Kyrgyzstan. FAST Update 4 / August October Matthias Müller Dr. Heinz Krummenacher

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1 Berne, November 2001 F A S T Kyrgyzstan FAST Update 4 / 2001 August October 2001 Matthias Müller Dr. Heinz Krummenacher Swiss Peace Foundation Institute for Conflict Resolution / SDC Department of Foreign Affairs

2 Table of Content 1 RISK ASSESSMENT KYRGYZSTAN CHRONOLOGY KYRGYZSTAN TENSION BAROMETERS KYRGYZSTAN ANALYTICAL RASTER KYRGYZSTAN...10 Note by the authors: For more general information on Kyrgyzstan (e.g. socio-demographic figures) see: FAST Report on Central Asia, 2 / 2000, p.16ff. Swiss Peace Foundation Institute for Conflict Resolution / SDC Department of Foreign Affairs 1

3 1 Risk Assessment Kyrgyzstan 1 Due to the expected boost in financial and military assistance after the terrorist attacks of September 11, the already low risk for violent conflict in the short and mid term has become even smaller. However, if Kyrgyzstan continues to further crack down on the secular and religious opposition instead of stimulating the weak domestic economy this would inevitably increase people s discontent compelling them to support groups which offer alternative concepts of power, such as Hezb-ut-Tahrir. If rising civilian discontent with the declining economic conditions can be exploited by radical opposition forces, tensions at some point will inevitably lead to armed conflict. Factors Increasing The Likelihood Of Armed Conflict The situation within Kyrgyzstan has been stable for the past three months. This is reflected in a consistently high degree of system stability (see Conflict Carrying Capacity Curve, p. 8) and rather low levels of Forceful Actions (see Forceful Actions Curve, p. 8). While Kyrgyzstan s stability is not threatened in the short term, the rising level of protests and demonstrations (see Protest Demonstrations Curve, p. 9) seems to indicate that this might change in the future. Central Asian governments as well as various political analysts fear that 11th September terror attacks in the US might have dangerous consequences for the republics in Central Asia. Recent developments indeed do have consequences on the stability, both in the short- and long term. Due to the expected increase in financial and military assistance (see Decreasing Likelihood of Armed Conflict), the already low risk for violent conflict in the short and mid term has become even smaller. However, if Kyrgyzstan uses the international financial community s increased support to further crack down on the secular and religious opposition instead of stimulating the weak domestic economy, this would inevitably enhance people s discontent, eventually compelling them to support groups which offer alternative concepts of power, such as Hezb-ut-Tahrir. When Kyrgyzstan broke loose from the Soviet Union and traded Soviet type planned economy against Western-style free market economy, there was hope that 1 This assessment is based on the analysis of events and developments from August to October 2001 along the FAST Analytical Monitoring Raster for Kyrgyzstan (see heading 4). Swiss Peace Foundation Institute for Conflict Resolution / SDC Department of Foreign Affairs 2

4 Kyrgyzstan would achieve self sustainablility. However, Kyrgyzstan s economic output declined during the initial period of transition and dit not recover until This recovery, however, was largely driven by the fact that the Kumtor gold mine started production, while the contribution of the emerging private sector was still negligible. In the second half of 1998 the Russian financial and economic crisis brought the relatively favourable performance to an abrupt halt. The economic crisis tightened even more in 1999 when Uzbekistan as well as Kazakhstan restricted cross border trade, and there has been no improvement ever since. Together with the severe economic crisis the fiscal situation of the Bishkek government worsened dramatically (see FAST Update ). As a consequence, the Kyrgyz government lost its ability to act at a time in which the economy and the people would have needed most urgently government leadership. Despite of President Akayev s very positive assessments and lofty plans, the Kyrgyz economic policy consiss of little more than debt management. In the climate of growing dissatisfaction, Akayev forsook the path of democratisation and turned last year s parliamentary and presidential elections into a farce. Consequently, times in which Kyrgyzstan was treated as the darling of the international community came to an abrupt end. Thus, increased fiscal and reform pressure has been imposed on Kyrgyzstan by its international donors. During their invasions of the past two years, querillas of IMU did find some support among the local population of Southern Kyrgyzstan. Even though people from this area are not particularly disposed to Islam or militancy, they appreciated that the fighters treated them fairly and paid them well for staple foods. For most of the people this is in sharp contrast to the Bishkek government: While these people pay their taxes once a year, the central government is offering no contribution in return. The main factor for social unrest in Kyrgyzstan is not Islamic Extremism but the need for alternatives that promise amelioration of today s hard living conditions. Thus, the greatest threat to political stability remains public discontent with the economic conditions. The period under consideration again tells the story of continuing policy failures under the present regime: Instead of supporting domestic economy and integrating different factions into the Kyrgyz society, the Bishkek government jailed public figures of both the secular and religious opposition, raised taxes for venders of the Osh market, and because of outstanding debts didn t reach an agreement with neighbouring Uzbekistan on further gas supply, which is essential for the domestic Swiss Peace Foundation Institute for Conflict Resolution / SDC Department of Foreign Affairs 3

5 economy. Not surprisingly, discontent within the Kyrgyz society is increasing slowly but continuously (See FAST Update, ). The growing number of protests and demonstrations (see Protest Demonstrations Curve, p.9) even if they are still predominantly targeted at local authorities are a clear sign that people are beginning to link their miserable living conditions with the failed policy of the central government in Bishkek. If this process continues, many ordinary Muslims, disillusioned by the poor performance of the post-soviet government, will join organisations such as Hezb-ut Tahrir. While Hezb-ut Tahrir actually pursues its goal of creating a Muslim state by peaceful means, they eventually could become radicalised if the authorities continue to indiscriminately crack down on all opposition groups. With such a scenario becoming more and more likely, the danger of large scale armed conflict in Kyrgyzstan increases as well not in the very short but in the mid to long term. Factors Decreasing The Likelihood Of Armed Conflict The VRA Tension Barometers indicate a high degree of stability for Kyrgyzstan for the past three months (see CCC and Goldstein average, p.8). In the following we point out why Kyrgyzstan s stability is not immediately threatened in the near future. For Kyrgyzstan, once labelled as an island of democracy, the September 11th terrorist attacks in the US could have come just at the right time to (1) find a way out of its severe economic crisis, which bears the potential for future social unrest, and (2) to lessen the military vulnerability of the country by stationing Russian troops in Southern Kyrgyzstan. Ironically enough, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) rebels are giving the Akayev government a chance to find a way out of its economic crisis and thus, contribute to Kyrgyzstan s stability. Thanks to the so-called terrorists of the, Kyrgyzstan most certainly will receive extended financial assistance by international donors (the US, EU, and the World Bank). The IMF already deblocked a 90 million $ credit, which was blocked due to the IMF s displeasure at Akayev s unilateral decision in July of this year to cut income tax rates. In addition to IMF credits, German Federal Chancellor Gerhard Schröder gave signals to the whole region of Central Asia that he will assist these countries financially in their fight against terrorism. Thus, Akayev may find enough money to finance planned projects to fight poverty (60% of the Kyrgyz population live below the poverty line; in the South of the country this figure is most probably even higher) and to support small and medium Swiss Peace Foundation Institute for Conflict Resolution / SDC Department of Foreign Affairs 4

6 businesses projects which are reasonable on paper but until now were absolutely unrealistic to be implemented. Kyrgyzstan does not only profit from changes in world politics in terms of economic assistance, but also in millitary terms. The US, and Russia even more, will help Kyrgyzstan overcome its vulnerability that allowed the IMU rebels to launch invasions into Kyrgyzstan during the past two years. Russia already announced to station for the first after the disintegration of the Sovjet Union troops on Kyrgyz territory. Unlike at previous occasions (implementation of an anti-terrorism centre and of a rapid deployment force in the framework of the Common Wealth of Independent States), we believe that this time s Russian announcement is more than just lip service. Russia that is worried about Uzbekistan s recent move away from the Russian sphere of influence (see Uzbekistan Update , p. 1f) is now trying to consolidate its position in Central Asia and thus will most certainly build up the military platform in the South of the country. The presence of military forces will undoubtedly add increased stability at least in the short term: Due to the presence of Russian military forces, fighters of the IMU rebels would face substantial difficulties launching a new military incursion into Kyrgyzstan. We don t believe that the ongoing Afghan war will have a negative short term impact. Many analysts as well as the Kyrgyz government itself fear that the new war in Afghanistan might result in a refugee influx into the Central Asian republics that would skew the current distribution of resources. We believe that the probability of such a scenario is very low because of the following reasons:! A possible refugee stream would affect first the neighouring countries, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.! The emergence of new refugee flows in Northern Afghanistan is very unlikely as the military battles are shifting south, rather than north.! When the Taliban launched their offensive against the Northern Alliance last year, only few refugees tried to move in northern direction.! The Kyrgyz government is trying to avoid a renewed refugee influx into its country, as Bishkek is well aware of the dangerous impact of such a scenario. Swiss Peace Foundation Institute for Conflict Resolution / SDC Department of Foreign Affairs 5

7 2 Chronology Kyrgyzstan Reuters, Itar Tass, Soros Foundation, FAST Local Network. Date Events 2001 Aug 1 The Bishkek City Arbitration Court refused to consider two suits against the Justice Ministry brought up by the editor of the newspaper "My Capital City" and the founder of the newspapers "Agym," "Techenie," and "Joltiken. The ministry registered these newspapers in May, but decided that those registrations were not valid and annulled them Aug 1 According to government information the delimitation of the Kyrgyz-Uzbek state border has been completed in the districts of Ala-Buka, Aksy and Chatkal of the southern Jalal-Abad Province. A special Kyrgyz-Uzbek inter- governmental commission is trying to solve the demarcation problems. There are about 140 disputable sites along the 1,300-kilometerlong border between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan Aug 6 Ten non-governmental organizations and independent journalists signed an appeal to President Askar Akayev claiming to release opposition politician Topchubek Turgunaliev. The National Security Service accuses Turgunaliev of preparing a plot to assassinate President Askar Akayev and a district court sentenced him to 16 years of imprisonment on 1 September The Bishkek city court reduced his term to 6 years on 24 November. Several other people were sentenced to different jail terms together with Turgunaliev, but all of them were amnestied on 30 November Aug 8 Kyrgyz deputy minister of agriculture, water resources, and food processing, Barataaly Koshmuratov stated that Kyrgyzstan will establish special commissions to draft regulations for receiving water payment from Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. According to ministerial information Kyrgyzstan needs some 1.2 billion soms ($25 million) annually to upkeep reservoirs that provide water primarily for neighbouring countries. Kyrgyzstan's President Askar Akayev on July 23 enacted a law passed one month earlier by the Kyrgyz parliament designating water as a commodity Aug 9 The National Security Service Medet Talyev decided to confiscate all property belonging to former Kyrgyz vice president Feliks Kulov Aug 9 A 13-member delegation from the public committee for Kyrgyz-Chinese border questions returned to Bishkek after a trip to inspect the region. According to a border agreement, Kyrgyzstan has to cede hectares of land to China. The leader of the Human Rights Movement of Kyrgyzstan, Tursunbek Akunov, confirmed that the land in question consists of rocky and mountainous terrain rather than arable or pasture land Aug 10 About 200 women blocked the central streets of Osh, protesting against a decision by local authorities to stop street trade in the Osh city centre. The police dispersed the picket by force and detained 15 of the women. One of the picket participants, Aigul Mamasheva, stated that they sell fruits and vegetables and have no other means of subsistence Aug 16 According to presidential sources Askar Akayev, decided that he will not run for an other presidential term in Aug 20 The Osh Regional state administration adopted a resolution on measures to prevent HIV infections. The Osh Region Governor Naken Kasiyev classifies the spread of the HIV-virus as dramatic. The Osh town council and the Kara Su District state administration are each to allocate 20,000 soms (about 400 dollars) for the mass printing of information and educational materials on preventing HIV infection Aug 20 President Askar Akayev issued a decree granting what he calls "clemency" to Erkindik party leader Topchubek Turgunaliev. Turgunaliev was sentenced to 16 years imprisonment on charges, of masterminding a plot to assassinate Akayev Aug 21 Kyrgyz Prime Minister Kurmanbek Bakyev stated that corruption is assuming increasingly dangerous dimensions in his country Aug 24 Erkin Topchubek, the recently amnestied leader of the Ekindik opposition party, stated that "there has never been a functioning opposition in Kyrgyzstan nor is there one now." 2001 Aug 24 Kazakhstan announced to pay its water debts to Kyrgyzstan in 2002 by supplying 400,000 tons of coal (worth $12 million) and power engineering equipment (worth $5.8 million) Aug 28 Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev signed a decree on measures to provide support to ethnic K h illi K H i d f f i Swiss Peace Foundation Institute for Conflict Resolution / SDC Department of Foreign Affairs 6

8 Kyrgyz who are willing to return to Kyrgyzstan. However, migrants and refugees are facing various problems as the prohibition to register newborn children, and marriages. They are also not allowed to get residence permits, or to work Sept 4 Deputies to the Kyrgyz Legislative Assembly refused to ratify a treaty on arms supplies to Uzbekistan signed last year by the presidents of the two countries. The deputies complained that Uzbek border guards increasingly encroach on Kyrgyz territory and extort money and goods from residents of southern Kyrgyzstan Sept 14 Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev decided to relocate the headquarter of the Defence Ministry's Border Guard to Osh in southern Kyrgyzstan Sept 19 An International Monetary Found (IMF) delegation headed by Tapio Savolainen met in Bishkek with Prime Minister Kurmanbek Bakyev and Finance Ministry officials to discuss a planned new three-year cooperation program. In the framework of the program in question Kyrgyzstan would receive $90 million Sept 24 Representatives of Kyrgyz traders who have just been expelled from Kazakhstan staged a protest outside the Kazakh Embassy in Bishkek. The traders, who ran market stalls in Almaty, said the Kazakh police began rounding them up on 21 September, annulled their registration papers with no explanation, and transported them to the Kazakh-Kyrgyz border. The total number of Kyrgyz traders in Kazakhstan is estimated at Sept 25 After consultation with fellow signatories to the CIS Collective Security Treaty, Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev has offered to open its airspace to the U.S. aircraft during a counter-terrorism strike against the Taleban. Akayev said that the offer was accepted Sept 26 Kyrgyz Deputy Foreign Minister Asanbek Osmonaliev pointed out that the U.S. has the right to attack terrorist bases in Afghanistan and that Bishkek supports these efforts Oct 1 IMF representative to Central Asia Tapio Sayolainen, and Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev, reached an agreement on a new three-year cooperation program. In the framework of the new program Kyrgyzstan will receive up to $90 million in new loans which were delayed due to the fund's displeasure at Akaev's unilateral decision in July to cut income tax rates Oct 1 Tursunbai Bakir Uulu, leader of the progressive Erkin party, announced that his party will shortly abandon its policy of constructive opposition Oct 5 Participants at a meeting of the Kyrgyz-Russian interparliamentary commission decided to propose to both governments the creation of a joint military base in southern Kyrgyzstan Oct 6 A delegation from Kyrgyzstan's southern Batken Oblast met at the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border with representatives from the Ferghana Oblast in neighbouring Uzbekistan whom they persuaded to remove two additional border checkpoints set up several days earlier Oct 13 Uzbekistan stopped all gas deliveries to Kyrgyzstan because of outstanding debts. A Chu Oblast administration official stated that several industrial enterprises stopped functioning due to the cut-off in gas supplies Oct 22 The Kyrgyz government has submitted a new draft law to the parliament, raising the tax rate to 20 percent. In June, the parliament passed a law, lowering the tax rate from 30 to 10 percent as of 1 January The IMF subsequently adduced that cut as grounds for withholding a planned $35 million loan tranche Oct 22 Some 150 farmers in the Djalalabad Oblast blocked the main Bishkek-Osh highway for seven hours to protest the government's failure to keep its promise to buy cotton at 20 soms (about $0.4) per kilo. Four protesters were arrested and a further 17 fined for disturbing public order. Cotton prices on world markets are currently very low, and farmers are unable to sell their crop even for the half of the arranged sum Oct 24 Kyrgyz and Uzbek government officials reached an agreement on further gas supplies from Uzbekistan to Kyrgyzstan Oct 29 A district court in Kyrgyzstan's southern Djalalabad Oblast sentenced five members of the banned Hezb-ut-Tahrir movement to jail terms ranging from 3 to 17 years. A police official in Djalalabad stated that 67 Hezb ut-tahrir activists have been arrested only in the Djalalabad oblast in Oct 31 The U.S. delivered a shipment of humanitarian aid worth $5 million to Bishkek. The humanitarian aid is to be shared among 50 hospitals in Bishkek. Washington declared that it will increase its humanitarian aid to Kyrgyzstan in Swiss Peace Foundation Institute for Conflict Resolution / SDC Department of Foreign Affairs 7

9 3 Tension Barometers Kyrgyzstan (Monthly) Source: FAST Country Coordinator Conflict Carrying Capacity and Forceful Actions /4 2000/5 2000/6 2000/7 2000/8 2000/9 2000/ / / /1 2001/2 2001/3 2001/4 2001/5 2001/6 2001/7 2001/8 2001/9 2001/10 n=14 n=16 n=16 n=14 n=16 n=15 n=20 n=13 n=26 n=35 n=35 n=20 n=48 n=68 n=86 n=89 n=85 n=107n=111 CCC Forceful Actions Conflict Carrying Capacity (CCC): Reflects the stability of the system or polity as a whole rather than a particular regime or administration. A CCC trend line approaching 1.0 suggests 100 % stability. Forceful Action (FA): Refers to the proportion of any and all uses of physical force and any associated manifest violence by any actor. When the CCC and FA trend lines intersect it implies severe regime instability coupled with violence. n : Signifies the number of events per month reported by the FAST Kyrgyzstan Country-Coordinator. 8 Goldstein Conflict and Cooperation n=14 n=16 n=16 n=14 n=16 n=15 n=20 n=25 n=26 n=35 n=35 n=20 n=48 n=68 n=86 n=89 n=85 n=107 n=111 Goldstein Conflict and Cooperation Goldstein Conflict and Cooperation: Measures the relationship between individuals, groups, or states ranging from 8.4 for unmitigated conflict to for complete cooperation, whereas 0 stands for neutral events. The Goldstein scale summarises the different values to an average for every time period. The value 0 indicates that the sum of all negatively and positively valued events revoke each other. Swiss Peace Foundation Institute for Conflict Resolution / SDC Department of Foreign Affairs 8

10 Number of Protest Demonstrations /6 2000/7 2000/8 2000/9 2000/ / / /1 2001/2 2001/3 2001/4 2001/5 2001/6 2001/7 2001/8 2001/9 2001/10 n=16 n=14 n=16 n=15 n=20 n=25 n=26 n=35 n=35 n=20 n=48 n=68 n=86 n=89 n=85 n=107 n=111 Protest Demonstrations Protest Demonstrations: signifies the number of protest demonstrations, and control crowds events. Swiss Peace Foundation Institute for Conflict Resolution / SDC Department of Foreign Affairs 9

11 4 Analytical Raster Kyrgyzstan ROOT CAUSES PROXIMATE CAUSES Intervening Factors A Historic # Weak national identity # Soviet hegemony / legacy Political / Institutional # Authoritarian political culture (as a perpetuating pattern of the Soviet area) # Aggravated access for Southerners to state institutions # Ruling of the old Soviet nomenclature Societal / Socio-Demographic # Negative impact of clan structure on nation building # Tensions between the Northern and the Southern part of the country Economic # Double economic transition: Transition from a planned oriented marked to a market economy and the transition from a colonized management to the rules of management # Scarce natural resources # Poor economic infrastructure # Dependency on the agriculture sector International # Arbitrary national borders with neighboring countries # Russia s interest in Kyrgyzstan Political / Governance # Crack down on all opposition parties # Hierarchical decision-making process # Widespread corruption Security # Incursions by militant Islamists (IMU) Societal / Socio-Demographic # Collapse of social infrastructure (education and health care) # Large Scale Migration because of deterioration of living conditions # Growing drug abuse Economic # Economic protectionism # Ongoing de-industrialization # High unemployment # Heavy taxation Ecological # Soil erosion # Soil and water poisoning because of poor watermanagement # Salienation of water and land International # Islamic agitation from abroad # Territorial claims by neighbouring states Decreasing the likelihood of conflict # Authoritarian political culture # History of ten years of political stability # Balance of power between different clans # Indifference of the people in religious matters # Fear of Tajik conditions and of the Taleban # Emerging civil society Intervening Factors Increasing the likelihood of conflict # Bureaucratic inefficiency # Indiscriminate arrests of Muslim activists # Harassment of independent religious and political movements # Closure of frontiers and rigid visa restrictions # Incursions by Islamic militants from Tajikistan # Eventual complete Taleban victory in Afghanistan R M E D C O N F L I C T Swiss Peace Foundation Institute for Conflict Resolution / SDC Department of Foreign Affairs 10