Kind Resistance: Attitudes toward Immigrants in Mexico and Brazil

Transcription

1 NÚMERO 227 COVADONGA MESEGUER AND GERARDO MALDONADO Kind Resistance: Attitudes toward Immigrants in Mexico and Brazil Please, do not quote without the authors permission Importante Los Documentos de Trabajo del CIDE son una herramienta para fomentar la discusión entre las comunidades académicas. A partir de la difusión, en este formato, de los avances de investigación se busca que los autores puedan recibir comentarios y retroalimentación de sus pares nacionales e internacionales en un estado aún temprano de la investigación. De acuerdo con esta práctica internacional congruente con el trabajo académico contemporáneo, muchos de estos documentos buscan convertirse posteriormente en una publicación formal, como libro, capítulo de libro o artículo en revista especializada. ENERO

2 D.R. 2012, Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas A.C. Carretera México Toluca 3655, Col. Lomas de Santa Fe, 01210, Álvaro Obregón, México DF, México. Dirección de Publicaciones publicaciones@cide.edu Tel

3 Abstract We study the attitudes of the Mexican public and Mexican and Brazilian elites toward immigrants. Mexican immigration policy has historically been restrictive and selective. As a result, only a few, highly qualified immigrants live in contemporary Mexico. In order to explore the attitudes toward immigrants, we consider two hypotheses. On the one hand, material interests and fears of labor market competition may explain the opinion about immigrants and about their numbers. On the other hand, ethnocentrism, nationalism, and fears of security threats might explain why immigration policy has been so restrictive. We test these hypotheses using "Mexico, the Americas and the World, 2010" survey. We find some support for the hypothesis that fears of labor market competition might explain restrictive policy preferences: individuals outside the labor market have better opinion of immigrants than respondents competing with them. However, an exclusionary nationalism is a more robust explanation of antiimmigrant sentiment. Interestingly, we hardly find any difference in the determinants of attitudes toward the two major groups of foreigners living in the country (U.S. citizens and Guatemalans). Also, we do not find important differences among the Mexican public and the Mexican elites and among Mexican and Brazilian elites. In both cases, attitudinal variables explain better than economic concerns elites' opinions toward immigrants. Resumen En este documento estudiamos tanto las actitudes de la opinión pública en México como las de las élites en México y en Brasil hacia los inmigrantes. La política de inmigración en México ha sido históricamente selectiva y restrictiva. Como resultado de ésta, sólo unos pocos inmigrantes altamente calificados viven en México actualmente. Con el fin de explicar las actitudes hacia los inmigrantes consideramos dos hipótesis. Por un lado, los intereses materiales y los temores a la competencia en el mercado laboral podrían explicar la opinión que se tiene sobre lo inmigrantes. Por el otro, el etnocentrismo, el nacionalismo y el temor a amenazas a la seguridad podrían explicar por qué la política de inmigración ha sido restrictiva. Contrastamos estas hipótesis con ayuda de la encuesta México, las Américas y el Mundo Encontramos evidencia débil que apoya la hipótesis de que el temor a la competencia en el mercado laboral explica las preferencias por una política migratoria restrictiva. Los individuos que se encuentran fuera del mercado laboral tienen mejor opinión acerca de los inmigrantes que aquéllos que sí participan en él. Sin embargo, el nacionalismo excluyente es una mejor explicación al sentimiento

4 antiinmigrante. Un resultado interesante es que no hay diferencias en los factores que determinan las actitudes hacia los dos grupos de extranjeros más importantes que viven en el país (el norteamericano y el guatemalteco). Asimismo, no encontramos diferencias importantes entre la opinión pública y las élites en México. Tampoco se encontraron diferencias significativas entre las élites mexicanas y las élites brasileñas. En ambos casos, las variables relacionadas con las actitudes explican mejor que las variables económicas la opinión que tienen las élites acerca de los inmigrantes.

5 Kind Resistance: Attitudes toward Immigrants in Mexico and Brazil Introduction In this paper, we explore the determinants of the attitudes of the Mexican public and Mexican and Brazilian elites toward the foreigners living in their countries. Whereas the attitudes toward immigration have been widely explored in advanced countries, this is to our knowledge the first paper that studies what shapes the attitudes toward immigrants in countries of out and transmigration. To the extent that public opinion informs policies, this study is a first step to understanding why countries that do not experience strong immigration pressures still embrace restrictive immigration policies. As opposed to other Latin American countries in which immigration was a massive phenomenon at the turn of the 20 th century (Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay or Chile), Mexico is not a country of immigrants. Yet, when seen from a historical perspective, Mexican immigration policy has been highly restrictive and selective. Still, according to the last 2010 Census, almost a million foreigners live in Mexico, which amounts to roughly 1% of the Mexican population. Whereas the figure is modest in comparison to other countries, it is double of what it was in the previous 2000 Census. Interestingly, North Americans constitute the lion share of the foreigners with residence in Mexico, followed in the distance by Guatemalans and Spaniards. We employ the 2010 wave of the survey Mexico, the Americas and the World (CIDE, 2010) and entertain two hypotheses. First, we shall explore whether material interests explain opinions toward immigration policy and toward foreigners. Economic models of migration anticipate the distributional impact of immigration in receiving countries. According to these models, those individuals whose wages, income, and employment prospects are threatened by the arrival of foreigners should support restrictionist policies and have unenthusiastic opinions about immigrants. In short, individuals with skills similar to those of immigrants should oppose the loosening of migration restrictions. The alternative hypothesis holds that fears of labor market competition do not explain attitudes toward immigration. On the contrary, non-economic factors such as national pride, concerns about insecurity, and cosmopolitanism determine how individuals regard foreigners and how they value the arrival of immigrants. Our results can be summarized as follows. First, labor market competition fears appear almost inconsequential to explaining how the Mexican public regards foreigners. Using several operationalizations of the skill levels of individuals (years of schooling, educational attainment and occupational skills) as well as their labor market status (in and out the labor force), we find that individual self interest is hardly related to opinions about foreigners and about preferences for immigration policy. The only evidence we have that DIVISIÓN DE ESTUDIOS INTERNACIONALES 1

6 Covadonga Meseguer and Gerardo Maldonado labor market competition concerns matter is that those more educated and out of the labor force therefore, not competing with immigrants have better opinions of foreigners. However, skill levels do not explain attitudes toward immigrants among those in the labor force. The economy does matter but in a sociotropic way. Thinking that foreigners contribute to the economy is positively related to holding a better opinion of immigrants. However, this does not make Mexicans less restrictionist. Interestingly, this paradox is especially evident among those in the labor force. Regarding non economic variables, we find that a strong sense of national pride which is felt by an overwhelming majority of the population is related to restrictionist views of immigration policy, but compatible with a diffuse sympathy toward the foreigners that live in Mexico. In other words, a good way to describe the views of Mexicans toward immigrants is kind resistance. Also, given the visibility of recent events involving the security of Central American emigrants and human right abuses to transmigrants on their way to the United States we took security concerns into account. Those that think that migrants are a security threat are less liberal and have worse opinions of immigrants. Finally, from a demographic point of view, males, young individuals, and those with a better perception of their own economic situation are more likely to hold a better opinion of foreigners. To test whether elites differ from the general public in their perceptions of immigrants and to increase the external validity of our results, we compared Mexican and Brazilians elites. Brazil and Mexico share a history of inward development strategies, nationalistic political regimes, and strong labor movements. However, at the turn of the 20 th century, Brazil had an open and pro-active immigration policy. Immigrants amounted to almost 7% of the population, a figure never reached in Mexico. Interestingly, Brazil is today one of the closest countries in Latin American, exhibiting very low rates of both immigration and out-migration (Solimano, 2010). The available questionnaire for elites is considerably limited when compared to that of the public; but still, we can draw interesting conclusions. In general, we do not find relevant differences between the elites from the two countries. In both cases, fears of labor market competition proxied by years of education and the particular sector in which elites work do not explain how they regard immigrants. However, leaders coming from the civil society are consistently less likely than those in other sectors to think that more and highly educated immigrants are desirable. All in all, also for elites, nationalistic feelings, cosmopolitanism, and a rightist political ideology have more leverage than material interests when it comes to explaining their views of immigrants. The paper proceeds as follows. In section 1, we review different distributional theories of migration to identify which individuals are expected to be pro and anti-immigration. In section 2, we briefly review Mexican 2 CIDE

7 Kind Resistance: Attitudes toward Immigrants in Mexico and Brazil immigration policy from a historical perspective and describe the relevant characteristics of contemporary immigrants to Mexico (main groups, skill levels, and occupations). As it will be explained, this close look is absolutely necessary in a case such as Mexico for two reasons. First, the information on immigrants and their impact on the Mexican economy is practically nil. Second, decades of voluminous emigration to the United States have dramatically affected the characteristics of the main group of foreigners in the country (U. S. citizens). In section 3, we present our data and models. In section 4, we discuss our results. In section 5, we extend the study to Mexican and Brazilian elites attitudes toward foreigners. We conclude in section Labor Market Competition and Attitudes toward Immigrants The prominent model used to anticipate the distributional consequences of immigration is the closed economy Factor-Proportions (FP) model (Borjas, 1999; Borjas, Freeman and Katz, 1996, 1997). This model derives the distributional consequences of immigration by looking at how immigration alters the supply of factors of production in the destination country. The fundamental datum is the skill composition of natives relative to the skill composition of immigrants. If immigrants are less skilled than natives, the increase in the offer of low-skilled labor will depress the wages of low-skilled natives. Depending on assumptions about wage flexibility, the effect can be on the employment rates of the low-skilled, too. On the contrary, as more low-skilled labor is applied to fixed amounts of the other factor, the real wages of the high-skilled natives will rise. Thus, if immigrants are less skilled than natives, low-skilled natives lose and high-skilled natives win from increasing immigration. The reverse occurs if immigrants are relatively more skilled than natives. In this case, immigration increases the supply of the highly-skilled and threatens the wages and/or employment opportunities of high-skilled natives. In this scenario, high-skilled natives are expected to oppose immigration whereas low-skilled natives win with increasing immigration. Overall, the prediction of the FP model is straightforward: natives should oppose the arrival of immigrants with similar skill levels, but favor the arrival of immigrants with different skills. More sophisticated models of the distributive impact of immigration arrive at ambiguous predictions. For instance, according to the Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) model, which presumes a small open economy, international trade can offset the impact of immigration if the arrival of new factors alters the output mix of tradable vs. non-tradable goods. If the economy is small relative to the world, production is diversified, and/or the inflows of immigrants are small in comparison to the local labor supply, local wages will be unaffected. This is called factor price insensitivity. More ambiguities result when models are DIVISIÓN DE ESTUDIOS INTERNACIONALES 3

8 Covadonga Meseguer and Gerardo Maldonado complicated with assumptions concerning factor specificity (as opposed to fully mobile factors), the fact that natives can experience real income effects depending on the change in output mix, and when economic models allow for economies of scale in production. In short, the predictions of the simple FP model are ambiguous depending on the assumptions that are added to the model. The empirical tests of the impact of immigration on labor markets in advanced countries equally throw inconclusive results. Some studies claim substantial and negative effects on the wages and employment of low-skilled natives, other studies report very small effects and yet a recent one reports positive effects on the average wages of natives (Heinmueller and Hiscox, 2010: 3). Empirical tests of how well the distributional expectations anticipated in the FP model explain the attitudes of individuals toward immigrants are equally mixed. The often-quoted papers by Scheve and Slaughter (2001) and Mayda (2006) report results that give strong support to the FP model. Scheve and Slaughter (2001) use the National Election Studies (NES) surveys and find a strong positive correlation between skill levels and support for immigration. In other words, they find that those with less education are the ones with a stronger dislike for immigration, which they attribute to labor market competition fears. Mayda (2006) uses cross national survey data taken from the 1995 National Identity Module of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) with information for 22 advanced countries and data from the World Values Survey (WVS) with information for 44 countries, mostly developing ones. The author finds that in advanced countries, pro-immigration attitudes are positively correlated to greater skills, whereas in developing countries the opposite occurs: pro-immigration attitudes are negatively correlated with skill levels. This is explained by the type of immigrants that advanced countries attract (relatively less skilled than natives) as opposed to developing countries (relatively more skilled than natives). To our knowledge, this is the only article that explores the attitudes toward immigrants in developing countries and test for fears of labor market competition in these countries. Given its relevance for our study, we return to this article later. In two excellent pieces, Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007, 2010) use the European Social Survey and an original survey experiment in the U.S. respectively to give a closer look to the relationship between individual skills and attitudes toward immigrants. In both cases, the questions about immigrants are refined to allow distinguishing between attitudes toward highskilled immigrants and low-skilled immigrants. This distinction is crucial to have a true test of the theory. Contrary to the simple predictions of the FP model, the authors find that people with higher education and higher occupational skill levels are more likely to favor immigration regardless of the skill levels of immigrants. The results of the survey experiment are similar. 4 CIDE

9 Kind Resistance: Attitudes toward Immigrants in Mexico and Brazil They find that both low-skilled and high-skilled natives prefer highly skilled immigrants. This preference does not decline in natives skill levels. Both results call into question the role of labor market competition concerns and material interests in shaping individual attitudes toward immigrants. On the contrary, the authors find that sociotropic views about how immigrants contribute to the economy, and values of tolerance explain a lot of the relationship between greater skills and pro-immigration attitudes. Other papers similarly downplay the role of material interests as opposed to values and beliefs and noneconomic concerns in shaping pro and anti-immigration attitudes (Citrin et al., 1997; Chandler and Tsai, 2001; Sides and Citrin, 2007). As should be evident, one important limitation of the extant literature is that it is almost exclusively based on advanced countries. Yet, it is known that about 50% of migrants move South-South (Ratha and Shaw, 2007). Availability of cross-national and comparable data on immigrant flows and stocks and their levels of qualification relative to natives is, of course, a major problem to explore the impact of immigration on the labor markets of less developed countries (LDCs). In her 2006 article, Mayda uses a measure of the skill mix of natives relative to immigrants in the destination country, which can only be calculated for her sample of advanced countries. For developing countries, the author uses an indirect measure, which is the (log) of per capita GDP of the destination country. Mayda (2006) takes as point of departure a simple one-sector model in which countries share the same production function. Destination countries with high ratios of skilled to unskilled labor (those with high per capita GDP) have lower rates of return to skilled labor and higher rates of return to unskilled labor. For countries with low values of the skill ratio the opposite is true. These are countries with low per-capita income. Therefore, in this simple model, skilled labor tends to move from high to low per-capita GDP countries to benefit from higher real rates of return to skills. In other words, poor countries are more likely to receive immigrants who are relatively more skilled than natives. Based on this assumption, per-capita income can be taken as an indirect measure of the skill composition of natives relative to immigrants. In high percapita GDP countries, the skill ratio of natives with respect to immigrants should be high, whereas in low per-capita GDP countries, this ratio should be low. Since this relationship is an empirical question, Mayda uses the 14 advanced countries for which there are data on the qualifications of natives and immigrants to calculate a direct measure of the skill composition. This measure correlates 0.61 with GDP per capita. The author takes this relatively high correlation to be an indicator that GDP per capita can be taken as a proxy of the skill composition of natives to immigrants in her sample of developing countries. Using this approach, the author finds that any country with per capita GDP in 1995 (PPP-adjusted) lower than approximately $4,480 DIVISIÓN DE ESTUDIOS INTERNACIONALES 5

10 Covadonga Meseguer and Gerardo Maldonado is characterized by a negative correlation between skill and pro-immigration preferences, whereas individuals from countries with per capita GDP above this threshold are more likely to be in favor of immigration the more educated they are (emphasis added, p. 519). Other than this cross national study, the extant knowledge about the impact of immigration on the wages, income, and employment in developing countries is practically inexistent. Two recent studies report different results. Gindling (2009) studies the impact of Nicaraguan immigrants on earnings, inequality, and poverty in Costa Rica. In this case, Nicaraguan immigrants have lower skill levels than Costa Ricans and they tend to concentrate in low paying industry sectors of the economy. The inflows of low skilled Nicaraguans have widened the gap in earnings between more and less educated workers. The author reports that Nicaraguans had a significant negative effect on the earnings of Costa Rican women at the lowest educational level. The opposite is true for female workers with more education. Therefore, this is a case of South-South migration that resembles what is known about South-North migration: less qualified Nicaraguans affecting the earnings of less qualified Costa Ricans, with a gender component. Contrary to this finding, Facchini, Mayda and Mendola (2011) study of immigration to South Africa shows that the country has turned into an attractive destination for highly skilled workers coming from other African countries. The authors describe that today s South African immigrants are at least as educated as their domestic counterparts, with a very strong presence at the very top of the educational attainment scale. As a result, the authors report (p. 19) a negative impact of immigration on the employment levels of more highly skilled natives, and in particular, of individuals who have completed a secondary education and, even more strongly so, of individuals who have completed a college education. Thus, South Africa is a case of important immigrant inflows, with highly educated foreign individuals at the very top of the skill distribution. They appear to have hurt the employment prospects of skilled South Africans. Note that this is the type of pattern that Mayda (2006) expected to find in developing countries. Whereas these two papers provide evidence of the impact of immigrants on local labor markets, they do not provide information about how these outcomes shape the attitudes of natives toward immigrants in these destination countries. In other words, these works are useful and necessary starting points from which to hypothesize about who is likely to hold pro and anti-immigrant stances. Note that the cases of Costa Rica and South Africa are two different stories, with two different compositions of immigrants with respect to natives. This happens despite the fact that both of them are middle income countries experiencing South-South immigration. Yet, in Costa Rica, we should expect low skilled natives (especially women) to be antiimmigration whereas in South Africa we would anticipate highly skilled natives 6 CIDE

11 Kind Resistance: Attitudes toward Immigrants in Mexico and Brazil opposing immigration. Thus, when dealing with the understudied developing countries, a close look to countries histories and patterns of immigration is essential to hypothesize about who is likely to fear labor market competition. To the best of our knowledge, the impact of immigrants on Mexican labor markets has not been explored. 1 Mexico is a rather peculiar case in that the two major groups of immigrants are radically different (North Americans and Guatemalans). Moreover, the demographics of those that declare having been born outside Mexico have been profoundly shaped by decades of high rates of Mexican emigration to the United States. Thus, before hypothesizing about who is likely to favor and who to oppose immigration in Mexico, we need to briefly review Mexican immigration policy in historical perspective and to describe the sociodemographic features of this heterogenous group. 2. Who immigrates to Mexico? Past and Present In this section, we briefly review the main characteristics of immigration policy in Mexico over time as well as the main sociodemographic features of contemporary immigrants. As we mentioned in the introduction, Mexico was never a country of immigration. The country just received 3% of the transatlantic flows of immigrants that arrived to Latin America at the turn of the 20th century (Salazar, 2006). Even in the most permissive periods, the rate of immigrants never exceeded 1% (Cordero, 2006). This contrasts with Brazil, the country we compare Mexico with later on in this paper (Gomes, 2003). The study of Mexican immigration has been well documented by historians. Scholars usually distinguish three different periods. The first period coincides with General Porfirio Díaz s rule ( ). This was a period of openness and pro-active policies to attract immigrants. The second period comprises the post-revolutionary years ( ) in which hostility toward immigrants became evident, especially regarding particular groups and nationalities. Finally, the third period goes roughly from 1974 to This is a period in which restrictions went on to exist, but responded to different motives than in the decades after the revolution. In 2011, a new Population Law was issued with the goal to reconcile the demands that the Mexican government make as a source country with its obligations as a country of immigration and transmigration particularly, the obligation of protecting the integrity of Central American immigrants and transmigrants on their way to the U. S. We briefly review these epochs next. 1 Even as prominent issue as the consequence of emigration on the Mexican labor market has barely received attention. In a recent paper, Misha (2007: 181) finds that emigration to the United States between 1970 and 2000 has caused an increase in the wages of the average Mexican worker by about 8%. Moreover, those more benefited from emigration have been those more educated (those with years of schooling). Thus, emigration seems to be contributing to increasing wage inequality in Mexico. DIVISIÓN DE ESTUDIOS INTERNACIONALES 7

12 Covadonga Meseguer and Gerardo Maldonado During the first period, under the leadership of General Díaz, an open policy toward international capital, foreign investment, and immigration was in place. This policy responded to the demands of businessmen in the North, who needed low-skilled labor to work in the construction of rails, mining, and farming. As a result, an important inflow of Chinese immigrants happened from However, Chinese immigrants did not turn out to be the type of colonists that were expected (they were few, were not considered to be an improvement in terms of race mixing, and were regarded as a potential health threat). The Population Law of 1908 made explicit restrictions to Chinese immigration justified on the basis of sanitary concerns. As for immigrants from other nationalities, prominently North Americans and Spaniards, they were soon distrusted due to their economic success, favorable treatment on the part of the regime, and political influence. This resentment permeated the attitude toward immigrants during the revolutionary and post-revolutionary period, which was marked by a strongly nationalistic and xenophobic immigration policy. During the post-revolutionary decades, economic and social nationalism prevailed. The 1926 Migration Law incorporated restrictions to select immigrants only when labor scarcity justified it. This Law gave the Servicio de Salubridad Pública the prerogative in determining who could enter the country. Implicitly, the idea was to avoid the entrance of particular nationalities (prominently Chinese and Japanese immigrants). Still, the perception continued that Mexico was an unpopulated country with abundant resources to be exploited, for which immigrants were needed. The 1936 Population Law made explicit two existing concerns: first, immigrants were welcome as long they did not compete with jobs with Mexicans. And second, racial and cultural assimilation was now a major concern. Immigrants should contribute to ethnic mixing. However, this restrictive policy was compatible with a generous refugee policy under presidents Lázaro Cárdenas ( ) and Manuel Ávila Camacho ( ). Of these refugee groups, the arrival of 20,000 Spanish republicans that fled the Spanish Civil war constitutes the most prominent, visible, and researched instance (Lida, 2006; Salazar, 2006; Pla, 2006; Cobo, 2006; Palma, 2008). The 1947 Population Law did imply a turning point in population and immigration policy. From that moment on, the emphasis shifted to populating the country with Mexicans. A population and education policy that fomented prolific women and births was instrumental to achieve phenomenal rates of population growth. Until 1970, a period of economic development characterized by rapid growth, rapid industrialization, urbanization, an active birth policy and reductions in mortality translated into rates of population growth of 3.5% on average. The development model that resulted from the nationalistic ideology of the post revolutionary period left a secondary role for immigration. The article 7 of the Law specified that the collective 8 CIDE

13 Kind Resistance: Attitudes toward Immigrants in Mexico and Brazil immigration of healthy foreigners, with good behaviour and that can be easily assimilated to our environment and beneficial for the race and for the economy will be facilitated. In short, during this period, immigration was barely considered in the population and industrialization strategies of the country. Finally, the period initiates and ends with two other Population Laws. The 1974 Law coincides with the decadence of the industrialization model that characterized the previous period. Demographic control turned out to be a priority. From the point of view of immigration, only highly qualified personnel (technicians, scientists, managers) were welcome. As the article 32 put it, immigrants should be useful elements for the country and have the necessary income for their subsistence. Whereas the emphasis on need and protection of employments for Mexicans persisted, assimilation concerns and the cultural identification of foreigners watered down in the new Law. The other major event that took place during this period is the arrival, once more, of groups of refugees fleeing from civil war conflicts in Guatemala and El Salvador and from the dictatorial regimes in the Southern cone of the continent. The 1990 Population Law belatedly took this phenomenon into account with the explicit regulation of the status of refugee. In 2011, a new Migration Law was approved. From the point of view of immigration policy, there are no major changes: highly qualified immigrants are particularly welcome whereas the processes to get the status of legal immigrant and to get the Mexican citizenship have simplified. However, foreigners nationalized as Mexicans still face tight restrictions to occupy political and other public positions. Morever, the Federal Labor Law sets an upper limit of 10% of foreigners that can be employed in Mexican firms (art. 7). 2 In the new Law, the major changes have occurred in the Sanctions chapter, aiming to align the demands that Mexican authorities do with respect to the treatment that Mexican emigrants receive with those made for immigrants and transmigrants in Mexico. 3 But who immigrates to contemporary Mexico? Recall that the main hypothesis we explore in this paper is that fears of labor market competition drive the opinion toward immigrants. According to economic theory, natives that share the same qualifications as immigrants should oppose immigration. The reverse applies to those natives with different qualifications. For this reason, research testing the labor market competition hypothesis usually starts with a review of the skill levels and occupations of those arriving to 2 Top executives and general managers are excluded from this regulation. 3 The newly approved Migration Law does not abolish the former Population Law. In general terms, it recognizes the vulnerability of transmigration groups in Mexico, preventing authorities about their protection; it also decriminalizes the status of illegal immigration; and it gives a legal status to the National Institute of Migration that was not recognized before. DIVISIÓN DE ESTUDIOS INTERNACIONALES 9

14 Covadonga Meseguer and Gerardo Maldonado destination countries. As we mentioned before, immigration to developing countries is an unexplored topic and cross national comparable data is hardly available. This applies to Mexico, where an added factor is that the interest in immigration pales in comparison to the magnitude of the emigration phenomenon. As we show below, the character of Mexico as a country of emigration profoundly shapes who the immigrants to Mexico are. According to the 2000 Census, 70% of the foreigners that live in Mexico report having been born in the U. S. Yet, more than half of those that declare having been born in the U.S. are children under 16 years old that live in families where the rest of the members report themselves as Mexicans (Cordero, 2006). More than one third of those children live in municipalities located in the Northern Mexican border and the other third in high intensity migration states. The other well known peculiarity with this group is that there is a voluminous number of highly mobile pensioners that do not register as legal immigrants, keeping a binational life. After U.S. citizens, the two groups by numerical importance are Guatemalans and Spaniards. However, their presence is six times lower than that of North Americans. The latter is the greatest numerical group even after adjusting for children under 16. Once the cleaning of the data is done, 40% of the immigrants fall in the year old range. Taken as group, immigrants resemble the kind of pattern anticipated in Mayda (2006): on average, immigrants are more qualified than natives. Among those 25 years old and more, 53% have 13 years or more of education. Between 80% and 85% have finished secondary school, and 42% has a college education and more. The former figure contrasts with Mexicans, of which only 12% have college education or more. Given this educational structure, it is not surprising that among those immigrants 16 years old or more, 37% occupies positions as managers or professionals and 15% work as technicians and in administrative work. According to the National Statistics Office (INEGI), a high 65.7% of immigrants work in the service sector. A look in more depth into the two main groups of immigrants (U.S. citizens and Guatemalans) gives us a better view of the complexity of immigration to Mexico. Contrary to immigrants as a whole and contrary to what might be expected, those that report having been born in the U. S. exhibit medium levels of educational attainment. Thirty seven percent has secondary education at the most. Moreover, according to the Census 2000, 6 out 10 do not participate in paid activities. These figures are likely related to two facts. First, there is a considerable volume of pensioners, not all of them legally registered, who do not participate in the labor market. And two, medium educational attainment among those 16 years old or more is in part due to these U.S. citizens having Mexicans origins linked to the Bracero Program ( ). 10 CIDE

15 Kind Resistance: Attitudes toward Immigrants in Mexico and Brazil U.S. citizens perform a wide range of activities. There are several interesting facts that the Census reveals: first, the occupational structure of U.S. citizens living in Mexico City do resemble the occupational structure of the overall immigrant community: professionals and managers constitute the highest percentage (22%). However, only 9% of total U.S. citizens living in Mexico are professionals and managers. Overall, U. S. citizens in Mexico present quite peculiar features inextricably related to the long history of Mexico-U.S. mass emigration: (1) about half of these citizens are children under 16 (2) their educational attainment and therefore their occupational structure show greater variability and (3) they present lower levels of labor market participation than South Americans and European immigrants. Guatemalan immigrants to Mexico are a peculiar group, too. A high percentage keeps a bi-national life around the Southern border. As could be expected, immigrants from Guatemala present very low qualifications. Thirty nine percent of those with 25 years or more completed primary school and the other 39% cannot read or write. The proportion of those with secondary education or more is only 12% (Paredes, 2009). Contrary to other groups of immigrants, a high percentage of Guatemalans are employed in agriculture (30%) and another 30% report themselves as self-employed, very likely in the informal sector. On the whole, close to 80% of immigrants of this nationality work in low skilled employments, of which half of them correspond to employments in agriculture. Guatemalan immigrants concentrate in the South state of Chiapas. Only 5% of Guatemalans work as professionals and technicians. With this overall picture in mind, we can start hypothesizing about how fears of labor market competition may shape the attitudes of Mexicans toward immigrants. First, the overall immigrant is highly qualified and works in highskilled occupations. Therefore, we should expect those Mexicans with high educational attainments and in high-skilled labor occupations to be the ones fearing immigrant competition and therefore holding anti-immigrant sentiments. On the other hand, if we distinguish between U.S. citizens and Guatemalans, the expectations vary. Whereas the diversity in educational attainments and skill occupations of those that declare themselves as U.S. citizens may complicate making predictions about who will oppose/favor that immigration, Mexicans with low educational attainment levels and working in farming and other low-skilled occupations should oppose the arrival of Guatemalans. An alternative possibility that we have to consider is that immigrants to Mexico are simply in too low numbers as to actually threaten the wages and/or job prospects of Mexicans. In other words, in the Mexican case, factor price insensitivity may be a real possibility. If fears of labor market competition cannot explain attitudes toward immigrants, then, ethnocentric feelings and fears, tolerance to foreign ideas and/or security concerns maybe DIVISIÓN DE ESTUDIOS INTERNACIONALES 11

16 Covadonga Meseguer and Gerardo Maldonado the reasons why immigration policy has been and continues to be so restrictive in Mexico. We test these alternative hypotheses next. 3. Data and Models In order to test the previous theoretical expectations, we examined a recent and innovative dataset: the survey Mexico, the Americas and the World, ( Conducted every two years, this is a public opinion survey on foreign affairs to public and leaders in Mexico and other Latin American countries. For the first time, the 2010 edition of the survey included an important set of questions about emigration and immigration. The questionnaire was applied in person to a national population sample of 2,400 Mexicans of 18 years of age or older from September 27 th to October 20 th, We selected four variables that reflect the attitudes and opinions of Mexicans about immigration policy and about different groups of foreigners living in the country. First, to capture citizens preference about immigration policy, we used as proxy the respondent s opinion regarding the number of foreigners living in Mexico (NUMBER). We assumed that those individuals that think that there are too many foreigners or that the number of foreigners is about right have restrictive immigration policy preferences. On the contrary, respondents who answer that there are too few foreigners living in Mexico would prefer a more liberal immigration policy. 4 A value of 1 is given to more liberal respondents, that is, to those thinking that foreigners are too few. Our second dependent variable refers to views about immigrants already living in the country (OPINION). We intended to capture the attitudes toward immigration policy, on the one hand, and the opinion that Mexicans have about immigrants already living in the country, on the other hand. 5 A value of 1 refers to good and very good opinions of immigrants. Interestingly, whereas 65% of respondents have a good or very good opinion of immigrants, only 35% think that the number of foreigners living in the country is too low. Recall that we hypothesized that respondents evaluate immigration policy and immigrants differently depending on how threatened they feel in their labor market prospects. This in turn depends on their skills and on the skills of those that immigrate. Even though the survey did not include a specific question about attitudes toward high-skilled and low-skilled immigrants, we used the opinions of respondents about North Americans and Guatemalans to 4 The question asked: Regarding the number of foreigners living in Mexico, do you think. We recoded the answers as follows: people answering There are too many and The number is about right were coded as 0; and people answering There are too few we coded as 1. 5 The precise question was In general, what is your opinion of foreigners living in Mexico? Is it very good, good, bad or very bad? With the intention of making more comparable and easy interpretable results, we dichotomized the answers as follow: 0 means very bad and bad ; and 1 means good and very good. 12 CIDE

17 Kind Resistance: Attitudes toward Immigrants in Mexico and Brazil capture the fact that Mexicans may hold different opinions about different nationalities depending on their own qualifications and skills. Based on the discussion above, we used the respondents opinion about Americans (AMERICANS) as a proxy of attitudes toward (relatively) high-skilled immigrants and the opinion about Guatemalans (GUATEMALANS) as a proxy of attitudes toward low-skilled immigrants. 6 In both cases, a value of 1 refers to good and very good opinions of Americans and Guatemalans, respectively. Sixty percent have a good or very good opinion of Americans whereas the figure goes down to 41% for Guatemalans. Given that these are binary dependent variables, we estimated a set of probit models weighted to account for sex, age, and regional post-stratification. As for the explanatory variables, we followed recent works on this topic (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007, 2010; Mayda, 2006; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001). First, we used education as a measure of individual qualifications. We employed two indicators of education. The first measure is YEARS OF EDUCATION. This variable counts the total number of years of respondent s completed formal education. The second variable is educational attainment (EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT). This is a categorical variable of the highest level of education attained by the respondent according to the Mexican system. 7 In line with recent literature, we used alternative measures of labormarket competition and individual skill levels. First, according to the employment status of the respondent, we split the total sample into two subsamples. One subsample refers to respondents that are in the labor force. Another subsample contains individuals who are out of the labour force: students, disabled, house-workers, and pensioners. 8 In theory, the former are more vulnerable to face labor market competition and, therefore, they should exhibit more restrictionist attitudes. Second, we used a categorical variable of occupations in order to examine whether fears of labor market competition depend on occupation rather than on overall qualifications. Given that a good number of immigrants work as managers and professionals, we constructed a dichotomous variable controlling for professionals versus other occupations (PROFESSIONALS). Also, we examine the relevance of different respondents 6 These two variables were obtained from the same question: Now please tell me your opinion about the following groups of foreigners who live in Mexico. Is it very good, good, bad or very bad? and then the interviewer list different groups including Americans and Guatemalans. As we did before for comparability issues, we dichotomized the answers as follow: 0 means very bad and bad ; and 1 means good and very good. 7 Both indicators are constructed from the question What is your level or highest grade of schooling? The first indicator is simply the self-reported years in school. The second is a categorical variable coded as follows: 0 mean no education ; 1 means primary school ; 2 means secondary school ; 3 means high school or technical college ; 4 means university and 5 means postgraduate studies. 8 With the aim of splitting the sample, we used the question What was your main activity last week? and created a dichotomous variable, where 1 = people who answer work, have work, but didn t work (vacations, sick, leave or illness) and unemployed (not working but looking) ; and 0 = people who answer home, student, retired or pensioner, permanently disabled and other. In that sense, we consider those assigned with 1 as people competing IN the labor market, and those assigned with 0 people OUT of the labor market. DIVISIÓN DE ESTUDIOS INTERNACIONALES 13

18 Covadonga Meseguer and Gerardo Maldonado occupations controlling for a battery of dichotomous measures of occupation: skilled workers, manual workers, agriculture workers, self-employed workers, domestic workers, and others. With these variables, we were able to estimate whether respondents occupations have any leverage to explaining attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policy. Another group of independent variables captures attitudinal evaluations about the benefits or threats of immigrants in two sensitive issues for Mexican public opinion. We included the respondent s opinion about whether foreigners contribute to the national economy (CONTRIBUTION), 9 and the respondent s appraisal of immigrants threat to public security (SECURITY). 10 Eighty one percent in the sample strongly agree or agree that immigrants contribute to the economy. Fifty four percent strongly disagree or disagree that they are a security threat. Opinions about immigration can be explained by non-material predispositions such as the attitude toward the dissemination of foreign ideas and customs (COSMOPOLITANISM) 11 and nationalistic feelings (NATIONAL PRIDE). 12 About half the respondents welcome foreign ideas and customs whereas an overwhelming majority declares to be proud or very proud of being Mexican. We stated before that the Mexican case is interesting and peculiar for several reasons, among them its international migration pattern as an emigration and transmigration-country. Taking into account this peculiarity, we employed two factual indicators of citizens experience with migration flows. First, we considered whether or not the individual has personal contact 9 With the intention of contrasting the individual answer to different categories of answers, the survey design splits the national sample into two subsamples. However, we use the whole sample incorporating the two questions in one variable. Half of the respondents were read: In general, how much do you agree or disagree with the following statements, regarding foreigners living in Mexico? Foreigners who live in Mexico contribute to Mexican economy. Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree? In this case, we coded the answer as follow: 0 means strongly disagree and somewhat disagree ; 1 means somewhat agree and strongly agree. The other half of respondents were read: For our next question we will be using this card. On it there is a set of steps numbered 1 to 7 [1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree]. You can pick any step to indicate your opinion. In general, how much do you agree or disagree with the following statements regarding foreigners living in Mexico? Foreigners who live in Mexico contribute to Mexican economy. In this case we dichotomized the answers as follow: 1, 2, and 3 into 0 (meaning disagree); 4, 5, 6 and 7 into 1 (meaning agree). 10 Like in the previous indicator, we incorporate the two subsamples and two questions into one variable. Half of the respondents were read: In general, how much do you agree or disagree with the following statements, regarding foreigners living in Mexico? Foreigners who live in Mexico compromise security. Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree? In this case, we coded the answer as follow: 0 means strongly agree and somewhat agree ; 1 means somewhat disagree and strongly disagree. The other half of respondents were read: For our next question we will be using this card. On it there is a set of steps numbered 1 to 7 [1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree]. You can pick any step to indicate your opinion. In general, how much do you agree or disagree with the following statements regarding foreigners living in Mexico? Foreigners who live in Mexico compromise security. In this case we dichotomized the answers as follow: 4, 5, 6 and 7 into 0 (meaning agree); 1, 2, and 3 into 1 (meaning disagree). 11 The question used is Do you think that it is good or bad to disseminate the ideas and costumes of other countries in Mexico? We coded the answer: 0 means bad and 1 means good. 12 The question reads: How proud are you of being Mexican? and answers we dichotomized as follows: 0 mean not proud and not very proud ; and 1 means proud and very proud. 14 CIDE

19 Kind Resistance: Attitudes toward Immigrants in Mexico and Brazil with foreigners living in the country (CONTACT). Based on previous findings (McClaren, 2003), we expected that direct contact or relation with foreigners positively influences their attitudes toward this group. Only 19% of respondents report having contact with immigrants, though. Second, we included a variable to capture whether the respondent has relatives living abroad (RELATIVES ABROAD). About half of the sample responded positively to this question. We are interested in knowing whether having relatives abroad shapes in any manner the opinion of these respondents about immigrants and about immigration policy. All models included a series of control variables. These are the standard sociodemographic variables: sex (MALE), AGE (measured in years), and subjective INCOME (respondent s assessment of household income). 13 In addition, we included the political orientation of individuals (IDEOLOGY) measured along a ten point ideological scale. 14 In many developed societies (especially in European democracies) right and far right parties/associations are the most forceful opponents of immigration (Pardos-Prado, 2011). However, in Mexico, leftist parties, leftist movements, and organizations have been historically more nationalistic and less tolerant of foreign influence. Thus, contrary to advanced countries, we expected respondents that locate themselves toward the right of the ideological spectrum to be more liberal. Finally, we controlled for two indicators regarding respondents location. First, immigrants to Mexico tend to concentrate in certain regions (many Americans settle in the Northern states of Mexico whereas Central Americans cluster in the South). We used an indicator of region to account for this fact (NORTH, SOUTH). 15 Second, we used a variable to distinguish whether respondents live in rural and urban localities (URBAN). Given the fact that most immigrants are concentrated in urban areas, and that according to areaanalysis models migrant concentration may boost fears of labor market competition, we anticipated that respondents living in these locations hold less liberal views of immigration policy. In the sample, 30% live in the Northern region whereas 73% live in urban areas. 13 The question reads: With the total family income, would you say that you We recoded the answer as: 1 = cannot cover expenses and have major difficulties ; 2 = cannot cover expenses and have difficulties ; 3 = can just cover expenses, without major difficulties ; and 4 = can cover expenses and save. 14 We use the question Talking about your political orientation, on a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 means left and 10 means right, where do you place yourself? We use this self-reported placement on the scale from 0 = left to 10 = right. 15 The 2010 edition of the survey incorporates two regional oversamples in order to allow not only inferences about the national sample, but also regional samples (North and South regions). This permits us to be confident about the estimations of the selected variable of regional location. DIVISIÓN DE ESTUDIOS INTERNACIONALES 15

20 Covadonga Meseguer and Gerardo Maldonado 4. Results and Discussion Table 1 shows the results concerning the attitudes of the Mexican public toward foreigners living in the country. As explained above, we take the first dependent variable, NUMBER, to be a proxy of how open Mexicans think immigration policy should be. We assumed that those saying that the number of foreigners is too low are the ones holding more liberal views of immigration policy. On the other hand, we considered the variable OPINION, which reflects how Mexicans view the foreigners already living in the country. We are able to distinguish between the opinions toward U. S. citizens (AMERICANS) and the opinions toward Guatemalans (GUATEMALANS). Since these two groups have very different characteristics possibly impacting how they are perceived as threats in the labor market, this distinction was relevant. The main independent variable is education. In Models 1-4, we used YEARS OF EDUCATION. In Models 5-8, EDUCATION is a measure of educational attainment. Given what we know about the average educational level of those arriving in Mexico, if fears of labor market competition prevail we should see those more educated to be the ones holding less liberal attitudes and holding worse views of immigrants. That is, we should obtain a negative sign for education years and attainment. This should hold for U.S. citizens as opposed to Guatemalans. In the latter case, those with less education should be the ones more concerned about what the arrival of Guatemalans can do to their job prospects. Since one could think that those more educated are also those more cosmopolitan, with more contact with foreigners, less nationalistic, and more knowledgeable of the economic contribution that foreigners make to the country, we explicitly control for variables that capture these individual traits. Interestingly, there were not high correlations in our data. The highest correlation coefficient was 0.26 (p<0.05) between years of education and having contact with immigrants. 16 Also, Mexico is above all a country of emigration. With high percentages in our sample declaring having relatives abroad and receiving remittances, it is interesting to learn how the experience of emigration shapes the views of immigration. Finally, we controlled for the usual sociodemographic variables. Our results can be summarized as follows. First, except to explain the overall opinion that Mexicans have of foreigners (Models 2 and 6), the measures of qualification are not statistically significant in any of the models. Contrary to expectations, those more educated are also those holding better opinions of immigrants. However, education measures are inconsequential to 16 Years of education correlate.05** with Contribution,.11** with Cosmopolitanism, -.02 with National Pride,.08** with Security, and 0.07** with Having Relatives Abroad. 16 CIDE

21 Kind Resistance: Attitudes toward Immigrants in Mexico and Brazil explaining attitudes toward immigration restrictions as well as the opinion toward U.S. citizens and Guatemalans taken separately. Therefore, it seems that egocentric interests and fears of labor market competition as captured by individual education levels are hardly relevant. However, when we consider sociotropic views of the economy (CONTRIBUTION), we find that those agreeing that foreigners contribute to the national economy have better opinions of immigrants in general and of U.S. and Guatemalan citizens in particular. Interestingly, views about whether immigrants contribute to the economy do not make Mexicans more liberal (Model 1). Second, in general, our indicators of attitudinal values fare much better and in the expected way when it comes to explaining the opinions toward foreigners. Yet, less of these variables are statistically significant to explaining the attitudes toward immigration policy. Nonetheless, there are some results that are remarkably robust and interesting. To start with, and as expected, those more cosmopolitan, that is, those more favorable to the arrival of new ideas, are less restrictionist and have better opinions of immigrants in general and of the two groups of immigrants in particular. The same applies to having contact with foreigners (CONTACT), although this variable only significantly impacts the opinion toward immigrants in general and U.S. citizens in particular. Security concerns (SECURITY) do influence attitudes toward policy and opinions: those disagreeing with the view that immigrants are a real security problem are more likely to think that foreigners are too few and have better opinions of immigrants. One interesting finding is that contrary to what could be expected, security concerns do not shape the opinions toward Guatemalan immigrants at all. Finally, it is interesting to learn that national pride (NATIONAL PRIDE) makes Mexicans less liberal, without negatively affecting the views of those already in the country. In other words, strong national pride makes Mexicans more resistant toward a liberal migration policy, but not less kind to immigrants in the country. Third, having relatives abroad does not seem to influence how Mexicans think immigration policy should be or how they regard immigrants (RELATIVES ABROAD). This variable is only barely positively significant in one of our models (Model 1). To conclude, men are less restrictionist than women. The same applies to those that locate themselves right in the ideological spectrum. Men have better opinion of immigrants than women as well as young people and those that regard their personal economic situation as good or very good. Not surprisingly, and in line with the apparent healthy effect of CONTACT, those living in the Northern region have better opinion of U.S. citizens than individuals living in other regions (NORTH). Immigrant concentration probably enhances fears of labor market competition. This is likely the reason why living in URBAN areas makes respondents less liberal (Models 1 and 5). DIVISIÓN DE ESTUDIOS INTERNACIONALES 17

22 Covadonga Meseguer and Gerardo Maldonado It is worth noting that despite the different features of North Americans and Guatemalans, there are hardly any differences in the determinants of opinions about these two groups. In both cases, young, cosmopolitan individuals, and those that think that foreigners contribute to the economy have better opinions of them. After controlling for a battery of attitudinal variables, educational levels (our proxy for egocentric material concerns) explain nothing. When the dependent variable captures opinions about these two groups, all the other independent variables are not statistically significant. 18 CIDE

23 Kind Resistance: Attitudes toward Immigrants in Mexico and Brazil TABLE 1. DETERMINANTS OF ATTITUDES TOWARD IMMIGRANTS IN MEXICO, PUBLIC NUMBER OPINION AMERICANS GUATEMALANS NUMBER OPINION AMERICANS GUATEMALANS YEARS EDUCATION *** [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] ED. ATTAINMENT *** [0.031] [0.031] [0.030] [0.030] CONTRIBUTION *** 0.443*** 0.197** *** 0.444*** 0.195** [0.088] [0.084] [0.083] [0.087] [0.088] [0.084] [0.083] [0.087] SECURITY 0.373*** 0.136** *** 0.134** [0.069] [0.067] [0.065] [0.066] [0.069] [0.067] [0.065] [0.066] CONTACT ** 0.158* ** 0.162* [0.085] [0.089] [0.084] [0.084] [0.085] [0.090] [0.084] [0.084] COSMOPOLITAN 0.174** 0.558*** 0.327*** 0.232*** 0.174** 0.559*** 0.328*** 0.231*** [0.069] [0.067] [0.065] [0.067] [0.069] [0.067] [0.065] [0.067] NATIONAL PRIDE *** 0.362** *** 0.362** [0.149] [0.141] [0.142] [0.146] [0.149] [0.142] [0.142] [0.146] RELATIVES ABROAD 0.119* * [0.069] [0.068] [0.065] [0.067] [0.069] [0.067] [0.065] [0.067] IDEOLOGY ** ** [0.013] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.013] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] MALE 0.193*** 0.122* *** 0.121* [0.068] [0.067] [0.064] [0.066] [0.068] [0.067] [0.064] [0.066] AGE *** *** *** *** *** *** [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] INCOME *** *** [0.045] [0.045] [0.043] [0.044] [0.046] [0.045] [0.043] [0.044] NORTH *** *** [0.091] [0.090] [0.089] [0.091] [0.090] [0.089] URBAN ** ** [0.080] [0.079] [0.076] [0.078] [0.080] [0.079] [0.076] [0.078] SOUTH [0.101] [0.101] CONSTANT *** *** [0.243] [0.237] [0.230] [0.237] [0.239] [0.232] [0.226] [0.232] N Pseudo R-sq AIC BIC Log Likelihood chi prob>chi Standard errors in brackets * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01 Given the non-linear character of these models, the coefficients give us little information about the actual impact that the different variables have on the probability of thinking that there are too few foreigners in the country DIVISIÓN DE ESTUDIOS INTERNACIONALES 19

24 Covadonga Meseguer and Gerardo Maldonado and on the probability of having good opinions about them. There are four independent variables that are significant to understand our two main dependent variables. These are gender, security concerns, cosmopolitanism, and national pride. Of these, only national pride operates in different directions (it is negatively correlated with more liberal immigration preferences but positively correlated with good opinions). Post-estimation analysis helps to evaluate the actual impact of these variables. Concerning immigration policy, being a male, disagreeing with the view that migrants cause a security problem, and being cosmopolitan increase in 7, 13 and 6 percentage points (pp) respectively the predicted probability of holding more liberal views (Model 1). However, being strongly nationalistic decreases 17 pp the predicted probability of embracing more pro-immigrant stances. Living in urban areas decreases the predicted probability of supporting a liberal immigration policy in 8 pp. All these predictions are statistically significant at least at 5%. On the other hand, regarding the opinion about immigrants (Model 2), being a male, disagreeing with the view that migrants cause a security problem, and being cosmopolitan increase in 3, 4 and 17 pp respectively the predicted probability of having a good or very good opinion of foreigners. In this case, nationalistic pride increases (not decreases) 10 pp the predicted probability of having good opinions about foreigners living in the country. All these predictions are statistically significant at least at 10%. It is interesting to note that seeing foreigners as contributors to the economy increases the predicted probability of having a good opinion of them in 11 pp in general, 14 pp for U.S. citizens (Model 3), and 8 pp for Guatemalans (Model 4). Also, note that education (significant in just 2 out of 8 models) does shape the opinion about foreigners. In comparison to those having primary education, having a college education increases 15 pp the predicted probability of having a good or very good opinion of foreigners (Model 5). 17 This post-estimation analysis reveals that a strong sense of national pride followed by fears of security threats have the strongest impact on the views about the desired number of immigrants in the country, making respondents less liberal. However, cosmopolitanism and the contribution that foreigners make to the economy are the main variables shaping the opinions about foreign residents. In sum, except in its sociotropic version, material interests hardly enter as an explanation of the attitudes of Mexicans toward immigrants. Figure 1 shows the difference in the predicted probability of thinking that immigrants are too few depending on whether the respondents are or not strongly nationalistic, for varying levels of education. Figure 2 below shows 17 Continuous variables were set at their means. The dummy variables were set at the most frequent sample value, that is, a cosmopolitan, nationalistic man that lives in an urban area, thinks that immigrants contribute to the economy, and that they are not a security threat. 20 CIDE

25 Kind Resistance: Attitudes toward Immigrants in Mexico and Brazil the difference in predicted probability of holding a good opinion of immigrants depending on whether the respondent exhibits or not strong national pride, also for different years of education. First, the differences are always significant. Second, the differences are positive between those strongly and weakly nationalistic, but the discrete change in the predicted probability of having a good opinion of immigrants is smaller with increasing levels of education (Figure 2). However, comparing those strongly vs. weakly nationalistic, increasing years of education do not reduce the difference in the predicted probabilities of thinking that immigrants are too few (Figure 1). Moreover, the differences are always negative. FIGURE 1 FIGURE 2 Additionally, Table 2 explores the labor market competition hypothesis in two ways: models 1-4 split the sample between those in the labor force and those out of the labor force. We run the same models as above. If fears of labor market competition hold, we should see those highly qualified in the labor market exhibiting more restrictionist views and worse opinions of immigrants after controlling for a host of factors. On the contrary, fears of labor market competition should not drive the opinions of those out of the labor force. Our results show that the overall level of qualifications is inconsequential to explaining the attitudes of those employed and actively looking for employment. However, among those out of the labor force, and therefore not facing the competition of migrants, education correlates positively with less restrictionist views and with a better opinion of immigrants (Models 2 and 4). This result makes us think that the positive sign of education and educational DIVISIÓN DE ESTUDIOS INTERNACIONALES 21

26 Covadonga Meseguer and Gerardo Maldonado attainment that we found in models 2 and 6 in Table 1 is driven by those individuals out of the labor force (which are a high 45% in our sample). There are other interesting results. In models 5-8, we controlled for measures of occupation in the sample of respondents in the labor force. First, according to the information that the Census provides, immigrants to Mexico are well represented in the category of Managers and Professionals. For this reason, national respondents working in that occupational category should feel specially threatened in the event of a loosening of immigration restrictions. We tested for this possibility in Models 5 and 7 and we found the category PROFESSIONALS not to be statistically significant to explain neither the opinion about immigration policy nor the opinion about immigrants. In Models 6 and 8, we included a set of dummy variables with different occupational categories and kept PROFESSIONALS as our baseline category. As it is possible to see, these occupational categories are statistically indistinguishable from the category PROFESSIONALS. More interesting is to explore the contrasting way in which those in the labor force form their views about immigration policy and the opinion they have about immigrants. These contrasts are clear in models 5 to 8. First, being open to new ideas (COSMOPOLITANISM) is positively correlated to thinking that immigrants are too few and to having a good and very good opinion of them. However, thinking that immigrants make a contribution to the national economy (CONTRIBUTION) is positively correlated to having a good opinion of immigrants but negatively correlated with thinking that immigration policy should be more liberal. We think that fears of labor market competition might be behind this apparent contradiction. Also, as before, a strong nationalistic feeling and fears of insecurity attached to immigration continue to shape the restrictionist attitudes of those in the labor force. And yet, none of these variables shapes the opinion about immigrants among those in the labor market. Finally, note that having contact with foreigners is positively correlated with holding a good opinion of immigrants but does not influence the views about their actual numbers. 22 CIDE

27 Kind Resistance: Attitudes toward Immigrants in Mexico and Brazil TABLE 2. DETERMINANTS OF ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRANTS IN MEXICO, IN THE LABOR FORCE VS. OUT THE LABOR FORCE NUMBER NUMBER OPINION OPINION NUMBER NUMBER OPINION OPINION (IN LABOR FORCE) (IN LABOR FORCE) (IN LABOR FORCE) YEARS OF EDUCATION ** *** [0.011] [0.016] [0.012] [0.015] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] CONTRIBUTION ** *** 0.289** ** ** 0.561*** 0.558*** [0.112] [0.148] [0.109] [0.134] [0.123] [0.124] [0.120] [0.120] SECURITY 0.390*** 0.308*** *** 0.433*** 0.431*** [0.090] [0.109] [0.090] [0.103] [0.097] [0.098] [0.096] [0.097] CONTACT *** *** 0.364*** [0.107] [0.142] [0.114] [0.146] [0.113] [0.114] [0.121] [0.121] COSMOPOLITANISM 0.309*** *** 0.569*** 0.327*** 0.345*** 0.581*** 0.593*** [0.090] [0.110] [0.090] [0.104] [0.098] [0.099] [0.097] [0.097] NATIONAL PRIDE ** ** 0.424* ** ** [0.181] [0.274] [0.173] [0.254] [0.206] [0.206] [0.204] [0.206] RELATIVES ABROAD ** * [0.090] [0.110] [0.090] [0.104] [0.097] [0.097] [0.097] [0.098] IDEOLOGY ** [0.016] [0.021] [0.016] [0.020] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.018] MALE 0.264** * ** 0.225** [0.106] [0.141] [0.102] [0.138] [0.113] [0.115] [0.109] [0.112] AGE ** * * [0.003] [0.004] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] INCOME *** 0.134* *** 0.186*** [0.059] [0.072] [0.060] [0.069] [0.065] [0.066] [0.066] [0.066] NORTH [0.119] [0.142] [0.119] [0.139] [0.129] [0.131] [0.129] [0.131] URBAN ** *** *** *** [0.103] [0.131] [0.103] [0.125] [0.111] [0.114] [0.110] [0.114] PROFESSIONALS [0.108] [0.111] MANUAL WORKER [0.139] [0.142] AGRICULTURE [0.200] [0.194] SELF-EMPLOYED [0.122] [0.125] DOMESTIC WORKER [0.398] OTHER [0.311] [0.296] CONSTANT *** *** *** *** ** [0.311] [0.430] [0.308] [0.409] [0.349] [0.368] [0.350] [0.374] N Pseudo R-sq AIC BIC Log Likelihood chi prob>chi Standard errors in brackets * p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 DIVISIÓN DE ESTUDIOS INTERNACIONALES 23

28 Covadonga Meseguer and Gerardo Maldonado Based on Model 5, it turns out that being cosmopolitan and disagreeing with the fact that immigrants cause security problems increases in 10 pp and 16 pp respectively the probability of holding more liberal views about immigration policy. Yet, strong nationalistic feelings, thinking that immigrants make a contribution to the economy, and living in urban areas decrease the predicted probability of being more pro-immigration in 20, 11 and 13 pp respectively. Therefore, among those in the labor force, two contradictory forces (cosmopolitanism vs. nationalistic feelings) continue to shape the views about immigration policy. Remember, however, that nationalistic pride is a much more spread trait among the Mexican public than cosmopolitanism is and that both traits are hardly correlated. 5. Extending the Study: Mexican and Brazilian elites Congruence between citizens preferences and the opinions of their representatives is considered an important condition for an effective system of political representation (Powell, 2004; Thomassen and Schmitt, 1997). For this reason, we contrast the attitudes of the public with the attitudes of their leaders and representatives. Besides, we compare Mexican and Brazilian elites. With this, we seek to increase the external validity of our findings. As said earlier, the project The Americas and the World allows examining the attitudes toward immigration of elites and leaders in the two regional powers in Latin America: Brazil and Mexico. By so doing, we can explore the argument of kind resistance at the decision-making policy level. The edition of the project administered a revised version of the national population questionnaire to a non-random sample of individuals in a position of leadership. 18 The questionnaire applied in Mexico interviewed 494 individuals from July 26 th to November 12 th, The questionnaire applied in Brazil interviewed 200 individuals from September 2010 to January Before describing the data and discussing the results, a brief account of Brazilian immigration history and policies is due. Contrary to Mexico, Brazil was a country of mass immigration. In the period , between 50,000 and 200,000 immigrants per year entered the country arriving mostly from Europe (Portugal, Italy, Spain, Germany) and the Middle East. In 1900, foreign population reached a high of 6.2% relative to the national population (Gomes, 2003). The arrival of immigrants continued until 1929, with a considerable presence of Japanese nationals who arrived in Brazil after Canada, the U.S., Mexico, and Argentina tightened up their immigration policies. Japanese immigrants replaced Italians in agriculture from 1930s on. It is estimated that 18 In both countries a similar sample procedure was follow. First, there was compiled a large dataset with names of several leaders related with foreign policy-making and international relations decisions from five different sectors, as described in the following pages. Then, the individuals were selected and interviewed randomly taking into account a balance between the five sectors. 24 CIDE

29 Kind Resistance: Attitudes toward Immigrants in Mexico and Brazil between the last quarter of the 19 th century and the end of the 1930s, 4.4 million people arrived in the country (International Migration Organization, 2010). The arrival of Getúlio Vargas ( ) to power marked a shift in immigration regulations. With the goal of protecting the Brazilian identity and the jobs of Brazilians, a quota system was introduced in 1934 allowing a very small number of immigrants in the country. Between 1930 and 1969 much less immigrants were admitted. Japanese nationals were the largest group together with Syrians and Lebanese, who were recruited for the emerging industrial sector. During this period, and similarly to Mexico, Brazil experienced rapid industrialization based on inward industrialization, strong population growth, as well as massive internal migration. Comparison of data from population censuses since 1940 shows a decline in the percentage of foreign population from 3.42% in 1940 to 0.52% in A combination of strong Brazilian population growth and the end of immigrant recruitment explain this fall. According to the 2001 Census, the percentage of foreign population living in the country is a low 0.4%. Interestingly, since the start of the 1990s, more than half of all immigration is regional. Argentines and Paraguayans constitute the bulk of regional migration to Brazil. Whereas the presence of North Americans has been on the rise, immigration from Europe is still twice as large (Gomes, 2003). Contemporary immigration to Brazil is regulated in the Law 6,815 1/8/1980. Brazil does not pursue an active immigration policy, although the highly qualified have an easier entry into the country. Some restrictions have been gradually lifted, in particular those that impeded legal residence in the country without a work contract. However, according to art No12, 1998, minimal levels of education are requested to enter the country with a work contract. As a consequence, most (legal) immigrants to Brazil have college education. Qualified immigrants enter the country under temporal permissions (permiso de trabalho temporário) to work in Brazilians firms or multinationals as high level technicians and managers. According to the International Labor Organization (ILO), in 2008, almost 60% of work permits were granted to foreigners with college education or more. In sum, whereas at the turn of the century immigration was a much more important phenomenon in Brazil than in Mexico, both countries practiced a restrictive and selective immigration policy. As a result, immigrants to both countries have been low in numbers and, on average, more qualified than natives. In recent years, both countries have carried out reforms in their Migration Laws to facilitate the process to gain permanent residence and to naturalize; however, the bias in favor of educated immigrants persists, especially in Brazil. Unfortunately, the questionnaire used in the elite survey did not include all the questions that were asked to the public. In particularly, it did not ask DIVISIÓN DE ESTUDIOS INTERNACIONALES 25

30 Covadonga Meseguer and Gerardo Maldonado the general opinion about foreigners and the particular questions about specific groups of immigrants. 19 Nonetheless, we could use a couple of questions as dependent variables. The questionnaire included a question about the number of foreigners living in the country (NUMBER). As before, we used this item as a proxy of immigration policy preferences. There is also a question about the importance of good education levels of future foreigners admitted in the country, which we used as a proxy of attitudes toward highskilled immigrants (EDUCATION LEVELS). 20 The elite survey did not ask all the explanatory variables we employed in our previous analysis but we have information about one indicator of respondents skill levels: years of schooling. Since most of the interviewed leaders have graduate and postgraduate education (the average years of education is 18 years) and all of them are employed, we cannot use educational attainment or the variable capturing their position in or out the labor-market to address fears of labor market competition. Nevertheless, the selection and sample design of the elite surveys allow us examining whether the sector in which elites work impacts their views about immigration policy. Although respondents were not randomly selected, the selection design forced the sample to include as equally as possible individuals from different sectors. The selection procedure picked leaders from: (1) the government sector: high-level civil servants from federal ministries, local governments, public decentralized entities (2) the political sector: governors, legislators, and leaders of political parties (3) the private sector: influential business leaders of the most important domestic firms within the country (4) mass media and academia: key leaders from newspapers, magazines, newswires, radio stations and television broadcasts with national coverage, and social sciences faculty members and directors of international relations departments at public and private universities and (5) social, civic, and non-profit sector: representatives of religious groups, unions, professional organizations, and relevant non-governmental organizations. In theory, we expected that leaders representing the sectors facing competition from high-skilled immigrants in the labor-market will have more restrictive policy preferences. Based on the previous specifications, we estimated a probit model and an ordered probit model for the two available dependent variables. Again, the two main independent variables are YEARS OF EDUCATION and SECTOR. Depending on the availability of information, we included some of the control variables specified in the national population models presented in the 19 Due to the fact of social desirability and political correctness, some questions, particularly about foreigners and migration issues, were not asked in the elites questionnaires. 20 Finally, the 2010 The Americas and the World questionnaire includes a question about the desirable characteristics of future immigrants in the country. Among these, there is one about the importance of good educational level (very important to not important, four categories) as an individual aspect that foreigners should have for allowing them to enter and live in Mexico. We expect this variable also show the preference and attitudes of Mexicans about high-skilled immigration based on education CIDE

31 Kind Resistance: Attitudes toward Immigrants in Mexico and Brazil previous section. 21 We controlled for these variables: gender (MALE), AGE (in years), political IDEOLOGY (respondent self-placement on the left-right scale), COSMOPOLITANISM, and NATIONAL PRIDE. All of them were coded as we did for the national population survey. For each of the dependent variables, we run three models: one that combines all leaders, and two separate models for Mexican and Brazilian elites. As for the dependent variables, about 50% of all the leaders believe that the number of foreigners in the country is too low (the percentages in each of the samples are the same and differences between Mexican and Brazilian elites are not statistically significant). Recall that among the Mexican public, this figure was 35%. An overwhelming majority of leaders think that it is important or very important that immigrants have high education levels. As for the independent variables, Mexican elites have slightly more years of education on average, and elites in both countries place themselves at the center of the ideological spectrum. Interestingly, Mexican elites are considerably more cosmopolitan than the Mexican public; but they are equally nationalistic. These same traits are extended among Brazilian elites and the differences with the Mexican elites are not statistically significant. For the sake of comparison, we start analyzing the results for the sample of Mexican elites. As with the public, the overall levels of qualification measured as years of education do not explain the opinion about the number of foreigners living in the country. However, as before, being cosmopolitan is positively correlated with thinking that there are too few foreigners in the country. In turn a strong feeling of national pride makes Mexican elites less likely to think so. The same happens in Brazil. From the point of view of sectors, only the civil sector looms relevant in Brazil and in the full sample. Compared to the government (the omitted category), those working in this sector are less likely to think that there are too few foreigners. In other words, they are less likely to prefer a more liberal immigration policy. Yet, the problem with this sector in that they represent groups with allegedly very different policy preferences concerning immigration policy (NGOs vs. unions). It is likely that the restrictionist preferences of labor movements are behind the negative sign. Based on Model 1, among elites, being cosmopolitan increases the predicted probability of thinking that there are too few foreigners living in the country by 20 pp, whereas having a strong sense of national pride and working in civic organizations reduces the predicted probability of thinking the same in 19 pp. If labor market competition were behind the opinions of the Mexican and Brazilian elites, we should observe that those with more years of education 21 The questionnaire applied to the elites did not include either the following control variables: subjective income; assessments of contribution of foreigners to Mexican economy; assessment of immigrants threat to public security; direct contact with foreigners; indicator of relatives living abroad; urban locations; and region. DIVISIÓN DE ESTUDIOS INTERNACIONALES 27

32 Covadonga Meseguer and Gerardo Maldonado are less inclined to think that high levels of education are important. The logic is simple: those highly educated are the ones more vulnerable to the competition of highly skilled immigrants. However, this does not seem to be the case, at least in the split samples. In Mexico, the more cosmopolitan the leaders are the less likely they are to think that high levels of education are highly relevant. The same happens among those leaders working in the Mexican civil sector. Note that those that self-placed as rightist in the ideological spectrum are more likely to think that high education levels of immigrants are very important. The same happens in Brazil, where those that exhibit a strong national pride are also more likely to value highly qualified immigrants. Interestingly, in this country, the private sector is more likely than the government (the omitted category) to give importance to the arrival of immigrants with high levels of education (significant at 10%). 28 CIDE

33 Kind Resistance: Attitudes toward Immigrants in Mexico and Brazil TABLE 3. DETERMINANTS OF ATTITUDES TOWARD IMMIGRANTS IN MEXICO AND BRAZIL, LEADERS NUMBER NUMBER_MEX NUMBER_BRA EDULEVEL EDULEVEL_MEX EDULEVEL_BRA YEARS EDUCATION *** [0.025] [0.039] [0.039] [0.022] [0.034] [0.033] MALE [0.131] [0.148] [0.294] [0.113] [0.133] [0.227] AGE ** ** [0.004] [0.006] [0.009] [0.004] [0.005] [0.007] IDEOLOGY *** *** 0.235*** [0.026] [0.029] [0.065] [0.022] [0.025] [0.056] COSMOPOLITANISM 0.599*** 0.735*** * [0.187] [0.219] [0.388] [0.162] [0.192] [0.345] NATIONALISM ** * * ** [0.231] [0.274] [0.452] [0.198] [0.258] [0.352] POLITICIANS [0.178] [0.201] [0.402] [0.157] [0.181] [0.340] PRIVATE SECTOR * [0.171] [0.199] [0.352] [0.154] [0.182] [0.300] MEDIA AND ACADEMIA ** [0.172] [0.207] [0.342] [0.148] [0.184] [0.282] CIVIL SOCIETY *** ** ** ** [0.174] [0.204] [0.365] [0.147] [0.179] [0.294] CONSTANT * [0.571] [0.783] [1.187] cut *** *** [0.506] [0.704] [0.984] cut *** *** [0.498] [0.691] [0.981] cut * ** [0.494] [0.686] [0.992] N pseudo R-sq AIC BIC Log-Likelihood chi prob>chi Standard Errors in Brackets *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 Whereas this analysis is somewhat limited due to the lack of explanatory variables, Mexican elites seem to be caught up in the same sort of dilemma as the public is. Whereas those with cosmopolitan views support more liberal immigration policies, their strong national pride operates in the opposite direction. Fears of labor market competition seem to be located in the civil DIVISIÓN DE ESTUDIOS INTERNACIONALES 29

34 Covadonga Meseguer and Gerardo Maldonado sector, being likely led by the preferences of unions. Interestingly, as predicted by the theory, those more educated are less likely to think that immigrants should be highly educated, but this relationship is not statistically significant in the samples split by nationality. 30 CIDE

35 Kind Resistance: Attitudes toward Immigrants in Mexico and Brazil Conclusions This paper explored the determinants of public opinion attitudes toward immigrants in Mexico and in Brazil. Whereas Brazil was a country of immigration during the first globalization epoch, foreigners to Mexico have historically been very few in numbers. In both cases, nothing like an active immigration policy existed after the 1930s. On the contrary, nationalistic authoritarian regimes imposed highly restrictive and highly selective immigration policies that gave priority to particular nationalities and qualifications. Whereas in recent decades both countries have inserted in the international economy embracing liberal trade and investment policies, their immigration policies have remained restrictive and far from pro-active. Why? Following the literature on the determinants of public opinion toward immigration in advanced countries, we entertained two possibilities. First, immigration policy may respond to fears of labor market competition. Those individuals whose wages and employment are threatened by the arrival of immigrants should be the ones opposing the easing of immigration restrictions. In both Mexico and Brazil, immigration policy gave priority to the entry of educated foreigners. As a result, and in contrast to advanced countries, the average immigrant is more educated and has greater skills than the average native. Thus, highly qualified natives were expected to be more restrictionist than those less qualified. Alternatively to material interests, the literature contends that attitudinal values of tolerance to foreign ideas, ethnocentrism, as well as security concerns, may be more relevant to explain public opinion toward immigrants than material interests. Our results give little support to the material interest hypothesis. Neither respondents education, nor their skill levels or their labor market status explained the views about immigration policy and about immigrants. The only evidence we found is that those educated but out of the labor market (not competing with immigrants) have better opinion of foreigners. Individual education levels as well as skill levels are for the most part unrelated to how Mexicans regard foreigners. One likely explanation for this lack of significance is that immigrants to Mexico are simply in too low numbers as to actually constitute a labor market threat to natives. In our view, the most interesting results concerned the contradictory role of attitudinal variables and in particular of nationalism vs. cosmopolitanism. Whereas those that welcome foreign ideas prefer a more liberal immigration policy and have better opinion of immigrants, those declaring to be very proud of being Mexicans do not prefer a more liberal immigration policy but may still have a good opinion of immigrants. Thus, national pride seems to be shaping an immigration policy that is both kind to immigrants yet reluctant to immigration. A positive view of immigrants as contributing to the national DIVISIÓN DE ESTUDIOS INTERNACIONALES 31

36 Covadonga Meseguer and Gerardo Maldonado economy also makes Mexicans more liberal, providing Mexicans are not in the labor force. Finally, security threats do matter. Those considering that immigrants do not threaten national security are more likely to think that immigrants are too few. Exploring the opinion of leaders was interesting for two reasons. First, given that they are on average highly educated, leaders should feel particularly threatened by the arrival of highly educated immigrants. Thus, the elites survey provided an ideal opportunity to test the material interest hypothesis. Also, Brazilian elites (but unfortunately not the Brazilian public) responded questions about foreigners. We could compare the elites of these two countries. In general, we found that elites opinions are shaped by very similar variables as the public s opinion. All in all, and in line with recent literature on advanced countries, we find values to be more relevant than economic self-interest to understanding restrictions to immigration in Brazil and Mexico. Emerging countries should however reflect whether opportunities are being missed by not engaging in a more liberal immigration policy that could bring talent and fiscal resources, to their growing economies. 32 CIDE

37 Kind Resistance: Attitudes toward Immigrants in Mexico and Brazil References Borjas, G. (1999), Heaven s Door: Immigration Policy and the American Economy, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Borjas, G., R. Freeman and L. Katz (1996), Searching for the Effect of Immigration on the Labor Market, American Economic Review, 86 (2): Borjas, G., R. Freeman and L. Katz (1997), How Much Do Immigration and Trade Affect Labor Market Outcomes?, Brooking Papers on Economic Activity, 1: Chandler, Ch. and Y.-M. Tsai (2001), Social Factors Influencing Immigration Attitudes: An Analysis of Data from the General Social Survey, Social Science Journal, 38: Citrin, J., D. Green, Ch. Muste and C. Wong (1997), Public Opinion toward Immigration Reform: The Role of Economic Motivations, Journal of Politics, 59: Cobo, S (2010), Los Inmigrantes Españoles Contemporáneos en México: Una Mirada a sus Perfiles Sociodemográficos y sus Patrones de Participación Laboral. En Rodríguez, E. (editor) Extranjeros en México. Continuidades y Aproximaciones pp: Mexico City: Centro de Estudios Migratorios. Cordero, E (2010), La Inmigración en México a Inicios del Siglo XXI. En Rodríguez, E. (editor) Extranjeros en México. Continuidades y Aproximaciones, pp Mexico City: Centro de Estudios Migratorios. Faccini, G., A. Mayda and M. Mendola (2011), South-South Migration and the Labor Market: Evidence from South Africa. Paper delivered at the 8 th IZA Annual Migration Meeting and 3rd Migration Topic Week, Washington, May. Gindling, T. H. (2009), South South Migration: The Impact of Nicaraguan Immigrants on Earnings, Inequality and Poverty in Costa Rica. World Development, 37(1): Gomes, C. P. (2003), La Migración Labora en Brasil. In E. Texidó, G. Baer, N. Pérez, A. M. Santestevan and C. P. Gomes Migraciones Laborales en Sudamérica: El Mercosur Ampliado. Estudios sobre Migraciones Internacionales. Geneva: International Labor Organization. Hainmueller, J and M. Hiscox (2007), Educated Preferences: Explaining Attitudes toward Immigration in Europe, International Organization, 61: Hainmueller, J. and M. Hiscox (2010), Attitudes toward Highly Skilled and Low- Skilled Immigration: Evidence from a Survey Experiment, American Political Science Review, 104: Lida, C. E. (2006). Los Españoles en el México Independiente: Un Estado de la Cuestión. Historia Mexicana, LVI: 2(222): Mayda. A.M. (2006), Who is Against Immigration? A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward Immigrants. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 88: DIVISIÓN DE ESTUDIOS INTERNACIONALES 33

38 Covadonga Meseguer and Gerardo Maldonado McClaren, L. (2003), Anti-Immigrant Prejudice in Europe: Contact, Threat Perception, and Preferences for the Exclusion of Migrants. Social Forces, 81(3): International Migration Organization (2010), Perfil Migratório do Brasil Geneva: International Migration Organization. Mexico, the Americas and The World Mexico City: CIDE. Misha, P (2007), Emigration and wages in source countries: Evidence from Mexico. Journal of Development Economics, 82: Palma Mora, M. (2008), De tierras extrañas: Un estudio sobre la inmigración en México, , México: Instituto Nacional de Migración-Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia-DGE Ediciones. Paredes, G (2009), Migración de Guatemaltecos a México y Estados Unidos a partir de la Encuesta sobre Migración en la Frontera Guatemala-México 2004: Un análisis de Estrategias Migratorias. Migraciones Internacionales 5(1): Pardos-Prado, Sergi (2011), Framing Attitudes toward Immigrants in Europe: When Competition Does Not Matter, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 37: Pla Bruget, D. (2006), Ser español en México, para bien y para mal, en D. Salazar, ed., Xenofobia y xenofilia en la historia de México, siglos XIX y XX, México: Instituto Nacional de Migración--Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia-DGE Ediciones. Powell, G. B. (2004), Political Representation, Annual Review of Political Science, 7: Ratha, D and W. Shaw (2007), South-South Migration and Remittances. World Bank Working Paper, no Salazar, D. (2006), Introducción, en D. Salazar, ed., Xenofobia y xenofilia en la historia de México, siglos XIX y XX, México: Instituto Nacional de Migración-- Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia-DGE Ediciones. Scheve, K. and M. Slaughter (2001), Labor Market Competition and Individual Preferences over Immigration Policy, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 83 (1): Sides, J. And J. Citrin (2007), European Opinion about Immigration: The Role of Identities, Interests, and Information, British Journal of Political Science, 37: Solimano, A (2010), International Migration in the Age of Crisis and Globalization. Historical and Recent Experiences. New York: Cambridge University Press. Thomassen J. and Hermann Schmitt (1997), Policy Representation, European Journal of Political Research, 32: CIDE

39 Novedades DIVISIÓN DE ADMINISTRACIÓN PÚBLICA Ma. Amparo Casar, Representation and Decision Making in the Mexican Congress, DTAP-258 Guillermo Cejudo y Dirk Zavala, Procesos y prácticas del acceso a la información: un ejercicio de usuario simulado, DTAP-257 Ernesto Flores-Roux y Judith Mariscal, The Development of Mobile Money Systems, DTAP-256 David Arellano et al., Control de los conflictos de interés, DTAP-255 David Arellano, Víctor Figueras y Walter Lepore, Política de tránsito en el DF de México: una introducción a su estudio empírico, DTAP-254 Sergio Cárdenas y Maximiliano Cárdenas, La participación del poder legislativo en la definición de la política educativa en México, DTAP-253 Sergio Cárdenas, Administración centrada en la escuela, DTAP-252 Joanna D. Lucio, Edgar Ramírez y Sergio Cárdenas, Libertad para quién? El efecto de comunidades cerradas en el espacio urbano, DTAP-251 Edgar E. Ramírez, Land Development Permitting, DTAP-250 Rodrigo Sandoval-Almazán, Luis F. Luna-Reyes y J. Ramón Gil-García, Índice de Gobierno Electrónico Estatal: La medición 2009, DTAP-249 DIVISIÓN DE ECONOMÍA Rafael Garduño-Rivera and Esteban Fernández-Vázquez, Ecological Inference with Entropy Econometrics: Using the Mexican Census as a Benchmark, DTE-511 Rafael Garduño, Kathy Baylis and Mary P. Arends-Kuenning, Regional Economic Analysis of Internal Migration in Mexico, DTE-510 Brasil Acosta Peña and Andrés Aradillas López, Semi-Empirical Likelihood Estimation of Manufacturing Interaction-Based Model, DTE-509 Brasil Acosta Peña, Technical Efficiency in the Mexican Manufacturing Sector: A Stochastic Frontier Approach, DTE-508 Brasil Acosta Peña, Estimation of a Multiple Equilibrium Game with Complete Information, DTE-507 Juan Rosellón, Anne Neumann and Hannes Weigt, Removing Cross-Border Capacity Bottlenecks in the European Natural Gas Market, DTE-506 Alejandro López and Javier Parada, Poverty Dynamics in Rural Mexico: An Analysis Using Four Generations of Poverty Measurement, DTE-505 Kaniska Dam and Antonio Jiménez-Martínez, A Note on Bargaining over Complementary Pieces of Information in Networks, DTE-504 David Mayer y Grodecz Ramírez, Ciclo de vida humano y ciclo de vida urbano: Urbanización y desarrollo económico, DTE-503 Kaniska Dam y Daniel Ruiz Pérez, On the Existence of Sharecropping, DTE-502

40 DIVISIÓN DE ESTUDIOS INTERNACIONALES Rafael Velázquez, La política exterior de Estados Unidos hacia México bajo la administración de Barack Obama, DTEI-220 Rafael Velázquez y Jorge Schiavon, La cooperación internacional descentralizada para el desarrollo en México, DTEI-219 Kimberly A. Nolan García, Whose Preferences?: Latin American Trade Promotion Pacts as a Tool of US Foreign Policy, DTEI-218 Farid Kahhat, Rodrigo Morales y Ana Paula Peñalva, El Perú, las Américas y el Mundo. Opinión pública y política exterior en Perú, 2010, DTEI-217 Guadalupe González, Jorge Schiavon, David Crow y Gerardo Maldonado, Mexico, the Americas and the World 2010, DTEI-216 Guadalupe González, Jorge Schiavon, David Crow y Gerardo Maldonado, México, las Américas y el Mundo Política exterior: Opinión pública y líderes, DTEI-215 Gerardo Maldonado, Desapego político y desafección institucional en México: Desafíos para la calidad de la democracia?, DTEI-214 Luz María de la Mora, Opening Markets without Reciprocity: Explaining Mexico s Trade Policy, , DTEI-213 Farid Kahhat, Las industrias extractivas y sus implicaciones políticas y económicas, DTEI-212 Mariana Magaldi de Sousa, Trade Openness and the Channels of its Impact on Democracy, DTEI-211 DIVISIÓN DE ESTUDIOS JURÍDICOS María Mercedes Albornoz, Cooperación interamericana en materia de restitución de menores, DTEJ-56 Marcelo Bergman, Crimen y desempleo en México: Una correlación espuria?, DTEJ- 55 Jimena Moreno, Xiao Recio y Cynthia Michel, La conservación del acuario del mundo. Alternativas y recomendaciones para el Golfo de California, DTEJ-54 María Solange Maqueo, Mecanismos de tutela de los derechos de los beneficiarios, DTEJ-53 Rodolfo Sarsfield, The Mordida s Game. How institutions incentive corruption, DTEJ-52 Ángela Guerrero, Alejandro Madrazo, José Cruz y Tania Ramírez, Identificación de las estrategias de la industria tabacalera en México, DTEJ-51 Estefanía Vela, Current Abortion Regulation in Mexico, DTEJ-50 Adriana García and Alejandro Tello, Salaries, Appelate Jurisdiction and Judges Performance, DTEJ-49 Ana Elena Fierro and Adriana García, Design Matters: The Case of Mexican Administrative Courts, DTEJ-48 Gustavo Fondevila, Estudio de percepción de magistrados del servicio de administración de justicia familiar en el Distrito Federal, DTEJ-47

41 DIVISIÓN DE ESTUDIOS POLÍTICOS Ana Carolina Garriga, Regulatory Lags, Liberalization, and Vulnerability to Systemic Banking Crises, DTEP-232 Rosario Aguilar, The Tones of Democratic Challenges: Skin Color and Race in Mexico, DTEP-231 Rosario Aguilar, Social and Political Consequences of Stereotypes Related to Racial Phenotypes in Mexico, DTEP-230 Raúl C. González and Caitlin Milazzo, An Argument for the Best Loser Principle in Mexico, DTEP-229 Francisco Javier Aparicio and Covadonga Meseguer, Supply or Demand? Politics and the 3x1 Program for Migrants, DTEP-228 Ana Carolina Garriga and Brian J. Phillips, Foreign Aid and Investment in Post- Conflict Countries, DTEP-227 Allyson Benton, The Origins of Mexico's Municipal Usos y Costumbres Regimes, DTEP- 226 Ana Carolina Garriga, Objetivos, instrumentos y resultados de política monetaria. México , DTEP-225 Andreas Schedler, The Limits to Bureaucratic Measurement. Observation and Judgment in Comparative Political Data Development, DTEP-224 Andrea Pozas and Julio Ríos, Constituted Powers in Constitution-Making Processes. Supreme Court Judges, Constitutional Reform and the Design of Judicial Councils, DTEP-223 DIVISIÓN DE HISTORIA Michael Sauter, Human Space: The Rise of Euclidism and the Construction of an Early-Modern World, , DTH-75 Michael Sauter, Strangers to the World: Astronomy and the Birth of Anthropology in the Eighteenth Century, DTH-74 Jean Meyer, Una revista curial antisemita en el siglo XIX: Civiltá Cattolica, DTH-73 Jean Meyer, Dos siglos, dos naciones: México y Francia, , DTH-72 Adriana Luna, La era legislativa en Nápoles: De soberanías y tradiciones, DTH-71 Adriana Luna, El surgimiento de la Escuela de Economía Política Napolitana, DTH-70 Pablo Mijangos, La historiografía jurídica mexicana durante los últimos veinte años, DTH-69 Sergio Visacovsky, Hasta la próxima crisis. Historia cíclica, virtudes genealógicas y la identidad de clase media entre los afectados por la debacle financiera en la Argentina ( ), DTH-68 Rafael Rojas, El debate de la Independencia. Opinión pública y guerra civil en México ( ), DTH-67 Michael Sauter, The Liminality of Man: Astronomy and the Birth of Anthropology in the Eighteenth Century, DTH-66

42 Ventas El CIDE es una institución de educación superior especializada particularmente en las disciplinas de Economía, Administración Pública, Estudios Internacionales, Estudios Políticos, Historia y Estudios Jurídicos. El Centro publica, como producto del ejercicio intelectual de sus investigadores, libros, documentos de trabajo, y cuatro revistas especializadas: Gestión y Política Pública, Política y Gobierno, Economía Mexicana Nueva Época e Istor. Para adquirir cualquiera de estas publicaciones, le ofrecemos las siguientes opciones: VENTAS DIRECTAS: Tel. Directo: Tel: Ext y 6091 Fax: Ext Av. Constituyentes 1046, 1er piso, Col. Lomas Altas, Del. Álvaro Obregón, 11950, México, D.F. VENTAS EN LÍNEA: Librería virtual: Dudas y comentarios: publicaciones@cide.edu Colecciones completas!! Adquiere los CDs de las colecciones completas de los documentos de trabajo de todas las divisiones académicas del CIDE: Economía, Administración Pública, Estudios Internacionales, Estudios Políticos, Historia y Estudios Jurídicos. Nuevo! Arma tu CD!! Visita nuestra Librería Virtual y selecciona entre 10 y 20 documentos de trabajo. A partir de tu lista te enviaremos un CD con los documentos que elegiste.