and characterized the RAP Guide as a more authoritative source for determining whether the definition of an RDM is sufficiently expansive to include the NLRT when compared to NARUC s guidance. PFD, pages The PFD, however, applied the RAP definition without regard to the simple fact that such an application would equally render nugatory many rate design decisions of the Commission such as increasing the per meter charge and proportionately reducing the per kwh charge. The Commission should reject the PFD s conclusion that the RAP Guide is more authoritative than NARUC guidance because the NARUC guidance properly tempers the definition. NARUC is the preeminent organization in the field of state public utility regulation, and Commissions around the United States regularly use NARUC guidance as a key reference when developing policies and practices. NARUC holds the correct view that net lost revenue recovery is one of the other methods that NARUC recognizes for dealing with the throughput issue and is recognized as distinct from decoupling. As the Company s Director of Regulatory Services, Mr. Andrew J. Williamson, explained in the record: While that is one way that it could be described for ease of understanding, it is an imprecise use of the term decoupling. If all mechanisms which break the link between kwh sales and revenues collected are considered a limited form of decoupling, then a mechanism that tracks a specific item of cost or lost cost recovery, such as the long-standing Power Supply Cost Recovery factor mechanism, could also be considered a limited form of decoupling Similarly, long-standing rate design methods that include service charges which provide for a limited form of fixed cost recovery using a non-volumetric charge could be 3

5 considered a limited form of decoupling. Yet to my knowledge no one has claimed either of these examples are illegal RDM s. Rather, these are other examples of ratemaking mechanisms within the Commissions tool kit that have been long found reasonable and appropriate. (4 Tr 70-71) Mr. Williamson also illustrated the problem of a simplistic use of the term decoupling to support the view that if any variation of decoupling is involved, it must be an illegal RDM. He explained that applying that approach could call into question other Commission rate design approaches: Using Staff s definition of decoupling, an increase in the customer charge to provide for full recovery fixed costs as opposed to have fixed costs reflected in a per kwh charge can be considered a form of decoupling. It would be a measure in the Commission s ratemaking tool kit that would address the confiscatory rates resulting from the mandated sales reduction from EO programs without an NLRT. ( 4 Tr 71) Thus, no one can reasonably assert that the Commission s ability to approve a fixed charge designed to recover fixed costs thereby breaking the connection between sales and revenues is an improper form of decoupling. Such an assertion would be absurd because any increase in a per customer charge could be challenged as an unlawful RDM Most importantly, the ALJ concluded that the Detroit Edison and Enbridge RDMs are factually different than the NLRT. PFD, page 26. It is clear in the record evidence that I&M s NLRT only replaces the fixed cost recovery that has been lost due to verified savings from EO programs. I&M s NLRT does not follow actual sales revenue which can and does vary based upon a number of other factors, such as weather, the economy, etc. As such, unlike Consumers, Detroit Edison, or UPPCO, I&M is in a much different position and has not broken the link between how much energy a utility delivers and the revenue it collects. Factually, I&M s NLRT s sole purpose is to recognize fixed cost recovery lost as a direct result of validated sales reductions from EO efforts. Accordingly, I&M s NLRT is factually and 4

6 legally distinct from the RDMs at issue before the Court of Appeals in Detroit Edison and Enbridge, as recognized in the PFD, and the record supports the conclusion that I&M s NLRT is factually different than the RDMs previously approved by the Commission, including the other mechanisms struck down by the Court of Appeals. The ALJ also failed to give any weight to the fact that parties, including Commission Staff, previously agreed with the Company when admitting that the NLRT was more limited in scope than other types of mechanisms previously approved by the Commission. Staff witness Ms. Smith testified in Case No. U that I&M s NLRT was more limited in scope than RDMs that had been approved in the past. Ms. Smith further reiterated that multiple parties, including the Attorney General and ABATE, signed the settlement agreement despite their objections to the RDM previously approved for Detroit Edison. In sum, the dispositive issue on remand is whether the NLRT is factually distinct from RDMs approved by the Commission in other cases, and the ALJ expressly answered this question Yes. PFD, page 26. The ALJ s over-reliance on the RAP Guide s broad definition of RDMs leads to an erroneous conclusion that is inconsistent with the record evidence and the ALJ s own conclusion. III. EXCEPTION REGARDING WHETHER THE NLRT IS SUBJECT TO THE UNLAWFULNESS DETERMINATIONS OF DETROIT EDISON AND ENBRIDGE. A. The PFD erred in finding that the lawfulness of the NLRT is controlled by Detroit Edison and Enbridge. Despite recognizing that I&M s NLRT is factually different from the RDMs approved for Consumers, Detroit Edison, and UPPCo, the ALJ proceeded to erroneously conclude that the NLRT is unlawful ab initio. I&M excepts to this conclusion. The Commission should find the NLRT does not fall under the auspices of the Detroit Edison and Enbridge holdings. 5

7 Even though Commission Staff agreed to the Settlement Agreement in Case No. U , it now believes that the NLRT is an illegal RDM and that I&M cannot recover lost revenue through it because of the decision in Enbridge. The ALJ s conclusion adopts this view, and should be rejected by the Commission for several reasons. To begin with, Enbridge did not hold that all mechanisms that track costs or lost costs are unlawful. It held only that the specific RDM in that case was unlawful. As the Court of Appeals recognized before remanding this case, factual distinctions between the RDM addressed in Enbridge and the NLRT are the dispositive aspect of this matter. If they were not, the Court could have easily found that the NLRT was unlawful without needing the Commission s consideration. Because the unrebutted factual distinctions set forth by I&M show that its NLRT is, in fact, distinct from the RDMs previously addressed, Enbridge has no bearing on whether I&M can recover lost revenue through the NLRT. It is also important to note further distinctions between the RDM discussed in Enbridge and the NLRT approved by the Commission in Case No. U The court in Enbridge took care to note that its decision that the RDM was unlawful was based on the fact that reasonable minds could not have disputed the extent of the PSC s authority at the time it approved the settlement agreement. 313 Mich App at 678. The same is not true here. Unlike the RDMs in Detroit Edison and Enbridge, which were intended to reconcile actual revenue levels to those used to set base electric rates and, therefore, clearly within the definition of a RDM, the NLRT only replaces the fixed cost recovery that has been lost due to verified savings from EO programs, and does not follow actual sales revenue. Thus, while the mechanisms in Detroit Edison and Enbridge clearly fell under the definition of a RDM, the NLRT does not. Indeed, the 6

8 ALJ supports this conclusion when stating the NLRT is factually different from the RDMs initially approved for Consumers, Detroit Edison, and UPPCo, on page 26 on the PFD. Even if the Commission were, today, to conclude that its Staff, the AG and ABATE agreed to an unlawful Settlement Agreement in Case No. U-16180, and find that the Commission itself acted unlawfully when it approved the Settlement Agreement in Case No. U-16180, given the factual distinctions between the NLRT and traditional RDMs, it cannot be said that reasonable minds could not have disputed the extent of the PSC s authority at the time it approved the settlement agreement. 1 reason, Enbridge is inapplicable. Enbridge, 313 Mich App at 678. For this additional 1 Effective in 2017, the Legislature amended MCL 460.6a(12) to provide: Subject to subsection (13), if requested by an electric utility with less than 200,000 customers in this state, the commission shall approve an appropriate revenue decoupling mechanism that adjusts for decreases in actual sales compared to the projected sales used in that utility s most recent rate case that are the result of implemented energy waste reduction, conservation, demand-side programs, and other waste reduction measures,.... MCL 460.6a(12) (emphasis added). Staff states that MCL 460.6a(12) clearly places recovery due to energy efficiency programs or EO programs within the definitions of an RDM. (Staff Initial Brief at 6.) Maybe so. But that only further supports I&M s argument here. As shown through MCL 460.6a(12), the Legislature clearly knows how to place lost cost recovery adjustments due to implemented energy waste reduction, conservation, demand-side programs, and other waste reduction measures under the definition of a RDM when it wishes to do so. But at the time the Commission approved the NLRT, the Legislature had expressly chosen not to. See Indiana Michigan, supra, at *3 n 1 (defining a revenue decoupling mechanism, prior to MCL 460.6a(12) s enactment, as a mechanism that adjusts for sales volumes that are above or below the projected levels that were used to determine the revenue requirement authorized in the natural gas provider s most recent rate case ) (citing MCL (6)). That the Legislature felt the need to explicitly make this change demonstrates that, before MCL 460.6a(12) s enactment, lost cost recovery mechanisms accounting for implemented energy waste reduction, conservation, demand-side programs, and other waste reduction measures were not considered RDMs. Staff s apparent argument that the Commission should read words that do not exist into the definition of revenue decoupling mechanism that was in place at the time the Commission approved the RDM has no support in tools of statutory interpretation, and should be rejected. See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts, p 94 ( The absent provision cannot be supplied by the courts. What the Legislature would have wanted it did not provide, and that is the end of the matter. ). 7

9 B. The PFD erred in finding the NLRT tracker unlawful as beyond the Commission s statutory authority. As a final matter, and relatedly, there is good reason why it cannot be said that reasonable minds could not have disputed the extent of the PSC s authority at the time it approved the settlement agreement. When the Commission approved the Settlement Agreement in Case No. U-16180, as is still true today, no statute prohibited electric utilities from using a NLRT which is factually distinct from traditional RDMs. The Legislature does not need to expressly authorize every action taken by electric utilities and approved by the Commission. As explained by the Court of Appeals just weeks ago, the lack of a statute authorizing the PSC to take a specific action does not mandate a conclusion that the PSC cannot take that action. In re Application of Detroit Edison Company re Licensing Issues ( Detroit Edison ), unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued February 8, 2018 (Docket No ), p 8. The Commission has broad general ratemaking and regulatory authority which, even without specific legislative authorization, provides it with the power to take specific actions. Id. For instance, the Court of Appeals has found that the PSC s general ratemaking power authorized it to approve a certain surcharge, notwithstanding the absence of a specific statute addressing the topic, because that action was within the PSC s general ratemaking power. Id., citing In re Application of Mich Consol Gas Co ( Michigan Consolidated ), 281 Mich App 545; 761 NW2d 482 (2008). As with Detroit Edison and Michigan Consolidated, that the lack of any specific statutory authority to approve the NLRT does not mean that approving the Settlement Agreement fell outside the Commission s general ratemaking authority. And certainly, the Commission s approval of the Settlement Agreement was not so unlawful that reasonable minds could not 8

10 have disputed the extent of the PSC s authority at the time it approved the settlement agreement. Thus, the Commission s approval of the Settlement Agreement was proper. The settlement agreement in Case No. U that contained the NLRT is also lawful under Clohset v No Name Corporation, 302 Mich App 550; 840 NW2d 375 (2013), in which the Court of Appeals considered the issue of subject matter jurisdiction and the validity of a consent judgment that exceeded the lower court s jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals held that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction and that the court s entry of a consent judgment was appropriate, despite the fact that the judgment exceeded the district court statutory limit for the amount in controversy. The Clohset Court noted that no party to the consent judgment appealed or properly moved to alter or amend the consent judgment and a challenge later was an improper collateral attack because a party may not properly create error in a lower court and then claim on appeal that error requires reversal. Id. Consistent with Clohset, the U settlement agreement containing the NLRT should be enforced. Unlike the circumstances presented in Enbridge, here, no party claimed that the NLRT was unlawful; thus, the Commission Staff s argument in the remand proceeding was improper. As emphasized in the Company s Initial Brief, the Commission should take a dim view of any state agency avoiding judicial review because the agency itself, instead of defending the lawfulness of its decisions, says its conduct was originally unlawful. It is simply an improper collateral attack and because a party may not properly create error and then later claim on appeal that error requires reversal. Clohset. If Commission Staff were correct with respect to the adoption of the NLRT, then all of the bargain struck by the parties to the settlement agreement in Case No. U and which formed the record basis for the approval of the NLRT is likewise 9

11 void in its entirety. This would leave the parties without bargained-for benefits and a need to reopen Case No. U IV. EXCEPTIONS REGARDING THE SCOPE OF THE REMAND AND THE RECOMMENDED CASE NO. U REFUND. A. The PFD erred in ordering refunds. The PFD failed to adhere to the Court of Appeals remand instructions to address the factual similarities and differences between the NLRT and RDMs previously approved by the Commission. Most troubling is the ALJ s unprompted recommendation that the Commission direct I&M to refund any revenues that were collected from customers pursuant to the Commission s order in Case No. U The issue of whether there should be refunds to customers based on rates previously approved by the Commission in Case No. U was never argued in this case and was improperly raised sua sponte by the ALJ at the conclusion of the PFD on page 29. The ALJ s recommendation to order refunds falls outside the scope of the Court of Appeals remand, represents prohibited retroactive ratemaking, violates the Company s due process rights, and would lead to confiscatory rates. i. Scope of the Remand An appellate court's decision bars lower tribunals from taking action on remand that is inconsistent with the judgment of the appellate court. Thus, as a general rule, an appellate court's determination of an issue in a case binds lower tribunals on remand and the appellate court in subsequent appeals. IBM v Dep't of Treasury, 316 Mich App 346, 348; 891 NW2d 880 (2016). The dispositive issue on remand in this proceeding was established in the Court of Appeals decision In re Application of Indiana Michigan Power Company, Per Curiam Opinion, Case No (Unpublished, November 29, 2016). At page 9, the Court stated: 10

12 The issue whether the NLRT is factually distinct from RDMs approved by the PSC in other cases requires analysis of the specific structure of the NLRT and comparison of that structure to RDMs approved by the PSC. The performance of such an analysis is more suited to the PSC in the first instance. We defer to the administrative expertise of the PSC. Attorney General, 237 Mich App at 88. Moreover, it is apparent that the PSC approves a number of RDMs and similar mechanism. To have the PSC rule on the validity of the NLRT in light of Enbridge Energy would provide guidance for future cases. *** We conclude that analysis of the issues raised by I&M is premature in light of Enbridge Energy and remand these matters to the PSC for reconsideration in light of that case. In its Order on Remand in this case, the Commission stated: As noted above, the Commission has not addressed the issue of whether the NLRT approved in Case No. U was an illegal RDM under Detroit Edison and Enbridge. Accordingly, the Commission directs the parties in I&M s currently pending EO reconciliation proceeding (Case No. U-18333) to address, in addition to EO reconciliation issue, the Court of Appeals remand in Case Nos. U and U The issue of whether the Company must provide refunds to customers based on rates previously approved by the Commission in Case No. U was not included in the Court of Appeals remand instructions to the Commission. Thus, the Commission must adhere to the applicable remand instructions, which precludes adopting the ALJ s recommendation concerning refunds related to Case No. U ii. I&M Did Not Collect Revenues to be Refunded in Case Nos. U and U The only cases at issue in this remand proceeding are Case Nos. U and U I&M was not authorized to impose an NLRT surcharge in either case. Hence, there is nothing to 11

13 refund even if the question of refund were properly before the Commission in this remand proceeding. iii. The PFD s Recommendation Involves Prohibited Retroactive Ratemaking for Cases Other than Case Nos U and U The ALJ s recommendation to require the Company to make refunds based on rates previously approved by the Commission in Case No. U is prohibited retroactive ratemaking. Mich Bell Tel Co. v. Pub Serv Comm (1946), 315 Mich 533, involved an attempt to require refund of charges which were admittedly approved by the Commission when made. In the absence of specific statutory authorization, retroactive ratemaking in utility cases is prohibited. Mich Bell Tel Co v Pub Serv Comm, 315 Mich 533, 547, ; 24 NW2d 200 (1946). There is no express or reasonably implied statutory provision authorizing the Commission to alter or readjust the rates approved in U retroactively. Past expenses and costs are factors to be considered in determining what the new rate should be so it is fair and reasonable. Past expenses and costs are not recoverable under a future rate. If a rate structure is wrong and causes a utility to lose $1,000,000, the utility cannot recover that in its new rate. Attorney General v Pub Serv Comm, 291 Mich App 106, 113; 804 NW2d 574 (2010). If the rate structure is wrong so the utility gains $1,000,000 more profit than is reasonable and just, the commission cannot order a refund. It can certainly lower the rate so there will be no excess profit in the succeeding years. Detroit Edison Co v Pub Serv Comm, 82 Mich App 59, 68; 266 NW2d 665 (1978). The ALJ s recommendation for the Commission to order I&M to refund customers based on rates previously approved by the Commission in Case No. U represents prohibited 12

14 retroactive ratemaking. Those rates were collected and are final, never being subject to refund. Thus, the recommendation should be rejected by the Commission. iv. The PFD s Recommendation Violates I&M s Due Process Rights and Would Result in Confiscatory Rates. The ALJ improperly raised the issue of refunds based on rates previously approved by the Commission in Case No. U on a sua sponte basis. The issue of refunds regarding Case No. U fell outside the scope of the applicable remand instructions and was not argued by the parties. If the Commission were to adopt this recommendation it would violate I&M s due process rights since notice and hearing were not provided on this issue. In addition, ordering the refund would lead to confiscatory rates. The question of refunds does not begin or end with the lawfulness of a rate. Hence, assuming that the NLRT surcharge collected by I&M is deemed unlawful, the Commission still must decide whether the rates were reasonable. Northern Mich Water Co v Pub Serv Com, 381 Mich 340, 343; 161 NW2d 584 (1968). The only evidence in Case No. U on the reasonableness of rates is that of I&M s witnesses testifying that in the absence of the NLRT surcharge, I&M s rate would be confiscatory. (4 Tr ). A rate order which is confiscatory is an unreasonable order and cannot be sustained. Mich Consol Gas Co v Pub Serv Comm, 389 Mich 624, 638; 209 NW2d 210 (1973). "In all such cases, if the owner claims confiscation of his property will result, the State must provide a fair opportunity for submitting that issue to a judicial tribunal for determination upon its own independent judgment as to both law and facts; otherwise the order is void because in conflict with the due process clause, Fourteenth Amendment." Id., quoting Ohio Valley Water Co v Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287, 289; 40 S Ct 527 (1920). 13

15 The test of rates is always reasonableness. A schedule filed and made operative by Commission approval is conclusive as to the reasonableness of the rates established therein, until changed prospectively after due proceedings are taken, but rates charged where no schedule has ever been operative are legal if they are reasonable. Northern Mich Water Co v Pub Serv Com, 381 Mich 340, 343; 161 NW2d 584 (1968). Norther Michigan Water Co is instructive, as the Michigan Supreme Court held the applicable test for legality is one of reasonableness, concluding that since the Commission determined the Northern Michigan rates to be reasonable and lawful, and, that being the case, there was no basis on which to order a refund. See In the Matter of the Complaint of Huron Valley Steel Corp against Detroit Edison Co, Commission order Case No. U-5875, June 12, 1979; 1979 Mich. PSC LEXIS 46, 22, pp The rates arising from the Commission s order in U are conclusive as to reasonableness regardless of other factors. If the Commission wishes to change the U rates, it must do so prospectively after due proceedings occur. The ALJ s recommendation to retroactively order refunds of Commission-approved rates would violate the Company s due process rights and lead to confiscatory rates. Thus, the Commission should reject this recommendation. CONCLUSION Indiana Michigan Power Company requests that the Michigan Public Service Commission issue a final order consistent with these Exceptions and grant the Company such other and further relief consistent with the positions set forth in these Exceptions as is just and reasonable. The Commission should find that the NLRT is factually distinct from the other RDMs approved by the Commission, that the NLRT is a rate adjustment mechanism within the 14

16 Commission s lawful authority to address the throughput issue and resulting confiscatory rate problem, and that I&M should have its NLRT mechanism fully reconciled to allow full recovery of net lost revenues through September 26, 2014, the date of the Commission s order terminating the NLRT. Respectfully submitted, Dated: June 27, ID\JANISZEWSKI, JOHN \ Indiana Michigan Power Company By: Richard J. Aaron (P35605) Jason Hanselman (P61813) John A. Janiszewski (P74400) DYKEMA GOSSETT PLLC 201 Townsend, Suite 900 Lansing, MI (5174)

17 STATE OF MICHIGAN BEFORE THE MICHIGAN PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION * * * * * In the matter, on the Commission s own motion, regarding the regulatory reviews, revisions, determinations, and/or approvals necessary for INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER COMPANY to fully comply with Public Act 295 of 2008 Case No. U PROOF OF SERVICE Rebecca L. Grenawalt, an employee of Dykema Gossett PLLC, being first duly sworn, deposes and says that on the 27 th day of June, 2018, she served Indiana Michigan Power Company s Exceptions to the Proposal for Decision upon: MPSC Michael Orris 7109 W. Saginaw Highway Lansing MI orrism@michigan.gov Administrative Law Judge Hon. Sally L. Wallace Administrative Law Judge Michigan Public Service Comm W. Saginaw Hwy., 3rd Floor Lansing, MI wallaces2@michigan.gov Via at the address above \ Rebecca Grenawalt