IDENTITY AND INSTITUTIONS SHAPING CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION:

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1 UNIVERSITY OF TARTU DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE JULIA BOMAN IDENTITY AND INSTITUTIONS SHAPING CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION IN THE ESTONIAN-RUSSIAN AND ROMANIAN-MOLDOVAN BORDERLANDS M. A. THESIS Advisor: Prof. Eiki Berg Tartu 2005

2 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 2 This M. A. thesis is the result of my independent research. All ideas and concepts borrowed from the works of other authors and other sources have been provided with proper references. JULIA BOMAN / /

3 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS: 1 INTRODUCTION THEORETICAL BACKGROUND MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE AND CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION THEORIZING CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION New Institutionalist Approach Institutional framework of cross-border cooperation Cross-border identity: historical-cultural and institutional SYNTHESISING THE THEO RETICAL DISCUSSION METHODOLOGY CONCEPTS, VARIABLES AND HYPOTHESES OPERATIONALIZATION AND MODE OF ANALYSIS Two cases studies: Estonian-Russian and Romanian-Moldovan cross-border cooperation Sources of evidence: project EXLINEA Operationalisation EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION ON THE ESTONIAN-RUSSIAN BORDER The profile of the Estonian-Russian cross-border region Quantitative and qualitative analysis: questionnaires and interviews Conclusions CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION ON THE ROMANIAN-MOLDOVAN BORDER The profile of the Romanian-Moldovan cross-border region Quantitative and qualitative analysis: questionnaires and in-depth interviews Conclusions COMPARISON OF THE SUCCESS OF CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION IN THE ESTONIAN- RUSSIAN AND ROMANIAN-MOLDOVAN CASE STUDIES CONCLUSIONS BIBLIOGRAPHY APPENDICES APPENDIX I: THE MAP OF THE EUROPEAN BORDER REGIONS 2000 (EDITOR: ASSOCIATION OF EUROPEAN BORDER REGIONS) APPENDIX II: THE MATERIALS FOR THE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH IN THE ESTONIAN-RUSSIAN AND ROMANIAN-MOLDOVAN BORDERLANDS In-depth interviews: TEMPLATE Standardised Questionnaire APPENDIX III: THE STATISTICAL DATA FROM THE ESTONIAN-RUSSIAN AND THE ROMANIAN-MOLDOVAN CASE STUDIES The Estonian-Russian case study The Romanian-Moldovan case study

4 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 4

5 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 5 1 INTRODUCTION Cross-border cooperation at the EU external borders aims to reduce the socioeconomic disparities between the border regions of the EU member-states and those of the neighbouring countries. While the first cases of cross-border cooperation within the EU appeared already in the 1950s and since then cross-border cooperation has developed into a variety of institutionalised forms, the situation at the EU current external borders is peculiar due to the large differences both in economic development and the political systems of the countries across the EU external border. What are the processes assuring the successful development of cross-border cooperation in these borderlands? This thesis aims to provide responses to this question by comparing two cases of cross-border cooperation in the Estonian-Russian and Romanian-Moldovan borderlands. Cross-border cooperation is defined in accordance with the definition used by the Association of European Border Regions, as neighbourly cooperation in all areas of life between regional and local authorities along the border and involving all actors 1. Crossborder cooperation has an important place in the border studies, where three major theoretical dimensions may be identified. First, cross-border cooperation has been studied from the perspectives of rational choice theories and neoclassical economics, where borders are perceived as barriers to economic efficiency. Second, cross-border cooperation has been a subject of policy-oriented research as well as institutionalist theoretical perspectives, where cross-border cooperation is viewed as a common virtue, especially in the context of the discourse on Europe of Regions and where for instance the EU policies (e.g. INTERREG) and institutions are believed to contribute to the creation of a cohesive and borderless Europe. Third, cross-border cooperation has been studied from the culturally- inflected and socialconstructivist perspectives, where borders and cross-border identities are believed to be shaped by the constantly changing perceptions of us and the other, cross-border regions being thus considered socially constructed spaces. These three approaches concentrate on different aspects of cross-border cooperation: the rational choice theory is used for the study of economic interaction; institutionalist and policy-oriented research explores the role of policies and institutions, while culturally-inflicted perspectives the role of identity, shaping cross-border cooperation. 1 Martinos, H. and Mahnkopf, K, Institutional Aspects of Cross-Border Cooperation, A report carried out by the Association of European Border Regions as part of the LACE-TAP Project, March 1999.

6 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 6 This thesis aims to establish a theoretical framework that would allow for a comprehensive analysis of the processes behind successful cross-border cooperation, as it is defined by the AEBR, and unites two separate dimensions in the theoretical research on crossborder cooperation, the study of institutions and identity shaping cross-border cooperation, into one theoretical model. Economic interaction appears largely to fall outside the scope of the institutionalised cross-border cooperation between the local/regional authorities across the border, and thus outside the scope of this thesis. On the one hand, cross-border is shaped by the institutional context and institutional identity, promoted by the actors of cross-border cooperation, and on the other, it is believed to depend on the existence of historical-cultural identity across the border. This theoretical model is based on the new institutionalist perspective for explaining the links between institutions, actors and identities, and on the multi-level governance model for providing a general framework for the study of cross-border cooperation as the interplay of institutions, actors and identities at various levels of governance. In the thesis, the empirical analysis involves the comparison of cross-border cooperation in the two case studies: in the Estonian-Russian and Romanian-Moldovan borderlands, and the use of a mix of quantitative and qualitative research methods. The comparison of the empirical results in the two case studies allows for two main conclusions. First, it appears that cross-border cooperation is relatively more successful where it has developed more towards multi-level governance, with the local/regional level enjoying more political autonomy and financial capacities, as well as direct access to the EU level institutions. Second, it appears that institutional identity is more important for successful cross-border cooperation than historical-cultural identity, where the latter may only have a minor facilitating and magnifying effect but does not appear to shape the development of cross-border cooperation. On the whole, although one cannot draw conclusions from the comparison of only two case studies, the empirical analysis provides strong support to the proposed theoretical model and the basis for the further comparative research of a larger scale. As for the structure of the thesis, it procedes to the second chapter on theoretical background, where the multi-level governance model is explained as a general framework for the study of cross-border cooperation, and which is then united with the new institutionalist theoretical model exploring the processes behind cross-border cooperation. The third chapter on methodology proposes hypotheses generated on the basis of the theoretical model and explains their operationalisation as well as the use of research methods. The fourth chapter includes the concise profiles of the Estonian-Russian and Romanian-Moldovan cross-border

7 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 7 regions and the empirical analysis of the quantitative and qualitative data in these two case studies. Finally, the conclusion provides a comparison of the empirical results from the two case studies, testing the proposed hypotheses and discussing theoretical implications. The empirical research of this thesis has been conducted largely thanks to the support of the Fifth Framework Programme of the European Commission, in the framework of the project EXLINEA Lines of Exclusion as Arenas of Co-operation: Reconfiguring the External Boundaries of Europe Policies, Practices, Perceptions. I would like to thank all project partners for their cooperation in working out the methodological templates for the conducted research as well as for providing inspiration for the theoretical advancement of this thesis through the multiple discussions and meetings. I would like to give my special thanks to project partners Henk van Houtum, James W. Scott, Roos Pijpers, Olivier Kramsch and Eiki Berg for their invaluable advice during my research on identity and institutions in crossborder cooperation, as well as for their inspiring work, which has been much used in the theoretical discussion in this thesis. Besides, I would like to thank all the people who helped me to conduct the empirical research in the Estonian-Russian and Romanian-Moldovan borderlands Nicoleta Culava, Vladimir Kolossov, Naderzhda Borodulina, Daniela Soitu, Grigore Musteata, Alla Skvortova and Karmo Tüür without them I would not have been able to carry out this study. I would also like to thank Andu Rämmer, who helped me with the statistical analysis of the quantitative data. Finally, I would like to thank my advisor, Prof. Eiki Berg, for sternly putting in order the chaos of my mind.

8 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 8 2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND The aim of this thesis is to study the processes ensuring efficient cross-border cooperation, and two cases of cross-border cooperation will be analysed empirically cross-border cooperation in the Estonian-Russian and Romanian-Moldovan borderlands. The two major processes behind the development of cross-border cooperation are assumed to be cross-border institutionalization and identity building. These two processes mostly have been studied separately, while this thesis suggests that the two should be united. Cross-border identity can be further divided into the historical-cultural identity, basing on the ethnic, historical or cultural links across the border, and the institutional identity, produced by the cross-border cooperation institutions and actors. As the nodal point for studying the institutional framework and the institutional identity of cross-border cooperation, a new institutionalist perspective is used. This theoretical model is placed into a more general framework of multilevel governance, which apart from providing the general context for analyzing cross-border cooperation, helps to distinguish among the multiple cross-border actors and institutions, which are located at local/regional, national and supranational levels of governance. Crossborder cooperation thus is best analysed as a multi-level cross-border governance, which depends on the coordination of multiple actors as well as the social construction of crossborder identity. Cross-border identity, as will be shown, is also a matter of negotiation among different cross-border actors and is produced and reproduced by cross-border institutions. Figuratively, the theoretical framework of this thesis can be depicted as follows (Fig. 1): Multi-level governance Cross-border cooperation Institutions Institutional identity Historical-cultural identity Fig. 1: The theoretical framework for cross-border cooperation

9 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION Multi-level governance and cross-border cooperation The multi-level governance model has evolved from the criticism of the state-centric theories of the European integration. While intergovernmentalism assumes that the state sovereignty is preserved and even strengthened through the EU membership, the leading multi-level governance theorists, Marks, Hooghe and Blank, point to the fact that the state sovereignty is becoming diffused across various levels of government subnational, national and supranational 2. The authors do not deny that the state still remains an important actor, yet it no longer monopolizes the EU level policy-making or the aggregation of domestic interests. Thus, the state power is being challenged both from below and from above. Marks et al emphasize the independent role of the EU institutions in the European policy-making, and stress that collective decision-making in the EU often does not reflect the lowest common denominator among the state executive positions, as intergovernmentalism would suggest. The multi-level governance model also rejects the division between the domestic and international arenas, pointing to the growing powers of the subnational actors. The subnational actors are not nested exclusively within the realm of the state executive preferences, but can act independently on both domestic and international arenas, creating transnational links or the links with the European level institutions. States no longer monopolize the links between the domestic and international arenas, but rather are one among a variety of actors contesting decisions that are made at a variety of levels 3. It is also through its continuous attention to the subnational level of government that the multi-level governance model has distinguished itself from the traditional theories of the European integration 4 and is often referred to as the study of the role of the regional and local levels in the EU multi-level governance 5. Neither intergovernmentalism nor neo-functionalism offers heuristic tools to study the subnational level, concentrating instead on the power game between the national and supra-national levels. The multi-level governance model expects that the subnational authorities have a choice to influence European policy through the member-state channels or by direct access to the European level. Marks et al for instance study regional representation at the European level as the outcome of overlapping 2 Marks, G., Hooghe, L., and Blank, K. European Integration fro m the 1980s: State-Centric v. Multi-Level Governance, in The European Union: Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration, Eds. B. Nelsen and A. Stubb, Houndmills, Palgrave, 1998, pp Ibid. p Hooghe, L. Introduction: Reconciling EU-Wide Policy and National Diversity, in Cohesion Policy and European Integration: Building Multi-Level Governance, Ed. L. Hooghe, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996, pp Hix, S. The Political System of the European Union. Houndmills, Macmillan Press Ltd, 1999, p. 18.

10 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 10 competences, tensions and conflicts in a system of multi-level governance 6. The authors argue that certain regions may be reluctant to channel their interests solely through the state mechanisms because they might have political interests divergent with those of the state, such as a strong sense of regional identity or a different political orientation. Further, the large overlap between the competences of the subnational and supranational levels and the need for the information exchange between these regions and the European Commission provide another reason for the regional representation in Brussels. The creation of the Committee of the Regions and the establishment of the regional representation offices in Brussels is seen as a step towards a larger subnational autonomy within Europe. Yet, the subnational mobilization has not superseded the national level and intergovernmental bargaining, and Europe has not become a Europe of the Regions 7. Instead, the subnational mobilization proceeds unevenly across the EU, where the regional or local authorities with more resources and capacities would be more successful in gaining access to the European arena. Instead of a Europe of the Regions Europe has become, to use Hooghe s coined term, a Europe with the Regions 8, or even, a Europe with some regions 9. At the same time, as Marks et al point out, there would not be any incentive for the regional authorities to open an office in Brussels if all relevant decisions were made by the Council of Ministers or if there were no multiple cracks of access to the European institutions, enabling the regions to influence policy outcomes 10. It is because of its subnational dimension that the multi-level governance approach is fitted to serve as a general framework for the purposes of this paper. Cross-border cooperation entails a degree of subnational autonomy as well as the complex governance mechanisms that include subnational, national and supranational actors, in other words, multi-level governance mechanisms. However, while providing the general setting and the vocabulary for discussing cross-border cooperation in a wider multi-level context, the multi-level governance model does not provide sufficient tools to explain the development of cross-border cooperation as such. Rosamond criticizes the multi-level governance model for its theoretical deficiency, 6 Marks, G., Nielsen, F., Ray, L. and Salk, J. Competences, Cracks and Conflicts: Regional Mobilization in the European Union, in Governance in the European Union, Eds. G. Marks, F.W.Scharph, PH. C. Schmitter and W. Streeck, London, Sage Publication Ltd, 1996, p See Note 3, p Hooghe, L. Building a Europe with the Regions: The Changing Role of the European Commission, in Hooghe, L. Introduction: Reconciling EU -Wide Policy and National Diversity, in Cohesion Policy and European Integration: Building Multi-Level Governance, Ed. L. Hooghe, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996, pp See Note 5, p See Note 5, p. 62.

11 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 11 calling it rather an organizing metaphor rather than a theory because its main goal is descriptive: to capture the complex nature of the EU rather than to predict the dynamics of the European integration 11. Another type of criticism of the multi-level governance model concerns its underestimation of the power of the state. Although, the EU regional policy has been a much used example of multi-level governance, Bache concludes that it is premature to assign much autonomy to the subnational level because the state remains a gate keeper in the policy making process allowing the subnational units to participate but not to significantly affect the policy outcomes 12. Despite the criticisms, the multi-level governance approach still remains a powerful metaphor and a suitable framework, in which to study cross-border cooperation. In this paper, the multi-level governance model is not used as a testable theory to predict the dynamics of the EU integration or the dynamics of cross-border cooperation. Rather, it provides a good description of the context, in which cross-border cooperation occurs. Multi-level governance model fits best for the study of cross-border cooperation because, unlike other approaches, it has directed much attention towards the third level of governance in Europe 13. The approach focuses on the nature of opportunities for the subnational actors that emerge from the European institutional context as well as from the trends of decentralisation. Whether the third level has already gained much influence in the decision-making process or not, is of lesser importance; what matters is that according to the central principle of multi-level governance, the subnational level possesses competences in certain policy fields and should be able to act in the matters that have impact on those policies 14. This principle resonates with the principle of subsidiarity, introduced in the Maastricht Treaty and then developed in the Treaty of Amsterdam, which favours the decision-making at the lowest possible level in the EU multilevel system of governance. Bainbridge assumes that the introduction of the principle of subsidiarity, on its part, has helped regional empowerment in Europe 15. The development of cross-border cooperation can be seen as the evidence of the increasing autonomy of regions in their external relations with other regions, and thus, as an 11 Rosamond, B. New Theories of European Integration, in European Union Politics, Ed. M. Gini, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, p Bache, I. The Politics of European Union Regional Policy: Multi-Level Governance or Flexible Gatekeeping? Sheffield, Sheffield Academic Press, 1998, p Bullmann, U. The Politics of the Third Level, in The Regional Dimension of the European Union: Towards a Third Level in Europe? Ed. Ch. Jefferey, London, Frank Cass, 1997, pp. 3-20; Grix, J. Towards a Theoretical Approach to the Study of Cross-Border Cooperation, in Perspectives, 17/2001, p Jefferey, Ch. Regional Information Offices in Brussels and Multi-Level Governance in the EU: A UK- German Comparison, in The Regional Dimension of the European Union: Towards a Third Level in Europe? Ed. Ch. Jefferey, London, Frank Cass, 1997, pp Bainbridge, T., The Penguin Companion to European Union, London, Penguin Books Ltd, 1995, p. 424.

12 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 12 example of multi-level governance 16. Weyand finds that cross-border cooperation contributes not merely to the European integration, by achieving socioeconomic cohesion and a wefeeling across European borders, but also to the establishment of a multi-level Europe, where in addition to the states, regions and European institutions would have a decisive role in Community-building 17. Weyand contends that central governments still tend to regard crossborder cooperation as part of international relations and thus do act as gate keepers ; yet she notes that thanks to their increasing self-assertiveness, regions tend to find way around legal restrictions and continuously widen the range of their competences, engaging in international activities, opening representative offices in Brussels, signing international treaties and engaging in cross-border cooperation 18. Aside from the subnational level initiative, cross-border cooperation is fostered by the European level by means of various support schemes and programmes. Successful crossborder cooperation within the EU and across its external borders has been one of the goals of the EU supranational regional policy, i.e. the Cohesion Policy, according to which the increasing power of the sub-national levels and their interconnectedness contribute to the creation of coherent multi-level Europe with decreasing divisions between domestic and international politics 19. Instruments such as INTERREG, PHARE CBC and TACIS CBC offer funding to joint cross-border projects while Euroregions, which are being called laboratories of European integration, provide expertise in fund-raising and project oriented cooperation enjoying much political encouragement 20. Most authors agree that especially since the early 1970s, the EU policies and funding have been among the key motivating factors for setting up cross-border cooperation institutions such as Euroregions 21. Cross-border cooperation involves various actors starting from local and regional authorities, cross-border institutions including Euroregions, the state authorities, inter- 16 Weyand, S. Inter.Regional Associations and the European Integration Process, in The Regional Dimension of the European Union: Towards a Third Level in Europe? Ed. Ch. Jefferey, London, Frank Cass, 1997, pp Ibid. p Ibid. p Perkmann, M. Euroregions: Institutional Entrepreneurship in the European Union, in Globalization, Regionalization and Cross-Border Regions, Eds. M. Perkmann and N. L. Sum, Palgrave, MacMillan, 2002, pp ; and Hooghe, L. Cohesion Policy and European Integration: Building Multi-Level Governance, Oxford, Oxford University Press, See note 19, Perkmann; and note 21, Scott. 21 See for instance Scott, J. Cross-border Governance in the Baltic Sea Region, in Regional and Federal Studies, Vol. 12, Nr. 4, pp , 2002; Perkmann, M. The Rise of the Euroregion. A bird s eye perspective on European cross-border cooperation, pp. 1-18, 2003; Kennard, A. The Changing Role of Border Regions in Central and Eastern Europe, in EU Expansion to the East: Prospects and Problems, Eds. H. Ingham and M. Ingham, Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc., Northampton, 2002, pp ; Häkli, J. Cross-border regionalization in Catalonia, in Cross-Border Governance in the European Union, Eds. O. Kramsch and B. Hooper, Routledge, London and New York, 2004, p

13 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 13 regional associations such as the Association of European Border Regions, the European Commission and its instruments supporting regional development and cross-border cooperation. Leresche and Saez, therefore, conclude that cross-border cooperation becomes a matter of coordination among different actors and different territorial scales, where coherence could be achieved through novel decentralized multi-level governance mechanisms 22. Indeed, cross-border regions, Perkmann contends, cannot be governed in the traditional territorial and political sense: they are not formal administrative units subordinate to the state and they do not have mechanisms for popular administration. Instead, cross-border regions are governed through various networks between multiple public and private actors and depend on the nature of socioeconomic relationships across the border 23. Here, it is thus important to make a distinction between the traditional notion of government characteristic to the nation-state, and the broader concept of governance, which initially was mostly used to describe the political system of the EU and then also became to be used in the context of European regions and cross-border regions. Le Galès defines governance as the coordination of public and private actors, social groups and institutions in an unstable and fragmented environment for the purpose of achieving collectively defined goals 24. Governance is being associated with fluidity, incoherence and diversity of different actors and their resources used for the attainment of common goals. Cross-border regions are good examples of governance, being based on the multiple-actor networks consisting of governmental, economic and cultural agents with overlapping interests, which are being tackled under the rhetoric of regionalization. In this sense, apart from the coordination of different actors and institutions, Häkli argues, governance also involves the social construction of the cross-border region, being not only a set of practices played out upon a particular regional setting, but also constitutive of the regional as a field of action and knowledge 25. The cross-border space, where governance takes place, is itself a 22 Leresche, J-Ph. and Saez, G. Political Frontier Regimes: Towards Cross-Border Governance? in Globalization, Regionalization and Cross-Border Regions, Eds. M. Perkmann and N-L. Sum, Palgrave MacMillan Ltd, New York, 2002, pp Perkmann, M. and Sum, N-L. Globalization, Regionalization and Cross-Border Regions: Scales, Discourses and Governance in Globalization, Regionalization and Cross-Border Regions, Eds. M. Perkmann and N-L. Sum, Palgrave MacMillan Ltd, New York, 2002, pp Le Galès, P. Conclusion government and governance of regions: structural weakness and new mobilization, in Regions in Europe, Eds. P. Le Galès and C. Lequesne, Routledge, London, p Häkli, J. Cross-border regionalization in Catalonia, in Cross-Border Governance in the European Union, Eds. O. Kramsch and B. Hooper, Routledge, London and New York, 2004, p. 58.

14 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 14 product of governance, where cross-border identities and purposes are being negotiated and contested by multiple actors 26. Thus, according to the multi-level governance approach, cross-border cooperation should benefit from first, the participation and coordination of different levels of government subnational, national and supranational where the subnational level has significant decisionmaking powers when it comes to its international relations; and second, from the participation of various public and private actors, groups and institutions at each level of governance to achieve common goals in an irregularly structured environment as well as the social construction of the cross-border regions. 2.2 Theorizing cross-border cooperation Cross-border cooperation within the European Union and across its external borders has a long history dating back from 1950s and has evolved into a variety of forms. Its theoretical discussion, therefore, includes various approaches cross-border cooperation can be studied from economic, anthropological, geographical, and political science perspectives. Van Houtum offers one of the most successful classifications of border studies differentiating among three major theoretical frameworks: the flow approach, the cross-border approach and the people, or sociocultural, approach 27. The flow approach has its roots in rational choice theories and neoclassical economics, emphasising the role of borders as barriers to economic efficiency. Human behaviour is considered rational and utility maximizing, while borders generate obstacles of physical distance and thus increase the cost of interaction and interrupt the free flow of activities. The cross-border cooperation approach, as well, views borders as barriers to successful cooperation but also as opportunities for contact and integration. Cross-border cooperation is viewed as a common virtue, as it eliminates the disparities across borders and contributes to the creation of a cohesive and borderless Europe. This approach emphasises the role of the EU policy initiatives and support programmes such as INTERREG as well as various cross-border institutions such as Euroregions, in turning border regions into active spaces that constitute Europe of regions. The people approach concentrates on the social construction of borders and cross-border 26 Scott, J. The Northern Dimension: Multiscalar regionalism in an enlarging European Union, in Cross- Border Governance in the European Union, Eds. O. Kramsch and B. Hooper, Routledge, London and New York, 2004, pp Van Houtum, H. An Overview of European Geographical Research on Borders and Border Regions. Journal of Borderland Studies, Vol. XV, No. 1, Spring 2000, pp

15 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 15 regions studying the processes of mental creation and symbolic shaping by different crossborder actors. Here, the distinction between us and others is pivotal in shaping border identities and creating mental distances that are constantly being produced and reproduced. This paper does not aim to study cross-border economic interaction but concentrates on cross-border cooperation as it is defined by the Association of European Border Regions: Cross-border involves direct neighbourly cooperation in all areas of life between regional and local authorities along the border and involving all actors 28. The main object of this study is the institutionalised cross-border cooperation at the local and regional levels, and therefore, the cross-border cooperation and people approaches seem to be the most appropriate tools for evaluating the roles of institutions and identity in shaping cross-border relations. Perkmann and Sum emphasise that generally cross-border cooperation specialists are concerned with how social practices influence the institution building across borders 29. In the culturally inflected studies borders are seen as the objects of analysis in their own right, and considered to be socially constructed spaces. Borders are never clear-cut, but are constantly contested and negotiated by the multiplicity of actors through various practices and discourses. Cross-border identities and social relations might persist notwithstanding the political changes in border demarcations 30. What Perkmann and Sum call the policy-oriented research resonates with van Houtum s cross-border cooperation approach as it also emphasises the role of the EU policies and programmes promoting cross-border cooperation and creating new institutional spaces across the borders. Multiple subnational, national and supranational actors create new cross-border governance mechanisms through novel patterns of social interaction and the interplay between structural change and social agency 31. This paper aims to combine the institutionalist analysis of cross-border cooperation policies and practices with the academic discourse on the role of identities and perceptions in the crossborder institutionalization process. 28 Martinos, H. and Mahnkopf, K, Institutional Aspects of Cross-Border Cooperation, A report carried out by the Association of European Border Regions as part of the LACE-TAP Project, March Perkmann, M. and Sum, N-L. Globalization, Regionalization and Cross-Border Regions: Scales, Discourses and Governance in Globalization, Regionalization and Cross-Border Regions, Eds. M. Perkmann and N-L. Sum, Palgrave MacMillan Ltd, New York, 2002, pp Ibid. p. 7; Bufon, M. Cultural and Social Dimensions of Borderlands: the Case of the Italo-Slovene Trans- Border Area, Geojournal, Vol. 30, Nr. 3; pp See note 30, p. 8.

16 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION New Institutionalist Approach New institutionalist theoretical approach has been applied to the analysis of the EU integration by various scholars 32. As opposed to the old, new institutionalism views institutions from a broader perspective as not only formal rules, but also forms of ongoing social interaction that form the compliance procedures and standard operating practices 33. New institutionalism is not a homogeneous approach but can be divided into rational choice, historical and sociological institutionalisms. However, Aspinwall and Schneider among others have attempted to highlight the similarities and synthesise the three approaches to establish a more coherent theory 34. Yet there are certain differences. The rational choice institutionalism borrows from methodological individualism, transaction costs economic theories, and game theory, defining institutions mainly as formal rules and procedures that act as intervening variables between human actions and desired outcomes. Actors create institutions in order to reduce transaction costs resulting from the lack of communication and information, regulations and sanctions. This approach, however, is deficient in its unaccountability for the institutional ineffectiveness and the norm-driven behaviour instead of rationally based, utilitymaximizing actions 35. The rational choice institutionalism is compatible with van Houtum s flow approach to the border studies and thus is more useful to the analysis of economic crossborder interaction rather than institutionalized cross-border cooperation between subnational authorities. Historical and sociologically inflected new institutionalism, which will be used for the analysis of the cross-border institutionalization in this paper, does not view transaction costs as key explanatory principles, but instead concentrates on the institutional embeddedness of actors and the role of both formal rules and informal practices in shaping actors behaviour 36. Institutions thus are created not only as a result of the rationalist logic but are also the carriers of norms, or appropriateness, and identity that are sometimes more important in the process of political decision-making 37. Further, institutions can also serve as independent variables 32 See Tsebelis, Pierson, Aspinwall and Schneider, etc. 33 Hall in Rosamond, B. New Theories of Integration, in European Union Politics, Ed. M. Gini, Oxford University Press, New York, p Aspinwall, M. and Schneider, G. Same menu, separate tables: The institutionalist turn in political science and the study of European integration, in European Journal of Policy Research, 38, pp Rosamond, B. New Theories of Integration, in European Union Politics, Ed. M. Gini, Oxford University Press, New York, pp See Bulmer in Chryssochoov, D. N., Tsinisizelis, M.J., Stravridis, S., Ifantis, K. Theory and Performance in the European Union, Manchester University Press, 1999; and North, D. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge University Press, March, J.G. and Olsen, J.P. Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics, New York, Free Press, 1989.

17 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 17 shaping actors actions through the processes called path-dependency and institutional selectivity. Pierson, an advocate of historical institutionalism, emphasises the path-dependent evolution of institutions, where the sunk costs and increasing price of exit limit the number of policy alternatives for the actors 38. Hall and Taylor explain path dependency in the way in which past lines of policy condition subsequent policy by encouraging societal forces to organize along some lines rather than others, to adopt particular identities, or to develop interests in policies that are costly to shift 39. Thus, in the path-dependent development, actors tend to form their identities and interests based on the previous policy decisions, which means that actors interests are shaped by, or are endogenous to the institutional context. The actorcentred analysis of most rational choice institutionalists has limits to explanation, as rationality of actors is itself limited. Thielmann among others proposes a more sociologically oriented approach in order to study how the institutional context, traditions and rule structures shape the expectations about what is appropriate behaviour and how they influence policy outcomes 40. Various authors have also emphasized the structural bias of institutions, where they tend to privilege certain actors over others, thus structuring the subsequent policy development 41. Jessop explains this phenomenon through the notion of the institutional strategic selectivity, strategic bias of institutions 42. In the development of cross-border cooperation, the strategic selectivity of the state, for example, is expressed in its resistance to the partial loss of sovereignty to the supranational and subnational levels of government 43. Generally, in the relations between the local and regional units on the different sides of the border, the respective nation-states still remain the sources of legitimacy and regulation despite the fact that some technoeconomic or narrowly political powers may be transferred to the regional and local levels. The strategic selectivity of the state also has implications for the 38 Pierson, P. The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis in The European Union: Reading on the Theory and Practice of the European Integration, Eds. B. Nelsen and A. Stubb, Houndmills, Palgrave, pp Hall, P.A. and Taylor, R.C.R. Political Science and The Three New Institutionalisms, in Political Studies, Vol. 44, Nr. 5, 1996, p Thielmann, E.R. Institutional limits of a Europe with the Regions : EC state-aid control meets German federalism, in Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 6, Nr. 3, 1999, p See Hall, P.A. and Taylor, R.C.R. Political Science and The Three New Institutionalisms, in Political Studies, Vol. 44, Nr. 5, 1996, pp ; Thielmann, E.R. Institutional limits of a Europe with the Regions : EC state-aid control meets German federalism, in Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 6, Nr. 3, 1999, pp ; and Armstrong, K. and Bulmer, S. The Governance of the Single European Market, Manchester, Manchester University Press, Jessop, B. Interpretive sociology and the dialectic of structure and agency, in Theory, Culture and Society, Vol. 13, Nr. 1, 1996, pp Jessop, B. The Political Economy of Scale, in Globalization, Regionalization and Cross-Border Regions, Eds. M. Perkmann and N. Sum, Palgrave Macmillan Ltd, New York, 2002.

18 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 18 evolution of the multi-level governance. Contrary to many multi-level governance theorists, Jessop assumes the shift from government to governance not necessarily to undermine the powers of the nation-state by involving other governmental levels and the non-government networks into the process of decision-making, but in fact to enhance the role of the nationstate in the metagovernance by organizing various governance mechanisms. This organizational role of the state is especially important for trans-frontier cooperation, which is characterized by the lack of the well-designed governance mechanisms 44. Perkmann is one of the few scholars who have systematically applied the new institutionalist theory to the study of the institutions of cross-border cooperation 45. This paper takes Perkmann s work as the basis for the analysis of the institutional framework and development of cross-border cooperation. In the decentralized governance mechanisms, according to Perkmann, institutions do not necessarily have specific functional purposes but instead the object of governance co-evolves along with the operation of governance institutions: for example the policy problems of cross-border cooperation may only become clear after or along with the evolution of the appropriate cross-border institutions and networks. Building upon Jessop s notion of the institutional strategic selectivity, Perkmann studies how the multiplicity of actors is organized into the mechanisms of governance where certain actors (e.g. Euroregions or the Association of the European Border Regions) are privileged over others in the development of cross-border cooperation policy. The essence of Perkmann s new institutionalist analysis of cross-border cooperation lies in the idea about the circular relationship between actors and institutions, where cross-border cooperation may be an effect, not necessarily the purpose, of the cross-border governance mechanisms. This process is characterized by the multiplicity of local and non-local actors that operate in the institutional context of opportunities and constraints, which is believed to shape their actions. As a result of their actions, the institutional setting itself undergoes changes not based on the optimization logic but by the logic of the path-dependent evolution Institutional framework of cross-border cooperation This section provides an analysis of the process of institutionalization of cross-border cooperation with the help of the sociologically influenced theory of new institutionalism. In 44 Ibid. p Perkmann, M. Building Governance Institutions Across European Borders, in Regional Studies, Vol. 33, Nr. 7, 1999, pp

19 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 19 order to assess the efficiency of cross-border cooperation, one should look at the degree of its institutionalization among other criteria. How the institutional change occurs is the subject of the heated debate among the three main new institutionalisms, as has been demonstrated above. Building on Perkmann s new institutionalist perspective 46, one could distinguish the main tenets of the institutional change in cross-border cooperation: - institutional context of cross-border cooperation exemplifies a multi-level governance system, based on formal and informal institutional networks; - existence of multiple actors, whose actions are shaped by the institutional context of opportunities and constraints; - strategic selectivity of institutions results in the more privileged positions for certain actors and institutions; - institutional setting changes due to path-dependency, and not necessarily due to the utility-maximizing logic of actors; - institutions do not always have functionalist purpose or well-defined actors from the start, but they may be generated in the course of the institution-building, which demonstrates the circular nature of the relationship between agency and institutions. Exemplifying a complex system of governance in itself, being based on the multiple vertical and horizontal institutional networks, cross-border cooperation becomes an integral part of the EU multi-level governance. The following discussion of various actors and institutions of cross-border cooperation will focus on the main tenets of Perkmann s new institutionalist perspective. Institutional context for cross-border cooperation: networks and multi-level governance The history of cross-border cooperation falls back to the end of the 1950s, when the pioneering border regions, predominantly on the Scandinavian, Dutch/German and French/German/Swiss borders, started to cooperate in an organized way, largely to address the problems natural to peripheral regions, and to cross historical barriers 47. The actual steps to institutionalize cross-border cooperation were only taken in 1970, when the first strategy for cross-border cooperation was developed under the European Regional Planning Strategy. The Madrid Outline Convention on Transfrontier Cooperation, promoted by the 46 See Note See the study carried out by the Association of European Border Regions, as part of LACE-TAP project, in response to a request from the European Commission (DGXVI) for an input on the institutional aspects of crossborder cooperation in preparing for INTERREG IIIA, March 1999.

20 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 20 Council of Europe in 1980, became the general basis for subsequent specific inter-state treaties, governing cross-border cooperation between local/regional authorities. The examples of such treaties include among others, the BENELUX Convention, signed in 1986, and German-Dutch Cross-Border Treaty, signed in According to the study by the Association of European Border Regions, however, much cross-border institutionalization has occurred since the 1950s thanks to the bottom-up initiatives by active border regions acting under private and/public law 48. It was on the Dutch/German border that the expression Euregio was first used, establishing in 1958 this first genuine cross-border structure. The multiplicity of Euregios and Working Communities appeared across the European borders since the 1970s, and this process was greatly accelerated since the late 1980s due to: - internal changes in the EU especially the completion of the Single Market, further enlargement and Economic and Monetary Union; - political changes in Central and Eastern Europe; - and last but not least, EU initiatives and funding programmes in support of crossborder cooperation, in particular INTERREG 49. Beginning with INTERREG I, introduced in 1990, the institutional arrangements for cross-border cooperation fell into two categories: the bottom-up approach and the top-downapproach 50. The bottom-up approach was based on the existing cross-border structures such as the Euroregions on the Dutch/German border, and the management and implementation of INTERREG funds was accomplished together by Euroregions and the state authorities. In some cases, however, new cross-border structures were specifically created for the purposes of INTERREG. The top-down approach involved only the national authorities, which were responsible for the creation of regional cross-border structures and the implementation of INTERREG, often only with limited cross-border coordination. The examples of such structures include the Working Communities of Galicia/Norte and Centro/Extremadura on the Portuguese-Spanish border. With the EU enlargement, INTERREG IIA for the period of was expanded to the EU external borders. The new instrument, PHARE CBC, was specifically created in 1994 to support the border regions of Central European Countries (CEC) with the EU Member States. INTERREG and PHARE CBC have been made to complement each other: they have 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid. p Ibid. pp. 6-8.

21 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 21 the same time line and the budget of similar proportions. Institutionally, PHARE CBC has established the Joint Programming and Monitoring Committees (JPMC), which include representative of the regional/local level (Euroregions). At the same time, the representatives of the CEC attend as observers the meetings of Monitoring Committees of counterpart INTERREG programmes. In 1996, TACIS CBC programme was established to cover border regions between Finland and Russia, although no cross-border institutional arrangements were made 51. Now, TACIS CBC supports the non-eu neighbouring states, such as Moldova, Ukraine, Russia or Belarus, in their development of cross-border cooperation. In 2003 the European Commission came out with Communication on Wider Europe Neighbourhood, that attempts to eschew new dividing lines and foster cooperation between the EU and its neighbours with the help of the Neighbourhood Instrument 52. These developments called for more coordination between programmes covering cross-border cooperation on the EU external borders and INTERREG IIIA, which remains the basis for the New Neighbourhood Instrument. In their statement to the European Communication s Communication on the New Neighbourhood Instrument, the AEBR indicated that there are still significant disparities between INTERREG A / PHARE CBC and INTERREG A / TACIS CBC, and that the implementation process in the framework of these programmes is characterised by a high degree of centralisation, which is detrimental to the process of crossborder cooperation 53. The New Neighbourhood Policy, thus, is expected to contribute to the solution of the above-mentioned problems. As Turnock explains, Euroregions are an extension to INTERREG: they are concerned with the same issues of border area cohesion hence each Euroregion has specific objectives, in the context of broad INTERREG objectives for an entire frontier between a pair of countries but with a desire for more permanent collaboration in agreed areas, rather than ad hoc arrangements 54. In some cases, the member states delegate the management of INTERREG programmes directly to Euroregions concerned. Because of their increasing autonomy and their dependence on the EU supporting programmes, Euroregions can be considered as legitimate partners of the European Commission and mechanisms in the 51 See note 49, pp Wider Europe Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours: Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, (COM (2003) 104 final, Brussels). 53 Statement of AEBR (August 2003) on the Communication from the European Commission Paving the way for a New Neighbourhood Instrument, 1 st July 2003, (COM (2003) 393 final). 54 Turnock, D. Cross-border Cooperation: A Major Element in Regional Policy in East Central Europe, in Scot. Geog. J. Vol. 118, Nr. 1, pp

22 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 22 implementation of the European regional policy 55. According to the AEBR, Euroregions are permanent institutions with a specific identity, their own administrative, technical and financial resources, and their own internal decision-making. They confirm that although most of the cross-border plans and actions must be coordinated according to the national procedures, Euroregions perform most of the functions needed for the management of the implementation of a specific operational programme 56. INTERREG Central state Central state Monitoring Committee Steering Committee Region/Land* Region/Land* Local authorities Euroregion Local authorities *In more decentralized countries only Fig. 2. The implementation of INTERREG 57 One can distinguish three main cross-border institutional structures: (1) the European INTERREG related structures; (2) national or regional authorities, as well as European Commission officials responsible for the implementation of INTERREG; and (3) Euroregions at the local/regional level. Perkmann explains the nature of the cross-border governance with the help of the network metaphor 58. The network metaphor has also been used by Scott, who also views cross-border cooperation as a part of the EU strategy of the multi-level institutionalization carried out in order to facilitate cooperation and the vertical and 55 Perkmann, M. The Rise of the Euroregion. A bird s eye perspective on European cross-border cooperation, pp. 1-18, See note 49, p Perkmann, M. Building Governance Institutions Across European Borders, in Regional Studies, Vol. 33, Nr. 7, 1999, p Perkmann, M. Building Governance Institutions Across European Borders, in Regional Studies, Vol. 33, Nr. 7, 1999, p. 661.

23 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 23 horizontal coordination of policy between different spatial levels 59. The vertical dimension is reflected in the policy networks, such as INTERREG, which involve public actors at the local, regional, national and European levels and are technocratic in nature, with the collective goal of the implementation of INTERREG. The horizontal dimension involves the cooperation at the local level: between municipalities, NGOs, universities, but is also present in the routines and procedures of the coordination of the European Structural Funds Policy, of which INTERREG is only one part. Jauhiainen as well as Perkmann calls these horizontal networks topocratic networks that interested in borders as potential sources for financing their activities 60. However, the vertical and horizontal networks may not be developed in the same proportion: namely, cross-border cooperation seems to rely largely on the vertical networks, being heavily bureaucratic, and technocratic with minimal participation of NGOs and the private sector 61. Further, even in the case of Euroregions, where by definition the horizontal networks should be most developed, there remains a lack of the institutional integration. Both Perkmann and Jauhiainen point out that Euroregions tend to have two separate sub-networks on both sides of the border, with two separate secretariats, which is re-enforced by the fact that co-funding is provided by the respective Member States 62. Much of the criticism around the network and multi-level governance metaphors concerns the predominance of top-down policies and the nationally bound initiatives in the cross-border governance 63. The role of the state level in the vertical networks has become that of the gate keeper, allowing for more direct access between the EU and the subnational level 64, yet remaining an important mediator in the implementation of the EU programmes. As for the horizontal networks, the traditional position of the state being sovereign over their territory hampers the integration of crossborder institutions 65. Strüver finds the lack of informal integration across borders can also be explained by the centralized mode of cross-border governance: people perceive cross-border 59 Scott, J. W. European and North American Contexts for Cross-Border Regionalism, in Regional Studies, Vol. 33, Nr. 7, 1999, p Jauhiainen, J. Territoriality and Topocracy of Cross-Border Networks, in Journal of Baltic Studies, Vol. 33, Nr. 2, Summer 2002, p See notes 61 and Jauhiainen, J. Territoriality and Topocracy of Cross-Border Networks, in Journal of Baltic Studies, Vol. 33, Nr. 2, Summer 2002, p. 163; Perkmann, M. Building Governance Institutions Across European Borders, in Regional Studies, Vol. 33, Nr. 7, 1999, p Strüver, A. We are only allowed to re-act, not to act Eurocrats strategies and borderlanders tactics in a Dutch-German cross-border region, in Cross-Border Governance in the European Union, Eds. O. Kramsch and B. Hooper, Routledge, London and New York, 2004, pp Scott, J. and Collins, K. Inducing Transboundary Regionalism in Asymmetric Situations: The Case of the German-Polish Border, in Journal of Borderland Studies, Vol. 12, Nrs. 1 and 2, Spring and Fall 1997, pp See note 62, p. 162.

24 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 24 cooperation as a policy tool by the state and the European Commission, not as serving people and having impact on people s daily lives 66. A true networked, multi-level governance system should include both formal and informal actors, with the key notion of interdependency, and the dominant role of one certain governance level (e.g. the state level) or one certain dimension (the vertical dimension) should be limited. Perkmann, however, admits that the local horizontal networks can in principle exist independently from the INTERREG policy networks, and the existence of cross-border cooperation prior to INTERREG provides support for this idea. At the same time, most of the older horizontal cross-border institutions have eventually become integrated within the INTERREG structures due to its financial incentives; and many cross-border regions were established based only on the implementation of INTERREG funds. In the latter case, the cooperation is more technocratic in nature, dominated by the state or regional structures, while in the former the local level authorities along with NGOs have become even more activated. One may conclude that INTERREG not only had spurred cross-border cooperation in the late 1980s, but its implementation mechanisms have contributed to the networked nature of cross-border governance, and to the larger variety of forms of crossborder cooperation 67. Actors of cross-border cooperation The networked institutional context of cross-border cooperation provides a novel forum for multiple actors, which Perkmann divides into three main types: (1) the grass-roots border actors; (2) the authorities responsible for INTERREG; and (3) the European Commission 68. The institutional context provides a range of opportunities and constrains, thus shaping and structuring the actors behaviour. Actors are in fact embedded in the institutional context, so that the lines between institutions and actors may seem blurred. Indeed, when discussing the institutional structures Perkmann similarly distinguishes between (1) locally based structures (e.g. the Euroregions); (2) the governmental commissions; and (3) the INTERREG related structures (at the EU level) 69. Here, Perkmann seems to make a distinction between actors and institutions similar to the one used by Marks in his actor-centred approach to multilevel 66 See note 65, p See note 60, pp See note 60, p See note 60, p. 659.

25 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 25 governance 70. Namely, in contrast to intergovernmentalists, who view the state as an actor in international relations, Marks distinguishes between the state as a set of formal and informal norms, and the state as a number of political actors represented by individuals or groups of individuals. According to this approach, institutions do not think, have preferences or act but rather provide constraints to political actors who are the only agents capable of goaloriented action 71. Although Perkmann s new institutionalist approach allots much more power to institutions, who are able to shape and structure actors actions, this distinction is useful in clarifying the double roles of the same entities as institutions and as a set of actors. This distinction helps one to account for significant changes in the institutional development that cannot be fully explained by path-dependency but rather by strategic behaviour of certain actors. The first set of actors, the local/regional authorities, benefit from the opportunities provided by the EU border instruments, primarily from the INTERREG related structures. The INTERREG funding provides additional funding for project leaders, and the local authorities normally assign their organizational and human resources to prepare and conduct cross-border projects. Perkmann calls these strategies by local authorities entrepreneurial regions/cities that is aimed at the improvement of their peripheral situation by means of collaborative marketing of the cross-border region 72 to attract investment, improve infrastructure, solve common environmental problems and foster cultural exchange. Thus, one may say that the existing EU policies shape the path of action of local/regional authorities. Another institution that provides opportunities for the local/regional authorities is Euroregion. As has been shown, Euroregions have become the standard model of cross-border cooperation, providing expertise and management skills for the implementation of the EU regional policy. One can explain the establishment of Euroregions by the local/regional authorities in the EU and its external borders using the new institutionalist idea of pathdependency and institutional imitation, or institutional transfer. According to Scott 73 and O Dowd 74, the German/Dutch EUREGIO became an institutional blueprint for other subsequent cross-border institutions. Thus, after the initially rational choice is made, actors become path-dependent over time and tend to merely reproduce institutions until opportunity 70 Marks, G. An Actor Centred Approach to Multilevel Governance, paper presented at the APSA meeting, San Francisco, 29 August-1 September Ibid. p See note 60, p Scott, J. European and North-American Contexts for Cross-Border Regionalism, in Regional Studies, Vol. 33, Nr. 7, 1999, pp O Dowd, L. The Changing Significance of European Borders, in Regional and Federal Studies, Vo l. 12, Nr. 4, 2002, pp

26 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 26 structures allow for another major institutional change. EUREGIO serves as a reference institution for many new Euroregions, such as those along the German/Polish and German/Czech borders or the Carpathian Euroregion, which cooperate and take over the experience of the older EUREGIOs on the western German borders 75. Another set of actors, the authorities responsible for implementing INTERREG, are usually central state agencies or regional authorities such as Länder in more decentralized countries. These authorities also act within the institutional context of opportunities and constrains, represented by the EU regulations: they have to programme policies in advance and involve local actors into the project making. They apply for the INTERREG funds and ensure that they are spent within the required time limits and according to material priorities of the Structural funds 76. Often, as Perkmann points out, when there are no local initiatives while the pressure to use the INTERREG funds is high, the central authorities have to act as network animators, mobilizing potential project leaders 77. More precisely, each Member State has to submit an individual INTERREG Operational Programme (OP), which involves conducting cross-border research, the preparation of the financial plan separate for each side of the border, the submission of the draft OP to the European Commission for evaluation, and the preparation of agreement concerning the management of the implementation of the OP 78. The central authorities, separately or jointly with their twin-structures across the border, also are responsible for the project appraisal and for setting the project criteria, which differ in different Member States. Besides, the Member States and the European Commission are involved in the programme evaluation, review and possibly modification. When it comes to the external EU borders, the implementation and appraisal of cross-border programmes is even more centralized, where the national-level Programme Management Units and the European Commission play major roles. Thus, especially in the CEC and to the lesser extent in more decentralized EU countries, the state authorities act, to use Bache s expression, as gate keepers 79, although 75 Perkmann, M. Euroregions: Institutional Entrepreneurship in the European Union, in Globalization, Regionalization and Cross-Border Regions, Eds. M. Perkmann and N-L. Sum, Palgrave MacMillan, 2002, pp See note 60, p Ibid. 78 See the study carried out by the Association of European Border Regions, as part of LACE-TAP project, in response to a request from the European Commission (DGXVI) for an input on the institutional aspects of crossborder cooperation in preparing for INTERREG IIIA, March 1999, pp Bache, I. The Politics of European Union Regional Policy: Multi-Level Governance or Flexible Gatekeeping? Sheffield Academic Press, Sheffield, 1998.

27 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 27 bound from above by the EU regulations and pressured from below by the regional/local authorities. Bailey and Propris conclude that in the new Member States the institution building has been primarily initiated by top-down policies of the EU and implemented mostly at the national levels; the regional level, however, remains weak 80. Ironically, while the European Commission advocates the establishment of the multi-level governance and the need for decentralization, the central governments are afraid this will weaken their position 81. Once being created, institutions are difficult to change, and thus the national governments continue to exercise control over the sub-national actors imposing constraints on their initiatives in cross-border cooperation. The third actor, the European Commission, has the goal to establish a more integrated cohesive Europe, and more precisely, to create a networked multi-level system of governance. The European Commission sees cross-border cooperation as a cornerstone of European integration, because its aim is to transform traditionally peripheral borderlands into prosperous core regions of Europe 82, a way to foster economic, political and spatial cohesion essential in maintaining an effective and internationally competitive Union 83, and as important part of the strategy of multi-level institutionalization that facilitates cooperation and the vertical and horizontal coordination of policy between different spatial levels 84. Cross-border cooperation thus provides an opportunity to involve the local and regional levels into the implementation of INTERREG policies, where these sub-national actors would act as partners for policy delivery 85. While the Member States are accountable for the implementation of INTERREG, the local/regional level as represented by Euroregions as well as the Association of European Border Regions are also important for providing advice and information to the European Commission, acting as project stimulators and local network managers Bailey, D. and Propris, L. EU Structural Funds, Regional Capabilities and Enlargement: Towards Multi- Level Governance? in European Integration, Vol. 24, Nr. 4, 2002, pp Ibid. 82 Bort, B. Mitteleurope: The Difficult Frontier, in The Frontiers of Europe, Eds. M. Anderson and E. Bort, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1998, p Kennard, A. The Changing Role of Border Regions in Central and Eastern Europe, in EU Expansion to the East: Prospects and Problems, Eds. H. Inham and M. Ingham, Edwards Elgar Publishing, inc, Northampton, 2002, p Scott, J. European and North American Contexts for Cross-Border Regionalism, in Regional Studies, Vol. 33, Nr. 7, 1999, p See note 60, p Ibid.

28 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 28 Cross-border governance: new institutionalist assessment As Perkmann concludes, there is no easy answer to the question who governs in case of cross-border cooperation: in conformity with the multi-level governance model, everybody co-governs 87. Actors are interdependent, and no certain actor can be said to monopolize the decision-making. Actors, in addition, are embedded in the institutional context, which shapes and structures their decisions and actions, providing a set of opportunities and constraints. Some actors and institutions, however, enjoy more power than others. As has been demonstrated, the vertical institutional networks dominated by formal rather than informal institutions are more stable than the horizontal topocratic networks across the border. The former are better coordinated, being tied together by the implementation of INTERREG, while the latter tend to involve bargaining games and competition for the division of benefits of the INTERREG programmes between the cross-border actors on different sides of the border 88. Further, the institutional setting of cross-border cooperation generates new actors and institutions, and privileges certain ones over others: for instance, Euroregions, rather than interstate governmental commissions, are promoted by the European Commission and the Association of European Border Regions as best practice in INTERREG implementation 89. The AEBR itself established under the lead the oldest Euregio is also an example of the strategic selectivity of existing institutions on the supra-local level. The European Commission, Euroregions and the AEBR have similar goals and can be opposed to the state actors, who act as gate-keepers and resist the dispersion of their power to the supranational and subnational levels. However, the existing opportunities for direct access between the EU and the local/regional levels increase the possibility of the establishment of the multi-level cross-border governance. 87 See note 60, p Ibid. 89 Perkmann, M. Institutional Entrepreneurship in the European Union, in Globalization, Regionalization and Cross-Border Regions, Eds. M. Perkmann and N-L Sum, Palgrave MacMillan Ltd, New York, 2002, p. 117.

29 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 29 Multi-level INTERREG regulations National INTERREG structures The European Commission; AEBR National authorities Framework Euroregions Local/regional authorities Cross-border cooperation institutions Cross-border cooperation actors Fig. 3: The institutional framework of cross-border governance Finally, how does the institutional change occur? Apart from the logic of pathdependency where institutions (e.g. Euroregions) are reproduced on the basis of previously made decisions and institutions, do actors have any real impact on the institutional change? Perkmann s new institutionalist perspective may be criticized for putting too much weight to institutions and too little weight to actors, which results in the trap of circularity: institutions shape actor s behaviour, who in their turn influence institutions. The institutional change thus must be rather incremental, based on the path-dependent development. Yet, the development of cross-border cooperation demonstrates impressive institutional innovations, such as the Euroregion. As if in the answer to this question, Perkmann in his later work turns from the deeply structural institutionalist perspective to a more actor-centred approach 90. Here, the author demonstrates that the Euroregion became the reference model for the EU and the local/regional actors thanks to the institutional entrepreneurship of the AEBR that acted on the opportunities provided by the European Commission. The AEBR, a network of crossborder cooperation actors, switched the emphasis from the national authorities to the local actors, with the goal to make the latter the principal actor in cross-border cooperation. As these goals were compatible with the rationale of the regional policy of the European 90 See note 92.

30 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 30 Commission, the Euroregion was successfully established as the best alternative for crossborder cooperation institutions. Thus, cross-border cooperation cannot be viewed only as a result of the EU strategy, supported by its instruments such INTERREG, PHARE CBC and TACIS CBC, as Scott among others would suggest 91. Rather, cross-border cooperation is a consequence of the institutional development, where new actors and institutions are generated on the basis of existing opportunities and constraints. However, to explain the substantial institutional change, the distinction between institutions and actors needs to be made and actors need to be assigned more weight in the new institutionalist approach. The multi-level institutional framework of cross-border cooperation is illustrated in the Fig Cross-border identity: historical-cultural and institutional While Perkmann s new institutionalist perspective is useful to explaining the institutional framework of cross-border cooperation, it does not take into consideration another important aspect in the development of cross-border cooperation identity. Identity on its part could be divided into the historical-cultural identity, basing on the ethnic, historical and cultural links across the border, and the institutional identity, produced by the cross-border cooperation actors and institutions. What van Houtum calls the people approach, concentrates on the sociocultural studies of borders, or on the study of the historical-cultural identity, while the sociologically influenced new institutionalism underlines the importance of the identity generated by institutions. Perkmann views institutions as opportunities and constraints shaping and structuring actors actions and preferences. Yet, according to sociological new institutionalism, institutions also constitute human identity and behaviour 92, and identity and norms in their turn constitute the basis for preferences and interests. While Perkmann allows for some degree of actors rationality, albeit mostly related to short-term entrepreneurship actions and strongly bounded by the institutional constraints in the longer run, sociological institutionalism assumes that human rational action itself is socially constructed and identity-bound, following, in March and Olsen s terms, the logic of appropriateness 93 : Who 91 Scott, J. European and North American Contexts for Cross-Border Regionalism, in Regional Studies, Vol. 33, Nr. 7, 1999, p Aspinwall, M. and Schneider, G. Same Menu, Separate Tables: The Institutionalist Turn in Political Science and the Study of European Integration, in European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 38, 2000, pp See March, J. and Olsen, J. Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics, New York, The Free Press, 1989.

31 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 31 am I? Where do I belong? What is appropriate for me to do? Therefore, as Hall and Taylor explain when individuals are socialized into a particular institutional context and take on particular roles, they also internalize the norms associated with these roles 94. It is through such socialization process that institutions are believed to constitute actors identity, selfimages and preferences. Perkmann s approach resembles what Hall and Taylor call historical institutionalism, which can be described as the middle ground between rational choice and sociological institutionalisms. Similarly to sociological institutionalism, it emphasises the importance of institutional context on the process of preference formation; yet, in the same manner as rational choice institutionalism, it views institutions as structuring constraints to rational action. However, as Hooghe, and Chong, among others explain, preferences are not only based on the short-term utility-maximizing calculations, but also on the past investments in norms, values, and identities 95. Since institutions influence actors preferences, should not they, by similar logic, also influence actors identities and values? If Perkmann seeks to uncover the effect of the institutional context on cross-border cooperation, why does not he take into consideration the ability of institutions not only structure and shape the preferences and actions but also identities of cross-border cooperation actors? Both new institutionalist approach and the study of cross-border cooperation would benefit from the partial theoretical convergence between the three new institutionalisms, which would result in a more consistent treatment of the interrelation between institutions, actors and identities. Historical-cultural identity is normally seen as a strong basis for the development of cross-border cooperation. One could assume that the cross-border regions with common historical and cultural identity would enjoy more intense cross-border cooperation. As Perkmann himself has argued, cross-border cooperation has a more developed horizontal, or topocratic, dimension where it was based on the older informal networks established prior to the introduction of the INTERREG programmes 96. In his empirical study on Euroregions, Perkmann demonstrates that the majority of Euroregions created before 1990 are characterized by high cooperation intensity, as opposed to the new Euroregions 97. Here, it is important to see whether cross-border cooperation is identity bound: does the mental 94 Hall, P. A. and Taylor, R.C.R. Political Science and The Three New Institutionalisms, in Political Studies, Vol. 44, No. 5, 1996, pp See Hooghe, L. The European Commission and the Integration of Europe: Images of Governance. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001; and Chong, D. Rational Lives: Norms and Values in Politics and Society. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, See note Perkmann, M. The Rise of the Euroregion. A bird s eye perspective on European cross-border cooperation,

32 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 32 borderline separating us and the other hinder the development of cross-border cooperation? Or does the border provide opportunities for contact? As Newman argues, the role of the borders is two-fold: first, it acts as a barrier with a protective function separating the self from the other ; second, it also creates opportunities for cross-border contact providing certain benefits, such as jobs or cultural exchange 98. Traditionally, it was the state that exercised absolute control over its borders, and this territorial absolutism is reflected in the border institutions governing the laws of crossborder movement. Since institutions are self-perpetuating and hard to change, Newman explains, the change in the perception of the border, as a barrier, requires both the pressure from outside or from below. It is mainly at the local level where the change in perceptions may occur, resulting from every-day cross-border practices of ordinary people 99. Therefore, it is in the cross-border regions where the impact of the border may be gradually diminished: The crossing of the border enables differences to be reconciled as part of a more diverse and mu lti-cultural landscape, although it does not mean that difference is negated altogether. Instead, it assumes that difference does not have to be enclosed by exclusive lines of separation and borders, which are barriers 100. Van Houtum regards borders as socially constructed, where the differences are continuously marked in social space beyond the border, and rejected within the space of the bordered 101. Although being imaginary, the constructed mental borders are no less real; they are the truth and represent reality 102. Van Houtum and Strüver assume that if imagination can separate, it can also unite, and thus overcoming borders through cross-border cooperation involves the reimagining of borders and the reimagining of outsiders as insiders 103. The authors explain the nature of cross-border cooperation through the much-used metaphor of the bridge that unites two cooperating sides, which often exist simultaneously near to and far from each other. The mental distance is thus important when building this bridge. As the border by definition creates difference, which constitutes the identities of us and the other, cross-border cooperation depends on the re-imagining of the other. While the perceptions 98 Newman, D. On Borders and Power: A Theoretical Framework, in Journal of Borderland Studies, Vol. 18, Nr. 1, Spring 2003, pp Ibid. p Ibid. p Van Houtum, H. The Development of Cross-Border Economic Relations, A Theoretical and Empirical Study of the Influence of the State Border on the Development of Cross-border Economic Relations between Firms in Border regions of the Netherlands and Belgium, Tilburg, CentER, Van Houtum, H. and Strüver, A. Borders, Strangers, Doors and Bridges, in Space and Polity, Vol. 6, Nr. 2, 2002, pp Ibid. p. 142.

33 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 33 that emphasise the difference of the other are mostly constructed from the centre, the change of perceptions generally involves a bottom-up process 104. Empirically, the study of the people s perceptions of the other across the border as well as their perceptions of the border would demonstrate the strength of the existing historical-cultural identity. Yet, the process of building cross-border governance is dominated by the top-down institutionalization. Europe of Regions involves the creation of cross-border regions, which apart from the purposes of implementing INTERREG, are expected to promote a common identity, or a we-feeling 105. Despite these attempts, as Paasi points out, these regions exist relatively separate from the everyday lives of ordinary people 106, there remaining a significant gap between people on the one side and institutions and policies on the other. Both Scott 107 and Perkmann 108 have indicated the lack of informal integration and small participation of NGOs in the cross-border governance. Strüver also agrees that the EU attempts to boost cross-border cooperation as well as the activities of Euroregions remain far from the concerns of the people, failing to mobilize popular attention and support 109. Kramsch stresses the passive ignorance of the people who live in Euroregions and often are not aware of that fact and of the opportunities Euroregions provide 110. The establishment of cross-border institutions thus seems to occur separately from the informal interaction that may (or may not) go on in the cross-border regions. Common identity cannot be simply imposed from above, but it should gain attention and acceptance of the population in order to become reality. Van Houtum and Strüver point out that perhaps the EU discourse and strategies on cross-border cooperation put too much pressure on the institutionalization, or on the fashionable Euroregionalization, of cross-border regions, which seems to be contrary to opening borders as it emphasises differences and sense of bounded places See note 97, p Marcuse, J. Transborder Regional Alliances in Europe: Chances for Ethnic Euroregions, in Geopolitics, Vol. 9, Nr. 3, Autumn 2004, pp Paasi, A. Europe As A Social Process And Discourse: Considerations of Place, Boundaries and Identity, in European Union and Regional Studies, Vol. 8, Nr.1, 2001, pp Scott, J. European and North-American Contexts for Cross-Border Regionalism, in Regional Studies, Vol. 33, Nr. 7, 1999, pp See note Strüver, A. We are only allowed to re-act, not to act Eurocrats strategies and borderlanders tactics in a Dutch-German cross-border region, in Cross-Border Governance in the European Union, Eds. O. Kramsch and B. Hooper, Routledge, London and New York, 2004, pp See also Scott, J. Euroregions, Governance and Transborder Cooperation Within the EU, in Borders, Regions and People, Eds. M. van der Velde and H. van Houtum, Pion Limited, London, pp Kramsch, O. Re -imagining the scalar fix of transborder governance: The Case of the Maas-Rhein Euregio, in Mapping Borders Between Territories, Discourses and Practices, Eds. E. Berg and H. van Houtum, Ashgate, London, 2002, pp See note 101, p. 144.

34 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 34 The questions arise: Does cross-border cooperation depend on the (pre-)existing common identity in the cross-border region? Or is common identity rather generated in the process of cross-border interaction and institution-building? In other words, which type of identity institutional or historical-cultural is more significant for the successful crossborder cooperation? While the attempts to foster the institutional identity in the Euroregions across Europe and especially on its external borders are faced with certain difficulties, the historical-cultural identity where it exists may not provide a sufficient basis for the development of cross-border cooperation. The cases where cross-border governance institutions were built upon the basis of the historical-cultural identity are few. This is no surprise because the cross-border regional identity along with the pan-european identity would have to cross national borders and develop in competition with the national identity, which persistently remains the main source of people s identity in Europe. States, as Paasi points out, still seek to control and produce territories and citizens 112. States, as imagined communities 113 with fixed boundaries and institutions, such as legislation, administration and educational systems, have a way to continuously reproduce national identities. In case of cross-border cooperation, thus there would remain a constant pull between national identity and the cross-border identity, and the creation of cross-border identity might actually require efforts on the part of cross-border actors and institutions. Cross-border cooperation thus involves a complex interplay of identities national identity, European and most importantly cross-border regional identity. Through the establishment of cross-border identity institutions and actors can be said to deconstruct the traditional boundaries between us and the other. Yet, this process is extremely difficult, even in the so called ethnic Euroregions, where the basis for common cross-border identity ethnicity is more than strong. According to Marcuse s study of the three ethnoregional border zones on the Belgian/German border, in the Basque Country divided by the French/Spanish border, and on the Italian/Austrian border 114, these Euroregions demonstrate a large potential for the regional institutionalization due to the common symbolic base. Yet, the national institutional contexts on different sides of the border generate administrative and territorial asymmetries, which act as obstacles for the establishment of ethnic Euroregions. The institutional context of the state and state boundaries is seen in new institutionalist light 112 Paasi, A. Regional Transformation in the European Context: Notes on Regions, Boundaries and Identity, in Space and Polity, Vol. 6, Nr.2, 2002, pp Anderson, B. Imagined Communities, London, Verso, Marcuse, J. Transborder Regional Alliances in Europe: Chances for Ethnic Euroregions, in Geopolitics, Vol. 9, Nr. 3, Autumn 2004, pp

35 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 35 as providing both opportunities and constraints, thus shaping interests and guiding actions of transborder ethnoregionalists 115. Marcuse emphasises that it is not self-evident that regional actors are inclined and able to create an ethnic Euroregion because of the constraints emanating from the structural and social institutionalization of the states 116. On the whole, various scholars point to the resilience of the national identity, which may be contested by the formation of regional or pan-european identities, however, the national identities tend to perpetuate themselves through institutions 117. Wilson and Donnan believe that border identities are contested and constantly in flux, and can involve the simultaneous pull to the centre, away from the border, and across the border 118. From the late 1980s, institutional identities of cross-border regions have gained momentum being promoted by Euroregions, in parallel with the European discourse on the empowerment of the regions. As a result of the regionalization process, Paasi notes, various regional authorities increasingly make their regions into products that can be sold on the market and that will attract tourists, skilled professionals and capital 119. Although Paasi himself does not say so, his study of the emerging socially constructed identity in the processes of regionalisation is conceptually close to the term institutional identity used in this thesis. According to the sociologically influenced new institutionalism, identities are endogenous, or shaped by the institutional framework 120, which includes formal and informal rules, practices, and norms. As Euroregional institutions are rather novel, one cannot expect that they would find a warm place in people minds straight away, fostering Euroregional identity. Instead, as Paasi also assumes, the cross-border regions, which are the products of regionalization rather than historical or cultural entities, may continuously develop from being simply abstract entities for the people into those affecting their actions and identity 121. The process of regional identity building is rather slow, and involves different stages: at first, regions exist in strategic definitions and discourses by political actors and then transformed into textual and cartographic representations; then these regions are transformed into a 115 Ibid. p Ibid. p See also Knippenberg, H. The Maas-Rhine Euroregion: A laboratory for European Integration? in Geopolitics, Vol. 9, No. 3, Autumn 2004, pp Wilson, Th. M. and Donnan, H. Nation, State and Identity at International Borders, in Border Identities: Nation and State at International Frontiers, Eds. Th. M. Wilson and H. Donnan, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998, pp Paasi, A. Bounded Spaces in the Mobile World: Deconstructing Regional Identity, in Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie, Vol. 93, No. 2, 2002, p Rosamond, B. The New Theories of Integration, in European Union Politics, Ed. M. Gini, Oxford University Press, New York, 2003, pp Paasi, A. Europe As A Social Process And Discourse: Considerations of Place, Boundaries and Identity, in European Union and Regional Studies, Vol. 8, Nr.1, 2001, p. 13.

36 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 36 number of political, economic and administrative institutions and finally into the everyday practices and discourses 122. When it comes to Euroregions, especially the ones on the EU external borders still may stumble on the institutionalization stage, but in general, Euroregions within the EU have developed institutional structures, they figure on maps and in the political discourse at all levels of governance. What Euroregions have not achieved yet is becoming a part of people s everyday lives, practices and discourses, i.e. forming or becoming a part of the common cross-border identity. How can one actually define (Euro)regional identity? More often then not, identity is defined in terms of the opposition of us and the other. Otherness comprises all differences and constitutes the inverse image of us indeed, as Connolly assumes, otherness is needed to establish identity, or to secure its own self-certainty 123. While the latter definitions have been traditionally monopolized by states, who construct the borders between us and others and conduct their foreign policy accordingly 124, what could be the image of the other that would constitute the identity of a cross-border region? Identity and borders are two sides of the same coin since we need to establish boundaries to separate us and the other 125. Alongside with deconstructing and re-imagining the border between us and the other, the development of regional identity, according to Paasi s famous conceptualization, can be associated with the complex process of regional institutionalization, the process through which regions come into being 126. The regional institutionalization involves three simultaneous processes of establishing (1) a territorial shape, or boundaries, distinguishing the regional identity discourses from those of other regions; (2) a symbolic shape, manifested in various practices and used to construct the narratives of the regional identity; (3) a set of institutions, needed to maintain the territorial and symbolic shapes, and involved in production and reproduction of differences. The established regional identity, Paasi explains, can be used against the other but also as a medium in a struggle over resources and power 127. Indeed, it is hard to construct a coherent image of the other in case of crossborder regions: should it combine the states on both sides of the border? Rather, in case of 122 Ibid. 123 Connolly, W.E. Identity/Difference. Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1991, p See for instance, Campbell, D. Writing Security. United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, See Conversi, D. Reassessing Current Theories of Nationalism: Nationalism as Boundary Maintenance and Creation, in Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 1, 1995, pp ; and Rose, G. Place and Identity: A Sense of Place, in A Place in the World, Eds. D. Masey and P. Jess, Oxford, The Open University Press, 1995, pp See note 118, p Ibid.

37 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 37 cross-border regions, identity should be explained in terms of social acceptance and social action. Paasi divides identity into ideal and factual, where the former refers to collective narratives of identity used by region-builders, and the latter means those forms of identity that find expression in social action and may serve as the basis for institutional thickness 128. In other words, institutional cross-border identity can be thin and undeveloped, and thick, which should involve popular consumption and acceptance of the identity narratives to the extent they result in social action. While Euroregions seem to have a thin identity, exemplifying, what Paasi calls regions on paper, they may one day turn into regions as social practice that may have very concrete effects on people s daily lives 129. Thus, in case of cross-border cooperation, identity can be treated first, as the historical-cultural cross-border identity that exists a priori and facilitates cross-border cooperation; and second, as the institutional identity produced by the existing cross-border actors and institutions, such as Euroregions. Where the common historical-cultural crossborder identity exists, it may facilitate cross-border cooperation, but it may not be a necessary condition as the national identities and institutions continuously undermine the historicalcultural cross-border identities even in the cases with strong ethnic links across the border. As has been shown in this section, cross-border cooperation in Europe and especially on its external borders is dominated by the top-down institutionalization rather than bottom-up initiatives, where cross-border identity is more often than not, promoted by the cross-border institutions. The sociological new institutionalism assumes that the internalization of norms and values conditions actors behaviour, although it may be a long-term process. Therefore, the long-term success of cross-border cooperation may be dependent on the internalization of norms and values generated by the cross-border institutions, or in other words, in the consumption and acceptance of the cross-border institutional identity. 2.3 Synthesising the theoretical discussion How can one develop a theoretical framework that would allow for a comprehensive study of both aspects of cross-border cooperation institutions and identities, also taking into consideration the multi-level nature of cross-border governance? While most scholars tend to study institutions and identity separately, using what van Houtum calls, cross-border 128 Ibid. 129 See note 120, p. 14.

38 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 38 cooperation approaches, or sociocultural people approaches, this thesis suggests that the two should be united. Perkmann whose new institutionalist perspective has been used as the basis for the analysis of the institutional framework of cross-border cooperation does not take into account the issues of identity. The sociologically influenced new institutionalism in fact emphasises the links between institutions and identities: identities are not exogenous, formed independently by actors, but instead are shaped and reproduced by existing institutions. This thesis, however, attempts to make a distinction between institutions and actors, supporting a slightly more actor-centred approach. Actors albeit bound by the existing opportunities and constraints are able to initiate strategic institutional change and to construct institutional identity. In case of cross-border cooperation, such institutions as the European Commission and the local/regional authorities participating in the creation of Euroregions aim at establishing common cross-border identities in Europe and its external borders, which in itself is a long process. As has been shown in the previous section, such institutional cross-border identities still are far from reality due to the facts that cross-border institutions are still too young. The institutionalization of cross-border regions should result, according to Paasi 130, in the establishment of regional identities, which are consumed and accepted by actors and which also mobilize social action. At present, cross-border regions across Europe and especially across its external borders fall short of true collective identities, which does not mean they cannot be developed in the future. Institutional cross-border identity evolves through the complex interplay of local cross-border, national and European identities produced and reproduced by existing institutions at all levels of cross-border governance. Some institutions become more privileged than others to build the institutional framework and to promote cross-border identities. Euroregions have become to be considered as best practice in the implementation of INTERREG, but they also are the main promoters of cross-border identity, along with the European Commission s supporting discourse on Europe of Regions. 130 See notes 118 and 120.

39 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 39 INTERREG regulations The European Commission, AEBR Europe of Regions Multilevel Framework National INTERREG structures State authorities National identity Euroregions Local/regional authorities Cross-border identity Institutions Actors Identities Fig. 4: The synthesised theoretical framework for cross-border cooperation Historical-cultural cross-border identity has been considered by the followers of the people approach as a strong basis for cross-border cooperation. Cross-border cooperation appears more intense in the older Euroregions, where the mental lines between us and the other became less prominent with time and increased informal interaction. Identity building involves re-imagining of the mental barriers, which is not necessary dependant on the physical obstacles. In Europe, for instance, where the borders have been removed, the cultural distance remains the main hindrance for cross-border cooperation 131. Yet, the reality of crossborder cooperation in Europe and on its external border has shown that national identities and institutions compete with the cross-border regional identities, where they do exist. Furthermore, since 1990s Euroregions were largely created not on the basis of pre-existing informal interaction and historical-cultural identity but rather on the basis of institutional identity promoted by cross-border cooperation institutions and actors. The state level institutions as well as national identities provide a series of constraints for building strong cross-border regions with enhanced cross-border identities. Wilson and Donnan summarize the tension between the state and the local levels as follows: States need to control their borders because they are their first lines of defence, institutions of social coercion, and symbols of a variety of state powers. But the people of a border s frontiers are often members of political institutions and informal networks which compete with the state See Scott, J. Research Notes on Cross-Border Regionalism. The Hungarian-Austrian and German-Polish Cases, Report based on research carried out within the framework of the EXLINEA project and funded by the EU s Fifth Framework programme for Research and Technology, Wilson, Th. M. and Donnan, H. Nation, State and Identity at International Borders, in Border Identities: Nation and State at International Frontiers, Eds. Th. M. Wilson and H. Donnan, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998, p. 10.

40 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 40 The multi- level governance model provides a wider framework for the study of crossborder cooperation, completing the theoretical model (See Fig. 4) in the sense that it underlines the growing autonomy of the subnational level in Europe, although the state keeps the constraining role of a gatekeeper both when it comes to the development of cross-border cooperation institutions and cross-border identities. Furthermore, it is useful to analyse crossborder cooperation in terms of governance, where multiple networks of actors at the local/regional, national and supranational level are interdependent and coordinated in the achievement of commonly defined goals. Finally, cross-border governance also involves the social construction of the cross-border regions, where identities are negotiated among the various actors, and produced and reproduced by cross-border institutions at all levels of governance.

41 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 41 3 METHODOLOGY 3.1 Concepts, variables and hypotheses Following the theoretical framework of this thesis, what major concepts, variables and hypotheses can be identified? The one dependent variable in this thesis is cross-border cooperation, which has been defined from the outset as the cooperation between adjacent border regions at the local/regional level. To be more precise, such cross-border cooperation largely involves the implementation of the EU support programmes such as INTERREG, PHARE CBC and TACIS CBC, and therefore, local/regional authorities as well as NGOs, universities or businessmen, are the main actors participating in cross-border cooperation through the project preparation and implementation. The scope of this thesis does not allow me to focus on other forms of cross-border cooperation, such as economic or informal interaction, which would also demand a different theoretical framework and different kind of data such as the statistics on exports/imports or on border crossings. Therefore, the main object of study is the more or less institutionalized cross-border cooperation at local and regional levels. The focus on the local/regional level actors, rather than on national or even EU level actors, is especially important, as it is there where cross-border practices and identities are the part of people s everyday life. As Newman explains, when it comes to identity, it is at the border where the change of perceptions of us and the other first takes place 133. Further, it is at the local/regional level where the effect of the EU and national policies are felt and where the main institutional changes take place, for instance through the establishment of Euroregions. According to the theoretical model of this paper, cross-border cooperation is best understood as cross-border governance, where actors are embedded within cross-border cooperation institutions at local/regional, national and EU levels of governance. According to the more sociologically influenced institutionalist approach, these institutions are believed to shape and structure actors preferences and actions, and thus, institutional context for crossborder cooperation is the first independent variable. As has been shown in the previous chapter, cross-border governance involves multi-level framework, where the local/regional as well as supranational level are pulling the blanket on themselves from the traditionally 133 Newman, D. On Borders and Power: A Theoretical Framework, in Journal of Borderland Studies, Vol. 18, Nr. 1, Spring 2003, pp

42 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 42 strong national level. Since cross-border cooperation involves the implementation of the EU programmes, which demands multi-level governance mechanisms and an active participation of local/regional levels, one could assume that: H1: The more levels of governance the institutional context for cross-border cooperation involves, the more successful appears cross-border cooperation. Here, the degree of multi-level governance means the participation of cross-border cooperation institutions at all levels of governance, but the degree of the involvement of local/regional and European institutions, as opposed to the national level institutions, is especially important. Various scholars have claimed that the national institutional context provides constraints rather than opportunity structures for cross-border cooperation. Hypothesis 1 thus establishes the possible interrelation between institutions and cross-border cooperation, and more precisely, between the multi- level institutional framework and crossborder cooperation. The opposite of the multi-level institutional framework would be a centralized system of implementing the EU programmes, without the active involvement of the local/regional institutions into the decision-making. Another independent variable would be cross-border identity, yet here two distinctions should be made. First type of identity facilitating cross-border cooperation is the historical-cultural identity that may exist in the cross-border region, which would involve ethnic, cultural or historical affinity between the two border communities. Since within the EU and especially on its external borders, however, the cross-border regions were often established by top-down institutionalization, without considering the historical-cultural affinities between the border regions, it would be wrong to assume that the existence of historical-cultural cross-border identity is a necessary condition for cross-border cooperation. Further, the institutionalized cross-border cooperation by its definition involves institutions, INTERREG implementation structures at all levels of governance, and project based cooperation. What is obvious, however, is that where it is present, historical-cultural identity may facilitate communication and magnify the effect of other independent variables on crossborder cooperation. Therefore, historical-cultural identity could be viewed as what Van Evera calls, a condition variable 134. The second type of cross-border identity discussed in the previous chapter could be called institutional identity, that is, identity generated by the existing cross-border institutions, such as Euroregions. This kind of cross-border identity is linked to what Paasi 134 Van Evera, S. Guide To Methods for Students of Political Science. Cornell University Press, New York, 1997.

43 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 43 calls the institutionalization of regions, which involves apart from establishing regions on paper promoted by the authorities and scholars, the consumption and acceptance of this identity by wider population, and which may mobilize social action 135. This view also corresponds to the sociological institutionalist approach, according to which, institutions affect not only actors preferences and actions, but also constitute their identities and behaviour. Such institutional cross-border identity may exist when the population is well aware of the cross-border institutions and the opportunities it provides, and takes action to integrate and use these opportunities in their daily routines. Taking into consideration the two types of cross-border identity, the proposed hypothesis is the following: H2: Institutional cross-border identity is more important for successful crossborder cooperation than historical-cultural identity. According to sociological institutionalism the causal link would have been as follows: institutions shape identity, and identity conditions cross-border cooperation. However, the theoretical model of this thesis attempts to avoid the trap of sociological institutionalism, which underestimates the powers of actors, creating what Hall and Taylor call, action without actors 136. Instead, this theoretical model combines the sociological approach with Perkmann s historical institutionalist approach, which focuses on institutions as opportunities and constraints to rational action, thus leaving some room for actors entrepreneurship strategies. Cross-border actors thus are simultaneously rational but heavily constrained by the Multilevel Institutional Context Historical-Cultural Identity X Cross-Border Cooperation Institutional Cross-Border Identity Fig. 5: Variables and hypotheses institutional context, and also relying on their identity, values and norms to guide their choices. Cross-border cooperation thus is on the one hand influenced by the institutional context and on the other hand depends on the strength of the cross-border institutional identity, being facilitated by the existence of historical-cultural cross-border identity (See Fig 5). 135 Paasi, A. Regional Transformation in the European Context: Notes on Regions, Boundaries and Identity, in Space and Polity, Vol. 6, Nr.2, 2002, pp Hall, P. A. and Taylor, R.C.R. Political Science and The Three New Institutionalisms, in Political Studies, Vol. 44, No. 5, 1996, pp

44 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION Operationalization and mode of analysis Two cases studies: Estonian-Russian and Romanian-Moldovan crossborder cooperation As it has been noted in the European Commission s Communication on Wider Europe 137, following the enlargement, the EU has ended up with highly differentiated external borders, and more so than the borders inside the EU, these external borders need extensive support in order to achieve stability and cohesion. It is at the the external borders of the EU that crossborder cooperation is much encouraged, but at the same time it may be most difficult to achieve due to the high asymmetries of the border regions as well as the presence of the Schengen border regulations. This thesis sets out to analyse and compare two case studies of cross-border cooperation on the EU external border: Estonian-Russian and Romanian- Moldovan cross-border regions. While Romania is not a EU member at present, it will be in 2007, and in this pre-accession process Romania orients itself towards the EU members rather than the EU non-member neighbour-states, such as for instance Moldova or Ukraine. Since the empirical part of this thesis mainly analyses perceptions of different cross-border cooperation actors, Romania s actual membership in the EU is less important than actors perception of it as an EU country, separated from Moldova by the future Schengen border. The two cases were chosen on the basis of similarity: they both represent cross-border regions at the EU external border and they both involve top-down cross-border cooperation institutionalization processes. However, there are profound differences when it comes to the existence of historical-cultural cross-border identity. Estonian border regions have an extensive Russian ethnic minority in the northeast; however, on Estonia s southern border with Russia, populated mainly by ethnic Estonians, the basis for the cross-border historicalcultural identity is rather scarce. Yet, it is namely there, on the southern border between Estonia, Russia and Latvia, that the Euroregion Pskov-Livonia has been created. In case of Moldova and Romania, one can talk about the same historical-cultural identity. Similarly, on the Moldovan-Romanian border the institutionalisation of cross-border cooperation has also led to the establishment of the Euroregions, out of which, the Euroregion Upper-Prut, is the focus of this thesis 138. Geographically, the research is concentrated on regions and municipalities adjacent to the border, that is, where cross-border cooperation is an important 137 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament Wider Europe Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours, COM(2003) 104 final, Brussels, For the map depicting the Estonian-Russian-Latvian Euroregion Pskov-Livonia and the Romanian- Moldovan-Ukrainian Euroregion Upper Prut see Appendix I.

45 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 45 everyday issue. The thesis will study whether Euroregions provide new opportunities for cross-border cooperation and whether the Euroregional identity can mobilize cross-border action. To conclude, the two cases provide a good basis for comparison and testing hypotheses 1 and 2. It is presumptuous to draw generalizations from just two cases, so this work will rather test the developed theoretical model for cross-border cooperation and provide the ground for generating further hypotheses. According to Yin, the case study method is most appropriate when answering questions as why or how, which point to the explanatory nature of the research, but also questions as what or where, that denote the exploratory purpose of the research and can also be studied by other methods 139. The case study should also be used where one deals with contemporary events, and where context and processes cannot be easily distinguished. The uniqueness of the case study method is also its ability to deal with multiple sources of evidence: documents, surveys, interviews and observations 140. The study of cross-border cooperation is fitting these conditions, as it concerns the study of contemporary events and the main research questions are of the types what and who but also why and how. The general problematique of the comparison of the two cases of cross-border cooperation on the Estonian-Russian and Moldovan-Romanian borders revolves around the main five research questions: (1) Why is or is not cross-border cooperation successful? What are the factors conditioning cross-border cooperation? What have the results of cross-border cooperation in the eyes of cross-border actors? (2) What is the institutional context for cross-border cooperation? What levels of governance does it involve? (3) How does the institutional context influence the development of cross-border cooperation? (4) What are the main actors of cross-border cooperation? (5) What is the role of cross-border identity (institutional and historical-cultural) in the development of cross-border cooperation? 139 Yin, R. K. Case Study Research: Design and Methods. Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, London, and New Delhi, Ibid.

46 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION Sources of evidence: project EXLINEA This thesis owes a lot to the project EXLINEA 141, which provided both ideas and means for conducting fieldwork in the border regions of Estonia, Russia, Romania and Moldova. Launched in January 2003 and to be finished by January 2006, the project EXLINEA Lines of Exclusion as Arenas of Co-operation: Reconfiguring the External Boundaries of Europe Policies, Practices, Perceptions is supported by the European Commission s Fifth Framework Programme, and its major goals include examining capacities for regionbuilding across national borders in Central and Eastern Europe in the anticipation of EU enlargement 142. Under EXLINEA, research is being carried out in the Finnish-Russian, Estonian-Russian, Polish-Ukrainian, Hungarian-Romanian, Moldavian-Romanian border regions and in Greek border regions with Macedonia, Bulgaria and Turkey, and the results are then to be compared. Although EXLINEA takes a multi-level approach to the study of crossborder regionalisation, its main focus falls on the regional level and the developments at the border, as it views border regions as vehicles for cross-border governance facilitating the European integration and enlargement process. EXLINEA explores the external borders of the EU as an area where European cross-practices could be transferred. Yet apart from the opportunities largely stemming from the EU policies for cross-border cooperation, there are also obstacles and fears of emerging fortress Europe that undermine the transferability of cooperation experiences and need to be studied. To sum up, EXLINEA s research encompasses the assessment of opportunities and constraints for cross-border regionalization at the former lines of exclusion at the external borders of the EU and attempts to predict the further development of local/regional cross-border cooperation between the EU and the neighbouring non-member states. EXLINEA attempts to elaborate typologies of cross-border interaction as well analyse the processes underlying the regionalisation in each of the six case studies employing a mix of methods that allows both for qualitative analysis as well as the use of supportive quantitative data. EXLINEA s sources of evidence thus include: the survey of relevant official documents, political statements, press materials, and local archival work; the collection of ethnographic data involving in-depth interviews and group meetings with network actors and experts; and standardised questionnaires. My almost three-year-old involvement in the project EXLINEA meant that I was actively involved in the compilation of all background reports and have been responsible for conducting the fieldwork in the Estonian-Russian and Moldovan-Romanian 141 See EXLINEA project description,

47 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 47 cross-border regions. For the purposes of this thesis I will use the data collected under the EXLINEA framework: mainly the standardized questionnaires and in-depth interviews, but I will also refer to EXLINEA background reports when explaining the institutional context for cross-border cooperation and the existence of historical-cultural cross-border identity. The research problematique of this thesis is narrower than that of EXLINEA; therefore, the data will be selected on the basis of relevance for my analysis (for instance, I will ignore the data provided by the standardised questionnaires on the economic cross-border interaction as it is not the purpose of my research). I have personally conducted 25 in-depth interviews in each of the Estonian, Moldovan and Romanian border regions, while in the Russian border region 28 interviews have been conducted by our Russian partner from the Moscow Institute of Geography, Vladimir Kolossov. As the interviewees in Estonia included both Estonian and Russian-speakers, I therefore offered as the choice of language Estonian or Russian. In Romania, I have used the services of a Romanian translator, while in Moldova more than a half of the respondents were willing to communicate with me directly, in Russian. All transcripts of the interviews except for the ones from the Russian border region, which are in Russian, were then translated into English. As for the choice of interviewees, I have identified four groups of potential actors of cross-border cooperation: (1) officials, representing local and regional authorities; (2) NGOs and cultural associations; (3) businessmen and the representatives of regional and local industrial and commercial associations; and (4) experts, represented by university scholars, the representatives of the EU and EU-affiliated agencies (for instance, info-centres) and media. I aimed at more or less equal proportions among the respondents, although the number of officials is slightly higher, since they are the main actors of institutionalised cross-border cooperation at local/regional level. The number of respondents by category in the two case studies is illustrated in Table 1. Table 1 Estonian border region Russian border region Romanian border region Moldovan border region Officials NGOs Businessmen Experts

48 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 48 When it comes to conducting in-depth interviews, in general, it was rather difficult to persuade people to part with the precious time of minutes in order to satisfy the scientific curiosity of the EXLINEA members. However, once I arrived and started the interview, by introducing the purposes of the project, the atmosphere generally became friendly and relaxed. Most of the time, I have managed to disperse any doubts or suspicions that the respondents may have had about my use of the voice recorder, by assuring that they will remain anonymous and that I am interested in their personal perceptions, rather than official views. However, certain respondents showed distrust by refusing to comment for instance on the political situation in the country and by general unease when criticising the authorities. This unease, however, was much more obvious in Moldova then in the other countries. I started the actual interview by asking about the actors life and work, as well as their perceptions about the general political situation in their country. Then I turned the interview towards the discussion of cross-border cooperation in general, to see how important in crossborder cooperation in their everyday life and work, and whether they view cross-border cooperation beneficial for their region. Then followed questions on their perceptions of the other : how they view people across the border and what images they have of the border itself. This section of the interview was by far most popular with respondents, resulting in smiles, stories from life, recollections of friends and relatives on the other side of the border. This section thus opened up the respondents the most, as it appealed to the emotive side and imagination, and concentrated on their personal feelings, rather than political opinions. Then I switched to the more technical discussion asking what institutions, policies and actors of cross-border cooperation they can identify and which they consider as opportunities and which as constraints to cross-border cooperation. I also tried to find out how aware the respondents were about the activities of the Euroregion, as well as about the EU programmes supporting cross-border cooperation. To conclude, I asked about the existing obstacles to cross-border cooperation and what policies and institutions they would like to see changed. I have conducted all interviews in all border regions concerned according to the same general template, which is available in the Annex II, keeping in mind the main questions or themes that need to be discussed. However, as many of the questions are open-ended, I tried to follow the respondent s train of thought in my questions, rather than stick to the template completely. Thus, the order and the form of the questions may vary from respondent to respondent, from category to category. Yet, overall I have tried not to omit any questions,

49 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 49 even if the respondent was not well informed for instance on the activities of the Euroregion, because my goal was to explore their perceptions rather than knowledge. In Romania, I have conducted the in-depth interviews during the time period of 5th- 12th of July 2004, in Suceava and Botosani judets, or regions, which are both represented in the Upper-Prut Euroregion 143. I have concentrated on the major cities such as Botosani or Suceava, which had the representatives of both local and regional level authorities, but also made trips to smaller towns by the border if the respondents there seemed potentially important for the database. In Moldova, I conducted the interviews during the period 13th- 18th of July 2004, in five districts bordering Romania, Briceni, Edinet, Riscani, Glodeni and Falesti, all of which are also represented in the Upper-Prut Euroregion 144. Since the fieldwork in Moldova included a lot of travelling between different districts, while the public transport between different border towns is close to nothing, this trip resulted in skewed time schedules and much stress 145. In general, Moldovan respondents seemed most cautious in expressing their opinions, which I had expected taking into consideration the centralized, hierarchical political system of the Republic of Moldova, with the Communist Party currently in power. It was easier to get interviews with upper-standing regional officials, as other lower-standing representatives of the administrations were afraid they would suffer consequences for not asking the permission to give an interview. My assurances of anonymity were accepted with distrust, and many respondents repeatedly expressed hope during the interview that I would not reveal their names, fearing that somehow this information would have bad consequences for them. Another difficulty, which confronted me in the Moldovan border region, was finding active NGOs, which was also the case in the Russian border region. In Estonia, I have conducted the interviews in August-September 2004, in Ida-Viru, Põlva and Võru counties the three counties that have land border with Russia. In September 2004, the interviews were carried out in the Russian border regions: Kingisepp district (Leningrad oblast), and Pechory and Gdov districts (Pskov oblast). In Estonia, I had few difficulties contacting and interviewing people. The time constraints were the main reasons for refusing to grant me an interview. The respondents seemed not to be disturbed by my use 143 For the setting up of the interview appointments, prior to my visit to Romania, I am very thankful to our colleague from the Iasi University, Daniela Soitu, who helped me organize my days perfectly, so that I have conducted on average 7-8 interviews per day (especially when I did not have to travel from place to place). 144 For the setting up of the interview appointments I was dependent on our Moldovan EXLINEA partner from the Chisinau Academy of Science, Alla Skovrtova. 145 In addition to practical difficulties, it was rather the norm, not the exception that officials and businessmen were not available at agreed times. Especially officials and businessmen seemed reluctant to spare with their time and ideas for the purposes of research; one official even asked me if he would get paid for giving me an interview.

50 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 50 of the voice recorder, speaking freely, even if their answers involved fierce criticism of the authorities, both local and national. Before contacting the potential respondents by phone, I usually sent out s explaining the purposes of the research and the interview. Many respondents expressed genuine interest in the project and were willing to receive results of the research. Such stark differences between the respondents reactions in different countries may be explained the degree of political freedom on the one hand, and on the other hand by the state of the academic culture. In the Moldovan border regions, few people had participated in a similar research projects before. So they would not know much about the nature and purposes of these interviews despite my explanations. They would not know if scholars stand by their pledge to anonymity. Despite this fact, I frankly believe that the quality of the interviews, even in case of Moldova, has not suffered that much due to the recording them on tape. Few questions were in any way sensitive, such as the one on the evaluation of the country s foreign policy, and they are mainly the background questions, not dealing directly with cross-border cooperation. When it comes to talking about perceptions or the role of institutions in cross-border cooperation, people were generally very relaxed in all countries. 146 Approximately at the same time with the in-depth interviews, 70 standardized questionnaires were conducted in the same areas and representing the same categories of respondents in each of the Estonian, Russian, Romanian and Moldovan border regions. The sample includes all potential actors of cross-border cooperation at local and regional levels: the representatives of local and regional authorities, businessmen, NGOs, EU-affiliated agencies, universities, and media. The sampling was not intended to represent the population of the countries or the border regions and thus does not take into consideration such standard variables as age or sex. Rather, the sampling aims to represent the actors of cross-border cooperation from different spheres such as administration, business, culture, media, etc. in order to compare the perceptions on different sides of the border. Since the number of crossborder cooperation actors is rather limited, such sampling seems well justified. The 11-page long questionnaire 147 consists of 7 parts, and each of them includes questions on certain aspects of cross-border cooperation. The respondents are for instance asked to evaluate a phenomenon on the scale from 1 to 7, where 1 is the smallest and 7 is the highest value (for instance, 1 means that cross-border cooperation is completely absent and 7 means that the level of cross-border cooperation is very high). The parts are presented in the 146 In my analysis of the interviews, I will stick to my pledge of anonymity and will not use any proper names or specific details such as work position but will refer to the category of the respondent and his or her place of living. 147 See Annex II.

51 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 51 following order: I Types and level of economic interaction; II Immigration and interaction; III Obstacles to cross-border cooperation and interaction; IV Perceptions of the other ; V Evaluation of policies of cross-border cooperation; VI Expected consequences of increasing cross-border cooperation; VII The consequences of the EU enlargement for the region. I will ignore the parts I, II and VII, as they are not relevant for the research goals of this thesis. The respondents were given choice not to give personal information such as name, profession, position, town or age. By contrast, the questionnaire provides information on the respondent s country of residence, level of education, knowledge of foreign languages, and how often the respondent visits the neighbouring state concerned. This thesis thus compares two case studies, within which it uses a combination of the qualitative and quantitative methods of research. The triangulation allows for the verification of the explanatory values of various sources of evidence, and thus contributes to the quality of findings. While the standardised questionnaires provide the basis for the generalization of perceptions, even if the level of measurement is as high as from 1 to 7, these questionnaires cannot answer the questions why and how. As Marsh and Stoker explain, quantitative methods cannot reveal meaning and motivations in contrast to open-ended qualitative approaches. Further, the questionnaires are often too narrowly focused, too structured so that they prevent respondents from speaking their minds 148. In this sense, combining the two methods, I provide for a degree of representation (although n=140 is a rather modest number) through standardised questionnaires, but also add flesh to the bones by adding possible explanations and motivations stemming from the analysis of the in-depth interviews to the numbers and correlations Operationalisation This subsection is perhaps one of the most important in this thesis as it explains how the theory and data will be united, how concepts will be operationalised and hypotheses tested. First, how can one measure cross-border cooperation? Indeed, there cannot be an absolute value, but rather cross-border cooperation can only be measured in relative terms and there can be many indicators. The standardised questionnaires provide information on the actors evaluations of the possible impact of increasing cross-border cooperation on the border regions and the countries in question (Question 4.3) and their perceptions of the degree of benefit that the increasing cross-border cooperation might have for the border regions and the 148 Marsh, D. and Stoker, G. Theory and Methods in Political Science. Macmillan Press Ltd, London, 1995, p. 167.

52 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 52 countries in question (Question 6.1). These indicators show us how positively the actors view increasing cross-border cooperation, which can be seen as the potential, or the basis of motivation for cross-border cooperation. Finally, the in-depth interviews provide descriptions and evaluations of the state of cross-border cooperation. Second, how to measure the multilevelness of the institutional framework, or in other words, how to see if cross-border governance involves multiple actors at local, regional, national and European levels, as opposed to the centralized decision-making mechanisms? The questionnaire provides information on the existence of cross-border policies at each of the levels of governance (Question 5.1), which can be considered as an indicator. Policies for cross-border cooperation in EXLINEA are meant to stand for the general institutional context comprising official frameworks and norms that govern border permeability and give direction to cross-border cooperation by defining priorities, formal incentive structures as well as restrictions; basic and particular documents regarding borders and cross-border cooperation (Schuman declaration or Schengen treaty); policies (such as Enlargement policies, Regional and Cohesion Policy), and geopolitical strategies involving regional cooperation with non-eu states (such as the Northern Dimension ) 149. Thus, based on the questionnaire data we can see the institutions at which levels appear to be more involved in cross-border governance from the actors standpoint. In addition, in-depth interviews provide explanations as to why certain levels of governance are more involved than others. The institutionalised cross-border cooperation, concerned with the implementation of the EU programmes such INTERREG or PHARE CBC, can vary as for the degree of the regional/local involvement. Thus, in this more narrow sense multilevelness can be associated with the existence and active participation of multiple actors at the local/regional level. Question 5.3 of the questionnaire provides the data on the assessment of the degree of involvement of different local and regional actors in crossborder cooperation. Third, the degree of historical-cultural cross-border identity can be measured by the study of the actors perceptions of the other, and Question 4.2 provides information whether the respondents view the people on the other side as friendly, hardworking, open, similar to themselves and as part of the European culture. If the values of the means for the answers from both sides of the border are high, then one may conclude that there is strong basis for cross-border historical-cultural identity. Further, Question 4.1 asks whether people consider historical events, religious, language and cultural differences to be obstacles or incentives for 149 EXLINEA Research Framework,

53 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 53 cross-border cooperation, where 1 stands for a large obstacle and 7 for a strong incentive. This helps to determine how important is the cross-border identity or the lack thereof for cross-border cooperation. In addition, as with previous variables, the in-depth interviews provide invaluable insights and images of the nature of the other. Finally, how can one measure institutional identity, which is promoted by institutions of cross-border cooperation, such as Euroregions, and which becomes reality only when, it is, to use Paasi s expression, consumed, or accepted by the population, mobilizing social action? In this sense institutional identity is closely related to how potential actors perceive institutions. In order to identify with an institution one needs to be aware of it and of the work it does, and the more positive the perception, the more there might be the basis for institutional identity. Question 5.2 of the EXLINEA questionnaire is meant to reveal the assessments of the efficiency of the institutions of cross-border cooperation at different levels of governance. Efficiency is the meaning of institutions; according to the rational choice theory, institutions are created to facilitate transactions. In cross-border cooperation, the actors should be aware of existing institutions, and perceive them in positive terms (for instance if there is no a priori identification with a Euroregion, then its efficiency is an important factor underlying people s acceptance), in order for it to mobilize social action. People should see institutions more as opportunities and less as constraints, for an institutional identity to develop. In-depth interviews provide additional information on whether the respondents are aware of the Euroregion and its activities, and on what institutions they consider to be opportunities or constraints for cross-border cooperation and why. I will analyse the standardised questionnaires establishing correlations between respondents answers to questions concerning the institutional context and identity on the one side, and their perceptions of cross-border cooperation on the other. Further, I will compare the means of various questions between the Estonian and the Russian sides of the border, and between the Romanian and the Moldovan sides of the border, and explain the most profound differences with the help of the qualitative data. Certain questions allow for the use of factor analysis, in order to compare, to which questions the respondents reply in the same way. The analysis groups the variable into a few subsets with an underlying factor. I then look at the grouped variables and propose the name for the factor and describe what these variables may have in common. In order to compare perceptions, this analysis is done separately for the respondents on different sides of the border. Further, the statistical analysis of the questionnaires also provides information on which questions were of particular importance

54 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 54 for the respondents of a certain country. One could also analyse the correlations between different responses and the fact how many times the respondents go across the border. In the case of correlations, while they can provide support for the theoretical model, it is impossible to show causal links between the two phenomena, as is often the case with quantitative methods. By saying correlation is not causation, Marsh and Stoker refer to the causal inadequacy, or loops of causation, of quantitative methods in cases where variables are other than background ones such as gender, age or class, which are normally antecedent to most political opinion variables 150. How can one prove that it is the multi-level institutional context or cross-border identity that influence cross-border cooperation, and not vice versa. In case of cross-border cooperation, the influence may flow in two directions: indeed according to the new institutionalist model, the institutional context structures and shapes the behaviour of cross-border actors, who in their turn influence institutions. In such cases, Marsh and Stoker point out, it is almost impossible to determine how much the influence flows in each direction 151. Here, the in-depth interviews are complementary to the questionnaires as they provide information about the actors motivation and help explain possible causal links. The analysis is first carried out separately in each of the two case studies, and then final section provides the comparison of the results and the assessment of the proposed theoretical model. 150 Marsh, D. and Stoker, G. Theory and Methods in Political Science. Macmillan Press Ltd, London, 1995, p Ibid. p 161.

55 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 55 4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 4.1 Cross-border cooperation on the Estonian-Russian border The profile of the Estonian-Russian cross-border region This section gives a concise overview of the existing institutional context of the Estonian- Russian cross-border region, discussing the legal framework and the main financing mechanisms for cross-border cooperation. Further, this section discusses the preconditions for the institutional identity of the Euroregion Pskov-Livonia, the most developed form of institutionalised cross-border cooperation between Estonia and Russia. Finally, the preconditions for the historical-cultural cross-border identity are assessed based on the existing academic research on the subject. To sum up, this brief profile of the Estonian- Russian cross-border region provides the necessary setting before proceeding to the empirical analysis. Institutional context The legal institutional context for the Estonian-Russian cross-border cooperation can be considered rather weak. In most European countries the cross-border cooperation is based on the general principles of the Madrid Outline Convention on Transfrontier Cooperation (1980), which serves as the basis for inter-state treaties governing cross-border cooperation between local/regional authorities. However, while Russia has joined the Madrid Convention, Estonia has not done so, and neither has it developed any documents that would contain the description of the strategy and goals for the cross-border cooperation with the Russian regional/local authorities. According to the Estonian Ministry of Internal Affairs, the first Estonian-Russian program for cross-border cooperation is to be prepared only by This program is to be prepared with the participation of the Russian side under the larger framework of the EU New Neighbourhood Program, which encourages among other things, cross-border cooperation at the EU external borders with the non-member neighbour-states. The Estonian-Russian program should contain the strategy and goals of cross-border cooperation, based on the on-going harmonisation process between the supporting funding 152 Telephone interview with Nelle Ivask, The Estonian Ministry of Internal Affairs, April 25, 2005.

56 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 56 mechanisms INTERREG (for the EU members) and TACIS CBC (for the EU nonmembers) 153. As has been mentioned, the Russian Federation follows the general principles of the Madrid Convention, according to which, the governments of the states that have signed the Convention, are obliged to encourage all cross-border cooperation initiatives spurring from the regional/local levels as well as from other juridical persons recognised by all cooperating sides 154. All agreements are to be concluded in accord with the national legislation of each contracting state. Such form of the institutionalized cross-border cooperation as Euroregion Pskov-Livonia has as its basis three juridical persons in Estonia, Russia and Latvia. Another important document, setting priorities and rules for cross-border cooperation in Russia is the Concept of Trans-Boundary Cooperation in the Russian Federation (February, 2001), which is also the only legal act describing the goals, types and actors, as well as their rights, for cross-border cooperation. The main actors of cross-border cooperation are federal subjects (oblasts), local governments, as well as juridical and physical persons in accordance with the national legislation. The goals of cross-border cooperation have a complex nature, including the socio-economic development of the border regions as well as cultural cooperation; however, according to Shlosberg et al, the list of the issues that can be solved by the cross-border actors in Russia in the sphere of cross-border cooperation is not that long 155. When it comes to the competences of the regional/local authorities in the spheres of cross-border in both Estonia and Russia, neither side has established detailed normative acts about the international activities of the regional/local levels of governance. In Estonia, the passing of the Law on Foreign Relations (Välissuhtlemisseadus) that describes the competences of the state subjects (e.g. counties, or regions) in their foreign relations is being postponed in the Parliament. However, it is expected that, the Local Government Act, which is drafted in accordance with the European Local Government Charter, will be passed by the middle of May So far, both Estonian regional and local levels were able to cooperate with the Russian actors of cross-border cooperation, despite the fact that the legal framework for such cooperation was missing 156. In Russia, the situation is similar, as both Federal Laws on the competences of the regional and local governments do not include detailed norms as for the international activities of the regional, and even more so of the local levels of 153 Telephone interview with Krista Kampus, The Estonian Ministry of Internal Affairs, April 20, Shlosberg, L. et al, Modelling of Euroregion for Pskov Oblast, Centre Vozrozdenije, Shlosberg et al, p Telephone interview with I. Ligemaa, The Estonian Ministry of Internal Affairs, April 25, 2005.

57 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 57 governance 157. Furthermore, according to Gavrilov et al, and Shlosberg et al, the situation in Russia is even more complicated due to the multiple bureaucratic barriers as the regional authorities have to submit all projects of agreements for the approval of the Federal Centre (Federal Government, the Ministry of Foreign Relations, etc.), as well as then register all agreements in the Ministry of Justice, which significantly slows down the process 158. The position of the local authorities is even less enviable, as there are no norms and established procedures as for the realization of their activities in the sphere of cross-border cooperation. Thus, one can say that so far, with the absence of the well-defined legal framework, the crossborder cooperation has been based to a large extent on the formal and informal practices of the local and regional authorities on both sides of the Estonian-Russian border. As for the institutional basis for the Euroregion Pskov-Livonia, each side operates in accordance with its national legislation, as well as the international agreements and acts. The participants of the Euroregion include the local and regional authorities in Estonia (Valga, Võru and Põlva counties), Russia (Pytalovo, Palkino, Pechory, and Pskov districts, as well as the municipality of Pskov in the Pskov oblast) and Latvia (Aluksne, Balvi, Ludza, and Valka districts), and the organs of the Euroregion include the Euroregion Council, Presidium and Directorate. It was the initiative of the Pskov oblast s administration to sign the agreement on the creation of the international organisation between the three sides in 1996, which served as the basis for the Council for Cross-Border Cooperation. The Council was transformed into the Euroregion Pskov-Livonia on October 15, 2003, and on November 25, 2003 the members of the Council in Estonia, Russia and Latvia signed the framework agreement Euroregion Pskov-Livonia. The main goals of the Euroregion consist of the development of the strategies of cross-border cooperation; the preparation and realization of cross-border projects; and the preparation of the documentation for the financing of these projects from support programmes such as INTERREG and TACIS. However, the budget of the Euroregion does not depend solely on the external sources, but also on the financial contributions of the participants and donations. There are multiple programmes offering support for the cross-border cooperation in the Estonian-Russian cross-border region, where the EU programmes such as INTERREG for Estonia and TACIS CBC for Russia, represent the major sources of financial support. On the Russian side, cross-border cooperation has been until 2004 supported by TACIS CBC Small 157 Shlosberg et al, p Gavrilov, A., Golikov, M, Malov, A., Chesnokov, B. The Threshold of Europe: Influence of the European Trans-Boundary Cooperation on the Regional Economic Development of Pskov Oblast, Ed. L. Shlosberg, Centre Vozrozhdenije, 2004, p. 202; and in Shlosberg et al, p.26.

58 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 58 Project Facility and one of the examples of such projects is the one supporting the private sector and providing assistance for economic development between the Municipalities in the Leningrad oblast in Russia and Ida-Viru county in Estonia, whose budget is approximately 190,000EUR 159. According to Repetoun, the number of projects has been increasing and their quality improving with each year 160. One of the most important mechanisms for the support of cross-border cooperation currently since 2004 is Estonian-Latvian-Russian INTERREG IIIA Priority, or Priority North, which is a part of the Baltic Sea Region INTERREG IIIB Neighbourhood Programme. It supports projects aimed at minimising the effects of the physical border and promoting cooperation between the people and institutions in the border regions 161. Priority North covers, on the Russian side, the Leningrad oblast, Pskov oblast and St. Petersburg municipality; the eligible regions in Estonia include Ida-Viru, Põlva, and Võru counties, among others. The first call for proposals was on October 1, 2004 with the deadline for project submission on November 15, However, out of the total 21 project proposals for the first round, only 4 concerned Estonian-Russian cross-border cooperation, and none of them were approved 162. The main reason for such a small number of Estonian-Russian project proposals is the fact that the Russian Federation has not signed the TACIS Financial Agreement 2004 due to the internal discord between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Economy and Transport, which means that the harmonization of the INTERREG and TACIS funds has been put on the shelf. The fact that the funds for the Russian partners are now blocked very much explains the low motivation for cross-border projects. One could speculate that the unwillingness of the Russian government to sign the TACIS agreement comes from the unwillingness to grant the oblasts more decision-making powers, since it is the oblasts that are expected to be direct beneficiaries of the TACIS funds, not Moscow. However, Finland opted to wait until Russia signs the TACIS Agreement before declaring the first round for projects proposals under the New Neighbourhood Programme, while Estonia and Latvia have not followed this example 163. One example of successful harmonization of INTERREG III A and TACIS on the EU external border is the cooperation between Latvia, Lithuania and Belarus, or Priority South. In case of Estonian-Russian cooperation, there is only one project concerning environmental protection, where the Russian side is involved, although only as 159 Interview with Ekaterina Repetoun, TACIS Local Support Office, St. Petersburg, May 27, Ibid. 161 INTERREG III A North and South, Newsletter, No. 1, 10, 2004; Baltic Sea Region INTERREG III B. 162 Interview with Peeter Unt, the Riga Office of the BSR INNTERREG III B Joint Secretariat, April 19, Interview with Ekaterina Repetoun, TACIS Local Support Office, St. Petersburg, May 27, 2005.

59 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 59 participants and not full partners. The total budget for the INTERREG III A Priority North is million Euro; yet the actors of the Estonian-Russian cross-border cooperation so far have not been able to use these funds. Thus, the institutional context for the Estonian-Russian cross-border cooperation includes the legislative framework for cross-border cooperation and the utilisation of the new mechanisms of support in the framework of the New Neighbourhood Programme. While in Estonia, although the legal framework is lacking, the state authorities do not hinder the activities of the regional and local governments in the sphere of cross-border cooperation and the financing mechanisms provide necessary support, in Russia there are serious bureaucratic obstacles both when it comes to the freedom of action of the regional and especially local authorities as well as the use of the financial mechanisms. Institutional Identity The institutional cross-border identity depends on the one hand, on the favourable political context between the two countries, and on the other hand, on the efficiency and the public image of the existing cross-border institutions, such as the Euroregion Pskov-Livonia. The political context of the cross-border relations between the two countries can be characterized mostly in negative terms, where the difficult 14-year-old negotiations on the border treaty between Estonia and Russia, as well as abolition of the simplified border-crossing regime between the Russian and Estonian border regions, have weakened the potential of the crossborder institutional identity. While the absence of the border treaty per se did not actually render cross-border cooperation impossible, it significantly influences the state of political relations between the state and regional/local authorities across the border. According to Berg, the border negotiations have passed through different stages from the hard Estonian restitutionalist policy towards subsequent abandonment of the restitutionalist claims for the sake of conforming towards the EU regulations and finally establishing the border treaty 164. Estonia has dropped the claims to the Eastern territories, which are considered part of the Estonian territory according to the Tartu Peace Treaty (1920), and conceded to establish the border according to the administrative border established in Up to now, the existing borderline with checkpoints and customs came to be called a temporary control line, and which also became the EU external border with Estonia s 164 Berg, E. Eesti: Tähendused, Piirid ja Kontekstid. Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus, Berg, E. Some Unintended Consequences of Geopolitical Reasoning in Post-Soviet Estonia: Texts and Policy Streams, Maps and Cartoons, in Geopolitics, Vol. 8, Nr.1, Spring 2003, pp

60 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 60 accession. Needless to say, the border negotiations brought turbulent reactions from different political groups in Estonia, such as the nationalist-minded Defence League members, as well as Narva town authorities in the northeast and the Setu in the southeast, the latter two being against the unnatural separation from the contingent territories (the eastern bank of the Narva river, including the town Ivangorod, or Jaanilinn, and the eastern part of the Setu Land, which together correspond to approximately 5 % of the Estonian territory) 166. On March 5, 1999, all technicalities connected to the demarcation of the temporary control line were settled, the political negotiations seemed over, the border agreement was initialled, and Estonia started the demarcation of the border (while Russia had done it already in 1994) 167. Yet, the border treaty was only signed on May 18, 2005, and is expected to be ratified and to come into force 30 days after the exchange of letters of ratification, after which the demarcation of the border will follow 168. Another cause for the worsening of the political relations between the two countries was the abolishing of the simplified border-crossing regime on January 25, 2000 and the introduction of the full visa regime between Estonia and Russia on September 11, 2000, which were the results of Estonia s accommodation to the Schengen border regulation and ensuring for the effective control on the external border of the EU 169. The simplified bordercrossing regime was created for the population of Narva-Ivangorod and the Setu Land in 1991 in accordance with the Estonian Government regulation and can be considered legal only till the end of 1992 since after that the Government did not prolong the regulation. Nevertheless, the regime de facto continued to exist for another ten years, being supported by the local authorities and the Border Guard. The regime involved approximately people living in the border regions concerned, who received border-crossing passes on the grounds of the existence of relatives or their graves, real estate, employment or studies, and places of worship on the other side of the border. While the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs attempted to gain total control over the border and establish the total visa regime, the Ministry of Internal Affairs tried to facilitate the border-crossing procedures. When the regime was finally abolished in 2000, in order to alleviate the situation, 4000 one-year multiple entry visas have been issued for free to the people with vital needs to cross the border, living in the 166 Berg, E. Some Unintended Consequences of Geopolitical Reasoning in Post-Soviet Estonia: Texts and Policy Streams, Maps and Cartoons, in Geopolitics, Vol. 8, Nr.1, Spring 2003, pp Ibid. 168 Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May , Berg, E., Schengeni leppega liitumise mõju Eestile, in Poliitikaanalüüs, Nr. 2, 2002.

61 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 61 border regions concerned. The number of visas was determined through the Estonian-Russian negotiations 170, but it remains disputable whether the number is adequate. According to the analysis of expert opinions in the Pskov oblast conducted by the Centre Vozrozhdenije, 48.3% of the interviewed representatives of political and business elite think that the inter-state relations between Estonia and Russia have a negative influence on the cross-border cooperation 171. The reasons behind such a negative evaluation include the absence of the border treaty between the two countries, as well as the Estonia s treatment of the Russian-speaking minority, which has been the stumbling block in the Russian-Estonian inter-state relations for the last decade. However, Estonia s accession to EU is believed to improve the situation with the protection of minority rights. When it comes to the absence of the border treaty, it is believed to have resulted in the excessively strict control of the federal services at the border. Further, the work of the Consulates, both Russian and Estonian, is assessed as providing obstacles rather than support to the Estonian-Russian cross-border cooperation by the majority of the respondents. When it comes to the contents of cross-border cooperation, here, the political dimension seems to dominate over the economic and social ones: over a half of the press articles concerning cross-border cooperation in the Pskov oblast in 2003 were of a political nature, which signifies a high level of politicization of cross-border cooperation 172. Another important precondition for the institutional cross-border identity is the efficiency and the public image of the existing institutions of cross-border cooperation, such as the Euroregion. Here, even among the representatives of the political and business elites in the Pskov oblast few understand the meaning of the Euroregion, while many are sceptical about its efficiency. According to the content analysis of the press releases concerning crossborder cooperation in the Pskov oblast, only 5 % of the articles mentioned the Euroregion Pskov-Livonia for the time period July 2001-March 2003, although their number has been continuously increasing 173. As for the concepts of the Northern Dimension or Wider Europe, they are completely absent from the political discourse on the Russian side. According to Shlosberg et al, the administrative structure of the Euroregion Pskov-Livonia can hardly be called efficient, as the three main organs have overlapping functions: for 170 Berg, E., Boman, J. and Kolossov, V. The background report: Estonian-Russian Borderland Gavrilov, A., Golikov, M, Malov, A., Chesnokov, B. The Threshold of Europe: Influence of the European Trans-Boundary Cooperation on the Regional Economic Development of Pskov Oblast, Ed. L. Shlosberg, Centre Vozrozhdenije, 2004, p. 202; and in Shlosberg et al, p Ibid. 173 Shlosberg, et al, p. 61.

62 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 62 instance, the Presidium may be in charge of the realisation of the Council s decisions, and the Directorate may realise the decisions by the Council and the Presidium 174. Further, the authors criticise the lack of transparency of the Euroregion s financial activities, which are not discussed outside the circle of the members of the Euroregion. While the regional and local authorities are the main participants of the Euroregion, other potential actors such as NGOs and business associations, to a large extent are left out due to the uncertainty as for their legal status and rights in the matters of cross-border cooperation. On the Estonian side, however, there is an opinion that the list of the Euroregion s participants should not be strictly outlined: it should be open to all subjects that are able to attract the necessary funding. The dominant role of the authorities in the development of the Euroregion, and the modest role of other actors of cross-border cooperation, may result in the failed institutional efficiency and identity of the Euroregion, poor quality of projects, and failed horizontal networks across the border and with the European partners. By the experts evaluations of the Euroregion s efficiency one may judge the potential for the institutional efficiency. Here, scepticism about the Euroregion s efficiency is connected above all to the cold political relations between Russia and Estonia, as well as the perceptions of the Euroregion participants as competing, not as cooperating sides 175. Various experts expressed fears that since Estonia and Latvia are more oriented towards the West, rather than the East, the declarations on cross-border cooperation might fall on deaf ears 176. As there are rather large obstacles to the efficient functioning of the Euroregion, there should be a concrete point of common interests between the two sides. This common benefit results from the possibility to implement projects attracting additional funding and to improve the socio-economic situation at the border. For the Euroregion to be continuously efficient there should be opportunities to realise these common projects without the obstacles spurring from the state level as well as there should be the common Euroregional budget that does not solely depend on the external funding 177. This would also help to generate the institutional identity of the Euroregion not as a project-fabricating organisation, but as an institution and a territorial unit erasing boundaries between the two border regions. To sum up, both the political context and the prevailing perceptions of the Euroregion s inefficiency hamper the development of the institutional cross-border identity. However, the improved political 174 Shlosberg, L. et al, Modelling of Euroregion for Pskov Oblast, Centre Vozrozdenije, 2004, p Shlosberg et al, p Gavrilov et al, p Shlosberg et al, p.80.

63 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 63 situation (e.g. with the expected signing of the border treaty), improved efficiency and the continuous image-making of the Euroregion by the political actors, may help the Euroregion Pskov-Livonia to become a reality. Historical-Cultural Identity One would assume that the basis for the historical-cultural cross-border identity in the Estonian-Russian cross-border region should be strong since in 1991 the border has cut through the more or less integrated communities in the north-eastern and the south-eastern parts of Estonia. However, while the majority of the population are ethnic Russians on both sides of the northern part of the Estonian-Russian border (69,5% in the Ida-Viru county and over 90% in the Kingisepp district) the southern part has a predominantly ethnic Estonian population on the Estonian side (94,4% in Põlva and Võru counties) and the predominantly Russian population on the Russian side of the border (over 90%) 178. The Setu number altogether people, of whom only less than 1000 live on the Russian side; therefore, it is hardly possible to consider the existence of the Setu culture as the important precondition for the historical-cultural identity of the Estonian-Russian cross-border region as a whole. The strongest basis for historical-cultural identity based on the common ethnicity and culture thus can be expected only from the northern part of the Estonian-Russian cross-border region, i.e. between Ida-Viru county and the Kingisepp district. The perceptions of us and the other in this part of the region should not therefore be an obstacle to but rather an incentive for crossborder cooperation. In 2001, a group of scholars conducted research on the multiple meanings of borders, taking in focus different parts of the Estonian-Russian border 179. The in-depth interviews were conducted in the summer of 1999, where one of the main goals was to study the perceptions of us and the other on both sides of the Estonian-Russian border. According to Brednikova and Siim, in the northern part of the border, in Narva-Ivangorod (population of 75,000 and 10,000, respectively), the border was initially perceived as artificial, as the two towns used to represent a common living space, with the common water drainage and sewage system, transport network, labour contacts and kinship ties 180. The administrative border that used to exist between the two towns before, did not have any impact on the people s everyday lives, 178 Berg, E., Boman, J. and Kolossov, V. The Background Report: Estonian-Russian Borderland Berg, E. (ed) Negotiating Borders of Multiple Meanings: Research Reports. Peipsi CTC, Tartu, Brednikova, O. and Siim, K. Divided Town in Transition: Social Space, Identity and Discourse, in Negotiating Borders of Multiple Meanings: Research Reports, Berg, E. (ed), Peipsi CTC, Tartu, 2001, pp

64 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 64 although as the authors comment, the imaginary border, and differences between the two towns have always been noticeable: people on both sides considered Narva as more foreign, more western and therefore more prestigious to live in. Starting from December 1991, the border has been de facto institutionalised, and the bridge of friendship across the Narova river connecting two towns, became a border zone with the Estonian and Russian checkpoints and customs located at the opposite ends of the bridge. The authors distinguish between certain stages of the people s accommodation to the new border: from the initial shock of being separated from relatives and friends, to the reconciliation with the border and border-crossing procedures and seeing border as a resource (e.g. petty trade resulting from the price differences across the border), and finally to the social reproduction of the border. The last stage of the border reproduction, or in other words, of the border becoming a social reality, is the result of the existing physical barriers represented by the border institutions, the rationalisation of social activities related to the border crossing as well as the Estonian national discourse of the border. Interestingly, when people were asked about the border, they most often treated it in terms of oppositions such as on the other side, us and them, there, over the bridge, etc. The border has also contributed to the emergence of stereotypes for the people over the bridge : for instance people in Narva perceived the Russians on the other side as sloppy, disordered and themselves as more developed. It is important to note that the differences were more accentuated on the Estonian side, while the people on the Russian side tended to see us and them in similar terms. As a result to the accommodation to the new social space, the people in Narva tended to base their identity only on their links to Narva or Estonia, and not on their family ties in Russia. Taking into consideration that most of Narva s population are immigrants from different parts of Russia, it is noteworthy that they seemed to cut off their history in Russia, and prioritise only the life events (e.g. moving to Estonia) that serve as the basis of today s identity and legitimise social status 181. The biographies of the Ivangorod people are constructed around the events of their lives connected to Narva. Now, the two towns seem to have grown further and further apart in the people s minds. The people in Ivangorod also perceived the Russian-Estonian state border as the border between Europe and Russian rural interior, which renders Narva more distant. The results of this interesting research, conducted in 1999, indicate that the border strengthens the differences in perceptions of us and the other in terms of both traits of 181 Brednikova, O. and Siim, K., p. 30.

65 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 65 character and the level of development. One can only assume that after the simplified bordercrossing regime was abolished in 2000, the intensity of the cross-border interaction has lessened and that the border continued to be reproduced, along with the stereotypes about the people over the bridge, although they belong to the same ethnic origin and culture. When it comes to the southern part of the Russian-Estonian border, as it has been mentioned, the Setu population aside, the people on each side belong to a different ethnicity, a different religion and a different culture. Therefore, the historical-cultural identity that may be present in the region would mostly be based on the common history of the Estonian and Russian people living side by side for centuries. Tüür and Norkin have conducted in-depth interviews in the bordering villages on the Russian side (Pnevo, Putkovo, and Samolva) and on the Estonian side in Mehikoorma and the island of Piirisaare 182. When it comes to selfidentification, the Russian interviewees identified themselves in terms of religion and culture, while the Estonian interviewees paid more attention to the ways they earn money, faith being less important (with the exception of the Piirisaare Old Believers who predominantly identify themselves by their faith) 183. While having access to the information in both languages, the interviewees on both sides preferred to receive information in their mother tongue. The Estonian respondents had a neutral attitude towards the people across the border, although some expressed fears about facing hostility on the Russian side. Interestingly, the interviewed Russian people in Estonia expressed a negative evaluation of the Russians across the border, willing to keep distance from them and identifying our side with Estonia, and not Russia. Some of the Russian respondents mentioned a hostile attitude of the Estonian people resulting from the turbulent history between Estonia and Russia 184. Furthermore, the Russian interviewees expressed the negative opinion about the condition of life of the Russian-speaking minority in Estonia. On the whole, especially the older Russian population had a positive attitude towards Estonians, describing them as good, friendly, cleanly, and hard-working, but the younger and the middle-age population also perceive them as aggressive. The authors note, however, that the differences are more important for Estonians, who clearly differentiate between us and the other, while the people on the Russian side do not perceive these differences as stark, expressing somewhat closer feelings towards Estonians. When it comes to the perceptions of the border and the simplified border-crossing regime, some Estonian interviewees demonstrated a rather 182 Tüür, K. and Norkin, D. Contested Experience of Border Life, in Negotiating Borders of Multiple Meanings: Research Reports, Berg, E. (ed), Peipsi CTC, Tartu, 2001, pp ). 183 Tüür and Norkin, p Tüür and Norkin, p. 57.

66 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 66 reserved attitude and lack of interest to cross the border, while the Russian responses have a much more positive and emotional character. This research is illustrative of the fact that even in the communities closest to the border, the attitudes, perceptions and stereotypes of the other as different can be strong. It is clear that the interviewed Estonian and Russian people have different, sometimes negative, perceptions of each other, and this tendency has spread even to the Russian people on the Estonian side. While for the people on the Russian side these differences are less important and they express willingness to cross the border, the interviewees on the Estonian side seem to be more oriented inwards or to Europe (in case of the Narva population). Therefore, the prospects for historical-cultural cross-border identity are rather slim, since it cannot be a onesided process. Therefore, in case of the Euroregion Pskov-Livonia, cross-border identity is expected to be rather a product of the effective institutionalisation and image-making, in other words, dependent on the institutional, rather than historical-cultural identity Quantitative and qualitative analysis: questionnaires and interviews I will organise the empirical analysis in the following way: based on the quantitative data, I will illustrate the correlations between each cross-border cooperation indicator, one by one, and the indications for institutional context of cross-border cooperation; institutional crossborder identity; and historical-cultural cross-border identity 185. The indicators for cross-border cooperation include (1) Question 526: the efficiency of cross-border cooperation at the local and regional levels; (2) Questions 611 and 612: benefits from increasing cross-border cooperation for Estonia and Russia, respectively; (3) Questions 615 and 616: benefits from increasing cross-border cooperation for the Estonian and Russian border regions, respectively; (4) Questions : possible impact of increasing local investments and the spillover of the local labour power across the border on the local socio-economic situation; and Questions : local export and import to the regions across the border; (5) Questions : mixed marriages, cross-border cooperation in the spheres of culture and education. 185 For the tables with all correlations, see Appendix II.

67 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 67 As can be seen from the list of variables above, I have grouped certain variables on the content basis in order to better organise my analysis. I have also included variables such as local imports and exports, although the purpose of this thesis is not to study economic interaction. These data, however, are not statistics of exports and imports but rather actors perceptions of how positively/negatively such economic interaction would influence the border region. Therefore, I deem these variables important for the potential of cross-border cooperation, shedding light on how open the actors feel towards increasing people-to-people economic interaction. Only the strongest correlations (**p<0.01) will be analysed first, and the possible reasons behind them will be simultaneously discussed based on the qualitative data provided by the in-depth interviews. With the help of the statistical analysis, I will also illustrate, which questions appeared most important for the Estonian respondents and vice versa. Furthermore, the factor analysis combined with other statistical data will demonstrate what groups of indicators the respondents mentally group together and which of the variables are thus more important for the development of cross-border cooperation in the Estonian- Russian borderlands. Table 2 Question 5.1: the existence of the institutional context for crossborder cooperation Means for Question 5.1 Correlations Means for Question 5.2 Question 5.2: the efficiency of the institutional context for cross-border cooperation Q517: CBC between local/regional enterprises 3.8 R =.57** 3.7 Q527: CBC between local/regional enterprises Q518: CBC in environment 3.7 R =.71** 3.6 Q528 : CBC in environment Q5110 : CBC in fighting organised crime 3.9 R =.69** 3.9 Q5210: CBC in fighting organised crime Q5111: CBC in migration issues 3.6 R =.65** 3.5 Q5211: CBC in migration issues Q5112: CBC in culture 4.8 R =.81** 4.8 Q5212: CBC in culture Q5113: CBC in education and science 4.3 R =.79** 4.3 Q5213: CBC in education and science Q5114: CBC for building mutual trust 3.5 R =.58** 3.7 Q5214: CBC for increasing mutual trust **p<=0.01; n=140 Before proceeding to the analysis of the correlations between the indicators of crossborder cooperatio n and those for the institutional context, institutional identity and historical-

68 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 68 cultural identity, one could assess the success of the existing cross-border cooperation in various spheres. Table 2 demonstrates the correlations between the existing institutional framework in different spheres of cross-border cooperation and their efficiency.the strongest correlation (R =.81) is between the institutional context for cross-border cooperation in the sphere of culture and its efficiency. The same can be told about cross-border cooperation in the spheres of education, environment, fighting organized crime and migration. The correlations are weakest between cross-border cooperation among local enterprises and its efficiency. The types of cross-border cooperation, with highest means include cross-border cooperation in culture, education, and fighting organized crime. Therefore, this statistical analysis of correlations and means indicates that it is in these spheres that cooperation is perceived as more efficient. Culture, education, environment and crime are all matters of the institutionalized cross-border cooperation, in contrast to economic interaction between enterprises on different sides of the border. The in-depth interviews have also demonstrated that cross-border cooperation is viewed largely as inefficient and the use of the existing opportunities as insufficient by the cross-border cooperation actors on both sides of the border. The main obstacles include the state of political relations between the two countries, the lack of the legislative framework for cross-border cooperation as well as the inefficiency of cross-border cooperation institutions and its non-participatory nature (NGOs and the representatives of business are not actively involved). Furthermore, cross-border cooperation has been evaluated as inefficient by many interviewees on the Russian side of the border due to the lack of economic interaction, although it is not among the primary goals of cross-border cooperation institutions, such as the Euroregion Pskov-Livonia, to develop economic relations across the border. With the absence of strong historical-cultural identity as well as economic interaction, cross-border cooperation seems to depend mostly on the availability of external funding: I can t say that cross-border cooperation is not important or that it is completely absent. But only when the EU money comes, our local authorities begin to look for some partners over there (a director of an enterprise, the Võru county). Yet, in these conditions there is a potential for the institutional identity of the Euroregion Pskov-Livonia to develop a stronger basis for cooperation. (1) Question 526: the efficiency of cross-border cooperation at the local and regional levels

69 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 69 The first indicator for cross-border cooperation comes from Question 526 of the questionnaire that measures how efficient cross-border cooperation between local authorities appears to cross-border actors. This indicator correlates most strongly with the indicators for institutional identity, or the efficiency of institutions involved in cross-border cooperation at local and regional levels (Questions 521, R =.65, and 522, R =.58). The correlations are also strong with Question 524 (R =.44), and less so with Question 523 (R =.38), which stand for the efficiency of institutions at the state and European levels, respectively. Here, it is important to note that the European institutional context appears to correlate with Estonia (R = -.19), or in other words, the Estonian respondents have given the efficiency of the European institutional context a much higher value than the Russian respondents. There are also relatively strong correlations between the efficiency of cross-border cooperation, and the political context: Question 418 (R =.36), which stands for the relations between Estonian and Russian local authorities, the inter-state Estonian-Russian relations (Question 417, R =.22), and the political differences between the regional and local authorities across the border (Question 419, R =.24). Political relations between the two countries and between the local and regional authorities across the border are valued much higher by the Russian respondents (R =.33 and.24). In order to analyse, which of the institutions and which spheres of cross-border cooperation the respondents assessed as most efficient, in Table 3 I illustrate the correlations between on one side the indicators for existing institutions (Question 5.1) and on the other the indicators for their efficiency (Question 5.2). This helps to demonstrate, where the potential for institutional identity is the strongest. From Table 3 one can see that the correlations between the existence of institutions at four different levels of governance and their efficiency are the strongest for the local and the European level. These correlations signify that the local and European level institutions are associated with efficiency more than the state and regional levels in the Estonian-Russian cross-border region as a whole. The means (n=140) 186 for the questions about the efficiency of both local and European levels are higher than those for the state level. In the case of the existence of the institutions for cross-border cooperation at regional level, while the means are almost as high as the ones for the local level, there are significant differences if one disaggregates the mean into Estonia and Russia: in Russia (Question 512, mean = 4.40, n = 73), the regional level seems to deal with cross-border cooperation more than the regional level in Estonia (mean = 3.96, n = 69) and more than the 186 For the means and standard deviations, see Appendix II.

70 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 70 local level in Russia (Question 511, mean = 4.29, n = 73). The regional level in Russia also appears to be slightly more efficient than the regional level in Estonia and both the local and state levels in Russia, although the difference is rather miniscule. In Estonia, the European and local levels are given the highest scores on efficiency, followed by the regional and only then the state level institutions. As it has been already mentioned, the Estonian respondents assessed the efficiency of the European level cross-border cooperation policies and institutions much higher than the Russian respondents (Question 524, means = 4.16 and 3.64, n = 68 and 74, respectively). Therefore, these findings once again confirm the results of the in-depth interviews, discussed above. Table 3 Question 5.1: the existence of the institutional context for cross-border Means for Question 5.1 Correlations Means for Question 5.2 Question 5.2: the efficiency of the institutional context for cross-border cooperation cooperation Q511: local level 4.2 R =.62** 4.1 Q521: local level level Q512: regional 4.2 R =.52**. 3.8 Q522: regional level Q513: state level 3.7 R =.52** 3.5 Q523: state level Q514: European 3.8 R =.61** 3.9 Q524: European level level **p<=0.01; n=140 Out of the four levels of governance, the local/regional and the European levels appear as more efficient (the means are higher and correlations with efficiency are stronger than for the state level). Therefore, the potential for emerging institutional identity lies at the local (and in case of Russia, regional) and European levels, while the state level may provide more constraints than opportunities for cross-border cooperation. The in-depth interviews provide a lot of information about the possible institutional cross-border identity in the Estonian-Russian cross-border regions, both when it comes to the political context of Estonian-Russian relations, and the efficiency of the existing cross-border institutions. Most interviewees on the two sides mention the importance of the Estonian- Russian political relations for cross-border cooperation. Many Estonian respondents, when asked about the Estonian foreign policy, referred to the double-faced foreign policy: There are two foreign policies one towards Russia, and another towards Europe. There is still room for development in the relations with Russia. There are no such problems and

71 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 71 misunderstandings in relations with Europe. There is still some mutual hostility in relations with Russia (interview with a local newspaper journalist, Narva). Two interviewees, a businessman and a representative of the Eurocentre, both from Narva, strongly criticise the Estonian Government for failing to establish a constructive dialogue and ignore the potential benefits that may result from the economic cooperation with Russia: Being a relatively small state, Estonia is showing its pride too much in relations with Russia. I think it is necessary not to think about one s own personal political profit when engaging in foreign affairs but about the economic profit of the people. There is no constructing dialogue but just quarrelling. A professor at the St. Petersburg State University views the cold political relations between the two countries as the biggest obstacle for cross-border cooperation, and he explains that for Estonian politicians, the anti-russian mood is the best way to gain political points, or in other words, to gain the support of the electorate. A representative of the Pskov oblast, among many others, explains the cold political relations between the two countries as a result of the difficult historical experience between the two countries, saying that one has to deal with one s emotions, or forget about the good neighbourhood, and wait till the storm calms down. High politicization appears to be one of the biggest obstacles to the formation of the institutional Euroregional cross-border cooperation. According to the representative of the Euroreigon Pskov-Livonia on the Estonian side, cross-border cooperation still remains a part of domestic politics in Russia being for instance connected to the governor elections, while it is a part of international politics in Estonia of the Estonian-Russian interstate relations and the Estonian foreign policy. The poor record of cross-border cooperation is also attributed to the poor performance of the Euroregional structures, where the obstacles include the impossibility of Russia to be a full partner in the first round of the INTERREG IIIA programme as well as the lack of the well-qualified staff to prepare cross-border projects and promote the idea of the Euroregion: Unfortunately, the number of our workers is small and the number of volunteers is not that great either so we have not had the opportunity to promote the idea of the Euroregion on a larger scale. For one, we need to decide what we want this Euroregion to be, there should be organised a meeting with the representatives of all local governments concerned and others to decide upon the goals of the Euroregion. It is difficult to pay the salary to our workers. We have applied to many EU foundations and programmes through the government structures where co-funding from the government was offered also for all other cross-border cooperation structures in Estonia, and finally seven cross-border cooperation regions have managed to get 200,000 EEK each. However, this was a one-shot deal resulting from the surplus of the PHARE CBC and generally the EU

72 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 72 programmes don t finance the administrative costs for the companies. I don t know about Russia and Latvia, but definitely the situation for the local governments is also rather complicated. In Estonia, people don t yet perceive the importance of cross-border cooperation; there is a widely spread notion that the Euroregion is just a project fabricating organisation (interview with the representative of the Euroregion Pskov-Livonia on the Estonian side). The image-making of the Euroregion appears to be extremely important for the efficiency of cross-border cooperation, yet even the local and regional administrations in the Euroregion do not coordinate their activities when it comes to the regional development plans, and therefore fail to economise their efforts through joint action. The purpose of the Euroregion is to facilitate the coordination between the bordering regions through the exchange of information, consultations and the preparation of joint development strategies and projects. Most of the interviewees, including the officials, do not know about the existence of the Euroregion or only heard of it, without any further knowledge about its achievements or purposes. At the same time, the Euroregion Pskov-Livonia is the only cross-border cooperation institution that is known at least superficially in this context. An official from the Pskov oblast administration, actively involved in the building of the Euroregion, refers to the problem of competitive, rather than cooperative relationships between the members of the Euroregion: When it comes to the New Neighbourhood Programme, its centre is still located in Riga. In order to pull the blanket on our side, there is a need for the coordination of the activities of the Russian delegations. One could play off on the oppositions between Estonians and Latvians. We have tried to put up this task on the federal centre the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Ministry of the Economic Development. Yet they have distanced themselves from it; it is too small a scale for them. Another official from the Pskov oblast administration directly blames the Estonian and Latvian partners for the unfair play: The Balts are trying to divide the Program into several large projects and drag over all the financing to their side. There was a battle over dividing the funds 50%-50% between different directions this idea has been abandoned. At the external borders, the projects can only be small-scale. There was a series of seminars. However, important decisions, formulations are taken at the seminars where the Russian partners don t take part. Procedures are not transparent. Estonians, who have been corrupted by the massive inflow of the European funds, take an especially rigid position. They have mastered how to use different political tricks (confrontation) to get financing at the expense of Russia. We cannot change anything till The first round for the large-scale projects will pass without the participation of the Russian side. Therefore, although the institutional identity is

73 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 73 deemed important for the existence and efficiency of cross-border cooperation, the politicization of cross-border cooperation, as well as the air of internal competition among the Euroregion s member regions result in the lack of common understanding and coordination even among the political actors. The Euroregion is little known, and is surrounded by the aura of inefficiency, where cross-border cooperation is perceived as fun visits paid by the officials to each other without any actual results (interview with a representative of the Võru county government). The fact that the Euroregion does not include the representatives of business, engaging mostly in soft projects, contributes to its perception as an inefficient organisation: One goes to meetings, eats, drinks and leaves. There are no obligations (a representative of the Pechory administration). Here, it is important to note, that the Russian interviewees largely perceive cross-border cooperation in economic terms, hence such negative assessments of the Euroregional activities. The efficiency of cross-border cooperation also correlates rather strongly with the indicators for institutional context, where the existence of institutional structures at local and regional levels is most important (Question 511, R = 51 and Question 512, R = 52, respectively). The multiplicity of actors at local and regional levels such as local and regional administration, NGOs and local/regional industrial and commercial organisations, also appears to be linked with the efficiency of cross-border cooperation with the correlation over.40 (Questions ). The correlation with the existence of the state and European institutions also appears strong (Question 513, R =.29, and Question 514, R =.26, respectively). Here, it is important to note that for the Russian respondents the regional level appears to be more important than for the Estonian respondents (Question 532, R =.20). In the in-depth interviews, the Russian as well as the Estonian respondents emphasised the constraining role of the state level. For instance, when asked about the opportunities for cross-border cooperation resulting from the EU New Neighbourhood Programme, one official from the administration of the Pskov oblast responded in the following way: Just recently I had a conversation about it at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I was told that they don t want to deal with such peanuts. They don t want to see that the Pskov oblast can get about 3 million Euro thanks to this Programme. I asked them, how are you going to compensate for this? When asked about the need for decentralisation, the interviewee corrected the question, saying instead there is a need for a reasonable centralization, as well as the need for active regional level officials to improve the legal institutional context for cross-border cooperation: Everywhere there should be some power engine. We don t have such an engine. The role of personality is very large. The topics of cross-border cooperation are distant for the

74 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 74 Administration. If I leave, everything will end up in a standstill. In order to secure the past achievements, we need to take three legal acts at the oblast level: the law on the international agreements, the concept of international cooperation, and the law on cross-border cooperation in the Pskov oblast. One needs a lot of time for this; it is difficult for me to prepare these alone, very difficult. The representative of the Leningrad oblast administration also refers to the problems in the federal legislation and the fact that the Estonian-Russian intergovernmental commission is not working, and they lobby the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to encourage the building of the partner, not competitive relations with the Baltic States. In Estonia, people also mention the institutional problems in Russia, in connection to the implementation of the EU programs: There is no committees or secretariats created in Russia, everything is just the responsibility of the Ministries. The EU has not been able to work out the regulations before the elections in Russia took place. It is a well known fact how long it takes for CIS countries to sign papers and implement new regulations (interview with the representative of the Euroregion Pskov-Livonia, Põlva). Here, the interviewee refers not only to the absence of the necessary coordinating institutions, but also to the inefficiency of the existing bureaucratic structures in Russia. In Estonia, the interviewee underlines the importance of the multi-level institutional governance: I believe that the intra-level cooperation between these different levels is more important than the work of any one of them separately. People from the state organs, local governments and local grassroots organisations should communicate more with each other; now this communication functions in form of orders. Various interviewees on the Estonian side noted that in ideal, cross-border cooperation should be the matter of the local level, provided that there is support from the national and especially, from the European levels. At the moment, as the representative of the Eurorocentre in Narva put it, the state level is more important in setting the legal framework for the cooperation, and the local level is responsible for the implementation of these regulations and agreements. The local level in Estonia also seems to have more freedom, than the regional level, which is tied down to the state level and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (interview with an official at the Development Department at Võru local government). As one expert from Narva concluded: It seems that the local level now is most important, and the state level is the weakest. Well, the state level is in a sense even an obstacle to cross-border cooperation all these lines of people in the consulate. The state power itself is pretty weak mostly children working there. I don t know about the regional level...nothing has been heard about it. Generally, the interviewees on the Estonian side expressed a desire that more powers

75 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 75 would be given to the local level in such issues as police cooperation, or the reconstruction of the bridge over the Narova river between Narva and Ivangorod, or the opening of the boat line between Tartu and Pskov, as well as the simplified border-crossing. The representative of the association Pskov Port commented that the question about opening the boat line Tartu- Pskov in fact, depends not on the ports, not on the oblast administration, but on Moscow. Like all other problems business and so on. We are living between bad socialism and underdeveloped capitalism. Another institutional problem connected to the state level, is of course the visa regime, and it seems to be an especially serious problem for most of the Russian as well as the Estonian NGOs, universities and culture associations. One professor from the Pskov Pedagogical University explains: The current visa regime has an extremely negative impact on the development of tourism, economy and especially tolerance. When the contacts are lost, any stereotype can be forced. It is sad, but almost none of our students have been to the Baltic States, they cannot get in. It is paradoxical that France or Spain have become closer... than Estonia and Latvia. We are cut off as if there was an ocean between us. Further, the respondents from both sides seem to agree that it is more difficult to get the Estonian visa, than vice versa: In order to get a visa to Estonia in the summer, one has to stand in line for at least three days (interview with the representative of an NGO, Ivangorod). A businessman from Narva also criticises the Estonian consulates: People from the eastern parts of Russia can only get a visa in Moscow, even if they are going to Estonia, and St. Petersburg would be much more convenient for them. The Politicians in Tallinn do not realise how huge the lines are in the Consulate in Moscow. My relatives cannot come and visit me easily have to sign up for the line a week before. So, when I come back from Russia, I can definitely perceive the border as a barrier, but not when I go there. An official from the Kingisepp municipal administration referred to the frequent changes in the the Estonia visa regulations: Today they have one type of regulations, tomorrow another! Everything s changing, and the forms as well. They have so many changes during one year! The efficiency of cross-border cooperation correlates somewhat less strongly with the indicators for historical-cultural cross-border identity, such as historical events between the two states (Question 411, R =.27) or cultural differences (Question 412, R = 23). Here, the largest number of correlations involves Question 4.2 studying perceptions of the other, where perceiving the other as hardworking (R =.25), productive (R =.28), friendly (R =.29), peaceful (R =.28) and as having a positive attitude towards us (R =.33) is linked with

76 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 76 the efficiency of cross-border cooperation. Interestingly, the Russian respondents much more than the Estonian saw the other in positive terms as hardworking (R =.38) and productive (R =.36), while the Estonian respondents assigned a higher value to religious and language differences in Questions 3510 (R = -.24) and 3511 (R = -.28) respectively. When it comes to historical-cultural identity, here the comparison of the means between the Estonian and Russian responses illustrates more profound differences than for the indicators for the multilevel institutional context and the institutional identity. The Estonian respondents thus tend to see the other in such terms as open, similar to us and having a positive attitude towards us, while the Russian respondents perceive the people across the border rather as hardworking, productive, powerful, and disciplined (see Table 4). Table 4: Comparison of the means for the indicators of historical-cultural identity between the Estonian and Russian respondents Question 4.2 Country N Mean Std.Deviation Q421**: Perception of the other as hardworking Estonia Russia Q422**: Productive Estonia Russia Q423**: Honest Estonia Russia Q426*: Powerful Estonia Russia Q427**: Open Estonia Russia Q428**: Disciplined Estonia Russia Q429**: Similar to us Estonian Q4210**: The have a positive attitude towards us Russia Estonia Russia *p<0.05 **p<0.01 The in-depth interviews as well as shed light on how people on both sides perceive each other. On the human level, both sides have a neutral attitude towards each other, where the answers were of the following type: people are people (a journalist from the Narva local newspaper), people should be treated on an individual basis (a representative of the Narva

77 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 77 Museum), When it comes to business, I think people are more or less similar everywhere (the owner of a hotel, Pechory) or People on the Russian side are not that different. If you take people in the same field of work journalism, then you will find out they have similar problems and interests (interview with a journalist from the local newspaper in Võru). The media representatives, businessmen, and NGOs tend to prioritise the social identity connected to profession and interests over the primordial, historical-cultural identity. Yet, the majority of the interviewees on the Estonian side refer to the profound cultural differences between the people on different sides of the border: Already long ago I have noticed that there is a difference. The mentality is different, we are more reserved, another level of culture (interview with the representative of the Ukrainian cultural association in Narva); Yes, they are definitely different; they have a different national character. I have worked with Russians in the past different culture, temperament (a representative of business, Võru county); Still yes, they have a different cultural background. They are better communicators, more emotional (a representative of the Võru county government); Of course, they are different: they have a different culture, Orthodox Church. We have a German culture and church (a businessman, Põlva). Only three interviewees on the Estonian side have an outright positive assessment of the people across the border. An official from the Development Department at the Võru local government, who is actively involved in cross-border cooperation with the Pskov oblast administration, perceives Russians as more kind and sincere, saying that it is better to cooperate with them. A representative of an NGO dealing with the Russian folklore in Estonia shows a rare sympathy towards the Russian culture and people with her images of the Russians, contradictory to those of most of the Estonian interviewees: Estonians cannot love their land that way Russians do. Estonians want to go to Europe. Russians are also different because they know how to smile, even to strangers. when my friends went to Pechory town days, they said that they hadn t seen a single drunk person on the streets; in Estonia, you can see gangs of drunk people hanging at gas stations. An Estonian representative of the Euroregion Pskov-Livonia differentiates between the Russian and Soviet nationalities, saying that Russians are very nice people. Another nationality, that lives there, is the Soviet nationality. These are people who still have the old Soviet mentality and culture, but without their own state and national identity.

78 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 78 The interviewees on the Russian side on the whole demonstrate a wider range of both positive and negative perceptions of Estonians, with the positive images still dominating the discourse. The majority of the interviewees point out the Europeanness of the Estonian national culture and character, voluntarily and involuntarily contrasting it with their national character and culture. Estonians are perceived as accurate, hardworking, and obeying the law, reserved and unemotional. Many have pointed out the traditional stereotype of Estonians as slow, but many also disagreed with this. As one businessman in Gdov has put, they (Estonians) speak slowly, but work fast. It has been proved already. They work fast and well. Many interviewees have emphasised a disciplined and rational attitude to work, as well as the knowledge of foreign languages and the European education in Estonia. The Europeanness of the Estonian culture also seems to be associated with the sense of order, tidiness and politeness: You come to Estonia, to a village of 2000 people, and everything is so clean, there are beautiful parks. Everything is done not just anyhow, but thoroughly... Everything is so perfect (an official from the Pechory administration); Estonians of course differ from us. They have order. You can cross the street not only at crossing points, like here, and Estonians would always stop and let you cross. All the cars stop straight away, together (a representative of the sports committee, Kingisepp). At the same time, there is a hint of the self-perception of the Russian interviewees as inferior as compared to Europe and more narrowly to Estonia. This perhaps explains some hostile and defensive attitudes of the Russian interviewees to Estonia s superiority: Yes, they think that Europe ends at their border (with Russia), as I have recently heard at one conference. But I stood up and said We are also Europe (an official from the Pechory administration). Most experts from the larger cities, which are more distanced from the border, express a somewhat defensive feeling of superiority, alluding to Estonians peasant mentality (a professor of the St. Petersburg State University) and their fake Europeanness : An Estonian is not a European for us, but rather a peasant. The Estonians also don t perceive us as Europeans. It is a vicious circle. They are going through a child disease of Europeanization, and are still in the state of happy delusion that by the accession to the EU they have ensured their happiness. The Finnish have long ago realised that this is not so, especially when their trade with Russia collapsed (a representative of the Pskov oblast administration). However, such examples of hostile perceptions are heavily counterbalanced by the dominant positive images of the Estonian people.

79 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 79 Most of the businessmen on the Estonian side mention differences in business culture, saying that the business in Russia is often a matter of personal contacts and that there are often no guarantees when conducting the business with the Russian partners: As for the business culture, yes. They now learn that to produce something you have to have money but not wait for Santa from, say, Estonia, with a bag full of money for their promises, which sometimes are not fulfilled. Now business culture begins to change (an owner of the medium size enterprise, Narva). The businessmen on the Russian side point out that the Estonian businessmen fear to do business with Russian partners because of the lack of trust: Estonians as business partners? They are very, very difficult. They are very much scared to do any large-scale projects in the Russian economy. They can only be interested if there is a certain person, a certain guarantor. For instance, I have been dealing with one cross-border project, and only after two years of work I can sense some interest on the Estonian side (interview with a businessman, Kingisepp). The officials on the Estonian side often highlight the differences when it comes to the people s attitudes to the authority: Our mentality is more westernised; they still think in hierarchical terms. They are not that active, they prefer to listen to orders from above. It is hard to work with them since they don t take much initiative (an official from the Võru town government). A representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Narva conveys a similar idea: For instance, they are really surprised that our officials and local government can be sued. Thus, there is a lack of democracy there. In some sense the (Communist) Party system has been preserved in Russia. Everything is decided from above; the same goes about the economic situation (planned economy). People are not active, they are used that the state pays for them; it doesn t occur to them that one can be an entrepreneur. Interestingly, most of the interviewees in Narva, both Estonian and Russian-speakers, have pointed to the increasing differences between the Russians in Estonia, and the Russians in Russia: Now the differences are becoming more and more obvious. The Russians living on our side of the border are more Baltic; they are more reserved and more polite. There are differences in mentality. Until the last year I have always felt comfortable when visiting Moscow, but the last time I felt as if with all this intensive economic development, people in Russia and especially in Moscow forget about values like politeness and prioritise money. To live in Russia, you have to know whom to bribe and how to respond in the same rude manner, which I cannot do after living in Estonia (an interview with a Russian-speaking representative of the Eurecontre, Narva). The Estonian interviewees in Narva also make a

80 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 80 distinction between the Russian people on both sides of the border: When talking about Narva s Russians, they seem to me more Estonised or Europeanised (a representative of the Narva Town Library); There are certainly differences. Russians are a big nation, and they think big, not like small nations. Even the Russians in Estonia differ from the Russians in Russia: they are living in a capitalist world and have a more European worldview (a representative of the Narva College). Therefore, the tendency to mentally separate us from the other in case of Narva s Russian population, also indicated by the previously conducted research on the subject, seems to have progressed for the last years. The interviewees from Ivangorod and Kingisepp perceive the population of Narva as different and more European, which is a new development compared to the results of the research carried out in 1999: I have been there last year. There is a difference in culture, of course. A European culture. Not here, but in Narva and further. Cleanliness, order in everything. Unfortunately, we don t have that. You cross the (Narva-Ivangorod) bridge, and everything is in order there (representative of the customs services in Kingisepp). One representative of the Humanitarian-Technical Institute in Ivangorod refers to the double, almost chameleon-like identity of Narva s Russian-speaking population: You know, Narva s people behave differently on the Russian and Estonian territories. You know, like those animals, who change their colour? There, they are good citizens of an almost European country, letting the pedestrians cross the road, etc. Here, however, they cross the border and become the former Soviet citizens; this always surprises me. Here, they feel they can relax, throw away the mask. Thus, one may say that even in the culturally similar, northern part of the Estonian-Russian cross-border region, there now exists a clear mental border between us and the other. Both questionnaires and in-depth interviews demonstrate that for both sides, the profound cultural differences are more important while for the Russian side the differences are also attributed to a higher level of development in Estonia. The Russian respondents also tend to have more positive perceptions of the Estonian people, which they attribute to the more European-like Estonian national character. (2) Questions 611 and 612: benefits from increasing cross-border cooperation for Estonia and Russia, respectively Similarly with the previous indicator for cross-border cooperation, Questions 611 and 612 appear to correlate strongly with the indicators for institutional cross-border identity, such the efficiency of institutions at the local and regional levels (Question 521, R =.31, and

81 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 81 Question 522, R =.24). Besides, the state of political relations between the two countries (Question 417, R =.25) and the local/regional authorities across the border (Question 418, R =.33) also appear to be linked to the benefits from increasing cross-border cooperation for the two countries. When it comes to the institutional context, the local (Question 511) and regional (Question 512) levels appear important in their correlation with the potential benefits for both Estonia and Russia, where for Russia, the correlations are somewhat higher:.36 and.34, compared to.23 and.22 for Estonia. For Russia, the state level remains important (Question 513, R =.23). The indicators for historical-cultural identity do not appear to have any significant correlations except for the existence of the Russian minority in Estonia, which appears much more important for the respondents on the Russian than Estonian side (Russia: R =.34). During the in-depth interviews, when asked which side Estonian or Russian benefits more from cross-border cooperation, the interviewees on the Estonian side were divided. Only a few felt that Estonia would benefit more due to the large size of the Russian market. Needles to say, it was mostly the businessmen and business consultants who expressed such a point of view: This is an easy question look at the sizes of the markets. If Russia loses the Estonian market, it won t change anything, while for Estonia, the Russian market is very important. If it wasn t for the Russian minority in Estonia, Russia would have given up trying to cooperate with Estonia long ago. Estonia has to do everything possible to develop the relations with Russia (a representative of the Eurocentre, Narva). Here, it is obvious that the economic interaction between Estonia and Russia is intertwined with political issues such as the existence of the Russian minority in Estonia. The interviewees in this group refer to the past when the Estonian agricultural production was exported to the St. Petersburg markets. Others envision the role of Estonia as a mediator between the East and the West, although most of the businessmen think that Estonia missed its chance due to the bad political relations with Russia. Another group of the interviewees believe that it is Russia who benefits more from cross-border cooperation. Here, the main reasons are that Estonia is more developed and can share its experience with the Russian partners (e.g. interview with the representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Narva administration), and that the people in Russia are much poorer so it is natural that they would profit more from both the visa-free regime and crossborder cooperation (a representative of the Narva Museum). The majority of the

82 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 82 interviewees, however, believe that the benefits are or at least should be mutual. When it comes to cross-border projects, as an official at the Võru local government explains, the benefits are always equally divided between the partners on two sides of the border. Cultural exchange is also believed to benefit equally both Estonian and Russian sides (according to the interview with the representative of the Võru Institute). When it comes to economic profits, while for Estonia the Russian market is important, for Russia the cooperation with Estonia is considered to open a window to Europe. On the Russian side, the prevailing perception is that it is Estonia, who will benefit more from cross-border cooperation. Here, most of the interviewees refer to the economic benefit for Estonia from the export of its production to the Russian market: They (Estonians) are now oriented towards the West, but the smart businessmen, politicians and bankers and there are many of those realise that the future of Estonia lies to the East. In the EU, everyone understands that at present the Baltic States are the least developed, all the EU businessmen realise this. Nobody will do serious projects there and invest in these countries, only some minor stuff. All of these programmes such as TACIS and others, can build a road, but what does it give to businessmen? So, they understand that realistically, only Russian business can provide real support. All that is possible to achieve on their territory, the Estonians have already done. They will never find another market like the Russian one. I think Estonians will benefit more. I think that this will be an obvious thing after 5 years. Estonians want to overload Russia, St. Petersburg with their goods (a businessman, Kingisepp). Russian businessmen feel very sceptical about the prospects for Estonia on the European market due to the strong competition for Estonian goods. Most of the Russian businessmen believe it would be profitable for Estonian businesses to transfer their production to Russia, like it has been done for instance by many Swedish companies (interview with a representative of the Pskov Chamber of Commerce). It is slightly paradoxical that when talking about the benefits of cross-border cooperation, the Russian interviewees criticise the economic barriers and trade regulations between the two countries these issues lie beyond the competences of the local and regional authorities, who are the main actors of cross-border cooperation. The problem is, as the representative of the Euroregion Pskov-Livonia explains, that Russia and the Baltic States have different goals for cross-border cooperation: Russia sees cross-border cooperation primarily in economic terms the development of enterprises and investments. Estonia and

83 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 83 Latvia perceive cross-border cooperation in more realistic terms these instruments and financial support are so small that they cannot really encourage the inflow of investments. Besides, the Estonian legislation does not allow local governments interfere with the creation of ties between enterprises and with their development. That is why Estonia and Latvia mostly concentrate on culture and social environmental affairs. Therefore, when talking about the benefits of cross-border cooperation, the Russian interviewees are more pessimistic than the Estonian cross-border cooperation at the local and regional levels by its definition is ineffective when it comes to the promotion of investment and economic interaction. Moreover, the Estonian interviewees tend to see benefits for the border regions, while the Russian respondents perceive benefits mostly for the countries, on the whole. (3) Questions 615 and 616: benefits from increasing cross-border cooperation for the Estonian and Russian border regions, respectively In general, these two cross-border cooperation indicators establish rather weak correlations with all three sets of indicators for institutional context, institutional identity and historicalcultural identity. A large number of not particularly strong correlations appear to be with the indicators for historical-cultural cross-border identity. Religious and cultural differences (Questions 359 and 3510) thus appear linked with potential benefits from cross-border cooperation for local and regional actors in both Russia and Estonia with correlations between.21 and.27. Language differences (Question 416) correlate with the potential benefits for border regions as strongly as.27 for Estonia and.22 for Russia. Language differences have also been assessed slightly more important for the Estonian (R = -.10) than the Russian side. The existence of the Russian minority in Estonia (Question 415) correlates somewhat more strongly with Question 615 (R =.28) rather than 616 (R =.20), which perhaps means that the Estonian northeast populated by the Russian-speaking minority is expected to benefit from the increasing cross-border cooperation with the Russian border regions. The benefits for the Russian border regions may be said to correlate with the perceptions of the other as hardworking (Question 421, R =.26). And since it is the Russian side that deems this question more important (R =.38), one may conclude that the actors on the Russian side consider the benefits high because they perceive the Estonian people as hardworking. Institutional identity, or the efficiency of local institutions (Question 521), also has established correlations.27 and.24 for the Estonian and Russian sides, respectively. Here, both Questions 615 and 616 correlate with Questions 418 and 419 (R >.21 for all four

84 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 84 correlations), which explore political relations and political differences between the local and regional authorities across the border. Question 418 appears to be more important for the Russian respondents (R =.24), and its correlations with Question 616 (benefits for the Russian border regions) are also slightly higher than with Question 615 (benefits for the Estonian border regions). For the Russian respondents thus the political context of the interstate relations is linked to the benefits of cross-border cooperation for the border regions. (4) Questions : possible impact of increasing local investments and the spillover of the local labour power across the border on the local socio-economic situation; Questions : local export and import to the regions across the border These indicators, as has been mentioned before, measure the level of the potential for more people-to-people economic cross-border interaction. As could be expected, these indicators show weaker links with the institutional context and institutional identity because economic interaction generally falls outside the scope of the institutionalized cross-border cooperation. However, the stronger links appear to be with historical-cultural institutional cross-border identity. For instance, the indicators for the impact of the increasing local investments and import/export across the border correlate most strongly with the existence of the Russian minority and various images of the other. For the Russian side, the Estonian border regions may appear attractive to invest in, because they view the other across the border as hardworking (R =.24), productive (R =.36) and disciplined (R =.23). Further, the indicaotr for the impact of the increasing export from the Estonian to the Russian border regions correlates with the existence of the Estonian minority in Russia (Question 414, R =.24) as well as the perceptions of the other as a part of the European culture (Question 4211, R =.23). As for the local export from Russia to Estonia, it correlates with the perceptions of the other as productive (Question 422, R =.26) and powerful (Question 426, R =.21). For both sides, the issue of local export is connected to religious differences across the border (Question 413, R =.24 and R=.25). When it comes to the correlations with the institutional context, questions about labour spillover establish no links. In contrast, the questions about Estonian local investments show some correlations with the institutional context at the state level (Question 513, R =.22), while Russian investments appear to be linked stronger to the regional (Question 532, R =.25) and particularly to the European level (Question 514, R =.27). This alludes to the previously discussed benefits for the Russian enterprises from cross-border cooperation with

85 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 85 Estonia, which can open a window to Europe for Russia. The indicator for the impact of the increasing local Estonian export across the border correlates stronger with the institutional context at the European level (Question 514, R =.25), which alludes to Estonia s adoption of the EU regulations for the trade with the non-eu countries. There are practically no correlations between the four variables concerned and the indicators for the institutional identity, except for the one correlation between the Russian local investments in Estonia and the state of relations between the local and regional authorities (Question 418, R =.21), which perhaps alludes to the fact that the economic interaction is perceived to be more tied to the sphere of politics in Russia than in Estonia. The matter of local export into the bordering regions appears to be more important to the Estonian respondents (R = -.23), which is understandable taking into consideration the size of the Russian market. While investments on both sides appear to be slightly more important to the Russian respondents (R =.12 and.14), the spillover of labour, albeit only from the Estonian side to the Russian border regions, seems more important to the Estonian respondents (R = -.13). On the whole the benefits from the increasing economic interaction appear to be most strongly linked to the issue of cultural differences between the two countries, and to the existence of the Russian minority in Estonia, which is perhaps veiwed as the main beneficiary from the more intense economic interaction with Russia and Russian border regions. The potential benefits from the increasing local export appear larger on the Estonian side, while for the Russian side, the benefits from the increasing economic interaction are linked to the European level institutions. (5) Questions : mixed marriages, cross-border cooperation in the spheres of culture and education These questions establish a large number of rather strong correlations both with the indicators for historical-cultural identity and the institutional context, and somewhat less so with institutional cross-border identity. The cooperation in the spheres of culture and education correlates strongly with cultural (Question 359, R =.39 and.29), religious (Question 3510, R =.30 and.29) and language differences (Question 3511, R =.28 and.31). The existence of the Russian minority in Estonia (Question 415, R =.25) is important for cultural cooperation and the Estonian minority in Russia (Question 414, R =.37 and.21) are important for the cross-border cooperation in both spheres of culture and education. Language differences (Question 416) are linked with the cooperation in education (R =.22), as well as the

86 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 86 perceptions of the other as the part of the European culture (Question 4211, R =.21). Both increasing cooperation in culture and the increasing number of mixed marriages correlate with the perception of the other as peaceful (Question 425, R =.21 and.22). As for the impact of the potentially increasing number of mixed marriages, it also correlates with religious and cultural differences, and especially with the existing Russian minority in Estonia (Question 415, R =.27). For the cross-border cooperation in culture and education the institutions at all levels (local, regional, national and European) appear important, where local (Question 516, R =.31 and.29), regional (Question 512, R =.33 and.30) and European level institutions (Question 514, R =.28 and.32) establish strongest correlations. As for the institutional identity, the efficiency of institutions at the European level (Question 524) correlates with both cooperation in culture (R = 24) and education (R =.27). Besides, the institutional efficiency at local (Question 521) and regional levels (Question 522) is linked with the impact of increasing cross-border cooperation in culture (R =.25 and.24), while cooperation in education seems to be connected with the political differences between the local and regional authorities across the border (R =.22). Here, it is important to keep in mind that cultural and language differences are much more important to the Estonian respondents (R = -.24 and -.28) than to the Russian respondents. Institutional and historical-cultural cross-border identities One can also compare the respondents on the Estonian and Russian sides as to which indicators they mentally group together. The factor analysis made separately for the Estonian and Russian respondents for Question 4.1 provides more insight into the comparison of the two types of cross-border identities: institutional and historical-cultural. Table 5 contains Rotated Factor Matrix made on the basis of the 70 responses from the Estonian side, while Table 6 illustrates the same based on the 70 responses from the Russian side. As can be seen from the two tables, the factor analysis of the same question generated two factors for the Estonian respondents and three factors for the Russian respondents. Within each factor I distinguish the highest items (items higher than.500 are put in Bold), and see whether they represent a group and what each group may signify. Although the first identified factor is generally considered slightly more important, the rotated factor analysis used in this paper, does not provide information as for the level of importance of different factors: they are all

87 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 87 considered more or less important. In order to see which factor is more important for the Estonian and Russian respondents, I will compare the means for the questions concerned and combine these results with the results of the factor analysis. In case of Estonian respondents, the first factor groups such items as the relations between regional and local authorities across the border (.801), Estonian-Russian interstate relations (.696), and political differences between local and regional levels of governance on both sides of the border (.699). Yet, two other items are also important in this factor: historical events between the two countries (.708) and cultural differences (.576). The second factor groups items such as religious differences (.849), the existence of the Estonian minority across the border (.804), cultural differences (.568) as well as language differences (.558). Therefore, it is reasonable to call the first factor politics, which alludes to the political institutional context and institutional identity. I call the second factor culture as seems to group indicators for historical-cultural cross-border identity. In Estonia, the first factor, which contains indicators for the institutional identity may be assumed to be stronger than the one behind historical-cultural identity. Table 5: Estonia, Rotated Factor Matrix(a) Question 4.1 : General conditions: incentives and obstacles Factor for cross-border cooperation 1 (politics) 2 (culture) Q411: Historical events between the two countries Q412: Cultural differences Q413: Religious differences Q414: Existence of the Estonian minority across the border Q415: Existence of the Russian minority on this side of the border Q416: Language differences Q417: Current interstate relations between Estonia and Russia Q418: Relations between the local/regional authorities across the border Q419: Political differences between the local and regional authorities on both sides of the border Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. a Rotation converged in 5 iterations In case of Russia, the factor analysis identified three factors. The first factor groups such items as historical events between the two countries (.813), cultural differences (.841) and religious differences (.554) and therefore stands for culture, or historical-cultural identity. The second factor, groups somewhat less heavily loaded items such as Russian- Estonian interstate relations (.715), relations between local and regional authorities across the

88 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 88 border (.694), political differences between local and regional levels of government on both sides of the border (.594) as well as the existence of the Russian minority in Estonia (.553), albeit the latter two are less heavily loaded and thus are weaker members of the group. This factor thus stands for politics, political relations between the two countries and border regions, which form the basis for institutional cross-border identity. Table 6: Russia, Rotated Factor Matrix(a) Question 4.1 : General conditions: incentives and Factor obstacles for cross-border cooperation 1 (culture) 2 (politics) 3 (minorities) Q411: Historical events between the two countries Q412: Cultural differences Q413: Religious differences Q414: Existence of the Estonian minority across the border Q415: Existence of the Russian minority on this side of the border Q416: Language differences Q417: Current interstate relations between Estonia and Russia Q418: Relations between the local/regional authorities across the border Q419: Political differences between the local and regional authorities on both sides of the border Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. a Rotation converged in 6 iterations. The third factor groups only two items the existence of the Russian (.561) and Estonian minorities (.928) on the opposite sides of the border. The fact that the Russian respondents view the minority issues separately from culture and politics is in itself an interesting phenomenon. The item for the Russian minority in Estonia also appears under the factor politics, meaning that for Russian respondents, minority issues tend to be associated rather with politics than with culture, as is the case with the Estonian respondents. The factor indicating historical-cultural identity appears first, which however only allows us to make weak conjectures that it is somewhat stronger that the factor behind political context and institutional identity, while with the Estonian respondents the case is the opposite. Thus, this factor analysis also confirmed that both the Estonian respondents distinguish between political context (institutional identity) and culture (historical-cultural identity). However, the factor analysis does not tell us much about the relative value of each group for the Estonian and Russian respondents, which I will find by complementing the factor analysis with comparing the means for the questions used in the factor analysis. In case of the institutional identity, the means for political relations between the state and

89 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 89 local/regional levels for the Russian respondents are higher than those for the Estonian respondents (Question 417, means = 3.04 and 4.09; Question 418, means = 3.84 and 4.01, n = 70 and 74). To remind, Question 4.1 explores general conditions for cross-border cooperation, where the lowest value is 1, meaning a serious obstacle for cross-border cooperation and the highest value is 7, meaning an important incentive for cross-border cooperation. Therefore, based on these data and the factor analysis, one may say that the Estonian respondents view political and historical context as a slightly more serious obstacle for cross-border cooperation than the Russian respondents: the means for the Estonian respondents to these questions are all below the neutral 4 and lower than the means of the responses on the Russian side. Similarly, the means for the indicators of the historical-cultural identity, such as the cultural differences (Question 412, means = 4.37 and 4.49, n = 70 and 74, for Estonian and Russian respondents, respectively), the existence of the Estonian minority across the border (Question 414, means = 4.81 and 5.38, n = 70 and 74) and the existence of the Russian minority in Estonia (Question 415, means = 4.61 and 5.84) are lower for the Estonian respondents than for the Russian respondents, yet still somewhat higher than the neutral 4. This means that the Estonian respondents view the historical-cultural identity as less of an incentive for cross-border cooperation, compared to the Russian respondents. During the in-depth interviews, I have asked the interviewees how they perceive the border as having a separating, protecting or uniting impact in the cross-border region, and whether they view the cross-border region as a region of its own. The answers to this question may also serve as the basis for discussing the existence of historical-cultural cross-border identity. On both Estonian and Russian side, the Estonian-Russian border generally has negative connotations of long lines at the border and in the Consulates, high costs of getting visas, bureaucratic problems, as well as political context of the interstate relations, which invariably comes to mind: Most often, it (the border) is associated with discomfort, these lines, loss of time, unnecessary conversations, discussions of the interstate problems we don t need this (a representative of the Ivangorod Music School); The border guard, border checkpoint, customs office, a mind line on the map. The border separates, naturally (a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Narva local administration). For the interviewees on the Estonian side, the border is sometimes perceived in less rigid terms, yet mostly these are the associations with the borders in the borderless Europe, not with the East. Although the border has been institutionalised for over a decade, the people in Ivangorod still seem not to come to terms with this fact: For instance, me and my husband. He remembers the socialist Estonia. It is simply an infringement of human rights. It doesn t

90 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 90 mean that I need to go there and buy something, no. Here they are so close! When we are walking with our guests along the Ivangorod fortress, they ask us, what is it there Russia? Here it is Russia, there, so really close, no. It is incomprehensible, and one cannot get there. It is an infringement of the normal human rights (a representative of the Humanitarian- Technical Institute, Ivangorod). The people in Narva, on the other hand, have less emotional responses about being separated from Ivangorod, hinting at a certain degree of adaptation to the new conditions: The connection is still there, although there are barriers to communication. People have adopted to them, however (an official, Narva local administration); After 12 years you feel separated from the other side, not like before, when Narva and Ivangorod were one territorial unit (a representative of an NGO, Narva). There is no perception of the cross-border historical-cultural identity; rather, people in Narva possess some kind of Narvian identity, which is not Russian anymore, but has not yet become Estonian either (a journalist from the Narva local newspaper). There is a general feeling that the importance of both Narva and Ivangorod has decreased as well as the links between them, and that they are becoming simply border checkpoints (a representative of the Narva Town Library). According to the majority of the interviewees from the southern part of the Estonian-Russian cross-border region, there seems to be no common historical-cultural identity except for the Setu, yet being a culturally closed people, they don t really contribute to the cross-border regional identity (from the interview with a representative of the Võru local government). The closeness of the border is troubling for many interviewees on the Russian side: You know, it is a little scary, they have opened up everything, Estonia has joined the EU. There is a sense of anxiety Hope there wouldn t be a war. We used to live so calmly, in an ordered way. But now we are on the edge. It is scary (a head of high school, Gdov). The unpleasant feeling of fear and of being separated as if by a wall, is contrasted with the desire to join the Schengen Agreement, although many realise it is unrealistic at present. For the interviewees on the Estonian side, on the contrary, the border is more often perceived as a protection: I feel myself safer living by the border because of the border control structures (an official at the Võru local government). The border separates and worsens the perceptions of the other : It is interesting that the very fact of the border results in some pressure, which leads to a negative reaction. That is the population of the border regions, which should communicate but don t, in the end think of each other in worse terms than, say, the population of St. Petersburg, for instance and Narva (interview with a professor at the St. Petersburg State University).

91 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 91 For the businessmen, the border is most often associated with long lines at the bordercrossing points, when people have to wait for 2-3 hours in their cars, as well as with the money they spend in order to buy the line : Estonians come earlier, stand in line. So, he is the third in line, then he comes up to me I am in the back and offers to sell his place in line. The cheapest that we ever bought was 300 rubbles, the most expensive 500. It could be more expensive, if the car is expensive, a person from Moscow. About 1000 rubbles. It is not only Estonians who do this. They in fact petty-trade gas more, but also deal with the lines (a businessman, Pechory). Thus, the border is an obstacle, and as is often the case with the ineffective bureaucratic procedures, they create incentives to go around them and to gain from them. Thus, he border is for many such entrepreneurs an additional source of income: The border has a great importance for the people, mainly as a source of income. The country people who cannot earn their income by other ways, use the petty trade across the border as a source of income. Some people have the opportunity to cross the border according to simplified rules, so then it is some kind of solution (NGO, Võru). The simplified rules that the interviewee is talking about signifies the 4000 free visas for those people in the Estonian and Russian border regions who have vital needs to cross the border (e.g. close kinship ties, the graves of relatives, etc), yet, from many respondents I could gather that these visas are often used for the petty trade across the border. Thus, one could conclude that there is little impact of the historical-cultural crossborder identity on the development of cross-border cooperation in the Estonian-Russian crossborder region, on the whole. The border destroys existing ties, thus having a further separating effect. What could serve as the basis for the development of cross-border cooperation is then the institutional cross-border identity, which depends on the political relations between the local/regional as well as state authorities across the border, the efficiency of cross-border institutions (e.g. the Euroregion Pskov-Livonia ) and joined attempts of the local/regional authorities and other actors at the image-making of such institutions. In fact, many interviewees believe that cross-border cooperation is necessary for the people in the border regions, but that they are not aware of this, so one has to force it upon them (a representative of the Pskov oblast administration). An editor of the Võru local newspaper, when asked about the common cross-border identity, referred to the Euroregional cooperation and not to the historical-cultural ties between the border regions: I believe that there is a common identity. Especially cooperative have been Võru, Valka and Aluksne, as well as the border regions of the Pskov oblast. But to establish cooperation is rather difficult

92 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 92 and takes time. We are watching the Pskov television here, which also strengthens the crossborder identity; and the media coverage of the cross-border cooperation is also contributing. The media and politicians are the first actors when it comes to fostering the institutional cross-border identity, which takes time to develop. NGOs have also a great potential to promote cross-border cooperation, but according to the representative of the NGO Chudskoy Projekt ( Lake Peipsi Project ), out of 1000 registered NGOs in Pskov, only are active, and only about 20 of them can be involved in the cross-border cooperation. However, a representative of the Pskov oblast administration contends that their experience when it comes to cross-border projects is invaluable and should be used more by the regional and local authorities. On the Estonian side, the main problem is that NGOs are not united in any way under the same roof, but act separately, which weakens their potential in the Euroregional institution-building (interview with the representative of the Euroregion Pskov- Livonia on the Estonian side). The majority of the interviewees on both Estonian and Russian sides underline the role of the EU in promoting such cross-border identity by creating financial incentives to cooperate in the otherwise uninterested sides: Estonians have not realised for a long time why it is necessary to cooperate. When they were told that they can get (the EU) grants for it, they have gone along with it. It is good of course, but it seems to be somehow artificial. That is, the third part is stimulating our cooperation. If they didn t show us this carrot, then I don t know if there would be any cooperation at all (a representative of the Gdov Historical Museum, Gdov). A professor from the St. Petersburg State University believes that the Euroregion Pskov-Livonia could borrow some experience from the history of the first Euroregions in Europe, created to overcome the historical barriers of the World War II. Europe thus serves not only the role of the financial supporter, but also provides institutional blueprints for the creation of the Euroregion on the Estonian-Russian-Latvian border. When asked whether there were any cross-border cooperation institutions that served as models for the creation of the Euroregion Pskov-Livonia, its representative in Estonia explained that the institution-building has gone through two different development stages. The Euroregion Pskov-Livonia was first modelled according to the Nordic Euroregional model, which represents an amorphic type of cooperation without administrative structures, which take more declarative decisions and launch rather large-scale projects. This model being less practical, the creators of the Euroregion now opt to follow the Central-European Euroregional model (e.g. the German-Czech, or German-Polish Euroregions), whose administrative structures and capacities are really well developed as they have a large crew

93 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 93 of people and deal with the INTERREG IIIA types of programmes, which means that they are able to manage the financing part on their own. Now, the Euroregion has a Presidium and juridical persons in each state who manage the administrative structures, however, the process of the transformation is largely hindered by the lack of financing for developing the administrative capacity of the Euroregion and by a high degree of politicization of crossborder cooperation: We have tried to achieve more independence in the matters of crossborder cooperation since local people know more about it than the ministries in Tallinn and in Riga anyway, but I may say that this plan has been relatively unsuccessful. Estonian and Latvian ministries did not agree that the potential project applicants might also be strategic decision-makers. Another problem is that we had wanted that the members of the Presidium would include politically important and recognised people that would be committed to the work for the Euroregion, but so far we haven t been successful. The development of institutional identity is hindered by other regulations at the interstate level, such as the visa regime: One tries to invent some kind of common identity, but the border still remains. To go to Pskov one has to prepare visas and stand in line for four hours (sales manager, a large enterprise, Võru). Aside from that, there are multiple reasons for the institutional inefficiency and lack of institutional identity of the Euroregion discussed above, such the lack of specialists, funding for setting up proper administrative structures, political differences and competition between the regional authorities across the border. Poor involvement of businesses in the Euroregional activities is criticised especially strongly by the interviewees on the Russian side, who perceive cross-border cooperation largely in economic terms: You know, the Council of the Euroregion includes the representatives of the administrations, but it doesn t include businesses. This is an organisation of the information exchange. However, both sides are interested in the creation of another organ; another approach is needed in order to organise the meetings for the business elite (an official from the Pechory local administration). Thus, economic cooperation seems to go on outside the framework of the institutionalised cross-border cooperation, being rather based on personal contacts and the links between the Chambers of Commerce across the border. In order to sum up findings Estonian-Russian cross-border region on the whole and to find out which variable institutional or historical-institutional identity is more important for cross-border cooperation, I will again conduct the factor analysis of Questions 4.1 and 3.5 but now combining both Estonian and Russian respondents, and complement it with the comparison of the total means for the questions concerned. As Table 7 illustrates, two factors can be identified for Question 4.1. The first factor groups such items as relations between

94 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 94 local and regional authorities across the border, current interstate relations between Russia and Estonia, political differences between the local and regional levels of governance on both sides of the border, the existence of the Russian minority in Estonia, and to a lesser extent, historical events between the two countries. Thus, it is clear that this factor stands for the political conditions for cross-border cooperation. The second factor includes items such as cultural and religious differences, the existence of the Estonian minority across the border, and language differences. This factor, thus, groups the cultural conditions for cross-border cooperation. It is interesting to note that the Russian minority in Estonia is identified as a political issue, while the Estonian minority in Russia (e.g. the Setu) as a cultural one. These findings seem to correspond to reality, where the issue of the Russian minority in Estonia is an important factor defining Russian-Estonian interstate political relations, while the Estonian ethnic minority as well as the Setu, being a rather small minority, is first of all discussed in terms of culture. Table 7: Estonia and Russia, Rotated Factor Matrix(a) Question 4.1 : General conditions: incentives and Factor obstacles for cross-border cooperation 1 (politics) 2 (culture) Q411: Historical events between the two countries Q412: Cultural differences Q413: Religious differences Q414: Existence of the Estonian minority across the border Q415: Existence of the Russian minority on this side of the border Q416: Language differences Q417: Current interstate relations between Estonia and Russia Q418: Relations between the local/regional authorities across the border Q419: Political differences between the local and regional authorities on both sides of the border Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. a Rotation converged in 3 iterations. By looking at total means for Question 4.1 (see Table 8), one could identify which conditions the respondents in the Estonian-Russian cross-border region identified more as obstacles and which more as incentives to cross-border cooperation. One can find the lowest means for the questions on historical events between the two countries, current interstate relations between Estonia and Russia and political differences between the local and regional levels of government on both sides of the border. These items belong to the first factor for the political conditions for cross-border cooperation, and therefore, one may conclude that the political context is seen most as an obstacle to cross-border cooperation, with the exception of

95 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 95 relations between the local and regional authorities, which are seen as an incentive rather than an obstacle, with the mean 0.5 higher of the neutral value 4. Cultural, religious and language differences are similarly seen as incentives rather than obstacles to cross-border cooperation, yet the value of the means is still rather close to the neutral 4. Finally, the existence of minorities, both Russian and Estonian, scored highest values of all 5.02 and 5.08, meaning that it is a significant incentive for cross-border cooperation in the Estonian-Russian crossborder region. The fact that the Russian minority in Estonia is grouped with the items for political conditions, perhaps means that it is seen primarily not as the source for historicalcultural cross-border identity, but as a political resource that provides more opportunities for cross-border cooperation e.g. through language similarities. In this sense, the existence of the significant Russian minority in Estonia could be the basis for developing an institutional identity. Table 8: Totals means for Question 4.1 Question 4.1 : General conditions: incentives and obstacles for cross-border cooperation Q411: Historical events between the two countries Q412: Cultural differences 46 Q413: Religious differences 44 Q414: Existence of the Estonian minority across the border 46 Q415: Existence of the Russian minority on this side of the border 10 Q416: Language differences 46 Q417: Current interstate relations between Estonia and Russia 46 Q418: Relations between the local/regional authorities across the border 46 Q419: Political differences between the local and regional authorities on both sides of the border Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation The factor analysis made for Question 3.5 demonstrates which groups of obstacles to cross-border cooperation can be identified in the Estonian-Russian cross-border region. As one see from Table 9, three factors are identified in the Estonian-Russian cross-border region on the whole. The first factor groups obstacles of political nature: political instability, historical background, corruption, and security issues. The second factor includes items that stand for obstacles of economic character: unstable currency rates, inflation and unsatisfactory bank system. And the third factor refers to the obstacles of cultural character such as cultural, religious and language differences. Interestingly, most respondents treat the item historical

96 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 96 background not as the basis for historical-cultural cross-border identity but rather as a part of the political context, most probably mentally referring to the Soviet Union s occupation of Estonia and the cold political interstate relations since Estonia has regained independence. That is also why one may consider historical background as the variable for institutional identity, and not historical-cultural identity. Table 9:Estonia and Russia, Rotated Factor Matrix(a) Question 3.5: General obstacles to cross-border cooperation Q351: Political instability 1 (political context) Factor 2 (economic 3 (cultural situation) differences) Q352: Historical background Q353: Corruption Q354: Security issues Q355: Frequent changes in the legal framework for business and business culture Q356: Unstable currency rates Q357: Unsatisfactory bank system Q358: Inflation Q359: Cultural differences Q3510: Religious differences Q3511: Language Differences Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. a Rotation converged in 6 iterations Table 10: Total means for Question 3.5 Question 3.2 : General obstacles to crossborder cooperation Q351: Political instability Q352: Historical background Q353: Corruption Q354: Security issues Q355: Frequent changes in the legal framework for business and business culture Q356: Unstable currency rate Q357: Unsatisfactory bank system Q358: Inflation Q359: Cultural differences Q3510: Religious differences Q3511: Language Differences Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation

97 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 97 A mere look at Table 10, illustrating the total means for Question 3.5, is enough to see which obstacles the Estonian-Russian respondents consider more serious. All items under the first factor, or the obstacles of political nature, have scores far below 4, meaning that the respondents saw them as rather serious obstacles for cross-border cooperation. The items for the economic situation have scored slightly higher than those for the political context; yet most of the means still fall below 4. Cultural, religious and language differences appear to be less of an obstacle, with the means higher than 4, albeit not much. While drawing conclusions about the Estonian-Russian cross-border region as a whole, one should keep in mind that there are certain differences between the respondents on each side of the border. The high standard deviations in Tables 9 and 10, demonstrate once again the indicators for historical-cultural and institutional cross-border identity, such as for instance, religious differences, historical background or the existence of minorities, have received very different scores from the Estonian and Russian respondents. When it comes to the institutional context, the differences mainly concern the importance of the regional and European level in cross-border governance mechanisms. On the whole, however, the political context seems to generate the largest number of obstacles to cross-border cooperation, while the basis for the historical-cultural identity is not especially strong. Border-crossing Another important source of information is how often the respondents on both sides cross the border. Tables 11 and 12 demonstrate that on the whole, many more Russian respondents cross the border than Estonian ones (approximately 60% out of both Estonian and Russian respondents that cross the border are from the Russian side), and they also do it more frequently. The majority of the respondents on both sides have crossed the border 1 to 2 times (34,9% and 34,6% of the Estonian and Russian respondents, respectively), or frequently (55,8% and 34,6% of the Estonian and Russian respondents, respectively). Many more Russian respondents cross the border very frequently (84%) than the Estonian respondents (16%). What could also be interesting to find out is whether the fact how often people cross the border correlates with their responses to the questionnaire. Interestingly, the more people cross the border, the less strong evaluations they seem to give for the existence of the institutional context and institutional efficiency the correlations are weak or even negative

98 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 98 for Questions 5.1 and 5.2. The strongest correlation of all (.39) is established with Question 613, that ask about possible benefits from increasing cross-border cooperation for Estonia s capital, Tallinn. Other two relatively weak correlations (both.22) are established with the questions about the possible impact of the Russian local investments in the Estonian border regions as well as of the increasing cross-border cooperation in the spheres of culture (Question 4.3). Contrary to what one would expect, the correlations with the indicators for historical-cultural identity are negligent. Table 11: Border-crossing * country of origin Crosstabulation Numbers of Border Crossings country of origin Total Estonia Russia Never % 100.0% 100.0% 1 to 2 times % 64.3% 100.0% Frequently % 52.9% 100.0% Very frequently % 84.0% 100.0% Total % 64.5% 100.0% Table 12: Border crossing: * country of origin Crosstabulation Numbers of Border Crossings country of origin Total Estonia Russia Never % 3.8% 2.5% 1 to 2 times % 34.6% 34.7% Frequently % 34.6% 42.1% very frequently % 26.9% 20.7% Total % 100.0% 100.0% Therefore, one may conclude that the frequency of the border crossing does not seem to influence people s perceptions of each other, or their view of cultural differences as obstacles to cross-border cooperation. On the contrary, the more people cross the border, the worse seem to be their assessments of the institutional context and efficiency, although these correlations are also rather weak.

99 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION Conclusions The quantitative and qualitative analyses of the cross-border cooperation on the Estonian- Russian border may be summarised as follows: - Cross-border cooperation is evaluated as most efficient in the spheres of culture, education, environment and fighting organised crime, while the economic interaction falls outside the framework of the institutionalised cross-border cooperation. On the whole, however, cross-border cooperation is viewed as inefficient, where the majority of interviewees on both Estonian and Russian sides believe that it depends largely on the influx of external funding yet that many existing opportunities are left un-used. - When it comes to the institutional context for cross-border cooperation, four different levels can be established: local, regional, national and European, where the national level is evaluated as an obstacle rather than as providing opportunity structures for cross-border actors. The local, regional and European level institutions establish strong correlations with the indicators for cross-border cooperation; and the majority of the interviewees on both sides of the border also consider them as the major opportunity structures for cross-border cooperation. For the Russian side, however, the regional level is more important than the local level since the legislative framework of the Russian Federation does not stipulate clearly the competences for the local when it comes to cross-border cooperation. On the Estonian side, the local level enjoys more freedom, yet the legislative framework for the Estonian-Russian cross-border cooperation (as for example The Concept of Cross-Border Cooperation in the Russian Federation) is yet absent. Many interviewees on the Estonian side emphasise the importance of the European level as well as the cooperation among various levels of governance, which is the basis of multi-level governance. - The indicators of institutional cross-border identity such as the political context of Estonian-Russian relations at all levels of governance, the efficiency and the imagemaking of the cross-border institutions establish the strongest correlations with the indicators for the institutionalised cross-border cooperation. The cold inter-state Estonian-Russian relations, resulting in the prolonged disputes over the border treaty as just one example, as well as the competitive rather than cooperative relations between local/regional authorities across the border when participating in the EU programmes such INTERREG IIIA, result in the poorly developed institutional

100 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 100 identity that should be fostered by the joint efforts of the political elite in the first place. When it comes to the efficiency of the Euroregion Pskov-Livonia, it suffers from the high politicization of cross-border cooperation, being linked to domestic politics in Russia and to the spheres of foreign affairs in Estonia. While for the Estonian side, the European level is evaluated as efficient as it provides means and encouragement for cross-border cooperation and identity, the Russian side cannot fully make use of the EU support due to the obstacles at the central level. The Euroregion has not yet achieved a level of popular support; in fact only few interviewees know about its existence and goals. The main reason for the Euroregion s inefficiency, according to the interviewees on the Russian side, is that it does not include the representatives of business, while the interviewees on the Estonian side refer to the poorly developed goals and administrative structures of the Euroregion, as well as the low participation of NGOs in the Euroregion s activities. These differences are explained by the fact that the Russian cross-border cooperation actors view crossborder cooperation largely in economic terms (e.g. the development of enterprises; increasing investments; etc.), which in fact is not a matter of the institutionalized cross-border cooperation supported by the EU programmes such as INTERREG IIIA. - As for historical-cultural cross-border identity, it establishes the weakest correlations with the indicators of cross-border identity, although most respondents evaluated it as an incentive rather than as an obstacle to cross-border cooperation. The indicators for historical-cultural identity, however, appear to have somewhat stronger links with the indicators for increasing economic people-to-people interaction. Here, the respondents on the Russian side view it as a stronger incentive than the respondents on the Estonian side. The in-depth interviews also confirm these findings, as the interviewees on the Estonian side, even in the northern part of the Estonian- Russian cross-border region do not perceive the region as the region with its own cross-border identity. On the Russian side, the questioned and interviewed people much more than on the Estonian side, view the other across the border in positive terms. However, the border on both sides is perceived in very negative terms, as separating rather than creating opportunities for contact. - According to the conducted factor analysis and the evaluation of other statistical data, the political context seems to be considered as more of an obstacle for the cross-border cooperation than cultural differences. Although historical-cultural identity is considered as a stronger incentive for cross-border cooperation, it is rather weak and

101 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 101 establishes weak correlations with the indicators for cross-border cooperation, and thus one can conclude that on the whole it is less important for cross-border cooperation than the institutional identity. The cross-border cooperation in the Estonian-Russian cross-border region seems to depend greatly on the political context, institutional efficiency and the public image of cross-border institutions, in other words, on institutional identity.

102 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION Cross-border cooperation on the Romanian-Moldovan border The profile of the Romanian-Moldovan cross-border region Institutional Context In case of the Romanian-Moldovan cross-border cooperation, the Euroregional cooperation boasts the highest level of institutionalisation 187. The Euroregion Upper Prut was established in order to improve cooperation between the border regions of Romania, Moldova and Ukraine, whereas its creation can be said to be a centralised process, rather than a result of the local/regional initiatives. At first, initiated by the Romanian side during the final negotiations of the base Romanian-Ukrainian political treaty, the establishment of the Euroregion was reflected in the Article 8 of the Agreement on Good Neighbourly Relations and Cooperation between Ukraine and Romania, signed on June 2, The Madrid Convention on Transfrontier Cooperation (1980) serves as the general basis of this agreement. The Moldovan side joined the process at the summit of the Presidents of Ukraine, Moldova Republic and Romania, where they signed the Statement and the Protocol on trilateral cooperation (July 3, 1997), which encourage the establishment of direct contacts between local and regional authorities of the countries concerned, cross-border initiatives and projects. Moldova Republic also has concluded the Agreement on Good Neighbourly Relations, Friendship and Cooperation with Ukraine (October, 1992) and the Agreement on Cooperation of Frontier Regions of Ukraine and Administrative-Territorial Units of Moldova Republic (March 11, 1997) 188. While both Romania and Moldova have agreements on cooperation with Ukraine, there is no such counterpart between them. On the basis of the interstate agreements, the regional authorities (Botosani and Suceava judets of Romania, Balti and Edinet judets of Moldova, and Chernivitsi region of Ukraine) signed the agreement on the creation of the Euroregion Upper Prut (Botosani, September 2000) and the Statute of Upper Prut Euroregion, authorised by the decision of the Council of the Euroregion (Edinet, November 2000). Gakman explains the centralised mode of the establishment of the Euroregion by the fact that neither the respective administrative- 187 Gakman, S. The Institution of Euro-Regions in the Context of Integration Processes of Ukraine, Moldova Republic and Romania, Ibid.

103 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 103 territorial units nor the Euroregion per se are the subjects of international law, and therefore, a certain degree of paternalism on the part of the central authorities provides the necessary legal basis for the Euroregion as well as allows to render its activities more efficient 189. The Euroregional activities can be thus considered as a component of the interstate relations between Romania and Moldova, where the projects of all documents and agreements need to be approved and co-signed by the central authorities. The regional level authorities in Moldova have limited competences when it comes to addressing the issues of cross-border cooperation. As the elections to the Moldovan Parliament are carried out on the basis of party lists, there are no representatives of regions in the Parliament that could lobby regions interests and initiate the legislative changes necessary for cross-border cooperation. There are no local political parties in the border regions concerned, and during the Parliamentary elections in 2001, the regions predominantly voted for the Communist party 190. Furthermore, the local government reforms carried out in 2003, reduced the powers of the local governments even more, curbing their financial autonomy and reorganising the territorial units, replacing 10 entities (judets) with 31 smaller territorial districts (raions) 191. The administrative reform has lead to the temporary slow-down in the activities of the Euroregion Upper Prut on the Moldovan side, as instead of the two judets Edinet and Balti the Moldovan members of the Euroregion now included 6 smaller districts: Briceni, Glodeni, Edinet, Falesti, Riscani and Ocnita. Esanu points out a number of institutional obstacles to cross-border cooperation in Moldova, which include the absence of governmental structures that would promote the regional policy and support Euroregional activities; the absence of the regional strategies of development; the small economic potential and political weakness of the recently created territorial-administrative units; as well as their small access to external funding 192. Romania on the contrary has shown a tendency to decentralisation and the growing powers of the regional and local levels. Similarly to Moldova, Romania has a two-tier administrative system: the regional, or county, level represented by judets, and the local level represented by communes, towns and municipalities. According to the Romanian Constitution (Articles 120 and 121), underlying the principles of decentralisation, local and county 189 Ibid. p Skvortova, A. Moldova-Romania Border Region, A Background Report, Commission of the European Communities, Commission Staff Working Paper, European Neighbourhood Policy, Country Report: Moldova, {COM(204)373 final}, Brussels, xxx SEC(2004) 567, p Esanu, V. Some Aspects of Moldo-Romanian Co-operation for Regulating the Flow of Goods and Persons at the Border Between the Republic Moldova and Romania, in New Borders in South Eastern Europe: The Republic of Moldova, Ukraine, Romania, (Eds.) A. Barbarosie and V. Gheorghiu, Institute of Public Policy, 2002, pp

104 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 104 councils are publicly elected, and the local councils represent autonomous local structures responsible for solving public affairs at the local level, while the county level coordinates the activities of the local councils ensuring public services at the county level 193. The relationship between the local and county levels is not subordinate but cooperative in character. However, there still remains a presence of the state in the form of the county prefect, who is appointed by the central government and can challenge any document issued by the county or local council if they are deemed illegal 194. The county level can thus be characterised as a combination of self-government and devolved state administration, where the county council has slightly more powers than the prefect 195. Besides, unlike in Moldova, the local interests are represented in the Romanian national Parliament, where the deputies are elected on the basis of electoral districts coinciding with 41 judets, as well as in the central government thanks to the associations such as the Federation of the Local Authorities founded in When it comes to cross-border cooperation, local and county administration authorities can cooperate with their counterparts across the border, signing agreements and participating in regional development programmes. Aside from the Moldovan partners, the Romanian counties are cooperating with Hungarian, Polish and Ukrainian counties in the framework of the Euroregion Carpathians created in 1993, and with Hungarian and Yugoslavian counties the Euroregion Danube-Körös-Mures-Tisa created in Yet, the Euroregional activities have not yielded any significant results 196. As for the European level institutions, the cross-border cooperation is supported through different instruments: PHARE CBC on the Romanian side and TACIS CBC on the Moldovan side. In the context of the EU Neighbourhood Policy the two programmes are to be harmonised both when it comes to funding and the application processes. The CBC (crossborder cooperation) Neighbourhood Programme between Romania and Moldova for the period has as its goal to achieve the sustainable socio-economic development of the eligible area in Romania and Moldova by developing the principle of cross-border cooperation 197. The Programme has the total budget of for 2004 is 5 mill Euro of PHARE funds, and foresees the setting-up of the necessary institutions on the Romanian side, which in the advent of Romania s accession to the EU, already mirror those of INTERREG in the EU 193 Committee of the Regions, A Europe of Regions and Cities: Strategies and Prospects for EU Enlargement (Part II on Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Slovakkia and Turkey), European Communities, 2002, p Ibid. 195 Ibid. Act on Local Public Administration (215/2001), p Ibid. p Annex C3: RO-Phare 2004/ CBC Neighbourhood Programme between Romania and Moldova,

105 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 105 countries: the Joint Co-operation Committee, Joint Steering Committee, and Joint Technical Secretariat, representing the local, regional and national authorities, NGOs, Chambers of Commerce, etc. from both Romania and Moldova as well as the representatives the European Commission. Both sides are supposed to contribute to the joint annual progress reports for PHARE CBC and TACIS activities. According to the TACIS CBC Strategy Paper 198, the TACIS CBC programme is to be reorganised to comply with the purposes of the Neighbourhood Policy and its major goals are to address the opportunities and challenges arising from enlargement through strengthened cooperation at the cross-border and regional level and to facilitate the legal flow of people, goods and services across the Union s external borders. TACIS CBC will thus provide a counterpart to the PHARE CBC (or in the future, new INTERREG programme), extended to the external borders of the remaining candidate countries (Romania and Bulgaria). The progress of cross-border cooperation has been delayed in , as the PHARE CBC programme on the Romanian side did not yet cover the Eastern border 199. In the framework of TACIS, it was the centrally managed Small Project Facility, which provided the complementary funding for the non-eu countries in their cooperation with the INTERREG and PHARE CBC countries, and it amounted only to 34 million Euro out of the total 257 million Euro of the TACIS CBC budget for the period The new TACIS CBC Neighbourhood Project Facility (NPF) is to replace the Small Project Facility and its allocations are to be significantly raised to mirror INTERREG/PHARE funding across the border. Furthermore, the management of the NPF is to be decentralised and well coordinated with the INTERREG and PHARE CBC counterparts. Thus, since few institutional structures for cross-border cooperation exist in Romania and Moldova, the European level institutional framework can potentially provide the major basis for further institutionalisation of crossborder cooperation and strengthening of administrative capacities at the regional and local levels. Among the ongoing cross-border cooperation projects contracted in 2002 basing on SPF, several could be named: Upper Prut a new tourist market offer for Moldova and Romania, Setting-up of Lower Prut Euroregion information network, Restoration and maintenance of Manta lakes ecosystem and Sustainable regional development through creation of the an agency for cross-border cooperation. One of the largest CBC projects on the 198 European Commission, Tacis Cross-Border Cooperation: Strategy Paper and Indicative Programme , November 21, Ibid. p Ibid.

106 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 106 territory of the Euroregion Upper-Prut has been the development of the ecological database in the national reserve Emil Racovita, which has been completed; yet according to the TACIS office, there are serious problems with the final reporting. Altogether in Moldova, there have been four projects (ongoing or completed) under TACIS CBC since 2000 and twenty projects under TACIS Small Project Facility since Each of the SPF projects has a budget below 200,000EUR while TACIS CBC allows for much more substantial support (e.g. the budget for the building of the Radauti-Lipcani Border Crossing and Approach Road is 2,863,000 EUR). Most of the projects concern the environmental protection and the development of the economic relations across the border. Since TACIS CBC SPF has been the major source of support for cross-border cooperation in Moldova, it seems obvious that SPF should be increased significantly, especially since the PHARE CBC funds in the framework of the New Neighbourhood Program would be a lot higher. Institutional Identity The institutional identity depends on the efficiency and the image-making of cross-border institutions, i.e. it can be considered developed when the population in the borderlands are aware of the existing institutions and actively use the opportunities they provide. At the initial stage, cross-border institutional identity is fostered by political actors, and therefore, the favourable political relations between various levels of governance across the border represent an important condition for the institutional identity. In the case of Romania and Moldova, the relations between the two countries have run hot and cold since the Republic of Moldova became independent in The major reasons behind this fact include the lack of the bilateral frontier treaty and the base political treaty between Moldova and Romania. Besides, Romania s future accession to the EU would imply the introduction of the Schengen visa between the two states and the strengthening of the border control. When it comes to the border issues, by adopting the Declaration of Independence on August 27, 1991, the Moldovan Parliament condemned the Soviet annexation of Moldova in 1940 but also declared the adhesion to the principles of the Paris Charter for a New Europe and of the Final Act from Helsinki. The main principle of these two documents is preserving the stability of frontiers and the non-admission of their forced modification, on the basis of

107 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 107 which Moldova has not modified the ex-ussr-romanian border 201. The border between the ex-ussr and Romania was established based on a series of the post-war treaties (the treaty on the frontier regime signed in Moscow in 1945, the Paris Peace Treaty signed in 1947, etc.), and therefore, according to Revenco, strictly from a juridical point of view, the state border between Moldova and Romania is clearly delimited and demarcated 202. However, the author explains, these older agreements should be re-examined since firstly, compared to the Soviet period there has been a relative opening of the border; and secondly, there is still no bilateral Romanian-Moldovan legal framework for the border issues 203. The border-crossing regime is a special issue, since beginning from 1991 the Moldovan citizens were allowed to travel to Romania as well as to many CIS countries simply with their ID cards or the old Soviet passports. However, under the pressure of the EU accession conditions, Romania has changed the border-crossing standards with the Agreement of June 29, 2001, according to which the international passport was needed to cross the Romanian-Moldovan border 204. This measure has served as a restriction of the border traffic largely due to the relatively high cost of the international passport (approximately USD30) for the local population, which almost equalled the average monthly salary in the Moldovan border regions in 2001 (USD35 in the Balti county and USD27.6 in the Edinet county) 205. To ease the tensions, the Romanian government at the time, unlike the Moldovan Government, provided financial support for the Moldovan citizens that amounted to 1 million US dollars, and totally 30,000 of Moldovan students, tourists and inhabitants of the border regions have benefited from this assistance 206. Yet, there was still a sharp decrease in border-crossings: for example, in 1995, 55,900 Moldovan citizens left for Romania, while in 2001 their number was ten times less 5, Due to Romania s accession to the EU in 2007, the Schengen visas will be introduced between Moldova and Romania, which is expected to have a severe impact on the border areas of the two countries, linked through multiple kinship ties, since the people in the border regions would have to travel to the consulates that would be located in the capital and deal 201 Revenco, E. Juridical Aspects of Border Organisation, in New Borders in South Eastern Europe: The Republic of Moldova, Ukraine, Romania, (Eds.) A. Barbarosie and V. Gheorghiu, Institute of Public Policy, 2002, pp Ibid. p Ibid. pp Gheorghiu, V. New Schengen Borders and Their Impact on the Relationships of Moldova and Romania, in New Borders in South Eastern Europe: The Republic of Moldova, Ukraine, Romania, (Eds.) A. Barbarosie and V. Gheorghiu, Institute of Public Policy, 2002, pp See Skvortova, A. 206 Ibid.; also see Gheorghiu, V. 207 See Skvortova, A.

108 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 108 with the relatively high costs and more complicated procedures for the Schengen visa 208. In the anticipation of these changes, many Moldavians are applying for the Romanian citizenship, similarly to many representatives of the Russian-speaking minority in Estonia, who opt for the Russian citizenship in order to cross the border easier. Unlike Estonia, however, Moldova allows for dual citizenship in accordance with the change of the Constitution in 2000, and since the change was introduced approximately 300,000 Moldavians have applied for the Romanian citizenship 209. This creates a unique situation on the EU external borders, where a large number of people from a non-eu country would be allowed to move and eventually work freely in the EU after Romania s accession and joining the Schengen zone. Another point of contention in the Romanian-Moldovan political relations is the prolonged absence of the basic political treaty between the two countries. The context behind the process of difficult negotiations is very complex dating back to the first years of Moldova s independence, as well as the issue of Moldovan national identity, which will be discussed in more detail in the next sub-section on historical-cultural identity. Up till 1994 the question of Moldova s possible reunification with Romania was high on the political agenda in Chisinau: the Popular Front and its successor, the current Christian-Democratic Party, view Moldova and the Moldovan people as simply part of Romania and the Romanian culture, illegally annexed by the Soviet Union in 1940 and artificially created as a separate nation by means of Soviet propaganda in order to justify its territorial claims 210. The rhetoric of the special relations between Romania and Moldova and of the two Romanian states was widely used in the political circles on both sides of the border to foster the re-unification of the two countries 211. However, a number of factors such as the large number of the Russianspeaking minority in Moldova, the Transnistrian conflict, Moldova s economic dependence on Russia and the CIS countries, as well as the change of government in Moldova have diluted the desire for the re-unification. In 1994, following the changes in the Moldovan Parliament, the Moldovan President Snegur re-installed the official line on the Moldovan history, largely similar to the former Soviet interpretation, declaring that Moldova would remain an independent state and that the 208 See Gheogrhiu, V. p Haukkala, H. and Moshes, A. Beyond Big Bang : The Challenges of the EU s Neighbourhood Policy in the East, FIIA Report 9/2004, The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, King, Ch. Marking Time in the Middle Ground: Contested Identities and Moldovan Foreign Policy, in Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, September 2003, Vol. 19, Issue 3, pp Tomescu-Hatto, O. Romanian-Moldovan Political and Economic Relations, in Contributions to International Conference Europe and the Transition Process in the Republic of Moldova, July 2-3, 2004, pp

109 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 109 re-unification with Romania was no longer on the political agenda; that same year Moldova joined the CIS prioritising its foreign relations with Russia, which Romania perceived as a legitimisation of the Molotov-Ribentropp pact 212. The Treaty of Fraternity and Integration between Romania and Moldova initiated in 1992 was therefore left in standstill. Here, Moldova wished for a simple bilateral treaty assuring the inviolability of the common border, while Romania stressed the special nature of the treaty between the two kin states with the idea of culture, civilisation and common language 213. When the Party of Communists gained an overwhelming majority of 71 out 101 seats in the Moldovan Parliament in 2001 and managed to elect their leader, Voronin, as president, the prospects for signing the treaty became even slimmer. Despite the mass demonstrations Voronin implemented cultural and linguistic policies propagating a distinct Moldovan identity in 2002, which became the biggest obstacle to signing the basic treaty with Romania. In 2003 the Romanian Government proposed a declaration on the European Partnership, which would specify the Romanian-Moldovan bilateral relations and represent a European logic, which the Moldovan government denounced as the refusal of the Romanian side to sign a bilateral political treaty. The meeting of the two Presidents, Voronin and his Romanian counterpart, Iliescu, at the summit in Stanca-Costinesti on August 1, 2003, turned out to be a dismal failure, due to the fact that the Moldovan side had changed the text of the treaty agreed upon in 2000, cleansing all references to a common history and language 214. Furthermore, the Moldovan government stressed the need for the treaty to exclude the interference of Romania in the internal affairs of the Republic of Moldova, and include military guarantees of non-aggression, while the Romanian government considered such banal treaty without any reference to the special relations between Moldova and Romania and their common cultural heritage useless in the post-cold War reality 215. The mutual mistrust and hostility were obvious during a number of further meetings for the last two years, where no progress signing the Basic Political Treaty was achieved. Furthermore, as King explains, the question of the Moldovan-Romanian interstate relations simply has not been a priority for the Romanian domestic politics as no political group can use this issue to gain the support of the electorate 216. Finally, engaged in the EU pre-accession process Romania s foreign policy is more oriented towards developing political relations with the EU member-states. 212 Ibid. p Ibid. p Amariei, R. Romanian, Moldovan Leaders Tong-Tied Over Treaty, in Transitions Online, 8/11/ See Tomescu-Hatto, O., pp See King, Ch., p. 73.

110 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 110 It is clear that such political interstate relations cannot but undermine the potential for cross-border cooperation and the cross-border institutional identity, especially, since the institutional context for cross-border cooperation is centralised in Moldova and to a lesser extent in Romania. When it comes to cross-border institutions, such as the Euroregion Upper Prut, here the potential for the institutional identity also seems extremely weak. Most of the authors mentioning the Euroregion point out the low level of efficiency, and even in the reports of the European Commission and the AEBR there is practically no information as to the results of the Euroregion s activities. Unlike the Estonian-Russian-Latvian Euroregion Pskov-Livonia, the Euroregion Upper Prut includes as one of its major goals the economic development, the development of communication, transport and new technologies as well as cooperation in the fields of environmental security, education, tourism and culture 217. Thus, primarily focusing on the economic cross-border cooperation, in 2001, the Euroregional Council has taken decisions on the 50% reduction of taxation for joint economic enterprises in the Euroregion as well as on the introduction of the simpler border-crossing regime for the inhabitants of the Euroregion. However, the Romanian Government kept the road taxes for the Moldovan buses and trucks introduced in 2000, which significantly undermines the exchange of passengers and goods 218, and the Moldovan side has failed to introduce the tax reductions. At the same time, the Moldovan mass media has not published any information about the Euroregion s activities since the summer of , and the population s awareness of the opportunities it could provide is extremely low 220. So far, it seems, the activities of the Euroregion have evolved around the organisation of trilateral meetings of the local and regional representatives across the border. The issues discussed included the coordination in the field of environmental protection, facilitation of the small traffic in the border zones and searching for the opportunities to attract external funding 221. However, as Skvortova explains, the competences and goals of the Euroregion are not yet defined, and the legislative framework and the institutional structures are not developed Soloviy, R. Possible Ways of Activating Trade and Economic Relations at Regional and Cross-Border Levels in the Moldova-Romania-Ukraine Triangle, in New Borders in South Eastern Europe: The Republic of Moldova, Ukraine, Romania, (Eds.) A. Barbarosie and V. Gheorghiu, Institute of Public Policy, 2002, pp See Skvortova, A. 219 See Skvortova, A. 220 IPP, Consolidation of Border Security and Regional Stability, in New Borders in South Eastern Europe: The Republic of Moldova, Ukraine, Romania, (Eds.) A. Barbarosie and V. Gheorghiu, Institute of Public Policy, 2002, pp Ibid. p See Skvortova, A.

111 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 111 Historical-Cultural Identity It is not the aim of this paper to debate about the linguistic differences of the Romanian and Moldovan languages or historical-cultural differences between Romanians and Moldavians. However, in Moldova even during the Soviet period, King writes, most scholars knew, but none had been able to say, the cultural differences between Moldavians and Romanians were minuscule; while both peoples had their own peculiarities and historical experiences, it was the political slant given to these differences not the magnitude of those differences themselves that had long kept Moldavians and Romanians apart 223. A British social scientist, Eyal, also supports this idea: According to any conceivable definition of a nation, [Moldavians] can only be considered Romanians: they share exactly the same language, practice the same faith and have the same history. At every conceivable opportunity (in the 1870s, in 1918 and in 1941) the inhabitants of Soviet Moldova freely opted for union with Romania and considered themselves as Romanian. Furthermore and despite persistent Russian or Soviet attempts to prove the contrary Moldavians never sought nor achieved an independent existence as a state. For all Moldavians, there are only two historic experiences: either union with Romania or Russian rule. Soviet Moldavia is, therefore, the only republic in the USSR which has a nation-state outside the country s boundaries; it is a territory without its own, separate nation, a political notion rather than an ethnic reality. 224 Yet, nowadays one is faced with the reality of the independent Republic of Moldova and the Moldovan-Romanian language dictionary by Stati that came out in 2003 and which in fact is described as an absurdity serving political purposes even by Moldovan scholars 225. Stati s book on the history of Moldova emphasises the importance of the historic Moldova, which included the territory of the current Republic as well as the eastern borderlands of Romania to the west of the Prut River, and which reached its height during the times of the famous historical leader, Stefan cel Mare ( ) 226. The Moldovan nation is believed to be a distinct historical nation that emerged from a cultural inter-mix of the two groups: the Romanised indigenous tribes in the region between the rivers Prut and Dniestr, and the Slavs. While the categorical differentiation between the Romanian and Moldovan peoples seems far-fetched, it should be noted that the territory of the current Republic of Moldova has been under the Russian/Soviet influence much more than it has been under the Romanian, 223 See King, Ch., p Eyal, J. Moldavians, in The Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union, ed. G. Smith, London, Longman, 1990, pp From the interview that the head of the Moldovan Academy of Sciences Institute of Linguistics, Ion Barbuta, gave to the Moldovan Flux news agency, quoted in Razvan, A. Romanian, Moldovan Leaders Tongue-Tied Over Treaty, in Transitions Online, 8/11/ Stati, V. History of Moldova. Kishinev, 2002.

112 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 112 which may have contributed to the creation of somewhat different traditions, different usages of the language and different identities. Bessarabia, which constitutes most of the current day territory of the Republic, became a part of the Russian Empire in 1812, while the part of the historic Moldova located to the west of the river Prut became a part of greater Romania. Only in 1918, after the Revolution in Russia, Bessarabia was incorporated into the Romanian state and stayed there up till the incorporation to the Soviet Union in 1940 as a result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact 227. It remains to be shown, however, whether the years of political domination and cultural propaganda of Russia/Soviet Union over the Republic of Moldova provide a sufficient basis for considering Moldavians historically, culturally and linguistically different from Romanians. The ideas of Moldovianness began to dominate the Moldovan political discourse in 1994 after the initial pro-romanian national awakening in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Yet, in 1994, the Popular Front lost its appeal, and the Parliament became to be dominated by the Agrarian Democrats and the Socialist Bloc, who oriented Moldova s foreign policy towards Russia rather than Romania. At the same time, a national survey conducted in March 1994 showed that over 90 percent of the population favoured the continuation of the independent Moldovan state within its existing borders 228. While the majority of the population seems to embrace the idea of Moldova s independence and nationhood, there are still certain groups who support pan-romanianism. Both King and Chinn emphasise the divide on this issue between the Moldovan masses and the elite represented by the university professors and students, young bureaucrats and media 229. Because of the strong influence of the educational and cultural elites on the socialisation of the future generations as well as because of the high level of informal connection between Moldova and Romania (e.g. through the easy access to the Romanian television in Moldova or to the Romanian news on the Internet), the cultural affinity between the two states is likely to persist behind the dominant rhetoric of the current Moldovan political leaders. It seems that at present, the cross-border cooperation between Moldova and Romania has historical-cultural identity as its strongest basis and both the institutional context and the institutional identity are relatively weak. The fact that the people in the Euroregion Upper Prut speak (more or less) the same language, and share a long common history dating back to 227 Chinn, J. Moldavians: Searching for Identity, in Problems of Post-Communism, May/June 1997, Vol. 44, Issue See Chinn, J. 229 See Chinn, J.; and King, Ch., p. 66.

113 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 113 the historic Moldova embracing the two banks of the river Prut, could be expected to be an important facilitating, if not motivating, factor for cross-border cooperation Quantitative and qualitative analysis: questionnaires and in-depth interviews The empirical analysis of the cross-border cooperation in the Romanian-Moldovan borderlands is organised in the exact same manner as the case study on the Estonian-Russian cross-border cooperation. Each indicator for cross-border cooperation is analysed as for their correlations with the indicators for the institutional context, institutional identity and historical-cultural identity. Furthermore, the factor analysis is applied in order to demonstrate which indicators the respondents group together and then, combining these findings with other statistical information, this subsection speculates on the importance of various groups of indicators for cross-border cooperation. Simultaneously, the qualitative analysis of the indepth interviews complements the quantitative analysis with insights and explanations of the cross-border actors views. In order to assess the success of cross-border cooperation in different spheres, one could compare the respondent s views on the existence of the institutional framework in different spheres of cross-border cooperation and its efficiency. Table 13 Question 5.1: the existence of the institutional context for crossborder cooperation Means for Question 5.1 Correlations Means for Question 5.2 Question 5.2: the efficiency of the institutional context for cross-border cooperation Q517: CBC between local/regional enterprises 3.8 R =.65** 4.0 Q527: CBC between local/regional enterprises Q518: CBC in environment 4.0 R =.67** 4.0 Q528 : CBC in environment Q5110 : CBC in fighting organised crime 4.0 R =.69** 4.0 Q5210: CBC in fighting organised crime Q5111: CBC in migration issues 4.1 R =.57** 4.3 Q5211: CBC in migration issues Q5112: CBC in culture 4.4 R =.64** 4.3 Q5212: CBC in culture Q5113: CBC in education and science 4.2 R =.58** 4.2 Q5213: CBC in education and science Q5114: CBC for building mutual trust 4.1 R =.55** 4.2 Q5214: CBC for increasing mutual trust

114 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 114 **p<=0.01; n=145 As one could see from Table 13, the highest correlations between the existing institutions and their efficiency, as well as the highest total means concerned the questions on cross-border cooperation in the spheres of culture, fighting organised crime, environmental protection and cross-border cooperation between local/regional enterprises. Interestingly, the existence of cross-border cooperation between local and regional authorities was assessed somewhat lower than its efficiency, which might signify that the respondents believe that the local and regional authorities are doing more than is allowed by the existing institutional structures. The Moldovan respondents in general gave somewhat higher evaluations than the Romanian respondents, with the starkest differences concerning the questions on cross-border cooperation and its efficiency in culture (Question 5112, Moldova: mean = 4.8, n = 73; Romania: mean = 4.1, n = 72), education (Question 5213, Moldova: mean = 4.5, n = 73; Romania: mean = 3.8, n = 69) and cross-border cooperation for building mutual trust (Question 5214, Moldova: mean = 4.6, n = 73; Romania: mean = 3.8, n = 69). The in-depth interviews have demonstrated that the majority of cross-border actors on both sides of the border in general consider cross-border cooperation inefficient and the use of existing opportunities insufficient. Here, many interviewees underlined that actors such as the Chambers of Commerce and NGOs should be more involved in cross-border cooperation. Among the general obstacles to cross-border cooperation people have named political relations between the two countries, lack of information, and red tape connected to project implementation, as well as customs barriers and problems of border-crossing. The actors on both sides of the border view economic interaction as an important part of cross-border cooperation that should be developed: The level of existing economic interaction is by no means sufficient. Much more could be done. However, I am not sure if the legislation of both countries allows for collaboration. I think that cooperation is very advantageous. I believe that top officials should come up with legislative initiatives to encourage economic cooperation, as it is very important. All other types of cooperation would follow naturally (a journalist at the local newspaper, Botosani). If one is to prioritise the development of economic interaction in cross-border cooperation, then it is obvious that the state level should be encouraging these activities and providing support in terms of legislative framework. In this situation, thus, the multi-level governance, allowing for cooperation between different levels of governance, is even more crucial for cross-border cooperation. Otherwise, crossborder cooperation might end-up in a standstill due to the inability of the local/regional level actors to achieve their goals.

115 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 115 (1) Question 526: the efficiency of cross-border cooperation at the local and regional levels The first indicator for cross-border cooperation comes from Question 526 of the questionnaire that measures how efficient cross-border cooperation between local authorities appears to cross-border actors. This indicator correlates most strongly with the indicators for the institutional identity. Here, the correlations are especially high (Questions , R>.50) for the institutions at all levels of governance, while the state and the European levels establish even higher correlations with the efficiency of cross-border cooperation (Questions 523 and 524, R>.60). In order to analyse, which of the institutions and which spheres of cross-border cooperation the respondents assessed as most efficient, in Table 14 I illustrate the correlations between on one side the indicators for existing institutions (Question 5.1) and on the other the indicators for their efficiency (Question 5.2). This helps to demonstrate, where the potential for institutional identity is the strongest. From the Table one can see the correlations between the existence of institutions at four different levels of governance and their efficiency are relatively similar for all levels of governance, with the regional level establishing a somewhat stronger correlation (R=.58) between the existence of the institutional context and its efficiency. These correlations being relatively low (as compared to those in the Estonian- Russian case study) signify that the institutional framework at all levels of governance is being assessed as relatively inefficient. Table 14 Question 5.1: the existence of the institutional context for cross-border Means for Question 5.1 Correlations Means for Question 5.2 Question 5.2: the efficiency of the institutional context for cross-border cooperation cooperation Q511: local level 4.4 R =.48** 4.1 Q521: local level Q512: regional level 4.3 R =.58**. 4.1 Q522: regional level Q513: state level 4.3 R =.52** 4.1 Q523: state level Q514: European level 4.2 R =.51** 4.2 Q524: European level **p<=0.01; n=145 If one is to disaggregate the total means into the means for the Romanian and Moldovan respondents, then one would notice that the latter, surprisingly, gave higher

116 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 116 evaluations of all questions concerning the existence of institutions and their efficiency, with the most profound differences concerning the efficiency of the local level (Question 521, Moldova: mean = 4.4, N = 73; Romania: mean = 3.8, N = 72) and the existence of institutions at the European level (Question 514, Moldova: mean = 4.5, N = 73; Romania: mean = 3.9, N = 72). It is largely doubtful that these findings correspond to reality, however, since as one could see from the profile of the Romanian-Moldovan cross-border region, the local level in Moldova is much less autonomous than in Romania and that the European structures, such as TACIS CBC have not until recently been well coordinated with its counterpart PHARE CBC in Romania, which was one of the obstacles to cross-border cooperation. Perhaps, the Romanian respondents are simply more sceptical and uninhibited than the Moldovan respondents to give a negative assessment to the institutions and authorities at all levels of governance. The in-depth interviews demonstrate that the institutional identity, both when it comes to the political relations between the two countries as well as the efficiency of cross-border institutions, is not well developed. Both the Romanian and Moldovan interviewees in general refer to the hostility of the Moldovan Government towards Romania being a significant obstacle to cross-border cooperation. When asked about three main national problems or the Moldovan foreign policy, a majority of Moldovan businessmen referred to the poor interstate relations between Moldova and Romania: One of the problems is the policy of our country. The direction that our President supports is not right. We have problems in relations with Romania and Ukraine, and I believe that if you don t get along with your neighbours you won t live quietly (an owner of an agricultural company, Glodeni). Most interviewees expressed mixed feelings about the Moldovan foreign policy, viewing it as double-faced or poorly defined: It is a strange policy, two-faced, I would say. On the one hand our government declares that we are oriented towards Europe, but in reality nothing is being done, our laws do not correspond to what is being declared. I think that our policy towards Romania is not bad even though probably we have some communication problems, because we have a communist government and they have a democratic one. Definitely it could have been better. Our relations with Romania are limited now only to education affairs. I would say that lately our relations with Romania improved a little bit, because for two-three years the situation had been really bad (a representative of the Chamber of Commerce, Balti). Most of the interviewed cross-border actors on the Moldovan side realise that the relations with the CIS and especially Russia should not be broken off, as they constitute an important market for Moldova s predominantly agricultural products as well as the suppliers

117 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 117 of energy for Moldova. However, at the same time people believe almost unanimously that their future also lies in Europe, where Romania is seen as an important collaborator in bringing Moldova closer to the EU: I would say that collaboration with Romania has only positive consequences concerning the integration to the EU market (director of an NGO, Riscani district). Romania is expected to help Moldova to integrate to the EU because of the historical-cultural links between the countries: Romania would like us since we have a common history, traditions, language; we are the same people (an official, Glodeni district). Yet, there is also a lot of scepticism as for Romania s desire to keep its links with Moldova: The level of interaction is so-so they are not so willing. They are ready to join the EU and are trying to estrange from us. Before, any initiative from Moldova was welcome and now we have more obstacles and more paperwork to be done (an owner of a company, the Glodeni district). The Romanian interviewees largely view the foreign policy of their state in very positive terms, due to the Government s orientation towards the West, which resulted in Romania s joining NATO and the subsequent joining the EU in Almost none of them, however, referred to the relations with Moldova in the context of the foreign policy or major national problems which demonstrates that the relations with their Eastern neighbour are low on the national agenda. When asked directly about the cross-border cooperation with Moldova, an official from the Botosani municipality explained: There activities are limited significantly by the lack of political will at the state level Romania does not strive for cooperation with its Eastern neighbours, it focuses more on the West. Of course, there is political will at the level of declarations, but true political will is non-existent. Romania s political will for cooperation with Moldova seems to be greatly weakened by the hostility of the Moldovan communist government: Political will play a decisive role. As Voronin refused to come to Putna (Romania) to Iliescu, this is a major impediment in our relations with Moldova 230. Romania has nothing to lose here. Moldova as a state does not have to lose much, but the people of Moldova are the ones who will suffer the consequences, living in a closed space filled with poverty and greyness. The barrier is of political nature. I would regard the lengthy period of Voronin s rule as stagnation in the evolution of Moldovan families (an official from the Botosani municipality). 230 The interviewee refers to the refusal of the Moldovan President Voronin to accept the invitation from the Romanian President Ilisescu to participate in the celebrations of the 450 th anniversary of the death of the great figure in the Romanian (Moldovan) history, Stephen the Great, held in the summer 2004, in Putna, in the county of Suceava, Romania.

118 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 118 A Moldovan businessman also used the same example to illustrate the impact of the political context on cross-border cooperation: But the policy carried out at the moment isn t right. You know what government we have. On TV I hear mostly about the collaboration initiatives coming from the Romanian side, and I don t see anything from the Moldovan side. It is not surprising that a scandal regarding Putna occurred when Voronin didn t want to come. Similarly, a representative of the Upper Prut Euroregion office in Edinet criticised the government for hindering their activities: In my opinion, the implication of politics in any situation damages more than it helps. More precisely, we were working on project priorities in the framework of the Good Neighbourhood Program, but the Government didn t allow us to go to Bucuresti, to the conference, and I am afraid that because of that we wouldn t be able to receive those 5mln for the implementation of our projects for the improvement of the roads and the facilitation of the customs procedures. Apart from political obstacles at the intergovernmental level, the institutional inefficiency of the cross-border institutions also hinders the development of the institutional identity on the Romanian-Moldovan border. Although most of the interviewed people on both sides of the border have heard about the existence of the Euroregion Upper Prut, they do not know about its goals and activities largely due to the actual lack of results. One of the hindrances to the Euroregion s activities is the administrative reform in Moldova, communication problems, and the competitive nature of relations between the regional authorities across the border: Now there are six Moldovan districts in the Euroregion 231 and they failed to come up with two officials to represent them and vote for Moldova. Besides, no agreement was achieved regarding the composition of working commissions and meeting venues. For the last year, nothing has been done by the Euroregion. We have cooperated a lot with Moldova, especially prior to the administrative reform. We had twin mayoralties, but we could not pursue further cooperation, as there was poor phone connection with Moldova and we did not manage to reach them. We wrote, and they did not answer. Thus, cooperation subsided. There was wish, but there was not enough will, it seems (a representative of the Suceava County Council, Romania). Thus, following the administrative reform, the Modovan side has failed to come up with two representatives of the six new districts, which could be explained either be the lack of agreement between the regional authorities or the lack of motivation for cross-border 231 When the Euroregion Upper Prut was created in 2001, it included two larger territorial units on the Moldovan side the Edinet and Balti judets, which were reorganised into six smaller districts after the administrative reform in 2003.

119 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 119 cooperation. Among the Moldovan local officials, however, the administrative reform is also seen in a positive way: In the recent time in the Euroregion s framework we had only one project with Botosani, and that s all, although the project was a successful one. Now after the rayons were created we are closer to the Romanian judets and probably have a larger room for work (an official from the Riscani district administration, Moldova). Yet, it is doubtful that the fact that the districts now are smaller and closer to Romanian judets will contribute much to the development of cross-border cooperation, as they are financially weaker and lack specialists. Another reason for the Euroregion s inefficiency is the lack of funds devoted to the development of its administrative capacities and the lack of expertise on cross-border cooperation: Public officials in Romania are blocked in their activities, as they have no right to be NGO members, to own businesses, while their salaries are not very high. Due to new transparency policies, public officials cannot get any fees for services provided as experts. Therefore, there is a risk regarding the initiating and implementing any projects by public administration. We cannot include project fees, travel expenses nothing (a representative of the EU Integration Department, Botosani County Council). Similarly with the Euroregion Pskov-Livonia on the Estonian-Russian border, the representatives of the administration have to engage in cross-border cooperation on more or less voluntary basis, apart from the everyday pressing concerns. It certainly is reflected in the lower number of project proposals as well as in their quality. The cooperation with NGOs, who often have expertise when it comes to project writing, is hindered by the lack of funds for the administrative costs of the Euroregions. In Moldova, the situation with specialists is even bleaker; most of the interviewees point out that Romanians are more experienced in project writing and hope to learn from them through cross-border cooperation: Of course, there are projects that are started but are not concluded with good results. I can tell that Romanians have worked with projects for a longer time, and are more experienced, and we try to collaborate with them, to learn from them how to proceed correctly (a representative of the Riscani district administration); It (cross-border cooperation) is a new thing for us. Out of 36 mayors 24 are elected for the first time, hence people do not have the necessary experience. At this stage they hardly know what to do with their own job responsibilities, to say the least about cross-border cooperation. We do not have a person who would be engaged strictly with this. Therefore, they have to address the issue overtime, without being paid. And who would like to work overtime without being paid? (an official, the Edinet district). A representative of the Balti Chamber of Commerce also

120 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 120 commented that the information concerning the cross-border project implementation does not reach the local actors: In my opinion, the European Commission should elaborate more projects on information and education of population, and the projects should be more publicised. The only project they have is implemented in Chisinau and only selected people are invited and the others don t know anything. If more people were informed, there would appear more projects and more substantial results. We live by the border but the exchange between our side and the Romanian one is very limited. The indicators for the institutional context at all levels of governance also establish high correlations (Questions , , R>.40), whereas the correlations are more or less equally strong for local, regional, national and European levels of governance. When it comes to the question on how active various cross-border actors are in cross-border cooperation, the Moldovan respondents assessed the regional authorities as the most active (Question 532, mean = 4.4, n = 73), while the Romanian respondents viewed the local authorities as the more efficient cross-border actor (Question 531, mean = 4.0, n = 69), although here, also the Moldovan respondents gave higher evaluations than the Romanian respondents to all the questions. Both sides assessed the participation of the Chambers of Commerce in cross-border cooperation as relatively low (both means below the neutral 4.0), whereas the participation of NGOs was assessed much higher by the Moldovan respondents than by the Romanian respondents (Question 533, Moldova: mean = 4.2, n = 73; Romania: mean = 3.5, n = 69). The in-depth interviews also demonstrate that in Moldova the regional level is more active than the local due to the lack of funding and specialists at the local level. The institutions at the state level (especially in Moldova) seem to hinder cross-border cooperation and many decisions undertaken by the local/regional authorities across the border are not being implemented: We agreed within the Euroregion to cut local taxes the Romanian and Ukrainian officials did that, while the Moldovan officials promised and yet did nothing. So far, cross-border cooperation has focused on cultural exchange, a little on tourism and very little on trade. We keep meeting and postponing plans and eventually nothing happens (a representative of the Suceava County Council). Thus, according to this official, directly involved in the activities of the Euroregion, the institution has failed to realise its major goal the development of economic relations across the border. The reasons seem to be primarily of the institutional character, linked to the level of decentralisation in both countries.

121 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 121 Here, the starkest difference concerned the question about the most active level of governance when it comes to cross-border cooperation: most of the interviewees on the Romanian side answered it was either local or county level as well as the European level, while in Moldova a large number of cross-border actors prioritised the central level: The local level is engaging, however, without the help from the centre nothing can be done (a representative of the Edinet district administration); The Government of the Republic of Moldova would be the first one, then the economic agents, and after the local administration. I think the most active is the Government (an official from the Edinet district administration); I think that the most comes from the centre. And with the initiatives many go to the centre. The information does not reach us; we know nothing about financing (an owner of a farm, the Falesti district). Some Moldovan interviewees mentioned the European level as the most active, as they provide assistance, information and ideas (a farm owner, the Glodeni district). The local/regional level in Moldova is believed to come up with ideas and initiate projects, but is seen as powerless or inefficient when it comes to their implementation: Now I believe those from the Upper Prut Commission started to meet quite often. But the problem is that they probably make some decision, but then it needs to be implemented by someone, but no one wants to. They were saying that they would give us those living in the Euroregion some concessions, but I haven t seen anything so far 232 (an owner of an orchard farm, the Falesti district). On the Romanian side, many officials have noted that the regional level in Romania enjoys much more autonomy in its international and cross-border relations than their Moldovan counterparts, who need the approval of the central authorities about the crossborder initiatives: According to the Local Public Administration Law No. 215, cross-border cooperation is managed by the Suceava County Council. We need no approval of the Government or other central institutions to participate in cross-border cooperation, especially with our neighbours. The Government encourages such initiatives (a representative of the Suceava County Council). The Romanian Government is seen as supportive of crossborder initiatives, having proposed the idea of the Euroregion, and having appointed a Government official on the Euroregion matters. Furthermore, there seems to be a good cooperation between the state (the Ministry of European Integration) and the county levels in the development of the Good Neighbourhood Program: Given the organisation of the public 232 Here, the interviewee refers to the proposed abolition of the customs duties for commercial goods on the territory of the Euroregion Upper Prut, which was carried out by the Romanian and Ukrainian side, but not by the Moldovan side.

122 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 122 administration in Romania we are independent, there is no administrative or financial subordination. Local taxes are distributed by local authorities. Nobody influences local administration. Quite the opposite, now everybody asks when the Good Neighbourhood will start, as Romania was given 25mln Euro for it and Moldova will get 5mln Euro. Duplication of projects will be eliminated (a representative of the Botosani County Council). Cross-border cooperation in Romania seems to be on its way to develop according to a multi-level governance model, yet the local/regional level should be the one initiating cross-border cooperation and not just the EU: The European level comes first they launch programs. At the national level memoranda on funding are signed. Regional and local levels execute projects. I am not sure which is the most important all are significant (a representative of the Botosani County Council). According to a representative of the Botosani County Council, the counties in Romania are also active members of a number of international bodies, for instance, the Association of the European Border Regions, which helps them to establish and maintain contacts with other regions in Europe, as well as to provide and receive information and expertise. In Moldova, however, the regions are much poorer than in Romania, and various officials have pointed out that the financial autonomy from the centre might even be undesirable: We have a political autonomy, but without a financial support from the centre we can do nothing. If we won t have at least small funds, we will be bound by legs and arms. Therefore, the financial autonomy from the centre is undesirable (a representative of the Costesti Municipality, Moldova). The Romanian officials at the county level, however, consider the financial dependence of the Moldovan district administration on the central level as an obstacle to cross-border cooperation: Once the legislative differences are eliminated, there would be plenty of opportunities. Romanian county councils can contribute funds for the implementation of national and international projects, while in Moldova only ministries and national agencies can provide funding for such initiatives. Thus, when we want to carry out projects at the local level, with, say, the Riscani district, we can do nothing. The Euroregion has been assessed as non-participatory : namely, both representatives of NGOs and Chambers of Commerce criticised the lack of transparency and desire for cooperation on the part of the public administration. For instance, a representative of one of the oldest and the largest NGOs in Botosani criticises the public administration for the lack of transparency and support to their initiatives: In 2001 we have signed a collaboration protocol with an NGO in Moldova, it was a move forward. Some project proposals followed, but we were a little disappointed. In Botosani there met the representatives of the Upper Prut

123 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 123 Euroregion and they did not accept to see us because we were not on the agenda. We agreed on this protocol with our Moldovan counterparts and we believed in it. From their behaviour we saw that public administration was not eager to collaborate with us. The Euroregion thus appears neither to use the expertise of the existing NGOs, nor support their independent initiatives. Similarly, a representative of the Botosani Chamber of Commerce, criticises the Euroregion members for the lack of transparency and the will to cooperate with the business representatives: It seems that County Councils are in control of everything, they are the key actors in the creation of the Euroregion. Still, transparency is an issue. The Euroregion is not participatory. It would be good if other parties were also involved. We collaborate with them to a certain extent. We have always provided the information they needed. The poor coordination and collaboration between the public administration and the Chambers of Commerce might explain why cross-border cooperation has been focused predominantly on the cultural field, and not on the economic interaction. Yet, both business representatives and administration underline the priority of the development of economic cross-border relations, which would eventually lead to the establishment of the free trade zone in the Euroregion. When it comes to the legislative barriers, apart from the customs taxes, the visa regime that already exists between Romania and Ukraine, and will be established between Romania and Moldova once Romania joins the EU, is considered the main obstacle for cross-border cooperation. According to various cross-border actors, in the framework of the Euroregion, the officials who are actively involved in cross-border cooperation have managed to attain special permits facilitating their travel across the border. In the light of the future visa restrictions, many officials expressed a desire to establish a simplified border-crossing regime for the people living in the Euroregion, where visas would be issued for free (a representative of the Suceava County Council). On the whole, most Romanian interviewees had a very negative assessment of the future visa regime mostly due to the cultural reasons, but realised that it is the condition they have to accept if they wish to join the EU: If we enter the EU we have to introduce visas it is a mandatory requirement. Until lately, I needed only the ID to cross the border when I went on excursion there, while a year ago one had to have a passport to cross the border already. It is unlucky for us, as there are Romanians as well, we have our roots there, common traditions, relatives. It is very different from the situation at the border between Romania and Hungary, for instance. Maybe the EU just wants to protect us, but it should not protect us from our own identity we are all Moldavians (a representative of the NGO Free Youth, the Botosani county). Others were yet more undecided about the visas: It is disputable. It would be good not to have visas. On the other hand, according to new

124 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 124 policies, we have to ensure security at borders. There are no risks from Moldavians and Romanians, but other countries might profit from it. Dangerous persons might come from other countries Smuggling of goods, drugs, weapons (a director of an artistic group, Botosani). Still, Moldova itself is not normally associated with a sense of danger; instead, the Romanian interviewees seem to sympathise with their brothers across the border who will become more isolated from them with the introduction of the visa regime. Thus, the Romanians support the continuation of the special relations with Moldova, saying that it is Moldova s Eastern borders that should be strengthened, but not the border between Moldova and Romania. Others would prefer if there would be simply more control at the border, but a visa-free regime: I don t think there are real risks, it is a wrong assumption. Any risk can be prevented through other methods, with the support of the state, by stricter controls rather than by more closed borders. The existence of the border does not mean that the trafficking will stop at once; criminals have enough money to get visas if they need them (editor of the local newspaper, the Botosani county). The interviewees on the Moldovan side, however, perceived more risks for Romania, the EU as well as for Moldova, resulting from open borders between Moldova and Romania, and therefore, expressed an understanding concerning the future visa regime, although they realised that would have a negative impact on Moldova: If the borders were open the only disadvantage would be that through Transnistria some undesirable stuff could be brought. There is also a problem with persons from Asia, who want to reach the EU through Moldova. These are problems not only for the EU, but also for Moldova (a representative of the Upper Prut Euroregion office in Edinet); Visa doesn t trouble me at all. Just all the procedures are cumbersome. If receiving a visa wasn t so time-consuming and there weren t such a huge bureaucracy, then it would be great. But the visa I think is a necessary thing. Such problems as drugs and arms would appear. If there weren t such control, the real chaos would occur. The customs is even welcomed (a director of an ecological agency, the Glodeni district). The fear of Moldova becoming a transit country is perhaps the main reason why the Moldovan interviewees view the future visa regime as a necessary measure. However, there were also a lot of rather emotional responses of the following kind: I assume that in a few years it will be easier to go Russia than to Romania. The introduction of the visa regime definitely would constitute a huge barrier. If I am a Romanian, my parents and grandparents were Romanians, then why do I have to do all this paperwork? Are they better than me? There should be a visa-free regime. Then everything would be better: the economy as well as common citizens would benefit from this (a businessman, the Edinet district). In Moldova, people would

125 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 125 perhaps continue to leave the country both if the borders are open, since many good specialists would search for higher pay somewhere else, and if the borders are closed, since there would persist a feeling of being closed, isolated, with practically no other option but to leave (a farm owner, the Glodeni district). As for the indicators for historical-cultural identity, here, two correlate with the efficiency of cross-border cooperation: Question 4210, standing for the perception of the other as they have a positive attitude towards us and Question 4211 that stands for another perception they are a part of the European culture. In both cases, however, the correlations are weaker than in the case of institutional context and identity (R<.40) and in both cases the differences in the means between the Romanian and Moldovan responses are significant (Question 4210, Moldova: mean = 5.2, n = 73; Romania: mean = 3.9, n = 72; and Question 4211, Moldova: mean = 5.3; Romania: mean = 4.6). Therefore, the Romanian respondents view the people on the Moldovan side as having a much less positive attitude towards them than vice versa, and also as less as a part of the European culture, although here, the difference is not that significant. Table 16 demonstrates the differences in the means for the different perceptions of the other between the Romanian and Moldovan respondents. The Moldavians much more than Romanians view the other as hardworking, productive, friendly, peaceful, open similar to us, having a positive attitude towards us and as a part of the European culture. They also view Romanians as slightly more productive and honest then the Romanians view Moldavians. Both sides have given similar medium high assessments as to the perception of the other as powerful and disciplined. Thus, on the whole, Moldavians have stronger positive perceptions of Romanians than vice versa. It is surprising, taking into consideration the assertions of distinct nationality traits in Moldova, they respondents there, more than those on the Romanian side, considered the other as similar to us. Table 15: Comparison of means for the indicators of historical-cultural identity between the Romanian and Moldovan respondents Question 4.2 : Perceptions of the other Country N Mean Std.Deviation Q421**: Perception of the other as Moldova hardworking Romania Q422*: Productive Moldova Romania

126 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 126 Q423*: Honest Moldova Romania Q424**: Friendly Moldova Romania Q425**: Peaceful Moldova Romania Q426: Powerful Moldova Romania Q427**: Open Moldova Romania Q428: Disciplined Moldova Romania Q429**: Similar to us Moldova Q4210**: The have a positive attitude towards us Q4211**: They are a part of the European culture Romania Moldova Romania Moldova Romania *p<0.05 **p<0.01 The in-depth interviews have demonstrated that the cross-border actors on both sides of the border almost unanimously view each other as belonging to the same nation with the common history, culture and language: They are just like us. There is a special relation with Moldova. If you asked me about, say, Hungary, it would be a different thing, but with Moldova these relations are very close and I see no differences (a representative of the Botosani County Council); They cannot be better or worse than us. In these regions, most people are Romanian by origin. Romania has provided support, as much as it could, for the Romanians abroad 233 (a representative of the Suceava County Council); Ordinary people are similar: we have the common language, common traditions, history, and this is why I don t see why they are different. And we have never had problems (a representative of the Costesti municipality, Moldova); They are not different: they marry each other, visit us and we go there. We are all the same, if you look at the history (a representative of the Riscani district 233 The interviewee refers to the special department created by the Romanian Government, the Department for the Romanians Abroad, which provides special support for the Romanian culture. There used to be a special fund for the Romanian culture in Moldova, until the Moldovan Government claimed it to be an interference with Moldova s internal affairs, and the fund was closed. Now the Romanian Government provides support for Moldova from the common fund for the Romanians abroad.

127 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 127 administration, Moldova); They are very friendly, joyful, communicative, open as we are. I was there and felt myself at home (an official from the Falesti district administration); I travelled often as a tourist guide and I wouldn t say I saw anything different. They have the same traditions, history and language; there is nothing different between them and us (an owner of a tourist agency, the Edinet district). However, many Romanian interviewees also view the people on the Moldovan side as having a slightly different mentality due to the prolonged Soviet influence: So, in my mother s side, we originate from the Republic of Moldova. I had the opportunity to see what kind of people were the Bessarabians before World War II and I am sad to see who Bessarabians are today, the difference is huge. 50 years under the Soviet Union made them settle on any compromise only to survive (a representative of a puppet theatre, the Botosani county); It is the same people. Maybe there are some differences that depend on the mentality of the people living there and the way they have managed to change since Soviet times (a director of an artistic group, Botosani); I perceive them as Romanians living in another country. They are no different from us except for the years when we have been separated (a worker at the Botosani School Inspectorate); They are not very different from us. We just were unlucky to follow an unfortunate historic course. Because of our history we have a certain mentality, and they have been influenced even more, they have been indoctrinated. I would like to say that villagers are more open to us, while those from cities changed more, so to say, be it genetically (through mixed marriages) or by being affiliated to certain political parties (a representative of the Botosani Chamber of Commerce). Thus, although being the same people, Moldavians are perceived to have developed minor differences in mentality or behaviour because of being isolated in a different political and social environment. The resulting differences in the Moldovan mentality and behaviour were said to be the fear of authorities (a journalist, Botosani), as the partisans of the centralised system and prisoners of the ideological system (a representative of the Botosani municipality), and that they are quieter and less daring than the Romanians (a lecturer at the Suceava University). Finally, the differences were also explained through a metaphor of a poor relative, or in other words, by the lower level of development and living conditions in Moldova than in Romania. Yet, one could sense a lot of sympathy and respect: Common people are very generous and they try to do everything they can with the scarce resources they have. If one needs help they give everything in their power. They are richer in spirit than we are (an owner of a publishing company, the Suceava county).

128 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 128 On the Moldovan side, the interviewees view the people across the border as more developed, more cultured and more ordered: They differ by their culture. They are more developed, their education and medicine are on a higher level. Many doctors from Moldova go there to work. The law is respected at all levels, all are equal in front of the law, doesn t matter if a person is a president or a citizen of this country. In our country an action is done only if an important person or any of his relatives wants the thing to be done (a company owner, Moldova); I wouldn t say that they differ somehow; just lately they have advanced a lot, and definitely are a step ahead of us. They not only declare, they also accomplish what they say What concerns their character, they don t differ from us, they just have a different pronunciation, they speak in a more literary way. When I go there, nobody sees any difference between me, a Moldovan, and a Romanian neither in pronunciation, nor in anything else (a representative of the Balti Chamber of Commerce). The Moldovan businessmen underline that the business culture is more developed in Romania, based on trust and the respect of the law: They have been more correct in doing business lately. They are honest and they do what they have promised. I respect them a lot because they have a culture and they know how to find solutions in difficult situations (an owner of a company, the Glodeni district). Certain interviewees seemed to feel uncomfortable about the current disparities in development between Moldova and Romania, and Romania s tendency to prioritise its relations with the EU over its Eastern neighbour: Now after you cross the border, you already feel uncomfortable, because a Moldovan is viewed as somebody who represents a barrier in their economic development. This separates us. Romanians are very interested in being accepted by the EU, and they are doing everything necessary for that, even if they have to give up some of their wishes or principles (a businessman, Moldova). Similarly, a representative of the Glodeni district administration referred to a certain disloyalty of Romanians, for the sake of material profit: Romanians are more cunning than we are, this could be seen even from the history. they go sometimes with ones, sometimes with others, only to be better off, and Moldavians are more trustful, naïve and more calm and open. Only one interviewee out of twenty-five, a devoted Communist, has stressed the differences between the Moldavians and Romanians, albeit without really explaining what these differences were: I am a Moldovan and not a Romanian, and I am frustrated when I am called a Romanian. Probably, if I were to be called Romanian from my birth I would not have had problems with that. They are good people; the only thing is that they were able to develop more quickly (a representative of the Edinet district administration). Therefore, one could conclude that the people on both sides of the border share a view of a common primordial, or

129 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 129 historical-cultural, identity, which, however, has been slightly weakened by historical events and current political circumstances. (2) Questions 611 and 612: benefits from increasing cross-border cooperation Moldova and Romania, respectively Here, the indicators for the institutional context and institutional identity have established similar correlations with the respondents perceptions of the benefits from increasing crossborder cooperation for both countries. However, for Moldova, the state level efficiency is more important than for Romania (Question 523, R =.30 and R =.23), while for Romania the local and the European levels are slightly more important than for Moldova. When it comes to the differences in perceptions of the benefits, the Moldovan respondents evaluated the benefits both for Moldova and Romania much higher than the Romanian respondents (Question 611, R = -.30; and Question 612, R = -.32) 234. The indicators for historicalcultural identity have established the largest number of correlations, and the highest correlations concerned the questions on the language differences and the perception of the other as having a positive attitude towards us (R >.30). Here, when it comes to the language differences (Questions 3511, R = -.46; and 416, R = -.37), the Moldovan respondents much more than the Romanian, believe that the language differences are not an obstacle or are even an incentive for cross-border cooperation. The same can be told about the perceptions of the other : the Moldovan people view the Romanians much more as peaceful (Question 425, R = -.40), open (Question 427, R = -.23) and as having a positive attitude towards us (Question 4210, R = -.34) than vice versa. Thus, from the analysis of the questionnaires, one could assume that the Moldovan respondents expect larger benefits from cross-border cooperation, and that the benefits are connected to the common historical-cultural heritage between Romania and Moldova. The indepth interviews have shown that the people on the Romanian side, almost unanimously, view the benefit from cross-border cooperation to be mutual. Furthermore, many more interviewees on the Romanian than on the Moldovan side believe that common culture is the main motivating reason for cross-border cooperation, or at least as important as the economic benefits. To the question why do people engage in cross-border cooperation, many 234 Here, R represents the correlation between a certain question and the country, where 1 is Moldova and 2 is Romania. The high negative correlation thus signifies that it were the Moldovan respondents who gave on average much higher evaluations to the question, while a high positive correlation means the opposite. I use this statistical data interchangeably with the comparison of the means for the Romanian and Moldovan respondents.

130 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 130 Romanian interviewees answered in a similar way: In our case, because it is a common cultural pool. Besides, history has never created insurmountable borders. There was crossborder cooperation at all times (director of the Regional Adult Education Centre, Iasi); The social factor is most important we are the same nation and it unites us and gets us closer to each other (director of a company, the Suceava county); First, I think that we belong to the same nation and then comes the money and economic interests (a manager of the market, Suceava municipality); We want to gain knowledge, first of all. There are many relatives on both banks of the Prut. We speak the same language, share the same traditions (historical, cultural) and customs (a representative of the Botosani County Council); We talk the same language and share the same interests the well-being of the people including the attraction of external funds to do things that we cannot afford (a representative of the Suceava County Council); It would seem that cross-border cooperation is needed due to the common grounds the same language, the same customs. It may be compared with living in the same village when one is short of salt he goes to his neighbour and asks for some (a representative of the Botosani Chamber of Commerce). As one can see, the view that cross-border cooperation relies primarily on the historical-cultural grounds, and the economic factor comes second, is shared by all the categories of cross-border cooperation actors on the Romanian side. Viewed from this perspective, it is clear why the Romanian interviewees also saw the benefits from cross-border cooperation largely as mutual. However, the interviewees on the Moldovan side demonstrated a variety of opinions, where the majority believed that Moldova would profit more since Romania is economically more developed: I think Moldova profits more because we are poor and we need them more. They have everything: heavy industry, and we have just agriculture with our tomatoes. We will profit more from cross-border cooperation because when they enter the EU, they may even forget about us, and we need to follow them and to be as close as possible (a farm owner, the Glodeni district). Most people referred to the benefits from exporting agricultural products from Moldova to Romania: For example, we, in the Republic of Moldova, have a surplus of the agricultural products vegetables, fruits, and the Romanian side needs those at a lower price. So, their population would have good products at an accessible price, and our people would have money (a representative of the Costesti municipality, Moldova). Another reason why Moldova is expected to benefit more is that through the cooperation with Romania, the Moldovan companies can gain access to other European companies and markets: As for the Romanian side, we are interested in it because it constitutes a transition point through which we can go further. For example, we went to a

131 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 131 poultry fair in Hungary being helped by Romanians and Chambers of Commerce from Balti and Botosani. We have to orient our policy towards Romania because only this way we would survive (a farm owner, the Glodeni district). When asked about the goals of cooperation, the interviewees on the Moldovan side prioritised the economic profit over the cultural cooperation much more than Romanians, which does not necessarily contradict the findings from the questionnaires; the common historical-cultural background is seen to facilitate cooperation although the main motivating factor for the Moldovan side is of an economic nature: I think it is first of all economic gain, but at the same time these relations are based on a traditional communication, on a history. It is easier to work with somebody you know, somebody who has blood ties with you (an editor of the local newspaper, the Edinet district). As a businessman from Glodeni explained, the restrictions for border-crossing have led to the more pragmatic reasons to cross the border: If you go there, you will see their beautiful cities, highways. And we are motivated to cooperate with them in order to see and to learn. Before more severe procedures for border crossing were introduced, people were travelling to Romania more for sightseeing and vacations. Now people go there if they have business to do. A representative of the Balti Chamber of Commerce also highlighted the need to borrow experience from the Romanian partners: If the bicycle was invented long ago, we do not need to reinvent it. We just need to take what is good and to use it to our advantage. We have been cooperating with the Chambers of Commerce from Romania, and I would say that our seminars where we share experience are very useful. However, many also believe that from the point of view of project writing, the Romanian side profits more, which could be explained by the fact that the PHARE CBC allocations are larger than those by TACIS CBC: If we get a grant, they get three times more (a representative of the Balti Chamber of Commerce); Of course they profit more: they can implement projects of 6mln, and we have just 3mln. They receive more grants and funds (a representative of the Upper Prut Euroregion office in Edinet). Thus, one can see that the Moldovan interviewees perceive cross-border more in economic than in cultural terms and therefore tend to assign different values to the potential benefits from cross-border cooperation for the two countries. (3) Questions 615 and 616: benefits from increasing cross-border cooperation for the Moldovan and Romanian border regions, respectively Questions 615 and 616 establish strong correlations with the indicators for the institutional context (Question 5.3) and the institutional identity (Question 5.2) at the local, regional,

132 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 132 state and European levels. Yet, the largest number of correlations again is established with the indicators of historical-cultural identity. The questions concerning the cultural (Questions 359 and 412), religious (Questions 3510 and 413), and language differences (Questions 3511 and 416), as well as historical events between the two countries (Question 411), are not seen as obstacles to cross-border cooperation and the Moldovan respondents, again, demonstrate much more positive evaluations. These results again demonstrate that the Moldovan respondents, somewhat more than Romanian, share an idea about the cultural closeness between the Romanians and Moldavians across the border, which could be an important incentive for cross-border cooperation. Furthermore, when it comes to the benefits for the border regions on our side of the border, they were associated with the perceptions of the other as productive, honest, and friendly, while the benefits for the border regions on the opposite side of the border were associated with such perceptions as disciplined and similar to us. Here, one should remember that the Moldovan respondents have stronger positive perceptions of Romanians than vice versa. (4) Questions : possible impact of increasing local investments, the spillover of the local labour power across the border as well as local export and import to the regions across the border on the local socio-economic situation These six variables are grouped together as they represent the perceptions about the impact of the increasing economic interaction between the border regions. There are almost no correlations between them and the indicators for the institutional context and institutional identity, which might mean that the economic interaction goes on outside the limited of the institutionalised cross-border cooperation. When it comes to the institutional context, here the active participation of the Chambers of Commerce in cross-border cooperation is the only indicator that establishes strong correlations with all six variables for economic interaction. Furthermore, it is largely the European level institutional efficiency that seems to matter to the level of economic interaction (almost all six variables correlate only with this one indicator for institutional identity represented by Question 524). It is perhaps connected to the changes in the trade regulations resulting from Romania s accession to the EU in When it comes to the labour spillover across the border, it seems to be connected to political differences between local and regional authorities on each side of the border (Question 418). More or less all indicators for historical-cultural identity, and especially the ones about the perceptions of the other (Question 4.2), on the contrary, establish strong correlations with

133 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 133 the indicators for economic interaction, which was also the case in the Estonian-Russian case study. (5) Questions : mixed marriages, cross-border cooperation in the spheres of culture and education These three indicators for the impact of the increasing cross-border cooperation in the spheres of culture and education also correlate most strongly with the indicators for historicalcultural cross-border identity, such as cultural, religious and linguistic differences as well as perceptions of the other as honest, friendly and peaceful. When it comes to the institutional context, the cooperation both in the spheres of culture and education correlates with the active participation of the regional administration (Question 532, R =.22 and R =.43) and of the third sector and NGOs (Question 533, R =.24 and R =.33), while the cooperation in the sphere of education is linked especially strongly to the institutional at local, regional, national and European levels of governance (Questions ) with all four correlations being over.40. As for the institutional identity, here, all three indicators correlate the strongest with the indicator for the efficiency of the European level institutions (R >.30), while the cooperation in the sphere of education also seems to be connected with the local, regional and state level institutional efficiency, although to a smaller extent. Institutional and historical-cultural cross-border identities One can also compare the respondents on the Romanian and Moldovan sides as to which indicators they mentally group together. The factor analysis made separately for the Romanian and Moldovan respondents for Question 4.1 provides more insight into the comparison of the two types of cross-border identities: institutional and historical-cultural. Table 16 contains Rotated Factor Matrix made on the basis of the 70 responses from the Romanian side, while Table 17 illustrates the same based on the 70 responses from the Moldovan side. As can be seen from the two tables, the factor analysis of the same question generated three factors for the Romanian respondents and two factors for the Moldovan respondents. Within each factor I distinguish the highest items (items higher than.500 are put in Bold), and see whether they represent a group and what each group may signify. In case of Romanian respondents, the first factor seems to combine both items for culture and politics, such items as the existence of the Moldovan minority in the Romanian

134 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 134 border region (.774), language differences (.625), the existence of the Romanian minority across the border (.558) and current political relations between the two countries (.540). Such contents of the first factor may allude to the intermingling of the cultural and the political in the Romanian-Moldovan interstate relations. The second factor groups such items as historical events (.794) and cultural differences (.961) between the two countries, and therefore, it could be called a culture factor. The third factor also includes only two items: current interstate relations (.511) and the relations between the local/regional authorities across the border (.842), and thus, this factor clearly represents the politics dimension. Table 16: Romania, Rotated Factor Matrix(a) Question 4.1 : General conditions: incentives and Factor Obstacles for cross-border cooperation 1 (culture/politics) 2 (culture) 3 (politics) Q411: Historical events between the two countries Q412: Cultural differences Q413: Religious differences Q414: Existence of the Romanian minority across the border Q415: Existence of the Moldovan minority on this side of the border Q416: Language differences Q417: Current interstate relations between Romania and Moldova Q418: Relations between the local/regional authorities across the border Q419: Political differences between the local and regional authorities on both sides of the border Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. a Rotation converged in 6 iterations. In case of Moldova, the factor analysis identified two clearly defined factors culture and politics. The first factor groups such items as cultural (.877) and religious differences (.785), historical events between the two countries (.697) and the existence of both Romanian and Moldovan minorities across the border. The second factor combines the three elements of the political dimension: the current Romanian-Moldovan interstate relations (.822), political differences between local and regional authorities on each side of the border (.673) and to a lesser extent, the political relations between local/regional authorities across the border (.479). Thus, while for the Romanian respondents, the two dimensions seem to be mingled, the Moldovan respondents clearly distinguish between political and cultural dimensions.

135 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 135 Table 17: Moldova, Rotated Factor Matrix(a) Question 4.1 : General conditions: incentives and obstacles Factor for cross-border cooperation 1 (culture) 2 (politics) Q411: Historical events between the two countries Q412: Cultural differences Q413: Religious differences Q414: Existence of the Romanian minority across the border Q415: Existence of the Moldovan minority on this side of the border Q416: Language differences Q417: Current interstate relations between Romania and Moldova Q418: Relations between the local/regional authorities across the border Q419: Political differences between the local and regional authorities on both sides of the border Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. a Rotation converged in 5 iterations However, the factor analysis does not tell us much about the relative value of each group for the Romanian and Moldovan respondents, which I will find by complementing the factor analysis with comparing the means for the questions used in the factor analysis. In the case of the institutional identity, the means for political relations between the state and local/regional levels for the Moldovan respondents as well as for the relations between local and regional authorities on each side of the border are higher than those for the Romanian respondents (Question 417, means = 4.47 and 4.38; Question 418, means = 4.85 and 3.94; Question 419, means = 4.70 and 4.13, n = 73 and 72). Since Question 4.1 explores general conditions for cross-border cooperation, where the lowest value is 1, meaning a serious obstacle for cross-border cooperation and the highest value is 7, meaning an important incentive for cross-border cooperation one may say that the Moldovan respondents view political context as an incentive rather than an obstacle to cross-border cooperation, while the responses on the Romanian side are closer to the neutral 4. Similarly, the means for the indicators of the historical-cultural identity, such as the cultural differences (Question 412, means = 5.41 and 4.86, n = 73 and 72, for the Moldovan and Romanian respondents, respectively), the religious differences (Question 413, means = 5.42 and 4.69, n = 73 and 72) and the language differences (Question 416, means = 5.55 and 4.22) are much lower for the Romanian respondents than for the Moldovan respondents, which signifies that the Moldovan respondents view historical-cultural identity more as an incentive than the Romanian

136 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 136 respondents. Nevertheless, for both groups the cultural dimension provides stronger incentive for cross-border cooperation than the political dimension. As in the Estonian-Russian case study, I will now conduct the factor analysis of Questions 4.1 and 3.5 combining both Estonian and Russian respondents, and complement it with the comparison of the total means for the questions concerned. As Table 18 illustrates, two factors can be identified for Question 4.1. The first factor groups such items as cultural and religious differences, historical events between Romania and Moldova and to a lesser extent, the existence of the Romanian minority across the border. Thus, it is clear that this factor stands for the culture dimension of cross-border cooperation. The second factor includes items such as current interstate Romanian-Moldovan relations, language differences and the political relations between the local and regional authorities across the border. This factor, thus, groups the items for the political dimension for cross-border cooperation. The first factor is usually considered to be slightly more important, therefore, one could assume that in the Romanian-Moldovan cross-border cooperation historical-cultural identity plays a more important role than the institutional identity. Table 18: Romania and Moldova, Rotated Factor Matrix(a) Question 4.1 : General conditions: incentives and Factor obstacles for cross-border cooperation 1 (culture) 2 (politics) Q411: Historical events between the two countries Q412: Cultural differences Q413: Religious differences Q414: Existence of the Romanian minority across the border Q415: Existence of the Moldovan minority across the border Q416: Language differences Q417: Current interstate relations between Romania and Moldova Q418: Relations between the local/regional authorities across the border Q419: Political differences between the local and regional authorities on both sides of the border Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. a Rotation converged in 3 iterations. By looking at total means for Question 4.1 (see Table 19), one could identify which conditions the respondents in the Estonian-Russian cross-border region identified more as obstacles and which more as incentives to cross-border cooperation. One can find that none of the indicators can be evaluated as obstacles: indeed the values of all indicators are above the neutral 4. The lowest means are established for the questions on the current interstate relations between Moldova and Romania, political differences between the local and regional

137 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 137 levels of government on both sides of the border, and the political relations between the local and regional authorities across the border in a word, the factor politics. Therefore, the institutional identity can be seen as a weak incentive, but still not as an obstacle. Cultural, religious and language differences, as well as historical events between the two countries and the existence of both Romanian and Moldovan minorities are seen as relatively strong incentives to cross-border cooperation. Thus, historical-cultural identity seems to be by far the stronger incentive for cross-border cooperation. Table 19: Totals means for Question 4.1 Question 4.1 : General conditions: incentives and obstacles for cross-border cooperation N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Q411: Historical events between the two countries Q412: Cultural differences Q413: Religious differences Q414: Existence of the Romanian minority across the border Q415: Existence of the Moldovan minority across the border Q416: Language differences Q417: Current interstate relations between Romania and Moldova Q418: Relations between the local/regional authorities across the border Q419: Political differences between the local and regional authorities on both sides of the border The factor analysis made for Question 3.5 demonstrates which groups of obstacles to cross-border cooperation can be identified in the Romanian-Moldovan cross-border region. As one can see from Table 20, three factors are identified. The first factor groups obstacles of political and economic nature: corruption, security issues, unstable currency rates, inflation and unsatisfactory bank system, and to a lesser extent, political instability and historical background. The second factor refers to the obstacles of cultural character such as cultural and religious differences. Interestingly, inflation also seems to be a strong member of this group, but it also appears rather strong in the first factor. The third factor only has one strong item, the language differences between Romania and Moldova. It is not surprising, as the stress on the language differences between Moldova and Romania has turned from a cultural into a politically important issue, as an issue in itself.

138 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 138 Table 20:Romania and Moldova, Rotated Factor Matrix(a) Question 3.5: General obstacles to cross-border cooperation 1 (politicaleconomic context) Factor 2 (culture) 3 (language differences) Q351: Political instability Q352: Historical background Q353: Corruption Q354: Security issues Q355: Frequent changes in the legal framework for business and business culture Q356: Unstable currency rates Q357: Unsatisfactory bank system Q358: Inflation Q359: Cultural differences Q3510: Religious differences Q3511: Language Differences Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. a Rotation converged in 6 iterations. Table 21: Total means for Question 3.5 Question 3.2 : General obstacles to cross-border cooperation N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Q351: Political instability Q352: Historical background Q353: Corruption Q354: Security issues Q355: Frequent changes in the legal framework for business and business culture Q356: Unstable currency rate Q357: Unsatisfactory bank system Q358: Inflation Q359: Cultural differences Q3510: Religious differences Q3511: Language Differences A mere look at Table 21, illustrating the total means for Question 3.5, is enough to see which obstacles the Romanian-Moldovan respondents consider more serious. All items under the culture factor, as well as some economic indicators are considered as incentives rather than obstacles for cross-border cooperation. Indeed, the economic and cultural cooperation between Romania and Moldova has progressed more than the political relations since The means for such items as political instability, historical background, security issues and corruption all have lower values, close to the neutral 4, meaning that the

139 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 139 respondents have assessed them neither as obstacles nor as incentives for cross-border cooperation. While drawing conclusions about the Romanian-Moldovan cross-border region as a whole, one should keep in mind that there are certain differences between the respondents on each side of the border. The high standard deviations in Tables 19 and 21, demonstrate once again the indicators for historical-cultural such as for instance, cultural, religious and especially language differences have received very different scores from the Romanian and Moldovan respondents, where the latter tended to see these indicators as strong incentives, more so than the former. When it comes to the institutional identity, the political context seems to be neither a large obstacle nor an incentive. Here, one also should be rather careful with the data from the Moldovan side: as the most of the Moldovan responses tend to be much higher than the Romanian responses, even when the reality seems different, there might be a reason to believe that the people on the Moldovan side of the border are inhibited to express their negative evaluations. The in-depth interviews have demonstrated, however, that for the Romanian interviewees, the cultural factor is somewhat more important in cross-border cooperation than for the Moldovan interviewees, who perceive cross-border cooperation more in economic terms than resulting from the common historical-cultural background. Economic and cultural dimensions appear to be blurred, yet most important in the development of cross-border cooperation. As was discussed above, the institutional identity in the Moldovan-Romanian cross-border region is largely non-existent, where the Euroregion Upper Prut is largely inactive and inefficient, and the political and institutional contexts are not favourable for its future development. When asked about their perceptions of the border, most of the interviewees on both sides expressed negative feelings. The border is associated with a wall that separates, sometimes only an imaginary line, other times is real and separates communities, traditions, an army, many soldiers where everybody has to stand upright, get out of buses and cars which hurts one s dignity through attitude and behaviour, a hurdle track with hindrances, fences, formal procedures. However, on the Romanian side there already exist rather European notions of the border as a modern customs checkpoint, just a place through which one crosses the border although before it was associated with a barbed wire (a journalist from a local newspaper, Botosani). Such changes in perceptions can be most likely attributed to Romania s joining the borderless Europe. When it comes to the regional cross-border identity, it seems that it is felt more on the Moldovan than on the Romanian side: Of course there is a regional identity, much stronger

140 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 140 on the other side of the Prut River and almost unnoticeable on this side of the border (a representative of the Botosani municipality); People on both sides of the border are related and feel close to each other. Still, the Romanians living by the border do not differ from those within the country (a representative of the Botosani County Council); Probably there are more differences between Edinet and Cajul than between Edinet and Botosani (a representative of the Edinet district administration); From a historic point of view we have a lot in common. At the beginning there was Moldova, and later appeared Romania as a part of Moldova, so in fact these two zones had been a single family, a community. We have relatives, brothers and sisters who were separated in 1941 and have lived since then in different countries and of course now they want to be together (a representative of the Upper Prut Euroregion office in Edinet); I would say that these regions are indeed the regions of their own. People from these regions differ by dialect, behaviour. They celebrate some holidays, common for all the citizens, and some of the traditions differ from those in the central regions of the country (an owner of a tourist agency, the Edinet district). Most interviewees on the Romanian side said that people are largely unaware of such identity, that the border regions do not differ significantly from the rest of the country; perhaps the border has a collateral impact it completes one s identity rather than changes it (a representative of the Iasi Regional Customs Directorate). Yet, others pointed out that people in this cross-border region live in-between the two worlds since the border between has shifted continuously (according to a lecturer from the Suceava University). Some people understood the question about the cross-border identity not from the point of view historicalcultural but rather institutional identity, relating it to the efforts of the political actors and media to build up an image of the border region, yet unsuccessfully: I think that common people are aware of a special character of those living at the border although they might not have heard about cross-border cooperation as a new concept yet. This concept is used at certain levels and the public does not know what it means and how it could be applied (a representative of the Iasi Regional Customs Directorate). The availability of external funding was also mentioned in the relation to the cross-border identity: If we think about eventual advantages then it might be a favoured region there are special funds and investments. If we think in terms of borders, this region is no different from others (a representative of the Botosani Chamber of Commerce). Besides, the question of the cross-border identity seems to be linked to the political relations between Romania and Moldova: People in this border

141 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 141 region are the ones who made the flower bridges 235 in the 1990s and they were eager to meet neighbours. Currently, I think attitudes are cooler, perhaps due to political reasons (an owner of a publishing company, the Suceava county). Thus, it seems that in the border regions, the people on the Moldovan side feel somewhat more united with the Romanian border regions than vice versa. The Romanian interviewees do not differentiate as much between the border regions and the rest of their country; yet, on the whole they feel that Romanians and Moldavians belong to the same nation and that this cultural heritage is a more important motivating factor for cross-border cooperation than for example economic profit. The Romanian interviewees more often than the Moldovan interviewees perceived the cross-border identity to be of an institutional nature based on the image-making by public figures or joint projects. When it comes to the cross-border identity promoted by the Euroregion s members, or Euroregion s image-making, it is largely undeveloped: I can say that in recent time the Euroregion tries to arrange some public events, meetings that would create that different identity of the people across the borders, to unite them in a way. But this is still very slow, not much could be noticed. I cannot say that people know too much about the Euroregion, in reality nothing has been done; the work of the Euroregion is invisible (a representative of the Costesti Municipality, Moldova); Mostly representatives of local public administration and mass media are acquainted with this idea (of the Euroregion), but common citizens don t know anything. It is not known much, because no direct relations are established between people working in the Euroregion and the citizens and the economic agents (an official, the Falesti district). Aside from the actual inactivity of the Euroregion, the media in Moldova does not seem to provide a necessary coverage of the cross-border activities: People in Moldova are very poorly informed: TV is not working properly and a small number of people can afford to subscribe to a newspaper, so the information almost doesn t reach our people. And I wouldn t say that the local administration engages in spreading the information. They (Romanians) are closer to Europe and can find out everything in mass media or internet, and here even if we find out anything, it is already late (an owner of a company, the Glodeni district). 235 In 1989 and several years afterwards, there were days (mostly weekends and banking holidays) when people from both sides of the border were free to go to the neighbouring country without any documents. At first, the flower bridges served cultural purposes; it was the time when the ideas of the re-unification with Moldova s historical motherland were gaining momentum in the Moldovan society. Eventually, however, the flower bridges became to be used largely for the petty trade.

142 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 142 The Romanian county officials seem to be more active in the image-making of the Euroregion: We hold press conferences weekly. Besides, any cross-border cooperation event in Suceava is covered by regional and national mass media. There was much publicity five years ago, when we managed to abolish local taxes at border crossing. Mass media got involved met people, took interviews, which contributed to developing cross-border cooperation (a representative of the Suceava County Council). A representative of the Botosani County Council is also rather positive about the image-making of the cross-border region: Mass media is informed about all cross-border cooperation activities. We involve in cross-border cooperation businesses, the civil society, central, regional and local entities (culture, art, education, labour protection, environmental protection, hospitals, etc.). I think that the public knows quite a lot about cross-border cooperation and has repeatedly had the chance to get involved. It is obvious, however, that in Romania the image-making suffers most from the lack of the actual results of the Euroregion s activities, not due to the inactivity of the media or to the inactivity of the political actors to make the results of their work known to the public. Furthermore, there seems to be a lack of consensus among the officials involved in the activities of the Euroregion Upper-Prut, as to which Euroregional model has been used as an example for the Euroregional institution-building: some told me they were following the Western European models; others that they closely imitated the Euroregion between Romania, Hungary and Serbia, which had also been created according to the Western European models. However, the majority of the involved interviewees admitted that the creation of the Euroregion Upper-Prut has not been thought over carefully enough (a representative of the Botosani County Council). To conclude, the historical-cultural identity appears to be a much stronger motivation basis for cross-border cooperation on the Moldovan-Romanian border than the institutional identity, which is largely undeveloped due to the inefficiency of the Upper Prut Euroregion and its insufficient image-making as well as unfavourable political context of the interstate relations. Border-crossing Another important source of information is how often the respondents on both sides cross the border. Tables 22 and 23 demonstrate that on the whole, the total numbers of the respondents who crossed the border are more or less equal for the Romanian (66) and Moldovan (70) sides. More Moldovan than Romanian cross-border actors cross the border 1 to 2 times

143 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 143 (60%), while more Romanian (56%) than Moldovan respondents cross the border frequently. Thus, there is more differentiation in the case of the Moldovan cross-border actors: they cross the border either very frequently or very rarely. More Romanians than Moldavians have never crossed the border, yet these numbers are minuscule. Not many respondents on either side cross the border very frequently. From this data it seems, that although almost an equal number of respondents have crossed the border at least once, the Romanian respondents cross the border somewhat more frequently than the Moldovan respondents. Table 22: Border-crossing * country of origin Crosstabulation Number of Border Crossings country of origin Total Moldova Romania Never % 81.8% 100.0% 1 to 2 times % 39.7% 100.0% Frequently % 56.3% 100.0% very frequently % 42.9% 100.0% Total % 51.0% 100.0% Table 23: Border crossing: * country of origin Crosstabulation country of origin Total Number of Border Crossings Moldova Romania Never % 12.0% 7.5% 1 to 2 times % 30.7% 39.5% Frequently % 53.3% 48.3% very frequently % 4.0% 4.8% Total % 100.0% 100.0% What could also be interesting to find out is whether the fact how often people cross the border correlates with their responses to the questionnaire. Interestingly, the more people

144 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 144 cross the border, the less strong evaluations they seem to give for the existence of the institutional context and institutional efficiency the correlations are weak or even negative for Questions 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3. The strongest negative correlations are established between the indicator for border-crossing and the institutional context at the European level (Question 514, R = -.18), cross-border cooperation between the local and regional authorities across the border (Question 516, R = -.19), the level of participation of the regional authorities in crossborder cooperation (Question 532, R = -.22), and the institutional efficiency at the local level (Question 521, R = -.18). Besides, relatively strong negative correlations are established with the indicators for the efficiency of cross-border cooperation in the spheres of education (Question 5213, R = -.23) and for building mutual trust (Question 5214, R = -.23). The indicators for political context also establish strong negative correlations: the relations between the local and regional authorities across the border (Question 418, R = -.28) and the relations between local and regional authorities on each side of the border (Question 419, R = -. 19). Stronger negative correlations are established with Questions 611 (R = -.30) and 612 (R = -.32), asking about possible benefits from increasing cross-border cooperation for Romania and Moldova. By far the strongest negative correlations were established with the questions concerning language differences between Romania and Moldova (Question 3511, R = -.46; Question 416, R = -.37). Yet, the religious differences (Question 413, R = -.22) and perceptions of the other, such as hardworking (Question 421, R = -.23), friendly (Question 424, R = -.26), peaceful (Question 425, R = -.40), as having a positive attitude towards us (Question 4210, R = -.34) and as a part of the European culture (Question 4211, R = -.23) establish rather strong negative correlations with the indicators for bordercrossing. Therefore, the people, who cross the border more often, tend to view the institutional context as less efficient and believe the political relations at the local and regional levels to be in a poor state. Furthermore, unlike in the Estonian-Russian case study, the level of border crossing seems to be connected to the perceptions of the other and the cultural and linguistic differences: the people who cross the border more often, tend to see the language and cultural differences as larger obstacles to cross-border cooperation and they also tend to have more negative images of the people across the border (or vice versa, the people, who cross the border less often, tend to have more positive images of the other and believe the cultural and language differences to be more as incentives than obstacles to cross-border cooperation).

145 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION Conclusions The quantitative and qualitative analyses of the cross-border cooperation on the Romanian- Moldovan border may be summarised as follows: - Cross-border cooperation is evaluated as most efficient in the spheres of fighting organised crime, environmental protection and cross-border cooperation between local/regional enterprises, where the latter is seen as the primary goal of the existing cross-border cooperation institutions such as the Euroregion Upper-Prut. On the whole, however, cross-border is viewed as largely inefficient where the majority of interviewees on both Romanian and Moldovan sides believe that many opportunities are left un-used. - When it comes to the institutional context for cross-border cooperation, it can be said to be very different across the border. On the Romanian side, cross-border cooperation appears to develop in the framework of the multi-level governance, where the local and regional levels enjoy political and financial autonomy from the centre, as well as the liberty in their international and cross-border relations, and have a direct access to the European structures, such as the Association of the European Border Regions. Furthermore, the state level appears to encourage the development of cross-border cooperation and cooperates with the sub-national levels in the development of the policy frameworks (e.g. the Good Neighbourhood Program is developed in coordination with the representatives of the County Councils involved in cross-border cooperation). In Moldova, however, the local/regional level is much less powerful both politically and especially financially, where all initiatives have to be coordinated and approved by the central level. The central level, however, appears to generate more obstacles rather than opportunities for cross-border cooperation. The customs regulations as well as the future visa regime are perceived as severe obstacles for cross-border relations on both sides of the border. - The indicators of institutional cross-border identity such as the political context of Romanian-Moldovan relations at all levels of governance, the efficiency and the image-making of the cross-border institutions establish rather weak correlations with the indicators for the institutionalised cross-border cooperation. The institutional identity largely seems to be undeveloped, due to the poor efficiency of the Euroregion s activities and insufficient image-making by the public actors. The political relations between the two countries are seen as the biggest obstacle to crossborder cooperation, where the Moldovan Government is viewed as hostile to all

146 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 146 initiatives coming from Romania by the interviewees on both sides of the border. At the same time, the Romanian Government seems to prioritise the integration with the EU over the development of the Moldovan-Romanian relations. The institutional inefficiency of the Euroregion Upper-Prut is explained by the lack of funds for building up its institutional structures as well as by the lack of specialists and information. The administrative reform in Moldova has also contributed to the slowdown of the Euroregional activities. Besides, the Euroregion is largely nonparticipatory, where the dominant actors are the representatives of the regional public administration while NGOs and the representatives of business (e.g. Chambers of Commerce) are not actively involved in its activities. The main goal of the Euroregion has been defined as the development of economic relations and trade across the border. However, the local and regional authorities, especially in Moldova, have few decision powers as for the issues of customs regulations or the border-crossing regime, necessary for the development of trade. It may seem that at this point the goals are too ambitious, which results in an almost complete standstill of the Euroregion s activities. - As for historical-cultural cross-border identity, it establishes by far the strongest correlations with the indicators for cross-border cooperation at the Romanian- Moldovan border. Both sides perceive each other as one nation, with the same culture, history and language, despite the political rhetoric of the current Moldovan Government. The differences in perceptions of the other are attributed mainly to the impact of the prolonged historical separation of the two people, which resulted in minor changes in mentality and behaviour of the Moldovan people as well as in their level of development. There is a sense of the cross-border historical-cultural identity, although it is stronger on the Moldovan side and the Romanian interviewees perceive the cross-border region rather in terms of institutional identity. However, historicalcultural identity remains the strongest incentive to cross-border cooperation, although in Moldova the economic benefits appear to become somewhat prioritised over the cultural cooperation. - According to the conducted factor analysis and the evaluation of statistical data, the institutional identity, including the political context, seems to be considered if not an outright obstacle, then the smallest incentive to cross-border cooperation compared to the economic interaction or cultural similarities. At the same time, as was demonstrated by the in-depth interviews and the regional profile, the political relations

147 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 147 between the two countries are in a very poor state and often are perceived as the most severe barriers to cross-border cooperation. Being perceived as severe barriers, the indicators for the institutional identity, however, establish the weakest correlations with the most indicators for cross-border identity. Historical-cultural identity, on the other hand, is very strong and it is also one of the most important motivating factors for cross-border cooperation, especially for Romania. Therefore, one can conclude that in the case of the Romanian-Moldovan borderlands, the historical-cultural identity has played a much bigger role in the development of cross-border cooperation than the institutional identity, both when it comes to the political interstate relations, institutional inefficiency and insufficient image- making of the Euroregion Upper- Prut. 4.3 Comparison of the success of cross-border cooperation in the Estonian-Russian and Romanian-Moldovan case studies In order to assess in which case study cross-border cooperation is more successful, one could compare the total means for the indicators of cross-border cooperation in the Estonian- Russian and the Moldovan-Romanian borderlands. The first indicator for cross-border cooperation is Question 526 of the questionnaire assessing the efficiency of cross-border cooperation at the local/regional level. The total mean for this question in the Estonian- Russian case study is 3.93 (standard deviation = 1.318, n = 144), while in the Romanian- Moldovan 4.14 (standard deviation = 1.576, n = 144). The standard deviation is much higher in the second case, meaning that the responses on the Moldovan and Romanian side differ substantially. If one is to disaggregate the mean, then one can see that the Moldovan respondents evaluate cross-border cooperation as much more efficient (mean = 4.36) than the Romanian respondents (mean = 3.92), where the latter give an assessment very close to the one in the Estonian-Russian case study. Here, one should note that the Moldovan respondents give much higher assessments to most of the questions while the reality seems not as bright, which could be explained by the fact that they feel more inhibited to give negative evaluations and express criticism of the current political context and existing institutions. When it comes to the efficiency of cross-border cooperation, one could compare how efficient the respondents in the two case studies view cross-border cooperation in different spheres. Here, looking at Tables 2 and 13 demonstrating the correlations between the existing institutional framework in different spheres of cross-border cooperation and their efficiency in

148 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 148 the two case studies, one could see the in the Estonian-Russian case study the correlations are relatively higher while the means for both the institutional context in different spheres of cross-border cooperation and their efficiency are somewhat lower than in the Moldovan- Romanian case study. This may mean that in the Estonian-Russian case study, the existing institutions are generally seen as more efficient than in the Romanian-Moldovan case study. The higher means for most of the indicators in the Romanian-Moldovan case study may signify that the respondents perceive the institutional context there as more developed than the Estonian-Russian respondents. However, while in the Estonian-Russian case study there were no significant differences between the responses on different sides of the border, the Moldovan respondents again gave much higher evaluations than the Romanian respondents, with the starkest differences concerning the questions on cross-border cooperation and its efficiency in culture, education and cross-border cooperation for building mutual trust. If one is to compare the responses from the Romanian side and from the Estonian-Russian cross-border region, then one could see that the former represent lower evaluations to cross-border efficiency in all spheres than the latter. In both case studies, the institutionalised cross-border cooperation in the spheres of culture, environment, fighting organised crime is seen as most efficient. In the Moldovan-Romanian case study, the cross-border cooperation between the local/regional enterprises is seen as more efficient than in the Estonian-Russian case study. The in-depth interviews in both case studies have demonstrated that cross-border cooperation is viewed as inefficient and the use of the existing opportunities as insufficient. The main obstacles in the Estonian-Russian cross-border region include the state of political relations between the two countries, the lack of the legislative framework for cross-border cooperation as well as the inefficiency of cross-border cooperation institutions and its nonparticipatory nature (NGOs and the representatives of business are not actively involved). With the absence of strong historical-cultural identity as well as economic interaction, crossborder cooperation seems to depend mostly on the availability of external funding and the development of the institutional identity of the Euroregion Pskov-Livonia. In the Romanian-Moldovan cross-border region the main problems involve the low involvement of actors such as the Chambers of Commerce and NGOs, political relations between the two countries, lack of information and red tape connected to project implementation, as well as customs barriers and problems of border-crossing. The interviewees in the Romanian-Moldovan borderlands underline the lack of economic interaction and its primary importance to the development of cross-border relations, which

149 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 149 constitutes a major difference with the Estonian-Russian case study. There, the economic interaction is much less on the agenda of cross-border actors, where only the interviewees on the Russian side believe it should be a primary goal of cross-border cooperation. The perceived obstacles to cross-border cooperation seem to differ depending on the goals of cross-border cooperation: thus, in the Moldovan-Romanian case study problems with the customs regulations and border crossing are perceived as much more prominent than in the Estonian-Russian case study. When it comes to the indicator for cross-border cooperation represented by Questions and standing for the perceived benefits from increasing cross-border cooperation for the two neighbour countries as well as for their respective border regions, the total means in the Estonian-Russian case study were significantly higher than in the Romanian-Moldovan case study. As no surprise, in both case studies the benefits from crossborder cooperation for the border regions are perceived larger than for the respective countries. When it comes to the perceptions of the increasing economic interaction (Questions ), the total means in the Romanian-Moldovan case study are in general somewhat higher than in the Estonian-Russian case study, with starker differences in the questions about the labour spillover across the border. The increase of the local export-import across the border is, however, valued somewhat higher by the Estonian-Russian respondents, while the increase of the level of local investments is evaluated equally but less positively in both case studies. In the increasing economic interaction, thus, the export-import relations are of primary importance, followed by the increasing local investments and the labour spillover across the border, where the latter appears more important in the Romanian-Moldovan case study. When it comes to the perceived impact of increasing number of mixed marriages, here, it is evaluated much more positively in the Romanian-Moldovan case study alluding to the cultural similarities between Moldavians and Romanians (Question 438, Estonia-Russia: mean = 4.29; Romania-Moldova: mean = 5.03). The increasing cross-border cooperation in the sphere of culture is seen in equally positive terms in both case studies, while in the sphere of education it is seen much more positively in the Estonian-Russian case study (Question 4310, Estonia-Russia: mean = 5.79; Romania-Moldova: mean = 4.97). In both case studies the impact of the increasing cross-border cooperation in the spheres of culture and education is viewed in more positive terms than the impact of the increasing economic interaction, although in the Romanian-Moldovan case study the differences are less obvious. The in-depth interviews also shed some light to how the cross-border actors perceive the benefits from cross-border cooperation. In the Estonian-Russian case study, the majority

150 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 150 of the Estonian interviewees perceive the benefits from cross-border cooperation to be mutual for the Estonian and Russian sides. Only a few (predominantly Russian-speaking or business related) interviewees believe that Estonia would profit more largely from the size of the Russian market, and somewhat more interviewees believe that Russia would benefit more as it is less developed and needs to borrow experience from Estonia as well as use Estonia as a window to Europe. The majority of the interviewees on the Russian side, however, believe that it is Estonia who would benefit the most from cross-border cooperation due to the export of goods to the Russian market. The reorientation of Estonian businessmen towards the East is often seen a natural course of things since, as many Russian interviewees point out, the competition for the Estonian goods on the European market would be too strong. One could conclude that for the Russian side, cross-border cooperation is first of all associated with economic interaction, while the Estonian side views it as a means to improve the socioeconomic conditions in the peripheral border regions through the joint actions of local/regional authorities. In the Romanian-Moldovan case study, the Romanian interviewees in their majority consider the benefits from cross-border cooperation to be mutual and the main motivational basis for cross-border cooperation to be the common historical-cultural background of the Moldovan and Romanian people, followed by the need to develop economic interaction across the border. The Moldovan interviewees, however, appear much more pragmatic, believing that the development of economic relations and economic gain are the primary motivation factors in the Romanian-Moldovan cross-border cooperation, and the common historical-cultural background is of a facilitating rather than motivating nature. The majority of the interviewees on the Moldovan side believe that it would be Moldova who would profit from cross-border cooperation most due to the export of the Moldovan agricultural production to the Romanian market as well as due to the opportunities to gain access to other European companies and markets. Thus, it seems that in the two case studies the interviewees in the countries outside the EU (Russia and Moldova) view cross-border cooperation largely in economic terms, much more so than Estonian or Romanian interviewees. Therefore, the barriers to cross-border cooperation mentioned the most by the Moldovan and Russian interviewees include the unfavourable trade regulations, problems with border-crossing as well as customs restrictions. Taking into consideration all variables for cross-border cooperation as well as the information from the in-depth interviews, one can conclude that in the Estonian-Russian case cross-border cooperation can be assessed as somewhat more successful: the efficiency of the

151 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 151 existing institutions is perceived higher as well as the impact of cross-border cooperation on the two neighbouring countries and the respective border regions is perceived in more positive terms than in the Romanian-Moldovan case study.

152 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION CONCLUSIONS Following the empirical analysis, one could conclude that cross-border cooperation can be evaluated as relatively more successful in the Estonian-Russian borderlands than in the Romanian-Moldovan borderlands. This conclusion would serve as the basis for testing the proposed hypotheses of this thesis determining the importance of the multi-level institutional context and comparing the relative importance of institutional and historical-cultural identity for successful cross-border cooperation. Although one cannot draw conclusions from the comparison of just two case studies, it could, nevertheless, provide the support for the proposed theoretical model for the study of the institutionalised cross-border cooperation. When it comes to the institutional context, it appears to be equally important for cross-border cooperation in both cross-border regions: the indicators for the institutional context have established strong correlations with most indicators for cross-border cooperation (except for those for economic interaction). More precisely, judging both from the number and the strength of the correlations, the institutional context comes second in importance after the institutional identity in the Estonian-Russia n case study, and second after the historicalcultural identity in the Romanian-Moldovan case study. The situations in the two cross-border regions demonstrate a number of similarities. In Estonia and Romania the development towards multi- level governance in crossborder cooperation is most obvious: all four levels of governance are actively involved in cross-border cooperation, where the local, regional and European level institutions are assessed as most important. In Estonia, the local level appears by the most important despite the fact that the legislative basis for the foreign relations of both local and regional authorities is yet absent (the Law on Foreign Relations of the state subjects and the Local Government Act, drafted in accordance with the European Local Government Charter, is expected to be passed). In Romania, the local and regional levels enjoy political and financial autonomy, and the Local Public Administration Law No. 215 allows counties and municipalities to engage in cross-border cooperation. The central level in Romania is seen as supportive of cross-border cooperation, having initiated the idea of the Upper Prut Euroregion and cooperating with the regional and local levels in the development of the new cross-border supporting programmes such as the New Neighbourhood Programme. However, both in Estonia and Romania the central level is also sometimes believed to generate obstacles for cross-border cooperation, such as the visa regime or the lack of the legislative framework for cross-border cooperation.

153 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 153 The European level is perceived as very important especially for Estonia, where the external funding appears one of the most important motivation factors for cross-border cooperation. In Romania and Estonia, the actors of cross-border cooperation at the local/regional level maintain direct communication with the institutions and organisations at the European level, such as the AEBR. In Russia and even more so in Moldova, the institutional context appears much more centralised, where the regional level is more involved in cross-border cooperation than the local and the central level provides a number of serious constraints. The Russian Constitution does not define the powers of the local level in cross-border cooperation clearly enough; besides, the regional level has more financial and human resources for the development of cross-border cooperation. In Moldova, the local as well as regional levels are politically and financially tied to the central level, and regions have no opportunity to represent their interests in the national parliament. In both Russia and Moldova, all agreement proposals and initiatives by the regional level authorities have to be approved at the level of ministries, which results in the prolonged bureaucratic procedures slowing down the development of cross-border cooperation. Furthermore, the state level may hinder cross-border cooperation due to political reasons: for instance, the fact that Russia has not signed the TACIS Financial Agreement 2004 has meant that the Russian border regions could not participate in the first round of project proposals for the INTERREG III A in The visa regime, customs regulations and border-crossing regime are seen as much more severe obstacles in Russia and Moldova than in Estonia and Romania, and these obstacles are also considered to originate at the state level. The active involvement of the local/regional level, using the opportunities provided by the European level as well as the lessening of the constraining role of the central level have been repeatedly mentioned by the interviewees in both case studies. The institutional context of the Estonian-Russian cross-border cooperation is on the whole somewhat closer to the multi-level governance model than in the case of the Romanian-Moldovan cross-border cooperation. In Russia, there exists a legislative framework for cross-border cooperation (e.g. The Concept of Cross-Border Cooperation) and the regional level is financially and politically more powerful than in Moldova. Since the cross-border cooperation has been assessed as relatively more successful in the Estonian-Russian case study, one could therefore confirm the first hypothesis that the more levels of governance the institutional context for cross-border cooperation involves, the more successful appears cross-border cooperation.

154 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 154 The institutional cross-border identity is by definition closely related to the institutional context: if the local/regional level is strong, it generates the actors who in their turn strengthen the existing institutions through the promotion of the institutional identity. The actor s behaviour is confined to the context of the opportunities and constraints existing at all levels of governance. As it has been demonstrated, the European level provides more opportunities and the state level provides more constraints for the cross-border cooperation actors in both case studies. Yet, the actors are not simply the products of institutions; they are also able to carry out significant institutional innovations through strategic action, such as the establishment of the Euroregion Pskov-Livonia in the Estonian-Russian cross-border region on the basis of the existing institutional links across the border. Such institutional change, however, can also in part be explained by the logic of path-dependency in a wider European context. Even though the creators of the Euroregions on both Estonian-Russian and Romanian-Moldovan borders followed certain pre-existing Euroregional models, the initiative itself indicates a strategic action, albeit bound by the existing constraints. The fact that in the Romanian-Moldovan cross-border region the Euroregion Upper Prut was established following a top-down initiative of the Presidents of Romania, Moldova and Ukraine, once again alludes to the relative weakness of the local/regional level actors, and therefore, helps to explain why institutional identity is less developed and less important in the Romanian- Moldovan case study. The institutional identity in the Estonian-Russian case study has proven to establish the strongest correlations with the indicators for the cross-border cooperation. In the Romanian-Moldovan case study the situation is reverse: the indicators for institutional identity establish the weakest correlations with the indicators for cross-border cooperation. In both cases, institutional identity is largely undeveloped, yet in the Estonian-Russian case study it is believed to be much more significant for the development of cross-border cooperation than in the Romanian-Moldovan case study. The institutional cross-border identity depends on the efficiency and the public image of the Euroregions Pskov-Livonia and Upper Prut, as well as on the political context of the relations between the two countries as well as the local/regional authorities across the border. The obstacles to the development of the institutional identity are rather similar in both case studies. The Euroregion Pskov-Livonia has reached a degree of the institutionalisation, where it is established as a juridical person in of the countries involved, and it acts within the framework of the national legislation of each country involved (Estonia, Russia and Latvia), representing the most institutionalised form of cross-border cooperation at the Estonian-

155 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 155 Russian border. In the Romanian-Moldovan case, the legitimacy of the Euroregion Upper Prut is based on the agreements between the Presidents of Romania, Moldova and Ukraine. The political context of the interstate relations between Estonia and Russia, resulting for instance in the absence of the border treaty, contributes to the over-politicization of crossborder cooperation, where the latter has become a part of domestic politics in Russia, and is connected to the sphere of foreign relations in Estonia. The political relations between Romania and Moldova have been extremely cold largely due to the hostile behaviour of the Moldovan Communist Government towards Romania, resulting for instance in the absence of the basic interstate treaty. Furthermore, in the Russian-Estonia case study and to a lesser extent in the Romanian-Moldovan case study, the relations between the local/regional authorities across the border can be characterised as competitive rather than cooperative. The officials on the Russian side for instance perceive that the attraction of the INTERREG IIIA funds is a zero-sum game between on the one hand, the Estonian and Latvian sides, and on the other, the Russian side. The European level is seen as one of the major motivation factors for cross-border cooperation; yet, on the Russian side, unlike on the Estonian side, the European level is still perceived as inefficient most likely due to the fact that the Russian side cannot fully make use of the EU support due to the obstacles at the central level. The institutional cross-border identity also suffers from the poorly defined goals and inefficient institutional structures with overlapping competences, as well as to its poorly developed public image. Here, a large obstacle to the development of institutional identity seems to be the fact that the EU has not been providing financial support for the development of the administrative capacity of the Euroregions, which limits the possibilities to hire specialists, widen the activities and develop the public image of the Euroregions. Few people know about the existence of the Euroregion on the Estonian-Russian border, although there has been a continuous increase in its appearance in the mass media in the Pskov oblast. In the Romanian-Moldovan case, the majority of cross-border cooperation actors have heard about the Euroregion but are not aware of its purposes or the results of its activities, whereas the media coverage of its activities appears much more significant on the Romanian rather than Moldovan side. The Euroregions in both case studies are seen as non-participatory, which means that the political actors the local and regional authorities have not yet managed to mobilise other actors of cross-border cooperation such as NGOs or the representatives of business. In Russian and Moldova, especially, the lack of involvement of the business actors is considered as one of the major reasons for the Euroregions inefficiency, perhaps due to the fact, that the

156 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 156 Russian and Moldovan respondents and interviewees mostly associate cross-border cooperation with the development of economic relations across the border, while the Estonian view it in more realistic terms as an additional tool for improving the socio-economic conditions in the border regions, and the Romanian primarily as opportunity to preserve historical-cultural links between the Romanian and Moldovan people. In the framework of the institutionalised cross-border cooperation, one can organise business fairs and establish business info-centres, but one cannot assume it would help to eliminate the customs restrictions or establish a softer border-crossing regime as these issues remain in the power of the state and even European levels. Where the powers of the local/regional level are limited, to define the goals of cross-border cooperation primarily in economic terms (e.g. the establishment of a free trade zone in the Euroregion Upper Prut ) may seem as too ambitious a task. When it comes to historical-cultural identity, there are profound differences between the two case studies. In the Estonian-Russian case study, the indicators for historical-cultural identity establish the weakest correlations with the indicators for cross-border cooperation (while they are stronger with the indicators of economic interaction). In the Romanian- Moldovan case study, on the contrary, historical identity is leading when it comes both to the number and the strength of the correlations with the indicators for cross-border cooperation. In both cases, however, the respondents regard historical-cultural identity as an incentive to cross-border cooperation. The in-depth interviews demonstrate that even in the northern part of the Estonian-Russian cross-border region, predominantly populated by the Russianspeakers, the border has contributed to the increasing mental distance between the populations on both sides of the border: the Russian-speakers on the Estonian side view themselves as different from the Russian-speakers on the Russian side. In the southern part of the Estonian- Russian cross-border region, the people on both sides of the border view each other as culturally different, referring to the differences in religion, ethnicity and language, as well as mentality. The interviewees on the Russian side tend to view the other in slightly more positive terms than the interviewees on the Estonian side. There is no perception of the historical-cultural cross-border regional identity, and the border is seen in negative terms, as separating, especially by the interviewees on the Russian side. A significant number of the interviewees on the Estonian side, however, view the border in positive terms, having a protective function. In the Romanian-Moldovan borderlands, almost all interviewees view each other as one nation, with similar culture, history, and language, which is contrary to the political

157 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 157 rhetoric of the current Communist Government in Moldova. However, the Moldovan interviewees have somewhat more negative perceptions of the other across the border than the Romanian interviewees. The differences in perceptions of the other are attributed mainly to the impact of the prolonged historical separation of the two people, which resulted in minor changes in mentality and behaviour of the Moldovan people as well as in their level of development. There is a sense of the cross-border historical-cultural identity, although it is somewhat stronger on the Moldovan side. Historical-cultural identity remains the strongest incentive to cross-border cooperation, although in Moldova the economic benefits appear to become somewhat prioritised over the cultural cooperation. The factor analysis demonstrates that historical-identity is seen as an incentive to cross-border cooperation in both case studies, more so than the indicators for the institutional identity such as the political context and of the interstate relations and the relations between the local/regional authorities across the border. At the same time, being poorly developed in both cases, the indicators for institutional identity (the efficiency of institutions at different levels of governance as well as the political context) establish very strong correlations with the indicators for cross-border cooperation in the Estonian-Russian case study and very weak correlations in the Romanian-Moldovan case study. As for the historical-cultural identity, while it is considered as an incentive to cross-border cooperation in both cases, in the Estonian-Russian cross-border region, it is largely undeveloped and establishes weak correlations with the indicators for cross-border cooperation. In the Moldovan-Romanian case study, historical cultural identity being very strong is considered as an important incentive to cross-border cooperation, establishing very high correlations with most indicators for crossborder cooperation. Therefore, one can conclude that in the Estonian-Russian case study institutional identity seems more important for cross-border cooperation than in the Romanian-Moldovan cross-border region, and that historical-cultural identity on the contrary appears to play a much more significant role than in the Romanian-Moldovan cross-border region than in the Estonian-Russian. Taking into consideration the fact that the Estonian-Russian cross-border cooperation appears relatively more successful than the Romanian-Moldovan cross-border cooperation, without the significant supporting basis of the common historical-cultural background, one could assume that historical-cultural identity may not be a necessary condition for crossborder cooperation. Institutional identity, on the contrary, appears very significant for crossborder cooperation, being connected to the institutional context of cross-border cooperation. In the Estonian-Russian case study, where the multi-level institutional context is relatively

158 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 158 more developed and the local/regional level enjoys a larger political and financial autonomy from the centre than in the Romanian-Moldovan case study, the actors at the local/regional level appear more prone to initiate institutional change (e.g. the bottom-up initiative to establish the Euroregion Pskov-Livonia ) as well as to develop institutional cross-border identity. Following Paasi s idea on the institutionalisation of regions 236, one could envision a well developed institutional identity as the final stage of the institutionalisation process, where political actors have succeeded to develop institutional efficiency and to promote the public image of an institution, which then becomes accepted by the wider population mobilising social action. The actor s behaviour is not simply shaped by the existing institutions and identities as a sociologically influenced new institutionalism suggests; instead, actors can initiate institutional change and construct an identity, such as in the case of the Euroregions. The existence of historical-cultural identity may facilitate cross-border cooperation, providing an additional basis for the cross-border cooperation actors in the process of identity-building but does not appear to be a necessary condition for successful cross-border cooperation, as the followers of the people approaches in border studies seem to imply. Although in the Romanian-Moldovan case study there exist strong historical-cultural affinities, due to the undeveloped multi-level institutional context and the weakness of the local/regional level (especially in Moldova), there are few opportunities for the actors at the local/regional level to mobilise the existing common historical-cultural background into social action, or the actual cross-border cooperation. Thus, it appears that institutional identity is more important for successful cross-border cooperation than historical-cultural identity, which is a confirmation of the second hypothesis of this thesis. Therefore, the empirical analysis carried out in the framework of this thesis provides support to the proposed theoretical model for studying cross-border cooperation. While institutions and identity have been studied separately as different aspects of cross-border cooperation, this thesis suggests that the two should be united. Yet, the two types of identity institutional and historical-cultural should be distinguished, where the institutional identity appears to play a more significant role in the development of cross-border cooperation. The sociological new institutionalism is one of the theoretical approaches that links institutions and identity, where identities are considered endogenous, or shaped and reproduced by 236 See Paasi, A. Bounded Spaces in the Mobile World: Deconstructing Regional Identity, in Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie, Vol. 93, No. 2, 2002, p. 137; and Paasi, A. Europe As A Social Process And Discourse: Considerations of Place, Boundaries and Identity, in European Union and Regional Studies, Vol. 8, Nr.1, 2001, p. 13.

159 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 159 existing institutions. This thesis, however, proposes a somewhat more actor-centred approach, similar to the one propagated by Perkmann in his later work, making distinctions between institutions and actors, and assigning more weight to actors than the sociological new institutionalism. Actors are able to initiate significant institutional change, which cannot always be explained by the logic of path-dependency, and the creation of the Euroregions by the local/regional actors is one major example. Furthermore, actors contribute to the persistence of the created institutions through the construction of institutional identity. Indeed, when it comes to the process of regional institutionalisation, as Paasi suggests, it is first the political actors and media who create a region on paper by inventing names, defining it on the maps, and developing a public image of a (cross-border) region. Institutional identity may be considered developed when it is accepted and consumed by the wider population, mobilising social action. In other words, where people are aware of the existing institutional opportunities and identify with certain institutions, they would aim to act in order to use these opportunities. Here, the efficiency of the existing cross-border institutions as well as the political context of the interstate relations and between the local/regional authorities across the border are of extreme importance to the development of institutional cross-border identity. However, similarly to Paasi, this thesis suggests that the process of the development of institutional identity takes time, especially where the institutions, such as the Euroregions in the Estonian-Russian and Romanian- Moldovan borderlands, are relatively young. As for historical-institutional identity, it is relatively less important for successful cross-border cooperation than institutional identity. This thesis suggests that where it exists, it may in fact provide a better ground, or more tools for the local/regional actors in the development of institutional or top-down cross-border identity. By all means, historicalcultural cross-border identity facilitates the communication between the actors across the border and provides additional reasons for cooperation; yet, there could be no cross-border cooperation, if this historical-cultural identity exists only parallel to the existing institutional opportunities and institutional context and institutional identity; it needs to be mobilised by the local/regional actors into a cross-border identity. Cross-border identity, like the national identity, needs to be constructed and reproduced by political actors and media to be a basis for social action, especially since cross-border regional identity is continuously pulled away to the centre, as it essentially competes with the national identities of the two neighbouring countries.

160 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 160 Institutional identity appears to be connected to the institutional context of crossborder cooperation. According to the multi-level governance approach, where the local/regional level enjoys more political autonomy and financial capacities, as well as a direct access to the EU level opportunity structures, the local/regional actors would be more able to engage in cross-border cooperation, establishing cross-border institutions and developing institutional identity. The establishment of the Euroregion is based on the awareness of the wider political context of cross-border cooperation and the regional empowerment in the EU, and the local/regional actors become the collaborators with the EU in the establishment of Europe of Regions. Thus, institutional cross-border identity evolves through the complex interplay of local cross-border, national and European identities, produced and reproduced by actors and existing institutions at various levels of governance. Similarly to institutional identity, the institutional context of cross-border cooperation also represents the interplay of institutions at local/regional, national and European levels of governance. Following Perkmann s institutionalist analysis of cross-border cooperation, this thesis demonstrates that cross-border cooperation is more successful where all levels of governance are involved, with the local/regional level being sufficiently strong and the central level not monopolising the decision-making. However, both Russian-Estonian and Romanian- Moldovan case studies demonstrate, as more sceptical scholars suggest, that the state still retains an important role of the gate keeper, providing more constraints than opportunities for cross-border cooperation. This is especially true about more centralised countries of Central and Eastern Europe, such as Moldova and Russia. True multi-level cross-border governance depends on the interdependency between institutions and actors at different levels of governance, as well as on the existence of both vertical and horizontal networks. The empirical analysis has confirmed Perkmann s fear that the vertical networks basing on the implementation of INTERREG and TACIS CBC programmes in both case studies are much more developed than the horizontal, or topocratic, networks across the border. The main problem is the non-participatory and non-transparent nature of the cross-border cooperation institutions such as the Euroregion Pskov-Livonia and Upper-Prut : cross-border issues remain predominantly the domains of the public authorities, while the representatives of business and NGOs are not sufficiently involved. Besides, the nature of relations between the involved local/regional authorities appears to be of a competitive rather than cooperative character, where each side appears to compete for the attraction of more EU funds than the other.

161 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 161 These Euroregions remain the most institutionalised forms of cross-border cooperation in the Estonian-Russian and Romanian-Moldovan borderlands, although their goals may be poorly defined and their institutional structures may be inefficient. Here, in accordance with Perkmann s new institutionalist perspective, cross-border cooperation may be a consequence of the institutional development, and not the reason behind it, where the actors and the goals of cross-border cooperation tend to be defined and redefined as cross-border institutions develop. For instance, in the Romanian-Moldovan case study the primary goal of cross-border cooperation is the development of economic interaction across the border, and even the establishment of a free trade zone in the Euroregion. However, the attempts to introduce different customs regulations and a simplified border-crossing regime fall beyond the powers of the local/regional level, especially so in Moldova, as a result of which cross-border cooperation has stumbled. The goals of cross-border cooperation need to be redefined as to be realistic considering the institutional context of the countries involved. Although the aim of this thesis was to test the proposed theoretical model and not to conduct a policy analysis, one could also mention possible implications for the European policy on cross-border cooperation at the EU external borders. Despite their problems, Euroregions may represent the best practice of cross-border cooperation and the use of the opportunities provided by the EU supporting programmes. However, the EU may need to provide support to the process of the decentralisation in the Central and Eastern European countries in order for the local/regional level to be able to cooperate not only with the regions across the border but also directly with the European level institutions. As the idea of the Euroregion is rather novel in most EU neighbour-countries, the members of these young Euroregions should be encouraged to cooperate with the older Euroregions, especially with those created between the old and the new members of the EU, whose background may be rather similar to those at the current EU external border. Furthermore, the creation of the Euroregions should be encouraged everywhere, not concentrating on the cross-border regions with the common historical-cultural identity, as the main goal of cross-border cooperation is to diminish the socioeconomic disparities across the borders. Instead, the development of institutional identity should be supported through financial support of the administrative structures of Euroregions, who would then be able to hire specialists, cover their travel costs and improve the efficiency and the public image of Euroregions. In order to improve the horizontal networks across the border, the Euroregion Councils should include the representatives of NGOs and business, and establish joint structures for the implementation of the EU supporting programmes, which would be easier when the New Neighbourhood

162 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 162 Programme finally functions at the EU external borders. This would allow for the joint project implementation and application processes, better coordination between the actors on each side of the border, and better efficiency of cross-border cooperation institutions.

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171 INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 171 APPENDICES APPENDIX I: The map of the European Border Regions 2000 (editor: Association of European Border Regions) 16 Council for Cooperation of Border Regions Võru-Aluksne-Pskov (EE/LV/RU), the Euroregion Pskov-Livonia since Upper Prut Euroregion (MD/RO/UA)