Liberalization of Trade in Services: Issues Raised by LAC s Experience

Transcription

1 Liberalization of Trade in Services: Issues Raised by LAC s Experience Guillermo Perry, Daniel Lederman Office of the Chief Economist, LAC World Bank, April 2004 Outline! Main Message: liberalization of trade in services is not enough.! Issues Migration of workers and development International financial transactions Is liberalization enough for financial development? Offensive and defensive interests Capital controls and FTAs with the U.S Telecoms, development, and domestic competition Cultural, information and entertainment services Outsourcing

2 Labor migration and remittances are important for LAC some data Mexican Wages Across States: Trade, FDI, and Migration (econometric evidence from Aroca and Maloney 2003)! Real wages increased more in the 1990s in States with higher: Labor force education FDI/GDP Imports/GDP Percentage of population that migrated to the U.S.A! Out migration lower from high trade/fdi states they are substitutes for migration! Maquila wages fell less during Tequila crisis than other manufacturing wages

3 Migration and Development Further Evidence from Mexico! Households in Southern States with temporary migrants have per capita income levels substantially higher than otherwise similar households! Permanent migration also brings income gains, but of a lower magnitude! In these States of Mexico, private transfers through remittances, matter as much as public transfers for reducing poverty Wodon et. al. (2003) 50 FINANCE: Increased access of large firms to foreign financing after NAFTA. Partly an endogenous response to the problems of the domestic financial system Stock market firms: recourse to foreign financing 25 Deuda Extranjera sobre Total de Deuda Emisión de ADRs Deuda Extranjera sobre Total de Deuda Emisión de ADRs Source: Cuevas et al (2002).

4 FINANCE: For smaller/newer firms, the problem is limited domestic financing Access to foreign markets is much harder than for large firms Shallow and illiquid local markets (for equity, debt, credit) make access to domestic finance difficult and costly Private sector credit (% GDP, 2001) Stock market capitalization (% GDP, 2001) Porcentaje del PIB Porcentaje del PIB MEX ARG BRA CHL COL EAP7 IND 0 MEX ARG BRA CHL COL EAP7 IND Note: Domestic credit to private sector refers to financial resources provided to the private sector, such as through loans, purchases of nonequity securities, and trade credits and other accounts receivable, that establish a claim for repayment. For some countries these claims include credit to public enterprises. Source: World Development Indicators - World Bank. Note: Market capitalization (also known as market value) is the share price times the number of shares outstanding. Listed domestic companies are the domestically incorporated companies listed on the country's stock exchanges at the end of the year. Source: World Development Indicators - World Bank. FINANCE: NAFTA was Not Enough: Weak financial institutional framework

5 Emerging Issues in FTA Negotiations in Financial Services! FTAs with the U.S. tend to prohibit use of capital controls NAFTA s Chapter 11 in cross-border financial transactions. -The Stiglitz critique! Chile-US FTA: Annex 10-C does allow imposition of non-discriminatory controls for up to one year Chile had already wiped them out, but wanted to leave open the possibility of using them again if needed Does it permit the use of controls that require permanent institutions (e.g. the encaje )? Yes (registring continues)! Evidence on effectiveness of capital controls: Brazil: If effective, only in the short-run (Cardoso & Goldfajn 2001) Chile and Colombia: most probably affected composition but not (much) volumes Emerging Issues in FTA Negotiations in Financial Services! Foreign Presence: Same conditions as for domestic firms Importance of Risk Capital Offensive interests : trade finance, remittances, banking services for migrants! Cross-border flows: Positive lists; Symmetry of restrictions? Conflicting domestic interests.! Regulation: Money Laundering? Regulators by service? (insurance)! Negotiating Strategy: Separate, among Treasuries?

6 TELECOMS: Why the Different Performance of Mexican States? (econometric evidence 1990 s NAFTA Report)! Initial education (literacy,education level)! Infrastructure phone density! Political instability and institutions! If poor States had had the same education, and infrastructure in 1990, they would have grown more than the rich ones ( conditional convergence ) The Development Gap within Mexico: GDP per Capita by States Since ,000 40,000 Chiapas Chihuahua Guerrero Nuevo León Oaxaca Sonora Distrito Federal 35,000 GDP per Capita (1993 pesos) 30,000 25,000 20,000 15,000 10,000 5,

7 The Problem of Telecom Competition in Mexico! Sub-regional divergence: TELMEX charges higher access fees (much lower telephone density) in Chiapas than in Mexico City.! TELMEX maintains monopoly over access by service providers to fixed-line users NAFTA demanded an open domestic market Mexico lost dispute at NAFTA panels Lost WTO dispute And national anti-trust agency has fined TELMEX! NAFTA not enough to ensure domestic competition in telecoms at least not in Mexico CAFTA and Telecoms! Four of five Central American countries in CAFTA already had open telecoms! Costa Rica is the laggard Public monopoly Presents difficult political economy constraints! The CAFTA exception: Costa Rica agreed to open wireless and internet services, but not fixed lines Is this a good outcome for Costa Rica? Yes

8 Emerging Issue in LAC FTA Negotiations: Cultural Industries! A source of tensions between the U.S. and Canada since US-Canada FTA of 1988; quotas maintained & disputed under NAFTA; tensions between Mexico and US on subsidies to national films Percentage of Imported Content in Cultural Markets, Late 1990s Industry U.S. Mexico Canada Quebec TV Film Books 14 n.a Records n.a. n.a Video n.a n.a. Bold = content regulated by quotas Source: Galperin (1999) Emerging Issue in LAC FTA Negotiations: Cultural Industries! Chile-US FTA Chilean cultural industries (books, films, videos, music, radio, and TV) were exempted from liberalization Example: Chile maintains a 40% quota for foreign TV programming in networks Example: Subsidies to cultural industries also excluded! Other sensitive issues Foreign Presence ownership limitations in Press and Media Copyrights vs author rights! Can cultural industries be safeguarded from future FTA & WTO negotiations? The USTR is pushing hard Are there welfare arguments for protecting cultural industries? Cultural identity and development: building strong institutions and policy consensus

9 Trade Negotiations and Outsourcing: Preliminary Thoughts! Outsourcing of white-collar services (accounting, programming, telemarketing) is viable without FTAs! Increase in outsourcing by OECD companies enabled by technological change (telecoms and internet) Similar effect as reduction in international transport costs that allows fragmentation of manufacturing processes International fragmentation of apparel & electronics production: very important for Central America, Mexico! Real Issue: Can the Doha Round and/or FTAs preempt future protectionism by OECD countries against outsourcing? (Mattoo & Wunsch 2004) Conclusions! Temporary migration: Worth looking at the Bush proposal for Mexico! Financial services: both offensive and defensive interests;not enough for access to financing by SMEs Offensive:LAC interest in trade finance, remittances and services to emigrants/defensive: LAC domestic requirements (Risk Capital) and positive lists for cross-border transactions. Capital controls: Chilean solution: use them in the short-run Credit for SME s: Require long-term institutional reforms. Special credit programs in the meantime?! Needed competition in Telecoms might not be completely achieved through trade negotiations Domestic anti-trust policies and enforcement matter! Cultural services: keep room for domestic preferences.! Outsourcing: avoid OECD protectionism..