The fourth annual meeting of the. Over. erlapping Societies. BERKELEY REVIEW OF Latin American Studies UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY

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1 BERKELEY REVIEW OF Latin American Studies UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY WINTER/SPRING 2006 Over erlapping Societies Photo by Getty Images. By Kirsten Sehnbruch and Harley Shaiken The fourth annual meeting of the U.S. Mexico Future s Forum took place during a transforming historical moment: the late February event was bracketed by a congressional vote on immigration in December 2005 and record-setting demonstrations in March The U.S. House voted to make an estimated 12 million undocumented residents into felons at the end of 2005, and this action spurred hundreds of thousands of protestors into the streets of Chicago, Los Angeles, Houston and countless other cities as winter eased into spring. Ironically, while September 11 had pushed Mexico into the wings in Washington, the House action thrust the issue of immigration and the U.S. Mexico relationship to center stage. The Forum, meeting in the San Francisco Bay Area, brought together a network of political actors, academics, business people, social movement leaders and public intellectuals continued on page 40

2 Chair Harley Shaiken Managing Editor Jean Spencer Design and Layout Greg Louden Contributing Writers Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas Lydia Chávez Kent Eaton Maria Echaveste Emily Felt Cori Hayden Joshua Jelly-Schapiro Tovin Lapan Alejandro Reyes-Arias Kirsten Sehnbruch Harley Shaiken Photography AP Wide World Jason Cato Mimi Chakarova Emily Earhart Getty Images Susie Hicks Tovin Lapan Beatriz Manz Dionicia Ramos Armando Salgado Fernández Nancy Scheper-Hughes Tino Soriano Meg Stalcup Ricardo Stuckert Manuel Villaseñor Andrés Wood The Berkeley Review of Latin American Studies is published three times a year by the Center for Latin American Studies, University of California, 2334 Bowditch Street, Berkeley, CA Cover: Pro-immigration reform demonstrators march on Washington, April 10, Immigration Spring. That may be the title historians attach to the recent combination of street demonstrations and public debate over immigration whose impact was felt from Los Angeles to Washington, D.C. Against this extraordinary backdrop, our cover story reports on the U.S. Mexico Futures Forum, which met in late February in the San Francisco Bay Area. While the Forum itself meets once a year, it is the organizing principle behind year-long research, program and dissemination efforts. Articles written by Forum participants in this issue include Maria Echaveste s look at the background to the demonstrations in Millions Outside, 535 Inside and Prof. Lydia Chávez thoughtful critique of guest worker programs. Excerpts from a public address on the future of U.S. Mexico relations by Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas another Forum participant are also featured in this issue. He was at Berkeley to teach a special seminar: 1988: Mexico s Transition to Democracy, organized by the Center for Latin American Studies (CLAS). Inside the Review Letter from the Chair Students and faculty who participated in the seminar found his reflections on that fateful year to be particularly insightful. This issue also covers Michelle Bachelet s historic election as President of Chile, new foreign policy directions for Brazil as laid out by that country s ambassador to the United States, a talk by Chilean film director Andrés Wood and internal tensions in Bolivia among other themes. On our Web site we also include coverage of presentations by Pulitzer Prize-winner Lowell Bergman on The Way Things Work: Multinational Corporations in Latin America and by Newshour Special Correspondent Elizabeth Farnsworth discussing her new documentary on pursuing Pinochet. In fall 2006, President Ricardo Lagos will be teaching a special seminar on issues related to development and democracy in Latin America, also organized by CLAS. We look forward to writing about this historic visit in our fall 2006 issue. Harley Shaiken Overlapping Societies 1 Millions Outside, 535 Inside 3 The Guest Worker Program Is No Simple Solution 8 Bachelet: Sí! 10 Brazil s New Role 16 Bolivia s Conservative Autonomy Movement 18 Human Rights, Democracy and Citizenship in Timbaúba 22 Making Movies in Latin America 26 Mexico s Generics Revolution 31 Killer Cola? 35 U.S. Mexico Futures Forum Participants 49 Cárdenas at Cal 50 The New Colossus / No Soy Criminal 54

3 U.S. Mexico Futures Forum Millions Outside, 535 Inside By Maria Echaveste Photo by Getty Images. The pictures of hundreds of thousands of people in cities across the nation taking to the streets to protest harsh antiimmigrant legislative proposals have taken many pundits and elite opinion leaders by surprise. Commentators have repeatedly stated that immigrant and Hispanic communities around the country have suddenly found their voices, marveling at the outpouring of support for legalization and comprehensive immigration reform. Many are asking whether these mass mobilizations have had any real impact on the Congressional debate. In order to begin to answer this question, we need to understand the apparently invisible organizing that has taken place over the last decade as well as the relationship of Washington, D.C.-based and community-based organizations to the legislative process and the political context in which this debate takes place. What so many commentators have failed to recognize is the work of immigrant advocates and other organizations that has been ongoing since Beginning with the anti-immigrant Proposition 187 passed in California in that year, the elimination of benefits to legal immigrants as part of welfare reform in 1996 and the reduction in due process rights for legal and illegal immigrants also enacted by Congress in 1996, the immigrant community has been under steady attack for over a decade. In the wake of 9/11, there have been countless other legislative and executive policy enactments and proposals at the local, state and federal levels directed mostly at illegal immigrants but also at legal immigrants. During this period, communitybased, statewide coalitions and national organizations have attempted to respond and fight back. While mostly unsuccessful in pushing back against these proposals, one result has been the expansion and maturity of the loose network of organizations large and small, national and local representing different interests such as immigrant communities, workers, faith-based groups, advocates for civil rights and civil liberties and community-service Immigration protestors listen to speakers on the National Mall in Washington, D.C. 3

4 Millions Outside, 535 Inside continued from previous page U.S. Mexico Futures Forum A billboard advertises for new Border Patrol agents. providers, among others. While the focus between 1994 and 2000 was mostly defensive, the election in 2000 of George Bush and Vicente Fox, as president of the United States and Mexico, respectively, set the stage for a more ambitious agenda: how to provide legal channels for the future flow of migrants and address the growing population of undocumented persons in the United States. Building on the work of the previous president of Mexico, Ernesto Zedillo, Fox made a concerted effort to connect to the millions of his compatriots working in the United States, both legally and illegally. Increased attention to hometown associations (organizations of persons from specific parts of Mexico) by the Mexican government helped deepen relationships and networks of Mexican immigrants across the United States. Additionally, immigrants from Central America, the Caribbean and Asia had also strengthened their organizations and networks as they struggled against draconian federal policies and Congressional proposals beginning in the late 1980s. Another watershed moment was the AFL-CIO resolution in the spring of 2000 calling for the legalization of undocumented persons; a significant statement from an organization previously generally perceived as anti-immigrant. The events of 9/11 and the focus on national security, but also the growing dependence of some economic sectors on immigrant labor, led many people to realize that the existing immigration system was badly broken and serving no one well. By late 2002, key leaders realized that immigration was likely to become a highly controversial issue and began developing a progressive and proactive agenda that could attract key organizations and interest groups, including business interests. There was also a realization that grassroots advocacy would be critical to success but only if connected to a legislative strategy. Informal strategy meetings took place; organizations jockeyed for position and primacy. Slowly there emerged a set of core principles: earned legalization for the currently undocumented, reduction of family backlogs, labor protections and a worker program to regulate the future flow of migrants with a path to permanent residency and citizenship. Plans were made to organize a legislative campaign 4 Photo by Susie Hicks and Jason Cato.

5 U.S. Mexico Futures Forum Photo by Manuel Villaseñor. focused on trying to enact comprehensive immigration reform with a special emphasis on grassroots support. Without going into all the details of legislative strategy and grassroots advocacy plans between 2002 and 2005, by December 2005 the legislative battle was publicly joined. The House had passed HR 4437, otherwise known as the Sensenbrenner bill, a draconian anti-immigrant measure that criminalizes all those in this country illegally, including 1.7 million children. There is no question that this bill has galvanized and angered many, many people and served as a rallying cry. Many political pundits argue that fear is a more powerful mobilizing force than proactive policy proscriptions. It is important to note, however, that being against something does not ensure the enactment of something more palatable. A foundation for an alternative policy proscription needs to have been laid; otherwise, simple opposition may not be sufficiently effective. In the Senate, McCain and Kennedy had previously introduced their version of comprehensive immigration reform. Struggling to find a way to counter the House bill, D.C.- based advocacy groups focused on a Senate strategy built around the McCain/Kennedy bill. By highlighting that this bill called for comprehensive immigration reform not just addressing border enforcement issues but also dealing with the millions of people who are in the country illegally and the thousands who will likely seek to come into the country advocates sought to frame the debate in more favorable terms. One sign of success is that many in the Republican Party have started calling for comprehensive reform though, of course, their definition is much narrower and more limited. More importantly, the D.C.-based groups were able to provide to the local, community-based groups with talking points regarding why McCain/Kennedy would not only be more effective in controlling the border but California State Senator and Futures Forum participant Gil Cedillo (left) raises a flag with other marchers at the May 1 demonstration in Los Angeles. 5

6 6 Millions Outside, 535 Inside continued from previous page also in helping people to become legalized. The inside-washington legislative game began to be played in earnest when the Senate reconvened in late January. There was, and is, great fear that an enforcement only/borderfocused approach will be the only thing that Congress can agree upon. Faced with that possibility, it became apparent to activists that there needed to be a show of how laws like the ones proposed would affect real families and real communities. Arcane rules of Senate procedure and process were the subject of countless discussions; equal time was spent thinking about how to show the power and force of grassroots advocacy to elected officials. Plans were laid to visit members offices while on recess and beyond. As word spread of the potential impact of the House bill, immigrant leaders and communities began to ask what they could do to fight back. As people learned how draconian the House bill was, a sense of urgency and anger began to take shape. The preexisting loose network of organizations and leaders focused on immigration reform allowed the anger and frustration to be channeled This is not to say that national organizations or even state and local organizations were completely in control of the size or message of these demonstrations. Rather, because of the preparatory work, information concerning the House bill and the alternative Senate proposals could be quickly communicated through press releases, talking points and messages that organizers of these various protests could use. In other words, the structure that had slowly been building over several years was able to provide assistance to the increasingly unhappy and numerous immigrant communities. The first huge demonstration took place in Chicago, Illinois on March 10, with crowds estimated at 100,000 or more. On March 25, over half a million people demonstrated in Los Angeles, calling for comprehensive immigration reform and protesting draconian proposals such as HR Demonstrations big and small have taken place since then, and more are planned. Interestingly, much of the credit for these mass U.S. Mexico Futures Forum demonstrations has gone to disc jockeys and radio stations for promoting civil protest. And thus, many conclude that these demonstrations are both spontaneous and locally-driven. Again, it is important to note that while the anger over 4437 may be the driving force, at least initially, the strength of the outside is helping those inside the Beltway negotiate and strategize on how to achieve a better bill. In that regard, these demonstrations occurred at important points in the legislative debate underway in Washington, D.C. While arcane rules of procedure and committee processes may be tedious to some, the reality is that the demonstrations in Chicago and Los Angeles, as well as the other efforts, took place at critical junctures. The Chicago demonstration took place just before the beginning of the Senate Judiciary Committee s consideration of various immigration proposals; the Los Angeles march took place the weekend before the final day the Committee had to consider the various proposals, under the artificial deadline imposed by the majority leader Senator Frist. There was a measurable shift in momentum in the legislative halls in the period between Chicago and Los Angeles. The ability of thousands of people to not only oppose bad policy but also to articulate that there was an alternative legislative proposal was vital. Many a legislative strategist has argued that to defeat bad policy ideas, one needs a good policy alternative you have to be for something, not just against something. But even good policy alternatives will not gather much steam unless there is demonstrable support from the outside. This is the classic inside/outside game. The size of the demonstrations impressed politicians of both parties, strengthening the hand of the inside- D.C. players and lobbyists, including key Senate staffers in both parties. Without the strong D.C.- based and national organizations with staff fully familiar with legislative process and procedures, the energy of the outside supporters would have been dissipated. Instead, it furthered the legislative process. This is where the politics of the issue

7 U.S. Mexico Futures Forum began to become important. The demonstrations helped strengthen the hand of progressive Democrats and moderate Republicans helping them argue that immigration reform that did not effectively and realistically address the status of the 12 million undocumented immigrants currently in this country would be insufficient. But political considerations can also be an impediment, especially in an election year. There will be some Democratic and Republican officials who will look at this issue and try to figure out where to find the policy position that will be most advantageous for them personally in retaining their seat or electing someone who is acceptable to them. In the immediate aftermath of the March 31, 2006, votes on immigration in the Senate, many were trying to blame some Democrats for stopping the compromise that had been reached in the last hours with Republican leaders. Some were arguing that the Minority Leader Harry Reid was more interested in protecting Democrats and having an issue on which to focus Latino voters than in finding a solution. For many politicians, thousands of people taking to the street represent future voters (either themselves or their families). Accordingly, it causes some politicians to try to negotiate the best immigration deal they can with Senator Frist. But a small minority might conclude that keeping the issue open may motivate Hispanics to participate more heavily during election season. The politics are difficult to fathom because if Republicans are held responsible for blowing up a potential agreement, it is possible they will be blamed by Hispanics in the voting booth come November and beyond. On the other hand, if Hispanics conclude that Democrats purposely achieved a stalemate, there may be some in the community who will object to such strategies. What is clear is that the public manifestations of anger and concern have crystallized in many people s minds that the Hispanic community is a growing political force. Still fresh in many politicians memories is the way Hispanic citizens were galvanized by Proposition 187, leading, in many experts opinions, to a Democratic hold on the state legislature in California. Many Republicans are concerned that such a result may be one outcome of this immigration debate if Republicans are not positioned properly. Democrats need to worry that if they play the political card too hard, they may lose Hispanic voters anyway. One thing is clear, the massive demonstrations, which exceeded prior public manifestations on other issues, have changed the way politicians look at immigrants and the Hispanic community. Whether those numbers will actually result in Congress enacting good comprehensive immigration reform is still unknown. Maria Echaveste is a researcher and lecturer at Boalt Hall School of Law and the Goldman Graduate School of Public Policy. Previously, she worked as an attorney and consultant in Washington, D.C. and was Deputy Chief of Staff in the Clinton White House from 1998 to Eduardo Sotelo, better known as the disc jockey El Piolín addresses his audience. Many of those protesting antiimmigrant legislation learned where, when and even how to demonstrate from Spanish-language media. 7 Photo by AP Wide World.

8 The Guest Worker Program Is No Simple Solution By Lydia Chávez U.S. Mexico Futures Forum Photo by Mimi Chakarova. Farm workers pick nectarines in California s Central Valley. 8 The great debate on immigration took a decided turn in late spring when the country s 12 million undocumented immigrants upstaged and outclassed our elected officials. Backed by the Catholic Church and spurred on by popular Spanishlanguage radio personalities, the undocumented took to the streets in some of the most massive marches since the Vietnam War. It was hard not to be inspired. And, oddly enough, it appeared that many in Washington were listening. It was still unclear if Congress would act this spring, but the new immigrant movement triggered a slew of meetings and talk of a compromise to offer comprehensive legislation rather than the enforcement-only bill the House of Representatives approved late last year. Still, one of the most contentious issues remained what to do about regulating the flow of undocumented who will continue to come. The House solution was to build a wall, but the most probable outcome is some sort of guest worker program: it satisfies businesses needs and it placates those who think undocumented immigration can be

9 U.S. Mexico Futures Forum controlled by offering temporary access to U.S. jobs. But those who know anything about immigration understand that the guest worker solution is replete with problems. First, the name leads us to believe that the visitors will be guests and the arrangement temporary, pero no es verdad. The guests stay. The bill offered by Senator Ted Kennedy and Senator John McCain recognized this by including in their proposal a guest worker path to legalization. But the bigger problem with the guest worker program there is talk of bringing in some 400,000 new workers a year is its impact on those already here. It depresses wages. The only guarantee of a guest worker program is that it will keep wage rates low for the guests and for U.S. citizens. Politicians don t have to worry about this cohort because the voting bloc is small, poor y pues sin poder. Agribusiness, construction and service industries on the other hand, are neither small nor poor. A guest worker program that guarantees cheap labor is exactly what business wants. Few are talking about guarantees for the employee to organize, to earn a living wage, to someday become a citizen. Political contributions aside, let s be clear about what will happen with the current guest worker proposals. Heavily immigrant cities in California will be burdened for decades with low-wage, needy residents who can t vote. Do they need more unskilled labor? No. Cities with unemployment rates of 20 percent don t need more workers, they need more jobs. It s hard to be moved by the Central Valley labor contractor Fred Garza who told Los Angeles Times reporter Solomon Moore that he couldn t find enough workers to pick nectarines because they were being lured way by the higher pay in construction. Mr. Garza, pay more. The labor cost of one nectarine is pennies. The labor cost of lettuce is a penny a head. UC Davis labor economist Philip Martin, found that the farm workers who got amnesty in 1986 moved to other jobs because of falling real wages and shrinking benefits in agriculture. At the CLAS Future s Forum in February, Martin talked about immigration and the need to look at each job and consider the question of whether it should be filled. He offered the example of the proliferation of migrants who work as gardeners, a job that homeowners once did for themselves. Would the economy suffer without the gardeners? The alternative example is construction where many migrants have become skilled workers, and without them, the industry would suffer a shortage, he said. A proliferation of cheap labor means that wages for unskilled labor fall. The Pew Hispanic Center concluded in 2004 that wages for Latinos in low-skilled jobs fell two years in a row. No other major group of workers has suffered a two-year decline in wages, the report concluded. And this was during a time of prosperity. Guest worker programs fail on so many fronts that history and numerous commissions all warn in the starkest of terms against pursuing such programs, Dr. Vernon Briggs, a professor of Industrial and Labor Relations at Cornell University testified last year before Congress. He continued, I know of no other element of immigration policy in which the message not to do something is so unequivocal. Regardless, Congress is poised to try once again. The upside this time around is that the experience this spring has taught immigrants the benefits of organizing. Lydia Chávez is a professor in the Graduate School of Journalism at UC Berkeley. 9

10 Bachelet: Sí! By Kirsten Sehnbruch Photo by Beatriz Manz. Bachelet supporters march in Santiago before the election. 10 A Woman! Euphoria erupted on the night of January 25, 2006, as Chile celebrated the election of its first female president, Michelle Bachelet. Hopes for a new style of politics, further progress on the country s outstanding human rights cases, a greater emphasis on social inclusion and an eradication of poverty reverberated among the celebrating voters. Who would have said, 10, 15 years ago, that a woman would be elected president? Bachelet asked ecstatically during her victory speech. A member of Chile s Socialist Party which has been part of the country s center-left governing coalition since the country transitioned to democracy in 1990 after the 17-year dictatorship of General Pinochet Bachelet defeated her opponent from the right wing coalition, Sebastián Piñera, with a sound 53.5 percent of the votes following a campaign that demonstrated all the strengths of Chile s governing coalition as well as her own personal appeal and capacity. The Remarkable and the Unremarkable These elections were in many ways remarkable and at the same time also wholly unremarkable. They were remarkable for four reasons: first, because for the first time in its history, Chile elected a female president. We could even go so far as to say that for the first time in Latin America, a woman was elected purely based on her own merit (i.e. not because she is the widow of an assassinated politician). The Chilean elections were further remarkable because they returned Chile s governing, centerleft coalition, the Concertación, to office for a fourth term, which will lead to a 20 year period of uninterrupted government. Conversely, the

11 opposition parties on the right will have spent 20 years out of power. In Chile s case, this is an indication of the successful administration of the governing coalition and not a sign of corruption or abuse of power. Third, by Latin American standards, the Chilean elections were also remarkable for the quality, integrity and capability of the main presidential candidates. Several Chileans said to me during the campaign period: I m going to vote for Bachelet/Piñera, but I don t really mind who wins. They re both very capable, and they have good teams. The same could also be said for the contenders in the Concertación s primaries. Fourth, these elections showed the remarkable progress that Chile has made over the last 16 years. The country s consistently high economic growth rates combined with a strong focus on social policies have produced the most significant reduction in poverty rates seen in Latin America over the last decades and led to widespread acceptance of Chile s development strategy. The concerns of the Chilean electorate today mirror those of developed countries: education, healthcare, the pension system, employment, discrimination and crime. It is a measure of how quickly the country s culture has changed in recent years that, after having implemented a divorce law only in 2004, the candidates were being asked about their views on homosexual marriage, a subject that would have been considered taboo during the elections in At the same time, these elections were also unremarkable in that they contained few surprises. The right-wing opposition was as riven with conflict as ever, and the personal rivalries among its principal politicians ultimately stymied any hopes of victory, despite Piñera s significant achievement in forcing Bachelet into a run-off. The campaigns also brought out the conflicts within the governing coalition, in particular the personal rivalries between party heavyweights within the Christian Democrat party. But as on previous occasions, when it came to the crunch, the cracks in the Concertación were quickly cemented up. The coalition thus ultimately succeeded in presenting a much more united front than the right. The historical factors that have influenced voting in Chile since 1990 still mattered as much in these elections as in previous ones. Whether the candidates had supported or opposed the Pinochet regime in the plebiscite of 1988 was a subject that came up again and again during the presidential debates and in the general political discourse. Bachelet herself frequently referred to what she and her family had suffered as a result of the dictatorship s human rights abuses, while conservative candidate Joaquín Lavín, who had worked in the Pinochet administration during the late 1980s, studiously avoided the subject. Meanwhile Piñera repeatedly emphasized the fact that he had voted against the dictatorship in 1988 in order to distance himself from his more right-wing rival. Also, as in previous elections, the government itself was by no means a neutral actor. Many of its senior officials were involved in designing Bachelet s political program, and even more officials from all levels of government were extremely active in organizing and running the Concertación s election campaign on the ground, often during office hours, which led the right to accuse them of abusing state resources. Above all, the political trend towards the center has continued, making it increasingly difficult for parties and candidates to differentiate themselves, especially as the political debates between the candidates rarely moved beyond broad generalizations and included almost no real debate of fundamental issues. Furthermore, the election campaign was again marked by an attitude of nonconfrontation: while there was some bickering, there was no serious mud-slinging. Strong language and personal attacks were largely avoided, as was any close examination of past voting records. The More Things Change Bachelet s campaign and political program illustrate the extent to which her administration represents continuity. Fundamental policy shifts from this new government are unlikely, but an accelerated pace of reform is possible, especially considering the fact that for the 11

12 Bachelet: Sí! continued from previous page Photo by Getty Images. Michelle Bachelet poses with the members of her new cabinet, half of whom are women. 12 first time since 1990 Bachelet commands a parliamentary majority, which will accord her a greater degree of political freedom than her predecessors. Her government s biggest and most important battle is likely to be the reform of the pension system, which leaves at least 50 percent of the Chilean workforce without even a minimum pension. However, a broad consensus will have to be achieved for this reform as the political power behind the pension funds is entrenched, and votes from the right will be needed to pass any new legislation. It is likely that her government will attempt to introduce a series of changes to the system aimed at increasing its coverage and contributions as well as the competition between individual fund management companies. However, since any genuine competition would significantly reduce the profitability of these companies, it is unlikely that the government will succeed in implementing any fundamental changes, which are violently opposed by the right. Additionally, any successful reform of the pension system will have to convince workers that it is worth contributing to the system. At the moment, most think that contributing is equal to pouring money down the drain. This opinion is unlikely to be changed by a reform consisting of half measures which is the likely outcome of negotiations between the government and the opposition. In short, significant progress on the matter is unlikely. The same holds true for social reforms in the areas of health, education, labor and social welfare. Structural changes, including significant increases in spending, would have to be negotiated with the opposition. But the advisors closely associated with Bachelet s campaign appear to be focused on pension reform and unwilling to take on other battles. In any case, this government will have much less time to act than the previous two Concertación administrations, which could look forward to six years in office. Due to constitutional reforms implemented by the Lagos government, Bachelet will only have four years, and she will not be eligible for reelection.

13 During the election campaigns, we saw both Bachelet s strengths and weaknesses. She made some mistakes, put her foot in it on several occasions and dithered every now and again. But she also showed capacity for leadership, great personal appeal and genuine warmth and sincerity. The cabinet that she nominated following the elections proves that she is her own master and will not be pushed around by political parties, even if she owes them a debt for her election victory. The first in the Americas to be based on a principle of gender parity, her cabinet consists of an array of mainly new faces, just as she had promised during her campaign. Bachelet has shown, too, that she is not averse to running risks. Many of her appointments lack high-level political experience, and even more surprisingly, they are not all fully backed by their parties. This could lead to problems and a loss of valuable time in a fouryear administration if the political parties, or factions within them, decide to block legislation that she proposes. On the other hand, if her new ministers perform well, Bachelet will be hailed as a political genius who has changed the style of politics in Chile. At this stage, it is difficult to predict whether Bachelet s bets will pay off. If her government performs well, she will go down in history as Chile s first female president, who did more than anyone before her to promote gender equality in Chile. However, if her administration is mediocre or worse, she will most likely pave the way for a shift to the right and may even damage the principle of gender equality. And the United States? One last question remains: Does any of this matter to the United States? The answer is yes, as the lessons from the Chilean case are valid for the entire region. Seen from a historical perspective, Chile s progress since 1990 in entrenching democracy as a system, as well as its progress in overcoming a legacy of political and economic instability, authoritarianism and the violation of human rights is nothing less than remarkable. Economic stability and growth, if they are combined with a strong social policy agenda that leads to a decreasing poverty rate, feed into political stability and a strengthening of democracy. The more an electorate gains through stable economic growth, the more it has to lose in a situation of political chaos continued on page 15 An elderly man collects cardboard in Santiago to supplement his income. Photo by AP Wide World. 13

14 Who Is Michelle Bachelet? Michelle Bachelet is the daughter of Angela Jeria, an archaeologist, and Alberto Bachelet, an air force general who served under President Allende. He was imprisoned following the military coup of 1973 and died of a heart attack in prison after being tortured. Bachelet herself became a militant socialist during her medical studies at the University of Chile in the early 70s and was associated with leading figures in the Chilean Youth Socialist Party. Following her father s arrest and death, Bachelet chose not to go into exile in order to continue the now clandestine struggle against the dictatorship.together with her mother, she was arrested and tortured in 1975 at the Villa Grimaldi, one of Chile s most infamous torture centers. Due to her family s personal ties with the military, Bachelet and her mother were released later that year, after which they were smuggled out of the country to Australia.They later moved to East Germany, where Bachelet continued to study medicine, married and had her first child. After her return to Chile, Bachelet specialized as a pediatrician and worked in an NGO where she looked after children who had in some way been affected by the human rights violations of the military dictatorship. With the return of democracy in 1990, she moved into jobs related more to health administration than practice as the immense challenges facing the new democratic government in the area of health policies became clear. Bachelet entered the Health Ministry as an advisor in Three years later, somewhat disillusioned with the continued rift between civil and military relations, she chose to undertake a course of postgraduate studies in Washington D.C. on military affairs. Upon her return, she moved to the Ministry of Defense to help coordinate and modernize the military s health services. When President Lagos assumed office in 2000, he appointed Bachelet as Minister of Health and charged her with one of the most important reforms that his government was to undertake: the Plan Auge. This was a comprehensive reform of the country s health insurance systems that was to guarantee a range of treatments to all Chileans, regardless of whether they were insured or not. He also asked Bachelet to eliminate the endless lines at doctors offices in the poblaciones. Both tasks were high profile, politically explosive and almost unachievable. As minister, Bachelet had to find a common ground for health reform, not only among the different opinions within the governing coalition, but also with the opposition on whose support any new legislation depended. Her efforts laid the foundation for a series of reforms which were eventually implemented in In the course of a cabinet reshuffle in early 2002, Lagos appointed Bachelet Minister of Defense, the first time a woman had held this position in Chile or Latin America. Helped by her intimate knowledge of the military community in which she grew up, she established excellent relationships with the military leaders, who learned to trust and respect her. During her period as Minister of Defense, the 30th anniversary of the military coup was commemorated, important information was released on human rights abuses during the dictatorship, General Pinochet and leading figures of the regime were prosecuted and significant changes were agreed to regarding the Chilean military as an institution. Bachelet s role as a mediator and facilitator of all of these processes was pivotal. When, in addition to her role as a symbolic figure of reconciliation, Bachelet oversaw the military s rescue operations during intense flooding in Santiago in 2002, her approval ratings skyrocketed. Together with her personable style of politics and her genuine warmth of character, which touched both the public and those she worked with, it was this rapid rise in the opinion polls that catapulted Bachelet into the position of a presidential candidate, even though neither her political experience nor her seniority in the coalition warranted such a move at the time. 14

15 Bachelet: Sí! continued from page 13 and the less credibility populist leaders with irresponsible economic programs have. The rapid deepening and strengthening of democracy in Chile illustrate this principle. The quality of the candidates and the subjects under discussion during the recent campaign are testimony to this. The rumblings of a military coup that could be heard as recently as 1993 are now unthinkable in a country that has signed a free trade agreement with the United States. Stable economic growth and a strong social policy agenda therefore remain the best guarantors of democracy. If other Latin American countries cannot achieve this level of economic development of their own accord, perhaps the United States could learn from the Chilean case. If the U.S. made a concerted effort to help these countries overcome poverty and create stable economic growth, this might do more to guarantee democracy in the region than sanctions and continued interference in local affairs. Kirsten Sehnbruch is a visiting scholar at the Center for Latin American Studies. Michelle Bachelet after being sworn in as Chile s first female president. Photo by AP Wide World. 15

16 Brazil s New Role By Emily Felt Photo by Ricardo Stuckert/PR. President Lula poses with the presidents of Argentina, Uruguay, Chile and Venezuela, among others, at a 2005 Mercosur summit meeting. 16 between the United States and Latin America today are at Relations their lowest point since the end of the Cold War, wrote Peter Hakim in a 2006 article for Foreign Affairs. Brazilian Ambassador to the United States, Roberto Abdenur, dedicated his talk at CLAS to dispelling this idea. Relations between the U.S. and Brazil are currently at a high point, not a low point, he maintained. While Brazil continues to have differences of opinion with the United States on issues like the invasion of Iraq, the environment and the International Criminal Court, the relationship between the two countries is positive. As evidence of collaborative efforts by the two nations he pointed to the current bilateral dialogue around economic issues, United Nations reform, security in the Americas and joint initiatives in Africa. Since the election of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in 2002, Brazil s foreign policy has focused on establishing ties with countries around the world. With its large economy and sizeable population, Brazil has become an economic force with more bargaining power than its Latin neighbors. Brazil played an important role in the Doha meeting of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and has made progress in bringing Latin American countries together on social and economic issues. This suggests to some that Brazil is taking on a leadership role within Latin America that might interfere with its relationship with the U.S. In the past, the United States has not looked fondly on solidarity among Latin American states, and there is some criticism that Brazil is not focusing on the U.S. as it should.

17 Ambassador Abdenur maintained that what some see as leadership is simply Brazil looking out for its own best interests which does not detract from its relationship with the U.S. While Brazil s independence could be perceived as a threat to U.S. hegemony, the ambassador argued that Brazil, like any other nation, must reach out to the world on economic and social matters. While clearly a part of the Third World and committed to the idea of Latin America as a concept, Brazil has no intention of strengthening the collective power of Latin America to the detriment of the U.S. According to Abdenur, Brazilian and U.S. interests converge economically, socially and strategically, and their relationship is characterized by the incentive of both countries to work together on common interests. Economically the two countries have every reason to collaborate. Brazil has entered a time of relative social and economic stability when viewed in the context of its turbulent past. This period of stability can be attributed both to trends begun by past administrations and to the important role Lula played in gaining the confidence of international investors after his election. One of Lula s strengths going into the upcoming presidential elections is his record on economic policy, which gives little political ground to the opposition. Lula did not, as analysts had suspected, abandon market mechanisms to pursue his social agenda. He was able to maintain confidence in the Brazilian economy while launching domestic social programs. Increasingly, the United States and Brazil are becoming economically interdependent. The U.S. is Brazil s most important trading partner; trade both ways tops $40 billion. Brazil is also starting to invest in the United States. Abdenur mentioned that his country still needs to maximize its comparative advantage to make inroads with U.S. consumers. Because Brazil was a latecomer to the arena of international trade, there are still markets to be tapped in the United States, and this is an area that Brazil will need to address in the future in order to continue its growth. On issues of international security and cooperation, the two countries have had some differences of opinion. However, even after disagreements on issues like the International Criminal Court, the illegal invasion of Iraq and the environment, the ambassador characterized the relationship between George Bush and President Lula as one with chemistry. During President Bush s visit to Brazil, Lula detailed the many issues on which the two countries converge. Bringing stability to Haiti is of interest to both countries as is a joint program by which Brazil and the U.S. will collaborate to foster democracy and good governance in Guinea Bissau, one of Africa s poorest countries. Although Abdenur did not comment on how this initiative would be implemented, he pointed to the political and symbolic significance of the initiative which might serve as the impetus for future collaboration. Ambassador Abdenur ended his discussion on a frank note. The U.S. is a hegemonic power, and as such, sets the agenda on economic, social and human rights issues. Brazil does not have the same luxury. However, it has become a nation that is indispensable in defining the terms on which the agenda will be set. This comes at a time when Brazil has begun to play an important role in bringing other nations to the table to dialogue. The Bush administration has faced criticism for its singular focus on the Middle East while neglecting its long ties with Latin America; hence the title of Mr. Hakim s Foreign Affairs article: Is Washington Losing Latin America? Brazil might be the partner that the United States needs to get Latin America back and on terms more equitable for all. President Lula s dialogue with George Bush has helped build a relationship of collaboration between the two nations, creating a potentially powerful alliance for the future. Brazilian Ambassador to the United States, Roberto Abdenur, spoke at UC Berkeley on March 9. Emily Felt is a graduate student in the Richard and Rhoda Goldman School of Public Policy at UC Berkeley. 17

18 Bolivia s Conservative Autonomy Movement By Kent Eaton Photo by Getty Images. Hundreds of thousands of cruceños demonstrate on behalf of autonomy for Santa Cruz, January 28, Latin America in the past two decades has experienced a transition to more decentralized forms of government, a change whose significance may well come to rival the two other major transitions toward democracy and the market that the region has also experienced. The reasons for decentralization and the consequences of the common decision to decentralize vary quite dramatically across different countries in the hemisphere. In most of the more extensively studied cases, decentralization appealed to progressive political actors and democratic reformers, who sought to decentralize in the expectation that it would reduce the likelihood of any future reversions to authoritarian rule. In Brazil, for example, the leaders of the civil society movement that helped terminate military-led governments explicitly argued that to decentralize was to democratize and that to democratize was to decentralize. The current movement to decentralize political and economic authority in Bolivia, however, displays a very different logic. Rather than progressives, it is conservative political groups and business elites who have championed the cause of decentralization and who have used their considerable economic resources in the service of a demand for regional autonomy. If Bolivia today is on the verge of a significant devolution of political and economic authority to regional governments, this is due largely to the efforts of economic elites who are deeply concerned about what they perceive as the weakening of respect for property rights in La Paz. This conservative autonomy movement can be understood as a response to the fundamentally new forms of indigenous mobilization that took place in Bolivia in the 1990s, transforming the country s political system. At the municipal level, the much-celebrated 1994 Law of

19 Photo by AP Wide World. Popular Participation established numerous new access points into the political system for formerly excluded indigenous groups. New municipal spaces and municipal electoral victories facilitated the rise of Bolivia s two most important new indigenous leaders: current president Evo Morales of the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) and Felipe Quispe of the Movimiento Indígena Pachakuti (MIP). At the national level, indigenous groups acquired sufficient political power and mobilizational capacity by 2003 to play a leading role in the termination of two Bolivian presidencies: Gonzalo Sánchez de Losada and his successor Carlos Mesa. When indigenous Bolivians mobilized to demand a more central role in Bolivian politics, they in turn challenged the special position that economic elites and pro-market political parties have long enjoyed in the government. Specifically, when indigenous political actors successfully inserted themselves into the only two levels of government that have any real significance in Bolivia the national and municipal levels economically powerful groups started to demand changes that would increase the significance of the intermediate level of government (called departments or regions in Bolivia). Explaining why economic elites adopted this strategy requires a basic understanding of some of the key features of subnational regionalism in Bolivia. In the 1950s and 1960s, the La Paz-based central government used revenues derived from the mineral wealth of Andean departments in the west and channeled these resources into development projects in the sparsely populated, lowland department of Santa Cruz in the east. Assisted by the U.S. Agency for International Development, the central government s March to the East resulted in large investments in Santa Cruz s infrastructure, including the critical highway and railway projects that helped produce a sustained regional economic boom beginning in the 1970s. Due to the phenomenal rise of Santa Cruz, now home to the country s most lucrative export activities and to its most powerful business associations, the department currently represents over 40 percent of Bolivia s export earnings and tax revenue. The rise of Santa Cruz, however, has also generated deep conflict between what many see as two different Bolivias: the poorer, more indigenous, less economically productive departments of the A Bolivian miner plays with homemade dynamite as he takes part in a march demanding nationalization of the country s oil industry and rejecting the autonomy referendum proposed by Santa Cruz. 19

20 20 Bolivia s Conservative Autonomy Movement continued from previous page mountainous west, and the richer, whiter and more economically vibrant departments in the lowlands that curve around the foothills of the Andes to the east. Bolivians in the east and west disagree about many things, including how to divide up seats in the national legislature between subnational regions an issue that nearly derailed the elections in December 2005 when departments in the west refused to reapportion seats based on the newest census figures (which would have given Santa Cruz at least four more seats in Congress). But in a more profound way, lowlanders (cambas) and highlanders (collas) even disagree on how to explain Santa Cruz success. Residents of western departments remind Santa Cruz of the role that eastern mineral wealth played in its growth and demand that eastern departments now share the proceeds of their newly-discovered natural gas deposits with the west. For them, Santa Cruz is the daughter of the national government. Meanwhile, cruceños argue that it was the absence of the central state and its overweening bureaucracy, rather than any special treatment from La Paz, which enabled the department to grow faster than the national average. Tensions between east and west noticeably worsened in the aftermath of Sánchez de Losada s disastrous second administration (July 2002 October 2003). In the October 2003 Gas War, when indigenous groups in the west besieged the president in La Paz, pro-market business and political leaders in the east responded by inviting the president to transfer the national capital to Santa Cruz. When this proposal failed and the following administration of Carlos Mesa began to negotiate directly with Evo Morales, the Santa Cruz leadership proceeded to organize a series of rallies, protests and signature-gathering campaigns to demand greater autonomy from the central government. Demands for regional autonomy certainly predate Morales national emergence, but they have escalated sharply in response to the growing political turbulence in La Paz. The move to make Santa Cruz more independent from the national government has been led by a powerful civic committee called the Comité Pro-Santa Cruz (CPSC), which originated in the early 1950s as a site of opposition to the National Revolution that Bolivia was then experiencing. Led by the business elites who dominate its decisionmaking bodies, the CPSC has successfully pulled off a number of dramatic episodes in the last two years. Most important are the two days in June 2004 and January 2005 when hundreds of thousands of cruceños answered the call issued by the CPSC to demonstrate on behalf of autonomy for Santa Cruz. An estimated 350,000 people participated in the second of these events, the so-called Second Great Town Hall (Segundo Gran Cabildo Abierto). As the largest recorded public demonstration in Bolivian history, this second cabildo served as a powerful counter-mobilization in response to the indigenous mobilization that has so transformed the west. Subsequent to this second and larger rally, the Santa Cruz autonomy movement began to be known as the Agenda of January in contrast to the Agenda of October (2003), which refers to the movement that ousted Sánchez de Losada. In the period between the two cabildo meetings, the CPSC led a civic strike in November 2004 designed to force the national government to hold a referendum on autonomy that would be binding at the departmental level. In a relatively compressed period of time, the CPSC has made substantial progress toward its goal of regional autonomy for Santa Cruz. In April 2005, pressure from Santa Cruz forced President Carlos Mesa to agree to hold Bolivia s first-ever elections for prefect, which were held in December 2005 along with the presidential and legislative elections. As a result, Rubén Costas, a wealthy landowner and former CPSC president, now governs the department as its first democratically-elected prefect. Furthermore, before resigning his office in June 2005, Mesa was also forced to agree to a nationwide referendum on departmental autonomy, which has now been scheduled for July 2006 on the same day that Bolivians will elect members of a new Constituent Assembly.

21 Photo by AP Wide World. The terms of regional autonomy will certainly be one of the most difficult and controversial issues under discussion in this new assembly. Bolivia s experience can be used to think more generally about the conditions under which conservative autonomy movements might emerge in other Latin American countries. For a variety of reasons, the conditions for such a movement have been especially ripe in Bolivia, and may not be equally present elsewhere, even in countries where the mobilization of indigenous populations might resemble the Bolivian case. Three factors have been critical in enabling and encouraging the conservative autonomy movement in Bolivia. The first is the disconnection between the location of economic and political power in the country. Only Ecuador, with its ongoing struggle between dynamic, coastal Guayaquil and sluggish but politically powerful Quito, approximates the mismatching of economic and political power that we see in Bolivia today between Santa Cruz and La Paz. The prominence of anti-market rhetoric and behavior among indigenous leaders is a second factor that helps account for the emergence of a conservative autonomy movement. In Bolivia, Evo Morales has effectively tapped into widespread opposition to one of the region s most doctrinaire experiences with economic liberalization. The third factor concerns the party system and the relative electoral strength of political parties that can be counted on to represent the interests of economic elites. In Bolivia, the three established parties that introduced and defended economic liberalization measures in the 1980s and 90s have been decimated in recent elections. That Morales party won the December 2005 elections so convincingly with 54 percent of the vote, or nearly 20 percentage points more than opinion polls had predicted creates further cause for concern among the leaders of Bolivia s conservative autonomy movement. Kent Eaton is Associate Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California and a visiting scholar at CLAS. He spoke at Berkeley on January 30, Cruceños sunbathe at Acqualand.The election of Evo Morales has led to rising calls for autonomy from business-minded, free-market-driven Santa Cruz. 21

22 Human Rights, Democracy and Citizenship in Timbaúba By Alejandro Reyes-Arias Photo by Nancy Scheper-Hughes. Abdoral Gonçalves Queiroz, head of Timbaúba s extermination group, sits shackled inside this police car, forced to watch the march against the death squads. 22 Brazil s democratic transition in the late 1980s brought about significant advances in human rights legislation, embodied in the 1988 Federal Constitution and the 1990 Child and Adolescent Statute. However, democratization was not accompanied by a concomitant implementation of such rights and, in many cases, repressive mechanisms such as death squads and extermination groups seem to have increased their activities after the end of the military regime. UC Berkeley Professor of Anthropology Nancy Scheper-Hughes, who has studied human rights issues in the Brazilian northeast since the 1960s, analyzed the complex relationship between human rights, democracy and citizenship through a case study of death squad operations in the plantation market town of Timbaúba, in the state of Pernambuco. The 1964 CIA-supported Revolution inaugurated two decades of military dictatorship that instituted both direct and indirect forms of repression. In her book Death Without Weeping, Scheper-Hughes poignantly describes the poverty, marginalization, exclusion, hunger, malnutrition and epidemics that resulted in frightening rates of infant mortality and represented insidious forms of everyday violence. More direct forms of repression were the detentions, disappearances and torture of suspected political dissidents and the activities of death squads. The repression was supported by the wealthy, who believed that Brazil s path to progress could only be assured by an authoritarian regime. The dictatorship did, in fact, bring about an economic upturn, although at a significant social cost. In the 1980s, however, as the so-called Brazilian economic miracle began to falter, the military faced increasing demands for a democratic transition. In 1985 the first civilian president was elected and in 1988 the new Federal Constitution was enacted.

23 The 1990s, however, saw a paradoxical resurgence of death squads. This can be viewed in part as a reaction to what was perceived as a state of lawlessness, wherein thugs and marginals were thought to be free to terrorize decent people. A real policing vacuum the result of reduced budgets and a poorly trained, poorly equipped and corrupt police force coincided in fact with a rise in criminality, due in great part to a new push in drug trafficking from the Colombian cartels as well as the smuggling of contraband and other forms of organized crime. When the misery of the shantytowns invaded the areas previously reserved for the middle and upper classes, the elites began to accept death squads as legitimate substitutes for control. Despite (or perhaps in reaction to) the extraordinary legal reforms supporting human rights, death squads began targeting street children without eliciting much public indignation. Such violence against children and the general public s indifference or even support are indicative, according to Scheper- Hughes, of an underlying racial hatred that is disguised by the prevailing myth of Brazilian racial democracy. Poor, black youth are viewed as inherently predisposed to crime and are often referred to as bichos, animals, not quite human. Death squads first entered into Alto do Cruzeiro, a shantytown in Timbaúba, in 1987, when 12 young black men in trouble with the law were seized from their homes by masked men in uniform, tortured and executed. This ushered in a period of terror for the residents of Alto do Cruzeiro. Terrified into silence, the shantytown population refused to talk about the killings and abductions. The middle classes were quietly complicit and the deaths were not even mentioned in the local opposition paper, whose editor questioned: Why should we criticize the execution of marginals? In addition, rumors of an international black market in organs were linked to the disappearance of children and youths, which deflected attention from the true nature of the death squads. Curiously, some shantytown dwellers sided with the police and the death squads. One of the paradoxical aspects of repressive institutions is the frequent complicity or acquiescence by the very people who are targeted by the violence. To understand this, Scheper-Hughes pointed out that the living conditions in Brazilian shantytowns tend to reproduce the moral economy of concentration camps. She referred to Primo Levi s essay The Grey Zone, where he describes the structures and technologies of violence and terror that become embodied in the common sense of everyday life and goad or trick the destitute into complicity, turning them into agents of their own destruction. Under extreme conditions, people s despair leads them to identify with their oppressors as their only chance for survival. In 1992, Scheper-Hughes, prompted by Franciscan liberation theology nun Sister Juliana, began investigating extrajudicial killings of street children and youths. Together with Berkeley anthropologist Daniel Hoffman, she followed a cohort of 22 street children whose friends had been killed by police and other street kids. Despite laws that prohibit the incarceration of minors in regular jails, several of them were being held in adult jails, presumably for their protection. Rejected by their families and despised by local merchants, several of them had already been marked for extermination. Between 1988 and 1990, the Federal Police reported more than 5,000 children murdered in Brazil. In that period, the Medical Legal Institute of Recife received an average of 15 dead children per month. The state of Pernambuco became Brazil s most violent state and Timbaúba was labeled crime capital of Pernambuco. In the 1990s, Abdural Gonçalves Queiroz, a young, working-class resident of the flatlands around Timbaúba, managed to build relationships with plantation and factory owners, businesspeople, the police, political leaders and the judge and rose as an extrajudicial enforcer of control. He formed a group of vigilantes who, with the support of the local elite, provided protection, settled debts, carried out vendettas and ran drug and arms trafficking in markets throughout region. The bulk of their activities was focused on surveillance and street cleaning, ridding the town of undesirables. Although the numbers are still unknown, it is estimated that they killed between 100 and 200 people during their reign of terror, probably with the aid of the police and the support of the elite. In a five-year period, they eliminated virtually all the older street children of Timbaúba. But Abdural seems to have overstepped his boundaries. By the late 90s he had displaced the mayor and the police and demanded weekly 23

24 24 Photo by Nancy Scheper-Hughes. The primary victims of Abdoral s reign of terror, like Pedro da Silva, 17, were poor, black and in trouble with the law, mainly for theft. Human Rights in Timbaúba continued from previous page wages from the municipal government and steady contributions from private citizens. He also started giving protection to highway robbers and dealers in contraband. When he began targeting middle-class transgressors women in extramarital affairs, homosexuals and transvestites he lost much of his support. In 2000, newly appointed judge Mariza Borges and district attorney Humberto da Silva Graça joined forces with a small local group of courageous human rights activists to wrest the community from vigilantes. Despite the rise of new forms of repression, the democratic transition also opened the doors to a new class of intellectuals: people who lacked professional credentials, material resources and symbolic capital, but who used the new Constitution to mobilize in the defense of street children and others targeted by the death squads. In the spring of 2001, Scheper-Hughes received an invitation from Judge Borges to help in the criminal case against Abdural Queiroz. Although her book Death Without Weeping had not been translated into Portuguese due to resistance to the controversial issues it raised a Spanish translation was being used as evidence by the prosecution. Scheper-Hughes was now being asked to help identify the victims and survivors of the death squads. The relatives were afraid to testify and only a fraction of the executions were known to the judge and prosecutor. In addition to talking to friends in the shantytown, Scheper-Hughes and her husband Michael searched the records at the Cartório Civil, where 95 homicides were recorded between 1995 and 2000, 31 of which were found to be linked to Abdural s death squad. Scheper-Hughes participation was seized by the human rights activists as a tool to build a broader coalition against death squads, bringing together political leaders, teachers and officials. On July 19, 2001, a march against death squads was organized to mark the one year anniversary of the arrest of Abdural and his accomplices. Most residents were still too afraid to participate in the march, but the municipal secretary of education declared the day a public holiday and led the town s school children down the streets of Timbaúba. José Carlos Araújo, the outspoken radio host of People s Radio, and his wife Maria do Carmo also participated, while hundreds of fearful residents peeked at the event from their homes. The march was led by street children dressed in white, carrying crosses with signs painted with the names of their siblings who had been killed. At some point, two heavily armed police jeeps appeared in front of the march, frightening the demonstrators. However, the police had been ordered by Judge Borges to accompany and protect the march. In one of the cars, a shackled Abdural Queiroz was forced to watch the public outcry against his activities. The march ended at the mayor s office, where the demonstrators delivered a plaque commemorating the end of terror, demanding that it be placed in the main square facing City Hall. The event received national TV and radio coverage by Rede Globo, and the public recognition of the demands for rights of an oppressed population created a sense of empowerment unknown until then. However, in April 2004 the shopkeepers of Timbaúba issued a manifesto decrying the

25 Photo by Emily Earhart. liberal legislation and the excessive protections against criminal children, appropriate, according to them, to the developed countries of the first world, but inapplicable in countries like Brazil. During a visit in the spring of 2004, Scheper-Hughes heard stories of a resurgence of death squads formed by Abdural and his accomplices, who were communicating with local bandits via cell phone. District attorney Humberto Graça had been reassigned to Recife, and Judge Borges was now viewed with suspicion as a liability to the community. Human rights activists were receiving death threats, and the elite once again actively supported hired killers behind the scenes. That spring a large cache of weapons was discovered in the warehouse of a local shopkeeper and in the garages of his friends and neighbors. The ringleader was arrested, but he was released within a matter of weeks. Then, at 7:30 pm on April 24, 2004, José Carlos Araújo was shot in the chest, belly and mouth by two young men on motorcycles, in view of his wife and three children. The 37-year-old community radio host had been denouncing the continuing existence of death squads in Timbaúba and the involvement of local businessmen in murders in the region. The local police later captured a suspected assassin, 19-year-old Elton Jonas Gonçalves, who confessed that he had killed Araújo because the radio host had accused him on the air of being a bandit. In the last program before his assassination, Araújo seemed to foresee his end and bid farewell to his audience. My friends, I do my duty with a clear conscience, but now it is time to return to reality, to the world of God, a world where I will never be betrayed. At the end of my program I always say that life is good, but it also has difficult times. The way out of hard times is never to bow your head. It is time to rise up and keep going. The story of death squads and resistance in democratic Brazil is one that clearly has no end in sight. But it is in the struggles of people like José Carlos Araújo and the intellectuals and human right activists of Timbaúba, who valiantly exercise what James Holston has termed insurgent citizenship, that hopes for a more just society remain alive. Nancy Scheper-Hughes is Professor of Anthropology at UC Berkeley. She spoke at CLAS on November 14, Alejandro Reyes-Arias is a graduate student in the Latin American Studies program. Nancy Scheper- Hughes speaks at CLAS. 25

26 Making Movies in Latin America By Joshua Jelly-Schapiro Photo courtesy of Andrés Wood. Andrés Wood on the set of Machuca. 26 one talks of cinema, wrote the great Brazilian When auteur Glauber Rocha in the 1960s, one talks of American cinema Every discussion of cinema made outside Hollywood must begin with Hollywood. At the time he wrote those words, Rocha and many of his Latin American contemporaries spoke often of the need to create a new cinema, one that not only challenged the formal dominance of Hollywood aesthetics, but that also challenged the economic dominance of American movies in the theaters and distribution networks of the Third World. Inspired in equal measure by Che Guevara s New Man and the French New Wave, the exponents of Brazil s cinema novo sought to make movies that depicted the harsh realities of impoverished societies, but that also instilled a radical vision of what those societies could become. In an epoch of revolutionary ferment, cineastes across the Third World commonly conceived of building national film industries as integral to the building of a new consciousness of liberation. In today s Latin America, a new generation of filmmakers confronts a very different political context. Theirs is an age not so much of revolutionary idealism as cautious hope. They make movies in societies coming to terms with the traumas of their recent histories, nations indelibly marked by the dashing of sixties hopes on the violent rocks of military dictatorship, dirty war and structural adjustment. This new generation, however, is still preoccupied with loosening the stranglehold of Hollywood films on domestic markets; American blockbusters are even more dominant in the region today than a few decades ago. And if less eager to make the stridently political films of their forebears, many of these filmmakers responsible for what

27 many are calling a new boom in Latin American cinema are still critically engaged in making movies that address the present circumstance and future trajectory of the national societies to which they belong. Andrés Wood, the Chilean director who has recently emerged as a key figure in this new generation of cineastes, addressed these themes in a public lecture at Berkeley s Center for Latin American Studies. Wood delivered his remarks the day after introducing a special screening of Machuca, his acclaimed semi-autobiographical depiction of events surrounding the 1973 coup against Salvador Allende, a film that was not only an unexpected smash in Chile it was the top-grossing movie in the country in 2004 but has since gone on to extraordinary international success. In a wide-ranging, informal talk entitled Making Movies in Latin America, Wood discussed his own journey as a filmmaker and the place of his work in the renewed Chilean movie industry that has emerged since the end of the Pinochet dictatorship in In sketching out the history of Chilean cinema, Wood pointed to the importance of early pioneers like Raúl Ruiz, who developed a successful career in exile after departing for France in the Pinochet years, and of Patricio Guzmán, whose three-part treatment of the politics surrounding the 1973 coup, La Batalla de Chile ( The Battle of Chile ) remains an international classic of documentary realism. Wood also identified a few seminal figures from elsewhere in Latin America Glauber Rocha first among them who had articulated an important vision for cinematic art in the region and whose films had spoken to the role that a man with a movie camera could play in the development of national culture and identity. Wood explained how the Pinochet regime, particularly brutal in its ideological character, had almost entirely eliminated Chile s domestic film industry during its years in power: over the near two decades of the dictatorship, no more than five feature-length films were produced in the country (this in contrast to Brazil and Argentina, which were also governed by military regimes over much of the same period, but whose large film industries survived relatively intact). Having grown up under the dictatorship Wood was a boy of seven in 1973 the director came of age at a time when there was no way to study film in Chile. Beginning on a university course in economics in Santiago, he spent time at Notre Dame in Indiana on a scholarship, and from there, attended film school at NYU. Upon returning to Chile, Wood made Historias de fútbol ( Soccer Stories ) in 1997, a domestic hit that was a key example of the small-scale movies that young directors were making in the first years of civilian government. Though a short decade ago there wasn t a single film school in Chile, Wood reports that today there seems to be one on every corner ; in the Santiago of Michelle Bachelet, studying cinema is the hip course of the moment. Wood estimated that the country is currently producing eight to 10 feature films each year and up to 20 documentaries. The emergence of this newly vibrant culture, however, does not mean that the financial infrastructure needed to make movies has materialized out of thin air. Feature-length filmmakers in Chile, as in every other Latin American country (save perhaps Brazil and Argentina) depend almost exclusively upon foreign financing to make their films. As Wood explained, the financing for Machuca which was made for $1.2 million, a miniscule amount even for independent studios in the U.S. was obtained from production companies in France, Britain and Spain, along with a small amount from the Chilean government s Fund for the Arts. And, as Wood discussed, gaining distribution once a film is complete and the all-important foreign distribution especially is a further, enormous challenge. It s very difficult. Very, very difficult, Wood said with a smile, alluding to the struggle he has personally headed up to gain distribution for his work in the United States (the Machuca DVD is still not available here, though he promised it will be soon). continued on page 30 27

28 Photo courtesy of Andrés Wood. Andrés Wood screened his film Machuca at CLAS on March 13,

29 Photo courtesy of Andrés Wood. Set in Santiago, Chile in 1973, the film portrays the unlikely friendship between two boys from different social classes. 29

30 Making Movies in Latin America continued from page Of course gaining distribution is a lot easier if you are shopping a product of the altogether exceptional quality of Machuca, a film that has garnered numerous plaudits on the international festival circuit, and has attracted rave reviews in each of the 30 countries where it has had a theatrical release. Critics writing about Wood s film have praised nothing quite so often as the quietness of the director s approach, his insistence that the defining moment in his nation s recent history be approached not as national epic but as intimate drama. Though the film s subject is inherently political, its point, as Tony Scott put in his New York Times review, is not to settle scores or reopen old wounds, but rather to explore, after a long period of repression, the possibility of grief. It is perhaps for this reason that Wood s film was so well received in Chile and elsewhere in Latin America. Machuca deals with a terrible time in the region s history not by recapitulating old debates, but by depicting the epoch s violence on a human scale. It approaches divides of ideology and class not as historical abstractions, but as complex lived realities, laid bare by events far outside the ability of the film s young protagonists to control. This trope that Wood uses to tell this tale indicting a traumatic history through the sympathetic eyes of children is a familiar one, and it carries with it a readymade form of moral clarity. But it is a trope also prone to sentimentality; tales of young innocence corrupted devolve easily into both the saccharine and the trite. Yet Machuca, whatever its imperfections, succeeds precisely for the degree to which it escapes these traps, managing to be a film about children and politics that is both emotively forceful and unsentimental. It succeeds in speaking to a traumatic past because it approaches that past not with the fervid alacrity of youth, but with the melancholic nuance of middle age. It befits, in other words, the stage in the life of its nation at which it was made. Yet as Wood emphasized in his talk, he is wary of the prospect that only serious films, dramas that self-consciously address the national drama, be the measure of a national cinema. A healthy film industry, as he put it, needs all kinds of films films about Martian invasions and teenage comedies, as well as the kind of dramas I like to make. In Latin America today, confronting the Hollywood juggernaut is not commonly approached as a problem of building a new aesthetic; it is more often seen as problem of simply building the means for filmmakers to make the movies they want to make, to tell the stories they want to tell and to have those stories be heard at home and abroad. Some of these stories will engage explicitly national themes; many others will not. But whatever their subject-matter, the best films, as ever, will succeed not because of their topic but because of their approach: their use of image, character and tone, their ability to engage universal themes through local detail. The true maturity of any national cinema must lie in the freedom it affords its exponents to make their art as they will: to explore the limits and capabilities of the medium itself, to tell stories that gain their power not from their status as national allegories but from their virtues as art. In Wood s estimation, his homeland, after many difficult years, is getting there. Let us hope so. If Chile and the larger region to which it belongs continues to produce films of the quality of Machuca and filmmakers of the unmistakable gifts of Andrés Wood, so much the better for us all. Chilean director Andrés Wood spoke at CLAS on March 14. Joshua Jelly-Schapiro is a graduate student in the Department of Geography at UC Berkeley.

31 Mexico s Generics Revolution By Cori Hayden Photo by Getty Images. Generic Drugs and a Política Pública In 1997 and 1998, following several years of economic crisis, medication shortages and spiraling drug costs, Mexican government agencies, health activists and companies joined forces to actively promote the domestic manufacture and sale of generics copied and cheaper versions of patented, brand-name drugs well beyond the Social Security medical system. It would seem at first glance that in Mexico, as in Brazil and elsewhere, the emergence of an increasingly vigorous generics market is part of a broad resurgence of a política pública (public politics) as a challenge to globalized intellectual property regimes. For international health activists in organizations such as Medecins Sans Frontiers and for a wide range of public health officials in Latin America and beyond, setting drugs in circulation beyond the confines (and high prices) of patents has become the key to improving access to medicines. Most visibly, perhaps, Brazil s much-vaunted measures to offer universal, free access to HIV drugs has meant threatening to override patents on antiretrovirals unless the transnational labs lower their prices, while also looking to domestic and Indian companies, primarily, for cheaper generic alternatives. Such measures are potentially sanctioned by the World Trade Organization, whose members passed an exemption in 2001 in the Doha Declaration, which grants nations the right to circumvent still-valid patents in the case of public health emergencies in a process known as compulsory licensing. Even the World Bank has issued calls over the last several A man dressed as Victor González Torres, also known as Dr. Simi, dances at the entrance of a Mexico City pharmacy. 31

32 Mexico s Generics Revolution continued from previous page 32 years to develop local (i.e., national) generic manufacturing capacities in the developing world as a route to addressing health inequities. Generics the right and capacity to produce them, as well as the right to buy them are crucial to a growing number of efforts to reorganize what anthropologist Joao Biehl calls the international pharmaceutical contract. The generic promises so much precisely because of its public-ness : its nonproperty status, its seemingly natural alignment with a politics of public health. But as events in Mexico suggest, such alignments are not the least bit predictable or self-evident. To the contrary, the struggle over generics has unleashed contradictory processes through which competing notions of a Mexican pharmaceutical public good are currently taking shape. An Embattled Marketplace In stark contrast to Brazil, where the state has led efforts to grant access to still-patented AIDS/HIV drugs, the generics question in Mexico has played out in different terms altogether. The effort here has focused not on HIV/AIDS but rather on introducing to a broad consuming public an affordable, legally copied pharmacoepia of antibiotics, analgesics, digestive aids, antiparasiticals and hundreds of other medications whose patents have already expired. It is a somewhat prosaic biochemical diet, to be sure, but one with extraordinary market reach: Mexico has recently become Latin America s leading pharmaceutical market, with total estimated sales in 2003 at $8.2 billion. From the 1950s until very recently, generic drugs were largely manufactured for and distributed by the Instituto Mexicano de Seguro Social (IMSS) and its sibling institutions in the public sector, while private pharmacies sold almost exclusively patented medications. In the late 1990s, 90 percent of the value of the Mexican pharmaceutical market was generated by the sale of brand-name medicines in the private sector. In 1997, following several years of supply problems within IMSS and dramatic increases in the cost of patented drugs on sale in most pharmacies, the Secretary of Health made a decision to encourage a move to generics more broadly. A reform in the Mexican health law, taking effect January 1, 1998, required doctors working in the public sector to prescribe the active substance of a drug and not simply a brand name, a move one Mexican pharmacoeconomist described as the first step to breaking monopolies. Thus doctors can no longer simply prescribe Claritin ; they must prescribe Loradatine, the active substance on which Claritin is based, and if the doctor in question so chooses, also the brand name of the patented original. Accompanying this move have been several legislative and regulatory decisions to define a generic drug and to set the parameters for registering and testing drugs under the new definitions. But of course another necessary element to reconfiguring the domestic pharmaceutical market is supply. Here ready to step into the opening provided by the Secretary of Health was Victor González Torres, who is, among other things, brother of the founder of the Green Party (PVEM) in Mexico and great grandson of the founder of Laboratorios Best, a company established in the 1950s to manufacture generics for sale to IMSS and other public sector health institutions. In 1997, just as the Secretary of Health (SSA) was announcing its change in prescription laws, González Torres announced the opening of the first branch of his new pharmacy chain, Farmacias Similares. The chain would distribute only copied drugs, either made in-house by Laboratorios Best or purchased from other generics companies. Farmacias Similares set forth with the rather bold motto, the same but cheaper! (lo mismo pero más barato!), fused with a nationalist and arguably populist claim to defend the health of those who have the least and a pointed critique of the transnationals which ostensibly had the health of the pueblo mexicano in their hands. The arrival of Similares and the

33 Photo by Getty Images. simultaneous regulatory shifts set off an explosive battle pitting the Secretary of Health and Dr. Simi /Victor González Torres against the transnational pharmaceutical industry and its domestic trade organization. Despite industry efforts to challenge the legitimacy of Mexican generics in general and Similares in particular, the introduction of a market for generics has had concrete effects. In the year 2000, pharmaceutical prices actually dropped for the first time in many years, due, industry analysts note, to the presence of viable, cheaper alternatives. But the tale a fight between transnational interests and those defending the national public interest does not end here. A Privatized Nationalization? While the Secretary of Health and Similares presented a relatively aligned front in 1997, these two defenders of the pharmaceutical public interest are now at war. The Secretary of Health must now issue public statements defending itself not against transnational companies but against the attacks of Victor González Torres whose civil association, the National Movement against Corruption (MNA), has launched an all-out attack on corruption in IMSS pharmaceutical purchasing practices. Refusing, as of May 2003, to sell Laboratorios Best products to the public sector, González Torres dramatically offered to sell at a further 25 percent discount any medicine that patients were prescribed by IMSS but could not get their hands on in the still understocked public sector pharmacies. But price wars with the public sector are merely the tip of the iceberg. González Torres is the head of a wide-ranging movement, simultaneously political, nonprofit and highly profitable, which is much more than a pharmacy chain. In many ways, his enterprise seems to be setting itself up as a direct competitor to the state, at least where health care and social assistance are concerned. A crucial aspect of González Torres s pharmaceutical revolution has been the establishment of health clinics adjacent to the Farmacias Similares storefronts. The clinics funded by Foundation Best, a nonprofit association established by González Torres are staffed largely by recently graduated doctors and located primarily in poor neighborhoods. They offer medical attention usually accompanied by prescriptions for Victor González Torres and Rigoberta Menchú visit a Clínica Simi for pregnant women in Chiapas. 33

34 Mexico s Generics Revolution continued from previous page 34 Similares products for a stunningly cheap 20 pesos ($2) to well over 1.5 million patients a year. These clinics now offer discounted diagnostic tests; the Foundation also runs call-in lines for advice on medications and mental health. In 2003, Foundation Best took the next logical step one that had its counterpart with the Federal government s new Seguro Popular created for those not covered by IMSS pioneering its own health plan, the Sistema Similar de Seguros. Patients pay pesos a month for the plan, also known as el Simi Seguro, and receive free medical treatment and half-price medicines. And while the Simi Seguro is now rumored to be suspended, the catalogue of goods and services offered by this hydra-like organization continues to proliferate. Indeed, these services are not limited to the provision of health care. Most importantly, Fundación Best offers a wide range of public and social-assistance programs to some of Mexico s most indigent citizens. Taking a cue from the time-honored tactics of the once-ruling party, the PRI, Dr. Simi has presided over the transfer of mountains of beans, rice, clothing, housing and other much-needed goods to the poor, the indigenous, the alcoholic, the orphaned and the disabled. The Foundation and Dr. Simi now hand out free rice at fiestas populares that they host on Sundays in city squares from Mexico City to Oaxaca and beyond. It may not be a surprise, given all of this, that González Torres attempted to run for president in the 2006 elections, first as an independent and then as the representative of the Social Democratic and Campesino Alternative Party (PASC). The party split over his candidacy, and he was ultimately forced to withdraw. However, his political setbacks have not stopped him from exporting the Similares business model throughout Latin America. What might we make of this? The Similares project has tapped into but also radically transformed a kind of pharmaceutical politics that has an illustrious history in Mexico. In the mid-1970s, President Luís Echeverría made pharmaceutical self-sufficiency the pillar of his efforts to shore up a fracturing national body politic. Where Echeverría s efforts saw the state as the main engine of this effort to reinvigorate the Mexican pharmaceutical sector, González Torres own brand of pharmaceutical nationalism calls on the private sector, a growing web of civil society organizations of his own making and citizens remade as consumers to do this work. As we might glean from his selfdescription I m Che Guevara in a Mercedes! González Torres movement is indisputably a businessman s revolution. In Mexico, generics or at least Similares are far from a straightforward challenge to neoliberal trade regimes. Instead, they seem to be part of an ongoing privatization of health care, in which the burden of medication costs shifts ever further towards individual consumers and particularly the poor (what business models now call the bottom of the pyramid ). The implications are not at all clear. As many of his critics grudgingly acknowledge, Dr. Simi is undeniably doing something important: speaking directly to those excluded from the care provided by costly private clinics as well as from the machinery of IMSS and the rest of the social security system. In the generics/simi wars we see a powerful battle afoot not just or even primarily between transnational (private) and national (public) interests, but simultaneously between the state and an increasingly powerful populist consumerism. With Echeverría s 1970s Mexico and post-1996 Brazil in mind, we should not be surprised that core questions about entitlements, the market and the state should be waged through the politics of the pharmaceutical. But as Victor González Torres shows us all too vividly, we would do well not to assume too much about the shape that this politics of the copy might take. Cori Hayden is Assistant Professor of Anthropology at UC Berkeley. She spoke at CLAS on October 24, 2005.

35 Killer Cola? By Tovin Lapan Photo by Tovin Lapan. On July 26, 2005 I landed in Bogotá, Colombia with fellow journalist Robert Harris. We were there to investigate the violent repression of a bottlers union working with Coca-Cola. For over a decade union organizers and their families had been assassinated, imprisoned, threatened and psychologically tortured. Despite the fact that the workers were employed by one of the largest companies in the world one born and based in Atlanta, Georgia Americans had just started taking notice. A lawsuit against Coca-Cola and its bottlers was filed in a Miami federal court in 2001 under the Alien Tort Claims Act, which allows plaintiffs to sue a U.S. company in America for actions abroad. Lawyers from the International Labor Rights Fund took up the case and, with the assistance of the United Steelworkers, nonprofit groups and college activists, word began to spread of the allegations against Coca-Cola in Colombia. Leaders from the bottler s union, the National Syndicate of Food Industry Workers, (SINATRAINAL), accused the bottling plants and Coca-Cola management of complicity with paramilitary groups suspected of perpetrating violence against them. Activist groups leading the international campaign against Coca-Cola played a key role in the company losing contracts at university campuses in the United States, Canada and Ireland. After a 2004 delegation from New York led by city councilman Hiram Monserrate returned from a fact-finding trip to Colombia convinced that Coca-Cola, at the very least, was negligent in its behavior, if not complicit in the violence, the campaign grew stronger. Coca-Cola responded to the accusations with internal investigations that found little. They pointed out that Colombia is a notoriously dangerous country dogged by a decades-long civil war and that violence against union organizers is rampant nationwide. In 2002, of A worker at the Carepa bottling plant inspects soda bottles. 35

36 Killer Cola? continued from previous page United States its was clear to us that it would be near impossible to decipher what was really happening at the bottling plants in Colombia without investigating for ourselves, something few journalists had done. We soon found that the situation was much more cloudy and complex then we could have ever imagined. Bucaramanga The first stop on our trip was Bucaramanga, an industrial town in the hills of northeast Colombia. The local union had gone from 350 members working at Coke to just 35 since The first morning Efrain Guerrero, president of the local chapter of SINATRAINAL, met us in our hotel lobby, a green canvas bag with a silver revolver slung over his shoulder. In November 2004 he had received a letter that read in part: We inform you that we have made a military judgment to force you from the areas of your influence or to kill you.we will show no mercy to those trade unionists who have initiated legal proceedings against government or private company officials. Efraín Guerrero, president of SINATRAINAL s Bucaramanga chapter, displays a death threat he received from the paramilitary group AUC. 36 Photo by Tovin Lapan. the 213 union leaders murdered worldwide, 184 died in Colombia. In less than a decade union membership in Colombia has dropped from 12 percent of the workforce to just 3.5 percent. As workers have become too intimidated to join unions, more and more temporary workers have been hired. Coca-Cola claimed that it does everything it can to protect its workers and its management was in no way involved in the murders and threats. Additionally, Coke noted, their bottling partners are independent companies for which they are not responsible. After interviewing everyone we could in the Guerrero s brother and sister-in-law had been shot and killed earlier in the year by suspected members of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), the largest and most powerful paramilitary group in Colombia. Less than 10 percent of murder cases in Colombia ever see a conviction, so Guerrero does not expect to see the murderers of his family brought to justice. We later met three union members who were arrested and imprisoned for six months after being accused of planting a bomb in the Bucaramanga plant and working with leftist guerillas. Alvaro González broke into tears as he recounted his time in jail. His wife lost her job for being the wife of a terrorist. As the family started to run out of money she had to sell her jewelry and other possessions to care for their four children. Finally, after six months, a Colombian court found no evidence that a bomb ever existed; all four were declared not

37 guilty. The workers had no option but to return to their jobs at the plant where they had been accused of being terrorists. No one else would hire them. Most of the Coca-Cola bottling plants in Colombia, including the one in Bucaramanga, are owned by Coca-Cola/Femsa, the company s second largest bottler. Coca-Cola actually owns 39 percent of the company, which operates in much of Latin America and is based in Mexico. Femsa refused to give us an interview, stating that the ongoing lawsuit in the U.S. prevented them from talking to reporters about union accusations. At dusk one morning we waited outside the plant to speak to nonunion workers. One truck driver told us that he worked from 6 a.m. to 10 p.m. every weekday and a half-day on Saturday but barely made enough to care for his family of four. The union is good, but I won t join the union, he added. If I join the union I d soon be out of a job. As we walked down the driveway I saw a line of men sitting on the wall, hanging their heads silently. One man told me that when he showed up in the morning security would not allow him into the plant. He had lost his job, with no explanation, no warning and no contract. Barrancabermeja Barrancabermeja lies two hours west of Bucaramanga in the Magdalena de Medio valley. SINATRAINAL leader Juan Carlos Galvis was our guide to this hot, humid town, the birthplace of Colombia s paramilitary forces. He showed us around in a bulletproof SUV piloted by armed guards. Galvis was ambushed two years ago; he survived the midday public attack, but the assassins killed a young boy in the drive-by. The security agency for the government, DAS, provides vehicles, cell phones and armed guards for union leaders, politicians and other Colombians deemed to be threatened by paramilitaries, guerillas, narcotraffickers or other groups. Like Guerrero, Galvis carries his own handgun for protection. Our SUVs rumbled down the broken streets of Barrancabermeja s paramilitary-controlled neighborhood to a low, muddy river where paramilitaries bring their victims to torture or execute. The bodies are then dumped in the river. Access to the neighborhood was made difficult by the maze of streets blocked in places by piles of rocks and rubble. The rough terrain gives the paramilitaries the upper hand during raids by authorities: they are able to navigate the perilous streets and escape through the thick grass and trees surrounding the town. In Barrancabermeja the number of union members has dropped from 100 in 1992 to 22 today. Violence against the families of union leaders is common here as well. Despite that fact, most of the relatives of the union leaders we talked to never expressed any desire to run away or to ask their loved one to give up labororganizing. They feared for the lives of their family members but refused to be dissuaded from what they saw as a necessary struggle. To give up would be to let the paramilitaries win and to fail at what they had struggled for most of their lives. At our next stop, the paramilitaries seemed to be winning. Carepa Near the Panama border, just east of the Uraba Bay, is the small Coca-Cola bottling plant in Carepa, owned by Bebidas y Alimentos de Uraba, the only non-femsa bottler we visited. In the mid-1990s the AUC and the leftist guerillas of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Popular Liberation Army (EPL) fought for control of this important banana growing and port region. During this violent period, five SINATRAINAL workers were killed. Among them was local union president Isidro Segundo Gil who was brutally gunned down just inside the bottling plant fence in December of After the attack, according to the workers we spoke to, an armed group came to the plant and gave them the option to sign letters renouncing their membership in the union or be killed. They signed. SINATRAINAL was forced to leave the region, and the union has never returned. The Carepa plant was the only one to give us access. Inside we spoke to the leaders of the new union, SICO. SINATRAINAL, one of the more radical unions serving the Colombian bottling 37

38 Killer Cola? continued from previous page A Coca-Cola sign marks the city limit of Carepa, an area where some of the worst anti-union violence has occurred. 38 and food industry, view less aggressive unions, such as SICO, as company unions. However, SICO, too, has an antagonistic relationship with the bottler. One of the chief complaints at all of the plants is the hiring of temporary workers who do not receive benefits or contracts. In 2004, SICO was days away from calling a strike over this issue when the powerful local banana workers union, SINTRAINAGRO, stepped in to support SICO and got the Carepa management back to the bargaining table. The Miami lawsuit claims that management let paramilitaries inside the plant to threaten workers. Upon entering, we saw how difficult it would be to prove this claim. In stark contrast to the Bucaramanga plant, which had high walls rimmed with razor wire and security cameras constantly scanning the perimeter, in Carepa there was only a low fence surrounding the plant and little security. The paramilitaries could have been let in, or they could easily have scaled the fence on their own. While ownership of the Carepa plant hasn t changed since the period of violence, the management accused of working with the AUC has been replaced. The new manager, Silvia Rodriguez, told us the workers have health insurance and other benefits and that the company helps the community by sponsoring soccer teams and providing water for bicycle races and other activities. Carepa mayor William Ortiz, a former president of SINTRAINAGRO, also claimed that the plant was a positive force in the community, providing work and reinvesting in the region. Bogotá Back in Bogotá the story became even more complicated. We met with SINATRAINAL vice president Edgar Paez who vehemently denied any connection between the union and leftist guerillas, claiming that it is a lie used to dismiss attacks against union leaders as part of the civil war. However, in Carepa, the EPL was strongly tied to the local banana unions. Current SINTRAINAGRO president Osvaldo Cuadrado admitted in an interview that during the 1990s he would work in the city as a union leader five days a week then venture into the hills on Photo by Tovin Lapan.

39 weekends to fight with his comrades in the EPL, so it is not unheard of for union members to be linked to guerilla activity. Coca-Cola Colombia s public relations director Pablo Largacha also met with us to share the company s viewpoint. Largacha claimed that the company works hard to be a positive and beneficial member of the Colombian community and to protect its workers. While workers who feel threatened await assistance from the government, the company provides security. They offer cell phones, shift changes and loans to relocate. Coca-Cola has also started a foundation to help Colombian children who have lost family due to the civil war. He also strongly denied any connection to the paramilitaries or complicity in the violence against workers. Largacha pointed out that at the national level only 4 percent of workers are unionized while Coca-Cola s workforce is 34 percent unionized. We also met with the president of SINALTRAINBEC, another union that works with Coca-Cola. Behind the bulletproof windows of his office Carlos Alfonso Ortiz said he won t back any accusations against Coke until he has concrete proof of its cooperation in the violence. Members of his union have been killed and threatened, but he still sees no connection between the company and the AUC. Ortiz even traveled to Delaware for the Coca-Cola shareholders meeting to defend the company s reputation. Sandwiched between lines of activists who had come to denounce the multinational corporation, Ortiz implored the crowd to wait until all the facts were in to decide. Since the majority of the violence took place several years ago and little legal progress has been made due to the chaotic and corrupt Colombian justice system, it is unlikely any smoking gun will be found. One thing for certain is that SINATRAINAL has been decimated by the constant threats and attacks on its membership, and little is being done to stop the bloodshed. Few people will join the union when they see that the price paid for extra benefits and job security is constant fear. Workers remain on edge waiting for the next assassination or kidnapping attempt. Tovin Lapan is a graduate student in the School of Journalism at UC Berkeley. He was the recipient of a 2005 Tinker Grant from CLAS which funded his travel to Colombia. Luís Eduardo García was imprisoned for six months after being falsely accused of terrorism. During that time his daughter had to drop out of school. Photo by Tovin Lapan. 39

40 Overlapping Societies U.S. Mexico Futures Forum 40 continued from page 1 from both countries. The 25 participants this year ranged from the chief financial officer of one of the largest firms in Mexico to a vice president of the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) in the United States and included members of Congress from both countries, the former mayor of Mexico City and faculty members from both the Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) and the University of California, Berkeley. Five themes defined the event: immigration, energy, China, violence and the upcoming Mexican elections in July. The notion was to discuss issues that were at the top of the political agenda today providing fresh ideas and a binational perspective and to raise issues that could define the political agenda tomorrow. As in previous years, the Forum was organized and co-chaired by Professor Rafael Fernández de Castro from ITAM and Professor Harley Shaiken, Chair of the Center for Latin American Studies (CLAS) at Berkeley. The event was preceded by a year-long research agenda and public program on both campuses that set the stage for the discussions. The goal was not to achieve consensus too many sharply divergent perspectives made that unlikely but rather to generate innovative insights on those issues that are central to both countries. The Mexican Elections Clearly the July 2006 Mexican presidential election will define the U.S. Mexico relationship. Mentor Tijerina, the Director General of Publicum Estragias, a political consultancy firm based in Mexico, opened the discussion, explaining that the contest represented a referendum on both democracy and economic issues. Electing Roberto Madrazo, the candidate of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) would essentially represent a return to the past, as Madrazo is closely associated with the traditional style of politics in Mexico with all that this implies, including corruption. Madrazo is trying to present himself as the candidate who will get things done, thus implying that the Vicente Fox administration is weak on accomplishment. The left-wing candidate of the Partido Revolucionario Democrático (PRD), former mayor of Mexico City and longtime frontrunner Andrés Manuel López Obrador, is focusing on economic issues and vows to put the interests of the poor first. Meanwhile, Felipe Calderón, the candidate of the currently governing right of center Partido de Acción Nacional (PAN), is presenting himself as the honest candidate who is not tainted by corruption scandals. At present the polls are tightening in the three way race although much could happen before election day. Tijerina maintained that the electorate s most pressing concerns are economic: unemployment, poverty and the high cost of living among others. He considered that López Obrador, whose campaign is focusing on these issues, therefore has the best chance of success, although he also observed that the outcome will ultimately depend on the level of electoral participation. López Obrador currently enjoys a high level of support among independent voters, who cannot be relied upon to turn out and vote. In his view, Madrazo has the strongest negative perception among the electorate, which raises the important question of whether former PRI voters would swing to the right or to the left. Since the Forum, Calderón has overcome early name recognition problems with an aggressive ad campaign that links López Obrador with Venezuela s Hugo Chávez and

41 U.S. Mexico Futures Forum Photo by Emily Earhart. implies that a PRD victory will lead to economic instability. Calderón has jumped into the lead in many polls, including the Reforma poll. David Ayón, Senior Research Associate at Loyola Marymount University, discussed the potential impact of the vote cast by Mexicans living outside the country. Last year, the Fox government approved the voto postal, a law that allows Mexicans living abroad to vote. However, the bureaucratic procedures required to register are so complicated that few Mexicans will actually be able to exercise this right. Thus, it can be assumed that the postal vote will have a minimal impact on the outcome of the election. Rafael Fernández de Castro added that Mexican immigrants are acting as members of other diasporas have acted in the past. Mexicans come here [to the U.S.] to stay and integrate, he maintained. Whoever is ultimately elected in Mexico will likely have to govern without a majority in Congress. This obstructs the political agenda of any government, as President Fox found during his term in office. So while the competitiveness of this election shows that Mexico is deepening its democracy, it is also clear that progress is unlikely to be as smooth as most Mexicans would hope. Immigration Immigration remains the most pressing concern for both countries. U.S. citizens share their daily lives with Mexicans across an ever-widening geographic area, while Mexicans benefit from billions of dollars in remittances, which constitute that country s second most important source of foreign currency. As the late Adolfo Aguilar Zinser, Mexico s former ambassador to the United Nations, put it so aptly: Mexico is in the U.S., and this has tremendous implications Diputado Adriana González Carrillo speaks while Rep. Linda Sánchez, State Senator Gil Cedillo and Dip. José Alberto Aguilar listen intently. 41

42 Overlapping Societies U.S. Mexico Futures Forum continued from previous page Photo by Emily Earhart. Eliseo Medina, Executive Vice President of the SEIU, speaks at the Futures Forum. 42 for the future of migration. It s not a question of labor markets anymore; it s a question of two societies that are overlapping. The Forum grappled with immigration in two sessions and the theme ran through many other discussions. The issue of immigration has also continued to generate heated debate among U.S. policy makers. In March, the Senate Judiciary Committee approved a legislative proposal which included earned legalization for most undocumented immigrants, but this compromise imploded on procedural issues prior to the Easter recess. The Senate will likely return to this contentious issue sometime in May. Whatever the outcome, reconciling the Senate and House bills could prove difficult particularly with U.S. midterm elections looming in November. At the Forum, Tamar Jacoby, a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute, argued that the U.S. can have both immigration and legality. However, this requires the recognition of the reality of immigration as a first step toward improving its regulation. She pointed out that in focus groups even hardline Republicans who start off arguing for deportation end up seeing the need for an accommodation of those workers who are already here when confronted by the practical question of how any form of massive deportation would be handled and how the legislation would be enforced. Jacoby also observed that the issue of immigration was becoming a politically more important concern for the U.S. electorate. Meanwhile, in Mexico, the problems relating to immigration are easily blamed on the U.S. The Mexican government has avoided the issue, partly in order to avoid being perceived as cooperating with the U.S., but largely because it simply has not defined a coherent policy with regard to the matter. That said,

43 U.S. Mexico Futures Forum Juan José García Ochoa, a member of Congress in Mexico from the PRD, maintained that the Mexican government has failed to adequately communicate what it does do to control illegal immigration. Eliseo Medina, a vice president of the SEIU, emphasized the importance of a comprehensive approach to immigration and the necessity of a coalition that could pass more progressive legislation. His union has endorsed the notion of a guest worker program as embodied in the McCain Kennedy proposal in the Senate. The bottom line is that roughly 1.4 million Mexicans enter the labor market every year. In order to absorb this additional workforce, Mexico would have to maintain 10 percent annual growth. However, even in a good year (e.g. 5 percent growth), Mexico generates only half a million new jobs. It is obvious that the surplus labor force has to do something. So as long as employers north of the border provide this surplus labor force with jobs, it is unrealistic to expect that the flow of immigration can be stemmed. An important dimension of the discussion was the dialogue between representatives of the U.S. and Mexico. Issues of sovereignty and perception at times generated a few sparks. However, at the end of the day participants from both countries gained a far more nuanced understanding of the political complexities and varied positions involved in the debate. The China Effect In a fascinating yet deeply disconcerting presentation on China s development process and its impact on the global economy, Clyde Prestowitz, the President of the Economic Strategy Institute and author of Three Billion New Capitalists, pointed out the need for the U.S. and Mexico to account for the China factor in their economic development strategies. In Mexico s case, he explained, 90 percent of the country s total exports and 96 percent of its non-oil exports are sent to the U.S., which means that Mexico has not focused on developing relationships with other partners in the global economy. This problem is compounded by increasing competition from China. Currently, the only Mexican exports not losing ground in the U.S. market are large trucks, as it is too expensive to ship them long distances. Prestowitz also warned Former Chinese President Jiang Zemin greets Vicente Fox at a 2001 APEC meeting convened to discuss terrorism and trade. 43 Photo by Getty Images.

44 Overlapping Societies U.S. Mexico Futures Forum continued from previous page Photo by Meg Stalcup. Clyde Prestowitz speaks with David Bonior at the 2006 session of the U.S. Mexico Futures Forum. 44 that the Mexican government is too dependent on revenues from the state-owned oil company, Pemex, which is not in good economic shape. He thus argued that Mexico s economy was not only wholly dependent on the U.S. but also built on shaky financial foundations. As for the U.S., the main risk that Prestowitz noted is the country s fiscal situation. Currently, the U.S. deficit is being financed almost entirely by two countries: Japan and China. He predicted that interest rates would have to continue to rise in order to attract the capital inflows necessary to maintain this situation. Prestowitz argued that not only has China emerged as a manufacturing superpower but that it is evolving into a major presence as a knowledge-producing economy. The Beijing area alone produces 70,000 university graduates in science and engineering annually, providing a powerful lure for research and development investment both domestically and internationally. Álvaro Rodríguez, Chief Financial Officer of Vitro, a leading producer of glass, argued that a lack of innovation and long-term vision has hobbled Mexican economic growth in contrast to China s trajectory. Renewable Sources of Fuel Another important issue that faces both Mexico and the U.S. in equal measure is how to generate energy from renewable and sustainable fuel sources. David Shields, a columnist for Reforma and the editor of Energía a Debate, argued that there were four compelling reasons for switching to alternative sources of fuel: the

45 U.S. Mexico Futures Forum first being global warming (an issue to which the U.S. government gives little credence); the second national security (as terrorists could target key fuel infrastructure); the third the depletion of oil reserves; and the fourth the geographic separation of fossil fuel consumers and producers. Shields pointed out that Mexico s position with regard to traditional energy sources is particularly precarious as Cantarell, its major oilfield, is likely to collapse within three years. This would not only put a significant dent in the government s budget roughly 30 percent of which is derived from Pemex but would also lead to a collapse in export revenues derived from energy trade to the U.S. Shields concluded by saying that international cooperation on energy matters should be more focused on producing sustainable energy sources and a safer future rather than simply on the mechanics of buying and selling fuels. Dan Kammen, a professor of energy at UC Berkeley, countered that Mexico was well positioned to become a leading exporter of energy to the U.S., mainly due to its geographic location. Kammen argued that California acts as a driver for energy policy elsewhere in the U.S., and that this affects Mexico, too. California s new legislation is both increasing the proportion of electricity that has to be produced from renewable fuels and reducing the maximum limits for greenhouse emissions. This opens up important opportunities for alternative fuel sources across the board. Mexico is uniquely positioned as an ideal source of solar, wind, tidal and wave-produced Offshore oil rigs in the Cantarell area of Campeche Bay. 45 Photo by Armando Salgado Fernández.

46 Overlapping Societies U.S. Mexico Futures Forum continued from previous page Photo by AP Wide World. A Mexican soldier poses in a field of opium poppies to publicize the government s antidrug efforts. 46 energy given its proximity to California s market. Kammen also emphasized that the economics of traditional fuels are changing rapidly as oil prices head towards the $100 per barrel mark. He pointed out that there are more oil reserves in Alberta, Canada than in Saudi Arabia. While this oil is more expensive and more polluting to extract, this option is becoming increasingly attractive given oil prices. The same goes for additional untapped sources in Venezuela and the Arctic. In an ironic aside, he remarked that global warming itself facilitates the exploration of artic oilfields by reducing logistical barriers, a fact that oil companies are already considering in their strategies in spite of the U.S. government s denial that global warming is taking place. As for Mexico, its development strategy should further consider the possibilities of the production of ethanol, especially from cellulosic sources, as the demand for this fuel in the U.S. is likely to increase significantly in line with California s progressive energy policy. Crime, Justice and Security The Mexican crime rate and its impact on the U.S. Mexico relationship was the final topic of discussion at the Forum. José Canela Cacho, President of the Ergo Group, a public policy consulting firm, argued that

47 U.S. Mexico Futures Forum Photo by Meg Stalcup. Mexico has as much of a crime problem as it has a problem with enforcing laws and justice. Crime statistics, however, have to be viewed with a degree of caution. While overall crime rates are decreasing, the crimes may be becoming more serious. It is also not clear to what extent crimes are actually reported. Nevertheless, Canela maintained that crime peaked during the 1980s and 90s. Since then, all measures have shown a significant drop in the Mexican crime rate, which he attributed to increased spending on public security and reforms of the judiciary. However, narcotrafficking continues to be an area of concern and a sticking point in U.S. Mexico relations. Drug money breeds institutional corruption and violence, hinders effective law enforcement and distorts the priorities of public security policies. Canela pointed out that a lot more is being spent on federal crimes (which include homicide and drug offenses), than on state crimes (e.g. robberies and assaults), of which there is a much higher incidence. The former constitute only 6 percent of total crimes, but 25 percent of incarcerations. He concluded by arguing that the problems generated by drug trafficking cannot be resolved without significantly reducing the demand for drugs. Concluding Remarks The discussions at the Forum ranged over a sometimes intense two days. The binational character of the meetings proved especially valuable for generating new insights and understanding different perspectives. On immigration, a key issue was the proper role of political leaders from each country on a Rep. Loretta Sánchez speaks at the U.S. Mexico Futures Forum, as Dip. Juan José García Ochoa looks on. 47

48 Overlapping Societies U.S. Mexico Futures Forum Participants in the 2006 San Francisco Bay Area U.S. Mexico Futures Forum. continued from previous page contentious issue that impacts both nations. Some U.S. leaders argued that sovereignty dictated that U.S. immigration policy be exclusively a U.S. concern; others countered that while this might be true in a formal sense, close cooperation between Mexico and the U.S. would be necessary to address the issues raised by immigration. On issues related to China, energy and violence, the sense of many participants was that innovative ideas could make a significant difference, particularly a comprehensive strategy for increasing the competitiveness of North America in the global economy, a greater emphasis on the diffusion and use of alternative energy and stronger binational cooperation on issues related to drugs and violence. The Forum once again demonstrated the value of divergent opinions in a common network. Kirsten Sehnbruch is a visiting scholar at the Center for Latin American Studies. Harley Shaiken is Professor of Geography and Education and Chair of the Center for Latin American Studies at UC Berkeley. Photo by Meg Stalcup. 48

49 U.S. Mexico Futures Forum Participants MEXICO José Alberto Aguilar Federal Deputy (PRI) Gustavo Alanís President, Mexican Environmental Law Center (CEMDA) Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas Former Head of Government, Federal District Juan José García Ochoa Federal Deputy (PRD) Rolando García Alonso Director of International Affairs, PAN Adriana González Carrillo Federal Deputy (PAN) Carlos Heredia Senior Advisor to Governor Lázaro Cárdenas Ricardo Obert Chief Executive Officer, Productos Químicos Mardupol Álvaro Rodríguez Chief Financial Officer,Vitro S.A. de C.V. Raúl Rodríguez Chair, Board of Advisors, North American Center for Transborder Studies, Arizona State University Cecilia Romero Castillo Senator (PAN) Miguel Székely Pardo Undersecretary for Budget, Planning and Evaluation, Ministry of Social Development Rafael Fernández de Castro Chair, Department of International Studies, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México UNITED STATES David Bonior Professor,Wayne State University; Member of Congress ( ), Democratic Whip ( ) Gilbert Cedillo State Senator, California Lydia Chávez Professor of Journalism, UC Berkeley Maria Echaveste Lecturer, Boalt Hall School of Law; Deputy Chief of Staff to President Clinton Kevin Gallagher Researcher, Global Development and Environment Institute,Tufts University Pete Gallego State Assembly,Texas; Chair of the Mexican-American Legislative Caucus Eliseo Medina Executive Vice President, Service Employees International Union Clyde Prestowitz President, Economic Strategy Institute Linda Sánchez Member of Congress, California Loretta Sánchez Member of Congress, California Alex Saragoza Professor of Ethnic Studies, UC Berkeley Stephen M. Silberstein Co-Founder and First President, Innovative Interfaces Inc. Harley Shaiken Class of 1930 Professor and Chair, Center for Latin American Studies; Professor of Education and Geography, UC Berkeley Photo by Meg Stalcup. 49

50 U.S. Mexico Futures Forum Cárdenas at Cal relevantly, laborers who make up the migratory flow to this country, one of the most important migratory flows in the world. Labor migration has been the most serious and complex human problem shared by our nations, which can be clearly seen by considering the important decisions and discussions that have taken place during the last months on both sides of the border, by people and institutions fundamental in the lives of our nations. 50 Photo by Dionicia Ramos. Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas on the UC Berkeley campus. The following are excerpts from a talk given by Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas at UC Berkeley on March 2, Mexico and the United States share a 2,000-mile border, relations of great diversity and, above all, a lasting friendship, even if it hasn t always been easy and comfortable to be the neighbor of the nation with the world s most powerful military and economy. During this long and complex relationship, the sentiments and goals of the majority of our people have generally coincided, although this has not necessarily been true with regard to our respective governments. The most valuable relationship and the most valuable exchange between our countries, is direct and human: a million Americans and Mexicans daily cross our borders. They include people who travel for business, work or pleasure; families living across the border; and, most The United States needs migrant workers. They arrive from all over the world, but as everyone knows, most of them, around half a million every year, come from Mexico. Without them, the U.S. economy and its social life would be paralyzed, a fact which the government and vast sectors of society refuse to recognize. Consequently, the labor and civil rights of immigrants and their families are not protected, and they are often abused by authorities and employers. To ease the conflicts surrounding illegal immigration, the Mexican government and Mexican society must take vigorous action so that the U.S. recognizes the indispensable contribution that immigrants the vast proportion of whom are undocumented make to this country through their work, taxes and culture. My personal view is that no real solution to the problems we share will be found in building longer or higher fences, increasing the number of Border Patrol agents or loosing the Minutemen and enabling them to act with impunity. If we really want to find effective solutions, it should be very clear that illegal immigration, border security and the fight against terrorism are not one problem, but different, separate problems. Each needs to be tackled in a different manner, through specific measures, some applied in this country, others in Mexico. Still other measures will require sharing the responsibility for decision-making and enforcement. Collaboration is indispensable if real and fair solutions to these problems are to be reached. We have to begin by facing reality, and I

51 U.S. Mexico Futures Forum would like to focus on two problems: the illegal entry of half a million Mexicans every year to this country and the presence of 8 11 million undocumented immigrants in the United States. Mexicans who leave their country and come here as illegal immigrants, would undoubtedly prefer to make their living in Mexico. Jobs have to be created for them in Mexico if we don t want them to migrate; and we don t want them to migrate. Twelve years ago NAFTA came into force. Since the time of the NAFTA negotiations, I have proposed an agreement that not only focuses on free trade between the three North American nations but also tackles development and involves all the nations in our continent. This agreement would have a much broader focus and would consider the creation and utilization of mechanisms like investment funds to reduce economic and social asymmetries and promote growth. I still believe this could be one way to a much fairer relationship among the nations of our continent as well as a way to reduce and finally stop illegal migration by offering opportunities in every country, for every country s nationals. In the meantime, there are an estimated 8 11 million illegal immigrants working and residing in this country. Does anyone sincerely believe it is possible to expel or deport millions of people? What would be necessary in terms of manpower and legislation to find and identify these immigrants, to gather them, to organize their deportation? How many buses, trains and planes would be needed to send them away? How long would it take? Who would replace them? Energy policies are another key issue in our relations. As time passes, oil is becoming scarcer and more expensive, and too little is being done, even in the most developed countries, to replace oil as the energy basis of the world economy. The United States is the most important oil consumer in the world and would like, as would any other country, to be assured of its long term supply. The U.S. has adopted highly aggressive policies commercially, technologically and politically to achieve this goal. Time and time again these policies have been imposed by force, as we saw during the Gulf War in 1991, not long ago in Afghanistan and at present in Iraq. Mexico s proven oil reserves, exploited as they are now, will last for 11 years, a terribly short time. Besides increasing exploration to find new deposits, Mexico should implement an oil policy with the priority of reducing crude oil exports to zero in the shortest possible time and switching to the export of refined products and petrochemicals. These contradictory positions and the needs of our countries must be conciliated so that a fair and beneficial solution for both parties may be found. This is, today, one of the most important challenges in our bilateral relations. North America s Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) came into force 12 years ago. Cold figures could make us think that all parties have benefited from it and that all three partners are fully satisfied. Reality is quite different. Eleven years after NAFTA, results have been good for Mexico in certain areas and bad or very bad in others. Trilateral trade has increased 117 percent, and Mexican exports have more than tripled during this period, going from $51.8 billion in 1993 to $165.4 billion in Although these figures seem to show that NAFTA has had a positive impact, the reality is that most of those exports correspond to foreign-owned maquiladoras and to the internal transactions of transnational corporations. Maquiladoras established in Mexico during this period, mainly in the border regions, represent a temporary relief to unemployment, but wages remain well below those received by American workers with equivalent jobs. Additionally, these industries have not integrated into the Mexican economy. So, in general, they haven t been a factor in creating stable and fairly paid jobs, improving living standards or rationally integrating our productive chains. It is easier to correctly appreciate Mexico s situation if we consider that in 1983, of every export dollar, 88 cents corresponded to national inputs: labor, services, raw materials, parts and components. In 1994 this figure fell to 42 cents, and today it may not reach 25. NAFTA, which erased nearly every limitation to investment, provoked a productive denationalization. This was probably the gravest effect of the indiscriminate opening of our borders, which started a little before NAFTA and accelerated after the agreement came into force. In 2000, Mexican exports reached their maximum: $166.5 billion. In 2003, total exports 51

52 52 Cárdenas at Cal continued from previous page decreased by a deceptively small 0.7 percent. However, excluding oil, the decrease totaled 2.2 percent. And if maquiladora exports are not considered, given that they are mostly internal corporate transactions, we find that Mexican exports went down 17 percent between 2000 and In agriculture, NAFTA produced both winners and losers. Cereal, bean, vegetable oil, sugar, milk and cattle producers were negatively affected while producers of vegetables, beer, tequila and fruits like mango, avocado, guava, lemon and blackberry, among others, have gained new markets. Undoubtedly, growers of basic grains corn, beans and wheat have been the most affected. Imports of these grains during the period reached 28.9 million metric tons; after NAFTA, these imports went up to 63.3 million tons, an increase of 123 percent in the period During this same period, imports of oil seeds increased 155 percent while those of sorghum and other animal foods went up 67 percent. Significantly, NAFTA is the only free trade agreement in the word that liberalized the trade of agricultural products. Mexico has subscribed to more than 10 agreements since 1994, and none of them considers the liberalization of agricultural products. The most serious social effects of the trade opening are growing poverty and the enormous increase in migration towards the United States: at least 3 million migrants have crossed the border in the past decade. The U.S. population of Mexican origin is already estimated at 25 to 27 million, and these migrants send over $20 billion annually back to Mexico as remittances. This fact is received with joy by the government which refuses to recognize it as one of the most indicative, shameful and worrisome facts of Mexico s social situation, as it shows the government s incapacity and lack of will to solve the problems of millions of Mexicans. We now face the need to revise NAFTA, according to the terms established in the agreement itself and in line with Mexican legislation (Chapter IV, Article 29 of the Foreign Trade Law), in those areas or with regard to those products in which there exists damage or risk of damage to national U.S. Mexico Futures Forum production, which can be clearly demonstrated considering the decline in agricultural production, the thousands of bankruptcies of industrial and service businesses, the decrease in the population s income, the abandoned fields and the increasing migration to the North. Considering that NAFTA is exhausted and has already given what it could, the Mexican government should propose a trilateral cooperation addendum to its two NAFTA partners which would commit the three parties to cooperating not only in trade but also in social areas, production and infrastructure. The main goal of the addendum would be the elimination of social differences and economic asymmetries as well as the creation of mechanisms like special funds for development following the European example to make these new policies into reality. Unfortunately, the Mexican government, for over a decade, hasn t done its homework. Modernization of the most important productive sectors should have started while NAFTA was being negotiated. This didn t happen and still hasn t happened. If we want to be competitive on a global scale and improve living standards, Mexico has to radically change its economic and social policies. Instead of restricting investment, conditions to attract investment have to be created. Instead of creating economic policies that favor foreign producers, the government should help Mexican producers become competitive. Instead of focusing only on exports, attention has to be given at the same time, and with the same priority, to internal markets and to increasing the spending power of Mexican consumers. Creating jobs and combating the causes of poverty not poverty but the causes of poverty should become the main goals of Mexico s development policies. In the early 90s, President Bush senior presented the Initiative of the Enterprise of the Americas as a continental project. NAFTA derives from this initiative. President Bush junior made a new proposal for our continent: the creation of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). Progressive sectors in Mexico

53 U.S. Mexico Futures Forum consider that both of these projects intend, as their real and never overtly stated aim, to subordinate Latin American economies to the U.S. economy and to consolidate U.S. political hegemony over the continent. We cannot accept unfair conditions of life to be the fate of our peoples. We have a far better, more equitable and beneficial proposal: since the time of the NAFTA negotiations, as I said before, I have proposed a continental agreement for development and trade, with a wider scope than NAFTA, with a broader scope and fairer conditions than the FTAA, not limited to trade, but rather with its principal objectives being the improvement of the population s living standards and sustained and sustainable economic growth for each and every country in our continent. This is the agreement our countries need. Our governments have to be convinced that this is the agreement we need for an equitable future. Negotiation of such an ambitious agreement will take time. The focus will need to be not only on trade, but on development, and especially on human development. Investment funds will need to be created, as in the European Union, to reduce asymmetries and erase marginalities. Environmental challenges must be faced and a social charter dealing with wages, working conditions, education, health, social security and the free transit of people and labor throughout the continent must be included. Thinking of a better future for both Mexico and the United States is necessarily thinking of the future of humanity, thinking of a future where problems are met humanely, with social responsibility and a spirit of justice. It means thinking of a new and fair world order, with confidence in our capacity to develop equitable relationships and collaborate with the different peoples of our world, our continent and, particularly, with our neighbors. Let s start to dialogue, to reason, to act, so the ties of our friendship strengthen and a future of fruitful and fair collaboration is assured for our peoples. I am confident we can do it, and we will succeed. Cuauhtémoc Cardenas, one of the founders of the Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD), was the mayor of Mexico City from and a presidential candidate. Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas greets audience members after his talk. Photo by Dionicia Ramos. 53

54 THE NEW COLOSSUS By Emma Lazarus Not like the brazen giant of Greek fame, With conquering limbs astride from land to land; Here at our sea-washed, sunset gates shall stand A mighty woman with a torch, whose flame Is the imprisoned lightning, and her name Mother of Exiles. From her beacon-hand Glows world-wide welcome; her mild eyes command The air-bridged harbor that twin cities frame. "Keep, ancient lands, your storied pomp!" cries she With silent lips. Give me your tired, your poor, Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free, The wretched refuse of your teeming shore. Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me, I lift my lamp beside the golden door! 54

55 No Soy Criminal preguntas por que? porque estoy aquí? mi voz puede decirlo. alguna razón, una explicación, yo puedo darte. Coro: la razón es sencilla, tengo hambre y sed de justicia y amor. la razón es humana, necesito paz, igualdad y libertad. es que en mi país ya no puedo vivir, un vacío es mi vida, necesito de ti. es que en mi país ya no puedo vivir, me mata la pobreza, me tengo que marchar. dame, un lugar, junto a ti, para vivir. Coro es que en tu país no quieren verme más, que soy un criminal, merezco algo más. es que en tu país yo soy un ilegal, no soy un criminal, merezco libertad. dame, un lugar, junto a ti, para vivir. I Am Not A Criminal You ask why? Why am I here? My voice can say it. A reason, An explanation, I can give you. Chorus: The reason is simple, I m hungry and thirsty For justice and love. The reason is human, I need peace, Equality and liberty. In my country I can no longer live, My life is an emptiness, I need you. In my country I can no longer live, Poverty kills me, I have to leave. Give me a place, Next to you, to live. Chorus In your country They don t want to see me anymore, They say I m a criminal, I deserve something more. In your country I am an illegal, I am not a criminal, I deserve liberty. Give me a place, Next to you, to live. Original lyrics and musical composition by two K iche migrants, born in Mexican refugee camps, who are now day laborers in San Francisco. Performed in Berkeley on April 11,

56 UC Berkeley after the rain. Photo by Tino Soriano. Please visit our Web site for analyses of all CLAS events. Center for Latin American Studies University of California, Berkeley 2334 Bowditch Street Berkeley, CA Tel: Fax: clas.berkeley.edu