Critical Cause Analysis of Delayed Evacuation in

Transcription

1 Critical Cause Analysis of Delayed in the Great East Japan Earth and Tsunami IRDR International Conference, Beijing 1 November, 2011 Junko Sagara CTI Engineering Co., Ltd. Japan ICHARM International Centre for Water Hazard Risk Management under the auspices of UNESCO 1

2 Forensic Investigation on Great East Japan Earth and Tsunami (GEJET) Meta & Longitudinal Analysis Characteristics of fatalities and losses Comparison with historical events Critical Cause Analysis Analysis of critical causes for human loss expansion caused by delayed Preparation of a question list for human loss vulnerability evaluation Scenario Analysis Estimation of damages and losses caused by of a similar magnitude to GEJET in central Japan. Identification of issues and proposal of measures to of an unexpected magnitude 2

3 Objectives Preliminary effort to conduct FORIN analysis of Great East Japan Earth and Tsunami. Investigate how the delay in from occurred, and how it lead to enormous human losses. Identify critical points for considering vulnerability of communities against human losses caused by delayed from. Outline 1. Overview of the Great East Japan Earth and Tsunami (GEJET) 2. Critical causes analysis of human losses due to delayed 3. Case Study of Rikuzentakata 4. Conclusion 3

4 1. Great East Japan Earth and Tsunami (GEJET) M9.0 earth occurred on March 11, 2011 at 14:46 Massive ground motion was observed throughout Japan Mega of about 1,000 year return period and subsidence led to enormous damages Complex disaster (earth,, nuclear accident) Historic Tsunami Events in the region 1897: [M8.5] 21,959 dead 1933: [M8.1] 3,064 dead or missing Seismic Intensity Japan Meteorological Agency 4

5 Overview of Damages Inundated area by :561km 2 Human casualties: 15,829 dead, 3,745 missing, 5,942 injured (as of Oct 25) Building damages: 118,790 completely destroyed, 184,343 half destroyed, 280 burned down, 10,961 inundated (above floor), 13,867 inundated (below floor) Agricultural land losses: 23,600ha Direct damages to infrastructure stock : approx trillion yen (US$200 billion, estimated by cabinet office, not including damages caused by nuclear accident) National Police Agency (As of Oct 25, 2011) 2011 White Paper on Disaster Management Fire and Disaster Management Agency (As of Sept 9, 2011) Fukushima Miyagi Iwate Higashimatsushima(1,145) Matsushima(2) Rifu(50) Shiogama(21) Tagajou(189) Taihaku ku, Sendai(53) Wakabayashi ku, Sendai(332) Hirono(0) Kuji(4) Noda(38) Fudai(1) Tanohata(31) Iwaizumi(7) Tarou(180) Miyako(362) Yamada(823) Otsuchi(1,397) Kamaishi(1,091) Ofunato(452) Rikuzentakata(1,951) Kesennuma(1,405) Minamisanriku(901) Ishinomaki(3,959) Onagawa(963) Shichigahama(71) Miyagino ku, Sendai(293) Natori(984) Iwanuma(184) Watari(270) Yamamoto(691) Shinchi(110) Soma(459) Minamisoma(663) Namie(184) Futaba(35) Okuma(81) Tomioka(25) Naraha(13) Hirono(3) Iwaki(347) Human losses in coastal municipalities Dead or Missing 1~9 10~99 100~ ~ ~ 5

6 Human Losses 92.4% of people died in Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima lost their lives due to. Crushed by buildings, etc 4.4% Fire 1.1% Tsunami was the main cause of death Tsunami 92.4% Unknown 2% 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 65% of fatalities were 60 years or older 0~9 10~19 20~29 30~39 40~49 50~59 60~69 70~79 80~ Death causes in GEJET (Iwate, Miyagi & Fukushima) Source: 2011 White paper on disaster management 0% Population of Iwate, Miyagi & Fukushima (As of Oct 2010) People killed in the GEJET (As of 8 Aug 2011) Age structure of population and people died in GEJET (Iwate, Miyagi & Fukushima) 6

7 2. Critical cause analysis of human losses due to delayed Why were so many people not able to escape from the? Strong ground motion (seismic intensity of 6 or greater) Quake occurred during the day. 30 minutes to 2 hours of time available before arrived. Tohoku region (especially Iwate) have experienced disasters repeatedly in the past Coastal levees had been constructed along much of the coast line Large attack could have been conceivable by people? actions could have been easily taken? Lessons learned in the past not effectively utilized? Misperception about safety existed (people thought disaster will never occur)? The critical points for human losses and delayed were analyzed by reviewing various reports published after GEJET. 7

8 Magnitude of Tsunami in GEJET % of people died or missing in inundated area 0~1 % 1~3 % 3~5 % 5~10 % 10 % < (Number of fatalities & missing) / (population in inundated area) Fukushima Miyagi Iwate Fire and Disaster Management Agency (As of Sept 9, 2011) Hirono(0.0) Kuji(0.1) Noda(1.2) Fudai(0.1) Tanohata(2.0) Iwaizumi(0.6) Tarou(13.5) Miyako(2.4) Yamada(7.2) Otsuchi(11.7) Kamaishi(8.3) Ofunato(2.4) Rikuzentakata(11.7) Kesennuma(3.5) Minamisanriku(6.3) Ishinomaki(3.5) Onagawa(12.0) Higashimatsushima(3.4) Matsushima(0.0) Shiogama(0.1) Shichigahama(0.8) Sendai(2.4) Natori(8.1) Iwanuma(2.3) Watari(1.9) Yamamoto(7.7) Shinchi(2.4) Soma(4.4) Minamisoma(5.0) Namie(5.5) Futaba(2.7) Okuma(7.2) Tomioka(1.8) Naraha(0.7) Hirono(0.2) Iwaki(1.1) design levee height current levee height trace height 25 (m) Tsunami height exceeded twice the height of coastal levees Tarou: levee height 10m, height 15.5m, runup height approx. 38m Otsuchi: levee height 6.4m, height 12.9m Rikuzentakata: levee height 6.15m, height 16.4m Onagawa: levee height 4.4m, height 15.9m levee height and trace height near the levee in front of the coastal cities and towns were plotted from the maps produced by the Tohoku regional bureau of MLIT. 8

9 Effectiveness of Structural Measures Structural measures proved to be effective and protected lives in certain areas Hirono, Iwate Fudai, Iwate Coastal levee (T.P.+12.0m)was higher than the height ( runup height T.P.+9.5m) City located far from the coast was protected by the gate. No inundation Inundated area Town center Fudai Gate Levee height T.P.+12.0m Tsunami height T.P.+9.5m Fudai Gate Upstream of the gate Inundation height near the gate T.P.+22.6m Estimated overflow depth 7.2m Gate height T.P.+15.5m Source: The Expert Panel on Earth and Tsunami Countermeasures in Light of the Lessons Learned from the 2011 Tohoku Pacific Ocean Earth 9

10 Effectiveness of Structural Measures The greater the height compared to the levee height the greater the human losses. Many other factors influenced the extent or severity of human losses. % human loss in inundated area 16% 14% 12% 10% 8% 6% 4% 2% 0% Taro Tsunami height Levee height (m) Otsuchi Rikuzentakata Onagawa Tanohata (urban center located far from the coast) levee height and trace height near the levee in front of the coastal cities and towns were plotted from the maps produced by the Tohoku regional bureau of MLIT. % Human loss based on the data announced on Sept by the Fire and disaster Management 10 Agency

11 Flow of Human Losses due to delay in Flow of human losses due to delay in in case of to identify the critical points for human loss expansion. Fundamental action to be taken by people Critical Point 1 Immediate recognition of necessity to evacuate Warning Critical Point 2 Accurate warning/ information Warning not Evacuated self judged info reactive follow others Critical Point 3 actions Did not evacuate Arrived at Critical Point 4 Obstacles during Did not arrive at shelter not stricken by Critical Point 5 Safety of shelter stricken by Escaped from Critical Point 6 Detection of danger and progressive Caught by 11

12 CP1 Immediate recognition of necessity to evacuate Critical Point 1 Immediate recognition of necessity to evacuate Evacuated self judged About half of the people who survived evacuated immediately after the earth. Evacuated only after noticing that was approaching Did not evacuate (already in safe area) Evacuated after completing other actions Immediately evacuated Timing of Source: The Expert Panel on Earth and Tsunami Countermeasures in Light of the Lessons Learned from the 2011 Tohoku Pacific Ocean Earth 12

13 CP1 Immediate recognition of necessity to evacuate Critical Point 1 Immediate recognition of necessity to evacuate Evacuated self judged Even among those who survived, many were not aware of risks. People who evacuated only after noticing that was approaching didn t evacuate immediately because didn t occur in past earths or never came up to their mind 1 In Miyagi, about half of the people survived thought wouldn t come or didn t think about. Only 4% had seen hazard maps. 2 Source: 1: The Expert Panel on Earth and Tsunami Countermeasures in Light of the Lessons Learned from the 2011 Tohoku Pacific Ocean Earth 2: Survey Research Center 宮城県沿岸部における被災地アンケート May

14 CP1 Immediate recognition of necessity to evacuate Critical Point 1 Immediate recognition of necessity to evacuate Evacuated self judged Because the occurred during the day, many were away from home. Instead of evacuating people went searching for their family members. Many of the people that didn t immediately evacuate were out of their homes. Instead of evacuating they went back home or went out to look for their families. 1 The disaster occurred during the day time when family members were scattered. People worried about the safety of their family and moved immediately to get together with their family members. 2 Source: 1: The Expert Panel on Earth and Tsunami Countermeasures in Light of the Lessons Learned from the 2011 Tohoku Pacific Ocean Earth 2: Survey Research Center 宮城県沿岸部における被災地アンケート May

15 CP1 Immediate recognition of necessity to evacuate Risk or danger of and necessity to evacuate not recognized by all people. Many prioritized actions to search for their family members over. Disaster education in schools proved very effective. Critical Point 1 Immediate recognition of necessity to evacuate Evacuated self judged 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% Disaster education and procedures in schools proved to be very effective, saving lives of school children. % Human loss in inundated area 60% Miyako 0% Ofunato Rikuzentakata Kamaishi Otsuchi Yamada Iwate Very small human loss rate in ages of 5 to 14 0~4 5~9 10~14 15~19 20~24 25~29 30~34 35~39 40~44 45~49 50~54 55~59 60~64 65~69 70~74 75~79 80~84 85~89 90~94 95~99 100~ Source: 1: The Expert Panel on Earth and Tsunami Countermeasures in Light of the Lessons Learned from the 2011 Tohoku Pacific Ocean Earth 2: Survey Research Center 宮城県沿岸部における被災地アンケート May

16 CP2: Accurate information Accurate and most up to date warning information was not for many people due to power outage, etc. Underestimated preliminary forecast lead to misconception that it is safe. Critical Point 1 Immediate recognition of necessity to evacuate Warning Critical Point 2 Accurate warning/ information Warning not Evacuated self judged Average time required to obtain warning or advisory was 16.4 minutes. 1 In prone areas 13% did not know that warning was announced. 1 Many of usual communication methods became in due to power outage, overwhelmed phone lines, etc 2 Underestimated preliminary forecast was misinterpreted as safe. 3 Due to power outage, updated information was not. 3 Source: 1 weathernews Survey Results of Great East Japan Earth and Tsunami (April 2011) 2 Crisis and Environment Management Policy Institute Preliminary Report on the Survey on Tohoku Pacific Ocean Earth and Tsunami (May 2011) 3 Japan Meteorological Agency Issues with regard to improvement of warning (June 2011) 16

17 CP3: actions warnings and advices by neighbors and families triggered actions for many people. Critical Point 1 Immediate recognition of necessity to evacuate Warning Critical Point 2 Accurate warning/ information Warning not Evacuated self judged info reactive follow others Critical Point 3 actions Did not evacuate In average it took 17 minutes to begin. Almost 80% evacuated with others, 53% with their family members. 1 Among people who heard warnings clearly from disaster management radio, 70 to 80% felt the necessity to evacuate. 2 Many people lost their lives while convincing or guiding other people to evacuate, including over 300 fire and disaster department staffs, fire fighters and police officers delivering warnings or guiding. 3 Source: 1: The Expert Panel on Earth and Tsunami Countermeasures in Light of the Lessons Learned from the 2011 Tohoku Pacific Ocean Earth 2: Survey Research Center 宮城県沿岸部における被災地アンケート May : Fire and Disaster Management Agency, National Police Agency 17

18 CP4: Obstacles during Critical Point 1 Immediate recognition of necessity to evacuate Warning Critical Point 2 Accurate warning/ information Warning not Evacuated self judged info reactive follow others Critical Point 3 actions Did not evacuate Arrived at Critical Point 4 Obstacles during Did not arrive at Many evacuated using cars and got trapped in traffic. 60% evacuated by cars and 1/3 were caught in traffic. 1 Many used cars because they thought otherwise they wouldn t make it, or they wanted to evacuate with family members. 1 In Miyagi, many people older than 60 or women used cars. Among those caught in traffic, only 7.3% changed the mean of transportation. 2 Source: 1: The Expert Panel on Earth and Tsunami Countermeasures in Light of the Lessons Learned from the 2011 Tohoku Pacific Ocean Earth 2: Survey Research Center 宮城県沿岸部における被災地アンケート May

19 CP4: Obstacles during Use of cars during caused traffic congestion and many got trapped. Pre installed emergency routes in schools proved very effective. Critical Point 1 Immediate recognition of necessity to evacuate Warning Critical Point 2 Accurate warning/ information Warning not Evacuated self judged info reactive follow others Critical Point 3 actions Did not evacuate Arrived at Critical Point 4 Obstacles during Did not arrive at routes played big role in securing safety of people, especially school children. Emergency route from the second floor of Okirai Elementary School Emergency route from Omoto Elementary School to national route highway Source: Asahi Newspaper Iwaizumi Town Paper (April 2011) 19

20 CP5: Safety of Safety (location and structural) of was insufficient in some cases Critical In 11 Point cities 1of Iwate prefecture 48 Arrived at Immediate recognition of Evacuated necessity to evacuate out of 411 were inundated. 1 self judged info reactive Critical Point 4 In Onagawa Town, reinforced concrete Obstacles follow others buildings often used as during Warning were collapsed Critical from Point the 3 foundation. 2 actions Critical Point 2 Accurate warning/ information Warning not Did not evacuate Source: 1 Kahoku Shinpo (April 14, 2011) 2 Japanese Society of Civil Engineers Emergency Investigation Group Report Did not arrive at shelter not stricken by Critical Point 5 Safety of shelter stricken by 20

21 CP6: Detection of danger and progressive Many evacuated to safer location regardless of the designated. Critical Point 1 Immediate recognition of necessity to evacuate Among those who evacuated from in Miyagi, 60.8% evacuated from the primary Arrived at Evacuated shelter to the next. Among them 55.5% said the self judged first shelter was stricken by. 1 info reactive Critical Point 4 Obstacles follow others For most people primary during Warning Critical shelter Point was 3 publicly designated shelter such as community actions Did not arrive centers and schools. About at 40% moved further to evacuate to higher elevation or safer facilities. 2 Critical Point 2 Accurate warning/ information Source: Warning not Did not evacuate 1: The Expert Panel on Earth and Tsunami Countermeasures in Light of the Lessons Learned from the 2011 Tohoku Pacific Ocean Earth 2: Survey Research Center 宮城県沿岸部における被災地アンケート May 2011 shelter not stricken by Critical Point 5 Safety of shelter stricken by Escaped from Critical Point 6 Detection of danger and progressive Caught by 21

22 Check List to assess Human Loss Vulnerability Accurate information Evacuated Self judged Info reactive Following others Arrived at shelter was not stricken by Escaped from CP1: Immediate recognition of necessity to evacuate CP2: Accurate warning/info Accurate information not CP3: actions Did not evacuate CP4: Obstacles during Did not arrive at CP5: Safety of shelter stricken by CP6: Detection of danger and progressive Caught by Is the risk of recognized from past disasters or hazard maps? Are methods of safety confirmation among family members ensured? Are there ways to disseminate warnings or information? Are there ways to disseminate information at once? Is information during power outage? Is information disseminated received/understo od by people appropriately? Are there community efforts to promote among neighbors? Is the safety of officers providing guidance ensured? Is the route safety ensured? Are people aware of the location of? Are located in ways so that people can walk to? Are there emergency routes secured that ensure immediate to higher elevation? Is the safety of shelter ensured (height & structural safety)? In flat areas far from hills, are there safe (such as buildings) designated? Are people provided with disaster education to evacuate to safer places regardless of designated? Can the real time information be obtained to detect danger early?

23 3.Case Study of Rikuzentakata City Approx. 2,000 persons (10% of total population) are dead or Population missing in Rikuzentakata Rikuzentakata Buildings destroyed 3,159 Dead and missing 2,191 Inundated area 1,300ha Population in inundated area 16,640 # households in inundated area 5, Population Population in inundated area dead dead or missing Fatalities ~4 5~9 10~14 15~19 20~24 25~29 30~34 35~39 40~44 45~49 50~54 55~59 60~64 65~69 70~74 75~79 80~84 85~89 90~94 95~99 100~ unknown 0 Rikuzentakata City Hall Rikuzentakata City Hall was devastated by Red :Inundated Area Tsunami submerged up to 4 th floor

24 Flow of Human Losses in Rikuzentakata Warning Evacuated self judged info reactive follow others Lack of awareness regarding risks lead to delay in. Escaped shelter not stricken by from Only 33 out of 180 immediately Arrived at evacuated. Out of 33 only 1 died. 1 Among those who didn t immediately evacuate half didn t think would arrive to their location 1 shelter Among 147 that stricken didn t by immediately evacuate 1/3 (42) died. 1 Did not arrive at Caught by Source: 1: 陸前高田市における東日本大震災大津波襲来時の住民行動 - 将来の防災へ向けて ICHARM, UNESCAP Did not evacuate Warning not 24

25 Flow of Human Losses in Rikuzentakata Safety of Evacuated was not secured. Warning not self judged Examination of bodies info reactive indicated that many had finished follow others or were in the midst of. 2 Warning Number of designated were located within the inundated area and many died at the. 1 Out of 68 primary 35 were inundated by. 2 Did not evacuate Source: 1: 陸前高田市における東日本大震災大津波襲来時の住民行動 - 将来の防災へ向けて ICHARM, UNESCAP Arrived at Did not arrive at shelter not stricken by shelter stricken by Escaped from Caught by City Gymnasium was a designated center but was inundated to 14m depth. 100 persons evacuated to this facility and most of them lost their lives. 25

26 Flow of Human Losses in Rikuzentakata 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% Human loss of younger generations Evacuated could be explained by the fact that many lost their lives at self judged upon completion of % Human loss in inundated area 60% Miyako 0% Warning Ofunato Rikuzentakata Kamaishi Otsuchi Yamada Warning not Iwate info reactive follow others High % human loss of younger generations in Rikuzentakata Did not evacuate 0~4 5~9 10~14 15~19 20~24 25~29 30~34 35~39 40~44 45~49 50~54 55~59 60~64 65~69 70~74 75~79 80~84 85~89 90~94 95~99 100~ Arrived at Did not arrive at shelter not stricken by shelter stricken by Escaped from Caught by 26

27 Critical Causes for Human Losses in Rikuzentakata Lack of awareness regarding risks Hazard maps Urban development in areas of high risks Inappropriate designation of 27

28 4.Conclusion The critical causes for human losses vary depending on the physical settings and social characteristics of the communities, and the extent of prevention/preparedness measures (both structural and non structural). The current FORIN template is useful in obtaining the in depth and exhaustive picture of the phenomenon of the disaster and its impact. But to do this in full scale it would require much time and resources. In order to identify critical causes or bottlenecks for certain area, utilization of hierarchical check list as prepared in this study could be useful. An investigation sheet consisting of check list can be prepared for different entities (administrator, community, general public, etc. ) to measure their vulnerability against disasters. Such tool could assist identifying weakness or necessity for future measures. 28

29 Thank you very much 29

30 Example of human loss vulnerability review sheet (municipality) CP1: Immediate recognition of necessity to evacuate Accurate information CP2: Accurate warning/info Accurate information not Evacuated Self judged Info reactive Following others CP3: actions Did not evacuate Arrived at CP4: Obstacles during Did not arrive at shelter was not stricken by CP5: Safety of shelter stricken by Escaped from CP6: Detection of danger and progressive Caught by Is a hazard map being prepared? Are there programs implemented to enhance disaster awareness of residents? Is disaster awareness education provided at schools? Are there ways to disseminate warnings or information? Are there ways to disseminate information at once? Is information during power outage? Is a hazard map being prepared appropriately? Are there programs implemented to enhance disaster awareness of residents ( drills, etc)? Is disaster awareness education provided at schools? Is information disseminated received/understo od by people appropriately? Are there community efforts to promote among neighbors? Is the safety of officers providing guidance ensured? Is the route safety ensured? Are people aware of the location of? Are located in ways so that people can walk to? Are there emergency routes secured that ensure immediate to higher elevation? Is the safety of shelter ensured (height & structural safety)? In flat areas far from hills, are there safe (such as buildings) designated? Are people provided with disaster education to evacuate to safer places regardless of designated? Can the real time information be obtained to detect danger early?

31 Additional Suggestions to FORIN Question List In the GEJET many infrastructure services were impacted in enormous scale. Propagation of damages among infrastructure and its impact to socio economic activities are critical issue. By knowing critical points in damage propagation, effective measures could be implemented to mitigate propagation of damages and to minimizing extent of impacts. Further questions could be added to the FORIN Questions List. What were the consequences of breakdown or malfunctioning of infrastructure networks (e.g., electricity, water supply, sewerage, transportation, communication, health services, educational services, etc)? How did the effect on an infrastructure network propagate to another infrastructure network? How were the economic activities of the affected area impacted and how did it propagate to other areas/regions? What actions were taken in order to compensate the infrastructure or service network failure. How were the infrastructure or service networks restored? 31